CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

CIVIL LAW
Dean Ed Vincent S. Albano

1. ***
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

1. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas [G.R. No. 186571 : August 11,

2010 | BRION, J.]

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.

Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose
or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse. (Art 15 in relation to Art 17)

The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
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the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no

longer married to the Filipino spouse (Republic v.
Orbecido). To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be
just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his
or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera).

2. ***
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect

to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(10a)

1. Quita vs. CA and Dandan [G.R. No. 124862. December

22, 1998. | BELLOSILLO, J.]

Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner

was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. The trial court found that
both were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954
in California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.
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[SC] deduced that the finding on their citizenship pertained

solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at
the time of their divorce x x x Once proved that she was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.

b. Llorente v. CA and Llorente [G.R. No. 124371. November

23, 2000. | PARDO, J.]

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The

"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It
can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no
showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
for or required by New York State law. The hasty application
of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will,
already probated as duly executed in accordance with the
formalities of Philippine law is fatal.

c. IN RE: In The Matter Of The Petition To Approve The

Will Of Ruperta Palaganas v. Palaganas [G.R. No. 169144 :
January 26, 2011 | ABAD, J.]

ISSUE: May a will executed by a foreigner abroad be

probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed?

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by

foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
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3. ***
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or

consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and

those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. (11a)

1. United Airlines, Inc. v. CA [G.R. No. 124110. April 20,

2001. | KAPUNAN, J.]

According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, as a

general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or
entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,
obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the
rule even though the place where the contract was made is
different from the place where it is to be performed, and
particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of
performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply
the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued,
when the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline.

4.

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently

causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
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Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

1. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr (G.R. No. 179736, June 26,

2013 | DEL CASTILLO, J.)

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a

Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents’
installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’
property and a revolving camera covering a significant
portion of the same property constitutes a violation of
petitioners’ right to privacy.

ISSUE: Is there a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy?

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code x x x protects an individual’s

right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses
that may be committed against him by other individuals. This
provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where
his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by
others x x x an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public
or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or
even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy x x x
petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear
violation of their right to privacy.

b. California Clothing, Inc v. Quiñones (G.R. No.175822,

October 23, 2013 | PERALTA, J.)

Petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication

between the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous
issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the
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amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was

missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who
failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their
right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or
not and collect from her if she did not.

ISSUE: Did the petitioner exercise their right to verify the

payment made by the respondent in good faith?

The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is

a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19, a

person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good
faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with
intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of
mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking
an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious
and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity.

c. Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide (G.R. No. 161921, July

17, 2013 | PERALTA, J.)

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted

by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.

Corollarilly, Article 20 x x x speaks of the general sanctions

of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
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provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is

thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy
for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

d. Pe vs. Pe (G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962| BAUTISTA

ANGELO, J.)

The claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that

defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with
Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.The
circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was
he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him x x x
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her x x x he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21.

e. Velayo vs. Shell Company [G.R. No. L-7817. October 31,

1956. | FELIX, J.]

Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that

insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the
creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner
of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and
believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such
understanding as it was really the case — schemed and
effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United
States, where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and
unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said
insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that
was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane.

5. *
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided
it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
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(29a)

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb.
However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

1. Continental Steel Mfg Corp v. Voluntary Arbitrator

Montaño [G.R. NO. 182836 : October 13, 2009 | CHICO-
NAZARIO, J.]

Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality

only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality
is extinguished by death.The rights to bereavement leave and
other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latter's death x x x while
the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not

synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death x x x the unborn child can be
considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines a dependent as "one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the
power or aid of someone else." The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes
the unborn fetus in the mother's womb.

FAMILY CODE
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6. ***
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites
are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
(53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a,
55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall

render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards

not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38,
may contract marriage. (54a)

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered
with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the
written authority granted by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in
Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
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assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,

likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in
Article 10. (56a)

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. (109a)

Art. 26. (supra)

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage shall not prescribe.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked

for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

1. Niñal v. Bayadog [G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000. |

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.]

The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the

State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a
basic "autonomous social institution" Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social
institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and case
law considers it not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."

However there are several instances recognized by the Civil

Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale
why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
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concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons

outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the
family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

x x x what nature of cohabitation is contemplated x x x

to warrant the counting of the five year period in order
to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license x x x that five-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate
the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day
of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise x x x the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse x x x
It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to
the local civil registrar.

b. Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot [G.R. NO. 175581 : March 28,

2008 | CHICO-NAZARIO, J.]

ISSUE: Is the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,

where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum
five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license? YES.
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x x x the contracting parties shall state the requisite

facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official x x x who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps
to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to
the marriage.

The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living

together barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage. The falsity of the affidavit executed by Jose
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question x x x it cannot be denied
that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the
law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate
the legal measures set forth in our laws.

x x x the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating

to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without
force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

c. *** Republic v. Albios (G.R. No. 198780, October 16,

2013 | MENDOZA, J.)

ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of

acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent? NO.

“LIMITED PURPOSE” MARRIAGES are marriages where a

couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire
specific benefits. A common limited purpose marriage is one
entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another is
for immigration purposes.
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The CA’s assailed decision was grounded on the parties’

supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

A MARRIAGE IN JEST is a pretended marriage, legal in form

but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. Marriages
in jest are void ab initio for a complete absence of consent.

Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in

order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly
present.

The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no

real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other
than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all
the essential and formal requisites precribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be

considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be
valid and subsisting.

d. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas [supra]

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e. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr (G.R. No. 201061, July 03,

2013 | CARPIO, J.)

ISSUE: May a marriage be declared null and void ab initio

and non-existent at the same time? YES.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized

without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where
no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In
this case, the marriage x x x was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that the purported Marriage License did
not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar. The case clearly falls under x x x marriage
void ab initio. The marriage was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts (Article 1409,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, herein
marriage is null and void ab initio and non-existent.

f. Garcia v. Recio (G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001 |

PANGANIBAN, J.)

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory

decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is
in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under
some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted
on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a

restriction that reads: “A party to a marriage who marries
again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.” x x x the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted x x
x Hence x x x no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
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restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity

of evidence on this matter.

g. Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 |

CARPIO, J.)

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects

the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity
of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a

marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know
the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who
is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.

7. ****
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
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For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

1. Republic v. Cantor (G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

| BRION, J.)

ISSUE: Is there a well–founded belief that respondent's

husband is already dead?

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are (4) essential

requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
 That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
 That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
 That the present spouse has a well–founded belief
that the absentee is dead; and
 That the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.

x x x the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was

the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one) x x x criteria for determining
the existence of a “well–founded belief” under Article 41 x x
x respondent merely engaged in a “passive search” where
she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in–laws,
neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search
because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well–
founded belief that her husband was already dead x x x
whether or not the spouse present acted on a well–founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent

spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the
present spouse.

8. *
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of
the following grounds:

(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act
complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of
the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal
separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of
legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.

Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other,
but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right
to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with
the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this
Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse
shall be revoked by operation of law.

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority

shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

9. **
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements
may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the
marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and
136.

Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage

settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial
separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient
cause. (190a)

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause

for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided
for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated
in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial
separation of property. (191a)

Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the
court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their
common properties.

All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal

partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse,
shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The
court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

with pecuniary interest. (191a)

1. Partosa- Jo v. CA [G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992. |

CRUZ, J.]

Article 128 of the Family Code provides that the aggrieved

spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these
grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without
just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or
her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said
spouse does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies
a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to
return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one’s family
although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of
marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation. The physical separation of the parties,
coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment
as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under
Article 135 of the Family Code

The order of judicial separation of the properties in

question is based on the finding of both the trial and
respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed their
real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided
between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they
were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses
half and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen,
the division must include such properties properly belonging
to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in
the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law.

10. **
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage. (133a)
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

1. Agapay v. Palang [G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997 |

ROMERO, J.]

Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the

prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union.

b. Arcaba v. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael (G.R. No.

146683. November 22, 2001 | MENDOZA, J.)

x x x cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a

woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man
and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as
such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together,
even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of
common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of
illegitimate children.

x x x since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and

Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very
least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife. Respondents having
proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the
donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void
under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

11. **
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or

by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor
repairs, upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the
family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-
improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall
be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the
debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to be groundless.

If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing

liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing

liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties. (161a)

1. Ayala Investment & Development Corp vs. CA (G.R. No.

118305 February 12, 1998 | MARTINEZ, J.)

ISSUE: Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract

entered into by the husband in favor of his employer redounds
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership? NO.

(A) where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of

the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given

to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the

conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish
benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did

not require the signature of the wife and the husband signed
alone does not mean that being a surety became part of his
profession. Neither could he be presumed to have acted for
the conjugal partnership. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the
Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the
family. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

12.

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community

property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal

partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

availed of within five years from the date of the contract

implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

1. Flores vs. Lindo, Jr [G.R. No. 183984, April 13 : 2011 |

CARPIO, J.]

Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide

that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other spouse. Any
disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall
be void. However, both provisions also state that "the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors."

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage were executed October 1995. The Special Power of
Attorney was executed November 1995. The execution of
the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract
between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage a valid contract.

Petitioner still has a remedy under the law x x x a mortgage-

creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the
mortgage x x x the remedies are alternative and not
cumulative.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

13. **
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and
the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated. (223a)

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living
in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for
legal support. (226a)

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.

Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (238a)

Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)

1. Spouses De Mesa vs. Spouses Acero [G.R. No. 185064 :

January 16, 2012 | REYES, J.]
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for

purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized
as follows:

First, family residences constructed BEFORE the effectivity

of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to
be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed AFTER the effectivity

of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically
deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or

extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.

The family home’s exemption from execution must be

set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction x x x petitioners should have
asserted the subject property being a family home and its
being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or
within a reasonable time thereafter. For all intents and
purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert
their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to
assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family
Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners
to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period
and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status
of the subject property as a family home.

b. Manacop v. CA [G.R. No. 104875. November 13, 1992. |

MELO, J.]
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

ISSUE: Is the family home of petitioner exempt from

execution of the money judgment aforecited? NO.

