EN BANC
debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money,
[G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, v. LUZON SURETY CO.,
INC., claimant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellee.
Tolentino & Garcia and D. R. Cruz for appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACTS; BINDING EFFECT OF CONTRACTS UPON HEIRS
OF DECEASED PARTY. — The binding effect of contracts upon the
heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in the Rules
of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid
from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule
39). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate
is ultimately a payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a
payment by the heirs and distributes, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would
have been entitled to receive. The general rule, therefore, is that a
party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
2. ID.; SURETYHIP; NATURE OF OBLIGATION OF SURETY. — The
nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the
conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a
principal inducement for the contract. The creditor expects of the
surety nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that said creditor
might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal
resulting from an obligation to give; and to the creditor, it was
indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by the surety
himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was
paid to it.
3. ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATION OF GUARANTOR; SUPERVENING
INCAPACITY OF GUARANTOR, EFFECT ON CONTRACT. — The
qualification of integrity in the guarantor or surety is required to be
present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty.
Once the contract of guaranty has become perfected and binding, the
supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the
disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not
terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a
replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the
creditor; it is his right, not his duty, he may waive it if he chooses, and
hold the guarantor to his bargain.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing
its claim against the Estate of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No.
Q-293) for failure to state a cause of action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on
twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each
subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady,
a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the
Luzon Surety Co.’s of having guaranteed, the various principals in
favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity
agreements, all contained the following stipulations:chanroblesvirtual
1awlibrary
"Premiums. — As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned
jointly and severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of
________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines Currency, in
advance as premium there of for every __________ months or
fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof
is in effect.
Indemnity. — The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times
to indemnify the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and
save it harmless from and against any and all damages, losses, costs,
stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and expenses of whatsoever kind
and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or
incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or any
extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the
instance of the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on
behalf of the undersigned or any of them; and to pay, reimburse and
make good to the COMPANY, its successors and assigns, all sums
and amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or cause
to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or
any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the
amount involved in the litigation or other matters growing out of or
connected therewith for counsel or attorney’s fees, but in no case less
than P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or
renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the payment
thereof under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned
without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement for
the purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified
of any renewal or extension of this ________ which may be granted
under this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company. — Any and all sums of
money so paid by the company shall bear interest at the rate of 12%
per annum which interest, if not paid, will be accummulated and added
to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as the capital
and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid to the
COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable
therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any
part thereof or not.
x x x
Waiver. — It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned
that any question which may arise between them by reason of this
document and which has to be submitted for decision to Courts of
Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent jurisdiction in
the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue. Our right
to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity
agreement is hereby likewise waived.
x x x
Our Liability Hereunder. — It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY
to bring suit against the principal upon his default, or to exhaust the
property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the undersigned
indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary one, the same as
that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the
occurrence of such default." (Rec. App. pp. 98-
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of
the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the
counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid
premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per
cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of
Hemady’s estate, the lower court, by order of September 23, 1953,
dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two grounds: (1) that the
premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not
contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the
undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities
incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that
"whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable
to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be
guarantor."chanrob1es virtual 1aw
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in
effects, the reasoning of the court below ran
follows:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady,
his liability as a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of
a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the claim cannot be
considered contingent. This Court believes that there is merit in this
contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It
should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a person
to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out by
the Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not
102.) transmissible. Upon the death of Hemady, his integrity was not
transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss therefore, may
occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate because
upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has
exclusively relied on the personality, character, honesty and integrity
of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the fact that in the printed
form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled ‘Security
by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and renounced
by the security company. The security company has not demanded
from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security
by way of first mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim
presented by Luzon Surety Company, no real property was mentioned
in the list of properties mortgaged which appears at the back of the
indemnity agreement." (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).
library We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code
(Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257),
the rule is that — "Contracts take effect only as between the parties,
as their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law."chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the
debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance
they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs
succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his
obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles
659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby
confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
"ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law."chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death."chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In Mojica v. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court
ruled:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession
are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article
661) and can not be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract
to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the
deceased (Barrios v. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
x x x inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co.
"The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the
provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with
that principle, the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be
"third persons" in relation to any contracts touching the real estate of
their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance;
they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in
the hands of him from whom they derive their rights."chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(See also Galasinao v. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de
Guzman v. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is
not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of
a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a
payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid
claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would
have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is
a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial
rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has
characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved
into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases
where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and
by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the
imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the
obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion
that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal
expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the
Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations
of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of
money, resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety
Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by
Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the
money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by
stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the general
rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be
expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the
provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued
upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
"(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. — Lo general es la transmisibilidad
de darechos y obligaciones; le excepcion, la intransmisibilidad.
Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la
transmision, como elemento natural a toda relacion juridica, salvo las
personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es menester el pacto
expreso, porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus
herederos.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante,
sobre ellos recaen los efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por
sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se quiere, es indespensable
convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir más allá de
las personas que les dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los
sucesores de esa persona; cuando no se quiera esto, se impone una
estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos
tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las
mismas personas que lo otorgon." (Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX,
p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a
contract is deemed to have contracted for himself and his heirs and
assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect;
hence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to
terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not
require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing
more than the company’s faith and confidence in the financial stability
of the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article
1311 exists when they are "not transmissible by operation of law". The
provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses
that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case
in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct
(Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership
(Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the
Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084)
contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death
of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the
effect that "one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a
person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and
sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees".
It will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be
present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty. It
is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and
binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate
to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; and if that
be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his
integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the
capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs
as follows:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
"ART. 2057. — If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of
a crime involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor
may demand another who has all the qualifications required in the
preceding article. The case is excepted where the creditor has
required and stipulated that a specified person should be
guarantor."chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the
supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the
disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not
terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a
replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the
creditor: it is his right, not his duty; he may waive it if he chooses, and
hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present
Civil Code is incompatible with the trial court’s stand that the
requirement of integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latter’s
undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the
guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of
Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature
of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves,
nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily
passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise
to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5, Rule
87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; Gaskell & Co. v. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810,
814).
"The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises
when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is
insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety
has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays
something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured.
When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right
to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has
contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed
the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action
against anybody — no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May
v. Vann, 15 Pla., 553; Gibson v. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; Maxey v. Carter,
10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves v. Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; Ernst v.
Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)"chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
For defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers
to a case where the surety files claims against the estate of the
principal debtor; and it is urged that the rule does not apply to the case
before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal debtor.
The argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between
parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor,
could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors
if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not
file such a claim against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a
solidary co-debtor of his principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may
claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from
the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter
does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the
principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of
the administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles 2071
and 2067 of the New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor’s liability is not
extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety
Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate’s
liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the
solution to this question, the Luzon Surety’s claim did state a cause of
action, and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are
ordered remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed
in accordance with law. Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee. So
ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831
affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No.
18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC)
and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement[3] in the
amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of
the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed
a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in
five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement,[4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was
intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories,
and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in
favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for the loan dated December 13,
1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6]
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed
as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During
the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund
and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that
is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each
of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities[9] was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the
latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February
5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money against
the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her
Answer[13] and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since
she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the
petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits
ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been
filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed
was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also
found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of
the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void,
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and
that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been
probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove
that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to
which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list
of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling
that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the
trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case
to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the
trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE
NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the
deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case,
Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S.
Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document;
as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal
capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the
probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement
was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the
deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the
money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held
that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It
further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void,
since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been
probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic
terms when the deceased referred to them as all other properties.
Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in
the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to
the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN
BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM
RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.

IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE
EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING
GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF
P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF
P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT
THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were
transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint
agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since
respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any
condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary
thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the
deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the
complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The
active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in
the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a
waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate
proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint
agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under
consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and
appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence
S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all
establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late
Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary
obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980
and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the
obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The
petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by
the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and
severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to
file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective
personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola
maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from
the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed
with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution
of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a
claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation,
the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in
declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even
if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother
Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court
as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore,
she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in
the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court.
Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed
any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document
presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be
bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not
the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b)
whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution
of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs
until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a
will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose
of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication
of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements
or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are
the same properties embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the
deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will[24] which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund
and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-
encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the
decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was
making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning
the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time
of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three
(3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts
approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction.[27] Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in
the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover,
it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity
of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no
showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs
of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors
was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and
creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption
of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the
negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as
parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein
after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an
event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the
validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The
partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability
cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed
barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due,
or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be
filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action,
or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his
lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against
the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court
as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng
Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the
deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees,
legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts
and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private
respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by
her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the
promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the
petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets
and liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue
of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and
between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines[34] However, the documentary evidence[35] clearly
reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of
liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank,
with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore,
no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to
show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial
notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is
wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus,
the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in
affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and
JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO
YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the
decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626
entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the
decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and
severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing
the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey
of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision
insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May
30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot
773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area
of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of
Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804)
issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental
Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,
are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear
why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only
three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions
of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares.
The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also
cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and
his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the
outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese
time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question
but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of
the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.
2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A
with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes
Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and
as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters
was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on
September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer
certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-
B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B.
Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5
Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292
were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the
administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed
in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A
and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on
March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for
P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos.
T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were
respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children
of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against
Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the
ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that
an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of
the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of
said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be
delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs
P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961,
Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were
issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name
for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and
in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a
manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs
"renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or
otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in
connection with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant
Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of
the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name
of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots
to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus
Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect
to Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff
stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots
773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who
had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be
delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of
execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a
hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31,
1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity
of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18
Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the
certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased
Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and
for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or
encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the
cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was
not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could
neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-
litigant therein but also because it had long become final and
executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the
cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous
order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned
therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22
In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower
court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the
recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein
could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the
case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery
of real property with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr.
Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for
the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason
(sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in
the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of
service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of
Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected,
or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez
and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of
P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the
fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the
complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the
Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his
titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court
in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the
Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part,
the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action
had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel."
27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo
Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he
was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in
good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were
negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights
over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity
demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the
sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court
approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is
hereby rendered in the following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the
Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez
being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-
B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00
representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's
fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this
complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against
the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is
hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are
hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
in its decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision
"insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing
the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey
of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded
the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive
portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it
ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of
P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for
reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the
following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been
timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower
court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private
respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated
February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil
Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or
prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case
No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or
party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No.
8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and
absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights
and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated
November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been
controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising
from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or
transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without
violation of law and due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that
matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case
No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein
private respondents. Said decision had long become final and
executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not
a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of
the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his
heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by
this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has
been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try.
The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For,
if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will
multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in
question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As
found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented,
the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and
possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now
under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022,
as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents
Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case
by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the
controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles.
Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a
purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale
executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but
in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo
Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private
respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant
Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established
that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if
the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third
party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if
deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits
of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of
decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is
precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it
cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the
defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly
considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the
former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their
rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another
case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has
longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots
No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason
should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate,
after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in
this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and
obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or
by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is
not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of
a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment
by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has
characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved
into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying
only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot
escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which
gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets
are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the
estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the
extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and
considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left
by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in
favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO
NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA,
Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five
(5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her
four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino,
surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his
death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda
left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff
claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife
Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving
her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February
21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda,
executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria
Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she
renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by
her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence,
the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the
plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without
special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the
present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful
wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands
litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria
del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-
law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four
illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new
Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit
any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his
death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21,
1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced
(1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio
vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor
defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and
under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June,
1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code,
they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article
2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides
indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when
the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the
same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be
declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once,
even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of
the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision,
the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is
so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria
Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband
was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign
the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they
were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and
Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to
them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is
disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes
of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no
material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be
made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same
document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch
as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the
alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA,
administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator,
CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the
Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA,
TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of the late Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
late Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-
appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate
estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise
agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its
Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the
disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832,
entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de
Borja, Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in
its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion,
which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as
the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and
not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa
Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate
estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife
Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of
her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2
April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became
the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa
Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and
Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and
counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18)
cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate
of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of
a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise
agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between
"[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer,
Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and
settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims,
counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of
the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily
and without any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement
under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala
properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more
specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del
Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos
de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia
Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount
of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which
represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-
rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed
de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment
and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc.
No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and
to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration
or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall
depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of
Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes
payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de
Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately
P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate
and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or
the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the
buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and
paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-
children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized
to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of
the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement
(approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de
Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors,
administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce,
withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of
action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums
of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in
law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against
each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955,
CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033,
CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the
case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally
release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and
all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the
administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as
heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the
payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de
Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de
Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall
issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the
sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement
and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the
sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment
of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND
WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their
hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the
agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No.
832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances.
