G.R. No.

130644, October 27, 1997

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, REPRESENTED IN THIS

SUIT BY HIS MOTHER MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, PETITIONER, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition

for certiorari, prohibition and mandamuswith writs of preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and serious illegal
detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the
RTC[1] of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a consequence thereof.
Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order[2] of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranagga’s motion for a regular preliminary
investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the
State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve her
son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.

It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for
Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest
Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit
remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The, police did not carry out the arrest on the
assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17,
1997 for perlominary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted
by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be
given a regular preliminary investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits
and documents in support of the complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-
extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt to file the defense affidavit. The
motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated
as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was
ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would be treated
as waiver of his client’s right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded
against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivit’s verbal
motion for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals
assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.[3] However, Larranaga’s effort to stop the filing of a criminal information
against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed
an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel
filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the RTC of Cebu
City to prevent petitioner’s arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was
arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second
Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranaga’s counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing
to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals’
dismissed Larranaga’s petitions, hence, the case at bar.

On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment on

the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we
temporarily restrained the presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from
proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from becoming moot.

On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and motion
in lieu of Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that “x x x it is within
petitioner’s constitutional and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary
investigation rather than a mere inquest be conducted before resolving the issue of
whether or not to file informations against him”. He asked that “x x x the petition be
given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation.” He
further recommended that “x x x during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from
detention.”

We agree.

Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary

investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner’s inquest
investigation. Said section clearly provides that “when a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.”

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested”. For one, the petitioner
was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers
that he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in
Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had no legal
authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two
(2) months before. So we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz:[4]
“Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless ‘arrest’ or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of the Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner’s ‘arrest’ took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The ‘arresting’
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the ‘arrest effected six (6) days after
the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected ‘when (the shooting had) in fact just been
committed’ within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the ‘arresting’ officers
had any personal knowledge’ of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting – one stated that petitioner was
the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not,
however, constitute ‘personal knowledge.’

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 of Rule 112 is not
applicable. x x x When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the
killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the
erroneous supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was applicable and required
petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition
for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was
entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him
without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without
a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at
the preliminary investigation.”
It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant
to section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with
a capital offense – kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his
arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction
will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner’s counsel was fart
from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be
furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-
extendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his
motion “x x x prevented petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some
forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and security guards who had previously made
known their willingness to testify that:
“- during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his classmates
were all in their school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16 and 17, 1997,
petitioner and his classmates took their mid-term exams;

- following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioner’s Quezon
City apartment until about 9 o’ clock in the evening, and then repaired to a Quezon City
restaurant at Katipunan Avenue where they stayed on until 3 o’clock in the morning of
July 17; they even had pictures taken of their party;

- indeed petitioner’s July 16 examination papers and that of a classmates are ready for
submission as evidence, along with petitioner’s grades for the term’s end in September
1997;

- two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing
petitioner at their Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;

- petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until term’s end in
September 1997;

- petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since June
1997, particularly including July 16 and 17;

- petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No. PR833,
as shown by his plane ticket and boarding pass”.
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense
case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon,[5] we
emphasized that “attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial
system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of
preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial.
As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, ‘the right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.’ A preliminary investigation should
therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a
potential accused can be protected from any material damage.”

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of
petitioner and to order the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular
preliminary investigation of the petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul
the order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case issued by Executive Judge
Priscilla Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to
order the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to
order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303
and 45304, pending the result of petitioner’s preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014

RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated April 25,
2011 and the Resolution[3] dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.[4]

The Facts

On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior
Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains
of the victims summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death Squad” may be
found.[5] In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented
to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in
December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.[6]

Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the
Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued
Search Warrant No. 09-14407[7] which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the
Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.[8]

On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence[9] premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a
search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position as Vice Executive
Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the
Court;[10] (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407
which was to be enforced in Davao City;[11] (c) the human remains sought to be seized
are not a proper subject of a search warrant;[12] (d) the police officers are mandated to
follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains;[13] (e) the search
warrant was issued despite lack of probable cause;[14] (f) the rule against forum shopping
was violated;[15] and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense
and the proper specification of the place to be searched and the articles to be seized.[16]

The Manila-RTC Ruling

In an Order[17] dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud “after a
careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein].” Aside from this general
statement, the said Order contained no discussion on the particular reasons from which
the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.

Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[18] which was, however, denied in an Order[19] dated December 8, 2009,
wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its reasons for the warrant’s quashal,
namely: (a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the issuance of a
search warrant by the Manila-RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where
the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court;[20] (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the
search warrant application was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable
cause;[21] and (c) the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as
the subject matter of the present search warrant application is exactly the same as the one
contained in a previous application[22] before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-
RTC) which had been denied.[23]

Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. No. 113017.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[24] dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People’s petition and thereby
annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied, pointing
out that an application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is an
exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC[25] and reiterated in A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC,[26] provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or
the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF),[27] with the endorsement of its
head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued
by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this
case.[28]

Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness
Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six (6) persons
in December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims – two bodies
in each of the three (3) caves.[29] Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC failed to
consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a
criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to justify the delay attending the
application of a search warrant.[30] Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a
protruding human bone in plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola’s first-hand eye
witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that the crime of
Murder had been committed and that the human remains of the victims were located in
the Laud Compound.[31]

Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the prior application
for a search warrant filed before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and circumstances
different from those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC.[32]

Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a

Resolution[33] dated October 17, 2011, hence, this petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues for the Court’s resolution are as follows: (a) whether the administrative
penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b)
whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-
compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description
were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the
PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

A. Effect of Judge Peralta’s Administrative Penalties.

______________________________________________

Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that “[t]he
imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position as
such,” Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge
and accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s Resolution
in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta[34] wherein he was administratively
penalized with fines of P15,000.00 and P5,000.00.[35]

While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did
operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge, it must be
qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the
invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be
considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless,
remain valid.

Funa v. Agra[36] defines who a de facto officer is and explains that his acts are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons
who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid
on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his]
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of
a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.[37]

The treatment of a de facto officer’s acts is premised on the reality that third persons
cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office and, as
such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally
such.[38] Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an
office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public – as
distinguished from the officer in question – is concerned.[39]Indeed, it is far more
cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public
and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of
an office without being lawful officers.[40]

In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: (a)
there must be a de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or general acquiescence by
the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.[41]

The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is
a de jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to
the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the
same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality – that is, the operation of Section 5,
Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there
was general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was regularly
endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-
RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.[42] Finally, Judge Peralta’s
actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as the
contrary was not established.[43] Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have
acted as a de facto officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated
as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative impediment.
 B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407;
Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.
______________________________________________

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance
of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
These special criminal cases pertain to those “involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-
Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.” Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by “the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies.” As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges” are authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
courts.”

The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this
case.

As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-
RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame
Versosa,[44] particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized (as
will be elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of Murder.[45] Finding
probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.

Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a “special criminal case”
excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made
in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)

As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on
search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-
mentioned special criminal cases “shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.” Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being applied for in
connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be
superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12,
Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue
warrants to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the
parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on these
grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search Warrant
No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.

C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the Issuance of Search

Warrant No. 09-14407 and the One-Specific-Offense Rule Under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
_____________________________________________

In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant
shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-
14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated
that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims:

Q9-Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and buried in the caves in
December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.?

A9-I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when they were still alive as
Pedro and Mario. I don’t know the names of the other four victims.

Q10-What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims were killed?

A10-Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and bury equally the bodies in
the three caves. We buried Pedro and Mario altogether in the first cave, located more or
less 13 meters from the makeshift house of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the
second cave and the remaining two in the third cave.

Q11-How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of December 2005?

A11-I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran errands [for] him.[46]

Avasola’s statements in his deposition were confirmed during the hearing on July 10,
2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the following examination:

Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong naghukay, nakatago o

kasama ka?

Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.

Court: Mga ilang katao?

Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.

Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?

Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki. x x x.[47]

Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola, who was
personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not the
crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human remains in
connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In Santos v. Pryce
Gases, Inc.,[48] the Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires
less than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However,
the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reason.[49]

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the
existence of probable cause had been met. That a “considerable length of time” attended
the search warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself,
negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As
the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal
and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case.[50] Ultimately, in determining
the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined
by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the
supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does not dilute the probable cause
finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.

The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”

“[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that
points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers
unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.”[51]

Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it
particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves located inside
the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City:

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time [of] the day of the
premises above describe[d] particularly the three (3) caves (as sketched) inside the said
Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao City and forthwith seize and take
possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the just
said premises.
x x x x[52] (Emphases supplied)

For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made explicit reference
to the sketch[53] contained in the application. These, in the Court’s view, are sufficient
enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be
searched, which they in fact did.

The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the remains of six (6)
victims who were killed and buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that
human remains are not “personal property” and, hence, could not be the subject of a
search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (Emphases

supplied)

“Personal property” in the foregoing context actually refers to the thing’s mobility, and
not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. Article 416 of the Civil
Code,[54] which Laud himself cites,[55] states that in general, all things which can be
transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Considering that
human remains can generally be transported from place to place, and considering further
that they qualify under the phrase “subject of the offense” given that they prove the
crime’s corpus delicti,[56] it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant
under the above-cited criminal procedure provision.

Neither does the Court agree with Laud’s contention that the term “human remains” is
too all-embracing so as to subvert the particular description requirement. As the Court
sees it, the description points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the
offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also perceived that the description is already
specific as the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies would
have naturally decomposed over time. These observations on the description’s sufficient
particularity square with the Court’s pronouncement in Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc. v.
Judge Ruiz,[57] wherein it was held:

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and
the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence. (Emphases supplied)[58]

Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement – both as to the
place to be searched and the things to be seized – had been complied with.

Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to prevent the
issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific
offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was discussed in the case of People
v. CA[59] as follows:

There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense, in
violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3 [now,
Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the search warrant and has
merely said that there was probable cause, omitting to continue that it was in connection
with one specific offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot
warrant that could refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, “to robbery, theft, qualified theft
or estafa.” On this score alone, the search warrant was totally null and void and was
correctly declared to be so by the very judge who had issued it.[60]

In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA,[61] the Court, however, settled that a search warrant that
covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule, viz.:

That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search
warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to
be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued
does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. (Emphasis supplied)[62]

Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific offense
– that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court had been violated.

That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum shopping.
D. Forum Shopping.
______________________________________________

There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another.[63]

Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering the
various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the Manila-
RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each
application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection
with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more
importantly, the places to be searched were different – that in Manila sought the search of
the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud
Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the
two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated.

Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the CA Ruling which upheld
the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the
Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017
are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 81510, March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, IN

HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, AND FERDIE MARQUEZ,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a
sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA
for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

"04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at nagbibigay ng

salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw
ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. - Horty Salazar, 615 R.O.
Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap ang ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng

tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S: Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

S: Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang
PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng Booking sa
Japan. Mag-9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay hindi pa niya ako
napa-alis. So, lumipat ako ibang company pero ayaw niyang
ibigay ang PECC Card ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said

complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
"YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA
ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR.
ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE
FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW."
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
"HORTY SALAZAR
NO. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being
operated at No. 615 R. O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have –
 (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the

New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987."

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B.
Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R. O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before
entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.) However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers –
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan
and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, filed with POEA the following letter:

"Gentlemen:

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R. O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we

respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26,
1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec.1, Art. 111, of the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which
guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, house, paper, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdie Marquez and five (5) others (including
2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search
as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were
without her consent and were done with unreasonable forge and intimidation,
 together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and
violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in
all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four
(24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and
criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters."
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant
petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig
Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.[1]

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts
sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we
consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure
(or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the
petitioner for the Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

x x x no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.[2]

It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.[3] In one case, it was
declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of
the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the
mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue
orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on
the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which
took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino
people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has
thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and
issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present
Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges,
might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search
warrants.[4]
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to
exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or
search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his
case. Although his office “is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and
his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to
make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our
mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2002, unconstitutional.[5]
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand
Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.[6]
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The
Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of Authority if after proper investigation it
is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order
or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers
for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.[7]
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving
the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and
the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so.[8]
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule
in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo[9] is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out final decision of deportation is valid.[10] It
is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters
involving foreign affairs. We have held:[11]

xxx xxx xxx

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228.U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised
by, the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief
Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious
to the public interest, "he may, even in he absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes
vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phi. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil.
41).
"The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified" (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs.
Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil, 949, 956).[12]
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the Power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like
the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No, 1920 and Executive
Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being
operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have –
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in
relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.[13]
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is
null and void, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

"1) All printing equipment, paprahernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the
like used and/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the 'WE FORUM'
newspaper.

2) Subversive documents pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote

the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM' and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2) DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking 'Bagong
Silang.' "

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for 'books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other
written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the
Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the
violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the
crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Court calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy
of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice
of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.[14]
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search;

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom

the President or the Commissioner of immigration may order arrested, following a
final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED
to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967

ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. MARTINIANO VIVO in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of
Immigration, respondent-appellant.

Engracio Fabre Law Office for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor A. M. Amores for
respondent-appellant.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6, 1932, arrived in
the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in
mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai
With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on
September 11, 1957.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines
under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of
P4,000.00.

On January 24, 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino
citizen. Born to this union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.

To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several
extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.1äwphï1.ñët

In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau
Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with
a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause
the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband
Esteban Morano) and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila
for mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien
Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing a warrant
for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from
confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this
case.1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962, issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the
parties, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment, viz:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to petitioner
CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines; ordering
the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other
immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the
preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the respondent,
his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

(b) Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN, and
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining the
respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting
said petitioner;

(c) Authorizing respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein

petitioners CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00;
and

(d) Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 unconstitutional;
 Without pronouncement, as to costs.

Petitioners and respondent Commissioner both appealed.

We will deal with the claims of both appellants in their proper sequence.

1. The Solicitor General's brief assails the trial court's declaration that Chan Sau Wah is a
citizen of the Philippines. The court a quo took the position that "Chan Sau Wah became,
by virtue of, and upon, her marriage to Esteban Morano, a natural-born Filipino, a
Filipino citizen.2

Placed to the fore is paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 [Revised

Naturalization Act], which reads:

Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife children. — Any woman who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) valid marriage of an alien woman
to a citizen of the Philippines and (b) the alien woman herself might be lawfully
naturalized.

We may concede that the first requisite has been properly met. The validity of the
marriage is presumed.

But can the same be said of the second requisite? This question by all means is not new.
In a series of cases, this Court has declared that the marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must satisfactorily
show that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by the
Naturalization Law.3 Ly Giok Ha alias Wy Giok Ha et al. vs. Emilio Galang, L-21332,
March 18, 1966,* clearly writes down the philosophy behind the rule in the following
expressive language, viz:

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under
section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its
section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the
wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that
citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy of the
statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —

"(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(b) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,"

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not

previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby disqualified; still
 it is certain that the law did not intend such a person to, be admitted as a citizen in
view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of
good moral character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in

government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk," and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is
not "opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or
teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments," nor "defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination
for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

Upon the principle of selective citizenship, we cannot afford to depart from the wise
precept affirmed and reaffirmed in the cases heretofore noted.

In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah
is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law.

Because of all these we are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan Sau Wah did not
become a Filipino citizen.

2. Squarely put in issue by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 37 (a) of the

Immigration Act of 1940, which reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after
a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien:

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or
condition under which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant.

Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional
mandate in Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of the Constitution, to wit:

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest
and that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is
thus violative of the Bill of Rights.

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with
law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of
judicial power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a
given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid
decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

The following from American Jurisprudence,5 is illuminating:

It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of

aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the
proceeding, the deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of
law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is so, although
the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair
though summary hearing, are made conclusive.

xxx xxx xxx

The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a

conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts
underlying the decision may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is
in effect simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not
want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of Congress is purely
accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a
proceeding for deportation are separate and independent.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the
Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a
judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.6

The view we here express finds support in the discussions during the constitutional
convention. The convention recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and
cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order of a competent court.7

Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is
planted on the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked
that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens are admitted as temporary
visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors who do not depart upon the
expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation by the
Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under
which they were admitted as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37 (a), subsection
(7); C.A. 613, as amended)."9

And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants
of arrest was challenged as unconstitutional, because "such power is only vested in a
judge by Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution," this Court declared —

This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as
temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the
cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of breach the Commissioner
may require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has been
filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step is
necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation
under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would
render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.10

It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is not
constitutionally proscribed.

