EN BANC March 11, 2014
of mixed use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition for
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.
(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E.
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The
complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating
the integrity and reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate
Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate
Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their
oaths on account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994
entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong
City.1 Due to the project’s location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an
access road and staging area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI
needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI).
Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored the notice. Left with no
option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a
temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence
to deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a
petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was
docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s
prayer for the WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building
corporate rehabilitation was approved.4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set
for hearing its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained
in its answer. The denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to
bring a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent Motion
to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and
Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file its
Comment. AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion for
partial reconsideration of the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI
filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these
motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included Associate
Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision
granting the petition of WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices
had conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and
Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated
that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and
deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross
misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the
dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge
against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence.10But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial
officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of
culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article
204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust
judgment in any case submitted to him for decision" is punished with prision mayor
and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be
a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who
merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial
point of law.12 The term knowingly means "sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate
intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust
decision.14 In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some
other similar motive in issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for
liability.16 The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate
the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable.17
But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial
officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and
declaration be made in administrative investigations and proceedings like a preliminary
investigation by the public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious –
only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction
over the judicial actions involved may make such determination and declaration.
Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer may be usurping a
basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by law
elsewhere in the appellate court.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the
CA through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the
pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to
administrative charges against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available
remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.
Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport
Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,18 we emphatically
held that the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing subverted
and undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the administrative complaint was to
take respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at
them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all,
for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and prosecution made against a
judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial office
always subverts and undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings
and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his
official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved
should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule
against it in its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1 The
complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has brought against
respondent Justices in relation to the performance of their judicial duty in the same
case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against
Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario,
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,19 AMALI accused respondent Justices of:
(a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the propriety
of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994.
The Court appropriately observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’ respective allegations
disclosed that the acts complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before
the respondent CA Justices and the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994
which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete
with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary
proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the
questioned order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action by
the Court. Consequently, a decision on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of
the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would be
premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be
erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the
respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended
by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither
was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the
stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be
inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than
AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with
WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in
committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was
alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly
performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed to
the evaluation of the Court in the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts’
dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic
legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the
complaint herein containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first.
Both were intended to intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the
performance of their judicial functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive,
but also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded
administrative charges against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere
with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not
then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its representative
personally responsible for the unfounded charges brought against respondent
Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the dignity
and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary.
AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their penchant for
harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing
so even if the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its
representatives would be to reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously
wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or
to answer for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is
a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer
justice area function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for granted. As a
recognized commentator on public offices and public officers has written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil
action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one
claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From
the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment
in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has
exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either
to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of
this rule. Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular
individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object which
were in view when his court was created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in
it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to
the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and that rights may
be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is
public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or
improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the
occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between
individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be called to
account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have
provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for
an individual injury, is not admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita,
its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of
AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing
why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded
and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be
clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting
judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer
by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending
such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines:22
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules
or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb
its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more
usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of
a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification
a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically
granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed,
there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation
to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful
mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults
of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The
reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the
courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against
Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS
Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the
members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to
bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect
contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices,
and for interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. SO
ORDERED.
EN BANC interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank Account number 040331-00087-9, fully
described as follows:
January 26, 2016
A.C. No. 10952 Check Number Date Issued Amount

ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,

0060144 August 14, 2011 P657 ,000.00
vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.
0060147 September 29, 2011 P 530,000.00
DECISION
PER CURIAM: 0060190 September 29, 2011 P60,000.00

This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
0060194 October 16, 2011 P90,000.00
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation2 of the Investigating Commissioner suspending Atty.
Ronaldo P. Salvado (Atty. Salvado) from the practice of law. 0060206 October 17, 2011 P2, 120,000.00

The Complaint: 0060191 October 29, 2011 P1,060,000.00

3
On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado
through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado
introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses
including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty.
Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he
would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured
of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and
investors.
Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he
would not place his reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial
investment in his business. This initial investment yielded an amount corresponding to
the principal plus the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011,
complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with
promises of high rates of return.
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated
checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus
0060195 November 16, 2011 P1,590,000.00
Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the
aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds
or a closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at
first, openly communicated with him, assuring him that he would not abscond from his
obligations and that he was just having difficulty liquidating his assets and collecting
from his own creditors. Complainant was even informed by Atty. Salvado that he
owned real properties that could serve as payment for his obligations. As time went
by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant's calls and text messages.