The exemption provided in Article 155 is effective from the

time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts
so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In
the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner
was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home
by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code.
It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity
of the Family Code. It does not mean that Articles 152 and
153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions x x x have a retroactive effect.

The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment

arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident
(1976) and the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered (January 1988). Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.

c. Arriola v. Arriola [G.R. NO. 177703 - January 28, 2008 |

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.]

Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the

family home not just to the dwelling structure in which
the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands.
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as
the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the

same as a family residence 20 years back.

Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate

partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This
signifies that even if the family home has passed by
succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been
willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the
family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual
co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the
rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the
family home. Set against the foregoing rules, the family
home - - consisting of the subject house and lot on
which it stands - - cannot be partitioned at this time,
even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs,
the parties herein.

d. Joseph v Mendoza ???

14. *
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,

the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial

insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence. (255a)
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

1. Concepcion v. CA [G.R. NO. 123450 : August 31, 2005 |

CORONA, J.]

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.

Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is
conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. Article 167 provides that the child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. The law requires that every reasonable
presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.

Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right

of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning, he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union

in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b)
of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The
presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by
the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate

status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law,
the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He
is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother,
full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an
illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under
the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim
support only from a more limited group and his legitime is
only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. Moreover
(without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against
him), in the eyes of society, a 'bastard' is usually regarded as
bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo

favors his interest.

15. **
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in

Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

1. Roces v. The Local Civil Registrar Of Manila [G.R. No.

L-10598. February 14, 1958. CONCEPCION, J.]

Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make of record the

paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate
child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is
incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.

b. Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. CA (G.R. No. 118464

December 21, 1998 | BELLOSILLO, J.)

x x x filiation of ligitimate children shall be proved by any

other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,
in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of
such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's filiation may

be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible
in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of
proving filiation may also be utilized x x x

The baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private

respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to
be the legal custodians of the parish records and are
authorized to issue true copies, in the form of certificates, of
the entries contained therein. It may be argued that baptismal
certificates are evidence only of the administration of the
sacrament, but in this case, there were (4) baptismal
certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that
xxx had the same set of parents, as indicated therein.
Corroborated by the undisputed testimony x x x such
baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to
prove filiation.

c. Eceta v. Eceta [G.R. NO. 157037 : May 20, 2004 |

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.]

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children,

is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.

d. Potenciano v Mercado ??? ~ Art 834, NCC

 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

16. ***
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
(287a)

1. Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 |

VELASCO JR., J.)

ISSUE: Does a father, upon his recognition of their filiation,

have the right to compel his illegitimate children the use his
surname? NO.

Art. 176 was later amended (2004) by RA 9255 which now

reads x x x However, illegitimate children MAY use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non–filiation during
his lifetime x x x

x x x the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use

the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by
RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child MAY use the surname of the
father. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide
if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is
not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

The use of the word “may” in the provision readily shows

that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

word “may” is permissive and operates to confer discretion

upon the illegitimate children.

17. *
Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents
who, at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only
because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of
age, may be legitimated.

Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid

marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage
shall not affect the legitimation.

As amended by : RA 9855

18. ***
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of
the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their
guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino

children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as
may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
(29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

RA 8552: Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

1. Republic v. Toledano [G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994 |

PUNO, J.]

x x x both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one

of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect Filipino
children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code
reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must"
jointly adopt, except in the cases provided for in Art 185.
Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses.

19. **
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 (2001) as amended by REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 10172 (2012)

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical

Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected
or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following

terms shall mean:

‘Clerical or typographical error’ refers to a mistake committed in

the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, mistake in the
entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person
or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference
to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

the petitioner."

Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. –

The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,

tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

1. Silverio v. Republic [G.R. NO. 174689 : October 22, 2007

| CORONA, J.]

ISSUE: May a person successfully petition for a change of

name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery? NO.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals

and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name
is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.(NOTE:

See amended provision above RA 10172 ). RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must

present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate

As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. Under RA
9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. There is no
such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner's cause.

20. Correction of Status

1. Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo [G.R. No. 189476 :

February 02, 2011 | CARPIO MORALES, J.]

F: Claiming that his parents were never legally married,

respondent filed a Petition to change his name.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103

(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. Respondent's reason for changing
his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one's

civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which
the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected, and "all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby" should be made parties to the
proceeding.

x x x the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108

to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for

correction or cancellation of entries.

21. ***
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities

whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding

paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority

shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law.

Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority.

Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of
eighteen years. (As amended by RA No. 6809 ; December 13,
1989)

1. Tamargo v. CA [G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.|

FELICIANO, J.]

x x x the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in

case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. This
principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" x x x where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others
with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or
logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents — their parental authority — which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. Article
221 of the Family Code has x x x insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the
actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the
ensuing damage

The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child

living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction
in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority.

No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the

adopting parents x x x could have arisen since [the minor]
was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.

b. Libi v. IAC [G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992. |

REGALADO, J.]

The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the
civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their
minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted
with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions
of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or
under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15
years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of

the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of
such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the
same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or
incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the
youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil
liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental
authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall
apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil
Code, as so modified.

c. Salen v. Balce [G.R. No. L-14414. April 27, 1960. |

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.]

Under Article 101 of the RPC, a father is civilly liable for the
acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an
insane, under 9 years of age, who acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his
part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability
(Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, RPC). The idea is not to
leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil
liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his
legal authority and control. But a minor over 15 years who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for
which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of
his parents should he stand convicted. In that case resort
should be had to the general law, the Civil Code, which, under
Article 2180, provides that "The father and, in case of his
death, or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages
caused by the minor children who lived in their company."
This provision covers not only obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts but also those which arise from criminal
offenses. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father
or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is

caused with criminal intent.

Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects x x x (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded
to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of
this Code; and

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority

shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit.

d. Bagtas v. Santos [G.R. NO. 166682 : November 27, 2009 |

CARPIO, J.]

Article 214 states that in case of absence or unsuitability of

the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised
by the surviving grandparent. Article 216 states that in
default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian,
the surviving grandparent shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child.

In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the

child's welfare is the most important consideration. The court
is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child x x x
the child's welfare is the supreme consideration.

e. Salientes v. Abanilla [G.R. NO. 162734 : August 29, 2006

| QUISUMBING, J.]

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful

custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto x x x
although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody
has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are
still entitled to the custody of their child.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the

judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for
the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can
raise it as a counter argument for private respondent's
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing

the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said
provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.

f. David vs. CA (G.R. No. 111180 | November 16, 1995 |

MENDOZA, J.)

x x x the determination of the right to the custody of

minor children is relevant in cases where the parents,
who are married to each other, are for some reason
separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that
it cannot arise in any other situation. In the case of Salvaña v.
Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the
proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her free will because the parents were
compelling her to marry a man against her will. Rule 102 §1
makes no distinction between the case of a mother who
is separated from her husband and is entitled to the
custody of her child and that of a mother of an
illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful
custody of her child.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the

minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of
the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

Under Art. 213, courts must respect the "choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and
here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit
to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent
loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support
for him on the award of his custody to him (private
respondent).

g. Silva vs. CA [G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997 | VITUG, J.:]
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that

petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children
once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is
but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no
man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would
ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action
for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just
be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of
his children of tender ages.

h. Beckett v. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 :

January 30, 2013 | VELASCO, JR., J.)

The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable.

If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character
change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always
be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare,
the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must
be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to
be the custodian. x x x in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody
agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and
unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the
parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking
to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latters
best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment
involving the custody of a minor child cannot be
accorded the force and effect of res judicata.

i. Magbaleta vs. Gonong (G.R. No. L-44903 April 22, 1977 |

BARREDO, J.)

x x x it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a

compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between
close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers x x x these considerations do not weigh enough
to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise
should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the
family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or
indispensable one. It is neither practical nor fair that the
determination of the rights of a stranger to the family Who
just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

interest in any right or property disputed among its members

should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle
their differences among themselves.

j. Kua v IAC ???

k. Siochi vs. Gozon [G.R. No. 169900 : March 18, 2010 |

CARPIO, J.]

x x x among the effects of the decree of legal separation is

that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and
the offending spouse would have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership x x x
Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that "[f]or
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited x x x is the net
profits of the conjugal partnership property.

l. Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014 |

VELASCO JR., J.)

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176

on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal
mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of
the following grounds:

(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act
complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of
the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal
separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.

m. Bugayong vs. Ginez [G.R. No. L-10033. December 28,

1956. | FELIX, J.]

ISSUE: Do the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for

2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to
him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed
adulterous acts?

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense

constituting a ground for legal separation or the “conditional
forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has committed”.
‘Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to a
divorce. But it is on the condition, implied by the law when
not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit the
offense; also that he shall thereafter treat the other spouse
with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive
the original offense as a ground for divorce. Condonation may
be express or implied’. The legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.

The act of x x x persuading her to come along with him, and

the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought
to the house of his cousin x x x and together they slept there
as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the
further fact that in the second night they again slept together
in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts
have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than
that a reconciliation between them was effected and
that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. This reconciliation occurred almost ten months
after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

“It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various

supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that a
single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the
innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially
as against the husband.

n. Brown v. Yambao [G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957 |

REYES, J. B. L., J.]

Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of married persons in

procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by
preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or
by failure, in pursuance of agreement, to defend divorce
proceedings

The policy of x x x calling for the intervention of the state

attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages) is to emphasize
that marriage is more than a mere contact; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon
the parties themselves.

Action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one

(1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred. (Note that this is a 1957 case)

22. ***
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while

they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of

the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or

her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation. (144a)

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding

Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in

the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both

parties are in bad faith. (144a)

1. Go- Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr. (G.R. No. 201061, July 03,

2013 | CARPIO, J.)
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

x x x the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse

are merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership.
Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of
the Family Code.

