Chapter I

INTRODUCTION
PA R T IT IO N O F IN D IA AND TH E
K A SH M IR D ISPU TE
 The partition of India was agreed upon by the parties involved in the Indian

constitutional tussle primarily because it appeared to be the only way to solve the

problems created by the lack of consentient politics in the country. Different

explanations have been given by different commentators and political analysts as to

why the partition took place. There are some, in both India and Pakistan who believe

that essentially the history of India of the last few hundred years has been the history

of Hindu-Muslim discord and 1947, marked the logical culmination of deep-rooted

historical conflicts.' There are others who attribute the growth of Muslim separatism

as well as the success of the Pakistan movement to British policies in the sub­

continent.^ Still others trace the origin of partition to such personal factors as the

obstinacy of the Jinnah or the inability of Gandhi and Nehru to comprehend the nature

of communal politics in India.^ Others have laid a great deal of emphasis on some

events in the constitutional history of India, like the communal award or the

unwillingness o f Congress to accept the Muslim League as a partner in the

government of Uttar Pradesh in 1937.'' There may be elements of truth in all these

view-points. A serious study of partition is yet to be made as personal evidences are

1 Siser Gupta, Kashmir a Study in India-Pakislan Relations, (Bombay, Asia Publishing

House, 1966), p. 13.
2 Ibid
3 Ibid
4 Ibid
now piling up in the form of memories and aulobiographies. new light is being

thrown on this momentous event in the histor> of India.'

The Indian Independence Act. 1947. passed by the British Parliament, made

provision for the setting up in India of two independent dominions. India and

Pakistan. The partition of an erstwhile single political unit into tw o independent states

necessarily gave rise to several problems; boundaries of the new slates have to be

determined; the army had to be di\ided; the sterling balances, the public debt and

other property or sen ices pre\iously handled or directed by the government of India

had to be equitably distributed betw een the two slates by agreement, if possible, or by

arbitral awards, if necessar)'.^ Some of these problems were resolved while as some

remained unresolved. However, the most thorny and intractable issue which remained

unresolved between India and Pakistan has been the Kashmir issue. It has perpetually

bedeviled their mutual relations since independence. The two countries had to go far

war with each other several times over this issue. It effects all aspects of domestic and

foreign policies of both the countries. It has become the symbol of their mutual

animosity. It continues to be a festering sore, or an article of faith, as far as Pakistan is

concerned. Far India it is a settled issue • a closed book.’ In understanding Kashmir

issue and Its present day manifestation a brief description of socio-political and

historical background of the same is necessar> .

5 For various accounts of the events leading to the partition, see E.W.R.Lumby, The
Transfer of Power in India 1945-47. (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954); V.P.
Menon, The Transfer of Power in India. {Bombay, Orient Longmans. 1957); Pyarelal,
Mahalama Gandhi. The Last Phase. (Ahmadabad. Navajivan Publishing House. 1958);
Abul Kalam Azad, India IVins Freedom. (Calcutta. Orient Longmans. 1959); Ram
Monohar Lohia, Guilty Men of India's Partition. (Allahabad. 1960); Leonard Mosley.
The Last Days of the British Raj. (London, Weidenfield Nicholison. 1961) and
H.V.Hudson, The Great Divide. fNew York, Oxford University Press, 1997).
6 A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations. (New Delhi. South
Asian Publishers, 1998). p. 58.
7 Prakash Chandra, International Relations, Foreign Policies of Major Powers and
Regional Systems. (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House. 1983). p. 174.
Formation of the Present State

The slate of Jammu and Kashmir in its present form came into being on March

16. 1846 when the British handed over the state to Raja Gulab Singh through the

Treun- of Amritsar. Prior to this, its three broad regions (Kashmir \allc\. Jammu and

the Ladakh), were go\emed separately under ditTerent rulers.** These three regions

having distinct cultures, languages, ethnic and socio-psychological characteristics

were brought under one administrative unit for the first time under the Treaiy- o f

Amritsar. According to the treaty, the British after the defeat of Sikhs in the first

Anglo-Sikh war at the battle of Sobraon transferred the hilly areas eastward of the

river Indus and \sest\vard of the river Ravi (including Chamba and excluding Lahoal

and Spill and was ceded to the British) to the Dogra Rajput Raja of Jammu Gulab

Slngh.^ Some of the other important features of this treaty are mentioned below.

Treaty of Amritsar

In order to cany out the provision o f the treaty o f Lahore, a separate

agreement was signed between the East India Company and Maharaja Gulab Singh at

Amritsar on the 16"^ of March 1846. This agreement, which is known as Treat}’ o f

Amritsar occupies an important place in the history o f Jammu and Kashmir. By this

treaty Kashmir was “sold" to Gulab Singh for cash payment o f seventy five lakh

rupees. This treaty also recognized Gulab Singh as the ‘Maharaja' (ruler) of the state

of Jammu and Kashmir.

The treaty had made it obligatory upon the Maharaja Gulab Singh not to make

any alteration in the territories of his slate without the due concurrence of the British

government.'^ The Maharaja was not permitted to employ or retain in his service any

British or European or American subject without the consent o f government of

8 P.S.Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads. (Delhi, Vikas Publishing
House. 1994), p. 9.
9 Treaty of Amritsar. March 16. 1846. (For full details see appendix 1).
10 Article IV.
India." The treaty had promised the British aid and assistance to the Maharaja for

defending and protecting his territories from external enemies.'* The treaty had also

put the Maharaja under an obligation to submit an> dispute that might arise between

the state of Jammu and Kashmir and any other neighbouring sate to ihe British

arbitration whose decision was to be binding on the Maharaja as well as his male

h e ir s .L a s tly the Maharaja was to recognize and acknowledge the supremacy of

British government.'■
* Thus the state of Jammu and Kashmir with its present

boundaries was founded.

Area and Location of the State

The state of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed in 1947, lies between 32° and

37° North latitude and 73° and 80° East longitude. From North to South it extends

over 640 kms. and from East to West 840 kms. In fact it was the largest state of the

British Indian Empire with an area of 2.22,236 square kms. Density o f population,

however, was very low only 39 persons per square mile in 1921.'^ This is explained

by the fact that three-fourth of the slate area \sas constituted by the frontier districts. If

these were to be excluded, density per square mile would have been up to 147.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir has the ^nost diverse people as its

neighbours. In the North across the mountain is Soviet Turkistan and Sinkiang

(Xingiang), in the East Tibet, in the West Afghanistan and the former North West

Frontier Province of Pakistan. In the South is the Punjab presently divided between

India and Pakistan. Geographical location has always been a crucial factor in the

strategic and the political importance of the state. O f the physical features of Kashmir.

11 Ibid. Article Vll.

12 /W . Article IX.
13 Article V.
14 The Maharaja will in token of such supremacy present annually lo British government
one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed {six males and six females)
and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.
15 Census of India. 1921, — Kashmir, Part 1. Volume XVll, Report by Khan Bhadur
Chaudhry Khushi Mohammad (Lahore. 1927), p. 4.
the most important aspect has been that Mountain is the predominating feature and

has always alTected the hislor>'. habits and the culture of the slate.

The central and most important part of the state — the Valley o f Kashmir has

been noted for its scenic beauty. In fact Europeans and Indians alike have gone lyrical

on its exquisite beauty. Bernier described it as the paradise of the earth. Jehangir

wrote that if one were to praise Kashmir, whole book had to be wTitten. Nehru

described it as a supremely beautiful lady. It is this scenic beauty of the Kashmir

which has always attracted the external invaders.

Rich Diversity

Jammu and Kashmir has been a multi-lingual and multi-racial state. In fact, it

always presented the picture of a rich diversity. People are speaking different

languages, ha\ing difterent religions and conforming to different traditions in dress,

manner and customs. As Balraj Madhok says. "The Jammu and Kashmir stale as at

present constituted ...is simply a political entity. It is a conglomeration of at least six

distant peoples inhabiting well defined parts or zones of the state and each having a

distant language, culture, customs, manners and histop.'."'^

The Imperial Gazetteer in 1908, noted that 34 per cent of the population spoke

Kashmiri, 15 per cent Dogri, while Punjabi was the tongue of nearly 30 per cent. A

great variety of languages were used in various parts o f the state by comparatively

small numbers.” The 1921, census showed that 1.81,739 spoke Bhotia (Ladakhi and

Balti). 12,56,886 spoke Kashmiri and 4,25.850 spoke Dogri.