Attempts to meet up with him through common friends also proved futile. This
prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate
legal action.
On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty.
Salvado, directing him to settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00,
corresponding to the cash value of the first two (2) PSBank checks, within seven (7)
days from receipt of the said notice.6 Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to receive
the said notice when Atty. Divina's messenger attempted to serve it on him.
Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again engaged the services of Atty. Divina, their respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued were merely intended as
who, with his filing clerk and the complainant's family, went to Atty. Salvado's house security or evidence of investment.
to personally serve the demand letter. A certain "Mark" who opened the gate told the
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would
filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in the
request complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by
province already.
sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the checks, for
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.
quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate
The Reply of Complainant
of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his
debt and invited complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply,8 pointing out that Atty. Salvado did
refused the invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should talk inside his not deny receiving money from him by way of investment. Thus, he must be deemed
vehicle where his companions were. to have admitted that he had issued several postdated checks which were eventually
dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim that it was complainant himself who prodded him
During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on
about making investments must be brushed aside for being self-serving and baseless.
"something" to pay his obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the least,
Assuming arguendo, that complainant indeed made offers of investment, Atty.
read the demand letter.
Salvado should have easily refused knowing fully well that he could not fund the
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations. checks that he would be issuing when they become due. If it were true that the checks
were issued for complainant's security, Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document
For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted
evidencing such agreement. His failure to present such document, if one existed at all,
a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the "Anti-Bouncing Checks Law,"
only proved that the subject checks were issued as payment for complainant's
but also reflected his depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not only refused
investment.9
to comply with his obligation, but also used his knowledge of the law to evade criminal
prosecution. He had obviously instructed his household staff to lie as to his Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty. Salvado was never meant
whereabouts and to reject any correspondence sent to him. This resort to deceitful to harass him. Despite the dishonor of the checks, he still tried to settle the dispute
ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain as a member of the Bar. with Atty. Salvado who left him with no choice after he refused to communicate with
him properly.
The Defense of the Respondent
Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective mandatory conference
On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his Answer,7 denying that he told complainant
briefs and position papers.1âwphi1 Atty. Salvado insisted that he had acted in all
that he had previously entered into various government contracts and that he was
honesty and good faith in his dealings with the complainant. He also emphasized that
previously engaged in some other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and
the title to his house and lot in Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, had been
rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to
transferred in the name of complainant after he executed a deed of sale as an
invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina's earnings of good interest that attracted
expression of his "desire and willingness to settle whatever is due to the
him into making an investment. He further stated that during their initial meeting, it was
complainant."10
complainant who inquired if he still needed additional investments; that it was Atty.
Divina who assured complainant of high returns; and that complainant was fully aware Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
that the money invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his clients and/or
On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado
borrowers. Thus, from time to time, the return of investment and accrued interest when
be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for
due – as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks issued to complainant- could be
engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and for
delayed, whenever Atty. Salvado' s clients requested for an extension or renewal of
behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty.
Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public confidence in the
legal profession.
The IBP-BOG Resolution
On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with
modification as to the period of suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of Atty.
Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to two (2) years.
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-BOG nor a petition for review
before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire
records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely
recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section
12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.11
The Court's Ruling
The parties gave conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to have
been lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his businesses with the promise of yielding
high interests, which he believed because he was a lawyer who was expected to
protect his public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied having
enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had invested by virtue of his own desire to
gain profits. He insisted that the checks that he issued in favor of complainant were in
the form of security or evidence of investment. It followed, according to Atty. Salvado,
that he must be considered to have never ensured the payment of the checks upon
maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the dishonor of the subject checks was
"purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that he
himself was a victim of failed lending transactions xxx."12
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in
part.
First. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence,
not only due to the unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid
down, but also by the coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The public is,
indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer
is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen.13 A man,
learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful representations when
dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had
observed, complainant's being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty.
Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior worthy of belief.
The Court finds it hard to believe that a person like the complainant would not find the
profession of the person on whose businesses he would invest as important to
consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way
or another, influenced complainant's decision to invest.
Second. It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie
the dishonor of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere
securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully
comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,14 the Court
ruled that the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration.
Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the
laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless
checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws
were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy
personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel,15 the Court wrote that the issuance of
worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's moral
character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship
with complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an
officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts
to evade payment of his obligations.1âwphi1 Instead of displaying a committed attitude
to his creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer complainant's demands. He even tried
to make the complainant believe that he was no longer residing at his given address.
These acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and
duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. The
subsequent offers he had made and the eventual sale of his properties to the
complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the
Bar.
Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of the Investigating
Commissioner's reliance on jurisprudence stating that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases, including violations of B.P. 22.
Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is the
respondent's fitness to remain as a member of the Bar. The Court's findings have no
material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file against
each other.16
All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty
commensurate to his violation of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and
approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty.
Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by
Caroline Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple
violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June
26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for
Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to complainant
was returned with the notation "unknown at the given address." No new address was
provided by the complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit their respective
position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The
Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for
estafa against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo,
Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The
said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares
of stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation (Clarion), which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in
Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original
stockholders of Clarion were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named
stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of
their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law
partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve
its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the
complainant in the amount of ₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the
Forbes property in the amount of ₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect
the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which was funded entirely by
Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to
appear that the Forbes property was purchased for ₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the
money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion
to Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were
transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1)
share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in
Clarion’s General Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another
deed of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to
₱1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004,
he learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue
Service (IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading
complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through
another deed of assignment. Again, this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year
2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for
sale sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro
Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the
deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the
payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds
thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with
Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale
to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents,
however, misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit
reiterating its factual averments.6A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the
following claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant
answered in the affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate
the sale of the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco
Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount
and handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes,
however, were paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the
sale of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of
the sale had already been farmed out to different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the
money of Mark Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed
by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of
Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate
counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against
Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually
conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s
transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and
transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the
members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in
the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth
of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed
the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in
1998 for the incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house
in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant;
that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares
in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion
shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as the corporate
secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal documentation togive
effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the
United States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time,
Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership
of Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax
evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance
with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was
transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to
prospective buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold
for ₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had
knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe
Philippines and discovered that the proceeds of the sale were coursed through other
corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of the
successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the
complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez,
Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of
privileged communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting
interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of
Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have
assisted her in some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had
given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no
attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was formed, as a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he
admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the
Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm,
he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served
no conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client"
who were the opposing parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege,
muchless prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty.
Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear
and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between
them. Complainant failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration
of facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled
that "the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer
for the defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case,
he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he
defended and served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that
unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It was
just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty.
Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for
one (1) year from the practice of law. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted
that the subsequent affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did
not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which
accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims of the
parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records would
show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and
Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original
incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate
secretary of the said corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include
Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when
Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s
participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his
shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco,
the report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to
Clarion’s ownership to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating
Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of
shares within Clarion were "without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of
assignment that he again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he
executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and
complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule
on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of
conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the
findings and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved
for its reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the
penalty of suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than
three decades of practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant
the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client,
Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner
that he experienced a major upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his not
being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the
execution of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all
connected to his capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to
mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity
to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and
shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a
shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words, Atty.
Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
Espousing Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law firm
was in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty.
Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these companies,
including Clarion. These documents were in the possession of complainant for
safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally
assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the
electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco
who visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the
sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He
asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until he
could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and complainant,
the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to
Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against him were now exhausting all
possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from performing
his duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes.
To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and,
thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference
to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience
tothe law, on the part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance
of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element.16 To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straight forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means
the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is
used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of
the party imposed upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only
learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach,
inorder to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must
at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can
never be over emphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers
are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws,"
"do no falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion.21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his
sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the
SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds
of assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for
consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the
alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out
that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as corporate
counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation
to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of
his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco
admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued
the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this
fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty.
Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was content to have
granted the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to
complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty.
Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be
embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the
specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming
and machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This
would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of
their clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer
owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest,
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It
needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held within the bounds of reason and
common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding
his dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a
lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court,
called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal
system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act
with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied
in the CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1)
and to actwith candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty.
Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing
of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and
disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideallybe imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to
his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in
this regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests…"25 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and
interest in this wise: requested documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes
property. This was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf
documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel of
of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the
them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to
services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the
a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the
complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco,
same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for
accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and
one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there
Clarion, would have to prevail.
is a violation of the rule.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
parties. Atty. Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
not of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of
Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being
that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
the client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through
circumstances.
their connection or previous employment.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation
Francisco’s answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated
showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the mandatory
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one
conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record.
client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be
Her participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.
no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage
of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the
or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of
lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary
Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court
nature of the ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be
may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they
place.
