N BANC

G.R. No. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, vs. The Honorable HARRIET O.

DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in
his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO,
LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON,
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State
Prosecutor's Office), Respondents.

FACTS:

On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the

filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner
MAYOR ANTONIO SANCHEZ, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.The Panel of State Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation which Atty.
Mariciano Brion Jr., counsel for Sanchez represented, as he was absent
during the said investigation.

On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the
petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in
Canlubang, Laguna. The morning after that, it was served to Sanchez, and
he was immediately taken to the said camp.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by

Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and
the killing of Gomez. AS such, he was then placed on "arrest status" and
taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. The respondent prosecutors
immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador
Panelo as his counsel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Lanzanas was served
on Sanchez. He was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp
Crame, where he remains confined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial
Court, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and
Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.ct

They were all issued a warrant of arrest in connection with the

aforementioned crime.

Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice expressed his apprehension that the

trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the
tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the
relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. Thus,
this Court ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig,
Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet
Demetriou.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

law library

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the

grounds that they were denied the right to present evidence at the
preliminary investigation; only the Ombudsman had the competence to
conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court
has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with
seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza
and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan.chanrob

ISSUE:
1) WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
2) WON the unlawful arrest of the accused resulted in the failure to acquired jurisdiction
over his person.

HELD:
1) NO. The crime of rape with homicide does not fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as such offense does not deal with graft and corruption cases and or an
offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation
between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as
municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged.
The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid
down in People v. Montejo. In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged
with murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at
a police substation.The Court held that, although public office is not an element of the
crime of murder in abstract, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their
respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices.

2) NO.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the
accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash
the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other
grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court. The Court also adverts to its uniform
ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest,
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny
him the right to be released because of such defect.

G.R. No. L-53373

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF
LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala filed an information for estafa
against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case
was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground
that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. However,
the motion was denied.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals restrained Judge
Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court. When a 5decision was rendered, the Court of Appeals granted the writ and
perpetually restrained the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of
the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review. 7

The Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., reversed the resolution of

the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate
dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal attaching a copy of the letter
of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment.
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition
for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in
the Court of Appeals A restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order.Thus, the
petitioner filed a petition praying that said decision be reversed and set aside,
respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed
not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said
case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under
orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. However,
the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the
case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power
to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary
of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that
an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine
the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused
is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
 [G.R. NO. 147065 : March 14, 2008]

JUANITO CHAN y LIM, a.k.a. ZHANG

ZHENTING, Petitioner, v.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PABLO C.
FORMARAN III and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME TASK
FORCE, represented by PO3 DANILO L. SUMPAY, Respondents.

FACTS

Police Director Panfilo M. Lacson, the Chief of the Presidential Anti-Organized

Crime Task Force (PAOCTF), referred to the State Prosecutor for appropriate
action the evidence collected by the task force during a buy-bust operation
against petitioner Juanito Chan, a Chinese citizen who was a resident of
Binondo, Manila. The evidence consisted of one self-sealing transparent
plastic bag containing white crystalline substance/granules suspected to be
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "SHABU," Buy-bust money amounting to
six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) placed inside a yellow paper bag with
markings "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" and one green Hyundai van with plate number
ULK 815 used in transporting the confiscated SHABU.2

PO3 Danilo L. Sumpay, PO3 Rolly S. Ibañez and SPO1 Ronald C. Parreño
narrated in their joint affidavit that their Confidential Informant reported to
them that a certain Juanito Chan was engaged in the sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in different parts of Metro Manila,
and that Chan offered him a handsome commission if he would find a buyer
of shabu. According to them, the CI and Chan made a deal for the sale of
one kilogram of shabu worth P600,000.00. They said that based on this
information, a buy-bust operation was organized by the PAOCTF. Hence,
they apprehended Chan after he turned over to the poseur-buyer a small
box containing one self-sealing transparent plastic bag of white crystalline
substance in exchange for the 12 bundles of boodle money which he
received from the poseur-buyer.

Petitioner requested a preliminary investigation and waived his rights under

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. He submitted his Counter-
Affidavit5 denying the charges against him claiming that he was the victim of
a frame-up and extortion by the police officers who allegedly demanded P2
million in exchange for his release. He contended that his warrantless arrest
was illegal because he was not committing a crime at that time.

After preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III 1999

recommended the filing of an Information against the petitioner. He did not
give credence to petitioner's unsubstantiated claim of frame up and extortion
and said that the defenses and accusation of petitioner were matters of
defense that should be threshed out in court. He further averred that
according to the laboratory findings, the white crystalline substance which
appears to have been taken from the possession of the respondent is
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. As such, the undersigned
investigating prosecutor finds sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that [the] crime charged has been committed and that the herein
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should, therefore, be held for trial.

whether or not respondent Secretary of Justice erred in affirming the finding of probable cause of prosecutor

HELD: NO

 Crespo dotrine does not bar the Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating prosecutor in the
exercise of his power of control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to
refrain from entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor’s finding when the Information is already filed in court. In
other words, the power or authority of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor’s findings subsists even after the
Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must
evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on
courts

 Albeit the findings of the Justice Secretary are not absolute and are subject to judicial review, this Court generally
adheres to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, particularly when the said findings
are well-supported by the facts as established by the evidence on record.[22] Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the
part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officer’s finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is
the function of the prosecutor.[

 Simply stated, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review, unless made with grave abuse of
discretion.

 The general rule is that the courts do not interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the
specificity and adequacy of the averments in a criminal complaint. The determination of probable cause for the purpose of
filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then
to the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive
determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

 Thus, the findings of the Justice Secretary may be reviewed through a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65
based on the allegation that he acted with grave abuse of discretion

 we hold that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the finding of probable cause
by the State Prosecutor

 In the case at bench, petitioner is charged with illegal sale of a prohibited drug. A successful prosecution of this
offense requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[31] To
our mind, the documentary and object evidence submitted to the State Prosecutor, particularly the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest, the 935.80 grams of shabu, and the buy-bust money sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause against petitioner for the crime charged. After all, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.[32]Unless there is a
clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were impelled by any improper motive,
or were not properly performing their duties, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.

 The allegation that the State Prosecutor was not impartial in conducting the preliminary investigation is merely
speculative — a bare allegation unworthy of credence. Such accusation is worthless in light of our finding that
there is, indeed, probable cause against petitioner. Moreover, bias and partiality can never be presumed.
Petitioner’s allegation of frame-up and extortion is evidentiary in nature, and are matters for his defense
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.

FACTS:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Isabela, which were later identified as the
dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.The venue was later transferred to Manila. The RTC
of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua
except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was
appealed to this Court where it acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2
Maderal. Thus, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

In the hearing of the urgent motion of preliminary investigation filed by the petitioners to quash the
warrants of arrest, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order
denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court

On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of said Judge
Anghad. Furthermore, he filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued
2001 dismissing the informations for murder."

ISSUE:
SSUE. WON the adjudication of a motion to quash requires jurisdiction or custody of law over the body of the
accused.
DECISION.
Yes, adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor
custody of law over the body of the accused.

A previous case was filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2
Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City for the same deaths. They
were subsequently acquitted
based on reasonable doubt by the SC.
2 The court nevertheless found that there was grave abuse of discretion by Judge Anghad first; he quashed the
standing warrant of because of a
subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable
cause due to the political climate in
the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the criminal
cases on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order against further
proceeding
with the case