People v Gaudia (offer of compromise; res inter alios acta) On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy
On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio
There can be no greater violation of a person’s right to feel safe and secure than the crime of rape. When one
commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that person’s body; more importantly, he
defiles that person’s mind. When the victim is a little child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a
bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints
and sinners alike, even to the most salacious ruffian.
Before us is the Decision1 dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del
Sur, finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia2 guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the penalty of death,
and ordering him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of
suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that
on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) 3and Kimberly (1 year old)4 at their
house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs’ food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was
working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not
find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of
Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out
Remelyn’s name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, "Ma, I am here," from a
grove of ipil-ipil trees.5 Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some
thirty (30) meters from their house.6 She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs
spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was
oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she
found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyn’s private organ.7
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack
doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the
appellant.8 The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyn’s vagina, and told
Amalia, "Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped."9 At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor,
came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn. 10 At this
point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, "Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are
willing to pay the amount of ₱15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed."11 Police officers came and
brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalia’s statement was taken.12
Hernane, the municipal health officer,13 conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and made the
following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried blood are
(sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 o’clock (sic) are noted
with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not extending to the perineum. No
lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child cry. (sic)
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.14
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as
the penis of a man.15
On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. 16 Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had told
her "Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos."17 (Meaning "crazy lendoy he forced me" in the Visayan dialect.)
Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, "Ma, Lendoy is
crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees."18
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyn’s neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik
testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering
at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant
carrying a small girl in his arms.19 He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia
Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.20
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had been
raped. He proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for examination.
Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the
crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud 21 and the other tanods of the incident. They
were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the police the information that appellant was in
Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took appellant for investigation. 22
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at
about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National Elections.
With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and
repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellant’s aunt, to ask for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish
composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina,
alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place
where Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen. 23 They
reached Catalina’s place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and
appellant’s parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of
the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997), appellant and Dodo Malon
went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in
Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated.24 He claimed that it was Daylen
and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex "Totong" Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March
1997, at about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they went home to
appellant’s house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalina’s
house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and her 3-year old grandchild
Daylen.25 Catalina’s daughter directed them to the place where she was gathering tuba. As Daylen was
crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished
gathering tuba, the four of them – appellant, Totong, Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to
Catalina’s house for the vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellant’s house where they spent the
night.26 Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day, and left appellant’s house. Totong came to know of
appellant’s arrest the following day.27
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellant’s story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she was
gathering tuba, at a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest child and
Daylen, her grandchild, at her house.28 At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong arrived. Appellant was
carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong
went to the former’s house, had a drinking spree, and then parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night,
according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was looking for
Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at the house of Catalina’s younger sister, which is located
across the river, about 4 kilometers away.29
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the
crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was
sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as
moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
30
In his Brief to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic)
GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.31
The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik
that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove,
some 130 meters from her house.32 As a neighbor and relative of Remelyn’s stepfather, Mik had sufficient
familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the
victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalia’s testimony that Remelyn emerged
naked from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and
walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyn’s private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-
like substance.33
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyn’s statement to her mother that it was
appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove34 and forced her to do something against her will.35
There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the
Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal
lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned
circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant contends,
first, that Tulon Mik’s testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the husband of
Amalia.36 He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw
him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for
Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the
fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains
that the accusation of flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents
as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken against him, 37 while the offer of compromise he allegedly
made to Amalia’s husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being
hearsay.38 Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano should not be
counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence.
We reject appellant’s arguments.
First, appellant’s attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by
affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to one of the parties,
without a showing of any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the
witness.39 In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive for Mik to testify adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik
for failing to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the inadvertence. He said his
own child was down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying home. 40 For this same reason, he
revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of
Remelyn’s fate. But thereafter, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the barangay chairman. 41 As a
barangay kagawad, he also assisted in the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.42 These
subsequent actions strengthen Mik’s credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Mik’s narration of the events over the testimonies of Cabano and
Loyola. It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of the testimony of a witness
and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty
circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could alter the result of the judgment rendered. In
the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost
credibility to Mik’s testimony. Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial
judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not. 43 The
trial court found Mik’s testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have no
reason to reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he sexually
molested her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, "Crazy Lendoy forced
me."44 Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she could not be expected to have a
comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make
the "perfect victims". They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches
children that adults are to be respected. The child’s age and developmental level will govern how much she
comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand
what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not
understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon
in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited
vocabulary.45 The fact that Remelyn called appellant "Buang" or crazy shows that he did something which
she knew was not right or proper. By saying "iya kong lugos," Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her
to do something bad. With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that
she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the
word "rape" in Visayan parlance.
Appellant’s charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to
his guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither will it affect the
penalty or the award of damages rendered against him.
Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to
Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against him by the
trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by
appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia
who testified as to the alleged offer,46 and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired
at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal
knowledge or perception.47 The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia
may have been the subject of testimony48 of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet,49 the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party
to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the
mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these
errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Appellant’s defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim that it
was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at the
place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant
carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and
the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house,
raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m.,
he could then have returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC
office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the
witnesses’ narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina was gathering tuba, his
time of arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and appellant actually parted ways, are not mere
trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses because of the passage of time. To make matters worse,
the appellant’s testimony was, at times, contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the
conflict between appellant’s statement that Totong had already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997
and Totong and Catalina’s own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellant’s house. These
contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellant’s tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information states that
appellant, "by means of force and intimidation…willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (had) carnal
knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice."50 (emphasis
ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven years old when she was violated.
Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced
seven new attendant circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape,
punishable by death. We again stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
information to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. 51 The main
purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of
its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. 52
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that when there is a
finding that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory. 53 If the death
penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be ₱75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled to
₱50,000.00 for each count of rape.54 Thus, the appellant is ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.55

We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim has suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such an award.56

We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant as proper
because complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against her was committed
with the aggravating circumstance57 of age. However, the amount awarded must be reduced to ₱25,000.00 in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.58

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del
Sur in Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of simple
rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to complainant
Remelyn Loyola the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Constantino v Heirs of Pedro Constantino (Judicial Admission)
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 31
May 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329, which reversed the 27 October
2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos City, Bulacan, in a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 &
1002655, With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-
99.
The facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to be
proportionally subdivided among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of
land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
208143consisting of 240 square meters situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his
death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the
grandfather of the respondents; 2) ANTONIA CONSTANTINO, who later died without issue; 3) CLARA
CONSTANTINO, who also later died without issue; 4) BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by his
6 children including petitioner Casimira Constantino-Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is
survived by his daughter Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by his five (5)
children which includes petitioner Oscar Constantino.4
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great
grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint 5
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of
Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10
August 1992,6Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-10022 (02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax
Declaration No. 208149in the name of Pedro Sr.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of
ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of
respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon verification, respondents learned that a Tax
Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner Oscar Constantino and his cousin Maxima
Constantino was unlawfully issued, which in effect canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the name of their
ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated,
fabricated and fictitious document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the
petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that
subsequently, the subject land was divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima resulting in the
issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265310 in the name of Oscar, with an area of 120sq m and the
other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02652.11 The share of Maxima
was eventually conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira in whose name a new Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-0265512 was issued.
Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as the Tax Declarations
that were issued on the basis of such document.
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr., upon his
death, left several parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered by Tax Declaration
No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq m also situated at Sta. Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an agricultural land with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or
less. The petitioners claimed that the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the 240
sq m lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and
among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the
respondents’ lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred to them as evidenced by
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver14 dated 5 December 1968,executed by Angelo
Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes
Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed, respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion
of other heirs, the parcel of land with an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were "the only
legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed that in the manner similar to the assailed
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot
without damage to the respondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the
issuance of Tax Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr., including the
petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no longer share and participate
in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered by the "
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and
admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision 16 in favor of the respondents finding that:
As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968 (Exh. "2")
executed by the heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and the subsequent
execution of another deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" dated August 10, 1992
(Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno Constantino, also other sons of Pedro Constantino,
Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of ANTONIA, CLARA, and EDUARDO
CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the
law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367
SCRA 559). Parties who are equally guilty cannot complain against each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45
SCRA 213.)
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code whereby
every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, is the legal maxim that "he who comes to court to
demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina
Cailipan, are not parties or signatories to the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5,
1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro Constantino, Jr. They areconsidered "privies" to said deed,
and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See: Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400). In other words, they
are "PRIVIES IN ESTATE". (Correa v. Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703).
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA 357). They
are estopped to share in the real property subject matter of this case. In fine, they are not entitled to the
reliefs prayed for.1âwphi1 (Communication Materials & Design, Inc. v. CA, 260 SCRA 673).
With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against defendants in their Complaint and
counterclaim for damages by defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are hereby dismissed
for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and disquisition, the deed denominated as "Pagmamana
sa Labas ng Hukuman" of August10, 1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02653 in the name of Oscar
Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 in the name of Casimira C. Maturingan (from
Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for nullification thereof with
damages is hereby DISMISSED.17
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising,
among others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari delicto" in declaring the
validity of the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the
"Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed covering the 192 sq mlot
actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. The CA rationated in this wise:
The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5
December 1968 among the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and Mercedes is a property
belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is a typographical error in that the name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently
typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the reading of the document that a typographical error was
committed because the four (4) children of PedroJr. by Felipa dela Cruz were specifically identified. Further,
during the presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6)
legitimate children namely: Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo 19 and Pedro Jr. had four
(4).20
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot
unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the document
entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968 pertains to a different property and is
valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in
pari delicto.
The Issue
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the propriety of the
application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Likewise assailed is the erroneous disregard by the CA of
stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of in pari
delicto was based.
