BOBCATS IN THE BEN CUI

1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry Defeats

the 33rd North Vietnamese Army Regiment
August 1968

Bob Wright
 Introduction:
Ben Cui and the After-Action Process

“History is the last thing we care about during operations and

the first thing we want afterwards. Then it is too little, too late,
and too untrue.”
Colonel W. A. Ganoe, Theater Historian of the European Theater of
Operations, 1 January 1944

Why another account of the 21 August 1968 fight between Company C and the 33rd
North Vietnamese Army Regiment? After all, there have been three different Army after-action
reports specifically about it, two others that deal with that day as part of the division’s August-
September fighting, and another that includes it in the 25th Infantry Division’s defeat of the
enemy’s attempt to take Tay Ninh. Furthermore, there are brief accounts in two books published
by the Army. This coverage for a company-sized slugfest in Vietnam is almost unparalleled.

The answer is quite simple. Dry military documents rarely turn into best-sellers. An
official after-action report is actually a summary intended to provide “just the facts”—the
information needed by the Army to improve tactics, equipment and the organization of units.
These have found their way into the National Archives and other Army reference collections
such as the Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. The accounts in Vietnam were
prepared by the unit involved, the staff of a higher headquarters, or by historian-soldiers serving
in tiny units. The 25th Infantry Division had such a unit in the 18th Military History Detachment
which in 1968 consisted of one major and one sergeant. The need to cover a division of over
15,000 soldiers obviously overwhelmed a two-man team, forcing them to pick and choose only
the most significant and to keep them very brief.

Information contained in after-action reports became part of another type of report

prepared by the same historians. Every three months the division and its higher headquarters, II
Field Force, Vietnam, had to send a large document called an Operational Report-Lessons
Learned through channels to the Pentagon with a second copy going directly to the history
center. The 18th spent most of its time working on the 60-page ORLL and had only a few days
to get it to II Field Force. Obviously even the most significant fights could take up only a few
paragraphs.
 Mandatory official after-action reports cannot begin to give a human face to combat.
Although technically not after-action reports, recommendations for awards do include accounts
of the courage and sacrifices of individual soldiers. This is also true for recommendations for
unit awards such as the Presidential Unit Citation (Army).

The story of Charlie Company’s and the battalion’s Reconnaissance Platoon’s intense
battle against a much larger force of North Vietnamese Army regulars first appeared on paper in
a report submitted up through channels by the company commander. In this case First
Lieutenant Arthur Cook wrote it because he had taken command from the seriously wounded
First Lieutenant John Snodgrass during the fight. It was dated August 1968.

Major Richard Baun, commander of the 18th MHD and the division historian, next
prepared a formal Small-Unit After Action Interview Report dated 21 September 1968. As part
of the search for who-what-when-where-how details he looked at immediately available records
such as the essential radio logs prepared in real time in the battalion’s tactical operations center.
But he also needed the kind of information that never makes it into the written reports.
Sometimes words require visual aids. That takes the form of diagrams, maps or photographs.
But to the combat historian the most important details come from interviewing participants.

While the Army’s earliest use of interviewing came in 1775 to establish the timeline for
the battles of Lexington and Concord, the modern interview techniques only go back to World
War II. Deployed historians assembled units as they came off the front line and questioned them
as a group or sometimes they picked out one or more key players. Interview techniques used in
the Vietnam War were more sophisticated and most of the time were performed with the aid of a
tape recorder. Although the World War II style group interviews did take place, talking to an
individual or small group enabled the historian to capture multiple voices, each relating his own
view without feeling that he had to avoid contradicting his comrades

There are two caveats. By its very nature the classic after action report focuses on the
junior people with detailed information about the event. That testimony is offset by the fact that
any participant probably has no accurate information about how that action fits into the “big
picture.” The Army has a built-in concern for erring on the side of preserving “the need to
know.” It is also true that in many cases participant details do not accurately preserve the
original perception but subconsciously present what a group of soldiers came to believe after
they talked over the fight and tried to make sense of it. Army historians know that in a situation
of extreme danger the rush of adrenalin can mean that a man in a foxhole may not see Marylin
Monroe standing next to him. Another problem arises from participants having wildly different
perceptions of the passage of time. Knowing such things are possible gives an Army historian
the tools to make sense out of conflicting evidence.
 In the case of the pitched fight in the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation an offsetting view of
evidence com es into play. Even after the passage of half a century a defining moment in
someone’s life means that what happened is as fresh today as it was when he returned to the
battalion hooches.

Major Baun only had time to interview four men who fought in the battle when he wrote
the Small Unit After Action Report. First Lieutenants John Snodgrass and Arthur Cook naturally
required his attention because they had exercised command during the battle. Specialists Fourth
Class Ronald Grim and A. G. McSwain represented the more focused experiences of the
individual soldiers. Adding the battalion’s intelligence officer, First Lieutenant Harold Metzger,
as a fifth shed some light on the enemy plan and actions.

The major continued to collect other information about the full extent of the 1st
Battalion’s 18-23 August battle for the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation. He developed an analytical
study to give the division immediate feed-back so that it could refine its tactics. It also became a
piece of a very large account of the division’s broader fight to defend the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng
region against well-armed and well-equipped North Vietnamese Army regulars. Working with
other history detachments Baun completed the Combat After Action Report entitled “Battle for
Tay Ninh” on 7 February 1969. Supporting materials used in the narrative required over 100
enclosures—written and taped. Anyone reading that document from cover to cover has a better
understanding of how the enemy’s third offensive of 1968 required him to bring in fresh units to
replace the Viet Cong units shredded in Tet (31 January-18 February) and the “mini-Tet” (2-15
May).

The Army has used the assorted reports as they were intended. For example, several
books in a series created as the war wound down include information taken directly from the
25th Infantry Division accounts. General Donn A. Starry became the head of the Army’s
training command and supervised the production of post-Vietnam field manuals. His ‘Chief of
Staff Monograph’ Mounted Combat in Vietnam covered cavalry, tank and mechanized infantry
experiences. Company C’s battle on 21 August appears on pages 132 and 133. Furthermore,
copies of reports and ORLLs held at the Center of Military History are used by its authors
preparing the volumes of the official history of the war. In this case Ben Cui appears in Eric B.
Villard’s Staying the Course October 1967 to September 1968.

But no matter how important they are within the Army, the records do not come close to
telling the entire story of the blood, sweat and tears shed by those who served. Families and
friends have to make do with stories that they have been told or old letters. Of course this has
also been true in every one of America’s wars. Filling that void is the task of writers who
publish books that are found in bookstores or on-line at Amazon. They do make people come
alive, capture the heat and dampness of the monsoons, and the strain of conducting sweeps by
day and ambushes by night. World War II books such as Cornelius Ryan’s D-Day and A Bridge
Too Far come alive because the authors sought out veterans and interviewed them years after
they returned to civilian life.

Ben Cui stands out as one of the relatively small number of fights that have become part
of Army’s record of the Vietnam War. However, it still needs another after-action ‘report’ that
tells the world about what happened from the time that Charlie Company and the
Reconnaissance Platoon task force “broke wire” and left the Dau Tieng gate until they returned.
A few hours and yet a lifetime. This book allows the squads to tell what the saw and did and
what those who did not return did lest it all fades away.
 Table of Contents

Introduction
Chapter 1: What Went Before
Chapter 2: The Offensive Begins: August 18th
Chapter 3: August 19th
Chapter 4: August 20th
Chapter 5: That Morning
Chapter 6: Getting into Position
Chapter 7: It Begins
Chapter 8: The Long Fight
Chapter 9: Field of Fire
Chapter 10: The Second Line
Chapter 11: Dustoff
Chapter 12: The Following Days
Chapter 13: End of the Third Offensive
Conclusion
Missing Comrades
Decorations and Campaigns
Further Readings
 Chapter 1: What Went Before

“To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy
or capture him and repel his assault be fire, close combat and counterattack.”
Table of Organization and Equipment 7-45G, 1966

We call it the Vietnam War but to the North Vietnamese it was Chiến tranh Việt Nam
(Resistance War Against America). Cochin China was partitioned after the French left their
former colony to form Laos and Vietnam, the later temporarily split. The Communists held
control in North Vietnam retaining Hanoi as its capital and transformed its guerrillas into the
Peoples North Vietnamese Army (NVA). It did not abandon its goal of unifying the country
under their own control. A flawed government established Saigon as its capital and sought to
hold the south, turning Saigon1 into its capital city. The southerners proved to be unable to
pacify the areas under the control of Communists and their guerrillas, the Viet Cong (VC).

America gave its support to the Saigon government, first with ever-expanding economic
aid and then the Pentagon sent advisors to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) a
make it capable of self-defense. That mission grew in 1962 when the first small units arrived to
provide helicopter support. More units and advisors followed as the mission expanded in
response to the growing military capacity of the VC. By 1965 it was clear that the situation had
reached the point when ground combat units from the Army and Marine Corps.

Following the end of the Korean War in 1953 the United States Army redistributed its
units to perform in the Pacific. Two divisions remained in Korea and the 173d Airborne Brigade
went to Okinawa where it could serve as a quick reaction force. The remaining large unit was
the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, positioned to reinforce any situation.
Vietnam’s continuing trials tested the system, sending the airborne brigade and the brand-new
airmobile force: 1st Cavalry Division. Other divisions followed, including the 25th, as did a
steady stream of logistical and specialized units kept company with the Army’s expanding
mission.

Offensives featuring large units had been the prevailing strategy of fighting during the
first three years of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry tour of duty in the III Corps

1
Now Ho Chi Minh City.
Tactical Zone. It had arrived ‘in country’ as the only mechanized battalion and then only
because the 25th’s commanding general insisted that it would be effective in the terrain where he
would fight. He had been correct: mech worked. The Army sent others and even upgraded
some ‘leg’ infantry battalions already in Vietnam. By the summer of 1968 the 25th included the
1st of the 5th; the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23d Infantry Tomahawks; the 2d Battalion
(Mechanized) 22d Infantry Regulars; the three ground troops of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry;
and backed up by M-48 tanks from the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor all working on favorable terrain
thus freeing up the remaining division battalions to push deeper into the forests and jungle.

The 1st Battalion belonged to the 1st Brigade which had its headquarters at Tay Ninh
West, the major base in the province of the same name. That city was more accurately described
as a cluster of villages plus the “Vatican” of the Cao Dai religion. The Bobcats did not call it
home. Instead in August 1968 it served as the lone maneuver battalion at Camp Rainier in Binh
Duong Province, just outside the cluster of villages that formed Dau Tieng. The camp had the
huge Michelin Rubber Plantation on its east and northeast; the somewhat smaller Ben Cui was
on the west just across the bridge over the Saigon River, the boundary between Tay Ninh and
Bin Duong Provinces.2 Flat terrain with rubber trees planted in straight lines that were far
enough apart to let an M-113A1 pass between them with excellent mobility; in places where the
underbrush was removed the .50-caliber machine guns could fire effectively at greater distances
than elsewhere. Weather in the summer was less favorable; it was the season for the daily
monsoon rain.

The situation changed dramatically on 31 January-18 February 1968 when the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese People’s Army unleashed a nation-wide offensive during the Tet or New
Year’s holidays. Intelligence had correctly anticipated some major action but could not
determine the dates and was taken aback when they broke the tacit understanding that a truce
would be taken as it had been in previous years. Instead the American units had to shift gears
and race to repel the attackers. In the case of Saigon, the 25th Infantry Division’s mechanized
and armored assets with their speed and protective armor led the way. The fighting subsided
without the VC/NVA making any territorial gains. Remaining enemy units withdrew into War
Zone C to regroup and reequip while the allies returned to normal operations that included
pushing the enemy remnants well away from Saigon.

Tet turned out to be tremendously important. The American people were shocked at
what they read in newspapers and saw on the nightly TV news. They were told that it was a

2
The place names in Vietnamese were respectively Tây Ninh, Dầu Tiếng, and Bến Củi (the
Plantation’s complete name is rendered Nông trường cao su Bến Củi); and Sông Sài Gòn. The
only significant terrain feature was a low ridge dubbed The Razorback. It played no role in
August.
defeat proving that we couldn’t even protect the U. S. Embassy. At the same time the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines were puzzled because they had scored a major triumph. Part of the
disconnect lay in the fact that the two groups had different definitions of victory.

In May, after the enemy regrouped, he launched “Mini Tet” (2-15 May) but this time the
uprising focused more on Saigon-Ben Hua-Long Binh area. Although intelligence correctly
anticipated that another major offensive, this time it was smaller. The same units responded by
racing to reinforce the threatened areas; in the case of the 1st Battalion battling through a very
large and tenacious group of attackers at Hoc Mon.

Once again, the NVA withdrew, but now it went even further into their sanctuaries in
War Zone C and across the border into Cambodia. The allies did not sit back. They chased them
and at the same time strengthened the defenses of Saigon, again using the 25th, 1st and 9th
Infantry Divisions to push to the northwest, north, and west creating a mobile defense rather than
digging in. These steps in effect extended the protective ring further out. They intended to
prevent the enemy from ever reaching Saigon again.

The division sent its 1st Brigade furthest north, utilizing Tay Ninh West for the brigade
base in the same way that the division used the Cu Chi base camp. Many units maintained their
rear echelon elements in one camp or the other. For the 1st Battalion “home” was Cu Chi where
it kept headquarters company, less its reconnaissance and 4.2-inch heavy mortar platoons, and
Company D, the support company pushing critical items such as ammunition and spare parts out
to the line elements.

After the May offensive failed and the enemy retreated to his base camps in War Zone C
or Cambodia the 25th fought fewer and smaller engagements. During June and July the division
reported that about the only contacts it made were with platoon-sized local force elements
although the enemy occasionally carried out mortar and rocket attacks on the various division
bases; one such attack in the predawn hours Dau Tieng was hit with 42 107 mm. rockets and 515
mortar rounds. What was more significant during the ‘slow’ months involved both sides’
stepping back to assess the results and repair the damages to men and equipment; a third and last
enemy offensive during 1968 fell not on the population or on critical areas but directly on the
U.S., Army of Vietnam, and allied troop units. After its own refitting the 25th Infantry Division
looked northwest for any sign of a renewed attack. One important change during this period
came when Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Anderson assumed command of the Bobcats on 27 June.

While the official histories published in Hanoi must be used with care—their versions of
actions grossly exaggerate our losses in men and equipment while minimizing theirs—it is
possible to gain some sense of an accurate assessment when the engagement was too lopsided to
hide. The various volumes that deal with 1968 are consistent in their assertion that Tet was an
enormous victory both on the battlefield and in its psychological impact. Wrong on the first
count, but arguably accurate in terms of the rapid decline in the American public’s support.

