https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/feb2012/gr_193978_2012.

html
G.R. No. 193978
February 28, 2012
JELBERT B. GALICTO, Petitioner,
vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the
Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No.
(EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010.

On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino mentioned in his State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the
Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System – a government owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC). The Senate of the Philippines (Senate) with the legislation then conducted an inquiry of the
said allegations extending to other GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs) which
disclosed that "officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting
themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well
as other] irregular and abusive practices,". The Senate then issued Senate Resolution No. 17
"urging the President to order the immediate suspension of said unusual, large and excessive
benefits.

On September 8, 2010, Pres. Aquino issued EO 7, effective September 25, 2010, imposing guiding
principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for
GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI
employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force
information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in
the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO
900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a
suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees
until December 31, 2010.

The petitioner, a PhilHealth employee, claimed that EO 7 is invalid, unconstitutional and null and
void for lack of legal basis,

Issue:
Whether or not EO 7 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Ruling:
No. Certiorari is not the proper remedy as under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance
of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an
incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. Also, the
petitioner lacks locus standi or legal standing – a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. Moreover, the petition has a defective jurat and has been mooted by supervening
events.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_154599_2004.html
G.R. No. 154599
January 21, 2004
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF
MANILA, respondents.

Facts:
On 16 March 2000, the Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga) adopted and ratified its own
Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization. By virtue of the above-cited provision,
the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar
of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting on 21
October 2002 the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga
Chapter of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.

On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,
providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City
Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections.

On 16 July 2002, the Liga sent a letter to the Mayor of Manila requesting to veto the ordinance since
it bypassed the functions of the Liga but instead, the Mayor of Manila signed and approved the
ordinance issued on 15 August 2002 as Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002.

On 27 August 2002, the Liga filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, and respondent City
Mayor’s Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, dated 15 August 2002 , for being patently contrary
to law.

Issue:
Whether or not the City Council and Mayor of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling:
No. First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor claimed any
judicial or quasi-judicial privilege. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Second, although the instant petition is styled as a
petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Third, even
granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here
a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and
compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to
this Court should be allowed.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_209287_2014.html
G.R. No. 211356
September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP,
SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE
PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE
MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY
POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Respondents.

Facts:
On January 7, 2010, petitioner’s company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay, Aklan for the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a hotel
over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of the company.

On January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the "no build zone" demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

On February 1, 2010, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor and followed
up on May 13, 2010 through a letter but no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor and
petitioner continued with the construction of the hotel.

On March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government and on
June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition
of the hotel.

Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA.

On August 13, 2013, the CA dismissed the petition because the special writ of certiorari can only be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since
the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions certiorari is not applicable.
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner is to file a petition for declaratory relief with the
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was denied by the CA on February 3,
2014 through the challenged Resolution.

Issues:
A. Whether or not declaratory relief is still available to petitioner.
B. Whether or not respondent mayor committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued EO 10.

Ruling:
A. No. Declaratory relief is not viable because it assumes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. The closure and demolition of the hotel
rendered futile any possible guidelines that may be issued by the trial court for carrying out the
directives in the challenged EO 10. Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that declaratory relief is
the proper remedy given such a situation.
B. No. The principal issue is the non-compliance with the permit, clearance, and zoning
requirements for building constructions and the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order
the closing and demolition of non-compliant establishments. 1âwphi1
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_209287_2014.html
G.R. No. 209287
July 1, 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN;
JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-
CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ
ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE,
BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY
GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER
MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR,
YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

Facts:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of
the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50
Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

According to Secretary Florencio Abad of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), that
amount is part of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) issued with the intention of
speeding up economic expansion based on senators’ letter of request for funding instituted in 2011.
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations
under Personnel Services;2 (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from
the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects. The DBM indicated in its website that the DAP releases had been
sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the
savings had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased
Personnel Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings;
and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that
had been earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.

Ruling:
Yes. The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1)
there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the
Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis
mota of the case. An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The
incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant
issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein
meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being
implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such implementation was
repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP
entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jan2006/gr_162416_2006.html
G.R. No. 162416
January 31, 2006
CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40, Manila-RTC,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant
of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation
of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1689.