3. A sequel to the questions just discussed is the second error set forth in the
government's brief. The Solicitor General balks at the lower court's ruling that petitioner
Chan Sau Wah is entitled to permanent residence in the Philippines without first
complying with the requirements of Sections 9 and 13 of the Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended by Republic Act 503.

We first go to the law, viz:

SEC. 9 [last paragraph]

An alien who is admitted as a nonimmigrant cannot remain in the Philippines

permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a nonimmigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine
consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.

SEC. 13. Under the conditions set forth in this Act there may be admitted into the
Philippines immigrants, termed "quota immigrants" not in excess of fifty (50) of
any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that
the following immigrants, termed "nonquota immigrants," maybe admitted
without regard to such numerical limitations.

The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate and

certify the eligibility of a quota immigrant previous to his admission into the
Philippines. Qualified and desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under
 temporary stay may be admitted within the quota, subject to the provisions of the
last paragraph of section 9 of this Act.

(a) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age
of a Philippine citizen, if accompanying or following to join such citizen;

(b) A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the mother,
the mother having been previously lawfully admitted into the Philippine for
permanent residence, if the child is accompanying or coming to join a parent and
applies for admission within five years from the date of its birth;

Concededly, Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa.
She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if
she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph
of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third,
she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at
the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of the immigration Act.

This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as
a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first departing from the
country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. 11

The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry,
married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help
analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her
deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such
solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the
care of neighbors in Fukien, China.

Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will
prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a
temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in
his country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed
us. We cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation.

Really, it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a
temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as
husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a
woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a
Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking
movement, we are confident, is impermissible.
Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently
without first departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false
pretenses. 12

The ruling of the trial court on this score should be reversed.

4. It is petitioners' turn to point as error the dismissal of the petition for mandamus and
prohibition with respect to petitioner Fu Yan Fun.

Petitioners' line of thought is this: Fu Yan Fun follows the citizenship of his mother. They
cite Section 15, paragraph 3, Commonwealth Act 473, which says that:

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the

naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen. . . .

Petitioners' position is based on the assumption that Chan Sau Wah, the mother, is a
Filipino citizen. We have held that she is not. At best, Fu Yan Fun is a step-son of
Esteban Morano, husband of Chan Sau Wah. A step-son is not a foreign-born child of the
step-father. The word child, we are certain, means legitimate child, not a step-child. We
are not wanting in precedents. Thus, when the Constitution provides that "[t]hose whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines" are citizens thereof, 13 the fundamental charter
intends "those" to apply to legitimate children. 14 In another case, the term "minor
children" or "minor child" in Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law refers only to
legitimate children of Filipino citizens. This Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, there said: 15

It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child," used in these
provisions, include adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory
that an adopted child is, for all intents and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever,
the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes, it is generally understood,
however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its spirit
indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides
that "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines," and "those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines" who shall elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, are citizens of the Philippines (Article IV,
Section 1, subdivisions [3] and [4]), our fundamental law clearly refers
to legitimate children (Chiongbian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).

At any rate, Fu Yan Fun entered the Philippines as a temporary visitor. The status of a
temporary visitor cannot be converted into, that of a permanent resident, as we have
heretofore held, without first complying with Section 9 of the Immigration Law.

5. Petitioners finally aver that the lower court erred in authorizing respondent
Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by petitioners Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun in
the amount of P4,000.00.
Here is petitioners' posture. They enjoyed their stay in the Philippines upon a bond. Now
they come to court and say that as the prescribed form of this bond was not expressly
approved by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Section 3 of Commonwealth Act
613, which reads —

SEC. 3. . . . He [Commissioner of Immigration] shall issue, subject to the

approval of the Department Head, such rules and regulations and prescribes such
forms of bond, reports, and other papers, and shall issue from time to time such
instruction, not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated to carry out
the provisions of the immigration laws. . . .

that bond is void.

Reasons there are which prevent us from giving our imprimatur to this argument.

The provision requiring official approval of a bond is merely directory. "Irregularity or

entire failure in this respect does not affect the validity of the bond. 16 The reason for the
rule, is found in 9 C.J., p. 26 (footnote), which reads:

(a) Reason for rule. — "Statutes requiring bonds to be approved by certain officials are
not for the purpose of protecting the obligors in the bond, but are aimed to protect the
public, to insure their solvency, and to create evidence of an unimpeachable character of
the fact of their execution. When they are executed for a legal purpose, before a proper
tribunal, and are in fact accepted and approved by the officer or body, whose duty it was
to approve them, it could serve no useful purpose of the law to hold them invalid, to
release all the obligors thereon, and to defeat every purpose of its execution, simply
because the fact of approval was not indorsed precisely as had been directed by the
Legislature." American Book Co. vs. Wells, 83 SW 622, 627, 26 Ky L-1159. (emphasis
supplied)

And another. This bond was accepted by the government. It had been there. The form of
the bond here used is of long continued usage. If the government did not question the
form of the bond at all, then we must assume that it counted with the Secretary's
approval. For the presumption is that official duty has been legally performed.

Surely enough, equitable considerations will stop petitioners from pleading invalidity of
the bond. They offered that bond to enable them to enter and stay in this country. They
enjoyed benefits therefrom. They cannot, "in law, and good conscience, be allowed to
reap the fruits" of that bond, and then jettison the same. They are "precluded from
attacking the validity" of such bond. 17

Actually, to petitioners the bond was good while they sought entry into the Philippines;
they offered it as security for the undertaking; that they "will actually depart from the
Philippines" when their term of stay expires. Now that the bond is being confiscated
because they overstayed, they make an about-face and say that such bond is null and
void. They shall not profit from this inconsistent position. Their bond should be
confiscated.

Conformably to the foregoing, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows:

(1) The portion thereof which reads:

(a) Granting their petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to
petitioner CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the Philippines;
ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other
immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring preliminary
injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting the respondent, his
representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or deporting said petitioner;

is hereby reversed: and, in consequence —

The petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioner Chan Sau Wah is
hereby denied; and the judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing
respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers,
and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set
aside; and

(2) In all other respects, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

No costs.

So ordered.

G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROBERTO

SALANGUIT Y KO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
of violation of §16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him
accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and of §8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on
December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he
was tried.

Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic
chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field
operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:

On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant
Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-
appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later
issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español.

At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with
one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]

The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it. They
heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced
the door open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group
started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana
wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt
of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]

After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]

PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13]The white

crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box
with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams
and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.[14]

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.

Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to
leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house.
Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the
gate and descended through an opening in the roof.[15]

When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside

a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses,
however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]

Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing
money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]

The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting
handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA,
Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.[18]

Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano

testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned
goods and other valuables.[19]

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana
bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The
evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the
National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH

WARRANT VALID

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A. NO. 6425

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)

BRICKS OF MARIJUANA

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.

Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility

of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in
evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain
view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant.

First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its
issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal
requisites are fulfilled.

In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160

For: Violation of RA 6425

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that
there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and
control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex "A", the
properties to wit:

UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite,
Philippines.

(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL

Judge

Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was
no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued
for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not
described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that
the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the
existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized
by the trial court.[23]

The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer
who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a
search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:

Q- Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM,

do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or
surveillance?
A- Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q- Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A- Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q- Are you familiar with that place?
A- Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and
established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my
friend who introduced me to the former.
Q- In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A- When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu,
sir.
Q- Were you able to buy at that time?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A- I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q- Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you
know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A- Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q- How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A- When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his
room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q- Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A- Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q- How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT
@ Robert is genuine shabu?
A- After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to
our office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to
 him the 2.12 grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our
Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services,
NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a
regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-
414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q- Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A- Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything
I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash
basis at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per
gram.
Q- Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A- Yes, sir.[24]

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday
v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly
described other articles. It was held:

Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was
invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles,
even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant
was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are
severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal
basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise
valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so holding
we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable
under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which
are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of
particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation
that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse
of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.