The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva
Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order
of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while
administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R.
case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement
of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless,
attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs
cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the
will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on
the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana
Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have
force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana
Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's
decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's
majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is
mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the
basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and
public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco
that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the
validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by
agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no
will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of
Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court
and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise
agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into,
on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74
of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether
he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice
Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed
the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in
accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless
ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner,
the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the
case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the
agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as
the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara
case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt
to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract
was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to
any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a
decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4
Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what
is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction;
neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations
between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court
enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be
considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if
only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory
heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore,
barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest
existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament
and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the
prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and
between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir
and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction
was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection
of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter
into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial
compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is
that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of
the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A
expressed no definite period for its performance, the same was
intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness.
In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was
expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by
said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit,
Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that
the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of
Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following
clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation
of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner
heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said
property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty
(60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and
void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose
de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that
the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date,
the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed
by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so
done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause.
Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A),
provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total
consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000
represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration
of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the
duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12
October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the
separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs.
Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter
(Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal
compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the
stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's
co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and
ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be
sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share
formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold
until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of
Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term
of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal,
for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had
no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex
A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa
Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of
Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special
Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco
was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the
estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned
from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could
not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such
alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori
sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja
(Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her
status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is
without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with
Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of
her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would
show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the
cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in
Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-
28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October
1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that,
after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its
order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable
settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja
himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred
to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the compromise
agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally
signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the
record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco
had unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise
agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the
Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23):
that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly
intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was
not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required
by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved
a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of
Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already
discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de
Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since
the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final
remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja
quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No.
28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September
1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the
parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to
reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise
(Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a
court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the
agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of
the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with
law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary
resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and
is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in
the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing
power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of
the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in
receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest
was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A")
she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney
Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what
We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA
554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency
and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present
case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco
de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the
husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse,
Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal
(ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that
there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of
its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana
Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in
view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana
Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband,
Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying
reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may
affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still
imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares,
had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo
de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly
registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No.
528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs.
Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was
partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo
de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part
in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V.
De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E.
Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay;
containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de
Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de
Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described
declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer
defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco),
conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of the
Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of
1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages,
compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio
Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco
de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to
be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed
to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the
character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal
partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late
Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa
Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the
Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the
proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O.
Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco,
submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3")
listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the
Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more,
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de
Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory
wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal
Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the
Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special
Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit
"4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they
are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja
and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial
proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal
presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below
declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal
property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de
Borja. It did so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn
statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado
(equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal
y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja,
that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for
P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo
de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a
subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the
sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son
of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's
assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay
the back taxes and said that the amount would represent Francisco's
contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by
Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived
from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n.,
pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement
overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by
defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally
determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the
testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja
acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for
which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership
property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article
1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first
place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the
money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence
inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating
what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of
ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and
Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In
addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there was no need
or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when
Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo.
A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's
testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion
thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi
terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers
precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and
4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by
Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and
a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the
affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y
exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of
cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant
(Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal
character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are
clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants,
Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and
as such of much greater probative weight than the self-serving
statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in
favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion)
now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof.
Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court
that claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding
special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased,
the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while
those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and
set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja in all three (3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor)
and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the
minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA
BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court
of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon
Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order
dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted
a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over
certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the
complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel
for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include
certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was
granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,
therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was
heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution
by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the
court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground
that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal
personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the
order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to
set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1,
1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be
allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the
counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the
deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was
denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying
the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is
true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The
records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took
place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975.
This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975,
Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had
acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules
of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during
the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies
... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was
complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died
on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the
case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead
person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article
777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except
by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of
the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before
judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or
right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted
... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on
the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of
action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and
principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being
merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive
the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of
property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion
the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over
the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property
and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her
death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the
legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be
substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being
informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was
dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done
for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even
the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent
Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because
her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted
for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian
ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living
for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for
substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and
cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the
respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section
17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent
Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad
litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely
abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the
Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First
Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is
hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who are
the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a
qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998]
HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-
Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES, BERNARDITA S. PALILIO,
HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A.
SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO,
GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C.
SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO,
CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A.
SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA
A. SAMPAYO, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30 March
1994 Decision and 21 December 1994 Resolution of respondent Court
of Appeals which upheld the right of private respondents as heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition under Art. 494 of the Civil
Code.
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were
the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square
meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City,
covered by TCT No. T15374, with a house erected thereon.[1] On 17
March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue.[2]
Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes,
Bernardita S. Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo,
Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A. Sampayo,
Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo,
Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo
C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A.
Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages
before RTCBr. 54, Lucena City.[3]
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition
on the ground that private respondents failed to produce any
document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo.[4] On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was
substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco,
Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.[5]
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and
Adelaida Sampayo to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as co-
owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the original copy of her
certificate of live birth showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes
and her mother was Josefina Sampayo,[6] Lydia Sampayo Reyes
testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being
the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living sibling of Lourdes.
Lydia also testified that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios
J. Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo
and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To
prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of
Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the
birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in evidence. These
documents showed that their father and mother, like Lourdes
Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.
The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia
Sampayo Reyes were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly
certified that all data therein written were in accordance with the
church records, hence, the lower left portion of the documents bearing
the seal of the church with the notation as to where the documents
were logged in particular.[7] The baptismal certificates were presented
in lieu of the birth certificates because the repository of those
documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had been
razed by fire on two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30
August 1983, thus all civil registration records were totally burned.[8]
On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25
October 1919 (Exh. "I")[9] showed that it was issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her
husband Manuel was the brother of the deceased Lourdes, and with
the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of
Lourdes was Josefina.[10]
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the
subject lot, petitioners presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines
Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti
and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been staying
in the subject property since 1937.[11] In fact, she said that her late
husband Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes[12] and spent for
the necessary repairs and improvements thereon[13] because by
agreement Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them.[14]
However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either
testamentary or holographic, was presented by petitioners to
substantiate this claim.[15] Rosario also disclosed that when Lourdes
died her remains were taken by her relatives from their house.[16]
When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that
the only one she remembered was Josefina since there were many
relatives who came. When asked who Josefina's parents were, she
said she could not recall. Likewise, when asked who the parents of
Lourdes were, Rosario denied having ever known them.[17]
Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to
be the neighbor and hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo
who told her that upon her death her share would go to Ignacio Conti
whom she considered as her brother since both of them were
"adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey
Cord,[18] although she admitted that she did not know whether
Lourdes had other relatives.[19]
According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the
tombs bearing the tombstones of Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey
Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of Lourdes Sampayo who was
supposed to have been interred beside her "adoptive" parents.