Mini-Tet received similar published bragging. However, the Vietnamese needed to gloss
over the relatively quiet months of June and July. Their choice was explaining that the North
Vietnamese and remnant Viet Cong units withdrew to refine their tactical objectives. More
specifically they decided to shift away from major attacks on the Saigon area and similar
important targets and planned instead to fight for a more limited goal. They wanted to secure
territory in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces to use as an intermediate base for units coming
from Cambodia and War Zone C. After completing the necessary build-up, a new general
offensive would be launched. During this so-called third offensive American bases and units
would be the high-priority targets, not South Vietnamese ones.

By August 16,000 soldiers of the 5th and 9th Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Divisions
had infiltrated into War Zone C and prepared to attack, while the 7th coped with the secondary
objective areas of Binh Duong. The main effort called for the two reinforced divisions to
effectively destroy the 25th’s 1st Brigade headquartered at Tay Ninh West. Capturing it would
be a smaller-scale Tet in terms of its outcome: less significant militarily but a huge propaganda
triumph. During this same period the 1st Brigade and the parent 25th Infantry Division were not
sitting on their hands. American forces patrolled daily and cleared the major highways
connecting the bases to resupply points, performed searches to locate targets for air and ground
action, and put out numerous night ambushes in attempt to bloc NVA infiltration into the new
area of operations.

The challenge for each unit in the 1st Brigade area of operations was to find the enemy,
engage him by moving heavy task forces built around M-113A1 armored personnel carriers
overland and “leg” infantry inserted by helicopters. That sounds quite simple, but reality was far
different. Leaders needed to know their subordinates’ strengths and weakness and to place them
in situations where they could excel. The attacking forces needed to have the weapons and
equipment appropriate for each challenge and with the expectation of success. They needed to
take full advantage of all available fire support: artillery, helicopter gunships, and attack aircraft.
But doing so in such a way that the ordnance inflicted the maximum damage with no risk of
striking friendly forces. Avoiding fratricide required careful planning, solid intelligence and
good teamwork. Fortunately, the 1st Brigade had those qualities in spades. And equally
important, the brigade had the confidence to give the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry “a
degree of freedom of action.”
 The most important advantage that the 1st Brigade enjoyed was the quality of its officers
and men. Units received the proper training to accomplish their assigned tasks. Leaders
mentored their subordinates whether they were squad leaders or battalion commanders, and in
the process generated a strong sense of esprit de corps. Its second decisive advantage lay in the
fact that battalions like the Bobcats had a clear mission (as did the subordinate line companies):
“MISSION: To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in
order to destroy or capture him and repel his assault be fire, close combat
and counterattack.” The same for both the battalion and for each of the rifle
companies. The company was capable of providing a base of fire and able
to maneuver its subordinate elements; to seize and hold terrain; provide
indirect fire. A mechanized infantry company is considered to be fully
mobile and capable of operating under most circumstances that and be
capable of transporting all of its personnel and equipment using its
personnel carriers; and is capable of cross country movement through most
of the terrain in the battalion’s area of operations.”

Translating the imperative into daily action requires measured aggressiveness. And that starts
with the unit’s officers and noncommissioned officers visualizing what victory looks like and
communicating that to every soldier.

A typical day during the lull before the storm consisted of a company sweeping west on
Highway 2393 toward Tay Ninh until it contacted a unit sweeping east toward Dau Tieng. As it
came back along the road the company would drop off one APC every quarter of a mile or so to
secure the free movement of convoys. At dusk when the carriers went back the company would
set out night ambush patrols. Other missions included: defending the base camp; furnishing
security and escorts to convoys; interdiction of enemy routes; locating and destroying enemy
infrastructure; and carrying out combined operations with local South Vietnamese.

Before examining the specific facts of the action on August 21st it is important to set the
stage. According the tables of organization and equipment for a mechanized infantry battalion
there were three line companies, each with three rifle and one weapons platoon, each with diesel
tracked vehicles. The rifle platoons and the battalion Reconnaissance Platoon had one M-113A1
for each squad. By the summer of 1968 the top-mounted .50 cal. machine guns had protective
shields but the sides were vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades and were using field-expedient
screens made of PSP panels that were intended to make the RPGs explode prematurely. Basic
tactics called for a vehicle to point at an enemy thereby presenting a smaller target and taking
advantage of its best combat characteristics. Each of the company’s 81 mm. mortars were
carried in a M-125A1 and could be fired either from the vehicle or set up on the ground. The
company commander had his own 113 from which to carry out the necessary command and

3
Route 239 was part of a network of Dau Tieng/Tay Ninh main supply routes along with Routes
13 and 26. There were several other routes reaching Tay Ninh from other directions.
control while another dubbed a ‘Little Angel’ track carrying the senior company medic.4 The
problem that plagued command vehicles came from the fact that whether tanks or tracks they
carried two radio antennas instead of one immediately making them a priority target.5

In theory a mechanized infantry battalion should have contained 40 officers, 2 warrant

officers, and about 865 enlisted men. Of course, throughout history no unit in the field expected
to have everything that it was supposed to have and on any given days the number of available
men dropped considerably lower due to wounds, illness, rest and recreation leave and a variety
of other reasons. The same constraints fell upon the battalion’s other maneuver element, its
reconnaissance platoon, about a quarter of the nominal size of a company. It not only had the M-
113 tracked vehicles, it included two jeep-mounted 106 mm. recoilless rifles adding punch that
offset its rifle strength.

1st Battalion, of course, operated out of Dau Tieng. But it was not alone. In August it
counted on supporting troops there, at Tay Ninh, and at Cu Chi.

The division had four artillery battalions. Three provided direct support to the brigades
with 105 mm. howitzers: 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery (1st Brigade); 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
(2d Brigade); 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (3d Brigade); and one armed with 155 mm. howitzers
(3d Battalion, 13th Artillery). But it could also draw support from the 23d Artillery Group’s 2d
Battalion, 32d Artillery; it manned the most powerful eight-inch howitzers and 175 mm. guns.
An exotic variety came with the attachment of M-42 “Dusters,” (twin 40 mm. guns mounted on a
tank chassis) and quadruple .50 cal. machineguns mounted on trucks. These came from Battery
B of the 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self-propelled), 2d Artillery (callsign Evil Time)
and Battery D (Machine Gun), 7th Artillery respectively.

The gunners were positioned at fire support bases that also housed infantry, enabling
combined operations, but were spaced out by element so that every base was protected by
covering fire from one or more other bases. FSBs seemed to be small organizations and the
frequent moving of the bases themselves provided a consistently tantalizing lure for the
Communist commanders. What they consistently underestimated was the ability that an
American unit in combat had to call upon through the fire support officers at the company and
battalion level and forward air controllers from the Air Force’s 19th Tactical Air Support
Squadron flying overhead in the venerable O-1 Bird Dogs.

4
The actual dedicated personnel carrier was ‘Big Angel’ and served as the battalion surgeon’s
field aid station.
5
Dismounted radio operators were marked by an antenna that made them priority targets—an
antenna dubbed the “shoot me first stick.”
 The same officers on the ground or in the air were also used to bring in the Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps and Vietnamese fighter-bombers whose bombs, rockets, machine guns and
even sometimes miniguns could break up most contacts. The trick for a unit in combat was the
amount of time that it took for the requested support to show up. Other fights by the division’s
units competed for the relatively small number of armed Hueys. It always took time for the
gunships, artillery, and aircraft to obtain clearance to engage from higher headquarters and South
Vietnamese authorities. Stress was laid upon not harming civilians and on avoiding collateral
damage. The greater problem came from “deconflicting” airspace to avoid inadvertently having
artillery shells, helicopters and airplanes wind up in the same airspace with probable disaster.

1st Brigade counted on support from multiple Army aviation units. The 25th Aviation
Battalion (Company A’s callsign Little Bear and Company B’s Diamondhead) flying utility UH-
1 ‘Hueys,’ and armed UH-1Ds in Company B. They flew out of Cu Chi as did the first AH-1
Cobra gunships received in June by Troop D, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur). The non-
divisional 269th Aviation Battalion (Black Barons), also in Cu Chi, and doing every type of
mission from delivering men and ammunition to bringing in hot meals. The 269th’s primary
assets were the 116th (Hornet), 187th (Crusader; the gunship section used Rat Pack), 188th
(Black Widow) assault helicopter companies, and the 242d assault support helicopter company
(Muleskinner). The most important supporting units in many veterans’ eyes was the 159th
Medical Detachment that flew the life-saving Dustoff missions. Medical support flew directly
from the Cu Chi and carried wounded either to the 45th Surgical Hospital at Tay Ninh for initial
treatment while the more serious cases brought men to the larger 12th Evacuation Hospital. At
12th Evac men received additional surgery, treated men needing longer recovery periods, or
prepared those who needed to return to the United States.
 Chapter 2: The Offensive Begins, August 18th

“for nine days fighting ranged through the rows of rubber trees. Counterattack
followed attack with such regularity that it became difficult to tell which was
which”
General Donn Starry

Very few people know about the August and September 1968 offensive, the last fighting
by large units in the war. They all know about Tet, or at least they think that they do. Those
Bobcats who fought then know that there was a ‘Mini-Tet’ in May—and that there was a slugfest
at Hoc Mon as they pushed through to help defend Binh Hua airbase.

Only a handful of men realized at the time that the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th
Infantry received a Presidential Unit Citation in recognition of their bitter combat against the 5th
North Vietnamese Division. Knowing how they fit into the big picture is essential for the
veterans of any company fight to gain closure. But the system doesn’t pass down unit awards
until after the participants rotated home.

Very large regular North Vietnamese Army formations had worked their way south using
the Ho Chi Minh Trail and had largely replaced the Viet Cong units destroyed in Tet and Mini-
Tet. Military intelligence correctly identified the movement and at the same time had correctly
noted that once the enemy had recovered from its May losses they would unleash another series
of attacks, but this time on a narrower scale. As a postwar official history stated: COSVN6
looked at the big picture and considered that “the General Offensive-General Uprising is a
process of continuous attack during which the prominent point is that the follow-up attacks
become stronger and stronger.” COSVN allocated their regular formations, especially those
fresh from the north, to carry out the push. The 9th NVA Division augmented by the 174th
Regiment (from the 5th NVA Division) and smaller units would carry out the main attacks on
Tay Ninh and its immediate vicinity. The remainder of the 5th “would be used to attack enemy
roads and waterways and to engage enemy counterattacks.” Both forces’ fighting emphasized
inflicting casualties knowing that any significant victory would have enormous impact on
American civilians.

6
Central Office for South Vietnam, the highest established headquarters.
 Using that logic, the May offensive counted as the second offensive while that the August
and September battles formed a “Third Offensive.” In this phase there would be no nation-wide
attack nor even combat within Saigon. Instead the enemy intended to focus exclusively on the
provinces to the city’s north and northwest with the intention of hacking out secure staging areas
for a new battle for Saigon that would be launched later. Simultaneously the VC/NVA intended
to inflict heavy losses on both U.S. and ARVN forces in Tay Ninh Province for the important
propaganda value that would inevitably result. While they knew that this offensive would
happen the problem for American leaders was once again that military intelligence had not been
able to determine just when that offensive would begin.

It started during the night of 17-18 August when the enemy struck the greater Tay Ninh
area with attacks on both ARVN and American installations, especially the set of fire support
bases.7 The first hit was Fire Support Base Buell II at 1:20 A.M. on the 18th and the attacks
spread across the region including on the signal station atop Nui Ba Den (“Black Lady
Mountain”). Instead of becoming quiet during daylight, the pressure from the 9th VC/NVA
Division continued. Meanwhile the 5th Division tried to slide past the brigade and concentrated
on penetrating through the eastern part of Tay Ninh Province and the western part of Binh
Luong, attempting in particular to cut Highways 239, 13, and 26. They had only one U.S. unit
standing in their way: the Bobcats. The two antagonists would carry out constant combat for the
whole of the August fighting. In this the enemy was assisted by the hot, humid summer
monsoon season and by the fact that the “battlefield” was about 15,000 square kilometers.

Although it did not take any direct fire during the night, Dau Tieng base camp did follow
the reports of the attacks around Tay Ninh. Coupled with the perception of large bodies moving
just outside of vision were enough to put the bunker line on red alert. Normal defense duties of
the base camp did not fall on the battalion, but the noise had indirect impact by causing some of
the men inside the perimeter to have trouble sleeping. Company A and the Reconnaissance
Platoon were inside the wire. Company B had set out two normal night ambushes, this time five
kilometers west. Company C’s three night ambushes were in the Michelin Rubber Plantation.
At 4:13 A.M. the battalion ordered C to consolidate at a single location and proceed to conduct a
reconnaissance in force towards a small village north of Dau Tieng. Two and a half hours later
the other shoe dropped: the battalion received orders that suspended the daily sweeping and
convoy protection missions.

New orders from Brigadier General Glen Long, the assistant division commander who
had moved up to track the 1st Brigade’s operations. The division halted the daily routine at 6:50
and announced that the battalion would be part of a flexible four-pronged attack on the suspected
location or locations of an enemy regimental headquarters.

7
Like medieval castles the base camps and especially fire support bases were not defensive.
While they did protect their inhabitants, it was primarily an offensive force that sent out patrols
and set up ambushes.
 First the Reconnaissance Platoon escorted Company B’s armored personnel carriers to
pick up the consolidated night ambush patrols. Company C’s tracks did the same thing, bringing
the full company back to Dau Tieng where it would serve as the battalion’s highly mobile
reserve. Company A’s task was to move into a blocking position north of the target location to
prevent an enemy withdrawal.

Company B’s tracks plus the Reconnaissance Platoon “broke wire” at 7:50. While they
were en route to the pickup some ten minutes later the dismounts received, and ignored, some
sniper fire coming from north of Highway 239. The 3d Brigade Reconnaissance and Intelligence
Platoon (CRIP), a combined U.S.-ARVN force, followed the scouts and prepared to sweep south
(not north) of the road to cover the battalion’s flank. At 8:45 they began their mission.

At 7:45 Company C received some rounds fired by two snipers, but this was irrelevant to
the conduct of its search and destroy mission which ended at 8:45. Next, following the plan, it
dropped back to the base camp and assumed the role of reserve—a task that became important
since A, B, and the Reconnaissance Platoon had departed about an hour earlier. Meanwhile the
command post informed the battalion that the at 8:30 S-3 Air the had received approval to fire
into a designated terrain box against an estimated 500 VC or NVA soldiers. All elements began
taking occasional small arms rounds that were nothing more than a nuisance. So far, so good.
But Company B’s continuing reports raised their estimates of the enemy’s numbers and growing
numbers of its own wounded. At 9:45 the enemy fire had increased to include 12.7 mm. heavy
machineguns; 15 minutes later it reported being in an intense engagement as it continued to
advance against an entrenched enemy of unknown size. And at 10 the Reconnaissance Platoon
had come up on B’s left flank.