It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the
search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even
though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of
drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It
will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with
"Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo
Olaes alias `Debie' and alias `Baby' of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics
preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." [28]

Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29]the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425,"
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search
and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:

Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1)
offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal
possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short,
following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for
illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third
for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]

Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P.D.
No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was
questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision
in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws
on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so
related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under
P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the
various provisions of the said law.

Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.

This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:

. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160
contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the
application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located
in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of
witness which described the premises as "a house without a number located at Binhagan
St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be
searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of
Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector
Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact
Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided
by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant's house and it was really appellant who was the
target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was
inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]

The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched.[33] For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3
of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there
were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top
floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description
was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass."[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the
evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.

In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's
residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the
deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.

Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride

or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the
ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is
contested by accused-appellant.

Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented in evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification;
(b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the
evidence before the police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied
with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.

Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the
police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
"plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found. As has been explained:

What the `plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification ¾ whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused ¾ and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the `plain view' doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.[37]

The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a
search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for
incriminatory evidence and destroy it.

The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant,
or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his
immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after
the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to
justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared
inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were
contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain
view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said
object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to
an observer.[40]

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he

undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this
case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the
form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the
contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor
was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for
failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was
conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the
drug must be upheld.

Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.

Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search. ¾ The officer, if refused admittance to
the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.

Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to
gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable
and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the
barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the
truth of his claim.

In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain
entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant,
refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door
several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people
inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into
the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would
be frustrated unless they do so.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty
of possession of illegal drugs under §16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging
from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under §8 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of
the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND JUNO CARS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole
function of the prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental
right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds
that the evidence does not establish probable cause.

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Court of Appeals’

decision[2] dated January 14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court’s dismissal
of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its
representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa
against Alfredo.[3]

In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as
Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando
Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had
been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s
permission.[4]

The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo
failed to remit the payments totalling ?886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there
were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation
revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda
City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the
acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of ?1,046,000.00 to its
prejudice and damage.[5]

In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to
prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported
unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.[6]

On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a resolution[7] finding

probable cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for
qualified theft and estafa.

Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.[8] He then filed a petition
for review with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.[9]

While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft[10] and
estafa[11] were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On
March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause[12] before the
trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.[13] On February 4,
2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory
hearing, for resolution.[14]

On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued
an order[15] dismissing the complaint, stating that:

After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the
assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does
not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x
x.[16]
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3,
2009.[17]

Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the
trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that “the determination of probable cause and
the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public
prosecutor.”[18]

On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,[19] reversed the trial
court, and reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction “in supplanting the public prosecutor’s
findings of probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of
probable cause.”[20]

Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence,
he argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as
shown by the evidence on record. He argued that “judicial determination of probable
cause is broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause”[21] and that “[i]t is
not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the
prosecutor x x x.”[22]

In its comment,[23] Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and
arguments that were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the
appellate court.

The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its
comment[24] that the appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his
findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his
determination of probable cause.

In his reply,[25] Alfredo reiterated that “judicial determination of probable cause[,] while
not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of
the issue on the existence of probable cause.”[26] He argued that the findings of the trial
court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the
findings of the trial court.

The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the
prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination
of probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft[27] and estafa under Article
315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)[28] of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted “to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial,” in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the
public prosecutor.[29] If upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient
basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information with
the court.

Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then “personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence”[30] to determine whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of
probable cause exists.

In People v. Castillo and Mejia,[31] this court has stated:

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation.
It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or
not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge
to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds
no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.[32]

The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself
with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:[33]

x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the
Prosecutor.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the
evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has
no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge
makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.

People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo[35] discussed the rationale. In that case,
Jonathan Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo.
An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda
Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with
conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information, which was
granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of
the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.

Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without
probable cause. The trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed
the case against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however,
reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of the amended information
against Billy Cerbo, stating that:

In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence
of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the
information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should
not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters should be
presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court
and the public prosecutor in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal justice system
should be clearly understood.

The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an “oppressive” exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require.
But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise
be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or
manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain
from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.

In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice
secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal
is resolved.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that
the facts and evidence were “sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x
x.”[37] There was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the
discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.

While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still
had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the
arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.

Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this,
the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the
judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase “upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce” allows a determination
of probable cause by the judge ex parte.

For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
mandates the judge to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to
establish probable cause.” Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. —
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge
who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:[38]

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the
filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause;
and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in
case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss
the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is
the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against
the respondents.[39] (Emphasis supplied)

It is also settled that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests
in the sound discretion of the court.”[40]

In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on

record and concluded that “the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable
cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.”[41] Specifically, she found that Juno
Cars “failed to prove by competent evidence”[42] that the vehicles alleged to have been
pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles
were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also
found that the complaint “[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged
office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by
the accused,”[43] which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She also noted that:

x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory
hearing to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed
the private complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as
affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable
cause exists to commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.[44]

Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali
correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo.

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with
caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary
nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand
absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case.
On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed
with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 163858, June 28, 2005

UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ERNESTO ISIP AND/OR

SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES AND/OR OCCUPANTS, SHALIMAR BUILDING,
NO. 1571, ARAGON STREET, STA. CRUZ, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance
of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building,
located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip;
and for the seizure of the following for violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8,
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:

a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB),

particularly REVICON multivitamins;

b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,

advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or
distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;

c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase

orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit
REVICON multivitamins.[1]

The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search
Warrant Case No. 04-4916 and raffled to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were
the following: (1) a sketch[2] showing the location of the building to be searched; (2) the
affidavit[3] of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired by
United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production
and/or distribution of fake drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3)
the letter-request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and exclusive manufacturer and/or
distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized
production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure; (4) the
letter-complaint[4] of UNILAB issued through its Director of the Security and Safety
Group; and (5) the joint affidavit[5] of NBI Agents Roberto Divinagracia and Rolando
Besarra containing the following allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE
AND SECURITY AGENCY named CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since
November 2003, at the said premises located at No. 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila. MR. RABE averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR. ERNESTO
ISIP and that the said premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar
Building, are being used to manufacture counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly
REVICON multivitamins, which was already patented by UNILAB since 1985;

3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-story
structure, with an additional floor as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It has a tight
security arrangement wherein non-residents are not allowed to enter or reconnoiter in the
premises;

4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
and has a new address as 1571 Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that the area of
counterfeiting operations are the first and second floors of Shalimar Building;

5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures of the area
especially the places wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations were being
held. At a peril to his well-being and security, the Asset was able to take photographs
herein incorporated into this Search Warrant Application.[6]
A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the
application for the search warrant. After conducting the requisite searching questions, the
court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 04-4916 dated January 27,
2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second
floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. The court also directed the police to seize the following items:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB),
particularly REVICON multivitamins;

b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles,

advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or
distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;

c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders
and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins.[7]
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true
inventory thereof executed under oath.

The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents
Besarra and Divinagracia, in coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon
multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes at the first and second floors
of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of
respondent Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION

792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.

30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg.[8]

NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in
which he declared that the search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building
at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises described in the warrant, was
done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search
Warrant,[9] alleging that no other articles/items other than those mentioned in the warrant
and inventory sheet were seized. The agent prayed that of the items seized, ten boxes of
Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be turned over to the custody of the
Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination.[10] The court issued an order
granting the motion, on the condition that the turn over be made before the court, in the
presence of a representative from the respondents and the court.[11]

The respondents filed an “Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress
Evidence.”[12] They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their
search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in “open display” were allegedly found. They
pointed out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in the
search warrant, the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571,
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI
officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of
properties to be seized in the search warrant.

UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search
was limited to the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of
Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They averred that, based on the
sketch appended to the search warrant application, Rabe’s affidavit, as well as the joint
affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the search was conducted was
located at No. 1571, Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They
pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address, and the
new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the
warrant was not implemented in any other place.[13]

In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in
the search warrant. They also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located
at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of the premises which the applicant
submitted to the trial court.[14] In accordance with the ruling of this Court in People v.
Court of Appeals,[15] the respondents served a copy of their pleading on UNILAB.[16]
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order[17] granting the motion of the
respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not
those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the trial court issued an
advisory[18] that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the
respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed.

UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI
agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court
in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of
the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the
appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the
People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of
UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that
the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson
Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating
on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the
search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. The
respondents emphasized that the Shalimar Laboratories is authorized to manufacture
galenical preparations of the following products:
Products:

- Povidone Iodine

- Chamomile Oil

- Salicylic Acid 10 g.

- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution

- Aceite de Alcamforado

- Aceite de Manzanilla[19]
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of the counsel
of UNILAB, and insisted that it was not authorized to appear before the court under the
Rules of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that the BFAD was the authorized
government agency to file an application for a search warrant.

In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the
motion for reconsideration because it was the one which sought the filing of the
application for a search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings and filing
pleadings. The only parties to the case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State or
public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the offended party, or the holder of a
license to operate, may intervene through counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in
relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the NBI
officers.[20] In their rejoinder, the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was
the option to look forward to.[21] However, no such ocular inspection of the said premises
was conducted.

In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the
Disudrin and Inoflox samples which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar
Building. On its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the BFAD declared
that the substance failed the test.[22] The BFAD, likewise, declared that the examined
Disudrin syrup failed the test.[23] The BFAD had earlier issued the following report:

PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS

1.Phenylpropanolamine Unilab 21021552 3-06 -
(Disudrin) 2.5 mg./5mL Registered, however,
Syrup label/physical
appearance does not
conform with the
BFAD
approved label/
registered
specifications.
2.Ofloxacin (Inoflox) Unilab 99017407 3-05 -
200 mg. tablet. Registered, however,
label/physical
appearance does not
conform with the
BFAD
approved label/
registered
specifications.[24]

On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order[25] denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take
possession of “finished or unfinished products of United Laboratories (UNILAB),
particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit nature
of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant does
not, however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized
products are imitations of UNILAB items is beside the point. No evidence was shown
nor any was given during the proceedings on the application for search warrant relative to
the seized products.

On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be
sustained.[26]
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, where the following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200 mg.
are INADMISSIBLE as evidence against the respondents because they constitute the
“fruit of the poisonous tree” or, CONVERSELY, whether or not the seizure of the same
counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the “plain view” doctrine and, hence, the
same are legally admissible as evidence against the respondents in any and all actions?[27]
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court
quashed the search warrant for a ground which was not raised by the respondents herein
in their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues that the trial court ignored the
issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC deprived
it of its right to due process. The petitioner asserts that the description in the search
warrant of the products to be seized – “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB” – is
sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within the premises of the respondents not covered
by any license to operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed to
manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the
ruling of this Court in Padilla v. Court of Appeals,[28] the petitioner asserts that the
products seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be seized by them. The
petitioner posits that the respondents themselves admitted that the seized articles were in
open display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of the implementing officers.

In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have been
filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) because factual questions are raised. They also
assert that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition involving the validity and
the implementation of the search warrant. They argue that the petitioner merely assisted
the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the
said government agencies as parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because
under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to represent the
government and its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the Supreme
Court. The respondents further assert that the trial court may consider issues not raised
by the parties if such consideration would aid the court in the just determination of the
case.

The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes so fast
even before respondent Isip could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No.
1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by
TCT No. 174412 as stated in the search warrant. They assert that the ruling of the Court
in People v. Court of Appeals[29] is applicable in this case. They conclude that the
petitioner failed to prove the factual basis for the application of the plain view
doctrine.[30]

In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-interest
to defend the validity of the search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its
instance that the application for a search warrant was filed by the NBI, which the RTC
granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from filing a criminal
complaint against the respondents and requesting the NBI to file an application for a
search warrant. The petitioner points out that the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
specifically prohibit a private complainant from defending the validity of a search
warrant. Neither is the participation of a state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said
Rules. After all, the petitioner insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of
a search warrant is not a criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place sought to be
searched was sufficiently described in the warrant for, after all, there is only one building
on the two parcels of land described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is located,
the place searched by the NBI officers.[31] It also asserts that the building is located at the
corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.[32]

The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the
boxes were found outside the door of the respondents’ laboratory on the garage
floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding team –
precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes in
which the items were contained were themselves so designated to replicate true and
original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left hand corner of one side
of some of the boxes[33] the letters “ABR” under the words “60 ml,” appeared to describe
the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true
medicine of the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that “ABR” is the acronym for
“amber bottle round” describing the bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for
children) is contained.

The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own “license plates” which
were instituted as among its internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate
that the items within are, supposedly, “Disudrin.” The NBI officers had reasonable
ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data appearing on their
supposedly distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that although some of the
boxes marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo were, indeed, sealed, the tape or seal
was also a copy of the original because these, too, were marked with the distinctive
UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its pleading pictures of the Shalimar building
and the rooms searched showing respondent Isip;[34] the boxes seized by the police
officers containing Disudrin syrup;[35] and the boxes containing Inoflox and its
contents.[36]

The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper party
to file the petition at bench; (2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present
petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and (3) whether the search
conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building and
the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and
Inoflox, were valid.

On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner’s contention that a search warrant
proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action[37] or the commencement of a
prosecution.[38] The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some
respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings.[39] While an application
for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.

A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery
employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime.[40] It is in the nature of a
criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions.[41] A search warrant is a
police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name
of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.[42]

A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating
civil rights or maintaining mere private rights.[43] It concerns the public at large as
distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons.[44] It
may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.[45]

However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a

government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the
BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to
maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the
admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such
private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The
party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court,
or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.[46]

In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents’ motion to
quash the search warrant. The respondents served copies of their reply and
opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro, Jr.[47] The court a quo
allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its
counsel.

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to
assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the
Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[48] the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the
RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the
OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its
case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the
Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition
will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow
petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor
General.[49]
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However,
in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[50] In this case,
the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues
raised by the parties.

The Court does not agree with the petitioner’s contention that the issue of whether the
Disudrin and Inoflox products were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of
the respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents failed to raise the issue in their
motion to quash the search warrant; in their reply, however, they averred that the seized
items were not included in the subject warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by
the raiding team. They also averred that the said articles were not illegal per se, like
explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the course of unlawful search.[51] In
their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the
following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there
is a legal basis to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in
evidence. Since the articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search
warrant – Disudrin and Inoflux products – were not included in the search warrant, they
were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it
were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu as to justify their seizure in the
course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some such. No need whatever for
some public assay.

The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper
examination or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from
respondent’s place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor of
legality.[52]
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the
respondents never raised in the court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the
Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.

In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11, 2004
Order of the court a quo on the following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the alleged
failure to particularly describe in the search warrant the items to be seized but upon
which NO challenge was then existing and/or NO controversy is raised;

2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that “finished or unfinished products of
UNILAB” cannot stand the test of a particular description for which it then reasons that
the search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,

2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully
inadmissible against respondents.[53]
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it before
finally resolving to deny the same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the petitioner was
denied its right to due process.

On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox,
the Court, likewise, rejects the contention of the petitioner.

A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly
described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so
as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.[54]

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing
officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain
view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the
executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the
officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.[55]

The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior
justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident
to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a
search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across
immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be
required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are
investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police
to obtain another warrant.[56] Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate
expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution.

The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery
of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the
object’s incriminating evidence.[57] In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must
be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory perception of the object.[58] The
object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to
criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the
course of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be
apparent at the moment of seizure.[59]

The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have
known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it.[60] Discovery is
not anticipated.[61]

The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to
the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be
presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal
activity.[62]

Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to

prove the guilt of a person.[63]

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the
facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that
certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It
does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical,
non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is
required. The evidence thus collected must be seen and verified as understood by those
experienced in the field of law enforcement.[64]

In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the
court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant
specifically authorized the officers only to seize “counterfeit Revicon multivitamins,
finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of
the said vitamins.” The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where
they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.