Our Ruling
Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a
crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement
has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto. 21 Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a
controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and it shall leave the
parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and
"in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis."22
When circumstances are presented for the application of such doctrine, courts will take a hands off stance in
interpreting the contract for or against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the case of Packaging Products
Corporation v. NLRC,23 where this Court pronounced that:
This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or respondent because we are asked to interpret and
enforce an illegal and immoral arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of the Civil Code).
Kickback arrangements in the purchase of raw materials, equipment, supplies and other needs of offices,
manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and pervasive that nobody seems to know how to
eliminate them. x x x.
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari delicto. Neither one may expect positive relief
from courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave them as they were at the
time the case was filed.24
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the
Civil Code, which state that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other,
and both shall be prosecuted.
xxx xxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue
of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;
xxx xxx.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal offense under
Article 1411. Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although such provision which is part
of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks of contracts in general, as well as contracts which are null and
void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code – such as the subject contracts, which as claimed,
are violative of the mandatory provision of the law on legitimes.
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they separately executed deprived each other of
rightful shares in the two lots subject of the separate contracts – that is, if the two (2) parcels of land subject
matter thereof, form part of the estate of the late Pedro Sr.
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman" which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an underlying agreement with the
other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr. and grandmother of respondents. 25 The
agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the 192 square meters lot subject matter of the "Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968 as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr.,
Petitioners respected such agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein
respondents, were not disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs
of Pedro Jr. were said to have acquiesced26 to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and the underlying
agreement and therefore they have no recourse or reason to question it taking cue from the doctrine of in
paridelicto. This was the basis of the trial court’s findings that respondents are now estopped from claiming
otherwise.27
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding the validity of the contract denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based on pari delicto, is also
incorrect.
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that Article 1412 of the
Civil Code that breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract
with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a criminal offense. It applies to contracts which are
void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts rendered void for being simulated, 28 or those in
which the parties do not really intend to be bound thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve the
parties in one contract who are both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action against each
other.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the portions of the
estate of an ancestor common to them and another set of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves
portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the
signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in
reality, an assignment of specific portions of the estate of Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful partition of
estate as both sets of heirs intended to exclude the other heirs.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only by the fact
that two deeds, not one contract, are involved, but because of the more important reason that such an
application would result in the validation of both deeds instead of their nullification as necessitated by their
illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is
nothing but a void agreement. Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; morals, good customs, public order or public
policy;
xxx xxx xxx
Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being void and in existent, it has, as a
consequence, of no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and which
cannot be validated either by time or ratification.29
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be attributed to them or
that they are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the supposed unlawful agreement
entered into between Maria Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-interest, and the other heirs, including
petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any
binding effect to them. Respondents argued and set forth as an issue during the trial that they were not
signatories to any of the contract or privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that
respondents are successors-in-interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver who was also allegedly in agreement with the petitioners.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum. By the term
"privies" is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to
the said action.30 This Court, in Correa v. Pascual,31 had occasion to explain that "privity in estate denotes
the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote
vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question
by purchase; one who takes by conveyance." In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right
from and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors,
respondents’ situation is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 32 reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz33 where this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by
the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an
indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the judgment against his predecessor.34
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to
respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver,
referred to a property owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this case.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanums’s statement that the parcel of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., their
common ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to the
respondents’ claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in the Deed. The basis for the CA’s
conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of their children, which the CA considered as
proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the
petitioners, the mention of the names of the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof
that the subject of the deed is the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only
the children of Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents
during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534
consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr.35
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-trial is hereunder quoted,
thus:
Respondents’ admissions:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was
transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11,
Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro
Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was transferred to respondents’ mother,
the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in one of the issues submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was
included: "Whether or not the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the
plaintiffs, thus curing the legal infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"36 – an issue
earlier mentioned.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases
is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the
action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., 37 this
Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become
binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. 39 (Highlighting ours)
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from
the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. 41 (Citations omitted)
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a caveat for the
rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions – for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the
course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the pre-trial can still be taken up.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded.1awp++i1 Upon the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the
conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or
admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the
order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding
conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two
exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is
shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission
by denying that he made such an admission.42
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While
denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on
the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr. A portion of
her testimony43 is hereto reproduced as follows:
"ATTY. DOMINGO:
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of land also
situated at Sta. Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square meters?
defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are,
does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied)46 As held in De Leon v. CA:47
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule expressed
in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis," which
refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are does not apply in this
case.
xxx xxx xxx

A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our property owned by Pedro Constantino, Jr. that was
inherited by my mother Maria Constantino.
Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that parcel of land, the one that you mentioned a
while ago?
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e amin." (Highlighting ours)
The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declarationunsupported by evidence. This renders
conclusive the stipulations made during the pre-trial conference. Consequently, respondents are bound by
the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right over the property subject matter thereof.
Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heir’s
right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate our ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, 44 disposing
that:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favour
of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented
therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting
ours)
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the
pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws, positive relief should be
granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was
before the transaction was entered into.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws as contemplated by the parties
in the instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any circumvention of the law cannot
be48countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby
REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver are hereby
declared void without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr. with the full
participation of all the latter's heirs.
SO ORDERED.

Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate, the case of Segura v.
Segura,45elucidated thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far
as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only partition. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under
the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not
correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from
its execution x x x.

In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari delicto rule,
expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto potior est condition
Doldol v People (implied admission)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to set aside a Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 12 April 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46502
declaring that the petitioner, Dolores Granada, is not an agricultural lessee of the subject land and may be
ejected therefrom. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, reversed the Decision[2] of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated 11 July 1997 in DARAB Case No. 0564.
The petition at bar arose from a Petition for Status Quo with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction, filed on 8 November 1989 before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
in Bacolod City and docketed as DARAB Case No. 379, wherein petitioner sought to prevent respondent
Border Machinery and Heavy Equipment Co., Inc. (BORMAHECO) from ejecting her from a parcel of land,
with an area of 2.5 hectares and with 300 coconut trees growing on subject property. The subject property,
owned by the respondent, is situated at Lot No. 641-A, Punta-Taytay, Bacolod City, registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27970, under the name of the respondent.[3]
Petitioner alleges that as early as 1950, her father, Alfredo Granada, was the agricultural lessee of
the subject property, which was then owned by Augusto Villarosa. When Augusto Villarosa sold the subject
property to respondent in 1965, she claims that Alfredo Granada continued to occupy the subject property as
an agricultural lessee until his death in 1981. Thereafter, petitioner succeeded to her fathers rights as an
agricultural lessee. Since then, she had cultivated the subject property and paid all rent due thereon.[4]While
the subject property was in her possession, she produced tuba or coconut wine from the coconuts that were
harvested from the property.[5]
Both parties stipulated that on 21 August 1984, petitioner and respondent executed a Contract of
Lease which provided that the lease covered the coconut trees growing on the subject property. However, the
following were enumerated, among other things, as the duties of the petitioner as lessee: [6]
3. That the LESSEE hereby undertakes to take care of the leased premises or coconuts
with the deligence (sic) of a good father of the family, to fertilize the same if and when
necessary, to apply proper insecticides or fungicides for proper pest and disease
control and to replace old or worn out trees with new plantings of coconuts.
The terms of the aforestated lease contract also implied that it was the petitioner and her relatives, and not the
respondent, who were in actual possession of the subject land, with the knowledge, or even the implied
consent, of the respondent:[7]
7. That the LESSEE admits having allowed, without permission from the LESSOR,
her relatives (namely, spouses Romeo and Betty Sobigon and Spouses Juan and
Nora Recodo, Jr.) to construct their houses on Lot No. 614-A, Bacolod Cadestre,
and binds and obliges herself on her coconut (sic) to cause their ejectment upon
demand at any time by the LESSOR; and the LESSEE further binds and obliges
herself not to allow any other person or persons to construct any structure or house in
any portion of the lease premises and to report immediately to the LESSOR any
attempt or attempts of construction. (Emphasis provided.)
During the proceedings before the PARAD, petitioner formally offered evidence consisting of
several receipts from 1965 to 1989 issued by respondent indicating that the payments were for lot rentals. Only
two receipts show that the payment was made for the lease of coconuts.[8] Petitioner also presented before the
DARAB a Certification[9] by the Local Assessment Operations Officer, dated 17 January 1992, stating that
the subject land was classified as cocoland, and, therefore, agricultural in nature.
Respondent sent the petitioner a letter, dated 20 October 1989,[10] terminating the lease and demanding that
the latter vacate the leased premises as of 30 October 1989, and pay the outstanding rental balance
of P2,500.00.