However, as revealed by Rosario during her direct examination,
Lourdes was not in fact interred there because her relatives took her
remains.[20]
On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the
rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private
respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot for confirmation by the court.[21]
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that
the trial court erred in finding that private respondents were the heirs
of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the
lot and the improvements thereon.[22]
On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC
decision and held[23]-
In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to
prove and establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the
collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore the lower
court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents]
and defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the
residential house and lot owned in common by the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the court
x x x x Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err
in declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of
deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit her property, the
argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now
private respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit
(insertions in [ ] supplied).
Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua[24] and
Marabilles v. Quito[25], that a prior and separate judicial declaration
of heirship was not necessary[26] and that private respondents
became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and
registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and,
consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all
other incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law including the
right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code,[27] and
Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa[28] holding that the property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for
reconsideration upheld the probative value of the documentary and
testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners for
not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital
witness in the case.[29] Hence, petitioners pursued this case arguing
that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the
latter's estate and compliance with all legal requirements, especially
publication, and private respondents were not able to prove by
competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.[30]
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not
essential before the heirs can commence any action originally
pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud [31] -
Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present
plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that
they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no
evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the
settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such
settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in
this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure,
the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes
at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law,
subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken
from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this
does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of
the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a
judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the
estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action
is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777
and 494[32] of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her
rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for partition
at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her
rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely
exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have
been correct had the action been for the partition of the estate of
Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement
by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates
of small value.[33] But what private respondents are pursuing is the
mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from
her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary
partition between co-owners. The applicable law in point is Sec. 1 of
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -
Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. - A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in
this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons
interested in the property.
A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not
required as erroneously maintained by petitioners. There are two (2)
simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First, whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned,
and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division
of the property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.[34]
Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents,
by preponderance of evidence, have been able to establish that they
are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late
Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a
niece. These, private respondents were able to prove in the trial court
as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation
because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove
filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability of records of birth do not
prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of alleged
collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia
S. Reyes, alleged daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida
Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were
incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events which happened
before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to
her.[35]
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted are competent and adequate proofs that private
respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private
respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or intestate
succession.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others either
by his will or by operation of law.[36] Legal or intestate succession
takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one
which has subsequently lost its validity.[37] If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.[38] It was established during the trial that Lourdes died
intestate and without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews
and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,[39] the filiation of legitimate
children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parents
admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document
duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[40] By analogy,
this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country.[41] The
baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents
are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal
custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true
copies, in the form of certificates, of the entries contained therein.[42]
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes,
absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder,
was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105
[1914]),[43] thus -
x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as
entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule
130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise
of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during
the course of its business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the
administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4)
baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that
Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents,
as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers
Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina
Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired
evidentiary weight to prove filiation.

Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of
Manuel Sampayo was properly discarded by the court a quo and
respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130,
of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself except when the original has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror. The loss or destruction of the original certificate of birth of
Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued
by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect
that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November 1974
and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all
civil registration records were totally burned.
Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners contention
that the testimony of Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove filiation for
being hearsay considering that there was no declaration ante litem
motam as required by the rules, i.e., that the declaration relating to
pedigree was made before the controversy occurred. Nonetheless,
petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in open court when
she was mentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As
correctly observed by the trial court in explicit terms, "the documentary
and testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants" (now
petitioners).[44] Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness
stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the identities of the
parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs counter to the relationship
akin to filial bonding which she professed she had enjoyed with the
decedent. As wife of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly a "sister-in-
law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a
brother. However, in sum, we rule that all the pieces of evidence
adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of private
respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible
error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
30 March 1994 and Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149017 November 28, 2008
VALENTE RAYMUNDO,petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ,
EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR, EVELYN
SUAREZ, ET AL., respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assails the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
58090 which reversed, set aside and recalled the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Orders3 in Civil Case No. 51203.
First, the long settled facts.
Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez'4 marriage was blessed with both
material wealth and progeny in herein respondents, namely, Danilo,5
Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,6 all surnamed Suarez.
During their marriage, governed by the conjugal partnership of gains
regime, they acquired numerous properties, which included the
following: (1) a parcel of land situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with
an area of 348 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 30680; (2) property located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, with an
area of 1,020 square meters under Tax Declaration No. A-016-01003;
and (3) Lot Nos. 5, 6 & 7, Block 2 covered by Tax Declaration No. A-
01700723 (subject properties).
After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein
respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez,7 executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate,8 partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate, thus:
WHEREAS, the said deceased is survived by the parties hereto who
are his only legal heirs: TEOFISTA ISAGON, being the surviving
spouse, and EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO
SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and
REGGINEO SUAREZ, being the legitimate children of the deceased
with the said TEOFISTA ISAGON;
WHEREAS, the minors ELPIDIO, SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ,
EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO
SUAREZ are represented herein by EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, in her
capacity as the guardian and legal administrator of the property of the
said minors;
WHEREAS, there are no known debts or financial obligations of
whatever nature and amount against the estate of the deceased;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the
Parties have agreed to settle and liquidate the assets of the conjugal
partnership between the deceased and TEOFISTA ISAGON, and to
settle and adjudicate the estate of the said deceased, by and
pursuance to these presents, in the following manner, to wit:
1. That TEOFISTA ISAGON, as the surviving spouse and partner of
the deceased, shall receive in absolute and exclusive ownership the
following properties as her lawful share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership of gains between her and the deceased, to wit:
(a) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 6938, situated at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of
Taytay, Province of Rizal;
(b) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 6939, situated at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of
Taytay, Province of Rizal;
(c) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 38291, situated at Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal;
(d) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 38290, situated at Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal;
(e) TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS AND
NINETY (P12,530.90) deposited with the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company of the Philippines, and THIRTY-NINE PESOS (P39.00)
deposited with Prudential Bank.
2. That the Parties TEOFISTA ISAGON, EUFROCINA S. ANDRES,
ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ,
MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, shall each and
all receive and be entitled to a share equivalent to one-seventh (1/7)
of the estate of the deceased MARCELO SUAREZ, which estate is
comprised of the following properties, to wit:
(a) A parcel of land covered by TCT No. 30680, situated at Barrio
Kaniogan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an assessed
value of P4,150.00.
(b) Three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 33982, 33983 and
33984, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, with an assessed value of P560.00.
(c) A parcel of land covered by TCT 33986, situated at Barrio Pineda,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of
P440.00.
(d) Two (2) parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 42 and 44 of the
amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of Lot 2
described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _____,
situated at Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal,
with a total assessed value of P590.00.