It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the
items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the
sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been
adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the
doctrine during the hearing of the respondents’ motion to quash, or at the very least,
during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on April 16,
2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central to the plain view exception
relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the
petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI
failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the
petitioner’s representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant
to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that
such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be
stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal
knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and
that they were immediately apparent.[65] There is even no showing that the NBI agents
knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove
the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 156804, March 14, 2005

SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT (PHILS.), INC. AND IFPI (SOUTHEAST

ASIA), LTD., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPANOL OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 90, DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE,
ELENA S. LIM, SUSAN L. TAN, DAVID S. LIM, JAMES H. UY, WILSON
ALEJANDRO, JR., JOSEPH DE LUNA, MARIA A. VELA CRUZ, DAVID
CHUNG, JAMES UY, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, AND SOLID LAGUNA
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be nullified in this petition for certiorari with application for
injunctive relief are the orders issued by the respondent judge on June 25,
2002[1] and January 6, 2003,[2] the first quashing Search Warrant No. 219-00, and the
second, denying reconsideration of the first.

From the petition, the comment thereon of private respondents, their respective annexes,
and other pleadings filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following relevant facts:

In a criminal complaint filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Videogram
Regulatory Board (VRB)[3] charged herein private respondents James Uy, David
Chung, Elena Lim and another officer of respondent Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC)
with violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1987.[4] As alleged in the complaint,
docketed as I.S. No. 2000-1576, the four (4) were engaged in the replication,
reproduction and distribution of videograms without license and authority from VRB. On
account of this and petitioners’ own complaints for copyright infringement, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through Agent Ferdinand M. Lavin, applied on September
18, 2000, with the Regional Trial Court at Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 80, presided by
the respondent judge, for the issuance of search warrants against private
respondents David Chung, James Uy, John and Jane Does, doing business under the
name and style “Media Group” inside the factory and production facility of SLC at Solid
corner Camado Sts., Laguna International Industrial Park, Biñan, Laguna.[5]

During the proceedings on the application, Agent Lavin presented, as witnesses, Rodolfo
Pedralvez, a deputized agent of VRB, and Rene C. Baltazar, an investigator retained by
the law firm R.V. Domingo & Associates, petitioners’ attorney-in-fact. In their sworn
statements, the three stated that petitioners sought their assistance, complaining about the
manufacture, sale and distribution of various titles of compact discs (CDs) in violation of
petitioners’ right as copyright owners; that acting on the complaint, Agent Lavin and the
witnesses conducted an investigation, in the course of which unnamed persons informed
them that allegedly infringing or pirated discs were being manufactured somewhere in an
industrial park in Laguna; that in the process of their operation, they were able to enter,
accompanied by another unnamed source, the premises of SLC and to see various
replicating equipment and stacks of CDs; and that they were told by their anonymous
source that the discs were being manufactured in the same premises. They also testified
that private respondents were (1) engaged in the reproduction or replication of audio and
video compacts discs without the requisite authorization from VRB, in violation of
Section 6 of PD No. 1987, presenting a VRB certification to such effect; and (2) per
petitioners’ certification and a listing of Sony music titles, infringing on petitioners’
copyrights in violation of Section 208 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known
as Intellectual Property Code.[6]

On the basis of the foregoing sworn statements, the respondent judge issued Search
Warrant No. 219-00[7] for violation of Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293 and Search
Warrant No. 220-00[8] for violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987.

The following day, elements of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, led by PO2 Reggie Comandante, enforced both warrants and brought
the seized items to a private warehouse of Carepak Moving and Storage at 1234 Villonco
Road, Sucat, Paranaque City and their custody turned over to VRB.[9] An inventory of
seized items,[10] as well as a “Return of Search Warrant” were later filed with the
respondent court.

Meanwhile, the respondents in I.S. No. 2000-1576 belabored to prove before the DOJ
Prosecutorial Service that, since 1998 and up to the time of the search, they were licensed
by VRB to operate as replicator and duplicator of videograms.

On the stated finding that “respondents can not be considered an unauthorized

reproducers of videograms”, being “licensed to engage in reproduction in videograms
under SLC in which they are the officers and/or or officials”, the DOJ, via a resolution
dated January 15, 2001,[11] dismissed VRB’s complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576.

On February 6, 2001, private respondents, armed with the DOJ resolution adverted to,
moved to quash the search warrants thus issued.[12] VRB interposed an opposition for the
reason that the DOJ has yet to resolve the motion for reconsideration it filed in I.S. No.
2000-1576.
Eventually, the DOJ denied VRB’s motion for reconsideration, prompting private
respondents to move anew for the quashal of the search warrants. In its supplement to
motion, private respondents attached copies of SLC’s license as videogram duplicator
and replicator.

In an order dated October 30, 2001,[13] the respondent judge, citing the January 15, 2001
DOJ resolution in I.S. No. 2000-1576, granted private respondents’ motion to quash, as
supplemented, dispositively stating:
“Nonetheless, such being the case, the aforesaid Search Warrants are QUASHED”
Petitioners forthwith sought clarification on whether or not the quashal order referred to
both search warrants or to Search Warrant No. 220-00 alone, since it was the latter that
was based on the charge of violation of PD No. 1987.[14] The respondent judge, in a
modificatory order dated January 29, 2002,[15] clarified that her previous order quashed
only Search Warrant No. 220-00.

Meanwhile, or on November 22, 2001, petitioners filed with the DOJ an affidavit-
complaint, docketed thereat as I.S. No. 2001-1158, charging individual private
respondents with copyright infringement in violation of Sections 172 and 208 in relation
to other provisions of RA No. 8293.[16] Attached to the affidavit-complaint were certain
documents and records seized from SLC’s premises, such as production and delivery
records.

Following their receipt of DOJ-issued subpoenas to file counter-affidavits, private

respondents moved, in the search warrant case, that they be allowed to examine the
seized items to enable them to intelligently prepare their defense.[17] On January 30, 2002,
respondent judge issued an order allowing the desired examination, provided it is made
under the supervision of the court’s sheriff and in the “presence of the applicant of
Search Warrant No. 219-00”.[18]

On February 8, 2002, the parties, represented by their counsels, repaired to the Carepak
warehouse. An NBI agent representing Agent Lavin appeared. The examination,
however, did not push through on account of petitioners’ counsel insistence on Agent
Lavin’s physical presence.[19] Private respondents were able to make an examination on
the following scheduled setting, February 15, 2002, albeit it was limited, as the minutes
of the inspection discloses, to inspecting only one (1) box containing 35 assorted CDs,
testing stampers, diskettes, a calendar, organizers and some folders and documents. The
minutes also contained an entry stating - “Other items/machines were not examined
because they cannot be identified as they are not properly segregated from other
items/machines in the warehouse. The parties agreed to schedule another examination on
(to be agreed by the parties) after the items/machines subject of the examination shall
have been segregated from the other items/machines by Carepak Moving and Storage ,
Inc.”[20]

During the preliminary investigation conducted on February 26, 2002 in I.S. No. 2001-
1158, however, petitioners’ counsel objected to any further examination, claiming that
such exercise was a mere subterfuge to delay proceedings.[21]
On April 11, 2002, individual private respondents, through counsel, filed a “Motion To
Quash Search Warrant (And To Release Seized Properties)” grounded on lack of
probable cause to justify issuance of search warrant, it being inter alia alleged that the
applicant and his witnesses lacked the requisite personal knowledge to justify the valid
issuance of a search warrant; that the warrant did not sufficiently describe the items to be
seized; and that the warrant was improperly enforced.[22] To this motion to quash,
petitioners interposed an opposition dated May 7, 2002 predicated on four (4)
grounds.[23] On June 26, 2002, respondent SLC filed a Manifestation joining its co-
respondents in, and adopting, their motion to quash.[24]

On June 25, 2002, the respondent judge issued the herein first assailed order quashing
Search Warrant No. 219-00 principally on the ground that the integrity of the seized
items as evidence had been compromised, commingled as they were with other articles.
Wrote the respondent judge:
Based on the report submitted, it appears that on February 15, 2002, an examination was
actually conducted. Unfortunately, the alleged seized items were commingled with and
not segregated from thousands of other items stored in the warehouse. Only one box . . .
were (sic) examined in the presence of both parties with the sheriff, such that another date
was set . . . . On February 22, 2002, during the hearing before the Department of Justice
(DOJ), [petitioners’ counsel] Atty. Arevalo manifested their objection to the further
examination on the alleged ground that all of the items subject of the DOJ complaint have
been examined.