23. *
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)

1. Vda. De Manalo v. CA [G.R. No. 129242. January 16,

2001. | DE LEON, JR., J.]

Art 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is

clear from the term "SUIT" that it refers to an action by one
person or persons against another or others in a court of
justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a
party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong x x x excerpt from the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the
intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision
applicable only to civil actions which are essentially
adversarial and involve members of the same family.

The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration is a

special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.

b. Magbaleta vs. Gonong (supra)

PROPERTY
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

24. ***
Article 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to
the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the
land or form an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or
ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the
immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding
places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or
preserves them with the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals
in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by
their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or
coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights
over immovable property. (334a)

1. FELS Energy v The Province of Batangas

In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v.

The City of New York, et al., a power company brought an
action to review property tax assessment. On the city’s motion
to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held that the
barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants
designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges
which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the
accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to
real property taxation.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
"[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a
river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property.
Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or
work

b. Davao Sawmills vs Castillo

The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant

by the owner of the property or plant. Immobilization cannot
be made by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having
only a temporary right. The tenant, usufructuary, or
temporary possessor acted as agent of the owner of the
premises; or he intended to permanently give away the
property in favor of the owner. Therefore, the machinery
should be considered as Personal Property, since it was not
placed on the land by the owner of the said land.

25.

Article 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land,

building, or other property on which it is found.

Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of

another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance,
one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a
trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State
may acquire them at their just price, which shall be divided in
conformity with the rule stated. (351a)

Article 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any

hidden and unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious
objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear. (352)

26. ***
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Article 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally
or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the
materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad
faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The
owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in
case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if
the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may
remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for
damages. (360a)

Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one
who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof. (361a)

Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land
of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity. (362)

Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every

possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith

with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)

Article 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful

improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property
leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the
lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove
the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled

to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects,
provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor
does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the
lease is extinguished. (n)

1. Rosales vs Castelltort

Under Art. 448, the landowner can choose between

appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land, unless its
value is considerably more than that of the structures, in
which case the builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to
exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.

Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character

except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by
suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.

b. Nuguid v CA

Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to

appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the
proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the
possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a
builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him

right of retention until full reimbursement is made.

While the law aims to concentrate in one person the

ownership of the land and the improvements thereon in view
of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-
ownership, it guards against unjust enrichment insofar as the
good-faith builder’s improvements are concerned. The right
of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by
the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object
is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits
the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not
been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case
for possession of the property) for those necessary expenses
and useful improvements made by him on the thing
possessed. Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be
compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be
disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. In
addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited
from offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful
expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in
good faith. Otherwise, the security provided by law would be
impaired. This is so because the right to the expenses and the
right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making
compensation juridically impossible; and one cannot be used
to reduce the other.

27. *
Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in
the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be

presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a)

Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in

ejectment. (n)

Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding

article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing
owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for
the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be
terminated in accordance with article 498. (401a)
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though
benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding
of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial
to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
(397a)

Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an

undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.

In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall

be governed by the provisions of this Title.

28.

Article 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed

transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.

One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have

possessed the same. (440)

Article 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not
shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of
possession in good faith shall not benefit him except from the date of
death of the decedent. (442)

Article 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription

the following rules shall be observed:

(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for
prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
predecessor in interest;
(2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the
possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession
during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary;
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (1960a)

29. **
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any

movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.

If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been

unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor. (464a)

1. Ledesma v CA

It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or
(b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the
same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it
in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the
first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is
equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make
possession of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a)
the possession should be in good faith; (b) the owner
voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the
possession is in the concept of owner.

Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been

unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to have voluntarily
parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for
the exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559
of the Civil Code.

b. EDCA v Santos

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired

ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer
to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid
for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and
did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to
the books.

One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase

"unlawfully deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner
suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's
title who buys a movable property from him would have to
surrender it to another person claiming to be the original
owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so
to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought
by him in good faith without even the right to reimbursement
of the amount he had paid for it.

c. Aznar v Yapdiangco

The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the

Civil Code to the case at bar, for under it, the rule is to the
effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only
from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons
who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief
or robber. The said article establishes two exceptions to the
general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1)
has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying any
indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public
sale.

Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, a person illegally

deprived of any movable may recover it from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the latter may
have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, in
which case, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor. In the present case,
plaintiff has been illegally deprived of his car through the
ingenious scheme of defendant B to enable the latter to
dispose of it as if he were the owner thereof. Plaintiff,
therefore, can still recover possession of the car even if it is in
the possession of a third party who had acquired it in good
faith from defendant B. The maxim that "no man can transfer
to another a better title than he had himself" obtains in the
civil as well as in the common law.

30. ***
Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention
clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by
the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct;
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;

(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the
usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (513a)

Article 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before
a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for the number of
years specified, even if the third person should die before the period
expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in
consideration of the existence of such person. (516)

1. Moralidad v Pernes

We disagree with the CA’s conclusion of law on the matter.

The term or period of the usufruct originally specified
provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary
to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct.
There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct
shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the
Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:

The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986

constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of,
the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of
my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail
the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What
may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may
be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner
made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes
to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an
atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid
bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a
peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin
constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of
the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding
Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my
kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned
may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the
occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere
of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory

condition which, by express wish of the petitioner,
extinguishes the usufruct.

From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable

that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the
subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished
by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in
the title creating the usufruct, namely, the document adverted
to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.

31. ***
Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right
may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet
to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the
neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use

may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to
the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering
of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way,
the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by
such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is

due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)

Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at

the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (565)

Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between

two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order
that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the
time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign

aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This
provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in
common by two or more persons.

1. Bogo-medellin Milling Inc v CA

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the
corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which
the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone
to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another
thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant
estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of
the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants
no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the
easement is an admission that the property belongs to
another

In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct

by petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be
implied, its possession of the lot can only be presumed to have
continued in the same character as when it was acquired (that
is, it possessed the land only by virtue of the original grant of
the easement of right of way),[28] or was by mere license or
tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs).[29] It is a
fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of
possessory character executed by virtue of license or
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of prescription

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either

continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or
physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus,
an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of drainage;[38] and it is discontinuous if it is used at
intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of
right of way.[39]

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous

because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on
somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles
or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when

a train operated by a person passes over another's property.
In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends
upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence
of discontinuous easements.

The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does

not in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of
way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of
apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence
of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof,
that categorizes such easement into continuous or
discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only
classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a
road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which
evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements,
while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is
non-apparent

b. Abellana v CA

Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is

continuous and apparent and may be acquired by prescription
under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a
footpath or road may be apparent but it isnot a continuous
easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the
acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts
his feet over somebody else's land (4 Manresa 597; Haffman
vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th
Ed., Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines). Hence, a right of
way is not acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs
Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil. 781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al.,
103 Phil. 84; Ayala de Roxas vs. Case, 8 Phil. 197).

c. Positive and Negative

d. Cristobal v CA

To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the

preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.[9] The burden of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.

e. S????????? vs CA – WIDTH

f. Ramos v Gatchalian

The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find

no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that
the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate
outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian
Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a
road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos
Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan
for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still
undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when
he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him
within the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the
appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have,
first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez
Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot
4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said
subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the
Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the
petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue
inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's
subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue
allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming
from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what
jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years
regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as
its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must
be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."

g. Unisource Commercial Corp v Chung

 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s property,

corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter
must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or
something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement. Easements are established
either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are
called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements

Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal

only to Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned
Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their heirs or
assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not
mentioned in the annotation does not mean that it is not
binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way
is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective
between the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.[25] Petitioner cites City of Manila v.
Entote[26] in justifying that the easement should bind only
the parties mentioned therein and exclude those not so
mentioned. However, that case is inapplicable since the issue
therein was whether the easement was intended not only for
the benefit of the owners of the dominant estate but of the
community and the public at large.[27] In interpreting the
easement, the Court ruled that the clause “any and all other
persons whomsoever” in the easement embraces only “those
who are privy to the owners of the dominant estate, Lots 1
and 2 Plan Pcs-2672” and excludes “the indiscriminate public
from the enjoyment of the right-of-way easement.”

PRESCRIPTION

32. * Periods

1. A???? vs D????

Void Title; Imprescriptible

33. Cases; Inter vivos/ Mortis Causa

34.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must

return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder
shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or
municipality where the finding has taken place.

The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two

consecutive weeks in the way he deems best.

If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or without

expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at
public auction eight days after the publication.

Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner
having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to
the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case
may be, to reimburse the expenses. (615a)

Article 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged

to pay, as a reward to the finder, one-tenth of the sum or of the price
of the thing found. (616a)

Article 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of lost

personal property shall be governed by articles 719 and 720.

1. Finders Keepers;

DONATIONS

35.

Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person

disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.

Article 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of
the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall
be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession.
(620)

Article 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take
effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not
be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of
the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides
otherwise.

36. ***
Article 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)

Article 737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time

of the making of the donation. (n)

1. When donation perfected

37. ***
Article 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in
writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or
of the document representing the right donated.