Battalion ordered Company C to board their tracks and move rapidly to reinforce B by
striking the enemy’s southern flank. Company B was now requesting assistance by artillery and
helicopter gunships and air strikes to protect his right flank which was at risk. Immediate heavy
artillery fire greatly reduced the danger. On the other hand, this fire caused Company C to halt
short of B and wait for the barrage to lift. It had previously expected to make contact in 30
minutes. Company A reported arriving in the blocking position, deploying on line, and had
begun firing its 81 mm. mortars.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel Anderson took off in a command and control helicopter
and was on station by 11 A.M. He began relaying information on enemy casualties whenever he
saw them and repeating the need for medical evacuation although it turned out that most of those
picked up were lightly wounded or even merely injured. Company B and Reconnaissance
continued in contact while the other elements “piled on,” taking advantage of several air strikes
followed up by heavy artillery fire and armed helicopters. The CRIP came up on line while
Company C moved into a jump-off position and swept to the northwest. It was expected to be
able get behind the enemy and keep him contained in the contact area where he would have to
fight in two directions at the same time. Of note was the resupply of Company B and the others
in its battle group by the battalion Support Platoon and Company D. They performed this
mission under fire using mechanized supply vehicles.

The battle continued when the force made a third attack on the contact area and finally
overran it using the tight teamwork of the dismounts and M-113s. Clearing the bunker complex
still had to be done the old fashioned way: one by one using grenades and small arms. On its
side of the battlefield Company C did the same and were able to take advantage of a crumbling
defense

Late in the afternoon the battalion elements returned to Dau Tieng. The final count for
the day said that the bodies of 42 regular NVA bodies had been found along with the capture of
three .51 cal. heavy machine guns and enough equipment to signal that this was a large, fresh,
opponent. Captured documents identified elements of the 33rd Regiment and 24th Anti-Aircraft
Battalion, both from the 5th NVA Division. The Americans had seven men wounded although
five returned to duty immediately and the other two would be kept for just several days.

At 4:25 the Bobcats had to relinquish command and control of Company A and send it to
Tay Ninh (at 8 P.M. the destination was changed to FSB Rawlins II). The transfer cost the
battalion almost a third of its rifle strength and indicates that to at least some degree the brigade
believed that the 1st Battalion had an offensive mission while the threat to the defenses of Tay
Ninh and the propaganda value of an overrun base made it more important there. A
reinforcement, Company C, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, a dismounted rifle company, did reach
Dau Tieng around 6 P.M., a move that allowed the Bobcats to concentrate their full attention on
the large enemy that had been engaged this day.

It is impossible to reconcile the accounts in the People’s Army of Vietnam8 official

histories with the tactical operations center records. In their version of the night of August 17/18
“we conducted numerous surprise attacks against concentrations of enemy troops in the field,
sapper attacks against American bases, and ambushes along lines of communications. These
attacks achieved a high degree of combat efficiency, and the most outstanding feature was the
pace of the annihilation of American troops achieved by COSVN’s main force units.” It is worth
noting that they focused attention on the 33rd Regiment’s attacks on Highway 22, not on
Highway 239.

So far the units and their soldiers had not identified the action as being the start of
something different and often down to today do not think that this fighting was any more intense
than the usual activity of the proceeding two weeks with heavy fighting on night ambushes. This
is not a majority viewpoint.

8
The name of the armed forces of the post-1975 unified country, replacing both the VC and
NVA.
 Chapter 3: August 19th

“well-disciplined, heavily armed and entrenched enemy forces”

Presidential Unit Citation, Department of the Army General
Orders 82, 9 December 1969

The NVA considered that today’s combat was a continuation of the opening battle during
which they combined the use of ambushes with maneuvering. The NVA’s official histories
single out the 33d NVA Regiment for an ambush during which it “annihilated a U.S. mechanized
infantry battalion and destroyed 57 American tanks and armored personnel carriers, killing many
enemy soldiers.” This, they claimed, raised the morale of the entire 5th NVA Division.
Achieving the specific results, however, would have been quite a trick given the fact that this
would have wiped out a large chunk of the fighting vehicles belonging to 1st Brigade.

Reality was quite different. After giving up Company A at the end of the day on the
18th, the 1st Battalion fell to just three maneuver elements: Companies B and C plus the
Reconnaissance Platoon (and the 3d Brigade’s CRIP). These all left the camp to carry out their
missions led at 8 A.M. by Reconnaissance that was tasked with performing the daily highway
sweep. Companies C and B departed a half-hour later on a reconnaissance in force mission.
Company B’s task sent it north while C took a northeast path. Those men rode into position on
the vehicles rather than walking beside them and proceeded west for a mile or two before
Company C turned into the large woods north of the highway. Company B kept going further
before it turned in the same direction. At 9:19, however, the Reconnaissance Platoon reported
finding fresh ox trails leading from yesterday’s battlefield and entering the woods on the south
side of the highway. That news triggered the two companies to initiate their search, moving
from west to east.

A half-hour later the Reconnaissance Platoon completed its sweep of Highway 239 and
became the 1st Battalion’s reserve. The CRIP, dismounted, followed Company B and was
expected to give it “a degree of flank security.” Taken together the battalion’s movements were
carrying the fight to a new opponent entering “ambush alley,” taking the offensive instead of just
reacting to the enemy. During this phase of the operation only Company C had any real contact
and even that was just firing its mortars.

At first everyone reported only sporadic long-range small arms fire until half an hour past
noon when first Company B and then Company C started receiving fire from three sides. Bravo
immediately found its lead platoon pinned down beginning when the first APC was hit by an
RPG (other accounts said that it hit a mine). While not destroyed the heavy fire still prevented it
from being recovered at this time. In turn the company responded with both small arms and
mortar fire. Unfortunately, the enemy fought from fortified and well-concealed positions that
were hard to pinpoint and put out a heavy volume of fire. This fighting began at half past 12
eight kilometers west of Dau Tieng and lasted until 9 P.M.

Major Robert Wood, the battalion operations officer (S-3) monitored these activities from
a helicopter overhead and ordered Company C to disengage and proceed to physically link up
with Company B. It did so in spite of being hit with “devastating and extremely accurate” 82
mm. mortar fire. As this was taking place the small element that had pushed ahead of B’s main
line finally had a chance to pull back but that meant the company also underwent accurate 82
mm. mortar, small arms, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and heavy machine gun fire.
Fortunately, the equally accurate fire by an artillery battery eventually silenced them. This phase
of the engagement cost eight wounded Americans and the loss of that one M-113.

Meanwhile Company C and the Reconnaissance task force were responding to orders and
heading for Company B’s position. Together the two companies began laying heavy fire on the
NVA position. It was also subjected to the gunships and attack aircraft being diverted into the
engagement area. The later arrived on station just after 3 P.M. and found that although the
enemy was very much dug in in well-camouflaged fighting positions it was now “under siege by
the combined force of both rifle companies.”

No sooner had the initial air strike been delivered on the target than both companies went
forward into the location that had been occupied. They were unable to completely clear it but
were able to significantly reduce the amount of enemy fire. They then halted while more
airpower and gunships resumed pounding suspected locations. Thanks to that fire the two
companies resumed moving forward and completed running over the final position. While they
were searching there other Americans were able to extract the “lost” M-113 and determine that it
was merely damaged and could be repaired. Upon learning of this contact the battalion reserve,
the Reconnaissance Platoon left Dau Tieng heading for the contact area. Throughout the
afternoon multiple medical missions pulled out soldiers on stretchers and ambulatory wounded.

At 5:30 the battalion began its return march to Dau Tieng. The order of march put the
scouts first, followed by the CRIP, Company C, and finally B. While on the march at 6:20 1st
Brigade ordered one company to reverse directions and head west where it would link up with a
platoon of cavalry. As the trail element it fell to Company B to execute the mission. On the
upside, by the end of the day a tank platoon of Troop A of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry had
been added to the 1st Battalion’s combat power. On the downside: the combined column had to
fight its way through to Dau Tieng.

Bravo organized a formation that distributed the tanks among the armored personnel
carriers. It set out at 7:40 and was engaged twice by small arms and RPG fire while still
westbound prior to making contact with the cavalry. Although taking heavy fire almost the
entire way back to Dau Tieng from the link-up point (the movement became a running fight that
lasted almost two hours) Company B and the tank platoon formed an effective combined arms
force that enabled the column to bring all of its available weapons effectively. Innovative
tankers, for example, began using their searchlights to mark targets for their main guns to fire
cannister at, a more effective round for the circumstances than a high explosive round.

Twice the column called for artillery support along both sides of the highway, but
clearance was denied; this made indirect fire minimally useful. Air strikes and gunships had to
carry the burden of being the only practical form of assistance. The 1st Battalion successfully
brought in heavy bombing and armed Huey gunship attacks. These produced the intended result:
driving off the NVA attackers. Once the firing ceased Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, now in the
command and control ship, swept over the attackers’ positions but saw no activity.

In the first engagement the trailing tank took an RPG hit to the turret. After recovering
the wounded crewmen, the column resumed its march. As it was passing one of the villages a
second tank that was in the middle of the formation was hit by another RPG that penetrated its
fuel cell. While it did not burn it was rendered combat ineffective. Further down the highway
another RPG and automatic weapons ambush destroyed two Company B’s M-113s (and
damaged another). Fortunately, the cavalry’s lead tank was able to move up and push both off
the road. This minimized the time when the column had to halt exposed to enemy fire. The third
track was later recovered. Finally, as Company B reached the village on Highway 239 that was
closest to Dau Tieng it was hit again but this time it kept moving while laying its maximum
suppressive fire. This incident cost several more men wounded. By now the APCs were
expending the last of their remaining .50- cal. ammunition. Luckily prompt action during these
brief halts ensured that all of the wounded were recovered while the vehicles themselves were
able to pivot and present their least vulnerable fronts.

This brought an end to the ambushes as the column rounded the two corners that brought
it into the final strip leading into the main gate of the Dau Tieng base camp. At ten minutes to
nine the last vehicle reached safety. The number of tanks and APCs lost on this day provided yet
another indication that this enemy was not only employing sound tactics, it was also better armed
that the typical VC unit. In retrospect the Bobcats had been able to punch through with relative
ease compared to how it might have been shredded had the ambushes been made by more NVA
soldiers. 1st Battalion credited its success to the basic advantage of using combined arms rather
that simply stapling two different columns together.

It also identified several enemy tactics that had broader significance. First the analysis
identified the employment of at least 35 RPG teams. Time and again over the following days
soldiers commented on the sheer volume of the rockets flying through the air. A second
important finding identified the windrows of fallen trees created during Rome Plow bulldozing
as important cover and concealment for the enemy. Finally, this day could have been worse—
instead of being a single coordinated action the enemy had actually carried out a series of
isolated fights. The disjointed nature led to troubles estimating enemy numbers and casualties.
Officially this day’s action resulted in 76 confirmed enemy dead while suggesting that another
25 had not been counted. Of course playing the numbers game in this war had little importance.

The purported final determination of the casualties suffered in this day’s fighting is
confused as three different sets of numbers are given. The “wrap up” statistics recorded at 11:02
P.M.: Company B, 43 wounded in action in addition to its dead; Company C, 20 wounded;
Reconnaissance Platoon, 3 wounded; Company A, two wounded. Another report said that across
the entire force of engaged Americans had nine men killed and 79 wounded. However the true
final casualty list was not completed by the battalion’s surgeon and medics until 2:15 A.M. on
the 20th. That total included eight men dead (all from Company B) and 72 wounded (of whom
32 returned to duty by the end of the day).

The price had also been high in equipment lost: two of the cavalry’s tanks and six
armored personnel carriers four of which belonged to Company B. Yet The lost equipment was
precisely given as two 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry tanks, both of which were recovered and
repaired, and six M-113s destroyed, four belonging to Company B.

It is interesting to “look at the other side of the hill;” to see what the enemy recorded in
his official history. That of the 5th NVA Division claimed that in this fight we lost 47 vehicles
including 33 M-41 tanks and M 113s. They also claim that over 100 Americans were killed on
the spot. In reality there were no M-41 tanks, only the M-48A1s from the cavalry. That number
of tracks lost was incredibly inflated as was the number of men killed. Sometimes it becomes
almost impossible to reconcile their claim with anything that 1st Battalion did.
 Chapter 4: August 20th

“Probably the 33rd NVA Regiment”

25th Infantry Division Periodic Intelligence Report

By the standards of the NVA’s third offensive the 20th started out relatively quiet. Dau
Tieng base camp took 47 rounds of 82 mm. mortar fire during the night that wounded two men
but had no effect on the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

At 4 A.M. the 1st Brigade directed that all of the day’s actions would not begin until
daylight and informed the tactical operations center that no air support would be available that
early. Still all three elements assembled at the bridge over the Saigon River (called Checkpoint
H). The Reconnaissance Platoon team temporarily assumed position guarding the bridge while
the two companies readied to begin their sorties. Based on the heavy fighting and vehicle losses
Company B was placed on alert but did not leave the perimeter at that time. It would
subsequently do so and join in probing the north side of Highway 239.

Company C received a reinforcement of the two Dusters assigned to the battalion,

Numbers 141 and 142 from Battery A, 5th Battalion (Automatic Weapons) (Self Propelled), 2d
Artillery. With reconnaissance also attached the company started moving at 6:25. Roughly an
hour later Lieutenant Colonel Anderson conducted an aerial search of Highway 239 ahead of the
company and told the TOC that he had seen an explosion in the village near the knocked out tank
and that he had called in artillery. It responded immediately: that location lay within the area of
yesterday’s fighting and the division had given prior approval allowed it to fire anyplace in the
area. Obtaining prior clearance was remarkable and rarely given.

At 9:25 Company C entered the first of two villages alongside Highway 239, the main
supply route. It deployed its dismounts and those belonging to both the Reconnaissance Platoon
and the CRIP. Clearing even a medium sized village, let alone a city, “ate” manpower and
moved slowly to ensure that anything or anyone suspicious was detained and that all mines,
booby traps, bunkers and tunnels were accounted for. Within minutes Lieutenant Colonel
Anderson recognized the number one issue with the sweep and ordered the TOC to send as many
interpreters as possible to help. The 3d Brigade’s Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence
Platoon did find fresh graves that presumably contained NVA casualties from the 19th’s fighting.
It also spotted and engaged three enemy soldiers who declined returning their gunfire.
 Company C also set out several strongpoints along the highway back to Dau Tieng to
detect and prevent anyone from maneuvering out of sight to cut the Americans off or
counterattack the village.