Region-wise and Religion-wise Population

The total population of the state in 1941, was 40.21,616. The population of

Kashmir was 17,28,705. The population of Jammu was 19,81,433 and the population

16 Balraj Madhok. Kashmir Divided. (Lukhnow, Rashtra, Dharma Prakassan, 1949). pp.
16-17. (The six divisions referred to are Jammu. Kashmir. Ladakh. Baltistan, Gilgat
and the districts of South West).
17 Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXI, (Oxford. 1908). p. 99.
of Frontier Region was 3.11,478. Similarly the religion-wise population was;

Muslims 31.01,247; Hindus 8.09.165: Sikhs 65,603; Buddhists 40.696 and others

4.605. This region-wise and religion-wise population is given in the following table:

Table 1.1

Number per 10,000 population

Region Hindus Muslims Sikhs Buddhists Othcn

Kashmir province
Baramulla 211 9.649 138
(2.n%) (96.49%) (1.38%)
Anantnag 785 9.143 67 -
(7.85«'o) (91.43%) (0.67%)
MuzafTarabad 222 9,290 488
(2.22%) (92.90%) (4.88%)
Indus Valley
Ladakh District 23 7,904 9 2,055
(Ladakh and Bultistan) (0.23%) (79.04%) (0.09%) (20.55%)
Gilgat 48 9,910 34 -
(0.48%) (99.10%) (0.34%)
Astore 67 9,916 15
(0.67%) (99.16%) (0.15%
Gilgal Agency 10 9,987 3 -
(0.10%) (99.87%) (0.03%)
Jammu
Poonch 572 9,073 353
(5.72%) (90.73%) (3.53%)
Chenani 8,122 1,870 8
(81.22%) (18.70%) (0.08%)
Rcasi 3,130 6,806 60 - -

(31.30%) (68.06%) (0.60%)

Udhampur 5,602 4,362 15 18 -
(56.02%) (43.62%) (0.15%) (0.18%)
Mirpur-Kotli Tehsil 755 9,117 128 - -
(7.55%) (91.17%) (1.28%)
Mirpur& Bhember 2,003 7,606 388 -

(20.3%) (76.06%) (3.88%)

Kathua-Basohli Tehsil 8.285 1.707 2 -

(82.85%) (17.07%) (0.02%)

Jasmergarh & Kalhua 6.849 3,099 39 -
(68.49%) (30.99%) (0.39%)
Jammu 5,753 3,960 212 75
(57.53%) (39.60%) (2.12%) (0.75%)
Source: C ensus 1941.
 The table depicts that all three areas o f Kashmir province i.e. Baramulla.

Anantnag and Muzaffarabad were dominated by Muslim population with 96.49 per

cent, 91.43 per cent and 92.90 per cent respectively. Hindus constituted next religious

community in Baramulla and Anantnag with 2.21 per cent and 7.85 per ccnt

respectively. While in Muzaftarabad. Sikhs constituted the second religious

community with 8.88 per cent of the population.

Accordingly in 194K all the areas o f Indus Valley region were dominated by

Muslim population. Hindus and Sikhs constituted the second and third religious

community o f the province respectively. However, in Jammu province Chenani.

Udhampur, Jasmergarh-Kathua and Jammu areas were dominated by Hindu

population. While as Poonch. Reasi and Mirpur-Bhimber areas were dominated b>

Muslim population as shown in the table. Sikhs existed as third religious community

in all the areas o f Jammu region.

Buddhists and other religious communities like Christians and Jains wore

almost absent in all the regions o f the state. However, Ladakh area in Indus Valley

region, Jammu and Udhampur areas in Jammu region constituted 25.55 per cent. 0.18

per cent and 0.75 per cent Buddhists respectively.

The People

The peace loving people o f the valley have been described by outsiders as zulum

parast (worshipper of t>Tann>). It is the ‘cowardly’ character o f the people which some

historians held responsible for the frequent conquest of the valley."^ Bui only one writer

G.M.D.Sufi seems to disagree with it in his monumental work in which he ponrass the

Kashmiris as fearless warriors of an ancient day who through centuries o f oppression

last their fighting qualities.'*^ Sufi further found them to be a people o f superior

intellect, intelligent and gay. emotional, hospitable, fond o f singing, good looking, good

18 Gupta, n. I. p. 27.
19 G.M.D.Sufi, Kashmir being the Hisioiy of Kashmir, 2 volumes. (Lahore. The
University of Punjab, 1948).
businessmen and excellent crafts men. not drunkards, kind to their wives and their

children. He criticized them, however, fa r being envious, sometimes malicious and

dirt}', also contrary’ to the sprit o f philosophy o f Islam, mystical and superstitious. The

Kashmiri is indeed made up o f contradictions. He is timid yet persistent, degraded yet

intellectual, mystical, yet adventurous, shrewd and business like.'"

Just as the slate was broken into separate areas by geography so were its

people divided and separated by cuhural dift'erences. The Hindus of Kashmir remain

apart from all other people. The tiny majority o f Kashmiri Pandiths (members o f the

Brahmin caste) and the Jammu Brahmins always enjoyed the privileged positions of

the land owners, money lenders and slate functionaries. The Muslims although in

majority w'ere leading a miserable life. Though bound by the \er> strong tie o f Islam

the Muslims o f Kashmir and other regions o f the slate showed some son of

differences in their temperament and altitude. The Ladakh's Buddhisis are having a

close spiritual affmiis wiih the Chinese.

This was the actual position o f Kashmir — a nation divided by its mountains,

its gods, its traditions, its allegiances and the temperament o f its people.

Socio-Economic Conditions of the People Under the Dogras

During the period o f the Dogra rule o f Kashmir, the majority o f the people

suffered miserably. The reasons for the economic backwardness o f the masses

W’e r e due to the very character o f the state, its institution o f Jag irdari (feudal)

system and the system o f revenue taxation and corrupt administration. Jammu and

Kashmir was a feudal slate with some variations. This feudal character o f the state

was evident in the claim o f its ruler that all land in Kashmir belonged to him.^‘

The Maharaja was thus, the biggest jag ird ar at the apex o f the chain jagirdars

20 G.M.D.Sufi, Islamic Culture in Kashmir. (Simla, The Amiy ^ess. 1925). p. 13.
21 The profx’rty right in all lands in Kashmir belong lo the nding chiefexclusively, for the simple
reas<m that the territories of Kaslmir were punhawd by nty late lamenied grandfaiher
Maharaja (Julab Singh. Letter from Maharaja Pratab Singh to his IVimc Minister. IXxcmbor
14. 1918. File No. 191/H-75, Kaslimir Govt, records. (J&K slate archives).
subordinate to him. Most o f the state was divided into a number o f Jagirs (estates)

and these estates were granted to the members o f the Royal family, to their

relatives, to the persons w'ho belonged to the same caste and religion as professed

by the Maharaja himself, and to those persons « ho pros ed by service or otherwise,

their loyalty to the person o f the ruler as well as his throne.” The Maharaja also

enjoyed unquestioned authority to deprive any person from the estate granted to

him.

The feudal fetters hardly allowed any growth o f agriculture, trade and

industry in the state. Since the ownership o f land in the state had either vested with

the state or land agents o f the state, the cultivators greatly suffered due to hea\y

taxation collected either by officials or through middlemen. According to Walter R.

Lawrence, their position was infinitely worse than Tier-Ekat. before the French

Revolution.’^

Economically Muslims were in the worst possible conditions. The jagirdari

(feudal) system accompanied by the revenue taxation, a corrupt administrative system

and the fact that all the jagirs (estates) belonged to the Maharaja made their plight

even worse."'' Butchers, bakers, carpenters, boatmen, labourers etc. were taxed for

practicing their trade. A specific tax was le\led on the sacrifice o f goats and sheep on

the occasion of Muslim religious festivals. The burden o f this tax is given in the

following table:

22 G.H.Khan, Freedom Stovement in Kashmir. {Delhi, Light and Life Publishers,

1980), p. 11.

23 Walter R. Lawrcnce, The Valley of Kashmir, (Srinagar Chinar Publications.

1992).

