11. SESINANDO MERIDA v.
PEOPLE In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
Facts:
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon,
Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,
for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree
inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil,... Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod
Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco
(Tansiongco) claims ownership.
Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property.
l Ruling:
Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong
barangay of Ipil.
When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner
admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of
one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod
Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale.
Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in
Sibuyan, Romblon.
Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra
trunk into lumber.
Hernandez took custody of the lumber,[9] deposited them for safekeeping
with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion
of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently
conducted an investigation on the... matter.
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner
guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal and ordered the
seized lumber forfeited in
Tansiongco's favor.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's
favor.
Issues:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207
even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a
DENR forest officer; and
Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to
Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private
citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property.
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products from any forest
land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or... disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority;[26] and (3) the possession of timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
Petitioner... stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed
timber or other forest products from a private land[28] without x x x the
necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for
"cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing]... and remov[ing] timber," under the
second category.
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that
he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did... so only with
Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the
tree in question
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod
Property constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was
to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q)
of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant,"... which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into
lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood... products.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the
Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification
that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four (4) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three
(3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional,
as maximum.
Principles:
Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from
filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of
PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer
or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately
be investigated by the forest officer... assigned in the area where the offense
was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence
supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the
investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation
of criminal cases and file an information in
Court.
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts[25] penalized under PD 705,
provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable... public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised
Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further... proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products... are found.
12. Topic: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Provident Tree Farms, INC. (PTFI) vs Hon. Batario & AJ InternationL
Corp. (AJIC) GR 92285 March 28, 1994 DOCTRINE:
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the
issues to a regular court in keeping with the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. (primary jurisdiction)
FACTS:
PTFI is a Phil corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It supplies to a
local match manufacturer solely for production of matches.
There’s a state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial
tree plantation under Revised Forestry Code which provides a set of
incentives to corporations like PTFI and is a qualified ban against
importation of wood.
Respondent, AJIC, imported matches from Indonesia which the BOC
released which violates the Revised Forestry Code’s ban of importing wood
and wood-derivated products.
RTC:
PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages
with prayer for a TRO against Commissioner of Customs to prohibit the
latter from importing matches.
AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:
The Commissioner of Customs and not the regular court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation.
The release of importations had rendered injunction moot and academic.
The prayer for damages has no basis as the Commissioner’s acts are in
accordance with law.
The complaint for injunction cannot stand it being only a provisional relief
and not a principal remedy.
PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss.
AJIC’s motion to dismiss was denied.
AJIC filed a motion for reconsideration and the Court reconsidered and
dismissed the case on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations
PTFI seeks to set aside the order of respondent court and prays for the
continuation of the hearing of the case contending that what was brought
before the trial court was a civil case for injunction for the purpose of
securing compliance with the provision of the RFC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bureau of Customs holds jurisdiction in the matter of
wood product importation.
HELD:
The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood and
wood products which is to be enforced by Bureau of Customs since it has
under the Tariff and Customs Code the exclusive original jurisdiction over
seizure and forfeiture cases. To allow the regular court to direct the
Commissioner is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
BOC.
PTFI’c correspondence with the BOC contesting the legality of match
importations may already take the nature of administrative proceedings the
pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, the court held that
under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction .
. . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v.
Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].) In this era of clogged court
dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become
well indispensable . . . . The court cannot compel an agency to do a particular
act or to enjoin such act which is within its prerogative, except when in the
exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the
case at bench, we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us. Thus, the order of
the RTC was affirmed and the petition for review was denied.
14. INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. UP
August 13, 1991
Davide, Jr., J
Luciano, Noel Christian O.
SUMMARY: International Hardwood was the grantee of a License
Agreement effective until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates from the
public domain parcels of land and reserved them for use by UP. The land
subject of Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said
Proclamation. On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted fully ceding ownership over
the land described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry
charges from Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the
control and supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without
other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that
exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession,
which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from
the area ceded and transferred to UP until February 1985. However,
Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest
charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over
the area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to
existing concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing
concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee
must not be affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be respected BUT
insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the
license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P

Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain
or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private
woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
were likewise terminated. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber
cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees
thereon because of this full transfer.
FACTS: International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing,
and exportation of plywood. It was granted by the Government an exclusive
license for 25 years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and remove timber
from a timber land in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna.
Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the
President issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation,
certain parcels of land of the public domain in Quezon and Laguna were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and were reserved for the UP College of
Agriculture as experiment station for the college.
On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was
enacted establishing a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of
agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA 3990 the land
described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing
concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood:
1. Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License
Agreement to UP, instead of the BIR
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land
described in RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel
However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s
demands.
International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory relief
seeking a declaration that UP does NOT have the right to:
1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other
forest products,
2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or
3. Collect forest charges, reforestation fees and royalties from
Hardwood and/or
4. Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its
concession covered by a License Agreement, ceded in full ownership
to UP by RA 3990
Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000 in damages.
UP filed its Answer:
1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the
petition states no cause of action
2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest
products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under RA 3990
CFI DECISION: CFI rendered judgment in favor of Hardwood:
1. RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber
cut by International Hardwood within the tract of land and collect the
corresponding charges prescribed by NIRC
2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim
CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal
questions.
ISSUE: WON UP as owner had the right to scale, measure, and seal the timber
cut by Hardwood and collect forestry charges thereon.
HELD: YES, by virtue of the full cession of ownership to UP.
I. Arguments of the Parties
A. UP asserts that:
1. Under RA 3990, the Philippines may effect collection of
forest charges through UP because the License Agreement
does not expressly provide that they be paid to the BIR
2. UP is vested with administrative jurisdiction over and has
ownership over the land in question. Thus, it acquired full
control and benefit of the timber and other resources in the
area
3. UP is entitled to the income derived from the tract of land
ceded to it by RA 3990
4. UP is duty bound to operate and maintain a central
experiment station
5. Supervision of the License Agreement in favor of Hardwood
by UP was intended by RA 3990
6. BIR and the Bureau Of Forestry issued specific rulings
recognizing the authority of UP to collect royalties and
charges
B. Hardwood contends:
1. UP has not been granted by RA 3990 the authority to collect
forest charges or the authority to supervise the operation of
the timber concession
2. Cession of the land was expressly made subject to any
concession, if any
3. Rulings of BIR and Bureau of Forestry are incorrect
4. It has acquired vested right to operate the timber concession
under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Forestry
II. Discussion on the effect of the laws
A. The laws:
1. Under Proc. 791 – a parcel of land of the public domain was
withdrawn from sale or settlement and was reserved for the
UP College of Agriculture as experiment station, subject to
private rights, if any
2. Under RA 3990 – the very same lot referred to in Proc. 791
was ceded fully to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if
any
B. Effect of the laws on the concession of Hardwood:
1. When RA 3990 ceded the property to UP, the Philippines
completely removed it from the public domain and
segregated the areas covered by the timber license from the
public forest
2. The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over
the area to UP
a. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to
existing concession
3. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this
means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must
not be affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be respected
4. BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as
grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and
conveyed to UP
a. Having been effectively segregated and removed from
the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect,
converted into a registered private woodland, the
authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over
it were likewise terminated
b. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from
the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other
fees thereon because of this full transfer.
III. As owner, UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without
other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that
exception is made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the
concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and
remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until
February 1985.
A. However, Hardwood has the correlative duty and obligation to
pay the forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP
B. Thus, the charges should not be paid to the Government but to
UP.
C. It follows then that respondent UP is entitled to supervise,
through its duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and
removal of timber within the area covered by R.A. No. 3990
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment is rendered reversing the decision of the trial court.
Thus:
1. Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut
pursuant to its License Agreement within the area ceded and
transferred to UP pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to UP;
2. UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by R.A. No. 3990.
15. TABAO VS. LILAGAN
FACT: On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-
tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of
tanbark. Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the cargo
was being unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying
documents where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently,
the NBI ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark,
the boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a
Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D.
705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the captain
and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K.
Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of
the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-
296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.
On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the
three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice
were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional
Director.
On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin to
recover the items seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
03-42.
On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. 98-
296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the
PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.
On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ
of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of
the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the
expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the
Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March
19, 1998.
Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.
Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to
be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that
respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or
purposely disregarded them.
Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard
M/L Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he
had served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard.
According to the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of
Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his
direct connivance with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed
out that respondent sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within
the five day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the
writ, thereby effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the
integrity of said evidence.
Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was
premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants
in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the
existence of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an
order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of
possession of the subject items, pending resolution of an urgent
manifestation by the complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ
of replevin was issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down
in Rule 60 of the Revised Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no
apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment and
neither did the DENR issue a seizure report.
Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast
Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not have the
means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further claimed that
he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a
legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order.
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ
of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999,
recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be
dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and
jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin.
RULING:
The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel
on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting
documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the
DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations
would have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had
custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have
already been commenced concerning the shipment.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special
competence. Also, the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the
shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him. Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss
the replevin outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his
representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances
involved in the offense.
It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The court held that the assumption of the trial court of
the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of
the administrative ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an
administrative body of special competence.
The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the
standard set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a
judge must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
To measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all
laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused,
not even a judge.
On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA
that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his
material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it
promptly in accordance with the mandates.
Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of
the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely.
The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is
dismissed for lack of merit.
16. TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
Facts:
On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license
of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the
Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the
area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the
extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by
the acting secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry which incidentally was the same date the license for petitioner was
signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to
the Court.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in
revoking the license
Held:
Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression
that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority of
the Director of Forestry was revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it
was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired
by the licensee.
c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer
any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore,
petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
ceise.
Petition denied.
17. PEOPLE V QUE
FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign
exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders
amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign
exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim
that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the
act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said
circular had no force and effect.
Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act
2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it
being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General
answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930
do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued
for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and
effect of law.
HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take
effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil
Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation
of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No.
20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general
principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents
and its penalties.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued
in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3
months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said
circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November
1951.
18. FACTORAN V CA
FACTS:
On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station
III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber
as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck
driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to
the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation
Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty.
Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the
discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.
What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of
the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of
the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492
or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881.
Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been
accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber
and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement
presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and
Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco
Lumber Hardware.
These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No.
10 which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported
by the following documents:
Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District
Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester;
Sales Invoice;
Delivery Receipt; and
Tally Sheets.
Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty.
Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra
lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of
the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck
Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the
said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and
six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later
on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for
the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to
enjoin the panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to
desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.
On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for
Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an
Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a
Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the
writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the
xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to
the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representatives x x x".
On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However,
petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch
80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him
from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and
transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police
Force. He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that
same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a
counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the
writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The
trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the
Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made
immediately the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it
was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing
on March 30, 1989.
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond
but was also denied for the same reason.
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in
contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners
24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.
On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial
court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary
relief in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ
of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount
of P180,000.00.
On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for
replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of
an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of
Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.
As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals
believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private
respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.
On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and
the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary
injunction.
RULING:
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are
subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved
thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and
executory after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party
of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the
Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a
special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the
confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper
authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct
their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the
enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest land fall within the primary and
special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court
of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction
does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.
Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.
First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the
applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly
put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the
requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot
justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the
properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established.
If only mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be
issued.
In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the
administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D.
No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ
of replevin prayed for by the private respondents.
Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the
subject properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and
hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it
found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under
SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation
of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705.
Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized
forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the
appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations
applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that
their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted
prior to confiscation of their properties.
Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial
court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot
constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court
order thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being
issued, no contempt of court could be committed.
The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside.
Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently
enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22,
1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was
directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private
respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently
enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private
respondents against petitioners.
19. MUSTANG LUMBER V CA
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra
flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the
course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes
and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices
and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo
and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon
City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date
from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings,
and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000
board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa.
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's
lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume
of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand
the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the
lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of
lumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against
him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different
from timber
HELD:
No,
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no
definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q)
of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant."
Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
20. TAOPA V PEOPLE
n April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber and
arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of
abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to
petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the
seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section
68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of
Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS
839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one hundred
thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong
species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty
Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand
One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without
any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial on
the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The
dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with respect to
accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect to accused-appellants
Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the penalty imposed on them
to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him. He
alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of
the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi because
Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of
the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that the truck was
loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that Taopa and Ogalesco
were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and
lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of
dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa
(and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other
forest products without the required legal documents. Moreover, the fact
that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the police was
likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus convinced that Taopa and
Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed
on Taopa.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa
shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the
minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years
and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the
medium period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21
days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere
between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22
years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008 decision
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators. and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30380
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby
theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No.
other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties
Articles 309 and 310 read: provided for by law.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: SO ORDERED.
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis
supplied)

2. xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9
Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty
should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a
period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an
additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.