If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand

pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing.
Otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)

Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be

valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a

separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall

be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted
in both instruments. (633)

Article 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they

may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a
contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such cases, the right
of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

(1278a)

Article 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or

through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose,
or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall
be void. (630)

Article 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the

donor and of the donee. (n)

1. Republic vs S?????

b. Lagazo vs CA

In the words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, 14

"Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is
essential. The donation, following the theory of cognition
(Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."
Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments." 15

Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore,

indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and
void.16 The perfection and the validity of a donation are well
explained by former Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino in this wise:

. . Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor

to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it
has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly
notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another.
Solemn words are not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the
intention to accept. But in this case it is necessary that formal
notice thereof be given to the donor, and the fact that due
notice has been given must be noted in both instruments (that
containing the offer to donate and that showing the
acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected. If
the instrument of donation has been recorded in the registry
of property, the instrument that shows the acceptance should
also be recorded. Where the deed of donation fails to show
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,

made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the
donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

c. Secretary Of Education vs Heirs Of Dulay

We find it difficult to sustain that the defendant-appellants

have complied with the condition of donation. It is not amiss
to state that other than the bare allegation of the defendant-
appellants, there is nothing in the records that could
concretely prove that the condition of donation has been
complied with by the defendant-appellants. In the same
breadth, the planting ofpalay on the land donated can hardly
be considered and could not have been the “school purposes”
referred to and intended by the donors when they had
donated the land in question. Also, the posture of the
defendant-appellants that the land donated is being used as
technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal
National High School is far from being the truth considering
that not only is the said school located two kilometers away
from the land donated but also there was not even a single
classroom built on the land donated that would reasonably
indicate that, indeed, classes have been conducted therein.
These observations, together with the unrebutted ocular
inspection report made by the trial court which revealed that
the land donated remains idle and without any improvement
thereon for more than a decade since the time of the
donation, give Us no other alternative but to conclude that the
defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply with what
is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation

Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the OSG

that respondents’ cause of action is already barred by
prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four
years from the non-compliance with the condition in the deed
of donation. Since such failure to comply with the condition
of utilizing the property for school purposes became manifest
sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property
for the construction of the school building, the four-year
prescriptive period did not commence on such date.
Petitioner was given more than enough time to comply with
the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

advantage. It must be stressed that the donation is onerous

because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the
obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes.
Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an
onerous cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed
by the rules on contract

38. **
Article 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the
donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
which the former imposed upon the latter.

In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the
alienations made by the donee and the mortgages imposed thereon
by him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to
third persons, by the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.

This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance
with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and
may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)

1. Central Philippine University v CA

Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its
nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the
duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself
cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period
for compliance therewith and such period has arrived. 8

This general rule however cannot be applied considering the

different set of circumstances existing in the instant case.
More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already
been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply
with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the
donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed
to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a
term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere
technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to
delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication
of suits. 9 Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when
one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall
decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the
court to determine the period of the compliance, there is no
more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.

Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is

basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in
favor of the least transmission of rights and interests.

b. *
Article 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot
dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)

Article 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a
right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. (n)

Article 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different

donees shall be governed by the provisions concerning the sale of
the same thing to two or more different persons. (n)

c. Double Donation; governed by rules on double sale

PARTNERSHIP

78. 1767**
SY VS CA
Article 1767 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of
partnership two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property or industry to a common fund,
with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
Not one of these circumstances is present in this case. No
[

written agreement exists to prove the partnership between

the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money,
property or industry for the purpose of engaging in the
supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving
a share in the profits as a matter of course, during the
period when the trucking business was under operation.
Neither is there any proof that he had actively participated
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

in the management, administration and adoption of policies

of the business.

79. 1789;1808*
80. 1801 – 1803**
81. 1804**
82. 1816; 1823 – 1824*
83. 1828; 1829; 1830***
ORTEGA VS CA
The birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on
the mutual desire and consent of the partners. The right to
choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is
the very foundation and essence of that partnership. Its
continued existence is, in turn, dependent on the constancy
of that mutual resolve, along with each partner's capability
to give it, and the absence of a cause for dissolution
provided by the law itself. Verily, any one of the partners
may, at his sole pleasure, dictate a dissolution of the
partnership at will. He must, however, act in good faith, not
that the attendance of bad faith can prevent the dissolution
of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for
damages.

In passing, neither would the presence of a period for its

specific duration or the statement of a particular purpose
for its creation prevent the dissolution of any partnership
by an act or will of a partner. Among partners, mutual
agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows
them to have the power, although not necessarily the right,
to dissolve the partnership. An unjustified dissolution by
the partner can subject him to a possible action for
damages.

The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the

relation of the parties caused by any partner ceasing to be
associated in the carrying on, as might be distinguished
from the winding up of, the business. Upon its dissolution,
the partnership continues and its legal personality is
retained until the complete winding up of its business
culminating in its termination. The liquidation of the assets
of the partnership following its dissolution is governed by
various provisions of the Civil Code; however, an
agreement of the partners, like any other contract, is
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

binding among them and normally takes precedence to the

extent applicable over the Code's general provisions.

* 1797

AGENCY

84. 1869**
PROF. SERVICES INC VS AGANA
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of
the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of
the physicians associated or accredited by it, including
those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it “is now estopped
from passing all the blame to the physicians whose
names it proudly paraded in the public directory
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their
skill and competence.” Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount
to holding out to the public
that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited
physicians, offers quality health care services. By
accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform
medical or surgical services for its patients. As expected,
these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the
services on the reasonable belief that such were being
rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
servants.
QC CAPITAL MEDICAL CENTER VS NOGALES
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an
exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This
exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent
authority.”

[U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can

be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of
whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless
the patient knows, or should have known, that the
physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

action have been set out as follows: “For a hospital to be

liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a
manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an
employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of
the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff
must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent
with ordinary care and prudence.”

85. 1874; 1315; 1356*

PINEDA VS CA
The Civil Code provides that in a sale of a parcel of land or
any interest therein made through an agent, a special
power of attorney is essential. This authority must be in
writing, otherwise the sale shall be void. In his testimony,
petitioner Adeodato Duque confirmed that at the time he
“purchased” respondents’ property from Pineda, the latter
had no Special Power of Authority to sell the property. A
special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any
contract by which the ownership of an immovable is
transmitted or acquired for a valuable
consideration. Without an authority in writing, petitioner
Pineda could not validly sell the subject property to
petitioners Duque. Hence, any “sale” in favor of
petitioners Duque is void

86. 1317; 1403 (1); 1881; 1882; 1883; 1898; 1909; 1910; 1911***
BICOL SAVINGS BANK VS CA
The sale proscribed by a special power to mortgage under
Article 1879 is a voluntary and independent contract, and
not an auction sale resulting from extrajudicial foreclosure,
which is precipitated by the default of a mortgagor. Absent
that default, no foreclosure results. The stipulation
granting an authority to extrajudicially foreclose a
mortgage is an ancillary stipulation supported by the same
cause or consideration for the mortgage and forms an
essential or inseparable part of that bilateral agreement.
The power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that
contemplates exclusively the representation of the
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

principal by the agent but is primarily an authority

conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own
protection. That power survives the death of the
mortgagor

87. 1924; 1875***

SANCHEZ VS MEDICARD
For the purpose of equity, an agent who is not the efficient
procuring cause is nonetheless entitled to his commission,
where said agent, notwithstanding the expiration of his
authority, nonetheless, took diligent steps to bring back
together the parties, such that a sale was finalized
and consummated between them. In order not to
prejudice its personnel, Unilab, through respondent
Ejercito, negotiated with respondent Dr. Montoya of
Medicard, in order to find mutually beneficial ways of
continuing the Health Care Program. The negotiations
resulted in a new contract wherein Unilab shall pay
Medicard the hospitalization expenses actually incurred by
each employees, plus a service fee. Under the "cost plus"
system which replaced the premium scheme, petitioner
was not given a commission. It is clear that since petitioner
refused to reduce his commission, Medicard directly
negotiated with Unilab, thus revoking its agency contract
with petitioner. We hold that such revocation is authorized
by Article 1924 of the Civil Code.

MEDRANO VS CA
The letter of authority must be read as a whole and not in
its truncated parts. Certainly, it was not the intention of
Medrano to expect the respondents to do just that (to
negotiate) when he issued the letter of authority. The clear
intention is to reward the respondents for procuring a
buyer for the property. Before negotiating a sale, a broker
must first and foremost bring in a prospective buyer. It has
been held that a broker earns his pay merely by bringing
the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is
eventually made. The essential feature of a broker’s
conventional employment is merely to procure a purchaser
for a property ready, able, and willing to buy at the price
and on the terms mutually agreed upon by the owner and
the purchaser. And it is not a prerequisite to the right to
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

compensation that the broker conduct the negotiations

between the parties after they have been brought into
contact with each other through his efforts. The case
of Macondray v. Sellner is quite instructive:
The business of a real estate broker or agent,
generally, is only to find a purchaser, and the
settled rule as stated by the courts is that, in
the absence of an express contract between
the broker and his principal, the implication
generally is that the broker becomes entitled
to the usual commissions whenever he brings
to his principal a party who is able and willing
to take the property and enter into a valid
contract upon the terms then named by the
principal, although the particulars may be
arranged and the matter negotiated and
completed between the principal and the
purchaser directly.
Notably, there are cases where the right of the brokers to
recover commissions were upheld where they actually took
no part in the negotiations, never saw the customer, and
even some in which they did nothing except advertise the
property, as long as it can be shown that they were the
efficient cause of the sale.In the case at bar, the role of the
respondents in the transaction is undisputed. Whether or
not they participated in the negotiations of the sale is of no
moment. Armed with an authority to procure a purchaser
and with a license to act as broker, we see no reason why
the respondents can not recover compensation for their
efforts when, in fact, they are the procuring cause of the
sale

88. 1919; 1927; 1930; 1800*

SEVILLA VS CA
It is the Court's considered opinion, that when the
petitioner, Lina Sevilla, agreed to (wo)man the private
respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc.'s Ermita office, she
must have done so pursuant to a contract of agency. It is
the essence of this contract that the agent renders services
"in representation or on behalf of another. In the case at
bar, Sevilla solicited airline fares, but she did so for and on
behalf of her principal, Tourist World Service, Inc. As
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

compensation, she received 4% of the proceeds in the

concept of commissions. And as we said, Sevilla herself
based on her letter of November 28, 1961, pre-assumed
her principal's authority as owner of the business
undertaking. We are convinced, considering the
circumstances and from the respondent Court's recital of
facts, that the ties had contemplated a principal agent
relationship, rather than a joint managament or a
partnership. But unlike simple grants of a power of
attorney, the agency that we hereby declare to be
compatible with the intent of the parties, cannot be
revoked at will. The reason is that it is one coupled with an
interest, the agency having been created for mutual
interest, of the agent and the principal. It appears that Lina
Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and as such, she
had acquired an interest in the business entrusted to her.
Moreover, she had assumed a personal obligation for the
operation thereof, holding herself solidarily liable for the
payment of rentals. She continued the business, using her
own name, after Tourist World had stopped further
operations. Her interest, obviously, is not to the
commissions she earned as a result of her business
transactions, but one that extends to the very subject
matter of the power of management delegated to her. It is
an agency that, as we said, cannot be revoked at the
pleasure of the principal. Accordingly, the revocation
complained of should entitle the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to
damages.
LIM VS SABAN
Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be
revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is
the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or
if a partner is appointed manager of a partnership in the
contract of partnership and his removal from the
management is unjustifiable. Stated differently, an agency
is deemed as one coupled with an interest where it is
established for the mutual benefit of the principal and of
the agent, or for the interest of the principal and of third
persons, and it cannot be revoked by the principal so long
as the interest of the agent or of a third person subsists. In
an agency coupled with an interest, the agent’s interest
must be in the subject matter of the power conferred and
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

not merely an interest in the exercise of the power because

it entitles him to compensation. When an agent’s interest is
confined to earning his agreed compensation, the agency is
not one coupled with an interest, since an agent’s interest
in obtaining his compensation as such agent is an ordinary
incident of the agency relationship.