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
a scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco. preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.27

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated, Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco
considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. among the members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could have been staunch in
reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for
Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract
the Court from finding that the totality of evidence presented by the complainant
miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her lawyer.
At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation
presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty.
Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v.
Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the
said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as
the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment
of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered
to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given
by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his
rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on
record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant
failed to establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The
records are further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a
demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed. All that
complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from
respondent in various occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not
impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and
client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be
gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege
applies, failed in this regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a
form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified
and who possess good moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively
allowing Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public
documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney,
for which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons
1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision,
with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information
and guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Decision so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension
shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
EN BANC Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as
they were in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he
A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013
would help complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent
(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any
vs.
sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
that he had lost all seven titles.5
RESOLUTION
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file
PER CURIAM: petitions in court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-
representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions
This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of for re-issuance of titles.6
the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the
Professional Responsibility (CPR).1 signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney
(SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned.7
sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father.
Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed
located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several without prejudice to their being re-filed.8
parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the
agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of
fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look more varied.9
agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her
to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons.2 Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed
several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the
recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious
caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10
persons, as follows:
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as
1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;
the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent
2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy; succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the
proceeds of the sales.12
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit,
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio; complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez; February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
Case No. 03-1054.
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3 fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia
Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels and that she had
unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the
sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a
"balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment.13
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,14 IBP Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report
of Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the
penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
16
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the IBP. The Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by
complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who
supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus,
there could not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as
grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings
were conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006;
November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.17
The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of
the Swiss American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend
introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven
(7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot
priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted
that his company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused
the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s failure to produce Leonor
Petronio, the alleged lot owner.
Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze
introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven
(7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot
priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon
learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to
respondent asking him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse
him. He added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible
owner of the parcel he had purchased.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for
complainants.20 He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent
who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned
by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00
which he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint.21
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their
Position Paper. Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of
Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross-
examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing"22 him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to
Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules
of Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit
his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters discussed during the
mandatory conferences, on the parties’ Position Papers (and supporting documents),
and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be
necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he
was required to file his Position Paper.23
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was
deemed submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.
In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia
Tabang on account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the
owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the
Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang.
He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels
since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and
him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public announcements (where
he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of Agreement.
He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name
"Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own
signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010,25 Commissioner
Limpingco found respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He
likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings without justifiable
reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be
disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 adopting the
Report of Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration.28
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the
Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days to
file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension will
be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first
on September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which were
denied by the Court.
Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December
14, 2011 a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal).
This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the
findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of
Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs
and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7)
subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities,
the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy
of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a
lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other
individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he
acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the
supreme penalty of disbarment.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred
for any of the following grounds:
deceit;
malpractice;
gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
violation of the lawyer's oath;
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons.
By way of examples:
In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for
having used a spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for
administration.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was
disbarred for having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported
vendors and for taking advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by
purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the
deed was fictitious.
In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having
converted to his personal use the funds that he received for his clients.
Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court
noted in Moran v. Moron:32
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his
serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the
most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or
fine – would accomplish the end desired.33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."36
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining
preponderance of evidence:
All the facts and circumstances of the case;
The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily
with the greater number.
In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule
1.01 of the CPR.
Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but
more so through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro
Gallinero that:
respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of
the subject parcels;
respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in
cash or in kind – of the subject parcels;
such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and
respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.
More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been
confronted with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities
of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had failed to produce such persons
or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter
Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far
as they have been made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that
of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.
Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels
were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent
also evaded the allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations. For instance,
he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the
proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she
threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of this
allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang.
He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above the
name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 the burden of proof is vested upon the
party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v.
Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation
is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners
of the seven parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the
slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less produce their actual persons.
As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the
forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that – allegations.
Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these claims.
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the
very basis of complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by
complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of
how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her
name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality,
and ownership of the ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed
Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41However, respondent loses sight his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of
of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and the petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others.
deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and
Court to sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has
as fraudulent. hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these proceedings,
he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and
Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly
self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang
absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed
as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is
this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended
related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from
period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’
anybody and for whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have confronted
cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.
him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could not have told them that he
lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and recognizes the right of WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the
an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of value;"44 and Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
(3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood,
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
and there was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to earn income.45
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
embarks on conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia
SO ORDERED.
Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale
of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment
after she had been refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is
clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest proof to substantiate these
claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file the present
Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.
Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the
sheer lack of evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable
conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which he is accused and that
he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an officer of
the court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."47
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY.
KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O.
Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since
the mid-1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but
they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig
and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church
in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married
Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a
scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a
foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry
her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr.
Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful
and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their
marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they
named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since
the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about
it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their
union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that
he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said
petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the
mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently,
five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to
their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On
August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to
Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to
an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file
their respective comments, which they separately did on November 25,
2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968.
He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that
she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984.
They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested
that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She
likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic
for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide
them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty.
Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed
a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23,
1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the
divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his
previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
19
relationship. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he
left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty.
Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out
that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed
that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however
rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate
his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite
being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an
Order24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003,
which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig
and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-
CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his
previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct,
which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner
further opined that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants
fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official
and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous
marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage
to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect
his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second
marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting
marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a
serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the
respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying
solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by
affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he
never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig
asserted that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied
Atty. Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which
would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations
of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral
character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because
“vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”34 (Citation
omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may
be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral
conduct. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours) purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral
in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr.
The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
36
various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
conduct. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a
grossly immoral conduct.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal
actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced
immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into
of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year.
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and
community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social
earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance
institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
of legality.
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship
with another woman who has borne him a child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from
the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint
his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves
required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment. to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. practice of law.
Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
to be the most appropriate penalty. of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since courts.
they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for
himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his lack of evidence.
previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides
ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him. This Decision takes effect immediately.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents. SO ORDERED.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth
of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As
it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having
an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required
in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves
that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between
the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the
supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship
with Atty. Catindig.
EN BANC named attorney-in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit
corroborated complainant’s allegations against respondent.2
A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ- On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
MALIT, Respondent. requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days
from receipt of notice.3
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.: In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in
the presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature.
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become “absolute and registered owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be
an officer of the Court. a cause for disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public
market stall under a “Build Operate and Transfer” contract with the local government
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a
prior mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant was represented
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of
on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor
perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore previous mortgage contract over the same market stall.
aware that the market stall was government-owned.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the
legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy.
respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s
However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by the assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the
lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent
Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, claimed that complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no
but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period within advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
which it could not be alienated. agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the
agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently the property was the subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian
submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of
Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by
were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned
from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the
document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be
notarized in the principal’s place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her
rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional
Evidence.5 Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the
SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of
either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete
signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease
contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an
unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned
Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification;
and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.6Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional
documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid,
Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent
and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as
such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had
purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations with respect
to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso.
However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract
was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule
18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that
she be suspended from the practice of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by
complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was
actually a supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules of procedure
of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question
those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the
documents from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also
prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal
and emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012,
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify
a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica
Y. Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio
– transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against
respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the
parties’ submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall
first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by
complainant are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule
VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised
in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of
the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral
conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules.” There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the
issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the
inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation
of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for
sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would
render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules
of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from
interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only
tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged
"warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's
office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted
searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the
subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules
on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in
question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly
taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against
respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a
supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental
pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual
office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with
respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original
complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by
complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges against respondent is
that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from
submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that
she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but
one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not
the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the
provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less
guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and
1.0224 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by No costs.
complainant sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of
the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a SO ORDERED.
certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity
in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions
from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned
or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground for
disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be
signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are
the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said
notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in
acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent
also violated Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as
a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public.
In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to
be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule
is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will
not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public
warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating

Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing,
is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a
member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for
their information and guidance.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty.
Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical
impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant)
against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within
15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a
query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing
on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the
scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents
would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for
clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based
on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that
respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was
terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079,
ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum
of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in
connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into
with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant
agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for
which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in
relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her
home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair
of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer,
agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to
transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of
contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter
received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee. 14 When asked
about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the
sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the
summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty
and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case
she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a
collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the
complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major
differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract
to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the
complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of contention in
the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the
hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend
to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the
sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable
ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually
gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is
understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment
for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the
remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case,
because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant
handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified
by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when
she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of
respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of
the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the
motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent
and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the
motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration
Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make
the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply
with a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were
mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that
these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for
P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of
wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments
on the case had been set the following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as
her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of
documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since
December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to
pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of
the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged
in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte
Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his
notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which
he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was
complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for
his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared
as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of
P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental
expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the
court would need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband
approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan
of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied
having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their
favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would
personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra
Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant
was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases.
Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the consequences
of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts.
Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the
services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
In her Reply, complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making
22
Responsibility (CPR).
reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted
The Court’s Ruling
the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent
was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil Commissioner with respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR.
company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
never considered as “no loan.”
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct
the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be
Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23 disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The
test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.”27
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both
the practice of law for one (1) year. in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant
into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved
modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted
and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded
the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00. the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to
P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then
filed a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would further
the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing
in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.26 to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-
reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of
reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.
return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to
P127,590.00. Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client
imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
No petition for review was filed with the Court. received for or from his client.”28Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but
not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return
upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in
him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various
amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could
not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he
failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His
possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When
a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from
his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the
amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the
judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself
signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse,
he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time the
case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross
misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of
demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure
a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act
of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their
utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a
lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s
perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The
denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not
excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed
used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would seriously
erode the public’s trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.
At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to
inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with
the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in
his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records
reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that
“[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his private
capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable
amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00
for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only
given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory
notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent.
These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated
to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant
because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the
records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these
loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and
P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality
of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his
client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and
sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at
all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference
is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the
lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated
to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately,
respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court
finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded
that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the
opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard
of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information
between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to
his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional
employment if the same would trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of
interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the
parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in
the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized
the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s
case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No.
14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions
of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that
the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside
the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the
complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he was the
one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of
the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case,
knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under
question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating
counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was
retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is
no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation
of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also
because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to
deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty.
Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a
form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified
and who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice
or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer
but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-
BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of
respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct
in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than
the penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it
cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private
capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities
which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material
bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since
administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of
evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in
administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability
of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere
scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively
liable.41Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to
civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42
purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional
relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the
said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should
be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As
to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal
loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.” 43 The Court likewise aims to
ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of
members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.”44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of
P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant,
as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar
to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as
representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported

EN BANC
A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by
Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan
M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts
of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up
the release of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod
which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s
late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of
the property, and the collection of the rentals due for the retained areas from their
occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for the property
but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the
services of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing
of a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with
the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees.
Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the
case, but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged
respondent’s services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in
Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to
register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is
registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration
expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the property was
already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not
have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the
real situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance
his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b)
shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real
estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue
postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the interest
thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro,
covered by a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA.
Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an
account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed
with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered
by a third MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter
property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero
postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged
under the third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over
a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he
mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay
complainants a total of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal
amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent
to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which
they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s
attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but
asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand,
Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed
petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their
favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious
and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering
very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to
be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent
deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because
he showed them a different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further
alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for
₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty
business and that it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him
loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw
sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed
the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that their
business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and covered by
postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero
was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because
the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged
to Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good
but he was unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when
the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because
Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding from
complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due
for September to December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He
claimed that complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current account
and they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks.
Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his
services were terminated before it could be completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while
under suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s
case in February 2006 and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the
parties, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and
₱1,000,000 from Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he
executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the documents presented by the parties,
respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that
respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very high interest rates of the loans
although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent
likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her husband regarding the identity
of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also mortgaged a property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000.
Documents also showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent
conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later
claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000
from the amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent could not
explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months except for his claim
that the price of sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the
issuance of the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would
show that he informed them that it would be his wife or son who would issue the
checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He
was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which
was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he
mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it
was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the
accounts were already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various
funds he received from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the
client’s interest is fully protected or the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the
records were not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29
May 2006 was the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of
this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by
reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice
of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered respondent to return
the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment
be instead imposed upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay
a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when
he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the
ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but
he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to
the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was
eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as
to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to
Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his
name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current
bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for
him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made
complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in
the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent
sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero
through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to
accounts in respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the
performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity.2 The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private
capacity. Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and
Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent misled
Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from
her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he
would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to
do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in
his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private
capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed
respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs
knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law,
he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were
drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to his without informing
complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that respondent
paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty.