(e) Two parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 43 and 45 of the amendment-
subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd., being a portion of Lot 2 described on
the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _______, situated at
Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with a total
assessed value of P1,190.00.
(f) A parcel of land, being Lot No. 6, Block 269 of the subdivision plan
pos-112, being a portion of Lot 2, Block 348, Psd-3188, G.L.R.O.
Record Nos. 375,699 and 917, situated at San Felipe Neri, Province
of Rizal, with an assessed value of P6,340.00.
(g) A parcel of land covered by OCT No. 391, situated in the
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of
P1,840.00.
(h) TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) shares of stock of the
Consolidated Mines, Inc. represented by Certificate No. 71-5-B (for
1,000 shares) and Certificate No. 12736 (for 11,000 shares).
PROVIDED, that their title to the properties hereinabove mentioned
shall be in common and the share of each heir being pro indiviso.
Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties,
explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate as forming
part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the
couple's name. Not surprisingly, Teofista continued to administer and
manage these properties. On the whole, apart from those now owned
exclusively by Teofista, all the properties were held pro indiviso by
Teofista and her children; and respective titles thereto were not
changed, with Teofista as de facto administrator thereof.
In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter
owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's shares of stock, were
sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta
and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for
Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos.
21736 to 21739. Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the
respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2)
holding the two defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs for damages in
the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.9
When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein
subject properties were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983
to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The
aforementioned plaintiffs were the highest bidder, and bought the
levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a result, a
certificate of sale was issued to them and registered in their favor on
August 1, 1983. On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued
a final deed of sale over the subject properties.
Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June
21, 1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action against
petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, docketed
as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and
recovery of ownership of the levied properties. Essentially,
respondents alleged in their complaint that they cannot be held liable
for the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having
been impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject properties,
which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be levied
nor be sold on execution.
Meanwhile, the RTC, Branch 151, formerly the CFI, Branch 1, in Civil
Case Nos. 21376 to 21379, issued an Order10 directing Teofista: (1)
to vacate the subject properties, (2) to desist from despoiling,
dismantling, removing or alienating the improvements thereon, (3) to
place petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion in
peaceful possession thereof, and (4) to surrender to them the owner's
duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
Herein respondents, joined by their mother, Teofista, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that the subject properties are co-owned by
them and further informing the RTC of the filing and pendency of Civil
Case No. 51203. Nonetheless, the trial court denied Teofista's and
herein respondents' motion, reiterated its previous order, which
included, among others, the order for Teofista and all persons claiming
right under her, to vacate the lots subject of the judicial sale.
Undaunted, Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders. The appellate
court, on July 6, 1987, dismissed Teofista's and herein respondents'
petition, thus:
We believe this petition cannot prosper for two reasons. First, as
purported case for certiorari it fails to show how the respondent judge
had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The two orders being assailed were preceded by a final
judgment, a corresponding writ of execution, a levy on execution and
a judicial sale, all of which enjoy a strong sense presumption of
regularity.
Secondly, as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she
cannot complain about the levy because she was a party in the
consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her
personal capacity. Since she did not appeal from the decision, she
cannot say that the judgment is erroneous for an obligation that belong
to the corporation. And with respect to the children of Teofista Suarez,
who are co-petitioners in this proceedings [herein respondents],
suffice it to point out that not being parties in the consolidated cases,
what they should have done was to immediately file a third party claim.
The moment levy was made on the parcels of land, which they claim
are theirs by virtue of hereditary succession, they should have
seasonably filed such claim to protect their rights. As the record
discloses, however, the children chose to remain silent, and even
allowed the auction sale to be held, filing almost a year later a half-
hearted complaint to annul the proceedings which they allowed to be
dismissed by not diligently prosecuting it.
In Santos v. Mojica (10 SCRA 318), a partition case with third- party
claimants, the Supreme Court came out with the following ruling: "The
procedure (a petition for certiorari) followed by him (a petitioner not
party to the original partition case) in vindicating his right is not the one
sanctioned by law, for he should have filed a separate and
independent action making parties therein the sheriff and the plaintiffs
responsible for the execution xxx. It can, therefore, be said that (he)
acted improperly in filing the present petition because his remedy was
to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his ownership
over the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the restraining order
previously issued is DISSOLVED, with costs against petitioners.11
On the other litigation front concerning Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the RTC Pasig, Branch 155, on
February 25, 1985, enjoining petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and
Maria Concepcion from transferring to third parties the levied
properties based on its preliminary finding that the auctioned
properties are co-owned by Teofista and herein respondents.
Subsequently, however, Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed by the
RTC, Branch 155, at the instance of petitioner Valente for failure of
herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet another turn of events, the
RTC, Branch 155, lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed
the issuance of alias summons.
Thus, it was now petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's and Maria
Concepcion's turn to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing
the various orders of the RTC, Branch 155, which all rejected their bid
to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The CA granted their petition, thus:
And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of
Teofista Vda. de Suarez and supposedly not parties in Civil Case Nos.
21376 - 21379 does not preclude the application of the doctrine of res
judicata since, apart from the requisites constitutive of this procedural
tenet, they were admittedly the children of Teofista Suarez, who is the
real party-in-interest in the previous final judgment. As successors-in-
interest of Teofista Suarez, private respondents merely stepped into
the shoes of their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property.
Verily, there is identity of parties, not only where the parties in both
actions are the same, but where there is privity with them as in the
cases of successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or where there is substantial identity.
Finally, the action to annul the judicial sale filed by herein private
respondents is not the reinvindicatory suit, much less the third party
claim contemplated by Section 17 of Rule 39.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the
questioned orders dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and
February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby
annulled; further respondent judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case
No. 51203.12
From this ruling, herein respondents appealed to the Supreme Court.
In Suarez v. Court of Appeals,13 we reversed the appellate court,
thus:
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both
petitioner [herein respondents] and private respondents [petitioner
Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] and the
developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, [w]e cannot
but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.
It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of
the execution and the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject
properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of
land [subject properties] should have been the subject of the auction
sale.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at
the time of the institution of the case:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides:
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights
of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter
provided."
Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of
each of the legitimate children or descendants."
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal
to the legitime of each child.
The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the
levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of
their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-
owners of the property not because of their mother [Teofista] but
through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo
Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any
way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their
own interest.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27,
1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby
REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated
only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul
the sale with regard to said portion.
It was at this point when another series of events transpired,
culminating in the present petition.