Guaranty and Surety

89. Distinctions**
90. 2056; 2058; 2059 ***
JN DEV. CORP VS PHIL GUARANTEE
Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself
to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal
debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The [34]

guarantor who pays for a debtor, in turn, must be

indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot
[35]

be compelled to pay the creditor unless the latter has

exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all
the legal remedies against the debtor. This is what is
[36]

otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.

It is clear that excussion may only be invoked after legal

remedies against the principal debtor have been expanded.
Thus, it was held that the creditor must first obtain a
judgment against the principal debtor before assuming to
run after the alleged guarantor, “for obviously the
‘exhaustion of the principal’s property’ cannot even begin
to take place before judgment has been obtained.” The [37]

law imposes conditions precedent for the invocation of the

defense. Thus, in order that the guarantor may make use
of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against the
creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment and point
out to the creditor available property of the debtor within
the Philippines sufficient to cover the amount of the debt. [38]

While a guarantor enjoys the benefit of excussion, nothing

prevents him from paying the obligation once demand is
made on him. Excussion, after all, is a right granted to him
by law and as such he may opt to make use of it or waive
it. PhilGuarantee’s waiver of the right of excussion cannot
prevent it from demanding reimbursement from
petitioners. The law clearly requires the debtor to
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

indemnify the guarantor what the latter has paid. The

benefit of excussion, as well as the requirement of consent
to extensions of payment, is a protective device pertaining
to and conferred on the guarantor. These may be invoked
by the guarantor against the creditor as defenses to bar the
unwarranted enforcement of the guarantee. However,
PhilGuarantee did not avail of these defenses when it paid
its obligation according to the tenor of the guarantee once
demand was made on it.

LOANS

91. 1956 ***

CB Circular No. 905 as amended by CB Circular 796
NACER VS GALLERY FRAMES
Thus, from the foregoing, in the absence of an express
stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the
parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of
any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per
annum - as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping
Lines and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations
40

for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of

the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No.
799 - but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective
July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new
rate could only be applied prospectively and not
retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per
annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013.
Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest when
applicable.

EASTERN SHIPPING CASE – NO LONGER RULE

IMPERIAL VS JAUCIAN
The records show that there was a written agreement
between the parties for the payment of interest on the
subject loans at the rate of 16 percent per month. As
decreed by the lower courts, this rate must be equitably
reduced for being iniquitous, unconscionable and
exorbitant. “While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

was lifted by C.B. Circular No. 905, nothing in the said

circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise
interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.” [13]

In Medel v. CA, the Court found the stipulated interest

[14]

rate of 5.5 percent per month, or 66 percent per annum,

unconscionable. In the present case, the rate is even more
iniquitous and unconscionable, as it amounts to 192
percent per annum. When the agreed rate is iniquitous or
unconscionable, it is considered “contrary to morals, if not
against the law. [Such] stipulation is void.” Since the
[15]

stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there were

no express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce
[16]

the interest rate as reason and equity demand. We find no

justification to reverse or modify the rate imposed by the
two lower courts.

ANGEL JOSE WAREHOUSING VS CHELDA ENTERPRISES

In simple loan with stipulation of usurious interest, the
prestation of the debtor to pay the principal debt, which is
the cause of the contract (Article 1350, Civil Code), is not
illegal. The illegality lies only as to the prestation to pay
the stipulated interest; hence, being separable, the latter
only should be deemed void, since it is the only one that is
illegal. The principal debt remaining without stipulation for
payment of interest can thus be recovered by judicial
action. And in case of such demand, and the debtor incurs
in delay, the debt earns interest from the date of the
demand (in this case from the filing of the complaint). Such
interest is not due to stipulation, for there was none, the
same being void. Rather, it is due to the general provision
of law that in obligations to pay money, where the debtor
incurs in delay, he has to pay interest by way of damages
(Art. 2209, Civil Code).

L**** vs O***********

DEPOSIT

92. 1998 – 2004; 1754 **

DURBAN APARTMENTS CORP VS PIONEER INSURANCE
[The] records also reveal that upon arrival at the City
Garden Hotel, See gave notice to the doorman and parking
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

attendant of the said hotel, x x x Justimbaste, about his

Vitara when he entrusted its ignition key to the latter. x x x
Justimbaste issued a valet parking customer claim stub to
See, parked the Vitara at the Equitable PCI Bank parking
area, and placed the ignition key inside a safety key box
while See proceeded to the hotel lobby to check in. The
Equitable PCI Bank parking area became an annex of City
Garden Hotel when the management of the said bank
allowed the parking of the vehicles of hotel guests thereat
in the evening after banking hours.

Article 1962, in relation to Article 1998, of the Civil Code

defines a contract of deposit and a necessary deposit made
by persons in hotels or inns. Plainly, from the facts found
by the lower courts, the insured See deposited his vehicle
for safekeeping with petitioner, through the latter’s
employee, Justimbaste. In turn, Justimbaste issued a claim
stub to See. Thus, the contract of deposit was perfected
from See’s delivery, when he handed over to Justimbaste
the keys to his vehicle, which Justimbaste received with the
obligation of safely keeping and returning it. Ultimately,
petitioner is liable for the loss of See’s vehicle.

MAMARIL VS BSP
Anent Sps. Mamaril's claim that the exculpatory clause:
"Management shall not be responsible for loss of vehicle or
any of its accessories or article left therein" contained in
31

the BSP issued parking ticket was void for being a contract
of adhesion and against public policy, suffice it to state that
contracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as
any other ordinary contract and a party who enters into it
is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms
thereof are accepted without objection, as in this case,
where plaintiffs-appellants have been leasing BSP's parking
space for more or less 20 years, then the contract serves
32

as the law between them. Besides, the parking fee

33

of P300.00 per month or P10.00 a day for each unit is too

minimal an amount to even create an inference that BSP
undertook to be an insurer of the safety of plaintiffs-
appellants' vehicles.

YHT REALTY CORP VS CA

 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an

expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations
such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like
the common carrier’s business is imbued with public
interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to
provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to
their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow
such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any
contrary stipulation in so-called “undertakings” that
ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel
keepers on guests for their signature. Paragraphs (2) and
(4) of the “undertaking” manifestly contravene Article 2003
of the New Civil Code for they allow Tropicana to be
released from liability arising from any loss in the contents
and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause
whatsoever. [40]

Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim

against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety
deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by
Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit
that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to
loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests
even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of
hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may
proceed from any force majeure. It is the loss
[41]

through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper

from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that
the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms
or through an irresistible force to qualify the same as force
majeure.

PLEDGES AND MORTGAGES

93. 2085
94. 2087; 2115 ***
CHU VS CA
A pacto commissorio is a provision for
the automatic appropriation of the pledged or mortgaged
property by the creditor in payment of the loan upon its
maturity. The prohibition against a pacto commissorio is
intended to protect the obligor, pledgor, or mortgagor
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

against being overreached by his creditor who holds a

pledge or mortgage over property whose value is much
more than the debt. Where, as in this case, the security for
the debt is also money deposited in a bank, the amount of
which is even less than the debt, it was not illegal for the
creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the
debtors' overdue obligation, with the latter's consent.

VASQUEZ VS CA
The Court of Appeals pronounced in its Decision that the
contract between the parties is an equitable mortgage.
Since the contract is characterized as a mortgage, the
provisions of the Civil Code governing mortgages apply.
Article 2088 of the Civil Code states:
The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by
way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any
stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

This Court has interpreted this provision in the following

manner:
The essence of pacto commissorio, which is prohibited by
Article 2088 of the Civil Code, is that ownership of the
security will pass to the creditor by the mere default of the
debtor … The only right of a mortgagee in case of non-
payment of a debt secured by mortgage would be to
foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property
sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The
mortgagor’s default does not operate to vest in the
mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for
any such effect is against public policy, as enunciated by
the Civil Code …

Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically

to equitable mortgages, in Montevergin v. CA, the Court
[27]

enunciated that the consolidation of ownership in the

person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of
the mortgagor in equity to pay the obligation, would
amount to a pactum commissorium. The Court further
articulated that an action for consolidation of ownership is
an inappropriate remedy on the part of the mortgagee in
equity. The only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure
of the mortgage in equity. And if the mortgagee in equity
desires to obtain title to the mortgaged property, the
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale. The

private respondents do not appear to have caused the
foreclosure of the mortgage much less have they purchased
the property at a foreclosure sale. Petitioner, therefore,
retains ownership of the subject property. The right of
ownership necessarily includes the right to possess,
particularly where, as in this case, there appears to have
been no availment of the remedy of foreclosure of the
mortgage on the ground of default or non-payment of the
obligation in question.