Colonel Anderson’s instincts in increasing his group of interpreters paid off at 12:40
when they learned from the Vietnamese civilians that a 500-man enemy force was in place some
700 meters past the force’s second objective intending to carry out an ambush from both sides of
the highway firing simultaneously. The colonel immediately called for artillery fire on the target
while at the same time the S-2 (battalion intelligence officer), First Lieutenant Harold Metzger,
was calling for gunships.

Company C initiated the first real “normal” action at 20 minutes past noon when it called
for an air burst over a damaged tank and an APC, both of whom had many people climbing all
over them. Fifty minutes later the lead element of Company C (still including the CRIP and
Reconnaissance Platoon) arrived in the second objective area and investigated the lost tracked
vehicles there. One dead VC soldier inside the tank; an American body was subsequently found
inside the other tank.

The battalion commander next radioed at 1:15 and said that the artillery fire into the pre-
approved box had produced one secondary explosion. 40 minutes later he gave orders to the
ground force to tow the two tanks and one damaged track hit yesterday back to Dau Tieng to be
repaired. Next he returned to the TOC and exchanged places with Major Robert Wood, the
battalion S-3 (operations officer). Thereafter the composite force carried out searches that
discovered bodies, blood trails, and equipment.

Company C reported at 1:42 that it had completed its mission and was departing; a half-
hour later it entered Dau Tieng with the Reconnaissance Platoon (including the 3d Brigade’s
CRIP) following. Even before separating to carry out the individual tasks the column made
contact when the NVA opened fire with small arms, automatic weapons, and RPGs.

It answered with fire from all three march elements employing effective supporting fires
from artillery, gunships, and fixed-wing aircraft. A subsequent sweep of the battlefield after the
contact ended located 47 dead plus 20 others clearly killed by the artillery. Intelligence later
identified the tenacious enemy as part of the 33rd NVA Regiment.
 In sum 1st Battalion lost 13 soldiers killed and 80 wounded—but Company C had only
20 wounded and six tracks knocked out—none from the 1st Platoon. Chu hoi (former Viet
Cong) Sergeant Long who was with 1st Platoon was run over by a track that didn’t know that he
was there.
 Chapter 5: That Morning

“just another day in the ’Nam”

Anonymous

August 21st began as the fourth day of what was now being recognized as the anticipated
“Third Offensive” in the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng corridor. The plan for the day called for the
battalion to look at the south side of Highway 239 after making heavy contact on the north side
for the past two days. Planners considered the overall situation and recognize that the 1st
Brigade had withstood its period of greatest danger even though it still had hard fighting ahead.
Under the new circumstances the 1st Battalion had a bit more freedom to expand upon its already
aggressive tactics and look to exploit the mobility of favorable terrain. That morning the routes
to be taken traversed flat ground without any standing water: ideal conditions for mechanized
operations in Vietnam. Moving into rubber plantations with their evenly spaced trees free of
underbrush allowed the M-113A1s to move straight ahead and employ the .50 cal. machine guns
efficiently. On the down side, the distances between individual trees restricted movement other
than in a straight line and it was particularly troublesome that they were too close to let a track
move laterally or pivot in place.

Lieutenant Colonel Anderson gave his orders to First Lieutenant John Snodgrass
commanding Company C and First Lieutenant Gary Martin of the Reconnaissance Platoon’s task
force. Although both units had heavy fighting on the previous day it had been tougher for
Company B. Therefore, a natural pattern was beginning to show itself: the two line companies
alternating between primary action and reinforcement missions. That was the most logical
system as it gave the “off” company at least a little time for repairs, restocking, and recovery.
Reconnaissance drew the proverbial short straw and went out daily. On this day the two officers
were told to remain side by side one kilometer apart so that if one got into trouble the other one
could come and help.

Lieutenant Martin was to clear the road as he often did, but today to pay particular
attention to the two villages at the eastern edge of Highway 239 since both had been used by the
enemy on the 20th. On this day he received two attachments. As usual the 3d Brigade’s CRIP
furnished him with additional dismounted men to do the dangerous job of clearing huts without
stepping on booby traps or mines. He also gained significant firepower from one of the two self-
propelled twin 40 mm. M-42 “Dusters” belonging to Battery B, 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery.
These were antiaircraft weapons developed for war in Europe but that had been used with great
effect in Vietnam in a ground mode. In sum he had his three M-113s’ .50 cal. heavy machine
guns, his two jeep-mounted 106 mm. recoilless rifles, and the Duster. All these weapons were
capable of long-range fire and suited the more open area of the highway right of way.

Lieutenant Snodgrass’s task was easier on paper but potentially more dangerous.
Company C was to carry out a reconnaissance in force and search for the enemy in the upper part
of the Ben Cui rubber plantation. He was to move the company down an unimproved trail (LTL
19) for about one kilometer before turning west and beginning to clear the plantation. No real
information existed to prove or disprove an expectation that he was going to face a large enemy
force. For two days the entire battalion fought very large elements on the north; he would be
alone on the south with little chance of a swift rescue if the enemy gained the upper hand.

As the units assembled on the morning of the 21st nothing seemed out of the ordinary
other than that several individuals felt an unusual generalized unease. For the majority, of
course, it was “just another day in the ’Nam.”

By the time that it finished Company C had slightly more than 70 members and 14
armored personnel carriers. Had the company been at the full-strength level called for in the
table of organization and equipment there should have been closer to three times that number.
For example, a company should have had a senior medic and three platoon medics but on this
day only one of the three platoon medics was available. Similarly, a reconnaissance platoon
organized into two squads plus three recoilless rifle teams mounted on jeeps should have a total
of 53. On paper the two units were nearly full but would normally be able to put as little as 70%
into action. Given that it is standard practice to consider a unit combat ineffective at that
strength it is surprising for someone who wasn’t there to realize that normal is just that, normal;
numbers on a piece of paper do not matter. Part of the reason for the lower strength came from
the cumulative losses incurred over the preceding days—less a matter of men killed or seriously
wounded than those with lesser wounds that required a day or two off to recover. Several other
individuals joined the company for the day: ARVN Sergeant Mau who was serving as an
interpreter, advisor, and acting as a forward observer for the company’s mortar platoon;
Battalion Chaplain Don Just; Specialist Don Mousseau, a member of the Cu Chi based public
information office (but who had previously been a member of Company A); and a scout dog with
its handler and accompanying military police lieutenant.

The situation with respect to arms and equipment remained closer to the norm. All of the
rifle platoons fielded their three squads, one per track. Every man carried either a M-16A1 or M-
79 grenade launcher (the gunners carrying spare rounds in a medic’s kit bag). That morning the
company fielded 14 tracks. Each of the three platoons fielded three basic M-113s (one per
squad) plus two for the command group. The company commander and the medics also used
generic versions. The weapons platoon fielded three M-125 mortar carriers. These were a
specialized variant of the standard M-113, each carrying one 81 mm. mortar. At the official full
strength each of the mortar squads consisted of six soldiers: four men firing the mortar in
addition to the track commander and a driver.

The order of march put the 1st Platoon in the lead, followed immediately by the 3d
Platoon. The 2d Platoon and the mortars of the Weapons Platoon trailed behind, with the
command group sitting in the middle. That piece consisted of First Lieutenant Snodgrass’
command M-113 and the M-113 designated this day to serve as the armed “angel track” which
shadowed the commander’s throughout the action. The later carried a driver and commander
plus senior medic Specialist Fifth Class Jerry Rudlaff and all of the company’s medical supplies
beyond the amount each medic carried in his kit bag. It was also kept almost empty in order to
carry wounded or injured men. As the action started it already held two brand-new soldiers
suffering from heat exhaustion. The only platoon medic who took part in the day’s mission was
Specialist Fourth Class Garry ‘Doc’ Young from the 3d Platoon.

From the time that the Company C “broke wire” at 6:40 A.M. its initial route took it
across the Saigon River on the short strip of Highway 239 running westward from the main gate.

Lieutenant Martin’s composite force came next in three M-113s. Reconnaissance platoon
reinforced by the 3d Brigade CRIP’s dismounts left Dau Tieng base camp at 6:58, allowing time
for Lieutenant Snodgrass to establish his combat formation. The Duster linked up at 7:20.
Unlike Company C, reconnaissance remained on Highway 239. This took it through a unique
pair of right-angle turns before settling down to the direct route west to Tay Ninh. The first turn
went left (south) and the second back to the west. That short stretch was one of the riskiest parts
of its route and on the preceding day some scattered fire came from the north side in its vicinity.
 Chapter 6: Getting Into Position

“Negative contact”
Tactical Operations Center Staff Journal, 21 August 1968

Almost immediately Company C turned left (south) along LTL 19. Barely a trail it ran
roughly parallel to the winding Saigon River and on its west side to a short stretch of Highway
239. The path taken had the advantage of having no threat from the river letting it focus
attention on the front of the column and its right flank where it skirted the treeline. The new
route would keep it in a position to rotate west in time for it to get into the proper alignment.
Lieutenant Martin’s composite force when he turned west on 239 placing it parallel to the route
that C would take. It would keep the two about a kilometer apart, just as planned.

As he had started to move Lieutenant Snodgrass arrayed his men and armored personnel
carriers in his habitual “Snodgrass Box” formation that took full advantage of the company’s
frontal and flank firepower while compensating for the M-113’s vulnerable sides. Two of his
rifle platoons (in this case the 1st and 2d) deployed on line and moved with a gap between
themselves. Most men of each platoon moved on foot in two columns with the tracks following
30 meters behind in positions from which to deliver heavy weapons fire with the .50 cal.
machine guns. Concerns for avoiding fratricide required those men to get out of the way by
creating clear lanes with each squad opening a gap between themselves and the adjacent squad.
The van of each leading platoon was only two men 15 meters ahead. Given the terrain that the
company was traversing that distance didn’t pose a risk because each of the four platoon
columns stretched 75 meters. Flank security consisted of three men moving about 20 meters on
the platoon’s open flank and the rear security consisting of four men 25 meters behind the APCs.

The rear of the box employed the 2d Platoon as a reserve that enabled it to move up in
support of either of the lead platoons or to be able to take a position on either flank. This was an
example of the flexibility that marked the best units participating in the war and took advantage
of the maneuverability of mechanized units that let a commander move heavy firepower rapidly.
The fourth corner consisted of the platoon manning the company’s 81 mm. mortars. The
Weapons Platoon did not accompany the rest of the platoons in every mission, but the
commander anticipated that he might need them on this day. The gunners moved on foot like the
riflemen and, with help from 2d Platoon, maintained two-man flank and four-man rear security.
In a further protective act the company put several men 30 meters further out than the flankers.
MOVEMENT SOUTH
 On this movement the two rear corners were combined. Smaller single columns of
dismounts bracketed their tracks which were arrayed in a cruciform. The center stretched 100
meters from front to rear with the three mortar carriers leading and one of 2d Platoon’s M-113s
at the rear. One other 2d Platoon squad formed each of the arms.

In one way or another Lieutenant Snodgrass’ dispositions would give ample warning
before the main body of the company could be attacked. He would not be ambushed like
General Braddock had been during the French and Indian War or Custer had been at the Little
Bighorn.

Just after 8 A.M. both Lieutenant Martin and Lieutenant Snodgrass reported “negative
contact.” So far, so good for both the sweeping and for starting the reconnaissance in force
‘push.’ As an additional precaution the company did not go southward in a straight line but
instead shifted back and forth to prevent being predictable which would be giving an unseen
enemy a chance to carry out an ambush. It turned out not to be a threat since the 33rd Regiment
had still had a long way to go to reach the eventual battlefield.

The company had a further unusual, security element. A scout dog from either the 44th
Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) with its handler and the M.P. lieutenant in command of the “team”
moved on the center line of the box. They formed the point some 45 meters in front of the
platoon columns. This decision paid off at 8:31 when the dog alerted to the southwest. The
handler informed Lieutenant Snodgrass and after a discussion interpreted the dog’s action as an
indicator that there might be a large enemy force to the west. Major Wood, flying overhead in
the OH-23 Raven9 command and control helicopter came down and flew over the suspicious area
at low level but saw nothing out of the ordinary. As result of these careful procedures the
conclusion that everyone reached was that the dog must have detected the inhabitants of a village
that was scheduled to be inspected by Lieutenant Martin. Nevertheless, with an abundance of
caution, Lieutenant Snodgrass told his forward observer, First Lieutenant Steve Ranney to have
his mortars conduct a small reconnaissance by fire to his front. It produced no response.

The next incident came at 9:06 when soldiers serving in the security elements saw two
armed men 200 meters away, running southward. The 3d Platoon fired a few rounds at them but
appeared to have no effect as they disappeared into the treeline without returning fire. Coupled

9
This aircraft had entered the inventory in 1948 and had a distinctive ‘bubble’ shape that
produced an excellent field of vision. This particular one came from Company B, 25th Aviation
Battalion.
with the fact that the scout dog had alerted to a potential enemy towards the west-northwest
Lieutenant Snodgrass discussed the dog’s behavior with the M.P. lieutenant. They agreed that it
was possible that the dog in fact had indicated the village that Lieutenant Martin was
approaching. Lieutenant Snodgrass continued advancing with the company on high alert and
ready to go into action when necessary.

Eight minutes later the company found and destroyed a buried mine with a pressure plate
trigger. No harm done but it confirmed that moving with all deliberate speed was the proper
choice. Lieutenant Snodgrass did, however, adjust his route a hundred meters further to the west
and off the LTL 19 path just to be safe.

Once he judged that they had moved the required kilometer, Lieutenant Snodgrass
pivoted his formation to the right, retaining the box formation. He was taking an advantage of a
large open area that gave him the time and space to re-align the men and vehicles and that was
bisected by another faint east-west path. The dog team and the 1st (right) and 3d (left) Platoons
retained their relative positions. The reserve and mortars shifted slightly and were now
following roughly behind the 3d Platoon.

While the turn was taking place Lieutenant Martin reported seeing a red star cluster that
appeared to have come from the second village that he needed to clear. In and of itself it would
have had minimal significance but given that the Bobcats now needed to carry out a movement
to contact trying to locate a force of unknown size it did raise the possibility of trouble.