24 Khan, n. 22, p. II.

 T ab le 1.2

S. No. Name of the commodit)' Tax paid Remarks

1. For each milk cow 1' “ seers of —

ghee
2. For each house hold I-IO fouls According to the number of
inmates
3. Fruil Va of the total It was realised on walnuts,
produce apples, pears, apricots, almonds
etc.
4. For each village producing 2 or 3 goats or Annual tax. half of the value
500 kanvars of grain sheep was returned to the Zomindars
For each village 1 pony Under conditions mentioned in
serial No. 4.
6. Puttoo (wool) I hie or Under conditions mentioned in
woolen serial No. 4.
blanket
7. Honey 2G of the total This tax was realized in the
produce honey producing areas.

Source: The table has been prepared from Robert Throp’s Kashmir M is g o v e r n m e n i in S.N.Gadru.
(ed.), Kashmir Papers, {Srinagar. Free Thought Literature. 1973), p. 55.

Oppression and Exploitation

The most pernicious method o f oppression which breaks the cultivator's

heart, was the system o f Begar or forced labour. Under this system many thousand

Muslims had been driven off every year to toil as carriers of burden on the most

dangerous and risky G ilgit road.'' No care was taken by the authorities of those

unfortunate wretches "laiden with grain toiling along the desert crags between

Austor and Gilgit on burning summer's day. urged on by a sepoy guard, is perhaps

as pitiable a spectacle as any to be seen on the roads o f Siberia. Begar was so

harshly enforced that the ver\- word was a constant terror in Kashmir. When there

was a call for it, the villagers would reluctantly leave their homes for two or three

25 E.F.Knight, li'lwre Three Empires Meet. (London. I.ongman Green. I 893). p. 68.

10
months with the prospect of death from cold or stan'ation".*^ No mercy was shown

to those men o f burden who were Muslim farmers, harmless subjects o f Maharaja

but were treated worse than convicts and criminals.*’ The oftlciais exploited the

begar to meet their personal gains. They otien secured purchases o f villagers for

small sums on promise o f exemption from begar. The officials were also taking

things like milk, poultr>-, grain, blankets, ponies, cows and sheep as bribe from

villagers just to keep them exempt from the begar.

Though the begar had been abolished on the recommendations o f Sir Waller

R. Lawxence in 1893, yet it continued in practice and the press wrote against it even

jn 1920-’ .

Discrimination in Governm ent Jobs and O ther Fields

There was appalling discrimination against the Muslims who constituted 77.11

per cent o f the total population. They were treated as second class citizens by the

Dogra niiers/'^ In the course o f their (Dogra) 100 years of rule (1846-1946). out of the

78 Prime Ministers appointed by the Dogra Hindus o f Kashmir, not one was a

Muslim, and out of 13. there was only one Muslim battalion in the state army.^'

Similarly there was a great discrimination to\\ards Muslims in other departments. The

share o f Muslims in various government ser\'ices during the year 1930 and 1931. is

shown in the following table;

26 Khan. n. 22, p. 19.

27 Knight, n. 25. p. 68.
28 From Pandilh Suraj Koul to Waller R. Lawrence, Calcutta Records. Foreign
Depanmcm. Secret E. ^Demi Oxford). Srinagar. June 22. 1889.
29 File No. 72/C-57 of 1920. (J&K Stale archives).
30 Siblain Tahira, Kashmir and United Suiions {PakistanNationalInsiituie of Pakistan
Studies, Quadi Azam University Islamabad, 1990), p. 5.
31 G.H.Khan, n. 22, p 120.
 T able 1.3

S.No. Name of the Total No. Non- Muslims Muslim

____________ department____ of officials Muslims____________ percentage
1. Forest 124 120 4 3.2
2. Customs 159 150 9 5.8
3. Education 62 56 6 9.6
4. Judiciao' 37 33 4 10.8
5. Medical 220 188 32 14.5
6. Revenue 148 113 33 23.6
7. Treasuo' 210 118 13 6.4
8 Police
(a )F r o m lG P to 87 71 12 13.2
Sub Inspectors
____________ (b) Constabulan-_________ 1378 628 650__________ 47.1
Source: InquHab, quoted in Khan. n. 22. p. 120.

The Dogra rulers also did ver>’ little for the heallh and welfare of the people.

According to the 1941. census 93.4 per cent o f the population was illiterate. In 1939,

there was one boy's priniar>' school for every 66 square miles and for every 3.850

people, and one girl's school for ever> 467 square miles and 25.670 persons. One

slate college existed in the whole countr>‘. As late as 1944-1945. per capita income

was only 11 rupees out of this some people had to pay taxes o f around 21 per cent per

head.^‘

Absence of Religious Libert}-

In spite o f the fact that the Muslims constituted majority o f the population but

they enjoyed very little religious liberty. Several mosques and other sacred places

were in the possession o f the govemmcni. No Hindu could become a Muslim without

loosing his all landed property."' Eve i m 1850. Maharaja expressed the wish that the

Kashmiris should return to the fai’h of their forefathers and wanted to reconvert

masses to Hinduism, but the high priests of Hindus at Benaras refused to give their

32 Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir. (America. Princeton. New Jerss. 1966). p. 16.
33 The Kashmiri Musalman. w ‘ekls. Lahore. May 25, 1931.

12
blessing to the plan.’^* As late as in 19;0, it was a capital offence for Muslim to

slaughter a cow, later the penalty was reduced to ten years, and still latter to seven

years.’ ®The starved and strangulated M uslim masses contributed 5,00,00,000 rupees,

year after year for the maintenance ol'the Maharaja’s fabulous court.’ ’’

This brief account o f Jammu and Kashmir would enable one to asses the basic

needs, urges and aspirations of the population. The history o f invasions, tyranny and

oppression was bound to creaie in the minds o f the people o f the state an intense

desire for self-government ana democracy. The Kashmiri had not participated in any

important way in the govemm,;nt o f his country ever since the Mughal conquest. Thus

the reassertion o f the people was an historical necessity.

Political Awakening

In 1925, Maharaj I Hari Singh mounted the throne. It was with the beginning

of his rule that the llrel signs o f political awakening were seen among the oppressed

people o f his princely atate. The Kashmiri Muslims for the first time began to demand

their share in government and other administrative services. In this regard they

formed first a ‘Reading Room Party’ in 1930, in order to mobilize themselves

politically, later on with the assistance o f some o f the established religious leaders,

they conducted the political meetings in the mosques. Gradually this political

consciousness began to take firm roots, spreading from the intelligentsia to the

general masses.

It was in 1931, that the growing dissatisfaction o f the Kashmiri people burst

into flame. Ii was led by a man of 25, a teacher hitherto unknown but soon to play an

important role in the political histor> o f Kashmir— Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. The

Maharaja reacted to the 1931. revolt with swift resolve, declared emergency and

threw Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah into prison for several weeks. This first abortive

34 Korbel, n. .'^2. p. 15.

35 Ibid
36 Aziz Beg. Captive Kashmir, (Lahore. Allied Business Corporation. 1957). p. 22.

13
attempt, however, was highly significant. It was for the first time in the centuries that

the Kashmiri people responded to the leadership o f one who sought to throw o ff the

old yoke o f oppression.^’

The neo-educated elite, highly politicized and fresh from universities in other

parts o f India, particularly from Aligarh, were now firmly convinced about the need

for a formal political organization which could not only articulate and spearhead the

movement but also aggregate the demands o f the Muslims, channelise their

grievances and eventually seek redressal from the officialdom.’ * This ultimately led to

the formation o f Muslim Conference in 1932. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and

Chaudhry Gulam Abass were elected its President and General Secretary respectively.

The Muslim Conference also adopted the flag o f Muslim League and determined to

safeguard the interests o f Kashmiri Muslims.^’

By 1934, differences had arisen in the working committee o f the Muslim

conference in regard to the attitude to be adopted towards the Franchise Committee

which the Maharaja has appointed as a part of his scheme for limited constitutional

reforms. This was the beginning o f division o f the political movement in the state.''”

As a consequence o f these differences the working committee was dissolved and

Chaudhr)' Gulam Abass was appointed leader of the Muslim Conference. Abass’s

talks with the Prime Minister o f the state failed. He gave a call for civil disobedience

movement for which he was arrested and sentenced to imprisonment for six months.