Although respondent admits that the former owner, Augusto Villarosa, leased the land to Alfredo
Granada, who planted coconut trees thereon before respondent bought the subject property in 1965, respondent
avers, however, that on 29 September 1965, respondent and petitioner entered into a lease contract covering
only the coconut trees growing on the subject property. [11]
Petitioner countered that the 29 September 1965 contract was spurious and that her signature therein
was forged. She added that this document was introduced for the first time before the Court of Appeals. [12]
Respondent alleged that the subject property is not agricultural, but industrial or residential land since the real
estate taxes it is paying thereon indicates that the property is industrial or residential. However, respondent
failed to introduce as evidence any tax receipts.[13]
In a Decision, dated 14 May 1991, the PARAD decreed that no agricultural leasehold relationship
existed between respondent and petitioner. It also found that there was no showing that the purpose of the
lease was for agricultural production since rent was paid in terms of money and not crops, and that the contract
of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the petitioner shall cultivate the subject property. It further
ruled that the subject property was not agricultural, but industrial or residential in
nature.[14] The dispositive part of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
respondent and against the petitioner, to wit:
1. Ordering the ejectment of petitioner from Lot No. 641-A, covered by TCT No.-
27970, situated at Punta-Taytay, Bacolod City and deliver possession thereof to the
respondent;
2. Ordering petitioner to pay respondent the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
No pronouncement as to cost.[15]
On appeal, the DARAB, in its Decision dated 11 July 1997, reversed the PARAD Decision. It
pronounced that the subject land was agricultural in nature as evidenced by the Certification issued by the
Local Assessment Operations Officer, stating that the same was officially classified as cocoland. It further
declared that the written contract of lease, dated 21 August 1984, is not reflective of the true intent of the
parties. Even though the contract stipulated that only the coconut trees were covered, the DARAB resolved
that petitioner was in actual possession of the land and cultivated the same. [16] In its Decision, dated 11 July
1997, the DARAB decreed that:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered as follows:
1. Declaring petitioner Dolores Granada the agricultural lessee of the subject
landholding;
2. Directing the party litigants to reduce their tenancy relation into a written agricultural
leasehold contract before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
of Bacolod City taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of Section 34 of
R.A. 3844, as amended, in relation to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657 and pertinent rules
and regulations thereon.[17]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Section 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals, which, in a Decision dated 12 April 2002, reversed the DARAB Decision. It determined
that the lease of the 300 coconut trees was a contract of lease of things, not an agricultural lease which
guaranteed the petitioner security of tenure.[18] The dispositive part of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the appeal, the Court renders judgment
REVERSING the appealed Decision and UPHOLDING the Decision of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator with the modification that the contract between petitioner
and respondent was one of contract of lease of things.[19]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 4 July 2002.[20]
Hence, this present Petition, wherein petitioner submits that the following errors were committed by
the Court of Appeals in rendering its assailed Decision dated 12 April 2002[21]:
I In a line of cases, this Court specified the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT OF LEASE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1965, RELIED
UPON BY THE HONORALBE COURT OF APPEALS WAS NEVER PRESENTED
AND OFFERED AS EVIDENCE IN THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL (PARAD) AND BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB). SAID ALLEGED CONTRACT OF LEASE
DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1965, WAS BROUGHT FORTH BY THE RESPONDENT
ONLY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL;
II
THE PETITIONER SUCCEEDED AS AGRICULTURAL LESSEE OF THE SUBJECT
PARCEL OF LAND AFTER THE DEATH OF HER FATHER IN 1981. SUCH
SUCCESSION AS AGRICULTURAL LESSEE COVERS BOTH THE LAND AND THE
STANDING COCONUT TREES; AND
III
THE FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) THAT THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DID NOT
REFLECT THE TRUE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES ARE SUPPORTED BY FACTS
AND EVIDENCE.
The petition is meritorious.
While the general rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to respect and
will not be disturbed except for compelling reasons, nonetheless, the lack of conclusiveness of the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, as well as the manifest contradiction between its factual findings and those
of the DARAB, would impel this Court to re-examine the records of this case.[22]
The main issue in the present case is whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural leasehold tenant
entitled to security of tenure.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1199 entitled, The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, which
took effect on 30 August 1954, defined agricultural tenancy thus:
Section 3. Agricultural Tenancy Defined.Agricultural tenancy is the physical possession
by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another
for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest
with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or
in both.
as follows: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of
the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.[23]
Respondent alleges that several requisites of agricultural tenancy are absent in this case. It denies
that the petitioner was an agricultural lessee. Moreover, it avers that the Contract of Lease dated 21 August
1984, clearly provides that the subject of the lease is not agricultural land, but rather the 300 coconut trees that
are growing thereon. Lastly, it insists that there was no cultivation of the subject property nor any sharing of
harvests therefrom.
 Section 166 of Republic Act No. 3844, known as the Agricultural Land Reform Act, which took
effect on 8 August 1963, defines an agricultural lessee in the following manner:
Sec. 166. Definition of Terms.
xxxx
(2) Agricultural lessee means a person who, by himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed
by, another with the latters consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money
or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Based on the aforequoted definition for the petitioner to qualify as an agricultural lessee, it is required that she
should cultivate the land with the consent of the landowner. In Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc. (COCOMA) v. Court of Appeals,[24] citing Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court specified the
activities which are considered as cultivation of coconut lands.
The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of
the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the
ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is
a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not
need harrowing or plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and
distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some
coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising
coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit bearing. Then it is cultivated by
smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer,
weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. x x x.
It is undisputable that the petitioner cultivated the land with the consent of the respondent. The
Contract of Lease, dated 21 August 1984, executed by both parties, unequivocally stipulated that the petitioner
perform the same acts of cultivation that were particularly described in the aforecited case. Under Section 3
of the aforementioned Contract of Lease, the petitioner was required to undertake the following activities:
3. That the LESSEE hereby undertakes to take care of the leased premises or coconuts with
the deligence (sic) of a good father of the family, to fertilize the same if and when
necessary, to apply proper insecticides or fungicides for proper pest and disease
control and to replace old or worn out trees with new plantings of coconuts.[26]
Respondent admits that the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984, which covered the period from 1983 to
1984, was orally renewed until 1989, which means that for no less than six years, petitioner had cultivated the
subject property.
In addition, it cannot be denied that there was a sharing of the harvest between the petitioner and the
respondent. Section 4 of the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984provided for a total rental
of P4,000.00.[27] Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199 confirms that sharing of harvest in an agricultural
leasehold tenancy may consist of a price certain to be paid by the person cultivating the land to the lessor.
Section 4. Systems of Agricultural Tenancy. x x x.
xxxx
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece
of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of
his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in
consideration of a price certain or ascertainable to be paid by the person cultivating
the land either in percentage of the production or in a fixed amount in money, or in both.
(Emphasis provided.)
Evidently, the law does not stipulate that the sharing of harvest be limited to a sharing of the crops, or that the
amount be set based on the abundance of the harvest. A fixed amount of money, such as the P4,000.00 agreed
to by the parties in their lease contract, can be considered as a share in the harvest.
Respondent insists that the Contract of Lease dated 29 September 1965, and the Contract of Lease
dated 21 August 1984, explicitly provide that the subject of the lease was not the subject property; rather, it
was the 300 coconut trees growing thereon. Both contracts contain the identical provision, which reads:
1. That this lease shall cover only the growing coconut trees in the abovementioned parcel
of land.
Respondents claim is unjustified. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit
provisions of written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3844 recognizes that an agricultural
leasehold relation may exist by virtue of an implied agreement:
Section 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold
relation shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section Four of this Code
and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.
In stipulating that such relation may exist by implied agreement, the law seeks to prevent the
invalidation by unscrupulous landowners of the right of security of tenure granted to agricultural lessees. If
agrarian relations were determined only by the explicit provisions of written agreement, poor and unlettered
farmers, who have toiled over the land, could easily be misled or pressured into signing away their rights,
which have long been guaranteed by law.
To strengthen the tenure of tenants, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that the agricultural
leasehold relation, once established, shall terminate only for causes provided by law and not solely based on
contractual stipulation:
 Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation
once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the
landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
As in this case, the Contract of Lease dated 21 August 1984 required the petitioner to perform the grueling
duties required of an agricultural lessee, but refused to grant her the consequent right to security of tenure. This
Court shall not tolerate this unjust, unlawful, and most certainly undeserved double standard against
agricultural tenants.
In interpreting the provisions of a contract, the intention of the parties shall prevail, should the words
appear contrary to their real intention. Articles 1370 and 1371 of the Civil Code govern such instances:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall
prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
The charade that the lease contract of 21 August 1984 covered only the coconut trees and not the
subject property wore thin after the petitioner presented before the PARAD receipts issued by the respondent
from 1965 to 1989, which state that the payments were for lot rental. In fact, only two receipts issued within
this period indicated that the payments were made in connection with the rent for the coconut trees.
In addition, Section 7 of the Contract of Lease, dated 21 August 1984, shows that both parties recognized that
petitioners relatives were occupying the subject land. Petitioner was even obligated to prevent any other
person from building any structure thereon. The aforementioned provision reads:
7. That the LESSEE admits having allowed, without permission from the LESSOR, her
relatives (namely, spouses Romeo and Betty Sobigon and spouses Juan and
Nora Recodo, Jr.) to construct their houses on Lot No. 614-A, Bacolod Cadestre, and
binds and obliges herself on her coconut (sic) to cause their ejectment upon demand
at any time by the LESSOR; and the LESSEE further binds and obliges herself not to
allow any other person or persons to construct any structure or house in any portion
of the lease premises and to report immediately to the LESSOR any attempt or
attempts of construction.
While the aforequoted provision states that the petitioners relatives occupied the subject land without the
permission of the respondent, it also obliged the petitioner to cause their ejectment upon the respondents
demand. This means that before the respondents demand to vacate, petitioners relatives were permitted to
stay. Had the petitioner been leasing the coconut trees only, there was no reason for the respondent, a stranger
to the petitioners relatives, to tolerate their occupancy of the subject property. Respondent could have easily
initiated proceedings for the ejectment of petitioners relatives. Conversely, respondents implicit consent to let
the petitioners relatives stay on the subject property supports the petitioners assertion that she and her relatives
had cultivated the land with the permission of the respondent, which in turn, received its share of the
agricultural produce through the rent paid by petitioner.
Lastly, it should be noted that petitioners father, Alfredo Granada, had been an agricultural lessee on the
subject land even before the same was transferred to the respondent in 1965. There is nothing in the records
which show that Alfredo Granada voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the land or he was divested
thereof after a proper hearing was conducted. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844[28] provides that even as it
is the respondents prerogative as landowner to choose the successor of its deceased tenant, such prerogative
is considered waived if it is not asserted within a reasonable time. Neither is there any showing that petitioners
mother or siblings had ever contested the petitioners claim over her fathers tenancy rights. Thus, there is no
reason to doubt the petitioners claim that she succeeded her fathers tenancy rights upon his death in 1981.