Analyzing the report and the incidents relative thereto, it shows that the items subject of
the questioned Search Warrant were commingled with other items in the warehouse of
Carepak resulting in the failure to identify the machines and other items subject of this
Search Warrant, while the other items enumerated in the said Inventory of Seized Items
and Certification of Legality, Orderliness and Regularity in the Execution and
enforcement of Search Warrants were not examined, hence, the charge imputed against
the respondents could not be established as the evidence to show such violation fails to
determine the culpability of said respondents, thus, violating their constitutional rights.[25]
Excepting, petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing on the main that the quashal
order was erroneously based on a ground outside the purview of a motion to quash.[26] To
this motion, private respondents interposed an opposition, against which petitioners
countered with a reply.

On January 6, 2003, respondent judge issued the second assailed order denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the strength of the following premises:
Careful scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the application of the above-
entitled case stemmed from the application for Search Warrant alleging that the
respondent was not licensed to duplicate or replicate CDs and VCDs. The Court was
misled when the applicants declared that Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) is not licensed
to engage in replicating/duplicating CDs and VCDs, when in truth and in fact, SLC was
still a holder of a valid and existing VRB license. Considering the fact that respondent
was duly licensed which facts (sic) was not laid bare to this Court when the application
for writ was filed by the private complainant through the National Bureau of
Investigation, this Court hereby recalls and quashes the above writ.

Lastly, taking into account that respondents were licensed to engage in

replicating/duplicating CDs and VCDs, the issuance of search warrant was of no force
and effect as there was absence of probable cause to justify said issuance. xxx[27]
Hence, petitioners’ present recourse.In a Resolution dated February 19, 2003,[28] the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing
and enforcing the respondent judge’s questioned orders.

Petitioners ascribe on the respondent judge the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the first assailed order in that:

1. It was based on a ground that is not a basis for quashal of a search warrant, i.e.,
private respondents’ failure to examine the seized items, which ground is
extraneous to the determination of the validity of the issuance of the search
warrant.

2. Public respondent, in effect, conducted a “preliminary investigation” that

absolved the private respondents from any liability for copyright infringement.

3. Public respondent recognized the motion to quash search warrant filed by persons
who did not have any standing to question the warrant.

Petitioners also deplore the issuance of the second assailed order which they tag as
predicated on a ground immaterial to Search Warrant No. 219-00.

Private respondents filed their Comment on May 13, 2003, essentially reiterating their
arguments in the “Motion To Quash Search Warrant (And To Release Seized
Properties)”. Apart therefrom, they aver that petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of
courts by filing the petition directly with this Court. As to be expected, petitioners’ reply
to comment traversed private respondents’ position.

Owing to their inability to locate respondent David Chung, petitioners moved and the
Court subsequently approved the dropping, without prejudice, of said respondent from
the case.[29]

On February 20, 2004, private respondents filed their Rejoinder, therein inviting attention
to petitioner IFPI’s failure to execute the certification on non-forum shopping as required
by Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court and questioning the validity of the Special
Powers of Attorney of petitioners’ attorney-in-fact to file this case.
In Resolution of March 31, 2004, the Court gave due course to the petition and directed
the submission of memoranda which the parties, after each securing an extension, did
submit.

The underlying issue before Us revolves on the propriety of the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 219-00 which, in turn, resolves itself into question of the propriety of the
warrant’s issuance in the first place.

It has repeatedly been said that one’s house, however, humble is his castle where his
person, papers and effects shall be secured and whence he shall enjoy undisturbed
privacy except, to borrow from Villanueva vs. Querubin,[30] “in case of overriding social
need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards.” The protection against
illegal searches and seizure has found its way into our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and is
now embodied in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,
and in Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz -
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Complementing the aforequoted provisions is Section 5 of the same Rule, reading:
SEC. 5. Examination of the complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the right to privacy, a
liberal construction in search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual.
Consistent with this postulate, the presumption of regularity is unavailing in aid of the
search process when an officer undertakes to justify it.[31] For, the presumption juris
tantum of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail against the constitutionally protected rights
of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself detests.[32]

A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause,
meaning “the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched”.[33] And
when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally
known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal
knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is
a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary, as held by us in Columbia
Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals.[34] Testimony based on what is supposedly told to a
witness, being patent hearsay and, as rule, of no evidentiary weight[35] or probative value,
whether objected to or not,[36] would, alone, not suffice under the law on the existence of
probable cause.

In our view, the issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the requirements
of probable cause. The respondent judge did not accordingly err in quashing the same, let
alone gravely abuse her discretion.

Petitioners argue that the instant petition is on all fours with Columbia,[37] wherein the en
banc Court upheld the validity of search warrants based on the testimonies of the
applicant and his witnesses who conducted an investigation on the unlawful reproduction
and distribution of video tapes of copyrighted films.

We are not persuaded.

In Columbia, the issuing court probed the applicant’s and his witnesses’ personal
knowledge of the fact of infringement. It was, however, determined by this Court that
during the application hearing, therein petitioner’s attorney-in-fact, a witness of the
applicant, “stated in his affidavit and further expounded in his deposition that he
personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his
clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purposes of selling any of the copyrighted
films.”[38]Significantly, the Court, in upholding the validity of the writ issued upon
complaint of Columbia Pictures, Inc., et al., stated that “there is no allegation of
misrepresentation, much less finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of
petitioners’ witnesses.”[39]

Therein lies the difference with the instant case.

Here, applicant Agent Lavin and his witnesses, Pedralvez and Baltazar, when queried
during the application hearing how they knew that audio and video compact discs were
infringing or pirated, relied for the most part on what alleged unnamed sources told them
and/or on certifications or lists made by persons who were never presented as witnesses.
In net effect, they testified under oath as to the truth of facts they had no personal
knowledge of. The following excerpts of the depositions of applicant Lavin and his
witnesses suggest as much:
A. Deposition of Agent Lavin

28. Question: What happened next?

Answer: We then went to the Laguna Industrial Park, your Honor. We then verified
from an informant that David Chung, James Uy under the name and style Media Group
were the ones replicating the infringing CDs.
 xxx xxx xxx

36. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs and CDs you purchased or are
indeed infringing?

Answer: I have with me the VRB certification that the VCDs are unauthorized
copies. I also have with me the Complaint-Affidavit of Sony Music and IFPI that
certified that these are infringing copies, as well as the title list of Sony Music wherein
some of the CDs purchased are indicated. (Annex “10”, Comment, Rollo, p. 841)

B. Deposition of Baltazar

18. Question: What did you see in that address?

Answer: We saw that they had in stock several infringing, pirated and unauthorized
CDs. They also had videograms without VRB labels, aside from artworks and
labels. John Doe gave us a “Wholesome” CD while Jane Doe gave us “Kenny Rogers
Videoke” and “Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke” which the informant told us were being
reproduced in that facility. The informant further showed us the rooms where the
replicating and/or stamping machine was located.

19. Question: How did you determine that the CDs you purchased are counterfeit,
pirated or unauthorized?

Answer: The Attorney-in-fact of Sony Music and IFPI certified in his Complaint-
Affidavit that they are unauthorized copies. I also have with me a listing of Sony Music
titles and some of the CDs I purchased are in that list.[40]

C. Deposition of Pedralvez

27. Question: What proof do you have they are producing infringing materials?

Answer: We were given some samples by John Doe and Jane Doe. These are Kenny
Rogers Videoke, Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke, and Andrew E. Wholesome CD. The
informant told us that the said samples were being reproduced in the facility.