Congress tow ards the State

In other princely states o f India, too, the freedom movement was having its

impact. The Indian National Congress was the motivating force behind it. It also took

37 Korbel,n. 32. p. 18.

38 Inqualab. Lahore, Oct. 23, 1932.
39 Mohammad Yousuf Saraf, Kashmir's Fight for Freedom, Vol. I, (1819-1946), (Lahore,
Ferozsons, 1977), p. 483.
40 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir. (New Delhi, Allied Publishers. 1992).
p. 77.

14
deep interest in what was happening in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian National

Congress began to figure openly in Kashmir politics since 1935/' On December 28,

1935, a public meeting was held at Amrakadal, Srinagar in connection with fiftieth

birth anniversar>' o f the Indian National Congress. The meeting was presided over by

Prem Nath Bazar.'’’ Tribute was paid to the Indian National Congress for the services

it had rendered to the Nation during the proceeding fifty years. The representatives

also requested the President o f the Congress that millions o f the people o f Kashmir

are with him in his fight for freedom o f the Motherland. The resolution moved by

Maulana Mohammad Syed Masoodi was unanimously passed.'*^

However, the Congress Party began to take serious interest in the Kashmir politics

immediately after Mr. Jinnah left the state in 1936. Some Congress leaders entered the

state to create a liaison with the leaders of different communities. In August 1936, Mr.

Punishotton Das Tandon was strictly advised by the Nehni to see Sheikh Abdullah and

Prem Nath Bazaz.'“ In 1937, two prominent Congress leaders, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan

and Dr.K.M.Ashraf came to Kashmir and made efforts to bring Kashmir freedom

movement closer to the Indian National Congress. Many talks were held benveen them

and the Kashmiri leaders for this purpose.'"’ Dr. K. M. Ashraf delivered many speeches in

favour o f nationalism and joint action by Hindus and Muslims.

The Nehru Abdullah Meet

At the invitation of President o f Indian National Congress Pt. Nehru, Sheikh

Abdullah went to Peshawar in January 1938, along with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.

Nehru was on an official tour in Frontier Pro\ince. The first meeting benveen the two

leaders took place at the residence of Dr. Khan.'’* During this period three meetings were

41 Khan, n. 22, p. 346.

42 Ibid
43 The /tambj'r (weekly). Jammu, Jan. 6, 1935, p. 4.
44 The Hamc/ard (weekly), Srinagar, August 15. 1936. p. 6.
45 The Rambir (weekly), Jammu. Oct. 18. 1937, p. 7.
46 The Rambir (weekly), Jammu, Januar>' 31, 1938, p. 7.
held at Peshawar, Banu and Kohat respectively. Issues related to the freedom movement

of Kashmir were seriously discussed. Nehru categorically suggested that the doors of the

Muslim Conference should be thrown open to non-Muslims and a new era should be

started in Kashmir politics.*’ With regard to the minority’s demand for safeguards, the

Sheikh assured Pandith Nehru that Muslims are ready to accept the legitimate demands

which may be presented by them either directly or through an arbitrator.'**

The Nehru-Abdullah meet was an important event in the growth of the secular

politics in Kashmir. Immediately after his return from Peshawar he (Abdullah)

explained his party that it was a best alternative for reorganizing the movement on

national lines and replacing the Muslim Conference by a national organization.*’

However, the main role in bringing Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah closer to

Indian National Congress was played by a Kashmiri Brahaman, Prem Nath Bazaz. To

advance the idea o f secularism, Bazaz and Abdullah had already founded in 1935,

weekly, Hamdard, printed in Urdu, in which Bazaz pleaded for admission o f Sikhs

and Hindus to the membership of the Muslim Conference.*” At one time he

(Abdullah) became President o f A ll India States Peoples Congress sponsored by the

Indian National Congress.*' Even it was Bazaz who had introduced Sheikh Abdullah

to Pandith Nehru who later turned to be very good friends.*^

Factionalism

Factionalism emerged as a significant phenomenon in the freedom movement

of Jammu and Kashmir as the leaders o f various classes tried to establish their

hegemony over the movement and the people. During the Initial phase o f 1931-35.

struggle, the ideological character o f factionalism was highly amorphous, largely due

47 rae SomA/r (weekly). Jammu, Kebruar>14, 1938, p. 15.

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Korbel, n. 32. p. 20.
51 Ibid
52 Ibid

16
to the use o f religion as main instrument o f ideological warfare by both the factions o f

Mirwaiz Mohammad Yousuf Shah and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah,” Soon after the

freedom movement was launched. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah started challenging

the importance o f the old religious group represented by the Mirwaiz Moulvi

Mohammad Yousuf Shah. The challenge to the position o f the Mirwaiz in politics

made him to think that he ought not to have supported Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah

and his colleagues at the time when freedom movement was launched in July 1931.

The first shot fired by the Mirwaiz was as early as September I I , 1931, when he

challenged Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and announced that those who do not know

the different aspects o f the meaning o f the Arabic language can interpret the Qur 'an

wrongly.** He also said that Ahmadiyas were mainly responsible for boosting the

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullaha’s position. He blamed them for their religious

heresies.’ ’ Thus sharp differences grew between these two prominent leaders which

divided almost all the Muslims o f the state into two hostile factions. The 1931-35,

period o f hostility between the two. factions which resulted in numerous conflicts

drew the masses into controversy in large numbers and led to their division. As a

matter o f fact, the Sheer (lion) and Bakra (He goat) factions are the outcome o f this

animosity. Both the leaders took to opposite directions, never met again and this made

the Kashmiris to cost very dearly. Mirwaiz later on floated a new party called as the

Azad Muslim Conference.

The leaders o f the Pandith community allied themselves with Mirwaiz Moulvi

Mohammad Yousuf Shah. They made contacts with some leading Muslim men of

influence and supporters o f the Mirwaiz such as Mirza Ghulam Mustafa, Assadullah

Vakil, etc. and had secret meetings with the Mir\vaiz.’'’ They assured Mirwaiz to

53 Saraf, n. 39, p. 473.

54 N.N.Raina, Kashmir Polilics and MaierialisI Movement, 18-16-1980 (New Delhi,
Patriot, 1988), p, 94.
55 Khan, n.22, p. 290.
5f< Ibid. p. 303. (quoted).
support his party sincerely and wholeheartedly. This new development in Kashmir

politics was a serious threat to the leadership o f Sheikh Abdullah and his party. So he

did not remain a silent spectator. He blamed the Pandiths o f being 'anti-movement'

and warned them to remain aloof In a speech at Amira Kadal on February 27. 1933,

he said.

During the Iasi agilalion, our Hindu brethren opposed our

movement. It is better fo r them to jo in us or at least refrain from

opposing the movement.^’’

Similarly on May 9, at a meeting held at the Father Masjid he said,

The Pandiths should neither come to me nor should they go to

see Mouivi Mohammad Yousuf Shah. Both o f us are at variance with

each other. The Pandiths must adopt an attitude o f neutrality.

However, when these warnings proved unfruitful to overthrow and decline the

position o f Mirwaiz by keeping the Pandiths aloof from supporting his, party, he

immediately changed his policies and programmes. He intensified the agitation and

asked the people to observe 8 May, 1936. as ‘responsible government day'. It was on

this occasion that Sheikh Abdullah, as President o f the Muslim Conference appealed

to the non-Muslims to participate in the mass uprising and lend their support to the

agitation against the autocratic rule o f Maharaja.

Secularisation of Kashm ir Politics

On 28“' June 1938, the working committee o f the Muslim Conference met in

Srinagar to consider the question o f changing the nomenclature o f the party. After

marathon discussion, lasting five days and spread over fifty two hours, it passed the

following resolution:

Where as in the opinion o f the working committee the time has

come when a ll the progressive forces in the country should be rallied

57 Ibid. (quoted).

18
 under one banner to fight fo r the achievement o f responsible

government. The working committee recommends to the General

Council that in the forthcoming annual session, the name and the

constitution o f the organization be so altered and amended that all

people who wish to participate in the political struggle are enabled to

become members o f the Conference irrespective o f their caste, creed

and religion.^^

On 10'*' and 11* June 1939, a special session o f Muslim Conference was held at

Srinagar under the Presidentship o f known leftist Khawaja Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq.