Private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development
Management Corporation but the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant,
purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for
insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and
directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions. A warrant of arrest was
issued based from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.

Ruling:
No. This Court finds that these documents obtained sufficiently establish the existence of probable
cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also,
petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the trial court as he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction based on the following:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the
court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the
parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in
the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by
the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is
acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it
in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the
court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in
land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a
non-resident defendant.
The court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves
the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an
interest. In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely
to comply with due process requirements.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_200334_2014.html
G.R. No. 200334
July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,
vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
On November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel
Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union, received a tip from an unknown person that one Marvin
Buya (Marvin) " will be transporting marijuana" from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. PSI Bayan then ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1
Taracatac), to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San
Fernando City. A jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two
male passengers, Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao, who were carrying bags with
marijuana. Coaged and Dayao did not know that they are carrying marijuana inside their bags as
they are only doing a favor for Marvin. SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed.

Dayao was dismissed because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal
liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344 while on May
21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty.

Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision however, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and
affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against
warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, he voluntarily opened
his bag."

Issues:
A. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant.
B. Whether or not the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and
C. Whether or not there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

Ruling:
A. No. For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."
B. No. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures]
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusionary rule or the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to
go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as
evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."
C. No. Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict
Cogaed.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1944/feb1944/gr_l-48930_1944.html
G.R. No. L-48930
February 23, 1944
ANTONIO VAZQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO DE BORJA, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-48931
February 23, 1944
FRANCISCO DE BORJA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO VAZQUEZ, respondent.

Facts:
On January, 1932, the defendant, Antonio Vazquez sell to the plaintiff, Franciso De Borja cavans of
palay to be delivered on February, 1932 and received from the plaintiff the agreed payment sum.
However, the defendant sis not deliver the agreed quantity based on contract causing damages
suffered by the plaintiff.

Later on the defendant denied the contract but instead noted that it was made between the plaintiff
and Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development Co., Inc., where he was the acting manager at the time
the transaction took place. By way of counterclaim, the defendant alleged that he suffered damages
on account of the filing of this action against him by the plaintiff with full knowledge that he is acting
on behalf of the corporation.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and releasing the plaintiff from the
defendant’s counterclaim. The defendant appealed but the Court of Appeals only modified sum for
payment to the plaintiff. But by a subsequent resolution upon the defendant's motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals set aside its judgment and ordered that the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings.

The defendant then filed the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 48930) to review and reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals doubly erred in ordering that the cause be remanded to the court of origin
for further trial. The action being on a contract, and it appearing from the preponderance of the
evidence that the party liable on the contract is the Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc.
which is not a party herein, the complaint should have been dismissed. On the other hand if
independently of the contract Vazquez by his fault or negligence cause damaged to the plaintiff, he
would be liable to the latter under article 1902 of the Civil Code. But then the plaintiff's cause of
action should be based on culpa aquiliana and not on the contract alleged in his complaint herein;
and Vazquez' liability would be principal and not merely subsidiary, as the Court of Appeals has
erroneously held. No such cause of action was alleged in the complaint or tried by express or
implied consent of the parties by virtue of section 4 of Rule 17. Hence the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the issue and could not adjudicate upon it (Reyes vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 48754.)
Consequently it was error for the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to try and
decide such issue.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/aug1949/gr_l-2372_1949.html
G.R. No. L-2372
August 26, 1949
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CRISANTO ARAGON, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, and YARAS and COMPANY, FAR
EAST,respondents-appellants.

Facts:
On September 27, 1946, the S/S Belle of the Sea took on board at Los Angeles, California, U. S. A.,
goods for shipment to Manila arrived on December 23, 1946, and discharged her cargo at the
Government piers under the supervision and custody of MTCI. One carton of assorted samples was
not delivered to Yaras and Company and was lost through the negligence either of the MTCI or
IHCP.

On July 9, 1947, the respondent-appellant, Yaras and Company, Far East (Yaras), filed a complaint
in the Municipal Court of Manila against the Manila Terminal Co., Inc., (MTCI) and International
Harvester Company of the Philippines (IHCP) alleging that MTCI is in charge of the custody and
delivery to the respective owners of cargoes discharged at the Government piers in the City of
Manila; that IHCP is the agent in the Philippines of the vessel Belle of the Sea. The complaint prayed
for judgment either against MTCI or IHCP for the amount of lost cargo, with legal interest from the
date of the filing of the complaint.