95. 2088; 2112 **

96. 2089 ***
YAP VS DY
From the foregoing, it is apparent that what the law
proscribes is the foreclosure of only a portion of the
property or a number of the several properties mortgaged
corresponding to the unpaid portion of the debt where
before foreclosure proceedings partial payment was made
by the debtor on his total outstanding loan or obligation.
This also means that the debtor cannot ask for the release
of any portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some
of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan
thus, secured has been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact
that there has been a partial fulfillment of the obligation.
Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of
the debt cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment
of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely
satisfied.

That the situation obtaining in the case at bar is not within

the purview of the aforesaid rule on indivisibility is obvious
since the aggregate number of the lots which comprise the
collaterals for the mortgage had already been foreclosed
and sold at public auction. There is no partial payment nor
partial extinguishment of the obligation to speak of. The
aforesaid doctrine, which is actually intended for the
protection of the mortgagee, specifically refers to the
release of the mortgage which secures the satisfaction of
the indebtedness and naturally presupposes that the
mortgage is existing. Once the mortgage is
extinguished by a complete foreclosure thereof, said
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

doctrine of indivisibility ceases to apply since, with

the full payment of the debt, there is nothing more to
secure. Nothing in the law prohibits the piecemeal
redemption of properties sold at one foreclosure
proceeding. In fact, in several early cases decided by this
Court, the right of the mortgagor or redemptioner to
redeem one or some of the foreclosed properties was
recognized.

97. 2176; 2177; 2179; 2194 ***

98. 2180; Family Code – 218; 219; 221
Vicarious Liability
Balce – Deep Pocket Principle “Parents are held
vicariously liable because they are the persons who are
financially capable of satisfying any judgment obligation”

FGU INSURANCE VS CA
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to ex
ercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates
to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly
[7]

observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly

applicable because none of the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case unde
r consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a
rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to
Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum
juris between them as employer and
employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be
responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former
not being an employer of the latter.

We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the

same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the
owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in
the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are
applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art.
2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of
master-driver relationship between respondent
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause

of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-
delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can
neither prosper.

CASTILLEX VS VASQUEZ
Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not
accurate. The phrase “even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry” found in the fifth
paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business
or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee
who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. [5]

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to

determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to
employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph,
to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers
negligent acts of employees committed either in the service
of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while
the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
employees acting within the scope of their assigned
task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of
employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the
occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees
oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions
which are beyond their office, title or designation but
which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty. Under
the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged
in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the
torts committed by employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task
when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the

defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee

VILLANUEVA VS DOMINGO
This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who
the actual owner is of a motor vehicle might be, the
registered owner is the operator of the same with respect
to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and
primarily responsible for the consequences of its
operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of
record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator
and employer being considered merely as his agent. ‘We
believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was
actually employed by the operator of record. It is even not
necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and
the employer of the driver is. Granting that, in this case,
the father of the driver is the actual owner and that he is
the actual employer, following the well-settled principle
that the operator of record continues to be the operator of
the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public
and third person, and as such is responsible for the
consequences incident to its operation, we must hold and
consider such owner-operator of record as the employer, in
contemplation of law, of the driver. And, to give effect to
this policy of law as enunciated in the above cited decisions
of this Court, we must now extend the same and consider
the actual operator and employer as the agent of the
operator of record.

99. 2183 *
AFIALDA VS HISOLE
This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a
case where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third
person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the
present where the person injured was the caretaker of the
animal. The distinction is important. For the statute names
the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for
"any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious
reason that the possessor or user has the custody and
control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position
to prevent it from causing damage.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

In the present case, the animal was in custody and under

the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as
such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to
prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal
under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.

100. 2185 ***

FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC CORP VS DELOS SANTOS
Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
9

contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor

vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the
present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules does not
erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the
time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations
as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise
ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with all the conditions encountered which
10

will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and,

whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to
avoid injury to others using the highway

DAMAGES

101. Actual and Compensatory *

VICTORY LINER VS GAMMAD
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the
deceased’s earning capacity should be deleted for lack of
basis. As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by

the Court of Appeals should be further reduced. In People
v. Duban, it was held that only substantiated and proven
[51]

expenses or those that appear to have been genuinely

incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the
victim will be recognized. A list of expenses (Exhibit “J”),
and the contract/receipt for the construction of the tomb
[52]

(Exhibit “F”) in this case, cannot be considered competent

[53]

proof and cannot replace the official receipts necessary to

justify the award. Hence, actual damages should be
further reduced to P78,160.00, which was the amount
[54]

supported by official receipts.

MERCURY DRUG VS HUANG

With regard to actual damages, Art. 2199 of the Civil Code
provides that “[E]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved x x
x.” In the instant case, we uphold the finding that the
actual damages claimed by respondents were supported by
receipts. The amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost of
hospital expenses, medicines, medical services and
supplies, and nursing care services provided respondent
Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the accident,
until December 1998.

Petitioners are also liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. The doctors who attended to respondent
[16]

Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances of

walking again and performing basic body functions are
nil. For the rest of his life, he will need continuous
rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications
such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal
failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and
fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related
conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care
and support of his family. We thus affirm the award
of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent
Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and
the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he is
expected to live; and the conservative amount
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

of P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court, for the

loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering
[17]

his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health,

and his mental and physical condition before the
accident. He was only seventeen years old, nearly six feet
tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in fourth year high
school, and a member of the school varsity basketball
team. He was also class president and editor-in-chief of
the school annual. He had shown very good leadership
qualities. He was looking forward to his college life,
having just passed the entrance examinations of the
University of the Philippines, De La Salle University, and
the University of Asia and the Pacific. The University of
Sto. Tomas even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic
scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending
the basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an
exceptional student. He excelled both in his academics and
extracurricular undertakings. He is intelligent and
motivated, a go-getter, as testified by Francisco Lopez,
respondent Stephen Huang’s godfather and a bank
executive. Had the accident not happened, he had a rosy
[18]

future ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a banking

career, get married and raise children. Taking into account
his outstanding abilities, he would have enjoyed a
successful professional career in banking. But, as Mr.
Lopez stated, it is highly unlikely for someone like
respondent to ever secure a job in a bank. To his
knowledge, no bank has ever hired a person suffering
with the kind of disability as Stephen Huang’s.

102. Moral Damages *

MERALCO VS CA
petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas
service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract
amounting to an independent tort. The prematurity of the
action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental
and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a clear
violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that
any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. This
is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by

Article 2220 which provides that wilfull injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches
of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.

LBC VS CA
Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. A corporation, being
7

an artificial person and having existence only in legal

contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses;
therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and
mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only
8

by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills,

sorrows, and griefs of life — all of which cannot be
9

suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.

We can neither sustain the award of moral damages in

favor of the private respondents. The right to recover moral
damages is based on equity. Moral damages are
recoverable only if the case falls under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in relation to Article 21. Part of conventional
10

wisdom is that he who comes to court to demand equity,

must come with clean hands.

FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK VS AGO MEDICAL

CENTER
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral
shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber
[40]

Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the award of moral damages.

[41]

However, the Court’s statement inMambulao that “a

corporation may have a good reputation which, if
besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral
damages” is an obiter dictum. [42]
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under

item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision
[43]

expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in

cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person
such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any
other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. [44]

Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law

implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest
[45]

mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party

libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. Neither in
[46]

such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence

of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery
of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts are
[47]

libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

103. Exemplary Damages *

104. Special Laws *
SUCCESSION

1. Article 777; Article 905; Article 1347; Article 1080; Article

870

Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from

the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)

Art. 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a

future legitime between the person owing it and his
compulsory heirs is void, and the latter may claim the same
upon the death of the former; but they must bring to collation
whatever they may have received by virtue of the renunciation
or compromise. (816)

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of
men, including future things, may be the object of a contract.
All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object
of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good

customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the
object of a contract. (1271a)

Art. 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an

act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to

keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise
intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this
article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to
whom the property is not assigned, be paid in cash. (1056a)

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part

of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
(n)

2. 804-806

SUBSECTION 3. - Forms of Wills

Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a

language or dialect known to the testator. (n)
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name

and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon

which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence

of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the

witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary

public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court. (n)

1. AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS|G.R. No. 122880, 12

April 2006 | 487 SCRA 119
 JURAT vs. ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The case
highlights the fundamental difference between a jurat and an
acknowledgment and based on the distinction, the Court held
that a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary
public is void, even if it was sworn to before a notary public.
 ISSUE IN THE CASE: Of note is the decision of the
RTC which admitted the will to probate notwithstanding the
defects thereof (no signature of witnesses at the bottom of the
attestation clause, no signature of the testator on the left
margin of the second page of the will, the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages used upon
which the will was written, and the lack of acknowledgment).

 REYES vs. VDA. DE VIDAL | No. L-2867, 21 April

1952
 Every will must be executed in a language known to
the testator. While this requirement is mandatory and, as a
rule, must be proved during probate proceedings, a failure to
introduce evidence in this respect DOES NOT necessarily
justify the denial of probate. Under certain conditions,
knowledge of the language in which the will was written may
be presumed.
 ISSUE IN THE CASE: the probative value of the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses must be noted,
particularly when such testimony is sought to be controverted
by the testimony of an expert witness.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

 [Comment: The case included in the Outline is Sy vs.