Like their brothers on the highway the larger company moved deliberately, at a slow
speed, trying to ensure that they missed nothing. This had the additional benefit of partly
avoiding heat injuries or booby traps, the later made more likely by virtue of the large mine.
Since the field was covered with tall grass, the search went slowly. Other than the company
spotting the two men and that star cluster nothing happened for two hours. The company did not
know what the later signified since it was in the distance, but the men became even more alert.
 Chapter 7: It Begins

“We continued our missions. You went out each day and put
one foot in front of the other.”
First Lieutenant Gary Martin

Company C executed a 90° turn to the west and entered a very large open area bisected by a
minor trail running in that direction. As the pivot progressed it remained deployed with the 1st
Platoon on the right, the 3d Platoon on the left, and the scout dog in the center. A task far more
difficult than it looks on paper. First Lieutenant Arthur Cook had command of the 3d which was
somewhat larger and utilizing the “angel track” as a fourth maneuver vehicle. The 1st Platoon
was commanded on this day by Sergeant First Class Mainor David Lang, Jr., the platoon
sergeant but serving this day as the platoon leader; he was arguably the most experienced soldier
in the company. Lieutenant Snodgrass with his two radio operators (RTOs) and his Fire Support
Officer, First Lieutenant Steve Ranney moved on foot between the two platoons, the best
position for exercising command and control. He shifted back and forth rather than taking a
direct line for that very reason.

The first step that the company had to take was making it across the open field and
securing a foothold in the treeline. From there it could either swing north to come to the
reconnaissance task force or push on into the rubber plantation proper. Private First Class Paul
Moir remembers that by 9:30 every man in the company had his safety off. Lieutenant
Snodgrass continued to proceed with all deliberate speed, allowing the 2d Platoon and mortars to
complete their wheel and slide more to their left to follow the 3d more than just remaining
centered in the rear. Movement westward took the company through a wide area of tall grass
and into the first significant position from which he would be able to cover the Reconnaissance
Platoon’s open southern flank. Thanks to its training and experience the company had no trouble
maintaining its formation throughout. From there the men on foot and APCs in overwatch
started moving toward the suspected enemy force that the company was trying to find. Its
assigned mission.

At precisely 11:10 the company began receiving isolated sniper fire: some coming from
the south and but more from ahead. The lieutenant’s first contact report said that he had taken
casualties: one man killed and two wounded. Opposition gunfire spread down the line being
formed as the dismounts deployed out of their columns. This in turn caused the lieutenant to
make his first call for gunship support and for artillery fire (whichever responded first would
dictate how rapidly the company could move). In any event the speed picked up as the front line
needed to get safely into the treeline.

The man killed at the start of the engagement was Sergeant Lang who had positioned
himself at the right (north) end of the 1st Platoon’s firing line where he apparently felt that he
could be more effective in maneuvering his men, identifying a threat before it could endanger his
men, and by leading from the front. The wounded man was his radio operator. Losing those two
specific men at the very beginning of the fight left the company unable to contact the platoon
other than by having the lieutenant yell instructions. It finally came back up on the company
radio net. The nearest squad had moved forward, recovered Sergeant Lang’s body and brought
back the wounded man and his radio. Before Lang went forward he had brought up the 3d
Squad’s M-113 to a position furnishing him covering fire. Private First Class Gary Robertson,
the driver, turned it 30° to the right and went a few meters further; he had just stopped when the
sniper killed the staff sergeant.

Fortunately, the company was not alone. Major Robert Wood still monitored the
battalion’s two forces from the OH-23 helicopter and used the battalion radio net to keep
himself, the tactical operations center (TOC), and both lieutenants in constant radio
communications. This situation gave the Bobcats a major advantage over their enemies. The
33rd NVA Regiment operated under the Soviet-style system in which requests worked their way
up the chain of command and then back down in the same process. For a fast-moving tactical
situation that system left the commander in contact at a real disadvantage. The practical
implication for the confrontation enabled the Americans to ‘think faster’ whereas the NVA had
an imperative to follow out a plan regardless of how quickly the junior officer discovered that it
was not working.

This morning Wood concentrated on trying to obtain gunships and airstrikes, taking that
burden off of Lieutenant Snodgrass’ shoulders. The second officer on board was First
Lieutenant Humphries, the battalion’s fire support officer, who would be responsible for relaying
the company’s requests and adjusting artillery fires. Half-way through the day’s mission the
helicopter would return to Dau Tieng to refuel and Major Wood would exchange places with
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, tacking control of the battalion’s operations center while the
colonel assumed the aerial responsibility. Rotation ensured that fresh eyes were in place
throughout nearly the entire contact.

The company commander kept informed of the 2d Platoon’s path, edging it over into the
rear of 3d Platoon with the exception that the right column of dismounts who still remained on
the north side of the faint trail. He particularly wanted to be sure that the mortar squads
remained protected in the cross formation and that the flankers and rear security would be able to
provide early warning if the enemy found a way to either slip around the company’s flank or the
more probable case where another force attacked them directly.

The main body reached the treeline without difficulty or drawing undue fire at about
10:12 A.M. Dismounts, now forming a line with a minimal flank guards, pushed forward while
the tracks stopped behind them. After only a few dozen meters the firing line emerged into an
open area 50-100 meters wide; the point was already across and some 40 kilometers into the
rubber. It contained a north-south trail running down from the first village on the highway
(Lieutenant Martin’s initial objective). This was a significant pathway partially screened by two-
to three-foot grasses and undergrowth. The dismounts continued still further forward into the
trees on the far side that marked the edge of the rubber plantation in this sector and formed a
rough arc with the point (dog team) furthest forward.
MOVEMENT WEST
 Chapter 8: The Long Fight

“The next one and a half hours were to be some of the bitterest
fighting recorded in the annals of the Army”
Recommendation for the Presidential Unit Citation (Army)

As the gunfire spread from the right flank of the 1st Platoon (now commanded by
Sergeant Thomas Frame) along the line until reaching the left flank of the 3d, the search phase of
the engagement ended, and it became a full-fledged pitched battle. Within the first 15 minutes
the simple exchange of gunfire began increasing in volume as both sides attempted to achieve
fire superiority; that swung progressively in the enemy’s favor as more and more of his men
entered the fight. What had started as sniper fire had now become a massive automatic weapons
and RPG bombardment that many thought was worse than any other firefight in 1968. The
initial position that the company created reflected the nature of the advance: the scout dog
penetrated the deepest in the very center with the squads on either side extending outward with
decreasing depth. The mounting fire slowly pushed the center backwards until the curve was
very mild.

Fifteen minutes later the front line on both sides of the battlefield were throwing
everything that they had at each other. The enemy’s weapons now included a cloud of RPGs, 57
mm. recoilless rifles, machine guns, and even 82 mm. mortars firing from hidden positions. To
say that the enemy fire, became “heavy” is to fail completely to transmit an image of the reality
playing out.

The Bobcats held their initial ground for about 10 minutes using small arms, M-79
grenade launchers, and M-60 7.62 mm. machine guns. Needing the immediate—and
responsive—fire support that only his 81 mm. mortars could provide, the company commander
ordered that platoon to fall back to a clearing where it could fire without overhead obstructions.
Employing the .50 cal. machine guns was a bit tricky since they were still firing over the heads
of their own men. Enemy pressure kept increasing and it was starting to look like soldiers, by
now clearly identified as NVA regulars wearing clean green uniforms, were rapidly advancing
from rubber tree to rubber tree in short rushes. The most dangerous of them were trying to work
their way around the 1st Platoon’s right side which had already lost its original leader (command
passed to Sergeant Tom Frame). The lieutenant countered by slowly giving ground, pulling the
firing line back to the edge of the trail. This made the depth of the arc very slight. He also had
the M-113s pull forward to the edge of the north-south opening to bring the company’s heavy
firepower, the .50-cal. machineguns, to where they could start joining the fight effectively.10
Because of the risk of fratricide, he pulled the dismounts back to their line and into the positions
between the platoons’ APCs. These moves created a solid front to counter what was clearly an
enemy attempt to crush the Americans by running right over them. Ten minutes in it triggered
Lieutenant Snodgrass to make his first request for gunship support to Major Wood.

Lieutenant Snodgrass saw that the enemy was attempting to work its way around both
flanks and allowed the platoons’ leaders begin to refuse their flanks to deal with the new danger.
On the left of the company Lieutenant Cook not only fought bitterly to his front, he became
increasingly concerned that his own flank was threatened by slow but steady evidence that the
NVA were quietly swinging wide to attack from the left and even worse getting around into his
rear and beginning to isolate the company. Like the 20th Maine in the battle of Gettysburg11 he
began to swing the left squad backwards to minimize that risk. The immediate action involved
pivoting the left-most M-113 to use its firepower directly on an estimated company rushing
forward out of the southwest. Even then he had to worry about a second enemy force moving
west behind the attack looked that it might be able to get all the way into the company rear—a
catastrophic blow.

On the right the situation was even worse given that it was dealing with the transition in
leadership caused by Staff Sergeant Lang’s death. The 1st Squad lost the last of its commanders
quickly but held itself together. Almost at once in the rightmost squad, the 3d, the machine gun
broke causing the gunner and driver to dismount and join the firing line on foot. Private
Robertson, the driver, first tried to fire a LAW but it wouldn’t function, so he picked up a rifle
which the gunner (Specialist Fourth Class Gerald Dutmers) did as well. Together they took up a
position behind a giant termite hill and fought on foot until it was time to pull the track out of the
front line. That was a bit tricky as Robertson never heard the order to fall back and did so only
when he realized that the others had gone. He turned the APC and spotted several members of
the 2d Squad, so he stopped and loaded them onboard. Just as he was starting up again he was
hit by an RPG that tipped the track over onto its right side. Seeing three soldiers with AK-47
rifles were approaching he yelled for someone in the rear of the vehicle to throw a smoke
grenade. Instead he tossed a CS gas grenade, adding to the normal confusion of a firefight.

10
One of the armored personnel carriers had left its machine gun behind to be repaired and was
using an M-60 as a replacement.
11
Depicted in Ted Turner’ Battle of Gettysburg movie based on Michael Schaara’s Killer
Angles. The role of the regimental commander who performed the difficult maneuver was
played by Jeff Daniels.
 While the men on the firing line all along the front executed their difficult withdrawal
across the open area and took up positions with the squads between the tracks. It was done in a
way that retained their positions relative to each other and to the NVA. The immediate concern
was for the 1st Platoon which was taking a pounding and in danger of being outflanked by a
significant force sliding through the kilometer-wide gap between it and the Reconnaissance
Platoon. To counter the immediate issue Lieutenant Snodgrass shifted 2d Platoon over to that
side of the formation but left it about 100-150 meters behind the 1st’s right effectively protecting
them from being outflanked. During this phase of the engagement NVA automatic weapons and
small arms fire had risen to such a volume that it was starting to suppress the company’s firing
line. It held in place for a half-hour while still looking for the gunships.12

Many participants commented on three features of the heart of the battle: the sound of
the .50-cal. machine guns was constant; the battlefield had patches of smoke, probably the use of
yellow and purple smoke grenades (vision was also impeded by dust and dirt that blew upward);
and that they never saw, before or since, that many RPGs. Heavy RPG fire in and of itself is
proof that the opposition was fully armed and equipped and therefore (along with the green
uniforms) NVA regulars.

During this phase of the battle the mechanized infantry’s enhanced capabilities were
clear. The heavy machine guns were much more powerful than anything in non-mechanized
rifle companies and as each man started running low on ammunition he could swiftly replenish it
from the large stockpile in each squad’s vehicle. It also allowed the men to bring the M-72
LAWs into the fight partially matching the RPGs.

Once again, the pressure built up on the engaged platoons by about 11:50. He had
already lost all three of the 3d Platoon’s APCs to short range RPG fire although to some small
measure they continued to be a presence on the battlefield. The situation forced the commander
to consider and then order another withdrawal of up to 150 meters which was carried out in a
very orderly and controlled manner resulting “stopped the enemy envelopment on the north
flank.” It was at this point that Specialist Fourth Class Michael R. Mangan was last seen
standing on top of his track swinging his rifle at several NVA soldiers who were trying to climb
up. He was reduced to an M-16 as he had already exhausted his 50 cal. and M-60 ammunition.
He was also in the process of coordinating his mortars’ fire to concentrate on the front and right
front where the danger was the greatest. In describing the situation Lieutenant Snodgrass
summarized it simply: “We were in dire need for assistance since we were being outgunned.”
The situation was becoming so intense that he was contemplating having everyone button up in

12
There were more engagements taking place than there were fire teams available.
the tracks and calling in overhead bursts on his own position, but Lieutenant Ranney told him
that it would take too long to get a clearance and there were just too many damn RPGs.

To many members of the company who were wounded multiple times the rule of thumb
was that anything that didn’t knock you to the ground was by definition minor. Once the medics
ran out of supplies they specifically they concentrated on stopping the bleeding, warding off
shock, and keeping the men’s morale up. The lightly wounded kept going thanks to adrenalin
and some were able to return to the fight and man the machine guns. Severely wounded or killed
men had sucking chest wounds and head wounds and were knocked completely out of the fight
but still needed to be moved to the informal collection point.

During this period, variously estimated by the participants as lasting at its most intense
level anywhere between 20 and 45 minutes,13 the American artillery ceased firing because they
considered that the bursts would be too close to American soldiers. Just as it has for many
centuries this instance infuriates troop commanders in combat; the man on the ground feels that
someone far away should not second-guess the man actually in the fight. And just as often the
artilleryman knows that checking fire may well save more lives. To some small degree this was
mitigated by the weapons platoon’s mortars controlled directly by the company. These were
now in the right rear of the company and safely away from a direct attack and were firing as fast
as they could load the rounds. Medic Jerry Rudlaff remembered that the fire sounded like
snapping limbs off trees.

13
Survivors’ impressions of the full length of the battle say that it lasted about an hour.
 Additional information about this day is contained in the recommendation for the
Presidential Unit Citation (Army) prepared by Lieutenant Colonel William E. Kline after he
replace the badly wounded Lieutenant Colonel Anderson. It sounds inflated to many who were
not there but is rock solid truth: “One mechanized infantry company was locked in battle with
an enemy regiment.” Not quite the full regiment but two of its three battalions with some
specialists attached. The training of that unit was clearly excellent enabling the NVA to use fire
and maneuver twice when attempting to turn the flanks and with virtual human wave attacks on
1st Battalion’s front.
 Chapter 9: Field of Fire

“prevented reinforcement by a battalion-sized enemy unit”

Presidential Unit Citation, Department of the Army General
Orders 82, 9 December 1969

Neither element of the mission moved alone. Overhead in a venerable UH-23 were two
critical officers. Major Robert Wood was the battalion’s S-3 (operations officer) whose primary
job was to perform aerial surveillance from the benefit of a larger and better field of vision. He
was assisted by the battalion forward observer, First Lieutenant Humphries, who was responsible
for ensuring that supporting artillery fire was both timely and appropriate. He also monitored
company fire support officers when they were in contact to ensure that their requests could be
passed on to the supporting battery (or batteries) with accurate coordinates and to help “walk in”
the rounds.