The Muslim Conference was renamed as All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference

and its membership was opened to all classes irrespective of their religion.

Revival of Muslim Conference

Earlier at the sixth annual session held on March 25, at Jammu, the resolution

was strongly opposed by some members and led to its postponement. Prominent

among those members were Abdul Majid Quraishi, Maulana Abdullah Siyakhvi,

Allah Rakha Sagar and Sheikh Mohammad Amin. After a deep controversy nothing

was achieved and a majority o f the members voted in favour of placing the resolution

before the people for their vote.'’ However, never was the public opinion sought on

the resolution. But before the change of Muslim Conference into All Jammu and

Kashmir National Conference, the following conditions were settled.^

Firstly, it will be in the objectives o f the National Conference to

struggle fo r the religious, economic, political and administrative

grievances (of Muslims).

58 P.N.Bazaz. The History o f Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir. (New Delhi. Kashmir
Publishing Co. 1954), p. 169.
59 TTie /!am6/r (weekly). Jammu, March 28. 1938, p. 12.
50 Chaudhry Gulam Abass, Kash-mu-Kash. (An Autobiography), (Lahore. Sind Sagar
Acadcmy, 1956), pp. 211-212.

19
 Secondly, separate electorate, which was already in force with

regard to elections to the assembly and other bodies shall remain in

force.

Thirdly, S. Abdullah will not own Congress politics nor will he

support the Congress in any case.

Finally, in the struggle against Maharaja H ari Singh, all the

Nationals inhabiting the state have an opportunity o f participation and

the goal o f the Conference would be to set up a Responsible

Government.

Similarly, when on 11"’ and 12“’ June 1939, the voting on the resolution took

place, there were some members who had strongly opposed the change, Chaudhry

Hamidullah opposed the resolution on the ground that the Hindu Muslim unity was

impossible because Hindus were already advanced in education and as such, would

have an edge over Muslims under the responsible government. It was also said that

the Hindu money-lenders of the Jammu province opposed the nationalism in the

state.*' This contention was also supported by Moulvi Rafi-ud-Din. Similarly.

Ghulam Hyder Khan wanted that the new National Conference be established without

disbanding the parent organization.*’’

Thus the process o f secularization created friction in the political organization

and even Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah for some time was quite disturbed about the

non-involvement o f non-Muslims in the National Conference. This adversely affected

the standing o f the National Conference and frustrated its leaders. That is why on 28"'

July 1941, in a public meeting at Srinagar Sheikh Abdullah said, "people who cannot

even tolerate the washing of hands and face by us on the banks of Jhelum, surely

61 TVie ATAaM (Srinagar). June 21, 1939,p.3.

62 Khan, n. 22, p. 547.

20
cannot he united with us".‘ ^ It was in this atmosphere o f gloom and fi^stration that

some people in Jammu thought o f reviving Muslim Conference. Some unknown

Muslim young men backed by Mr. M. A. Hafiz a member o f the legislative assembly

had formed the local branch o f the Muslim League.*^

The growing cordial relationship between Pandith Jawaharlal Nehru and

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, accentuated the conflict further. Abdullah fondly

admitted Nehru’s influence on him.“ Nehru also developed cordial relations with

Sheikh Abdullah just to bring him closer to the Indian National Congress. He was

invited to attend the Tripora Congress session in 1939. Nehru responded with a visit

to Valley the same year, together with Khan Abdul Gafar Khan. Again in 1940, he

visited the Valley to take stock o f the situation. This w'ay the ties between the Jammu

and Kashmir National Conference and Indian National Congress were being

strengthened.

As Abdullah drew closer to Congress, some of his party colleagues felt that he

was going against the policy o f equidistance between the Indian National Congress

and the Muslim League that had been accepted when the National Conference was

inaugurated. This ultimately led to their resignation from the part) . One of the

resignations would have far-reaching repercussions. It was b\' the Jammu leader

Choudhao' Gulam Abass, who revived the Muslim Conference from the pro-Muslim

League elements. Bazaz also resigned and formed his own Kashmir Socialist Party.

As in the British India, where ever)' political concession by the British

government deepened the split between the Indian National Congress and Muslim

League, so in Kashmir with every political concession made by the Maharaja, the

abyss grew between the National Conference with its programme of unity for all India

and the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference. The members of these two parities began to

63 Saraf, n. 39, p. 547.

64 Ibiil. p. 566

65 Ajil Bhattacharjea, Kashmir the Wounded Valley. (New Dellii, U.S.B. Publishers.
1994). p. 74.

21
fight like arch enemies and this led to the division of the people into two hostile

groups.

Jinnah’s Visit to Kashmir

Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah entered the state on 8"' May, 1944, on the

invitation o f Sheikh Mohammad .Abdullah in order to bring about a compromise

between National Conference and Muslim Conference. Just as the reception from

Suchetgarh to Ramban was a Muslim Conference show, it was a National Conference

show from Banihal onwards. In Srinagar, a mass rally was held by the National

Conference at Partap Park to welcome Jinnah. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah

addressed him as ’beloved leader of Muslims o f India’.''^ In his reply, Jinnah thanked

the National Conference for the grand reception. Mr. Jinnah stayed in Srinagar up to

25''' of July, attending different political meetings and trying to extend his influence

over the state. However, sharp differences between Jinnah and Sheikh grew as the

former tried to project the Muslim Conference as an afllliate of All India Muslim

League. On the other hand Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah offered to accept the over­

lordship of the All India policies but in return sought a policy o f neutrality on the part

of Muslim League in so far as the National Conference and the Muslim Conference

were concerned.'’’ At the reception held by the Muslim Conference, however, Jinnah

came out openly in its favour. He said, -the Muslims have one platform, one ’Kalima'

and one God, I would request the Muslims to come under the banner o f the Muslim

Conference and fight for their rights".” He described the National Conference as a

band of gangsters. On the other hand Sheikh Abdullah warned the Muslim League

President not to interfere in the state’s politics. On 20"' June, 1944 he said.

65 Dina Nath Raina, Unhappy Kashmir—The Hidden Story. (New Delhi, Reliance
Publishing House, 1990), p. 27.

67 Saraf, n, 39, p. 473.

68 Jagmohan, n.40, p. 473.

22
 I f Jimiah does not give up [he habit o f inlerfering in our politics.

it will be difficult fo r him to go back to an honourable manner.*''^

Jinnah also labeled the quit Kashmir movement launched by National

Conference later on, as an agitation carried on by a tew malcontents who were out to

create disorderly conditions in the state." Thus it is clear that this must have

convinced Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah that his political future would be bleak if the

state joins Pakistan. In his autobiography, Aatsh-e-Chinar. Sheikh writes. ”At the

time Mr, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was intoxicated by power. He thought it beneath his

dignity to talk to a poor and resourceless nation. When this equation of power went

against him he woke up in panic from his dream. By this time, the snake had passed

only its line remained”.’ '

Jinnah even criticized the role of Mouivi Mohammad Yousuf Shah by

describing him as a 'rotten egg'. He also told the Mouivi that, "I advice you to remain

aloof from politics. In Kashmir we want a leader and not a Mullah".’ ’

Thus forties was the period o f conflicting ideas and ideologies in the state of

Jammu and Kashmir mainly because the two premier national organizations All India

Muslim League and Indian National Congress were busy in extending their influence

to the stale and carve out their own separate segments o f supporters. It was this rivalry

of these two national organizations which proved to be an obstacle in the way of any

possible compromise between the National Conference and the Muslim Conference.

However, the visit of Mr. Jinnah injected new life and authority in Muslim

Conference.’^ Also when the Muslims in British India became more and more

pronounced in their support o f an independent Pakistan, the Muslims in Jammu and

69 Raina, n. 66, p. 28.

70 Jagmohan, n, 40, p. 78.

71 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Aatish-e-Chinur. (Srinagar, 1986, Ali Mohammad and

Sons), p. 321,
72 /A«,p.316.