Reyes, but I can’t find the case related to articles 805-806.]
 ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO | No. L-18979, 30 June
1964
 Article 805 requires that each of the subscribing
witnesses should sign each and every page of the will on the
left margin. This requirement is, as a rule, mandatory and a
failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect.
 Icasiano holds that the failure of a witness to sign one
of the pages of the will through inadvertence or oversight
(there being no bad faith or fraudulent intent) can be cured by
the presentation of a carbon duplicate of the will which
contains all the required signatures. This ruling is based on
the principle of liberal interpretation of the statutory
requirements for the formal validity of the will, provided that
the need to safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the
will is not compromised. It is important, for the proper
understanding of this case, to differentiate a duplicate copy of
a document from a duplicate-original thereof.
 ORTEGA vs. VALMONTE | G.R. No. 157451, 16
December 2005
 CORE ISSUES: (i) how to prove the fact of fraud in
the making of the will; and (ii) what constitutes a sound and
disposing mind.
 FRAUD: Fraud “is a trick, secret device, false
statement, or pretence, by which the subject of it is cheated.
It may be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which
he executed, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is
led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would
not have made.
 The party challenging the will bears the burden
of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than
the self-serving allegations of petitioners, no evidence of
fraud was ever presented.
 The omission of some relatives does not affect
the due execution of a will.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

 WHAT CONSTITUTE SOUND AND DISPOSING

MIND: The three things that the testator must have the
ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows:
(1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of; (2) the proper
objects of the testator’s bounty; and (3) the character of the
testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we
find that the appellate court was correct in holding that
Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of his will.
 It must be noted that despite his advanced age,
he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property
he owned, the extent of his shares in them, and even their
locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it
was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.
As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives
from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being
no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its
disposition becomes irrelevant.

3. 808

Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him
twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by
the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)

1. ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA, JR. | G.R. No. 74695, 14

September 1993
 MEANING OF “BLIND TESTATOR”: A person
unable to read the draft of his will, either because of poor,
defective or blurred eyesight must be considered blind for the
purpose of compliance with the additional formalities
prescribed in Article 808.
 Inability to read by reason of illiteracy is
included within the broader concept of "blindness" for the
purpose of the same article.
 NOTA BENE: Alvarado makes a landmark exception
to the rule of strict compliance when it affirmed the probate
order despite non-compliance with the double reading
requirement. How this decision will affect the court’s
interpretation of the other formal requirements of the law
remains to be seen.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

4. 810-811

Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must

be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
(678, 688a)

Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be

necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such
witnesses shall be required.

In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the

preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)

1. ROXAS vs. DE JESUS, JR. | No. L-38338, 28 January

1985
 GENERAL RULE: Article 810 of the Civil Code
requires, among others, that a HOLOGRAPHIC WILL BE
DATED.
 EXCEPTION: While a complete date is generally
required, an incomplete date which sets forth only the month
and the year of execution, is not a fatal defect if it can be
shown that there was no bad faith, fraud, and undue and
improper influence and pressure. Probate is further justified if
the genuineness of the handwriting of the testator is proved,
or otherwise admitted by the parties, and the only ground for
opposing probate is the technicality resulting from an
incomplete date.

5. 830 & 834 in relation to 172

Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following

cases:

(1) By implication of law; or

 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as

provided in case of wills; or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will

with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by
some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some
other person, without the express direction of the testator,
the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in
accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and
the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
(n)

Art. 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose

its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made
should be revoked. (714)

Art. 172. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership

without the husband's consent except in cases provided by
law. (1416a)

6. 854

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of

the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,

the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the
right of representation. (814a)

1. ACAIN vs. IAC | No. L-72706, 27 October 1987

 SURVIVING SPOUSE COULD NOT BE
PRETERITED: Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance for she is not in the direct line.
 PRETERITION OF THE ADOPTED CHILD:
Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and
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duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted and

makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited
in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it
be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence,
this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
 ROSALES vs. ROSALES | No. L-40789, 27
February 1987
 A daughter-in-law is not a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law. This is because of the absence of blood
relationship between the two. The surviving spouse is
considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-
in-law.
 VENT*** vs. COURT OF APPEALS – Sister

7. 863

Art. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the

fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the
obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take
effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided
further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are
living at the time of the death of the testator. (781a)

1. NUGUID vs. NUGUID | No. L-23445, 23 June 1966

 GENERAL RULE: The area of inquiry of a probate
court is limited to the TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY of the
testator and the DUE EXECUTION OF THE WILL.
 EXCEPTION: If it should appear on the face of the
will that the sole disposition is intrinsically invalidity, and that
nothing is gained from an inquiry into extrinsic validity, then a
probe into the testamentary disposition and the consequential
invalidation thereof is justified for practical considerations.
While Article 854 annuls merely the institution of heir, the
court is justified in declaring the entire will void if the only
testamentary disposition in the questioned will is the
institution of the universal heir. In such a case, the effect of
the nullification of the testamentary disposition would be the
same as the nullification of the will itself.
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 DY SEANGIO vs. REYES | G.R. No. 140372-72, 27

November 2006
 ISSUES RESOLVED IN THE CASE:
 Where the sole disposition of a purported will is
the disinheritance of a compulsory heir, the disinheritance
is considered a property disposition. Therefore, the
document is must be considered a will because it conveys
property.
 The failure of the testator to institute an heir or
to even mention by name any of the compulsory heir, per
se, does not constitute preterition.
 SUMMARY OF THE CASE: Segundo’s document,
although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand
of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed him in the
absence of Alfredo.
 ARANAS vs. ARANAS | G.R. No. L-56249 May 29,
1987
 The Last Will and Testament shows that it was the
intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew
Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by
allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's
third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal
to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall
pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and
upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select
one among themselves.
 As a USUFRUCTUARY HAS THE RIGHT TO ENJOY
the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result
from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's
property, WITH THE OBLIGATION TO RETURN, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its
equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there
is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
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8. 891

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged
to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came. (871)

1. SUMAYA vs. IAC | G.R. Nos. 68843-44, 2 September

1991
 The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost
to an innocent purchaser of the reservable property. For the
protection of the said reservees, it is important that the
reservable character of the property must be properly
annotated at the back of the title thereto. However, even
absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third party
purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the reservable
character of the property, then the reversionary rights of the
reservees shall be upheld.
 MENDOZA vs. DELOS SANTOS | G.R. NO. 176422
: March 20, 2013
 TRANSMISSION: There are three lines of
transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by
gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law
from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also
called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from
the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be
relatives within the third degree from which the property
came.
 The lineal character of the reservable property is
reckoned from the ascendant from whom the prepositus
received the property by gratuitous title. Based on the
circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva
troncal is not applicable.
 LIMITATION – 3 DEGREE: The petitioners are not
RD

relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the

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properties came. The person from whom the degree should be

reckoned is the descendant/prepositus, the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree relatives, being her
first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
 They CANNOT even claim representation of
their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives
up to the third degree from whom the reservable
properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the
case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the
right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers)
who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives
within the third degree.

9. 902; 992

Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the

preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab

intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

1. MADARCOS vs. DE LA MERCED | G.R. No. 39975, 30

June 1989
 LEGAL HEIRS: The restrictive meaning refers to
heirs called upon to inherit by intestacy. However, the more
liberal interpretation would include any person called to
succeed, either by virtue of a will, or by intestacy.
 CORE ISSUE IN THE CASE: Proper construction of
the term "legal heirs" as used in §119 of the Public Land Act
which provides: Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
conveyance.
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 The term "legal heirs" is used in §119 in a

generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who
is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by
operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and
intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by
the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not
necessarily compulsory heirs but they maybe so if the law
reserves a legitime for them.
 RESOLUTION OF THE CASE: Petitioners are legal
heirs. Having been decreed under the rules of intestacy as
entitled to succeed to the entire estate of the Catain spouses
due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into
the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as
among the legal heirs contemplated by §119 as entitled to
redeem the homestead.

10. 494; 870; 1083 – Will provides indivision of estate

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-

ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a

certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which

shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by

law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir

against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part

of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
(n)

Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of

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the estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden

its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not
exceed twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of
the testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership

terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is
dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling
reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one
of the co-heirs. (1051a)

1. SANTIAGO vs. SANTIAGO | G.R. No. 179859 August

9, 2010
 INDIVISION IS SUBJECT TO STATUTORY
LIMITATION: It is clear from testator’s will that he intended
the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners’
names for administration purposes only, and that the property
be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition set by
the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject to
a statutory limitation, particularly Articles 494, 870, and
1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to
divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty
(20) years.
 Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of
the indivision of a property for more than 20 years, it
would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership
beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

1. 1174 (1942; 1979; 2147; 2148)

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or

when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
(1105a)

Art. 1942. The bailee is liable for the loss of the thing, even if
it should be through a fortuitous event:
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(1) If he devotes the thing to any purpose different from that

for which it has been loaned;

(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated, or after

the accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum
has been constituted;

(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its
value, unless there is a stipulation exemption the bailee from
responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;

(4) If he lends or leases the thing to a third person, who is not

a member of his household;

(5) If, being able to save either the thing borrowed or his own
thing, he chose to save the latter. (1744a and 1745)

Art. 1979. The depositary is liable for the loss of the thing
through a fortuitous event:

(1) If it is so stipulated;

(2) If he uses the thing without the depositor's permission;

(3) If he delays its return;

(4) If he allows others to use it, even though he himself may

have been authorized to use the same. (n)

Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any

fortuitous event:

(1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not

accustomed to embark upon;

(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;

(3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand

by the owner;

(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)

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Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save

property or business from imminent danger, the officious
manager shall be liable for fortuitous events:
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;

(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent

person from taking up the management. (n)

a. FILESTATE vs. COURT OF APPEALS |G.R. No. 185798

January 13, 2014
 The Asian financial crisis is not a fortuitous event that
would excuse petitioners from performing their contractual
obligation; second, as a result of the breach committed by
petitioners, respondents are entitled to rescind the contract
and to be refunded the amount of amortizations paid
including interest and damages; and third, petitioners are
likewise obligated to pay attorney’s fees and the
administrative fine.
 The Court did not generalize that the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 was unforeseeable and beyond the control of a
business corporation. It is unfortunate that petitioner
apparently met with considerable difficulty e.g. increase cost
of materials and labor, even before the scheduled
commencement of its real estate project as early as 1995.
However, a REAL ESTATE ENTERPRISE engaged in the pre-
selling of condominium units is concededly a master in
projections on commodities and currency movements and
business risks. The fluctuating movement of the Philippine
peso in the foreign exchange market is an everyday
occurrence and fluctuations in currency exchange rates
happen everyday, thus, not an instance of caso fortuito.

2. 1182 (1197)

Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon

the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be
void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third
person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the
provisions of this Code. (1115)

Art. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period
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was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.

The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it
depends upon the will of the debtor.

