The Dialectic of Kant and Hegel: Metaphilosophy and Metaphysics

James Kreines
jkreines@cmc.edu

I am still at the stage of a draft written very loosely as the basis for spoken presentation. For
written work that forms the background to this new work, click here for Reason in the
World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal.

ABSTRACT: Kant criticizes metaphysics; Hegel promises to turn Kant’s own arguments to the purpose of defending
metaphysics. Of course, there are many possible definitions of the term “metaphysics,” and in some senses Kant is
not criticizing it; in others, Hegel is not defending it. But Hegel is taking issue with Kant, and
we should not seek to paper over the conflict, but rather to learn from it. The conflict fixes a privileged notion of
metaphysics over which they do disagree; this is what I will call “the metaphysics of reason.” I argue that the
philosophical terrain underlying this conflict is surprising: If we look at Kant from Hegel’s point of view, this does not
prejudice matters against him; it brings out some otherwise hidden strengths in Kant’s critique of metaphysics in the
“Transcendental Dialectic” of the first Critique. And, similarly, if we then look back at Hegel from the point of view of
Kant’s Dialectic—if we look at Hegel as seeking to construct a dialectical form of metaphysics—we can see that
Hegel is in a position that is stronger than has been recognized. Both have arguments that can reach across a
conflict extending all the way to the metaphilosophical topic of what philosophy itself should be about. And even today
both fans and foes of metaphysics can still learn from engagement with this dialectic of Kant and Hegel.