73 Korbel,n,32.p.23,
Kashmir began to return to the Muslim Conterence led by Chaudhr>' Ghulam Abass,

abandoning ihe ranks of the National Conference of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah/'*

When in March 1946, the Cabinet Mission was to meet with Indian leaders to

discuss the future of India, including the status of princely states. Sheikh Mohammad

Abdullah sent a memorandum to the mission, declaring that “the fate of the Kashmiri

Nation is in the balance and in that hour o f decision we demand our basic democratic

right to send our selected representatives to the constitution making bodies that will

construct the framework of free India, we emphatically repudiate the right of Ihe

princely order to represent the people of the Indian state on their right to nominate

personal representative as our spokesmen”.’^ The memorandum was ignored and

Sheikh reacted by launching a quit Kashmir campaign against the Maharaja in May

1946.

Quit Kashmir Movement

On May 10, the National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh

Mohammad Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir movement. In his speech on May

17, 1946, Sheikh .Abdullah said, "The tyranny of the Dogra has lacerated our souls. It

is time for action. You must fight slavery and enter the field o f Jehad as soldiers.

Every man, woman and child will shut 'Quit Kashmir’, The Kashmiri nation has

expressed its will. I ask for plebiscite on this question".” On May 28, Sheikh was

arrested by Maharaja and sentenced to nine years in prison. The other prominent

leaders of the National Conference were also put behind the bars. Nehru strongly

condemned the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and demanded his immediate release. He

himself proceeded to Kashmir to make arrangements for the Sheikh’s defence but he

too was arrested.

74 Ibid.

75 The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, opening address by the Honourable
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, (Srinagar. Nov. 5, 1951, New Delhi, The Caxton Press),
p, 14.

76 Quoted in Jagmohan, n. 40, p. 79.

24
 There was very limited support for Ihe Quit Kashmir movemenl both inside

and outside the Valley. Chaudhry Gulam Abass. President of the Muslim Conference,

whose main base was in Jammu, disowned the movemenl as it was started at the

behest o f Hindu leaders and its objective was to restore the prestige o f the

nationalists.’’ Similarly Mohammad .-\li Jinnah strongly condemned the movement

and its leaders. Their aim. he said, was to coerce the Maharaja into recognizing the

National Conference as representing the Muslims, in utter disregard of the

representative character of the Muslim Conference,” Not only did this movemenl

failed to strength Abdullah's position with the Muslims but also because of his

campaign against Maharaja, he became unacceptable to many Hindus and Sikhs who

looked upon the Maharaja as the main pillar of their privileged position in Muslim

Kashmir,” Mirwaiz Mouivi Mohammad Yousuf Shah displayed extreme hostility to

the Indian National Congress and the National Conference, Deploring what he called

inference of the Congress, he said in a statement on September 25, 1946:

The Hindu capitalists want to get the state into their grip, but I

warn that if the government o f Jammu and Kashmir gets terrified at the

might o f Congress and strikes an unholy alliance with the National

Conference fascists, it will have to face the terrific opposition o f the

Muslims. And this sinister alliance will be smashed to pieces. The

Muslims o f Kashmir have warned off Pt. Nehru's invasion in 1940,

1945 and 1946. Now he is again out to make a fresh attempt and it is

the duty o f the Kashmiri Muslims particularly and all Ihe well wishers

o f the country to smash up this onslaught}"

In January 1947, new elections were held in Kashmir, The elections were

boycotted by the National Conference and Muslim Conference captured 16 seats out

77 Bazaz. n, 58, p. 257.

78 Ibid.

79 Korbel, n, 32, p. 23.

80 Jagmohan, n, 40, p, 80.

25
of 21. Both the parties made claims and counter claims over the failure and success of

these elections. The National Conference claimed that their boycott call had been

highly successful as only 1,82,800 votes out o f possible 6,07,419 went to the polls.*'

But the Muslim Conference claimed that 30 per cent o f the possible votes was a

smashing victory as the whole Valley was under a heavy snowfall. It also claimed that

the appeal o f National Conference for boy cott of these elections had been largely

ignored.

Meanwhile, the leaders of both the parties lay in the Maharaj’s prison talking

through the night about reconciliation. But it was a reconciliation that would never

take place. For beyond the walls of Maharaj’s prison, indeed beyond the borders of

his princely state, historic forces were shaping their own pattern o f events w hich were

soon to plunge the Kashmir into another bloody chapter o f its long and tragic history.

Over these forces neither Sheikh Abdullah nor Chudhary Gulam Abass had any

control.

Kashmir as a Dispute Between India and Paldstan

At the time of partition, there were about 600 big and small princely states in

India.*’ These states had their own rulers but the British crown was exercising

suzerainty over them. There was difference o f opinion between the Congress and

the Muslim League regarding the future of these states. Jawaharlal Nehru was

opposite to the idea o f independence, while as Ali Mohammad Jinnah on the other

hand, was o f the view that every state was sovereign, according to the Indian

Independence Act passed by the British Parliament on July 16. 1947. the British

paramountcy was to lapse on August 15, 1947.*^ The pro\ isions of the Indian

Independence Act 1947, regarding these princely states were not very clear. It only

81 Korbel, n. 32, p. 23.

82 The exact number of princely stales varies from source to source. This number has been
taken from S.M.Burke's and Lawrance Ziring’s Pdkisiaii Fon^i}>n PdHcv. (Karachi.
O.vford University Press, 1990), p. 16.

83 P.N.Bazaz, Trulh about Kashmir, (Delhi, The Kashmir Democratic Union. 1950),
p. 233.

26
provided for the lapse o f the British government over the Indian sates and the

termination o f all agreements, treaties or obligations.*' Lord Mountbatten stricll)'

advised the states to join either o f the two dominions. In the House of Lords, the

Secretar>' o f State for India Lord Listowel warned these stales that "the British

government will not recognize your independence, no one else will. You have no

choice but to opt either for India or Pakistan".*' As to the criteria for deciding which

of the two new dominions a state should join, Lord Mountbatten said, "normall)'

geographical situation and communal interests and so forth will be the factors to be

considered". The rulers of the states were ad\ised by Lord Mountbatten to accede

to either o f the two dominions, India or Pakistan on the issue of defence,

communication and foreign alTairs otherwise they may be cut off from any source of

supplies of up-to-date arms or weapons.*’

Towards Kashmir, the leaders of the Indian National Congress were

unanimously agreed that while acceding to either of the two dominions, the will o f the

Kashmiris would be ascertained. On May 31, 1947, Gandhi had said in relation to

Kashmir that it was not Maharaja with his solidarity that would count, but the

Muslims who were the vast majority there.** On 10 June in a letter to Begum

Abdullah, Nehru wrote, 1 have firm conviction that will o f people will prevail in

Kashmir*’ On August 6, after a visit to Kashmir, Gandhi said, the will of the

Kashmiris was the supreme law in Kashmir.’ ** On October 2, Jayaprakash Narayan,

the then leader o f the socialist wing in the Congress said in Bombay that, a

referendum o f the people should decide whether Kashmir would join India or

84 Mansergh,N. The Transfer of Power. Vol. .XII, (London, HMSO, 1980), p. 233.
85 Burke and Ziring. n. 82, p. 16.

86 Speeches of Mountbatten. Time only to Look Forward. (London, Nicholas Ka\a. 1949).
p. 42.

87 Mansergh, n.84, pp. 347-352.

88 Hindustan Times. I June 1947.
89 /Wrf. II June, 1947.

90 /AW, 11 August 1947.

27
Pakistan.''’ On the other hand the leaders o f the Muslim League urged the Maharaja of

the stale to declare independence.

B\ 15th August 1947. ever)' one of the 600 princely states with three

exceptions had acceded either to India or Pakistan mostly on the grounds laid down in

the partition plan. The three which remained out were Jinagardh. Hyderabad and

Kashmir. In addition to these three, another state Jodhpur was also in the same

situation.

In Jinagardh. 80 per cent population was Hindus, while as the ruler was a

Muslim. He acceded to Pakistan but the accession was rejected by Lord Mountbatten,

now the Governor General o f free India. India took over the administration of the state

by deploying troops there and conducted a plebiscite and announced that the state had

acceded to India as the majority o f the people had voted in favour of India. Similarly

the ruler of the Hyderabad was a Muslim, while as 85 per cent o f the population was

Hindus. The ruler (Nizam) desired to assume the same status as India and Pakistan, i.e.,

dominion status or to join Pakistan.’^ On September 13, the Indian army invaded

Hyderabad and subdued all opposition. Later on it was said by an Indian official that

there was a real danger that communal disorder, spreading over Hyderabad, might

break all over India.’ ^ Yet another prince, the Maharaja o f Jodhpur had to accede to

India, though he was interested in joining Pakistan. The population of the state was

predominantly Hindu, so his accession to Pakistan was rejected tooth and nail.