There is no question that the subject property is agricultural land. The Certification of the Local Assessment
Operations Officer, dated 17 January 1992, states that subject property is cocoland. The existence of no less
than 300 coconut trees on a 2.5 hectare land would confirm that the subject property is devoted to the raising
of agricultural products thereon. Respondents allegation before the PARAD that the subject property is
industrial or residential is not supported by evidence and, thus, cannot be credited.
The authenticity of the Contract of Lease dated 29 September 1965 between the petitioner and respondent is
doubtful. This contract was not presented before the PARAD whose findings of fact in its
Decision,[29] dated 14 May 1991, show that no written contract was executed by the parties before the Contract
of Lease dated 21 August 1984:
The said parcel of land was formerly owned by Augusto Villarosa, who leased the same to
Alfredo Granada, father of the petitioner, under an oral contract as far back as 1950, on a
yearly basis with the rentals, in terms of money. To make use of the property and to be able
to pay the rentals, the lessee planted the landholding to coconuts and some fruit trees. The
same was then purchased by respondent, BORMAHECO, present owner, but remained leased
to the lessee until his death, sometime in 1982. Thereafter, the petitioner entered into a
contract of lease with the respondent, covering only the growing coconut trees in the aforesaid
parcel of land for the duration of one (1) year, beginning October 1, 1983 to October 1, 1984,
x x x.
The aforequoted portion of the PARAD Decision rendered in favor of the respondent clearly states that before
the death of Alfredo Granada, the lease agreement was between respondent and Alfredo Granada, not the
petitioner. Moreover, there was no mention of the lease contract of 29 September 1965 during the proceedings
before the PARAD and the DARAB.
Even assuming that the Contract of Lease dated 29 September 1965 was authentic, it would still not
negate the existence of a leasehold tenancy relation between the parties. The said lease contract, likewise,
obligated the petitioner to perform the same acts of cultivation and imposed an annual rent of P600.00. More
importantly, the receipts issued by the respondent for lot rentals from 1965 to 1989 patently show that the
lease contract covered the subject land and not just the 300 coconut trees growing thereon. Like the Contract
of Lease dated 21 August 1984, the Contract of Lease dated 29 September 1965 does not fully reflect the true
intent of the parties and thus cannot invalidate the petitioners status as an agricultural lessee.

It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements of agricultural leasehold tenancy are met in this
case. The Contracts of Lease, dated 29 September 1965 and 21 August 1984, presented by the respondent to
disprove the existence of an agricultural leasehold relation, stipulate that the petitioner perform acts of
cultivation of the subject property.The respondent provided the agricultural land, classified as cocoland; and
the petitioner took care of the coconut trees, replanted new ones when necessary, harvested the coconut fruits
and produced tuba or coconut wine therefrom. Respondent received a fixed sum of P4,000.00 each year as its
share of the harvest. Without any question, respondent was very much aware that petitioner had been
cultivating the land and paying the lot rentals as early as 1983, or even earlier, and continued to do so until
1989. Petitioner is unquestionably an agricultural lessee of the respondents land, and is, thus, entitled to
security of tenure.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court GRANTS this petition and REVERSES the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46502, dated 12 April 2002 and REINSTATES the
Decision of the DARAB dated 11 July 1997 in DARAB Case No. 0564. This Court declares the petitioner an
agricultural tenant of the subject property owned by the respondent; and orders both parties to reduce their
agricultural leasehold relation into writing before the Municipal Agrarian Reform, in accordance with law. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
Ladiana v People (Admission v Confession)
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the
accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during
a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during
the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against
the affiant.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10, 2000
Decision[1] and August 4, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No.
16988. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentencing
the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum[;] (b) suffer
all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim, Francisco
San Juan, in the total amount of Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay the
costs.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information [4] dated
August 5, 1991. However, the anti-graft court issued an Order[5] dated October 14, 1991, noting that besides
the allegation that the crime was allegedly committed by the accused while he was taking advantage of his
official position, nothing else is in the Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information stands,
nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the
crime for which he is charged.
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show adequate facts
to vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an Amended Information,[6] still
charging petitioner with murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a
member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban,
Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction,
taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the
steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P.
Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the
said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said
accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San
Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San
Juan.[7]
During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte,[8] pled not
guilty.[9] After due trial, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the Sandiganbayans
narration of the facts as follows:
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda, Dr.
Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2 Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their respective testimonies, in essence
are as follows, to wit:
1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, Caridad) declared that she is the wife of Francisco
San Juan (hereinafter Francisco), the victim in the case at bar. Caridad testified that Francisco was the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana,
who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house when an unidentified woman came and
told her that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately called up her sister-in-law before
rushing to Jacinto Street where the gruesome incident allegedly transpired. Thereat, many people were
milling around, and Caridad saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying in the middle of the road and being
examined by [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 oclock a.m. when she reached the place of the subject incident. At
that point in time, she was not even allowed by the police to touch, much less get near to, the cadaver of
Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was crying and one of her aunts advised her to go home.
Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this was
what the woman actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the police station, where she gave her
written statement before police investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter, Halili).
Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that he was eventually
buried at the Lumban Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred about Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial and other incidental expenses by reason of the death of Francisco.
On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house and that she did
not hear any gunshot between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m. Caridad also admitted she did not witness the
killing of her husband.
On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot wounds -
one on the upper right temple and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad stated that she was told that
the wounds were the entry and the exit points. She also told the Court that her husband was wearing short
pants at the time of his death and that she found some bruises on his knees.
Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was with his close friend, a certain
Rodolfo Cabrera, and some other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair the steel humps
which were used to block the street during school days for the protection and safety of the school children.
2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, CACALDA) declared that he is a
policeman assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been designated as the radio
operator of the station since 1989.
Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 oclock a.m., somebody, whose name he
could no longer recall, reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac
Cacalda responded by going to the scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member of the
CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not
examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete and
other policemen subsequently arrived.
Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who
shot and killed Francisco. Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However, he eventually
saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of the police station and thereafter learned that said accused had
surrendered to the police authority.
Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was the responding policeman who
went to the scene of the incident. Consequently, Cacalda executed a written statement in relation to the
subject incident.
On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an investigator of the police
station. He also testified that he did not witness the incident subject matter of the case at bar.
Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the incident told him that accused
Ladiana had already left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused Ladianaa house but
was told that he had already gone to the police station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station where
he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He also saw a stab wound on accused Ladianas right
bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury.
3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, Javan) declared that he is a physician and the
Municipal Health Officer of Lumban, Laguna.
Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and that he
had prepared the corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto. Javan made a sketch representing
the anterior and posterior views of the body of Francisco, and labeled and placed red markings on the
gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The marking Gunshot wound A is the point of entry, which is
one (1) centimeter in diameter and situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking Gunshot wound
B is the point of exit of Gunshot wound A, which is two (2) centimeters in diameter and found above the
right cheekbone and one (1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another gunshot
wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as Gunshot wound C and Gunshot wound D,
respectively. Gunshot wound D is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left
cheek, three and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while Gunshot wound C is one (1)
centimeter in diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the adams apple.
According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted Gunshot wound A. As regards
Gunshot wound C, the assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than twenty-four
(24) inches away.
Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination. However, judging
from the size of the wound and the point of entry, Javan opined that the firearm used was probably a caliber
38.
On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that Gunshot wound A could have been fired first
because the trajectory is on the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim could have been both
standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot wound C could have been inflicted while the victim was already
falling down. Javan then stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature.
4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, Gabinete) declared that he is a police officer
and a resident of No. 4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense that he was
part of the group of policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body
of Francisco lying along the road. Additionally, the defense admitted the existence of the receipt issued by
Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990 in the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, Cortez) declared that he is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of
Laguna.
Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the
authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana,
which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly
admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense
as Francisco was then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound
on the arm of accused Ladiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the
complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able
to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a
person who appeared and identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-
affidavit.
After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated
August 16, 1995, claiming that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the
prosecution allegedly failed to show that the accused is guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the
evidence submitted by the prosecution are allegedly hearsay in character, considering that the supposed
eyewitness in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was
allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the identity of the person who caused
said death.
On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a demurrer to
evidence is no longer appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this Courts resolution
dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of the prosecutions documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995.
On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the prosecution is allegedly
inadequate to sustain a conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his right to present
controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for time to file a written memorandum. Thus, both parties were
given time within which to do so, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the Memorandum for the defense. As for the
prosecution, it opted not to file any.[10] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit,[11] in which he had admitted to having fired
the fatal shots that caused the victims death,[12] may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the
admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of
the Counter-Affidavit.[13] In short, it ruled that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility for
the death of the victim.However, it found no evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only. [14]
Hence, this Petition.[15]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide even in the absence of any eyewitness who personally saw the sho[o]ting of the victim by
the accused, basing it only on the testimony of the prosecutor who had administered the oath on the Counter-
affidavit filed by petitioner-accused.
II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused and his right against self-incrimination on the basis
of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted by the counsel of the petitioner, but not by the
accused personally.
III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision as similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted against him as
evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was
under custodial investigation.
IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing the Order of August
23, 1996 denying the Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995 filed
by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation
to Rule XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which fact was
admitted by the prosecution as it even used the same as proof of the guilt of the accused. [16]
In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit he
executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the
crime, (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence,
and (3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-
Affidavit[17] submitted by petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was
present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.[18]
It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply
only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodialinvestigations.[19] Indeed, the rights
enumerated in the constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation
of accused persons.[20]
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [21]
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary
investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and
independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. [22]
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a
defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. [23] It explained as
follows:
His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of
the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant
in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to speak of
his right while under custodial interrogation laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the
obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial interrogation.[24]
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his
Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was
not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a
person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not
at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor -- unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to
be made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the
right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying,
the right to refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that
for which they are being prosecuted.[25]
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit
as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact
not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which
one is charged.[26] Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act
charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession. [27]
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when
the latter was attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang
ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag
hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay
tinamaan;[28]
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters
death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-
defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence
against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to
the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court
how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his
defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by
mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not
a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. [29] Yet, petitioner
never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In
addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the
declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.[30]
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the
authorship, the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We quote verbatim the proceedings
in the Sandiganbayan:
PJ GARCHITORENA
 Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was
your client who took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation?
ATTY. ILAGAN
We will admit that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero?
ATTY ILAGAN
Admitted, your Honor.[31]
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their counsels,
save when the latters negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day
in court.[32] Also, clients, being bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the
litigation might have been different had their lawyers proceeded differently.[33] A counsel may err as to the
competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of evidence, the proper defense, the burden of
proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence, or the manner of arguing the
case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a new trial,
unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case.[34]
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing
was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. [35] Petitioner should have relied on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be
weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. [36]
Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he
could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed earlier, the declarations
contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against him. [37] The
Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the theory of self-defense, because this
argument had already been laid out in his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the
admission was clear and unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the anti-graft court miserably failed to give equal effect or
treatment to all the allegations found therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately and without reasonable
basis the parts which are incriminating in character, and ignoring without sufficient legal basis the exculpatory
assertions of the accused.[38]
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are utterly
insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine that
self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. [39] It cannot be entertained if it is
uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is also doubtful. [40] The question whether the
accused acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the lower court; in this
case, the Sandiganbayan.[41]
By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense enumerated in
the law.[42] Had petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent
evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a quo, he not only failed to discharge the burden
of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any
evidence at all.[43] So, we do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his
Counter-Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of any
other circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of
his admission of the killing.[44] Upholding this principle does not in any way violate his right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed the victim, the burden of proving his
innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification
for the killing.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime
charged.[45] As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established.The fact of death and its cause
were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of
Death,[46] the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination[47] and the Medico-Legal Findings.[48] The intent to kill
is likewise presumed from the fact of death.[49]
Second Issue:
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for Leave to
File Demurrer to Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally wrong. [50]
We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. [51] And,
unless there is grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial courts resolution
may not be disturbed.[52]
Final Issue:
Voluntary Surrender
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor,
implores this Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a mitigating
circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the police
authorities after the shooting incident.[53] To buttress his argument, he contends that the main reason for his
voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally justified in defending himself as a
policeman when he fought the victim after he was attacked by the latter. [54] It goes without saying that this
statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to
discredit.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the
latters agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary.[55] To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and
made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they
acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be
incurred in searching for and capturing them.[56]
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are
statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people that he had
already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went
to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has
evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the
shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing.Thus, he could not be deemed
to have voluntarily surrendered.[57] In the absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of
indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
People v Ulit
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were filed against her uncle,
the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of each Information reads:
Criminal Case No. 97-385
That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of the
complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence, her relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an
eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 97-386
That sometime in the month of February 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle of complainant
LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence her relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree, while
armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11)
year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 97-387
That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and
there kissing her and touching her sexual organ, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Criminal Case No. 97-388
nd
That on or about the 2 day of March 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, by then and
there dragging her inside a bathroom and repeatedly kissing her on her checks [sic], without her consent and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the cases
ensued.
In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General Hospital. On
May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first witness.
On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986. [7] In November 1996,
her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the prosecution asked her what happened, Lucelle did
not answer. When asked if she wanted to continue with her testimony, again, she did not respond. The trial
was reset to June 2 and 9, 1997. When trial resumed on June 9, 1997, Lucelle was questioned by the
prosecution on direct examination, but still, she gave no answer. She cried profusely in open court. When
asked by the court if she wanted to proceed with the trial, she remained silent. The trial was reset anew to July
9 and 14, 1997.
In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and psychological
examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr. Rochelflume Samson examined Lucelle
and submitted her Report dated August 29, 1997 with the following remarks and recommendation:
Based on clinical history, mental status examination and psychological evaluation, this patient is suffering
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This illness is characterized by intense fear and feeling of helplessness
whenever she recalls her traumatic experience of being raped. It causes her intense psychological distress
whenever asked to talk about the rape scene or incident. Thus, she avoids recollections of the trauma.
At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above. She would be having difficulties testifying in
court because of this. She requires psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Section.[8]
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial was reset to July
21, 1997.
During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew to continue with her
testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant raped her in November 1996 and many other
times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Makati City. Instead of asking questions to
elicit the facts and circumstances before and during the commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked Lucelle
to identify her signature in her sworn statement[9] and to affirm the truth of its contents. She did so. The public
prosecutor then marked the sworn statement in evidence as Exhibit H, and then manifested to the court that
he had no more questions for the witness on direct examination.
On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986. The
appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her and threatened her. [10]
On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mothers older brother. In November
1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working at a construction firm, the appellant was
employed at the Department of Environment and Sanitation in Makati City, while her grandmother, who lived
with her, worked as a maid in Bel Air Subdivison. Her mother worked for one of her fathers cousins. On re-
direct examination, the prosecution elicited from Lucelle that the appellant raped her in November 1996 at
11:00 p.m. inside the room of her aunt Marina in her grandmothers house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street,
Olympia, Makati City, and that her aunt, Marina, and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where
her aunt and Ate Sharon were when she was being raped in her aunts room, Lucelle did not respond. When
asked why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the previous hearings and why she
had been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her uncle, the appellant.
In her sworn statement,[11] Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she was sleeping in a room
in the house. It was about 6 oclock in the evening. She was awakened when she felt someone kissing her on
the cheek. When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncle, the appellant, armed with a bladed weapon
(balisong). He poked the weapon on the left side of her neck. He warned her that if she told her parents, he
would kill her. He removed her panties, undressed himself and mounted her. He then inserted his penis into
her vagina. She felt pain in her private part and cried. The appellant, thereafter, left the room. Also during the
month of November 1996, the appellant continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the house.
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed her and mashed her
private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused her (sinalbahe) while she was in the
same room. It was about 11 oclock in the evening. He again warned her not to divulge to her parents what he
did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, Lucelle urinated in the bathroom and when she was about to go
out, the appellant entered, pushed her inside and kissed her on her cheeks several times.
Celso Serrano, Lucelles father, testified that sometime in November 1996, at dawn, he was in bed and
noticed that the appellant was in the bedroom of his cousin-in-law. Sometime later, he went to the bathroom.
He then heard his wife ask the appellant where he had come from and the latter replied that he just came from
the roof of the house. On another occasion, one early Sunday morning, he noticed blood stains on Lucelles
short pants. When she declared that she had her monthly period, he gave her P5.00 with which to buy sanitary
napkins. Lucelle refused to accept the money. He suggested that she wash herself but she just nodded her
head. When he asked her why she refused to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell him
because she might be killed.
Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelles mother. Lucelle was born on February 19, 1986. [12] She
and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle resided with her mother, Guadalupe Ulit, at No.
7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City. Her sister Marina and the appellant, her brother, also resided
in the same house. The family slept together in the evenings in the sala of the house while Marina slept in her
bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece Lucelle to sleep in her bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19,
1997, Lourdes noticed that Lucelle was not at her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was
not there either. Lourdes went to Marinas bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a blanket.
Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. When the appellant saw
Lourdes, he slid down from the bed, went under the papag, and furtively left the room. When Lourdes removed
the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying sideways with her knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was
trembling with fear. When Lourdes asked Lucelle what happened, she did not respond. Lourdes left the room
and went back to the sala. She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided against it when she saw him seated
in the sala, playing with his balisong.
Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband were having dinner
when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked for her daughter in the house, but failed
to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if she had seen Lucelle. Nita replied in the negative. When Lourdes
asked Nita if Lucelle was inside the bathroom, Nita responded that the appellant was using it. Momentarily,
Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from the bathroom. He was in his short pants and his shirt was on his
shoulder. He was perspiring profusely. Lourdes was flabbergasted when she saw Lucelle come out of the
bathroom after the appellant. Lucelle was crying and looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was
crying, she told her mother that she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes that he did
not do anything to Lucelle.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes brought Lucelle on
March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way, Lucelle adamantly refused to tell her
parents what the appellant did to her. However, when they reached the barangay headquarters, Lucelle told
the barangay chairman that the appellant sexually abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting Lucelle.
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay chairman ordered him
and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant to the barangay hall. The barangay
chairman asked the appellant if he raped Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was
prepared in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in
February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he threatened to kill her and her family
if she divulged the incidents to her parents. [13] The appellant signed his statement in the presence of the
barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City Police Headquarters
where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape and acts of laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia
Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit took the sworn statements of Lourdes and Lucelle.[14] She conducted a
custodial investigation of the appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped
the victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a report on her investigation of the victims complaint. [15]
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that on March 12,
1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and submitted Living Case Report No. MG-
97-355 which contained the following findings:
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Height: 141 cm. Weight: 78 lbs.
Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject.
Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light-brown, 2.6 cms. in diameter. Nipples, light-
brown, protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injuries noted.
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax.
Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice, admits a tube 2.5 cms.
in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities, shallow.
CONCLUSIONS
1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time
of examination.