Upon our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every
pleading filed by herein respondents, as plaintiffs therein, was hotly
contested and opposed by therein defendants, including petitioner
Valente. Moreover, even at that stage, when the case had been
remanded with a directive to "determine that portion which belongs to
[herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion,"
Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled and transferred, for varied
reasons, to the different court branches in Pasig City. In between all
these, petitioner Valente, along with the other defendants, repeatedly
filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the purported failure
of herein respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to
Dismiss were denied.
With each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the
case was raffled had to study the records anew. Expectedly, part of
the records went missing and were lost. On April 12, 1993, the Clerk
of Court of RTC, Branch 71, to which Civil Case No. 51203 was
remanded, filed a report on the records of the case, to wit:
1. The first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was
recorded as received on June 20, 1990, by Sheriff Alejandro O.
Loquinario;
2. That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small room
with Branch 161 at the First Floor of the Justice Hall, and as the Branch
was newly formed, it had no equipment or furniture of its own, and was
still undermanned;
3. That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the staffroom
of Branch 159 at the Second Floor of the Justice Hall;
4. That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of Judgment
dated October 22, 1990 from the Court of Appeals that ruled the
dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per standing instructions
of Judge Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, the same was bound as
volume 2 of the case;
5. That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch was
forced to hastily move all of its records and equipment to branch 69,
because of the unexpected notice we received that the room we were
occupying was to be demolished in order to meet the schedule for the
renovation of the building;
6. That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the
undersigned could make a last check to see if everything was
transferred;
7. That it was only later on that this office discovered that important
documents were indeed lost, including transcripts of stenographic
notes in a case that was submitted for decision;
8. That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its
present location;
9. That on March 8, 1993, this Court received a copy of a Decision of
the Supreme Court reversing the earlier ruling of the Court of Appeals;
10. That it was at this time that the first volume of this case, which was
bundled along with other cases which were decided and/or archived,
was reported as missing;
11. That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge
Claravall ordered that a search for the same be made in all of the
offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as well
as the Court of Appeals, in the event that the same was transmitted to
said Court;
12. That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be located
anywhere;
13. That the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of the
above-entitled case was probably lost during the renovation of the
Justice Hall Building, and will have to be reconstituted with the use of
documents in the possession of the parties, or documents entered as
exhibits in other Courts.14
In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of
Records15 of the case. Initially, petitioner Valente, and the other
defendants -- Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion -- opposed the
motion.16 However, the trial court eventually granted the motion for
reconstitution, and ordered petitioner Valente and the other
defendants to submit a copy of their Answer filed thereat and copies
of other pleadings pertinent to the case.17
Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the
parties' pleadings, are worth mentioning, to wit:
1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplemental Complaint18
filed by herein respondents. The Supplemental Complaint additionally
prayed that the levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties
be annulled and set aside, as the bid price was unconscionable and
grossly inadequate to the current value of the subject properties. The
Supplemental Complaint further sought a re-bidding with respect to
Teofista's share in the subject properties. Finally, it prayed that TCT
No. 6509 in the name of petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria
Concepcion be cancelled and TCT No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo
Suarez, married to Teofista Isagon, be reinstated.
2. A Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated
September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court)19 filed by herein
respondents pointing out that the Supreme Court itself had noted the
current increased value of the subject properties and that petitioner
Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion unjustly enriched
themselves in appropriating the subject properties worth millions then,
for a measly bid price of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation worth
only P70,000.00.
3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein
respondents) with Supreme Court Decision or to consider the matter
submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs]20 filed by therein
defendants, including herein petitioner Valente, pointing out that
plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC,
Branch 67 Order commanding them to submit (to the RTC) any
evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo
Suarez, in order for the court to determine the portion in the estate
which belongs to Teofista. The Urgent Motion stated in paragraph 2,
thus:
2. The defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did everything
possible to expedite the disposition of this case while the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] did everything possible to DELAY the disposition
of the same obviously because the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are
in full possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute. In its
decision of September 4, 1992, the SUPREME COURT nullified TWO
final and executory DECISIONS of the Court of Appeals in an
unprecedented action. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered
the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to establish with evidence their
personality as heirs of Marcelo Suarez, and after being able to do so,
to adduce evidence that would determine what portion belongs to
plaintiffs hence the above matters need be litigated upon before the
RTC can "annul the sale with regard to said portion" (belonging to the
plaintiffs alleged heirs).
On these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by
the different branches of the RTC:
1. Order dated March 17, 1995, issued by Presiding Judge Rodrigo B.
Lorenzo of Branch 266, Pasig City, admitting herein respondents'
Supplemental Complaint.21
2. Order dated January 22, 1996, issued by Judge Apolinario B.
Santos resolving: (a) herein respondents' Manifestation and Motion (to
execute/enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme
Court), and (b) therein defendants' (including herein petitioner
Valente's) Request for Answer to Written Interrogatories.22 The RTC,
Branch 67, resolved the incidents, thus:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, this Court is convinced
beyond a shadow of doubt that the Decision of the Supreme Court of
September 4, 1992, being the final arbiter in any judicial dispute,
should be implemented for the following reasons:
xxxx
On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the
defendants, it is obvious that at this stage of the proceedings where
the Supreme Court had already pronounced the undisputed facts,
which binds this court, the answer sought to be elicited through written
interrogatories, therefore, are entirely irrelevant, aside from having
been filed way out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court, implements the
decision of the Supreme Court dated September 4, 1992 which
mandates that:
"xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that
portion which belongs to petitioner and to annul the sale with regard
to said portion."
In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme Court, this court
orders that:
a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and all prior and
subsequent proceedings in relation thereto are declared null and void.
b. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name of defendant
Valente Raymundo is also declared null and void, and the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Pasig City, is ordered to issue a new one in the name
of the deceased Marcelo Suarez or to reinstate Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez.
c. Teofista Suarez is ordered to reimburse the amount of P94,170.00,
plus legal interest from the date of issuance of this order, and failing
which, the portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez belonging to the
surviving spouse, Teofista Suarez, may be levied on execution.
d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez, are hereby
ordered to submit to this court any evidence showing settlement of the
estate of the deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this court to
determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez.
Therein defendants, including petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the trial court denied on May 29, 1996.
3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by Judge Santos denying
the appeal interposed by petitioner Valente from the January 22, 1996
and May 29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory orders,
and, therefore, not appealable.23
4. Order dated April 8, 1999, issued by Pairing Judge Santiago Estrella
which declared, thus:
Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth
certificates of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove their affiliation with the
deceased which is one of the matters written in the decision of the
higher court which must be complied with, and in order for counsel for
the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to have the opportunity to complete
all documentary evidence and in view of abbreviating the proceedings
and as prayed for, today's scheduled pre-trial is re-set for the last time
to May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is
advised to secure all the documentary evidence she needs material to
this case which will expedite the disposition of this case.24
This last Order and therein defendants' Urgent Motion spawned
another contentious issue between the parties. In this connection,
Judge Estrella issued an Order25 requiring the parties to file their
respective position papers due to the "divergent views on the nature
of the hearing that should be conducted in compliance with" our
decision in Suarez. Both parties duly filed their position papers, with
herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate executed by the heirs of Marcelo Suarez in 1957.
In resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch
67, issued an Order dated January 11, 2000, which reads, in part:
This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, precisely it directed that the records of this case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.
xxxx
It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed
in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of
Civil Case No. 51203. Naturally, there was no trial on the merits before
this Court that allowed the parties to adduce evidence to establish their
respective claims in the plaintiffs' [herein respondents] complaint and
in the defendants' [including petitioner Valente] counter-claim,
respectively. It is in this context that the Honorable Supreme Court
reinstated the "action [of herein respondents] to annul the auction sale
to protect their [herein respondents] own interest.
While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for
the purpose of giving the plaintiffs [herein respondents] a chance to
adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the defendants
[including petitioner Valente] to prove their defense, consistent with
the directive of the Honorable Supreme Court (in its Decision
promulgated on September 4, 1992), the Court is, however,
confronted with the very recent decision of the Honorable Supreme
Court in "Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., G.R.
No. 124320, March 2, 1999" where it held that -
The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA 119, 128). The
trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for
the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only
in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking
the establishment of a status or right.
In as much as the leading case on the matter is that of "Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" it is left
with no choice but to obey said latter doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds
that in the light of the doctrine laid down in the case of "Heirs of
Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" this
case is dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' [herein
respondents'] filing a special proceeding consistent with said latest
ruling.26
Herein respondents moved for reconsideration thereof which,
however, was denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on March 14, 2000.27
Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's order
dismissing Civil Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants
in the trial court were impleaded as private respondents in the petition.
Yet, curiously, only petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto. The
appellate court granted the petition, recalled and set aside RTC,
Branch 67's Orders dated January 11, 2000 and March 14, 2000, and
reinstated Judge Santos' Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September
6, 1996. It disposed of the petition, thus:
We agree with [herein respondents].
On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918) reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals and mandates that Civil Case No.
51203 be reinstated in order to determine the portion in the estate
which belongs to Teofista Suarez. The sale of the parcels of land was
declared null and void. Necessarily, the title (TCT No. 5809) in the
name of respondents was also declared null and void. xxx
xxxx
Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, on
January 22, 1996 and on motion of [herein respondents], issued an
order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme Court xxx.
xxxx
[Petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] filed a
notice of appeal on the order of Judge Santos. The appeal, on motion
of [herein respondents] was denied on September 10, 1996.
Obviously, the decision of the Supreme Court had become final and
executory. Likewise, both orders of Judge Santos dated May 29, 1996
denying the motion for reconsideration and the denial of the notice of
appeal dated September 6, 1996 had also become final and
executory.
The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for Reconsideration
prompted the filing of this present petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion in recalling and setting aside the Orders of Judge
Estrella and reinstating those of Judge Santos because:
1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September
6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos were final and executory, and yet the
latter did not allow an appeal to be taken therefrom ratiocinating that
the questioned orders were interlocutory, and therefore, not
appealable; and
2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario28 which held that a declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
At the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition
for certiorari to appeal the CA decision. Petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Simply imputing in a petition that the decision sought to be reviewed
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not magically transform
a petition into a special civil action for certiorari. The CA decision
disposed of the merits of a special civil action, an original petition, filed
thereat by herein respondents. That disposition is a final and
executory order, appealable to, and may be questioned before, this
Court by persons aggrieved thereby, such as petitioner Valente, via
Rule 45.
On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright.
However, we have disregarded this procedural flaw and now resolve
this case based on the merits or lack thereof.
Petitioner asseverates that the assailed CA ruling "is unfair and it
amounts to a trickery to prevent an appeal against a final order by
claiming that the appealed order is merely interlocutory and later
maintain that the same order has become final after declaring it to be
interlocutory."
We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not
comprehend the distinction between an interlocutory order which is
final and executory, and a final order which disposes of the
controversy or case; much less, understand the available remedies
therefrom.
We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something
between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides
some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole
controversy.29 It does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose
of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the
case is finally decided on the merits.30 Upon the other hand, a final
order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve
the case.31
On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain
whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., "Does it leave something
to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?" If
it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what
is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the
merits of the case.32 The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September
6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are interlocutory, and therefore, not
appealable, as they leave something more to be done on the merits of
the case. In fact, in paragraph (d) of Judge Santos' Order dated May
29, 1996, herein respondents were directed to submit evidence
showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Sr.
Contrary to petitioner Valente's stance, there is no trickery or
chicanery in the CA's distinction between an interlocutory and a final
order. Indeed, as ruled by the CA, the RTC Order denying petitioner
Valente's Notice of Appeal attained finality when he failed to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the
nature of an assailed order determines the remedies available to an
aggrieved party. The old Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads,
thus:
SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.-Only final judgments
or orders shall be subject to appeal. No interlocutory or incidental
judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be
the subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one
party or the other.
xxxx
With the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule
41 now provides for the appropriate remedy to be taken from an
interlocutory order, thus:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the denial of therein defendants' (including petitioner
Valente's) appeal from the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September
6, 1996 was in order. Thus, the CA decision affirming the RTC's denial
was correct.
Further, on this crucial distinction as applied to this case, petitioner
Valente filed a petition for certiorari from the CA decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58090, which is not an interlocutory order. It is a final order
which completely disposed of the merits of the case with nothing more
left to be done therein. The correct and available remedy available to
petitioner Valente was, as previously discussed, a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through reversed
remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory orders of the RTC which
are unappealable. Thus, the RTC properly denied his Notice of
Appeal, and the CA correctly upheld the RTC. He should have filed a
petition for certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final
order of the CA, he comes before this Court on a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, when the proper remedy is an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45.
In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of
Appeals33 we ruled in this wise:
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal
via petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review,
which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case. It seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the
court, tribunal, or officer. In contrast, a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds
therein provided and proper only if there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal.
Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the
case, the petition does not fare otherwise. It must be dismissed for
lack of merit.
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario,34 herein respondents must first be
declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul
the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista
and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and
Teofista ― and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs ― has been firmly
established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of
Appeals.35 True, this Court is not a trier of facts,36 but as the final
arbiter of disputes,37 we found and so ruled that herein respondents
are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This
having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue
when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner
Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation
in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to
present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is
wrong.
As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No.
51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to
[herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion."