Thus 599 states out o f 600 acceded to India or Pakistan in accordance with the

religion professed by the majority o f the population in each case. Where ever the

rulers had indicated their wish to go against the principles of partition, both the

coumries compelled them to abandon that idea as it would violate the rules and

regulations o f the partition plan.

91 /Wrf, 30 Oct. 1947.

92 Burke and Ziring, n. 82, p. 18.

93 India as a World Power, by an Indian official, (Foreign Affairs, July 1949).

28
 The trouble over Kashmir arose as India laid claim to ever)' single Hindu

majority area on the pretext that the people o f these states were not with the rulers

hence their accessions to Pakistan were not acceptable, on the other hand Pakistan

made claim over the Muslim Kashmir on the same ground but that claim was always

rejected by India.'” Thus the dispute over the state o f Jammu and Kashmir occurred

and both the parties resorted to different kinds o f tactics in order to gain this disputed

state.

Indecision of M aharaja

The state o f Jammu and Kashmir did not join the Constituent Assembly of

India or Pakistan set up under the Cabinet Mission Plan. The state had an over all

majority o f 77.11% Muslim population.” The Hindu Maharaja o f the state refused to

yield on accession to either side despite a warning by Jawaharlal Nehru, that such an

act by any state would be considered hostile.’ * The unequivocal support o f the

Muslim League to the sovereign right of the princes strengthened the idea of

Maharaja in not joining the Constituent Assembly.” The leader o f the Muslim League

in the interim government, Liyaquat Ali Khan had declared that the states were

perfectly free to refuse to have any thing to do with the Constituent Assembly.’ *

Maharaja was having his dream of complete independence. His idea of independence

was supported by some top most Hindu leaders in Jammu. The working committee of

the All Jammu and Kashmir Rajya Hindu Sabha (the earliest incarnation o f the

present Bhartiya Janata Party in the State), formally adopted a resolution in May

1947, reiterating its faith in the Maharaja and extended its support to whatever he was

doing or might do on the issue o f accession. The acting President o f the All Jammu

94 Burke and Ziring, n. 82, p. 18.

95 1941 Census.

96 The Hinduslan Times, April 21, 1947.

97 ieorfer, June 27, 1947.

98 Rambir. February, 20, 1947.

29
and Kashmir Muslim Conference Choudliary Hamidullah Khan also urged his

Highness to declare Kashmir independent immediately and establish a separate

Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution o f the state. In a press statement

issued in May 1947. he assured the Maharaja complete support and co-operation from

Muslims as the first constitutional ruler o f an independent and democratic Kashmir.”

By early July, however, it was reported that the Maharaja intended to declare his

independence. The President of the Muslim Conference congratulated the Maharaja

for his bold decision. In a telegram he assured the Maharaja their loyal support and

co-operation.'*

In late June 1947, Lord Mountbatten paid a four day visit to Kashmir just to

infiuence the Maharaja’s decision. He urged the Maharaja and his Prime Minister

Pandith Kak, not to make any declaration of independence, but to find out in one way

or another the will o f the people of Kashmir and to accede to the dominion which the

people prefer. But the Maharaja dodged him. In the meeting to be held on the day of

Mountbatten’s departure, the issue was to be finally discussed. The Maharaja

pretended an attack o f colic and the meeting was cancelled. Pakistan suspected

Mountbatten's visit to Kashmir and said that the government o f India is trying to

exercise coercion upon Maharaja just to compel him for the accession o f the state

with India.'”'

In order to dispel any such doubt, lord Mountbatten repeated before the East

India Association in London that "in the case of Kashmir persisted with the same

advice; ascertain the will of your people to any means and join whichever dominion

your people wish to join by August 14 this year. He did not do that and what

happened can be seen. Had he acceded to Pakistan before August 14, the future

government o f India had allowed me to give his highness an assurance that no

objection whatever would be raised by them. Had his highness acceded to India by

99 Daun, 11 May, 1947.

100 Hindustan Times, 15 June 1947.

101 Dawn.24 August 1947.

30
August 14, Pakistan did not then exist, and therefore, could not have interfered. I'he

only trouble that could ha\e been raised was by non-accession to either side, and this

was unfortunately the \ery course followed by the Maharaja”."''

G andhi's Visit to Kashmir

Though Lord Mountbatten repeatedly advised the Congress leaders not to visit

the valley as It will effect the partition plan, still the Maharaja o f Patiala, Koporthala

and Faridkot and the President of Indian National Congress Acharya Kripalani paid

visits to Maharaja o f Kashmir. Gandhi himself visited the state in July-August 1947.

Immediately after Gandhi's visit Pakistan had charged that a 'sinister design’

had been worked out by India to secure the accession o f the state. Gandhi's meeting

with Maharaja on August, replacement of the Prime Minister o f Kashmir, Pandith

Kak (who had signed the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan) by Janak Singh and

later by Mehir Chand Mahajan (who sided openly with the Indian dominion), the

dismissal o f the British officers from the Kashmir police and army, release o f Sheikh

Abdullah on September 29, afler he tendered an unqualified apology in his letter of

September 26, strengthening o f the road link between India and Jammu, and the

scheme to construct a boat bridge over the river Ravi strengthened Pakistan’s doubts

about Maharaja's accession of the state with India.'“

As a result of these misgivings, Pakistan set aside the Stand Still Agreement which

it had signed with the state and imposed economic blockade on Jammu and Kashmir.

The Tribal Invasion

The trouble started towards the end o f July when the Maharaja ordered his

Muslim subjects to surrender their arms to the police. The Muslims responded by

organizing themselves as guerrillas in the hills o f Poonch, an area abounding with

demobilized ex-servicemen who had fought in the Second World War in the ranks of

102 Speeches of Mountbatten, Time only to Look Forvrard, (London, Nicholas Kaja, 1949).

103 Korbel, n. 32, pp. 59-60.

the British Indian Army, This gave rise to a war like situation bet\veen these ex-

servicemen and the Dogra forces which ultimately resulted in communal trouble and

brought whole Jammu region under the violence. The Muslims in Jammu were largely

killed and abducted by the Hindu and Sikh militants. There is evidence that from the

outset regular troops and police in the state service joined informally and co\ertly. but

enthusiastically, in these atrocities which, some have estimated, eventually resulted in

the death of at least 2,00.000 Muslims and drove twice as many into exile.'°^

By this time the tribesmen o f the Frontier, whose feelings had long been

inflamed by the atrocities in the East Punjab and the ‘massacre’ o f their fellow

Muslims near door to them in Kashmir, made them to infiltrate into the state. On

October 22. a large band o f tribesmen crossed the border and entered into Kashmir to

wage a ‘holy war’ (jehad) against the Dogra forces. These people advanced rapidly

and occupied some o f the important areas o f Jammu and Kashmir like Muzaffarabad,

Baramulla, Bhimber, Kotle etc. and it seemed quite possible that the capital and its

airport would fall. Both India and Kashmir declared it a full-fledged inxasion and

preplanned aggression by Pakistan.'”* But on the other hand P.N.Bazaz observed that

if the Congress leaders had not made repeated and vigorous attempts to influence the

Maharaja for joining India, there would have been no incursion o f tribesmen into

Kashmir.'** Whatever the fact is, one thing is very much clear that these tribesmen

were not fair in dealing with the people in Kashmir.

Accession

When the Maharaja felt that he could no longer retain his hold on Kashmir,

he fled from Srinagar to Jammu on 25"’ of October 1947, at the dead o f night. Ho

104 The number of killings \aries from source to source. The number 2,00.000 has been
quoted from; Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Aalsh-e-Chinar {an autobiograph)).
Srinagar. Ali Mohammad and Sons, 1986): Alaislair Lamb, Incomplcie Purtilion,
(U.K., Roxford Books Hertingfordbury, 1997), p. 128; Jan Stephen, Piiki.siim (London,
Emest Benn, 1963), Korbel, n. 32 and Bhattacharjea, 65.
105 Gupta, n.I, p. 12.
106 P.N.Bazaz, n. 58, p. 338.