In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from
complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that
respondent received ₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was
paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was
only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee, publication
fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any
receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in
accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s
property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting
to Yulo who had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that
respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the
records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent
in liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he
received from his client, Presbitero.1âwphi1Indeed, his failure to return the excess
money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it
for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client
Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained
counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks
and real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of
the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his
account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the
MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan
was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were
dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on
his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of
his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his
client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on
respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the
facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up
to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as
a member of the legal profession.7 Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and
skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself8 that
warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP
Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid
obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his
client, Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar.9 Our only concern is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability.10
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may
choose to file against each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from
a client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose,
he must immediately return the money to his client.13 Respondent was given an
opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full amount of
the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S.
Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his
compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel
issue presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001
Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on
April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until
January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the
9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987
and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry
at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.2
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from
Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in this administrative
case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises.3
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-
Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this
office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in
the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos
submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name
Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos
was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the
charges against him. He also submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-
Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the
City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register.
The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted
by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized documents
and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled
Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and
Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge.
The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need
to resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat
the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant
requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied
the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded to the
Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The
complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of
Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of
violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without commission; (b)
tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these
infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present commission, if any,
be revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his
defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the
charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned
as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so
commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record
Books available in the notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de
Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains
items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of
the notary public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose
so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book.
Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental,
or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under
Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by
the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath
of office of the notary public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the
complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being
commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of
record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as
a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases
against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated
separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices
of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may
be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on
October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the
respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For
Acts Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the
complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before
his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts
committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing
documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court
or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government
service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed
with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the Judiciary,
shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or
before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by
the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together
with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action
of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the
Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the
complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any
officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base
its final action.15
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered
as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 616of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such,
the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case
the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint
shall be filed with the Supreme Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of
An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable
If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service
does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the
bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty,
he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or
criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we
issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in
part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an
administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan
or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be
clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding
should be included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the
complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he
or she should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an
officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a
Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it
must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days
from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation
not later than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is
not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the
release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be
withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or
justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint
must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or
justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing;
and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the
Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise,
the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the service.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown
to be without merit and intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore,
the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court.29 The
Judiciary Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power
over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. This is
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment
why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.30
to the judiciary.22 In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the
immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes
against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the respondent continued the
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.
doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.31Notarization by a notary public
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without
continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.32
Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing lawyer.
treated as a mere casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of
The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands,
notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s subsequent appointment as a
documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring
judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts
lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission
as an officer of the court.25
and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.35
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -
be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged with
immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a
time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which
pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be
the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
free from the appearance of impropriety. ...27
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
substantial evidence.28 The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the conduct."37
respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was,
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-
however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this case because
stake in every aspect of that function.38
the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after
the respondent was appointed to the judiciary. The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right
and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare.
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting
the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings
filed.39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely
alleged in his answer that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers
in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial
Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent
presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983,
as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to
controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the
documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties
as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27,
Rule 13842 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of
a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is
essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent
judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning one’s mental or
moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to practice
merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held
in the leading case of In re Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court
Administrator’s recommendation that the charge for immorality against the respondent
be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the
respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit
conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s
certificates of live birth to show that her paramour was the father. The complaint in this
case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair
ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative
complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit
filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred
by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened
to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long
as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as
well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of
the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This
should particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter
involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act
to the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely
Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.52 By his actuations, the
respondent failed to live up to such standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The
respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In representing that he was
possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood
of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of
justice is mandated in this case, considering that the complaint against the respondent
was filed twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained of;56 that there
was no private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely
affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned
retirement benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this
case.WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).SO
ORDERED.
EN BANC c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;
A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004
DECISION
until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.3
PER CURIAM:
The Case Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC
and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women
to start a love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married to
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Jardiolin.4cralawrednad
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12,
2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate
which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development
immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath. Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel,
The Facts respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted
KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine
Government.3cralawrednad
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University
of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor
or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's
being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return
Quezon City. for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly
rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises
a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between itself.6cralawrednad
the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations
involved:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that
respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land
a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990
titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land
to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be investigated
despite being already married to Jardiolin; and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and
corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave
misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.7cralawrednad allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure
to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even
attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of
Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and
their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request, information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." 16cralawrednad
however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the
subject of the Senate Inquiry.8cralawrednad On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28,
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued 2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion to
a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information was Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due
thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was
No. (RA) 3019.9cralawrednad opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his
Order19dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly,
Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September
"nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas21 were issued.
students in exchange for passing grades.10cralawrednad
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for
The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973. Reconsideration,22praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that
the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said motion,
In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly
A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified answer. known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to
two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies
In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from
facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition sore eyes.
suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to
substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed
Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his personal verification with the court
formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic also argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because
Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a limited
as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was
established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses.23cralawrednad
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.
Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl
14
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer), stating that the Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong
(Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs.
Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report
had recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email
messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their
familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which contained
references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high
blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his
girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in
Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering
respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived
to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in
more than one occasion, brought with him his students during their drinking sessions
and had even one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about
respondent's preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD
called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had
broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus
surmised based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell
the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that
during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as
his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments),24pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the
IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City to
verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled
mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's
Compliance (with Comments),25cralawred submitting the certified photo copies of the
Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of
the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position
Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent
is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any decision or
judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position
Paper.28cralawrednad
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid
rendered a Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing
respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer
of the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code30 and/or
RA 301931 as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials,
complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which
support his allegations in the petition.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited
their affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant complainant's assertion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his
included in his petition. alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was not able
to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory to this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However,
conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent committed
respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within thirty grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while
(30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case still married to Jardiolin, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
was considered submitted for report and recommendation.
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
x x x x
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer
"engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession".32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and member of the bar. this Commissioner
respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his
conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility."33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
34
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting
and approving, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's
violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's
Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name
Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration35 dated
July 3, 2013, to which complainant was required to submit his
comment.36cralawrednad
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report
dated June 28, 2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to
comment on complainant's motion in an Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the same
date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration).39cralawrednad
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave40dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the
Comment and/or Opposition41 dated September 20, 2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline
forwarded the records of this case to this Court on November 11, 2014.43cralawrednad
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct,
which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of
Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability
fully supported by the evidences offered. of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side
the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
of proof according to the equipoise doctrine.
conduct.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
x x x x
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise
INTEGRATED BAR.
doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.46
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were
the legal qualifications for the profession.44 Good moral character is not only required
proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their professional and
for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good
personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.45
maintaining illicit affairs.
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed
proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that
disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman,
lawyer.47cralawrednad
Jr.:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not there
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.
x x x x
The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with
which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds
expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are
broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.49
complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead,
questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents. Due to respondent's own
failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence
of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.52(emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the
findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding
as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render a facade of
validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
said:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
COURT.
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.51 (emphasis ours.)
x x x

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous
and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990
to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the
form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DDD
and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were
not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate
Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice &
Human Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the
same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as
Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to
suffer the penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached
Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption against him is still
pending with the Sandiganbayan.''53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that
complainant failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against
him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not
substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD
Report, viz:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made
in attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or
denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge
thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant" s position of being
not present in the country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents,
skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof
which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent,
through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a
member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the
original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead
the IBP, which intention was more so established because complainant was able to
submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the Senate Report,
the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the
lawyer's oath which he took before admission to the Bar, which
states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; [will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; 1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligations without any menial reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of
the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the
Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His
actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is
found GUILTYof gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon
1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan
with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and circulated by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its
President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael
(Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz),
former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary
held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005.
As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money
matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention
was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national
convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was
conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not
elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board
of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007
appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official
qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th
convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a
matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty.
Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07
directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain
why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for
the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention;
that it was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds
of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE
accounts;"5 that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national
convention on May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash, checks and
original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed by former PACE
officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as PACE national treasurer during the
Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member
of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the ₱30,000.00
term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous
board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by
Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the
said term-end bonus.8
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an
exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the
protagonists were directed to submit their respective position papers. Thereafter, the
case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz
offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation
reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty.
Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to
the Davao City convention.10 As to the sufficiency and completeness of these reports,
this would be better resolvedthrough an audit rather than in disbarment
proceedings.1âwphi1 Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the position
of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being as
a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-
laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case.11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections
even though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore
disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was the
"certificate of candidacy," was never offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer,
knew that her bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not
beable to assume office if she won.13
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never
sponsored the appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of
Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the Board of Directors. Again,
Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the passage of the
questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer.14
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez,
and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.15
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21,
2013, granting the complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set
asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one
(1) year.17
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of PACE
funds;(ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and
(iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer working in the
Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable actions18 committed by Atty.
Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession
which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.
For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been
exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the
Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble
profession.21
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election,
including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her
certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her
involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE
officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary,
were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in
Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended This decision shall be immediately executory.
Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to
It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he
all courts of the land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.
conferment of such privilege.
SO ORDERED.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all
their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair Associate Justice
play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the
opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to
speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.19Time and again, the
Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character.
The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their
clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.20