Carrying out the task of overhead command and control of the battlefield is difficult. Not
only are there technical issues such as maintaining an absolute awareness of his own position
relative to the unit in contact, the helicopter needed to be constantly in motion to minimize the
risk of being shot down. In one respect during the war in Vietnam many senior officers
committed an arch sin by stepping all over the guy on the ground who was trying to do his job.
It was even worse when still more senior officers came on station and now began doing the same
thing; at times even a division commander would add himself into the mix. Not only did such
confusion lead to unforced errors, it totally demoralized the company grade officers who were in
the fight. On August 21, 1968 the Bobcats enjoyed the full support that they needed without the
potential pitfall. Neither the 1st Brigade commander Colonel Duquesne A. Wolf; the assistant
division commander Brigadier General Glen C. Long; nor Major General Ellis W. Williamson
tried to teach Lieutenants Snodgrass and Martin “how to suck eggs.”

There was a second aircraft overhead. A forward air controller from the Air Force’s 19th
Tactical Air Support Squadron in Cu Chi flying O-1 Bird Dogs. He (due to limited loitering time
several different individuals performed the function during the course of this battle) did the
critically important job of bringing in the fighter-bombers and ensuring that they flew in a way
that did not risk hitting our own men. They would do so for a period stretching from noon until
3 P.M.
 Lieutenant Martin’s team had a basic mission to perform on the 21st—one that it had
been doing for a very long time. Basic does not mean safe. While monitoring Charlie
Company’s progress he swept Highway 239 moving west towards Tay Ninh. He knew of a
potential threat sitting on his right—the 33rd Regiment whom he had fought for the three
previous days. But on this day, the first looking for an enemy south of the highway, he had to
keep his head on a swivel. The Reconnaissance team had orders to pay particular attention to
two small roadside villages that behaved suspiciously during the conduct the previous day. At
9:13 A. M. the team entered the first of them.

Clearing meant that his men also needed to move with deliberate speed. They were
searching for mines in their way, whether pressure or command detonated, to eliminate the
primary threat to the movement of convoys. But Martin also had responsibility to watch out for
possible ambush sites in the treeline on both sides of the road. Both types of searching required
that the men moved on foot using the standard formation with columns on both flanks of the
vehicles. These consisted of his own set of three M-113A1s, two jeeps mounting powerful 106
mm. recoilless rifles, and the attached Duster aligned in that order. Martin’s small number of
dismounts required that as many men as possible dedicated to careful and comprehensive
searching of every structure along the way. That is, everyone in the platoon aside from the
drivers, track commanders, gunners, the lieutenant, his radio operator, and medic Specialist
Fourth Class Eustevio Alvarado.

At 9:13 A.M. the Reconnaissance Platoon task force reached the first of the two villages
and began searching it. Although it took some time they reached the southern edge of it before
finding any evidence of VC/NVA activity. Searching hooches was one of the 3d Brigade CRIP’s
particular tasks so they were naturally more suspicious and hence moved slower than the
reconnaissance scouts. At the far end of the village There the 3d Brigade CRIP uncovered
several buildings that had been used as billets and, more significantly, a hootch that had served
as a classroom teaching something highly significant to the 1st Battalion. The instructional
materials were still on its walls and featured a picture showing how to attack a vehicle with two
antennae. That meant that their headquarters was absorbing the lessons from August 19th and
was teaching its units how to seek out and destroy command and control tanks or APCs. Once
the search of the three buildings finished the CRIP set about destroying them.

During the search process the 106-mm. recoilless rifles took up a position short of the
village but from which it had a clear field of fire to engage anyone trying to enter or leave it on
The
the north. The tracks and Duster hung back in primary overwatch from which they could
maneuver with ease in the event that their great firepower needed to be brought to bear. Nothing
untoward was happening on Highway 239 for nearly another hour. At 10:12 the scouts saw a red
star cluster signal flare near their village. It was also seen by Company C. Neither element
knew what it meant. Finding out was the responsibility of Lieutenant Martin.

His clear field of vision enabled him to see a very large group of men attempting to
overwhelm the north end of Company C’s position. They were coming out of the north
woodlands forming the tip of the plantation. They were well-disciplined and moved in a
compact formation. Although that is the way to move fastest while keeping control of a
formation on this day it was fatal. All of the long-range weapons had a field day decimating that
company, especially after the Duster moved onto the front of the task force’s left flank and
continued blasting all of the way the southern treeline to take out stragglers (it fired over 300
high explosive rounds). The survivors either turned back almost immediately or reached safety
in dribs and drabs. In either case that reinforced company was no longer “in the game.”
 Chapter 10: The Second Line14

“it was the first time my position was compromised by the enemy”
Paul Moir

Intense pressure—almost reaching hand to hand combat—came from what would

subsequently be discovered to be at least two of the 33rd NVA Regiment’s three battalions
reinforced by part of another manning heavy machine guns. The hail of RPGs had continued to
grow to a point that it almost made no difference to duck. Although the M-113’s were facing the
fire and therefore presented the smallest targets the sheer volume including those using a
crossfire technique began to overwhelm the line and had already knocked out all three of 3d
Platoon’s in place on the first line. While serving on this second defensive line three more were
taken out partly due to being struck on the side as they were trying to turn and withdraw.

1st Platoon had been able to extricate its three APCs as did both the command track and
“Little Angel.” All fell back to the left end of the 2d Platoon and formed up to create the
designated second line position. The 2d remained in place as the right flank of the company,
having two tracks engage the frontal attack coming out of the west. The last vehicle also
remained in its position as the company’s extreme right. The NVA had moved a force into the
kilometer-wide gap between the company and reconnaissance task force that threatened to get
into the company’s rear. Unfortunately for them the force turned too soon and came directly
toward the main line. They missed the fact that there was that other APC lined up specifically to
counter such a move. When it opened up it effectively ended the danger on the north.

By the time that everyone had gotten into place 75 meters behind the 2d Platoon’s
covering fire the company had two of the remaining eight M-113s south of the faint trail and five
on the north, in each case with the refused flank vehicle. The command track was in place along
the northern edge of the trail and behind the firing line. It and the “angel” vehicle came under
heavy fire just as the line began falling back. Lieutenant Snodgrass’ track as the more forward
took the brunt of that exposure. After being in action for a while it was struck by what was
probably several RPGs hitting its engine compartment and permanently immobilized it.

14
When written out the fighting here seems to be a cut and dry chess match. Anyone
there knows that it masks the blood and tears and a day in which eighteen men died while
virtually everyone in a small company displayed conspicuous bravery and professional skill.
 Lieutenant Snodgrass was standing alongside it with Ranney and both of his radio
operators (one for the company net and the other for the battalion net), Sergeant Mau who was
acting as the forward observer for the 81 mm. mortars, and his driver when an RPG hit,
effectively knocking out the company headquarters. It killed Mau, the driver, and both of the
radio operators while wounding the two lieutenants. Snodgrass had tried to call in artillery fire
but his forward observer First Lieutenant Steve Ranney and both radiomen were wounded and
out of action taking away any chance to send that message and quite frankly the airspace was too
congested to get clearance for that shelling. He had just kneeled down to try to get a radio off
one of the RTOs when he suddenly realized that his arm came over his back and landed in front
of him.

The medics’ APC had no special equipment or Red Cross markings so it remained in
action as a fighting element. However, when Jerry Rudlaff saw Lieutenant Snodgrass get
wounded he left his protection to run forward to begin treatment. As he arrived the lieutenant
was still on the radio directing the fight. Rudlaff saw that his hand was so mangled that he had
lost his fingers.

Amazingly the commander had started to get up again when the very heavy RPG fire
knocked out two nearby vehicles. Roy Bressler hastily bandaged him up, preserving the arm, but
the company commander continued to lose blood and finally realized that it was time to call
Lieutenant Cook over from his platoon and turn over command of the company to him. Once the
change of command was completed the former commander had to be loaded into a track carrying
casualties back to the relative safety behind the 2d Platoon’s firing line.

Cook quickly familiarized himself with the company’s full situation and proceeded to
establish the new line in a way that temporarily relieved the pressure on both flanks—although
not to the front. Even as the company continued to give up terrain grudgingly he knew that he
had lost three tracks, and that many men were dead or wounded. The 1st Platoon had no leaders
left but 2d Platoon and the mortars were only lightly engaged yet. It was clear that the 1st and 3d
Platoons needed to get back as rapidly as possible. Like Snodgrass earlier, Cook had no radio so
he began shouting instructions over the din of the battle. His command was simple: put every
wounded man into the tracks and then have the ones still able to fight jump on as well allowing
the vehicles to move as fast as possible to the rear. A process that needed ten minutes. The two
lieutenants had reached the same conclusions about what was happening and how to save the
unit. Now Cook gave the order for everyone to fall back to the Mortar Platoon and establish a
perimeter while 2d Platoon covered the withdrawal.
Individual riflemen or small groups moved independently but with purpose coming back to the
new location and brought the wounded with them. In fact, one of the constants throughout the
battle was the excellent care and planning for anticipated casualties. As a man went down he
was taken to a central point from which he could be loaded into tracks as necessary. The two
medics dealt with the problem of mounting casualties in the same way and had about the same
experiences. Once their medic’s kit bags ran out they focused on applying tourniquets and
improvised using anything available. By this time one piece of medical news was positive. The
two “newbies” who had been heat casualties probably hadn’t thought that anything was unusual
since this was their first firefight and promptly picked up their rifles and ran forward to join the
firing line.

The NVA, on their part, kept pressing harder and harder on the front of the formation
with at least a full battalion directly assaulting just four squads while sending multiple companies
to attack from the flanks. They botched the attack on the north and went too deep on the south
allowing the company to engage them far enough outward that it left just a minimal threat and
even then, the NVA would be coming into the range of the rest of the southern part of the
American formation.

By now it was past noon and the fight—best categorized as a very pitched battle—had
been going on for nearly an hour. The fact that one company had been able to sustain itself at
such a high tempo for so long furnishes a true example of the advantage that mechanized infantry
held over their dismounted comrades. Thanks to having armored personnel carriers a
mechanized unit could load vastly larger amounts of ammunition of all varieties and bring it onto
the battlefield under fire. Foot soldiers limited to the dozen or so M-16 magazines engaged in
this intensity of combat would have run out in perhaps ten minutes.

When the first light fire team of two UH-1D armed Hueys reported on station at one
minute after noon Company C was still in the heart of a situation that later generations of
American soldiers would call an example of “fighting outnumbered and winning.” The gunships
brought to the fight an ability to lay down heavy fire at a shorter distance than the fighter-
bombers were cleared to hit.15

While starting to withdraw Lieutenant Cook could see enemy soldiers climbing all over
the first three tracks, the ones from his platoon, that had been knocked out. As the withdrawal
was in progress the officers on the ground and in the air believed that it had lost six armored
personnel carriers and perhaps that as many as 15 soldiers had been killed and 21 wounded in

15
At the same time the battalion placed Company B on alert for possible reinforcement; as it
turned out they were never deployed.
action—losing a man nearly every two minutes. If that hemorrhage did not stop the handful who
remained were doomed. He was dropping slowly to the rear while still fighting hard to cover the
rear even though only a few M-113s were left fully mission capable. Conducting a fighting
withdrawal at any time or in any place is extremely difficult; doing so while engaged in close
combat with a much larger enemy is among the most difficult tactical maneuvers. It requires
maintaining the cohesion of the firing line and at the same time avoiding the natural instinct to
run. It is particularly valuable to have a unit where the men have such faith in each other and in
their leaders along with the natural leadership that steps up when a superior falls.

The new commanding officer had the formation drop back a final 100 meters and
establish a rough perimeter with men taking up their positions as they arrived rather than trying
to preserve platoon and squad organization. They were covered the whole way by the 2d
Platoon. Curiously the enemy fire waned and no one seemed to be chasing the Americans.

The story unfolded differently for the reinforced Reconnaissance Platoon. As the size of the
NVA force that fully engaged Company C grew, Lieutenant Martin’s team now had both of its
flanks exposed. That situation required him to withdraw for its own safety. He had an easy time
due to the intimidating firepower. That was heavy enough to hold back the newer NVA
formation slowly emerging in the distance and it had already neutralized the force that tried to
cross Highway 239 in order to attack Company C’s flank. Lieutenant Martin had followed the
company’s situation on the battalion radio net as it moved to the rear. Now it was time to
completely break contact and take the highway to link up with Lieutenant Cook. They
rendezvoused in a clearing after the wounded were extracted by 159th Medical Detachment dust
off helicopters. Lieutenant Martin credited the intimidating Duster fire as an important factor in
his platoon task force’s easy movement.
 Chapter 11: Dustoff

“Abe get out of here, I’ve had it and there is no need for you
to die here also, now get.”
Roy Young’s last words

At this point in the battle Lieutenant Cook ordered Company C to conduct its third
controlled withdrawal—still maintaining unit integrity. The 2d Platoon laid down the covering
fire while the remainder of the company pulled back some 500 meters toward LTL 19. It
stopped at an open area that could be used as a landing zone—just as the box formation
anticipated. The men came back in small groups or as individuals while the eight surviving M-
113s backed out and then spun to head towards the rendezvous.

During this whole movement the .50 cal. machine gunners provided overhead cover.
They held an advantage more valuable now than at any earlier moment during the fight. The
drivers were left free to just drive while the men firing them were at least eight or nine feet above
the ground, able to see over obstacles and specially to observe movement by the riflemen as they
came back and to watch for any NVA soldiers trying to catch up. It is also important to
understand that the dismounts and tracks worked together as always, each contributing to the
overall success of the disengagement process.

The wounded had been being moved during the fighting to a central collection point
covered by armored personnel carriers in anticipation that it might become necessary to leave in
a hurry. Now that prior planning paid dividends because all of the wounded were loaded swiftly
onto the armored personnel carriers all of whom had their rear hatches already open. In this way
they left no man behind.

Once back in the open area—that is, the area without trees but covered in grass that
reached six feet tall in places—the company formed a rally point with the M-113s that men on
foot could identify and, as they say, “move to the sound of the [machine] guns.” When they
came in the men and eight remaining tracks established a rough perimeter and prepared to fend
off another NVA wave attack. One that never came.
 Meanwhile the medics organized the wounded for extraction. A hasty triage easily
identified the worst cases to load first. The 159th Medical Detachment’s Hueys came in one at a
time until everyone, other than the walking wounded, but including Sergeant Lang’s body, were
lifted out and taken to the 12th Evacuation Hospital at Cu Chi. Based on the intensity of the
battle brigade had several aircraft on stand by and therefore able to reach the landing zone almost
as soon as the company was ready for them.