There is clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to
determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as
heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the
status of herein respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and
Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their
filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s
and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status
as legitimate children:
1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where
Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the RTC, Branch
151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although
the CA ruled against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly
recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of Teofista and
Marcelo Sr.; and38
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled
that herein respondents were, as children of Teofista, merely
successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue
thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379
consistent with the doctrine of res judicata.39 We subsequently
reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the
conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed, however, the
CA's factual finding of herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo
Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of
[herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is
different from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents]
became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but
through their own right as children of their deceased father [, Marcelo
Sr.]."
Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate
children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly or directly
attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.
Articles 262,40 263,41 265 and 26642 of the Civil Code, the applicable
law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the foregoing conclusion,
to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the
child only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed
for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without
having desisted from the same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the recording of birth in the Civil Register,
if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any
of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if
they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the
birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from
the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of
birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a
final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article,
the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of
a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration
of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to
demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses
Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a
document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which
explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate
children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the
estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and
separates the properties she owns in common with her children,
herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably.
Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion,
became owners of the subject properties only by virtue of an execution
sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment
obligation is solely Teofista's, and payment therefor cannot be made
through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her.
These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact,
even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon
Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s
share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law
to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not
categorized as such in Article 77843 of the Civil Code. It reserves a
portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or
group of heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of
succession.44 The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article
886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as "that part of the testator's
property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein
respondents are primary compulsory heirs,45 excluding secondary
compulsory heirs,46 and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs
in the distribution of the decedent's estate.47
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s
estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein respondents' rights to
the succession vested from the moment of their father's death.48
Herein respondents' ownership of the subject properties is no longer
inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their
respective shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the
time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for
Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents'
share therein was null and void.
In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not
absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to
dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista
owns only a portion of the subject properties, only that portion could
have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the
provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by
herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their
share in the subject properties.
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,49 where we
scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and the cited cases of
Litam v. Rivera50 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,51 and Guilas v. CFI
Judge of Pampanga52 cited in Solivio. We ruled thus:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the
adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties
to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed
but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be
raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed
for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the
partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988
the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of
Rule 74, Section of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an
exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving property,
it should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6,
Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed
to name an executor therein.
xxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceedings. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial. PUNO, c.j., Chairperson,

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no Sandoval-Gutierrez,
compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could Corona,
be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners xxx.53
AZCUNA, and
All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled
status of herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., there is no need GARCIA, JJ.
to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to
institute a separate special proceeding for a declaration of their Promulgated:
heirship.
September 3, 2007
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090 is x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFFIRMED. The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 -x
issued by Judge Santos are REINSTATED. Costs against the
petitioner. DECISION

SO ORDERED.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FIRST DIVISION For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to
HEIRS OF THE LATE DOMINGO N. NICOLAS, reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals ( Sixteenth Division)
dated January 14, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49926.
Petitioners,
The facts of the case are not in dispute, thus
versus -
Spouses Domingo and Josefa Nicolas are the registered owners of
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, two (2) parcels of land located at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City as
evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 156339 and
Respondent. 156341 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. On these lots is the
residential house of spouses Nicolas and their two children, herein
G.R. No. 137548 petitioners. These properties are conjugal.

Present: On May 19, 1986, Domingo Nicolas passed away.

On June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. Among the records destroyed were the original copies
of TCTs Nos. 156339 and 156341.
Sometime in 1988, Josefa Nicolas, the surviving spouse of Domingo,
filed with the Land Registration Administration (LRA) an application for
reconstitution of the two (2) land titles.
In 1991, the LRA approved the application and ordered the
reconstitution of the destroyed TCTs but only in the name of applicant
Josefa Nicolas.
In 1998, petitioners learned that their mother mortgaged the lots with
the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., herein respondent; that the
mortgage had been foreclosed; that respondent had the land titles
consolidated in its name; and that respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession (LRC Case No. Q-8019[96]) which was granted
on January 15, 1998.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC, Branch 22, Quezon City Civil Case
No. Q-98-34312 for Annulment of Reconstituted Titles, Mortgage and
Sale at Public Auction. This case is still pending trial.
Petitioners also filed with the RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City a motion
to quash the writ of possession, but it was denied on September 10,
1998. Thereupon, they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49926. However, the appellate
court dismissed the petition. It held that the trial court, in issuing the
writ of possession in favor of the respondent, did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that the trial court has the ministerial task to issue such
writ.
Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of February 24, 1999.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their
petition for certiorari, invoking our ruling in Rivero de Ortega v.
Natividad[2] which reads:
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in
a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the
purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action in law to obtain
possession. The power of the court to issue a process and place the
purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has
power to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous actions
and vexatious litigation. But where a party in possession was not a
party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession from a
person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and
who entered into possession before the suit was begun, the court has
no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the decree. Thus,
it was held that only parties to the suit, persons who came in under
them pendente lite, and trespassers or intruders without title, can be
evicted by a writ of possession. The reason for this limitation is that
the writ does not issue in case of doubt, nor will a question of legal title
be tried or decided in proceedings looking to the exercise of the power
of the court to put a purchaser in possession. A very serious question
may arise upon full proofs as to where the legal title to the property
rests, and should not be disposed of in a summary way. The petitioner,
it is held, should be required to establish his title in a proceeding in LRC Case No. Q-8019(96) shall apply only to such portion of the
directed to that end. lots
pertaining to Josefa Nicolas as may be determined in Civil Case No.
Q-98-34312 or in any other proper proceeding which petitioners may
file.
Here, petitioners as children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of
spouses Nicolas, acquired ownership of portions of the lots as their
legitime upon the death of their father or prior to the foreclosure of
mortgage and the filing by the respondent of its petition for the SO ORDERED.
issuance of a writ of possession. Consequently, petitioners are
strangers or third parties therein whose rights cannot be determined
as they were not impleaded by respondent. Verily, they should not be
deprived of their legitime by the enforcement of the writ of possession.
Clearly, therefore, the writ of possession should not include parts of
the two lots pertaining to petitioners.

Records indicate that the estate of Domingo Nicolas has not been
judicially or extra-judicially settled.

It is basic that after consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure
of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter
of right[3] and its issuance to a purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.[4] However, considering
the circumstances obtaining in this case and following our ruling in
Rivero de Ortega, earlier cited, we hold that such writ of possession
should apply only to the share of Josefa as may be determined in Civil
Case No. Q-98-34312 or in any other proceeding that may be
instituted by petitioners for the purpose of settling the undivided estate
of Domingo Nicolas.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49926 is MODIFIED in the sense
that the writ of possession issued by the RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City