32
sought help from the government of India and offered accession to it. Sheil<h

Mohammad Abdullah (along with Mehar Chand Mahajan), urged Nehru to accept

their offer o f sending the troops to rescue Kashmir. Before the Indian army was air­

lifted to Srinagar, Maharaja acceded to India and the Governor General conveyed

the acceptance o f the same. In his covering letter. Governor General said, "in

consistence with their policy that in case of any state where the issue of accession

has been subject o f dispute, the question of accession should be decided in

accordance with the wishes of the people o f the state, it is my government's wish

that as soon as the law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared

of the invaders, the question o f the state's accession should be settled by a reference

to the people"."" This was also confirmed by Prime Minister Nehru. He announced

in his broadcast on 2 November 1947, that “we have decided that the fate of

Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people o f the state. The pledge we have

given and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to

the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and

law and order have been established, then have a referendum held under

international auspices like the United nations. We want it to be a fair and just

reference to the people and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and

justier offer”. T h u s on October 27, the Indian anmy was air-lifted to Srinagar,

saved the city and recaptured some other adjoining areas. How'ever, about one third

of the state’s territory came under the occupation of Pakistan, most o f which

constitutes the present 'Azad Kashmir’ .

During this period Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah played a vital role in

defending the Srinagar city and other areas of the Valley from the raiders as the head

of the emergency administration. Earlier he was sentenced a nine year punishment by

Maharaja for the launching of quit Kashmir campaign against his rule. But on

107 White paper on Jammu and Kashmir, CNew Delhi, 1948).

108 Ibid.

33
September 29, 1947, he was released when he promised his loyally to the Maharaja of

the state.'*” All the other leaders o f Muslim Conference were in Prison,

Kashmir Dispute in UNO

After the failure o f Indo-Pak negotiations on Oct-Nov., 1947, India ultimately

decided to refer the issue o f Kashmir to the United Nations and on January 1, 1948,

filed a formal complaint in the Security Council against Pakistan. It is noteworthy that

India, which was later to place the utmost emphasis on her allegation that Pakistan

was the 'aggressor' in Kashmir and also to deny that Kashmir issue constituted a

'dispute’, filed her petition in the Security Council under section 35 o f the chapter V!

which relates to ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and not under chapter VII which

deals with the 'Acts o f Aggression'."” As a matter of fact it is this petition which has

kept the Kashmir pot boiling right from 1948, up to this date.

The government o f India asked the Security Council to take immediate action

on her request otherwise it would send its own armed forces across the Pakistani

territory for dealing effectively with the invaders if she (Pakistan) did not stop

assisting invaders.'" Defending the accession India said that the request had come not

only from Maharaja but also from the National Conference headed by Sheikh

Mohammad Abdullah on behalf of the people o f Kashmir.

Pakistan responded by denying that she is directly involved in the tribal

invasion and charged that India had acquired the accession o f the Kashmir by fraud

and violence, had unlawfully occupied Jinagradh and other neighbouring states which

were interested in joining Pakistan, had pre-planned the genocide o f Muslims and was

persistently attempting to destroy the state of Pakistan."^ She asked the Security

109 Balraj Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency. (New Delhi, OrientLongman, 1993). p, 11.

110 Burke and Ziring, n. 82, p. 28, See also Puri, n. 109. p.l6.
111 Security Council Official Record, (S/628), November 1948, p. 144
112 Security Council Official Record, 3rd year Supplement, November 1948. pp.67-87.

34
Council to appoint a commission which will assist the two countries in Ihc solution of

various disputes including the Kashmir dispute.

Taking the gravity of the Kashmir conllict into consideration, the United

Nations Security Council passed the first resolution on Kashmir in January 1948.

However, in this resolution it merely urged the two go\emments of India and

Pakistan to take measures necessary for improvement o f the situation. The second

resolution o f April 17, 1948, recommended setting up o f a five member commission

to proceed to the sub-continent and place their good offices and mediation at the

disposal o f governments o f India and Pakistan. It was recommended that Pakistan

should secure the withdrawal o f tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, and that India

should progressively withdraw its forces to the minimum strength required for the

maintenance o f law and order. It suggested that a coalition cabinet be formed in

Kashmir, representing all major political groups, that measures be taken for the

release o f political prisoners and grant of political freedom and that a plebiscite

administration be nominated to ensure freedom and impartiality in the eventual

plebiscite. Notably, it also made the first mention o f the use o f observer in Kashmir

"The commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such obser\ ers as it may

require of any o f the proceedings in pursuance o f the measures indicated above".'"

However, in spite of their rejection o f the resolution both India and Pakistan were

prepared to accept the good offices o f United Nations Commission for India and

Pakistan (UNCIP). on the Sub-continent.

After talking to the leaders on both sides and studying the situation, the

Commission passed the third resolution on 13 August 1948, which had three parts.

Part I asked India and Pakistan to order a ceasefire. Part II made it incumbent upon

Pakistan to withdraw all its regular and irregular forces and the territory evacuated b>

the Pakistani troops would be administered by the local authorities under the

surveillance o f the commission. When the commission notifies the government of

113 Pauline Dawson, The Peace Keepers in Kashmir, (Bombay, Popular Prakash. 1995),
p. 24.

35
India that the tribesmen and the Pakistani nationals had withdrawn and the Pakistani

forces being withdrawn, the government o f India will also reduce its forces and will

keep only a minimum forces necessary for the local authorities in the observance of

law and order. Part HI called upon them to reaffirm that Kashmir’s future status

would be determined by the Kashmiris themselves,"^

India accepted the resolution but Pakistan objected to it that it did not contain

detailed guarantees for a free plebiscite."*

Af^er another round o f negotiations the commission was able to get the two

governments to agree to a ceasefire from Januar>’ 1, 1949, and also to certain

proposals which were embodied in the commission’s resolution of 5 January. By

spelling out the arrangements for a plebiscite, this resolution was meant to

supplement that o f 13 August 1948, which Pakistan had deemed inadequate.

However, on July 22. 1949, a ceasefire line was established b\' mutual agreement and

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was nominated as the 'plebiscite administrator'.

On 14 March 1950. the UNCIP was disbanded and replaced b> a United

Nations Representative by the Security Council to assist towards demilitarization. Sir

Own Dixon was chosen for the assignment. After a detailed discussion with the

involved parties, he formed what is known as ’ Dixon Plan’. It was either

a plan for taking the plebiscite by sections or areas and the allocation
of each section or area according to the result of the vote therein.
or
a plan by which it was conceded that some areas were certain to vote
for accession to Pakistan and some for accession to India and by which,
without taking a vote therein, they should be allotted accordingly and the
plebiscite should be confined only to the uncertain areas, which appeared to
be the valley of Kashmir and perhaps same adjacent countr)."*'

114 Korbel.n.32,p. 141.

115 K.Sarvar Hassan, (ed), Ducumenls on itu; Foreign Relations of Pakisicin: The Kashmir
Qiieslion. (Karachi. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966). p. 180.
116 Dison Plan, September 1950, (For full details see appendix II).

36
 This plan was rejected by both India and Pakistan. On April 30, 1951. the

Security Council appointed Frank P. Graham, a former U.S. Senator as the new

representative. He laboured for about two years. Unfortunately his recommendations

were also rejected by both the countries. The deadlock continues till present.

Besides the Indo-Pak inability to come to any compromise another important

reason responsible for the failure o f United Nations to solve the Kashmir problem was

the super power rivalry. The competition between the United States of America and

the former Soviet Union, for their own influence in South Asia, had started

immediately after the British withdrawal and this competition finally resulted in the

complete polarization of the entire region. The former Soviet Union casted its veto

against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue in 1957 and 1962. This polarization

marginalized the United Nations capacity to play a role in resolving the Kashmir

issue. Thus super power rivair)’ also proved an obstacle in the way of the peaceful

solution of vexed Kashmir problem.

Meanwhile, new developments were taking place inside the state o f Jammu

and Kashmir which with the passage o f time gave entirels a new dimension to the

Kashmir issue.

37