Note that this was a controlled withdrawal. It was most emphatically not a disorganized
retreat caused by the enemy’s overwhelming attack that destroyed the Americans’ will to fight as
some have alleged. The newly-formed perimeter was fully prepared to resume fighting had they
been pushed. To the surprise of most soldiers they were not even pursued. Instead the 33rd
NVA Regiment decided that it had enough for one day and broke contact. It was encouraged to
do so by the covering artillery fire and especially by several air strikes that dropped napalm as
well as conventional high explosive bombs.

The negative version of this battle blaming Company C with suffering a defeat is
surprising since the it has appeared in print multiple times. The details in this account were
clearly laid out in the actual records and after-action reports written for internal Army use that
are now in the National Archives. This creates a mystery: why the difference? The answer is
that history tends to enshrine factual mistakes because the writers do not have the time to poke
too deeply into a small engagement like that on the 21st. Thus, when one account stated that
within the first hour “almost every officer in the two lead platoons, including the company
commander, died” leaving only a second lieutenant unhurt that became the story line. Of course,
this is pure nonsense. There were only two officers on the front line and neither Lieutenants
Snodgrass (the commander) nor Cook were killed. Oh yes, the company did not have a second
lieutenant with them.

After the last medevac departed the company regrouped and started back to Dau Tieng
following in reverse the same Route LTL 19 trail that they had used when moving south in the
morning. During this period Lieutenant Martin’s reconnaissance force easily broke its contact
and moved to a rendezvous point. The NVA chose not to pursue. Recon then escorted Company
C back to Dau Tieng where the lightly wounded received treatment in the battalion aid station.

As soon as the tracks pulled into the company area everyone’s thoughts turned to the 17
missing men (including Sergeant Mau). Survivors and the men who had been held back began
preparing to go right back out and recover them. To everyone’s surprise they were stopped and
told that the battlefield was still too “hot.” One possible explanation lay with the critically low
level of ammunition remaining even as the Charlie Company soldiers were restocking as fast as
possible. Later that evening Sergeant Tom Frame began circulating through the company getting
signatures recommending Rex for the Medal of Honor.

That night the survivors talked to each other about what had transpired, starting the
process of achieving closure. A process that continues half a century later. And a process that is
not helped by the true story remaining lost to the public. For example one survivor recognized
how important the continuity of superior leadership had been: “If it wasn’t for Art Cook, none of
us would be here today.” Others noted that Reconnaissance’s force guaranteed that nothing
within multiple kilometers would get close enough to ever be a threat.

Junior soldiers rarely know either the ‘big picture’ or the degree of support that they had
actually received. They were too busy fighting, and besides no one ever passed down such data.
Nor do they often know who to thank for furnishing support such as the Air Force’s forward air
controllers of the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron in their O-1 “Bird Dogs.” Statistics are
universally forgotten. No one without access to some of the more arcane documents could
remember that the action in the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation included 14 separate air strikes, or
that the several artillery batteries that contributed during the day fired 1,094 rounds.
 Chapter 12: The Following Days

“Craters of the Moon”

The name given to track after being hit on the 21st, reflecting
the scars caused by RPGs.

The PAVN official histories skip over the 21st to a large extent and instead highlight the
5th Division’s actions for the remainder of the month. “To build on this tide of victory” during
the night of 22-23 August 2nd Battalion, 33rd Regiment attacked a concentration of U.S. military
vehicles and destroyed 60 military vehicles, shot down four aircraft, and “eliminated hundreds of
enemy troops from the field of battle.” Another battalion participated in a 275th Regiment
ambush along Route 22, killing or wounding 300 Americans, destroying 141 vehicles (including
34 tanks and armored personnel carriers), and shooting down six helicopters.

On the American side the 25th Infantry Division began moving elements of the 2d
Brigade northward. On the 21st while the intense fighting was taking place in the Ben Cui
plantation Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery arrived at Dau Tieng from Cu Chi specifically to
increase the fire support available for the Bobcats.

On August 22d the 1st Battalion passed to the operational control of the 2d Brigade
whose 1st and 2d battalions of the 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) flowed into Dau Tieng to provide
more dismounted manpower. This did not have much immediate impact on the battalion’s line
companies. 2d Brigade’s first act opened FSB Schofield on August 22d when it arrived at Dau
Tieng and had been opened by the 2d Brigade as it assumed control at Dau Tieng. This position
was between the Ben Cui and Michelin plantations at Cau Khoi. The initial force stationed there
included two batteries of 105 mm. howitzers (Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and Battery
C, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery); three companies of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry (A, B, and
D); and Troop A, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. By devoting that additional strength devoted to the
August fighting the division recognized that the enemy’s push was strictly local and therefore
positioning a blocking position separating the 33d Regiment from the 275th Regiment (before
the later shifted west replacing the spent 33d).

The 22d August missions for Companies B and C and the Reconnaissance Platoon had
already been laid on—continuing the now-normal daily routine. However, in a very unusual
step, Major General Ellis Williamson granted permission for the Dau Tieng force to fire artillery
at both villages that had been partially searched the day before. In an equally unusual step at
9:24 the Republic of Vietnam District Office passed on intelligence that the 33d Regiment’s
people who had fought Company C had pulled back and furthermore gave specific grid
coordinates for their location.

The Reconnaissance Platoon task force went out at 7:15 A.M. to conduct the normal
sweep of Highway 239 and then to work on Highway 19. It was followed by Company B
reinforced with a platoon of tanks from Company A, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Then Company
C pushed south with a part of the Wolfhounds trailing. The plan was to have all of the
components sweep west to the abandoned airstrip on the far side of Dau Tieng.

It was B’s turn in the “rotation” to act as the battalion’s primary maneuver element. As
expected it ran into a strong force of unknown size that intelligence believed contained part of
the 33rd Regiment. The enemy opened fire at 9:28 just west of the junction of Routes 19 and
239 using his RPGs and automatic weapons fire. A mistake. The company responded in kind
but also called in a heavy volume of support from artillery, gunships, and fixed wing aircraft all
of whom had been alerted that the contact would be intense. Higher headquarters released
multiple gunships for the fight along with placing Dustoff on standby; just over an hour later
Company B was still receiving heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire and the attached cavalry
element had lost two men with an unknown number of wounded as well. This fighting lifted at
ten minutes to 11 but Bravo continued to pursue the enemy until it reached Company C.
Thereafter the battle passed to gunships and aircraft took over the fighting. Company C and the
Reconnaissance task force linked up with the reinforced Company B at noon and an hour later
one Duster and one Quad .50 entered the fray. Back and forth sweeping recovered the body of
one of the two missing men. Finally, all elements fell back to the airstrip and sent out ambush
patrols.

Today furnishes one significant example of “lesson-learning” in the 1st Battalion.

Company B faced the possibility of being overrun several times. By “Using the controlled
withdrawal technique employed by Company C the previous day” it was able to consolidate its
elements and fend off the multiple attacks by a much larger enemy force. In fact, thinking
aggressively let it counterpunch when the opportunity arose.

The following day, the 23d, companies B and C carried out the sweeping mission,
leaving the Reconnaissance Platoon to maintain the perimeter at the airfield. Around 11 A.M.
Company C found about 100 bunkers with evidence that they had been used recently; they were
too extensive for the company to destroy and shortly thereafter it recovered the body of the other
man missing the day before. Almost immediately the brigade gave Company B the mission of
returning to Dau Tieng and wait there for a convoy which they were to escort toward Tay Ninh;
at the midpoint they would pass it off to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Organizationally with 2d
Brigade now present in strength the various detached pieces returned to their proper units.
Company A returned from its service with the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23d Infantry, and
Troop A returned to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

August 23d had special meaning for Company C. Volunteers went back to the battlefield
with a graves registration team to recover the 17 dead and to deal with the enemy bodies who
had also been left by their people. At 10:51 the group reached the August 21st battlefield. Then
the strangest order came to the battalion at 11:25 A.M., August 23d. 2d Brigade ordered
Company C to secure a landing zone for brigade and division personnel “who wish to check out
the area of missing in action. Instruct C Company not to move or touch a thing in that area.”
Eight minutes later the company reported that the battlefield was secure. At 1:30 Company C
reported that it had located the bodies of 14 men that had been carried as missing in action and
an hour later the company commander confirmed that, counting the one found on the 22d the
complete listing of men missing in action had been confirmed to be dead. The second half of the
mission was processing the NVA soldiers’ bodies that hadn’t been secured by the 33rd. Between
those men lying where they fell and several that were in hasty graves the company had 182
bodies by actual count, not as an estimate. The presence of blood trails indicated that the true
number was probably higher.

The remaining few days in the fighting over the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation seemed an
anticlimax. Routine patrols, convoy security assignments, and no excitement.
 Chapter 13: End of the Third Offensive

“the battle to the borders of South Vietnam and beyond”

General Donn Starry

The 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry played an impressive role in

defeating the enemy push in the second half of August in and around the Ben Cui Rubber
Plantation. It would do so once more when the NVA tried again in September. Almost single-
handedly the Bobcats pounded the 33rd NVA Regiment so intensely that by the end of August it
effectively left the war. Once it reached the sanctuaries it played only a minor role in military
operations in Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces until 1972 when the Americans ended their
part in the war.

The best way to recognize that the Third Offensive was a disaster is to compare the
official accounts on both sides and see which comes closest to “ground truth.”

The official People’s Army of Vietnam histories covering these few days is very hard to
reconcile with the hard evidence of battle. For example, they claim that on 19 August they killed
over 100 men on the spot and destroyed 47 vehicles including 33 M-41 tanks and M-113
armored personnel carriers—a total higher than the number of available tracked vehicles. And,
without identifying the locale, on the 21st the 33d Regiment killed “many” and shot down two
helicopters. Their version of Company B’s action on the 22d identifies the 5th (275th) Regiment
plus a battalion each from the 88th and 33d Regiments carrying out a major ambush, but on
Highway 22 not Highway 239.
.
They claim that their third wave of attacks was indeed part of the General Offensive-
General Uprisings that began with Tet and Mini-Tet. Elsewhere they also state that the decision
not to make a large attack on Saigon in the Third Offensive but instead to shift the primary focus
to the Tay Ninh area was a decision that was correct and appropriate to the situation at that time.
It led to killing large numbers of enemy troops while suffering only small losses.

The VC/NVA forces resumed high-tempo attacks in September. Comparing that period
with the August surge shows that the fighting around Tay Ninh was once again the target,
including spending more resources on cutting the other main supply routes. Route 26 had major
attacks on September 16th (174th Regiment) while on that night and those of the 17th and 18th
the 33rd Regiment plus the 275th conducted four attacks along Route 22.

The action more relevant to the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry came on September 16th as
well when the 275th Regiment of the 5th Division attacked “Ben Cui Base” (FSB Schofield).
On September 17th the 275th Regiment attacked Ben Cui a second time. One day later, the 18th,
the regiment conducted the third, a follow-up attack against the enemy force at Ben Cui,
“eliminating almost 400 enemy troops from the field of battle and destroying or damaging 100
enemy vehicles and nine artillery pieces belonging to the forces holding the U.S.-puppet long-
range outer defensive perimeter protecting Saigon.”

There remained five instances where the Bobcats continued their fighting within five
kilometers of Dau Tieng. On September 3d Companies A and C had a contact in the Ben Cui
just three kilometers away. While only one soldier was killed, 34 were wounded. Eight days
later the same two companies had another fight five kilometer away that resulted in three men
killed and another 20 wounded. Other engagements took place between September 16th and
20th during the last days of the “Third Offensive.” Company A fought only four kilometers
southwest of Dau Tieng twice, 16 and 20 September, each time having five of its soldiers
wounded. B’s contact was only another kilometer away but in that one two men were killed and
14 wounded

The changes between August’s and September’s enemy surges marked a shift in the
approaches towards the convoys, especially those of the 25th Infantry Division which took a
different approach that would subsequently adopted by the entire army forces in Vietnam.
Instead of the sweep-and-outpost approach with small escorts a convoy route had strongpoints
from which rescue forces could be dispatched and beefing up the in-convoy combat power.
Procedures required that an attacked convoy’s leading serials push forward to get out of the kill
zone and those behind the actual ambush reverse and get clear. The engaged sections would
consolidate and establish a perimeter to hold until relief arrived. The tactical change obviously
had an impact on the mechanized battalions who could move the fastest.

Once again, the 5th Division’s official history said that September was a string of “clear-
cut victories.” Apparently, they consider that they have achieved a victory if they avoid
catastrophic losses and therefore never mention their own losses.

The more generalized People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) official histories of the war
give a very different account than American records. Skipping over the debilitating events of
August they explained the early September lull as a time when they adjusted their formations for
further operations. The terminology glosses over the fact that changes were forced on them to
relieve major combat units and feed in fresh troops. They attempted to hide this activity by
conducting “interim operations.”

Their “review of the results achieved” after 43 days and nights of continuous fighting
during the “Tay Ninh-Binh Long Campaign” (from August 17th to September 28th, 1968),
COSVN’s main force 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions and the soldiers and civilians of Tay Ninh and
Binh Long had fought a total of 315 battles (including 53 battalion-sized battles and 16
regimental-sized battles). An even more extravagant exaggeration stated that 13 battalions and
55 companies were driven from the field of battle, of which they had inflicted heavy losses on
seven battalions of the U.S. 1st and 25th Mechanized Infantry Divisions and on a number of
units of the puppet army’s strategic reserve force as well as on many local CIDG (Civilian
Irregular Defense Groups) and Regional Force companies. Critics of the American performance
in the war often consider our statistics to be exaggerated. In point of fact we made every effort
possible to be accurate including refusing to count dead soldiers unless they were physically
confirmed. By the PAVN’s arithmetic they had eliminated 18,406 men; destroyed 1,507 military
vehicles, 112 aircraft, and 107 artillery pieces; and captured a total of 282 weapons. While we
saw that the three enemy divisions were basically pounded into hamburger and chased back into
their sanctuaries in COSVN’s version their main force troops supposedly reached a new level of
maturity and now could attack and destroy enemy battalion-sized units. Heaping further praise
on Tay Ninh and Binh Long local force troops made even less sense as they were more or less
insignificant even before the offensive started.