IHCP filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction
to try case because the action involves admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, but was overruled on
December 16, 1947.

IHCP then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition against the Hon.
Crisanto Aragon, Judge of the Municipal Court of Manila, and Yaras for the purpose of restraining
said respondent judge from in so far as IHCP was concerned, on the ground that admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction is involved. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioners IHCP, ordering the respondent judge of the Municipal Court to desist
involvement.

From the facts alleged in the complaint filed in the municipal court, it is clear that the International
Harvester Company of the Philippines, as agent in the Philippines of the vessel S/S Belle of the
Sea, is alternatively being held liable for the loss of the cargo in question through its negligence.
Inasmuch as it is expressly that the cargo of the S/S Belle of the Sea was discharged on December
23, 1946, at the Government piers under the supervision and custody of the Manila Terminal
Company, Inc., the International Havester Company of the Philippines may be held liable only on the
assumption that the goods had been lost in transit or before being discharged at the pier. In other
words the liability of the International Harvester Company of the Philippines is predicated on the
contract of carriage by sea between the International Harvester Company of the Philippines and
Yaras and Company as evidenced by Bill of Lading No. 105, independently of the liability of the
Manila Terminal Co., Inc, as operator of an arrastre service.
Admiralty has jurisdiction over all maritime contracts, in whatever form, wherever they were
executed or are to be performed, but not over non-maritime contracts, (2 Corpus Juris Secundum, p.
84.) Whether or not a contract is maritime depends not on the place where the contract is made and
is to be executed, making the locality the test, but on the subject-matter of the contract, making the
true criterion a maritime service or a maritime transaction. (Id., p. 85.) Specifically, admiralty has
jurisdiction of a proceeding in rem or in personam for the breach of a contract of affreightment,
whether evidenced by a bill of lading or a charter party. (Id., pp. 90-91.) And typical of a controversy
over contracts of affreightment is a suit of one party against the other for loss of or damage to the
cargo. (1 American Jurisprudence, p. 567.) This is the very case now before us, because the
respondent Yaras and Company seeks to recover from the petitioner International Harvester
Company of the Philippines the value of a certain lost cargo.
The contention of the respondent Yaras and Company that admirally jurisdiction is not involved
herein because the contract in question was made upon land and to be terminated upon land,
merely reflects the English rule which had long been rejected in the United States. It is now settled in
the latter country that "the jurisdiction of admiralty in matters of contract depends upon the subject-
matter, i.e., the nature and character of the contract, and that the English rule which conceded
jurisdiction (with few exceptions) only to contracts made upon and the to be performed upon
navigable waters, is inadmissable, the true criterion being that the contract has reference to maritime
service or maritime transaction." (Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 127.) We choose to adopt
the sound American rule. Even in England the English rule was not without protest. Lord Kenyon,
in Menetone vs. Gibbons, 3 Term, 269, had expressed the following criticism: "if the admiralty has
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, to say that it is necessary for the parties to go upon the sea to
execute the instrument borders upon absurdity."
The respondent Yaras and Company cannot invoke the rule against multiplicity of suits, for the
simple reason that said rule has to be subservient to the superior requirement that the court must
have jurisdiction. In view of our conclusion that the cause of action of said respondent against
International Harvester Company of the Philippines involves admiralty over which the courts of first
instance have original jurisdiction (Par. 4, Sec. 56, Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission, as
reproduced in sec. 43 [d] of Republic Act No. 296), and to which the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace courts (including municipal courts) does not extend (sec. 68, Act No. 136 of the Philippine
Commission, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 4090, reproduced in par, 2, sec. 88, Republic
Act No. 296), the respondent judge was properly restrained from further proceeding with civil case
No. IV-262.
We hold also that prohibition is the proper remedy, since the respondent judge was taking
cognizance of the case over which he had no jurisdiction and his order overruling the motion to
dismiss filed by the petitioner-appellee is interlocutory and therefore not appealable. (Sec. 2 of Rule
67, Rules of Court 2.) At any rate, the remedy of appeal available when the case shall have been
decided on the merits, is inadequate.
The appealed judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs against the appellant Yaras and Company.
So ordered.

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