28. Question: How do you know that all of these VCDs you purchased or got are indeed
unauthorized?

Answer: The VRB has certified that they are unauthorized copies. (Annex “12”,
Comment, Rollo, pp. 849-852).
Unlike their counterparts in Columbia who were found to be personally knowledgeable
about their facts, Agent Lavin and his witnesses, judging from their above quoted
answers, had no personal knowledge that the discs they saw, purchased or received were,
in fact, pirated or infringing on petitioners’ copyrights. To us, it is not enough that the
applicant and his witnesses testify that they saw stacks of several allegedly infringing,
pirated and unauthorized discs in the subject facility. The more decisive consideration
determinative of whether or not a probable cause obtains to justify the issuance of a
search warrant is that they had personal knowledge that the discs were actually
infringing, pirated or unauthorized copies.[41]

Moreover, unlike in Columbia, misrepresentation on the part of the applicant and his
witnesses had been established in this case.

This is not to say that the master tapes should have been presented in evidence during the
application hearing, as private respondents, obviously having in mind the holding in 20th
Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,[42] would have this Court believe. It is true
that the Court, in 20th Century Fox, underscored the necessity, in determining the
existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases, of presenting the master
tapes of the copyrighted work. But, as emphatically clarified in Columbia “such auxiliary
procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence,
depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence xxx especially where the production
in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of
proportion to its evidentiary value.[43] What this Court is saying is that any evidence
presented in lieu of the master tapes, if not readily available, in similar application
proceedings must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at the very least, be based on the
witness’ personal knowledge.

Petitioners argue, citing People v. Chua Uy,[44] that Agent Lavin’s informants’
testimonies are not indispensable as they would only be corroborative.[45] Like Columbia,
Chua Uy is not a winning card for petitioners, for, in the latter case, there was a reliable
testimony to corroborate what the applicant testified to, i.e., the testimony of the police
poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation involving prohibited drugs. The circumstances are
different in this case wherein the applicant and his witnesses had no personal knowledge
that the discs they purchased were infringing or pirated copies. It cannot be
overemphasized that not one of them testified seeing the pirated discs being
manufactured at SLC’s premises. What they stated instead was that they were given
copies of “Kenny Rogers Videoke”, “Engelbert Humperdinck Videoke” and “Andrew E.
Wholesome CD” by two anonymous sources, while yet another informant told them that
the discs were manufactured at said premises.

Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and
validated,[46] as what transpired in Columbia. Unfortunately, the records show that such is
not the case before us.

On the issue that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in conducting what
petitioners perceived amounted to a “preliminary investigation”, this Court has already
ruled in Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sheriff of RTC Quezon City, Branch 93,[47] that “in
the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an
offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the warrant”. In the exercise of this
mandate - which we can allow as being akin to conducting a preliminary investigation -
abuse of discretion cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the issuing court on
account of its prima facie holding that no offense has been committed, even if consequent
to such holding a warrant is recalled and the private complainant is incidentally deprived
of vital evidence to prove his case. Solid Triangle succinctly explains why:
The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one
hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are
proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other’s finding
as regards the existence of a crime. The first is to determine whether a warrant should
issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court.

When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant,
finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating
officer not to file the information for the court’s ruling that no crime exists is only of
purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to
believe, constitute a usurpation of the executive function. Indeed, to shirk from this duty
would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation.[48]
While the language of the first questioned Order may be viewed as encroaching on
executive functions, nonetheless, it remains that the order of quashal is entirely
independent of the proceedings in I.S. No. 2001-1158. And needless to stress, the DOJ is
by no means concluded by the respondent judge’s findings as regards the existence, or
the non-existence, of a crime.

We can, to a point, accord merit to petitioners’ lament that the basis of the first
questioned order, i.e., the mingling of the seized items with other items, is extraneous to
the determination of the validity of the issuance of the search warrant. It is to be pointed
out, though, that public respondent corrected her error when it was raised in petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. There can really be no serious objection to a judge correcting
or altogether altering his case disposition on a motion for reconsideration, it being the
purpose of such recourse to provide the court an opportunity to cleanse itself of an error
unwittingly committed, or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous.[49] A motion for reconsideration before
resort to certiorari is required precisely “to afford the public respondent an opportunity
to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case”.[50]

Similarly, as to the matter of the respondent judge’s recognizing the April 11, 2002
motion to quash search warrant[51] filed by the individual private respondents, instead of
by SLC, as presumptive owner of the seized items, such error was properly addressed
when respondent SLC, represented throughout the proceedings below by the same
counsel of its co-respondents, formally manifested that it was adopting the same motion
as its own.[52]

It is apropos to point out at this juncture that petitioners have imputed on individual
private respondents criminal liability, utilizing as tools of indictment the very articles and
papers seized from the premises of SLC. Be that as it may, petitioners should be deemed
in estoppel to raise the personality of individual private respondents to interpose a motion
to quash. To be sure, it would be unsporting for petitioners to prosecute individual private
respondents on the basis of seized articles but on the same breath deny the latter standing
to question the legality of the seizure on the postulate that only the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, meaning SLC, can raise that challenge. There can be no
quibbling that individual private respondents stand to be prejudiced or at least be
inconvenient by any judgment in any case based on the seized properties. In a very real
sense, therefore, they are real parties in interest who ought not to be prevented from
assailing the validity of Search Warrant 219-00, albeit they cannot plausibly asked for the
release and appropriate as their own the seized articles.

Petitioners’ related argument that SLC could not have validly adopted individual private
respondents’ motion to quash due to laches is untenable.

The records show that the seizure in question was effected on September 19, 2000. The
complaint in I.S. No. 2000-1576 was filed against the officers of SLC, all of whom,
except for one, are also private respondents in the instant petition. I.S. No. 2000-1576
was only resolved on January 15, 2001 when the DOJ dismissed the complaint on the
ground that SLC was, in fact, duly licensed by the VRB. Shortly thereafter, or on
February 6, 2001, less than five (5) months after the seizure, private respondents moved
to quash both search warrants.[53] The motion clearly indicates private respondents’ desire
for the return of the seized items, and there is nothing in the records showing that
petitioners objected to the motion on the ground that the movants had no standing to
question the warrants.

This bring Us to the second assailed order. As earlier stated, DOJ, in I.S. No. 2000-1576,
found respondent SLC to be licensed by VRB to engage in the business of replicating or
duplicating videograms.

Petitioners would have the Court believe that the second questioned order was based on a
ground immaterial to the charge of infringement. A scrutiny of the text of the said order,
however, shows that the respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
because she was misled by the applicant’s and his witnesses’ testimony. It may be that a
VRB license is no defense to a charge of violating Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293. It must
be stressed in this regard, however, that the core issue here is the validity of the warrant
which applicant secured on the basis of, among others, his representation which turned
out to be false.

As above discussed, the answers of Agent Lavin and his witnesses to the public
respondent’s searching questions, particularly those relating to how they knew that the
compact discs they purchased or received were illegal, unauthorized or infringing, were
based on certifications and not personal knowledge. The subject warrant, as well as
Search Warrant No. 220-00, was issued nonetheless. It may well have been that the
issuing judge was, in the end, convinced to issue the warrants by means of the erroneous
VRB certification presented during the joint application hearing, overriding whatever
misgivings she may have had with the applicant’s and his witnesses’ other answers. This
Court, however, cannot engage in such speculation and sees no need to.

Summing up, the issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-00 was, at bottom, predicated on
the sworn testimonies of persons without personal knowledge of facts they were
testifying on and who relied on a false certification issued by VRB. Based as it were on
hearsay and false information, its issuance was without probable cause and, therefore,
invalid.

Given the foregoing perspective, the peripheral issues of (a) whether or not petitioner
IFPI (South East Asia), Ltd. failed to comply with the rules requiring the filing of a
certification on non-forum shopping; and (b) whether or not IFPI’s board of directors
ratified its conditional authorization for its attorney-in-fact to represent IFPI in this
petition, need not detain us long. In our review of the records, R.V. Domingo &
Associates, whose authority to represent the petitioners in this petition continues, had
duly executed the sworn certification on non- forum shopping.

In the same manner, this Court, having taken cognizance of this petition, need not belabor
the issue of whether or not petitioners have cavalierly breached the rule on hierarchy of
courts. Suffice it to state that, while the Court looks with disfavor on utter disregard of its
rules,[54] it is within its power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
its operation whenever the ends of justice so requires, as here.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary

restraining order issued on February 19, 2003 is consequently RECALLED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.