One of the changes instituted by the 2d Brigade as it assumed control at Dau Tieng
created Fire Support Base Schofield in a position between the Ben Cui and Michelin plantations
at Cau Khoi. The initial force stationed there on August 22d included two batteries of 105 mm.
howitzers (Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and Battery C, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery);
three companies of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry (A, B, and D); and Troop A, 3d Squadron, 4th
Cavalry. The strength represented a sizeable block separating the 33d Regiment from the 275th
Regiment (before the later shifted west replacing the spent 33d).

The nearly spotless American defense suffered one significant setback when a convoy of
89 vehicles left Long Binh to deliver supplies to Tay Ninh on August 25th. Ten kilometers
southeast of its destination the 88th NVA Regiment staged a highly successful ambush that
stretched for two kilometers. Although the route did not come within the Bobcat’s area of
responsibility the propaganda value increased the risk to everyone fighting in the province. The
last engagement of the August part of the Third Offensive came on August 27th. It was a last
gasp by the 275th VC/NVA Regiment who made another unsuccessful attempt to hit FSB
Rawlins.16

In the September phase the still-fresh 275th Regiment of the 5th NVA Division received
another mission—to gain control over the Route 26 segment of the Tay Ninh main supply route;
once again the COSVN attempt to carve out a base area for a future attack on Saigon failed.

When the NVA spent its last reserves in September 1968 it ended their ability to mount
further large-scale offensives until 1975. That met the definition of success that had been set for
the 25th Infantry Division overall and the 1st Brigade in particular. The Americans were
outnumbered but enjoyed the advantages of speed in maneuvering, firepower, and a will to win
whereas the enemy displayed a fatal flaw in his attacks. Once he made a plan and positioned his
assets Soviet-style centralized control effectively eliminated any hope of making changes; no
matter how inappropriate, he pressed forward until losses mounted to the point that he was
forced to break off contact.

On April 30th, 1971 the 1st Battalion (Mechanized) 5th Infantry, the Bobcats, left
Vietnam and transferred its colors back to Fort Schofield.

16
It was a fresh entrant into the Tay Ninh-Dau Tieng fighting and would replace the combat
ineffective 33rd Regiment in September as the primary opponent of the 1st Battalion.
 Conclusion

Victory or defeat?

Historians and members of the public inevitably want to know in which category this
battle in the rubber plantation belongs. Did the company get chased back to Dau Tieng or did
they defeat the enemy force estimated as two battalions of the 33rd North Vietnamese Regiment?
The correct answer has nothing to do with who held the battleground as darkness fell. It is all
about which side completed its assigned mission. The NVA regulars were attempting to cut the
Route 239 line of communications to Tay Ninh and the surrounding fire support bases, and
destroy any significant American force. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division working with Army
of the Republic of Vietnam forces held their ground and inflicted far heavier losses than they
suffered. In fact, they had the same outcome throughout the Third Offensive.

Specifically, how did the Bobcats do? For starters it is important to realize that for
American soldiers being professional is not a matter of carrying an RA serial number—it is an
attitude. Receive a mission. Carry out that mission effectively while taking minimum losses and
imposing greater losses on the enemy. This is what professionals do. They do not defile the
enemy dead but instead show respect. In August the 33rd Regiment joined the 1st Battalion in
doing so.

On the 21st Company C drew a mission that had two components. They were testing the
possibility, or rather probably, the enemy had moved larger than normal units to operate south of
the highway. Fighting on the last three days confirmed that a large element had dug in on the
north side. At the same time the company and reconnaissance team were protecting each other’s
flank. Clearing and holding that road open had been the battalion’s mission since well before the
21st. Sweeping toward Tay Ninh to keep the eastern end of Highway 239 open to allow convoys
to reach Tay Ninh was a daily task, rotating between the elements: Companies A, B, and C, and
the Reconnaissance Platoon. Late in the day on the 18th Company A was detached by the
brigade and sent to help at Tay Ninh. Fortunately, the battalion Reconnaissance Platoon received
several attachments: the 3d Brigade’s Combined Reconnaissance and Intelligence Platoon and
two 40-mm. “Dusters” from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery to partially offset the small number of
soldiers by using massive firepower.

Both elements contacted a much stronger opponent than they expected. It is confirmed in
the PAVN official history as consisting of two battalions of the 33d Regiment plus the D24 Anti-
Aircraft Battalion making it the equivalent of a full regiment. Bobcats continued to advance
until the volume of fire led Lieutenant Snodgrass to form a firing line that continued to hold firm
in the face of a massive counterattack that many called several human wave attacks. It became a
matter of physical numbers. They had severely pummeled a force as much as eight times their
size but couldn’t hold its ground when the numbers of dead and wounded mounted to a critical
level, and while facing envelopment on both ends. Only then did the company fall back.
Meanwhile the reinforced Reconnaissance Platoon shredded an estimated probable reinforce
company or even two companies. Once again a case of Bobcats handling a much larger element
of the 33d Regiment.

Neither Company C nor the reconnaissance task force was ambushed, an incorrect
statement made by historians and endlessly repeated. In all probability the mistake traces back to
considering it a “tiny” fight not worthy of actually examining the rich array of source materials
available. That is not a mistake made by anyone who survived.

Ambush has a very specific meaning. According to the dictionary ambush means “a trap
in which concealed persons lie in wait to attack by surprise.” Lieutenant Martin initiated his
contact by engaging the force trying to cross the highway and attack the company’s flank.
Company C also reacted first to a sniper before the leading numbers of NVA soldiers moved into
range. That is called a meeting engagement and doesn’t in any way imply defeat. Both elements
extricated themselves, denying Hanoi a major propaganda triumph. And both accomplished the
mission of destroying large enemy forces despite having 18 men killed (counting Sergeant Mau)
and between 46 and 50 others wounded. In fact, after the August surge ended the terribly
battered 33d North Vietnamese Regiment left Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces for the
sanctuaries in Cambodia, never again to return to the fighting as a complete unit. The Bobcats
would face another regiment from the 5th North Vietnamese Army Division, the 275th, in the
September surge, handing it in a similar outcome.

Did the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division have a
fundamental mission for which it was designed to accomplish? Yes. It “closed with the enemy
by fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close
combat, and counterattack.”

Well, did they win? They carried out their mission, so the answer is yes.

Without the slightest doubt.

 “The Memorial Service at Dau Tieng”

On 1 September 1968, I conducted the memorial service for our fallen at our base
camp. We were still the only maneuver battalion at Dau Tieng, so with guards posted the
battalion assembled in formation around a large Soldier’s Cross—32 rifles with fixed
bayonets inverted into the ground. After posting the colors, I approached each rifle where
someone who knew the fallen soldier would hand me his helmet. I would then place the
helmet on the butt of the rifle. Afterward I made my comments, ever mindful of both the
heroism of all participants and the high cost in human lives lost in The Battle of Ben Cui.
This was indeed one of the most difficult days of my life, but as recounted later there was
yet another sad and related day yet to come.

Seven days later I turned 40 years of age, and in doing so truly became “The Old
Man” of both the traditional commander’s title and in chronological fact. This milestone
reminded me that I was twice as old as the average battalion soldier, who I had already
come to think of as my younger brothers.”

General Anderson

THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY)17

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I have today awarded
THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (ARMY)
FOR EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM
TO THE
1ST BATTALIOION (MECHANIZED), 5TH INFANTRY
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
AND THE FOLLOWING ATTACHED UNITS:
1ST PLATOON, TROOP A, 3D SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY
38TH INFANTRY PLATOON (SCOUT DOG)

17
Announced in Department of the Army General Orders 82, 9 December 1969. The
accompanying streamer on the battalion distinguishing flag is embroidered BEN CUI.
 3D PLATOON, COMPANY A, 65TH ENGINEER BATTALION
1ST PLATOON, BATTERY B, 5TH BATTALION (AUTOMATIC WEAPONS) (SELF
PROPELLED), 2D ARTILLERY
5TH SECTION (-), BATTERY D, 7TH ARTILLERY
44TH INFANTRY PLATOON (SCOU DOG)
BATTERY A (-), 7TH BATTALION, 11TH ARTILLERY

The 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division and its attached
units distinguished themselves by extraordinary heroism in combat operations against
numerically superior enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam from 18 August to 20 September
1968. During the period, the 1st Battalion Task Force, through reconnaissance in force, ambush,
counterambush and reaction missions, effectively destroyed a regimental size enemy force and
prevented the enemy from seizing the initiative in its “third offensive.” The officers and men of
the Task Force displayed outstanding bravery, high morale and exemplary esprit de corps in
fierce hand-to-hand combat and counteroffensive action against well disciplined, heavily armed
and entrenched enemy forces. An example of the outstanding bravery and aggressiveness
occurred on 21 August during a reconnaissance in force mission. The lead elements of Company
C, 1st Battalion came under heavy mortar, rifle propelled grenade, machinegun and automatic
weapon fires. The company deployed against the enemy forces while the scout platoon protected
the company flank and prevented reinforcement by a battalion sized enemy unit. Through
skillful use of close supporting fires from artillery, helicopter gunships, and tactical air, the
officers and men of the Task Force repulsed ‘human wave’ counterattacks and defeated a
numerically superior enemy force, which left one hundred and eighty-two dead on the battlefield.
The individual acts of gallantry, the teamwork and the aggressiveness by the officers and men of
the 1st Battalion Task Force continued throughout the period of prolonged combat operations,
resulting in the resounding defeat of enemy forces in their operational area. The heroic efforts,
extraordinary bravery and professional competence displayed by the men of the 1st Battalion, 5th
Infantry and attached units are in the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great
credit upon themselves, their units and the Armed Forces of the United States.
(s) Richard Nixon
 MEDAL OF HONOR
Marvin R. Young
Rank and organization: Staff Sergeant, U.S. Army, Company C, 1st Battalion, (Mechanized), 5th
Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. Place and date: Near Ben Cui, Republic of Vietnam, 21 August
1968.
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and
beyond the call of duty. S/Sgt. Young distinguished himself at the cost of his life while serving
as a squad leader with Company C. While conducting a reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of
Ben Cui, Company C was suddenly engaged by an estimated regimental-size force of the North
Vietnamese Army. During the initial volley of fire the point element of the 1st Platoon was
pinned down, sustaining several casualties, and the acting platoon leader was killed. S/Sgt.
Young unhesitatingly assumed command of the platoon and immediately began to organize and
deploy his men into a defensive position in order to repel the attacking force. As a human wave
attack advanced on S/Sgt. Young’s platoon, he moved from position to position, encouraging and
directing fire on the hostile insurgents while exposing himself to the hail of enemy bullets. After
receiving orders to withdraw to a better defensive position, he remained behind to provide
covering fire for the withdrawal. Observing that a small element of the point squad was unable to
extract itself from its position, and completely disregarding his personal safety, S/Sgt. Young
began moving toward their position, firing as he maneuvered. When halfway to their position he
sustained a critical head injury, yet he continued his mission and ordered the element to
withdraw. Remaining with the squad as it fought its way to the rear, he was twice seriously
wounded in the arm and leg. Although his leg was badly shattered, S/Sgt. Young refused
assistance that would have slowed the retreat of his comrades, and he ordered them to continue
their withdrawal while he provided protective covering fire. With indomitable courage and
heroic self-sacrifice, he continued his self-assigned mission until the enemy force engulfed his
position. By his gallantry at the cost of his life are in the highest traditions of the military service,
S/Sgt. Young has reflected great credit upon himself, his unit, and the U.S. Army.

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Michael R. Mangan
For extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations involving conflict with
an armed hostile force in the Republic of Vietnam: Specialist Four Mangan distinguished
himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 21 August 1968 while serving with a mechanized
infantry company combating a large enemy force in the Ben Cui rubber plantation. The
communists began a human wave assault. Specialist Mangan maneuvered his armored personnel
carrier into a position from which it could deliver the most effective firepower and began firing
his light anti-tank weapon into the charging enemy. Constantly exposed to the intense hostile
fusillade, he continued firing until ordered to withdraw. As he maneuvered his assault vehicle
into a defensive position, it was struck by an enemy rocket, which caused it to burst into
flames. Specialist Mangan again exposed himself to the communists’ barrage to extinguish the
fire and was wounded in the arm. The vehicle was then struck by a mortar round. Finding the
carrier inoperative, he ran to another assault vehicle to assist its machine gunner in delivering
suppressive fire on the enemy. When the gunner had expended his ammunition, Specialist
Mangan ran through a hail of bullets to obtain a resupply from his demobilized track. As he
climbed into the vehicle it was struck by a rocket, knocking him to the ground. Struggling to his
feet, he picked up the vital ammunition and returned it to the machine gunner’s position. While
handing the resupply to his comrade, he was mortally wounded. Specialist Four Mangan’s
extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty, at the cost of his life, were in keeping with the
highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit upon himself, his unit and the
United States Army.18

SOME GAVE ALL

THE WALL Panel 47W
Staff Sergeant Mainor David Lang, Jr.
Staff Sergeant Marvin Rex Young
Corporal James Lee Bowden
Corporal Edward Vincent Coffee
Corporal James Lavern Harbottle
Specialist Fourth Class Jerry West Combest
Specialist Fourth Class Michael Robert Mangan
Private First Class Bruce Eugene Bartlett
Private First Class Jesus Colon-Rivera
Private First Class Richard A. Damschen, Jr.
Private First Class Gary Lee Dobbins
Private First Class David Wayne Ledbetter
Private First Class Hubert William Martin
Private First Class James Edward Rush, Jr.
Private First Class Delbert Ray Stogsdill
Private First Class Edward James Dull
Private First Class Jesus Rivera

18
Announced in United States Army Vietnam General Orders 5006, 29 October 1968.
Silver Star, Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, Purple Heart
 Vietnam Campaign Ribbon*, Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal,
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm,

*Campaign Service Star for participation in each campaign

 FURTHER READINGS

UNITED STATES ARMY IN VIETNAM SERIES

Dorland, Peter; and James S. Nanney. Dust Off: Army Aeromedical Evacuation in Vietnam.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982.

MacGarrigle, George L. Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to

October 1967. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998.

Villard, Eric B. Combat Operations: Staying the Course October 1967 to September 1968.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 2018

CHIEF OF STAFF MONOGRAPH SERIES

Dunn, Carroll H. Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965-1970. Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1972.

Hay, John H. Tactical and Materiel Innovations in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Department of
the Army, 1974.

Ott, David E. Field Artillery, 1954–1973. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1975.

Rogers, Bernard William. Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point (1973) Washington,
D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973.

Spurgeon, Neel. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965-1970. Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1973.
Starry, Donn A. Mounted Combat in Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,
1978.

INDOCHINA MONOGRAPHS SERIES

Lung, Hoang Ngoc. The General Offensives of 1968–1969. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1981.