2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration
by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury. [16]
When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay before the barangay
chairman[17] as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando David, the appellant objected to its
admission on the ground that the appellant was not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced
into signing the same. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement as part of Davids testimony. The
appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of Lucelles sworn statement on the ground that she
was incompetent to give the same because of her mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement
of Lucelle in evidence as part of her testimony.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to November 5, 1997 for the
appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for trial on that date, his counsel manifested to the
court that the appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 from not guilty to
guilty. He also manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases Nos.
97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes
charged therein. The trial court suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer
with his counsel. When trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court
that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his decision to plead guilty
in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer present any evidence in his defense in the other
two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 with the assistance of
the same counsel and entered his plea of guilty to the charges.
On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes
charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in the two counts of statutory rape
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is hereby declare[d]
CONVICTED in each of the cases. Accordingly he is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty [of] DEATH
in each of the two cases; and indemnify the victim LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P50,000 as
moral damages for each of the cases;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two counts of
acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5(b)
of R.A. 7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of the two cases; and, accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term from eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim,
LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the cases.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the prosecutor adduced
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385
and 97-386. The trial court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn
statement[19] the same were admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.
The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and 97-388. In view of
the trial courts imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386,
the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal.
The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FELICIANO ULIT WITH A DEATH
PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION OF GUILT.[20]
The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and
the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however, that he be spared the
death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful for the crimes he committed and that he pleaded guilty in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387; he no longer presented any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-388
so that the proceedings before the court would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless, the appeal in a
criminal case is a review de novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors. [21] An appeal thus opens
the whole case for review, and the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and
even reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.[22]
Appellants Plea of Guilty in
Criminal Case No. 97-385
was Imprudently Made.
In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape of his niece,
who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital offense. When the appellant informed
the trial court of his decision to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, it behooved the trial court to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated
by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay,[23] this Court
enumerated the following duties of the trial court under the rule:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by the
accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and precise
degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.[24]
 The raison detre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care where the imposable ATTY. MANALO
penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that
even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part Your Honor, at todays reception of defense evidence, accused informed this representation that he will no
of the accused must be averted since by admitting his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his longer present evidence and instead willing to change his plea from not guilty to that of guilty. This
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his accuseds representation is therefore praying that he be allowed to change his plea from that of not guilty to
plea.[25] guilty.
There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching inquiry. It has been held,
however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and the full or complete COURT
comprehension by the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly be said that it is based on a free and
informed judgment. In People vs. Aranzado,[26] we formulated the following guidelines as to how the trial You better confer with your client and explain to him the consequences of his intended change of plea from
court may conduct its searching inquiry: not guilty to that of guilty.
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary ATTY. MANALO
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the accused Yes, Your Honor.
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm
coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. COURT (to the accused)
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty. Is your counsels manifestation true, that you would like to change your plea from not guilty to that of guilty
and that you are no longer presenting evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388?
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity
to give a free and informed plea of guilty. ACCUSED

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and Yes, Your Honor.
the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
COURT
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the
(to the accused)
duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions.
You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking the court to change your plea of not guilty to that of
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or make guilty. The Court will call your case again.
him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing
details or significance.[27] COURT
In People vs. Ostia,[28] we held that the trial court is also required to probe thoroughly into the reasons (to the accused)
or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the accused and his
comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you would like to change your plea from not guilty to
nature and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense, inclusive of that of guilty, in Criminal Case No. 97-385, for rape and Criminal Case No. 97-387, for Acts of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying circumstances, and Lasciviousness, do you affirm the manifestation of your counsel?
inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty
to.[29] ACCUSED
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellants voluntariness and full
comprehension of his plea of guilty. This is evident by the transcript of stenographic notes taken on November Yes, Your Honor.
5, 1998:
COURT
(to accused) ACCUSED

Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of rape, a capital offense which carries with it a capital Yes, Your Honor. I am willing to plead guilty.
punishment?
COURT
ACCUSED
Alright, arraign the accused.[30]
Yes, Your Honor.
First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from not guilty to that
COURT of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do so.
(to accused)
Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the appellant opted not to avail
himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and refused to execute a waiver under Article 125
Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital offense which carries with it a capital penalty of the Revised Penal Code. The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while
you still insists that you are pleading guilty? detained at the barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2,
1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he was
ACCUSED brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire
about the circumstances and the appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
Yes, Your Honor.
The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay in evidence to
prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected
COURT (to accused) thereto on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same.

Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not guilty to that of guilty? Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when
he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by
counsel, whether he had waived his right thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
ACCUSED
Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a rape committed in
None, Your Honor. November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[31] he confessed to having raped the victim only in
February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant did not admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged
in the Information in Criminal Case No. 97-385. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who
COURT prepared and typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement were explained to him before
(to accused) he signed the same.

Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced in accordance with [what] the law provides? Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and simple terms so as to be
understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape; (b) the circumstances of relationship and
the minority of the victim; and (c) that his plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for
ACCUSED
the crime in light of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Yes, Your Honor. Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he would be civilly liable
to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
COURT Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellants counsel whether the meaning and the
consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a language or dialect known to and understood
(to accused) by him.
Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age, educational attainment
Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death penalty because the Information states that the and socio-economic status.
victim is eleven years old and your niece and that you used a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape?
 Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and circumstances surrounding the A Marami po.
incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 97-385.
Q Kailan ka ginahasa ng tiyuhin mo?
Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-385 in
spite of his plea of guilty. A November po.

As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of the Q 19?
improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. [32] However, where A 1996, po.
the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether the accused
committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be Q Saan ka ginahasa?
convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate
conviction.[33] A 7104 San Maximo St., Makati City, po.[36]

In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided to change his plea. Fiscal
In fact, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion that the evidence it had presented be considered proof Q Humigit-kumulang, anong oras ng gabi nang gahasain ka ng Tito Ely mo noong
of the degree of culpability of the appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the Nobyembre 1996?
evidence adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the appellants guilt for qualified rape. A Alas onse po ng gabi.
In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following considerations: Q Samakatuwid, hindi na siya nagtratrabaho, wala na siya sa trabaho?
(a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually A Wala na po.
involves two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that Q Saang lugar ka ginahasa?
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. [34] It, likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal A Sa 7104 San Maximo St.
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [35] Q Sa loob ba ng bahay?
A Opo.
Q Saang parte ng bahay ka ginahasa ng Tito mo?
The Prosecution Adduced Proof
of the Appellants Guilt Beyond A Sa kuwarto po.[37]
Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
of Rape in Criminal Case ...
No. 97-385 COURT
Q Noong Nobyembre 1996, ayon sa iyo ay ginahasa ka ng iyong Tito. Saan ka ginahasa ng Tito
We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution adduced proof mo?
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The victim declared in her
sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on clarificatory questions made by the trial court, A Sa 7104 San Maximo St., po.
that indeed, the appellant raped her in November 1996. Quoted hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on direct Q Doon din sa bahay na iyong tinitirhan?
and on re-direct examination:
A Opo.[38]
Fiscal
In her Sworn Statement,[39] Lucelle narrated in detail how the appellant ravished her:
Q So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?
06. T: Kailan ka unang senalbahe ng iyong TITO ELY?
A Ginahasa niya ako. S: Noon pong Nobyembre 1996 hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa, mga bandang 6:00 ng
Q Ilang ulit kang ginahasa? gabi po nang ako ay natutulog sa loob po ng kuwarto ay nagising na lang po ako nang
maramdaman ko na may humahalik sa aking pisngi, at nang ako po ay magising ay nakita
 ko po si TITO ELY na may hawak na balisong na humigit kumulang po sa 10 pulgada ang
haba na nakatutok sa aking kaliwang leeg habang humahalik po sa aking pisngi at ang sabi
ay kung ako daw po ay magsusumbong sa aking magulang ay papatayin po niya (TITO ELY)
ako. Pagkatapos po ay hinubaran po ako ng panty at naghubad na rin po si TITO ELY ng
kanyang short pants at pumatong na po sa akin. Ipinasok po ni TITO ELY and kanyang
(TITO ELY) ari sa aking PEPE at ako po ay nasaktan at umiyak na lang po ako at nang
makaraos po si TITO ELY ay umalis na lang .[40]
We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of Lucelle are
hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her signatures therein. By hearsay
evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be
attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from
whom the witness has received the information.[41] It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the
personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-
examination.[42] The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the
test which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not
present and available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a
violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine
the witness testifying against him.[43] Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on
the truth of the contents thereof are hearsay evidence.[44] Such affidavit must be formally offered in evidence
and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court for the simple reason that the court
shall consider such evidence formally offered and accepted. [45]
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement which she
herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the appellant raped and
subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-examined by the appellants counsel and answered the trial
courts clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her testimony and the
court admitted the same for the said purpose without objection on the part of the appellant.
The Prosecution Proved Beyond
Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant
Raped the Victim in February 1997
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-386 on the basis of Lucelles
sworn statement,[46] the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the appellants statement[47] executed in the
Barangay Chairmans Office, and the testimony of Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil. We agree with the trial courts
findings and conclusion.
First. In Lucelles sworn statement,[48] she declared that the appellant subjected her to sexual abuse.
Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marinas room, covered with a blanket beside the
appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. He slid down from the papag, went under the
bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle trembling with fear, lying
sidewise, her knees near her chin (nakabaluktot).
Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on March 5, 1997, that he raped Lucelle in
February 1997:
Na, noong isang araw ng PEBRERO 1997, sa loob ng kuwarto ng aking kapatid na babae, pumasok ako na
nadatnang nakahiga si LUCILLE ULIT sa isang papag na anyong natutulog. Lumapit ako sa kanya at
pinaghihipuan sa maseselang parte ng kanyang katawan at nang siyay magising tinakot ko siyang huwag
sisigaw, habang siya ay aking hinuhubaran ng Short na kasama pati ang kanyang panty. Nagpupumiglas
siya habang ako ay nakadagan sa kanya na noon din ay hinuhubad ko ang aking brief. Pinaghahalikan ko
po siya habang siya ay nagpupumiglas at umiiyak at noon din ay aking pinasok ang aking ari sa kanyang
ari. Umiiyak siya habang ang aking ari ay labas masok sa kanyang ari. Nang ako ay makaraos ay tinakot ko
siyang huwag magsusumbog sa kanyang mga magulang.[49]
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay
chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not under
arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. [50]
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this
covers investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the
municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.[51] The barangay
chairman[52] is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants
statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.
The Sufficiency of Evidence on
Lucelles Relationship with the
Appellant, her Minority, and the
Propriety of the Imposition of
the Death Penalty
The appellants conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by the prosecution, we
now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, which was
the law in effect at the time of the commission of the subject rapes, provides in part:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
...
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More importantly, they must be
both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of rape and warrant the imposition of the death
penalty.[53] In addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be
specifically alleged in the information, it must be established with certainty that the victim was below eighteen
(18) years of age or that she was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that
the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the
decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.[54]
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately established. The allegations
in both Informations that the appellant is the victims uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree is specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship.
In People v. Ferolino,[55] we said
In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO's niece is not specific enough to satisfy the special
qualifying circumstances of relationship. If the offender is merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, or guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim - it must be alleged in the information
that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree. That
relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it
was still necessary to further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree. [56]
The prosecutions evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victims uncle, being the older brother
of the victims mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In People v. Pruna,[57] the Court,
after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases, set out certain guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.[58]
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in
evidence to prove Lucelles age. While the victim testified that she was born on February 19, 1986, therefore
11 years old when the appellant twice raped her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not expressly
and clearly admit the same as required by Pruna.The corroboration of Lucelles mother as to her age is not
sufficient either, as there is no evidence that the said certificate of birth was lost or destroyed or was
unavailable without the fault of the prosecution. The fact that there was no objection from the defense
regarding the victims age cannot be taken against the appellant since it is the prosecution that has the burden
of proving the same. Moreover, the trial court did not make a categorical finding of the victims minority,
another requirement mandated by Pruna.
 Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which provides that, [w]henever rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle with the use of a deadly weapon in both
rape incidents as alleged in both informations, and under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death.
In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the appellant, the presence of
an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. In the cases at bar, although the
relationship of uncle and niece between the appellant and the victim has been duly proven, the alternative
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship
is always aggravating in crimes against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or
lower degree of the offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or
sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The relationship of uncle and niece is not
covered by any of the relationships mentioned. [59]
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set forth in Pruna, and
considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned in
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its aggravated
form, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes, the appellant should
be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, conformably to Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof other than the fact of the rape itself because
it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. [60] We find the trial
courts award of P50,000 as moral damages to the victim in each rape to be in order.
However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity to the victim in each case, the same being
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. [61] Thus, this Court awards the victim the sum of P50,000 as
civil indemnity for each count of rape.
In addition to this, appellant is ordered to pay the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages, the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon having attended the commission of the crime. [62]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and in
each case, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim,
Lucelle Serrano, P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People v Sayaboc
Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and (2) finding appellant
Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as
accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon
Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, and who were then armed with a firearm, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and with intent to
kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Joseph Galam y Antonio, by then and there
suddenly firing at the said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not given any provocation, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.[1]
At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje pleaded
not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on 10 July 1997, also pleaded
not guilty upon his arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos was at a vulcanizing shop
in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid screaming from across the road:
Enough, enough, enough! In front of her were Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were engaged in a
fisticuff. By the time Pawid was able to subdue the two men by standing between them and embracing Galam,
Buenviajes face was already bloodied and Galams shirt collar torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to
face Galam and, with his right index finger making a slicing motion across his throat, shouted: Putang-ina mo
Joseph, may araw ka rin, papatayin kita. Galam retorted, Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika.Buenviaje did
not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.[2]
More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at the Rooftop
Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short) owned by him, which was located at Barangay Quezon,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of that
fateful day, a man whom she later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the Rooftop and asked
whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked in. She answered in the negative. As she was about to
leave, Sayaboc asked another question, What time does your bosing arrive? She replied that she did not
know. She then went to the second floor of the establishment. [3]
Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. Sayaboc, who
was still seated in the swing beside the information counter with his hands tucked in the pocket of his jacket,
ordered a bottle of beer. She then went up to the kitchen, but was delayed in delivering the beer because she
gave some instructions to the dishwasher.When she gave the beer to Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked
why it took her so long to bring the beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and some
other waitresses. Then the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.[4]
Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground floor of the building. When
Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the latter to fall to the ground face up, with
blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and disappeared into the darkness. [5]
Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao, Chief Barangay
Tanod of Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon Restaurant located along
the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The
three were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop and Diego Theater. The younger
Buenviaje was on the drivers seat, while the older Buenviaje and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao
ordered pancit bihon. While he was waiting outside of the restaurant, he noticed that the tricycle was still
parked in the vacant lot, and the three occupants thereof were talking with each other. After getting his order
and while he was getting out of the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop
building. He thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc, walking briskly
toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle sped off towards the
center of the town.[6]
The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital, where he was declared dead
on arrival.[7] Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his cadaver, found four gunshot wounds
and opined that the first two of which were inflicted from behind and the last two were frontal.[8]
That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano Police Station, assigned some
investigators to go to the scene of the crime to gather evidence. At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., he and Lt.
Alejandro Parungao brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo were interviewed by the cartographic artist, who thereafter
drew a cartographic sketch showing the face of the assailant.[9]
On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial Headquarters
in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death.[10]
On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command Headquarters in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw
Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner
part of the room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then
Sayaboc told him that he wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one,
Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers brought Atty.
Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc
say, okay, he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire
time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the
comfort room.[11] That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession[12] in Ilocano dialect. He therein
confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise
implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and
attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.
At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case, 1counsel for accused Mike
Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso manifested that he be given fifteen days to file a motion
for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.[13] The trial court acceded. But instead of filing such motion first,
he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July 1999. [14] The motion for leave to file the pleading was filed the
next day only.[15]
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order[16] issued on 16 August 1999. Further, it ruled
that because of they did not seek nor were granted express leave of court prior to their filing of the demurrer
to evidence, the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted their case for judgment in
accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with
the presentation of his defense.
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi. He also flatly denied
having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights. He testified to having been beaten by six or
seven police officers in the investigating room, who then coerced him to confess to having killed
Galam.[17] Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated 20 March 1995[18] and an
affidavit dated 10 April 1995[19] to support his claim of police brutality and retraction of his confession.
In its decision dated 9 November 2000,[20] the trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the crime of
murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating
circumstances. It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel
Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery employed by Sayaboc could not be taken
against them and, therefore, declared them guilty of the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and
the two others as accomplices. Each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty and to pay solidarily
with Sayaboc the amounts of P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and the costs of the
suit in favor of the heirs of Joseph Galam.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:
I confession that he shot the victim in the back is adequate proof of treachery. Invoking People v. Aquino,[21] the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT SAYABOC GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY ONLY OF THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A
COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT
COUNSEL.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON BUENVIAJE AND ACCUSED
ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
BE HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL AFTER THEY FILED THEIR DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.
In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that the crime committed by Sayaboc was
homicide only, there being no proof of treachery because the two eyewitnesses did not see the commencement
of the shooting. Besides, treachery, as well as evident premeditation, was not specifically designated as a
qualifying circumstance in the information. Neither can the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or
reward be appreciated because they were not alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial. Sections 8
and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating and qualifying
circumstances to be alleged in the information, are beneficial to the accused and should, therefore, be applied
retroactively.
As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not
be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the
custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective
because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge
in the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya.
Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso claim that they were
denied due process because they were not able to present evidence in their defense. They ask this Court to
relax the rule of criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional right to be heard by themselves
and counsel.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that Sayabocs extrajudicial
OSG contends that for treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, it needs only to be specifically
alleged in the information and does not have to be preceded by the words qualifying or qualified by. As to the
proven circumstances of craft and price or reward, the same cannot be appreciated because they were not
specifically alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are
applicable to actions that are pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
The OSG further asserts that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him,
since it was made after he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights, particularly the right to an
independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was adduced during the trial to substantiate the claim
that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was made for the first
time in this appeal, and was based merely on an information furnished by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro
(now deceased) to Sayabocs counsel in this appeal, which makes the said information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional circumstance exists in this case
that may warrant the relaxation of the rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer to evidence carries with it a
waiver of the accuseds right to present evidence.
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we hold that such cannot be used
in evidence in this case.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. [22] The condition for
this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements
safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially
when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear
that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating
environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have
been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment,[23] the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders
the confession valueless and inadmissible.[24]
In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungaos claim that he conferred with Sayaboc for half an hour
informing him about his constitutional rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only the following:
PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to you
regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy.
Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of
Joseph Galam, owner of the said Disco House as a result of his
death. Before questions will be asked [of] you I would like to inform
you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the Philippines,
as follows: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to answer
the questions which you think will incriminate you; That you have the
right to seek the services of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this
office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.
QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you willing to give your
true statement regarding the death of Joseph Galam?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo.
QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to assist you in this
investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. [25]
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. In People v. Jara,[26] the Court explained:
The stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with
the curt Opo as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up
of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.[27] It should allow the suspect to
consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect
is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and
had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for
another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. While
we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts
show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo
remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial investigation. The trial court attributed the silence of
Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:
As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It was in his character for him to want to be
a central figure in a drama, albeit tragic for others. He would do what he wanted to do regardless of the
advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo could only advise him of his constitutional rights, which was
apparently done. The said counsel could not stop him from making his confession even if he did try. [28]
We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a garrulous man who would do what he
wanted to do regardless of the advice of others is immaterial. The waiver of a right is within the rights of a
suspect. What is lacking is a showing, to the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful attempt at each stage of
the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions. If anything, it appears that
Sayabocs counsel was ineffectual for having been cowed by his clients enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was
indifferent to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during
the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences of answering the
questions propounded. In People v. Deniega,[29] we said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer
merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession. Indeed, as
an officer of the court, it is an attorneys duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth. However, counsel should
be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and
halting the investigation should the need arise.The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under
custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring
criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with. Those tasked
with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden of ensuring that all
evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their duties are untainted with constitutional
infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent
and the weak, against possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be
tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against him. We
hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc shot and killed Galam in the early
evening of 2 December 1994. He was seen waiting at the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of that day, shooting
Galam shortly after the latters arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime to a waiting tricycle. Credible
witnesses described Sayabocs appearance to the police soon after the shooting incident and prepared affidavits
about the incident. They identified Sayaboc at the police station while he was in custody, during the
preliminary investigation, and, again, in open court. Such positive identification constitutes more than
sufficient direct evidence to uphold the finding that Sayaboc was Galams killer. It cannot just be rebutted by
Sayabocs bare denial and weak alibi.
Appellants claim that the information against them is insufficient for failure to specifically state that
treachery and evident premeditation were qualifying circumstances holds no water. In People v. Aquino,[30] we
held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need
not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an
offense. Nevertheless, from our review of the case, we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery
has been sufficiently proved to qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Thus, two conditions must be
present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be
appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars
are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. [31]
In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses did not hear any shout or
conversation between the assailant and the victim immediately before the attack could only mean that Sayaboc
had approached his victim through stealth.[32] While not improbable, that conclusion is merely an
inference. The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified as to how the aggression began. The witnesses
testified having heard four shots, the last two of which were seen as having been fired while Sayaboc was
facing Galam. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and the shoulder,
and two wounds on the right side of Galams back. Although it is plausible that the initial shots were fired from
behind, such inference is insufficient to establish treachery. [33]
Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident premeditation
exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of evident premeditation are (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[34]
Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the testimony that
the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of that fateful
day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown
how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident
premeditation cannot be considered.[35]
The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved, can neither be considered
because they were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime for it to be considered in the imposition of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to
an accused and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect. [36]
Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of homicide only, which is
punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances appreciated for or
against him, the penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose
maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period.
We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio
Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial court because they were denied the right to be heard
by the trial court. It must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July 1999 was without
prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said pleading was filed only the next day. The filing of
the demurrer was clearly without leave of court. The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on
demurrer to evidence found in Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure when it
disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present
evidence for the accused.[37] The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is
insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot
be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever
dictated by convenience. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions
for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to
present its evidence.[38]
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present evidence on their
behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by themselves and counsel.
On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence of conspiracy between Marlon
Buenviaje and Sayaboc.
It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy. [39] But the same was not established by
competent proof in this case. The extrajudicial confession[40] and the newspaper reports[41] adduced by the
prosecution, which both contained Sayabocs statement pointing to Marlon Buenviaje as the one who paid
him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible in evidence. The first, as earlier stated, was executed in violation Costs de oficio.
of Sayabocs constitutional rights. The second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented
as witnesses to affirm the veracity thereof.[42] SO ORDERED.

Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be shown by circumstantial
evidence.[43] As correctly found by the trial court and concurred with by the OSG, the concatenation of
circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc, thus:
1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph Galam, causing him injuries on his
face and prompting him to make a threat to kill the latter;[44]
2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who had no discernible motive to do
so;[45]
3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and the other appellants in the
tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot near the crime scene;[46]
4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and disappeared; [47]
5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or until 10 July 1997; and
6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje offered prosecution eyewitness
Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad, allowances, and two motorcycles in consideration of her
retraction of her testimony against Sayaboc.[48]
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is more than one circumstances
established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proved; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites are
present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator equally guilty as Sayaboc, Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the
same penalty as that of Sayaboc.
However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is paucity of evidence linking them to
the killing. They might have been with Marlon Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is nothing to show that
they knew of the conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent any active participation in furtherance of the common
design or purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the crime scene or in the tricycle driven by Marlon
Buenviaje does not necessarily make them conspirators. Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act
without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish conspiracy. [49]
Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial courts award of actual damages,
representing the wake and burial expenses, is reduced to P106,436, this being the amount supported by
receipts. The award of moral damages is, however, increased to P50,000 conformably with current
jurisprudence.[50] In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 2912 is MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Joseph Galam the amounts of P106,436 as
actual damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Tanenggee v People (Extra judicial confession)
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents
were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in
Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes
involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz:
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private
individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial
document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer,
Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein accused, being then the Manager of the
COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria,
Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and
filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading "BD#083/97"
after the letters reading "PN", with figures reading "07.24.97" after the word "DATE", with the amount of
₱16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or
causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging or
causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature
at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by
Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and filled up METROBANK
CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading "July 24, 1997",
with the name reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and in figures,
which purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon,
and directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as authorized
signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4)
times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that
Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the
signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK and that he obtained a loan of
₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not
the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK, neither did he participate in
the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note and signing and endorsement of said
METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his
signature in the said documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above
set forth, the said accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of
₱15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his
possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of ₱15,363,666.67,
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a
plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:
During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that accused was
the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December 1997, no other
stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-markings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and
cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has substantial deposits in
his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank. Appellant approved
and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed,
forged or caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the
back of the same to show that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to
the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified,
appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the
same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and
an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a
written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he conducted
and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted having committed
the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan
were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be the client of the bank who should
receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document
voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N").
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the promissory
notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear her signature although it
is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her manager accommodated valued clients;
that she signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks,
appellant took the same which remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures appearing
on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan were not written by
one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several cashier’s
checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the same; and that it was
appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree from the
Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994
until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with Metrobank for nine (9) years
starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas Branch, Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw
the day to day operations of the branch, solicited accounts and processed loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the branch
manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit line for forty
million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious account for his
personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the bank. In the middle of 1997,
Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients was
allowed by and known to the bank to hide their finances due to rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5) times
on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for
six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos (₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21
November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos
(₱2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the
bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon receiving the
instructions, appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the same
through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the street. The latter would then
return to the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of
the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashier’s check representing
the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s messenger to the office of Tan, and the
latter would return the same through his own messenger already endorsed together with a deposit slip under
Current Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen
million pesos (₱16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan
obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory
notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix
them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio Branch for
more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice
president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day. When appellant arrived at the
said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other people present: two (2) senior branch officers,
two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a representative
of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was
intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he will not
sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and
that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting,
appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no
avail.10
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision 11 dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner
guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents charged in each of the five (5) Informations
filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight
(8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law.
2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight
(8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight
(8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱6
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight
(8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱2
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.
5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight
(8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱3
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 12 November 1997 until fully paid.
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.
As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence imposed shall
not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision 13 affirming with modification the RTC
Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee on
five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24 July 1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.14
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its September 6,
2007 Resolution.16
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the basic
issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written
statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the
same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were established by the prosecution.17
The Parties’ Arguments
While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges
that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement
was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right
to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription
invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment but is
applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of the appealed
CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is
applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a
person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. 19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that
petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he
managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but
merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of
his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel "applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation."
Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service
Commission:21
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12
of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.22
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer
in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No
error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration
to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already prepared
typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is just an afterthought
for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and
the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption.
On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The
pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the
crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the
CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could
only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated
with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and 24 were even
initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to every question
was fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from
extraneous restraints.24
In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s
extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not
have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and
forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where
the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed. 26
Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his
signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral
degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He
is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just
unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect
no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to
defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or genuine one.
A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts whose
opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded but is even authorized by law28 to
conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes
and cashier’s checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also made an independent examination
of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan
appearing in the promissory notes are different from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit
Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to
disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect.
Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive
and binding to this Court.
No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter. His
non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the case of the
prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence or the
witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its case.29 Moreover, the
presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal
of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal
witness who could exculpate him from liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the
subject documents, the most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the
right to have compulsory process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section
14(2)31 of the Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of
these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans
covered by the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by Tan against his
approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this
allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence. "It is settled that denials
which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They
merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation of
the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and
based on petitioner’s own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful
acts alleged in the Informations.
Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification
of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed
in a public, official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual.
Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or
signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it
to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the
falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial
documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions."34Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a
check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A
cashier’s check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature
appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein. 35
Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or malversation,
the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex
crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa,
because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has
already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another
is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit estafa.
"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means
of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation."37Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." 38
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to process
purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the
cashier’s checks.1âwphi1 Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Once
in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future Commodities.
Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to
his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount
of about ₱43 million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money without
falsifying the questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa,
and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to defraud the
bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Document by the lower courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00.
The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period 39 if the amount
defrauded is over ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter
sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an incremental
penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed 20 years
of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of commercial document. The crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit
estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The applicable
penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more serious offense than falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said amounts being in excess of
₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional penalty of one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum limitation provided under Article 315, which is twenty (20)
years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA in each
case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful range. Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed for the estafa charge
against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would
then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore
sentenced in each case to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the
petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.