In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may

under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by
the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be
changed by them. (1128a)

a. CATUNGAL vs. RODRIGUEZ | G.R. No. 146839 March 23,

2011
 EFFECT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF
CONDITION: The Court has distinguished between a
condition imposed on the perfection of a contract and a
condition imposed merely on the performance of an
obligation. While failure to comply with the first condition
results in the failure of a contract, failure to comply with the
second merely gives the other party the option to either
refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition.
 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: Pursuant to Art.
1197, If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period
was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof. The
courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it
depends upon the will of the debtor. The courts shall
determine such period as may under the circumstances have
been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the
courts, the period cannot be changed by them.

3. 1191; 1381; 1383; 1385

Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in

reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be

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just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of

third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. (1124)

Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the

wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-
fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the

latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter

cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have

been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge
and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial
authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject

to rescission. (1291a)

Art. 1383. The action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be

instituted except when the party suffering damage has no
other legal means to obtain reparation for the same. (1294)

Art. 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the

things which were the object of the contract, together with
their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it
can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can
return whatever he may be obliged to restore.

Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are
the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third
persons who did not act in bad faith.

In this case, indemnity for damages may be demanded from

the person causing the loss. (1295)
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a. U.P. vs. DELOS ANGELES | G.R. No. L-28602. September

29, 1970
 BREACH OF CONTRACT – RESCISSION UNDER
1191: Where UP and ALUMCO had expressly stipulated in
the "Acknowledgment of Debt and Proposed Manner of
Payments" that, upon default by the debtor LUMCO, the
creditor (UP) has "the right and the power to consider the
Logging Agreement as rescinded without the necessity
of any judicial suit," respondent Alumco’s contention that it
is only after a final court decree declaring the contract
rescinded for violation of its terms that UP could disregard
ALUMCO’s rights under the contract and treat the agreement
as breached and of no force or effect is untenable. In
connection with Article 1191, it is NOT always necessary
for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of
the contract.
 The act of a party in treating a contract as
cancelled or resolved on account of infractions by the other
contracting party must be made known to the other and is
always provisional, subject to review by the proper Court.
If the other party denies that rescission is justified, it is
free to resort to judicial action in its own behalf, and bring
the matter to court. Then, should the court, after due
hearing, decide that the resolution of the contract was not
warranted, the responsible party will be sentenced to
damages; in the contrary case, the resolution will be
affirmed, and the consequent indemnity awarded to the
party prejudiced.
 WHEN JUDICIAL ACTION NECESSARY: Where the
extrajudicial resolution is contested, only the final award of
the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle
whether the resolution was proper or not, unless attack
thereon should become barred by acquiescence, estoppel or
prescription.
 EFFECT OF UNILATERAL RESCISSION: In the
case of abuse or error by the rescinder, the other party is not
barred from questioning in court such abuse or error, the
practical effect of the stipulation being merely to transfer to
the defaulter the initiative of instituting suit, instead of the
rescinder.

4. 1207; 1208 – REP. GLASS vs. Q***

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Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two

or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not
imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or
that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law
or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. (1137a)

Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the
obligations to which the preceding article refers the contrary
does not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be
divided into as many shares as there are creditors or debtors,
the credits or debts being considered distinct from one
another, subject to the Rules of Court governing the
multiplicity of suits. (1138a)

5. 1245: PHILIPPINE LAWIN BUS LINES vs. CA | G. R. No.

130972. January 23, 2002

Art. 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to

the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be
governed by the law of sales. (n)

a. DACION EN PAGO: Property is alienated to the creditor in

satisfaction of a debt in money. It is the delivery and
transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the
creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the
obligation. It extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the
value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties
or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express
or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent
to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally
extinguished.
 Article 1245 of the Civil Code provides that the
law on sales shall govern an agreement of dacion en
pago. A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there
is a meeting of the minds of the parties thereto upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price.
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b. In this case, there was no meeting of the minds between the

parties on whether the loan of the petitioners would be
extinguished by dacion en pago. The Court cited the ruling in
PNB v. Pineda that, where machinery and equipment were
repossessed to secure the payment of a loan obligation and not
for the purpose of transferring ownership thereof to the creditor
in satisfaction of said loan, no dacion en pago was ever
accomplished.

6. 1278; 1279 – DBP vs. UNION BANK | G.R. No. 191555

January 20, 2014

Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons,

in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
(1195)

Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is

necessary:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and

that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;

(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things

due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the
same quality if the latter has been stated;

(3) That the two debts be due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or

controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated
in due time to the debtor. (1196)

a. LEGAL COMPENSATION: Compensation is defined as a mode

of extinguishing obligations whereby two persons in their
capacity as principals are mutual debtors and creditors of each
other with respect to equally liquidated and demandable
obligations to which no retention or controversy has been timely
commenced and communicated by third parties.
b. REQUISITES ARE PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE 1279:
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1. That each one of the obligors be bound principally,

and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the
other;
2. That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the
things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also
of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
3. That the two debts be due;
4. That they be liquidated and demandable;
5. That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated
in due time to the debtor.
c. RULE UNDER 1290 – BY OPERATION OF LAW: When all the
requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present, compensation
takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to
the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors
are not aware of the compensation.

7. 1291; 1292 – AJAX MARKETING vs. COURT OF APPEALS |

G.R. No. 118585. September 14, 1995

Art. 1291. Obligations may be modified by:

(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;

(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;

(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.

(1203)

Art. 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by

another which substitute the same, it is imperative that it be
so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new
obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
(1204)

a. NOVATION AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISHMENT:

Extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of
the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or
modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal
conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or
by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
 Novation is a juridical act with a DUAL FUNCTION: it
extinguishes an obligation and creates a new one in lieu of the
old. It can be objective, subjective, or mixed.
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 OBJECTIVE NOVATION occurs when there is a

change of the object or principal conditions of an existing
obligation while SUBJECTIVE NOVATION occurs when there
is a change of either the person of the debtor, or of the
creditor in an existing obligation.
 When the change of the object or principal conditions
of an obligation occurs at the same time with the change of
either in the person of the debtor or creditor a mixed novation
occurs.
b. NOVATION WILL NOT BE ALLOWED UNLESS IT IS
CLEARLY SHOWN BY EXPRESS AGREEMENT, OR BY ACTS
OF EQUAL IMPORT: Novation is never presumed and it will
not be allowed unless it is clearly shown by express agreement,
or by acts of equal import.
 To effect an objective novation: The new obligation
expressly declare that the old obligation is extinguished, or
that the new obligation be on every point incompatible with
the new one.
 To effect a subjective novation by a change in the
person of the debtor: The old debtor be released expressly
from the obligation and the third person or new debtor
assumes his place in the relation. There is no novation
without such release as the third person who has assumed the
debtor’s obligation becomes merely a co-debtor or surety.

8. 1315; 1316; 1318; 1319

Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from

that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment
of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. (1258)

Art. 1316. Real contracts, such as deposit, pledge and

Commodatum, are not perfected until the delivery of the
object of the obligation. (n)

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites

concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

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(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (1261)

Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer

and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a
counter-offer.

Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the

offerer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The
contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered
into in the place where the offer was made. (1262a)

a. ABS-CBN vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 128690.

January 21, 1999
 A CONTRACT UNDERGOES THREE STAGES: (a)
preparation, conception, or generation, which is the period of
negotiation and bargaining, ending at the moment of
agreement of the parties; (b) perfection or birth of the
contract, which is the moment when the parties come to
agree on the terms of the contract; and (c) consummation or
death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms
agreed upon in the contract.
 Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected
upon mere meeting of the minds. Once there is concurrence
between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject
matter, consideration, and terms of payment a contract is
produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the offer
into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must
not qualify the terms of the offer; it must be plain,
unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort
from the proposal.
 A qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new
proposal, constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection of the
original offer. Consequently, when something is desired
which is not exactly what is proposed in the offer, such
acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent because any
modification or variation from the terms of the offer annuls
the offer.
 CASE AT BAR: ABS-CBN made no unqualified
acceptance of VIVA’s offer. Hence, they underwent a period of
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bargaining. ABS-CBN then formalized its counter-proposals or

counter-offer in a draft contract. VIVA through its Board of
Directors, rejected such counter-offer. Even if it be conceded
arguendo that Del Rosario had accepted the counter-offer, the
acceptance did not bind VIVA, as there was no proof
whatsoever that Del Rosario had the specific authority to do
so.
b. SORIANO vs. SORIANO [Comment: Apologies… I can’t find the
case.]

9. 1314: Any third person who induces another to violate his

contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party.

Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party. (n)

a. SO PING BUN vs. CA | G.R. No. 120554 September 21,

1999
 There is tort interference when during the existence
of a valid contract, a third person, to whom the existence of
such contract is known, interferes without legal justification
or excuse. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence
of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the
third person is without legal justification or excuse.
Petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute
lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latter’s property right. Clearly,
as correctly viewed by the appellate court, these elements are
present in the instant case.

10. 1324; 1479

Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain
period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time
before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except
when the option is founded upon a consideration, as
something paid or promised. (n)

Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a

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price certain is reciprocally demandable.

An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate

thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the
promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the
price. (1451a)

b. EQUATORIAL REALTY vs. MAYFAIR THEATER | G.R. No.

106063. November 21, 1996
 ART. 1324 speaks of an ‘offer’ made by an offeror
which the offeree may or may not accept within a certain
period.
 The offer may be withdrawn by the offeror
before the expiration of the period and while the offeree
has not yet accepted the offer. The offer cannot be
withdrawn by the offeror within the period if a
consideration has been promised or given by the offeree in
exchange for the privilege of being given that period within
which to accept the offer.
 The consideration is distinct from the price
which is part of the offer. The contract that arises is known
as OPTION (option contract).
 ART. 1479, second paragraph: Contemplates of an
‘accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate
thing for a price within (which) is binding upon the promisee
if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from
the price.’ That ‘unilateral promise to buy or to sell a
determinate thing for a price certain’ is called an offer.
 OFFER: A proposal to enter into a contract. To
constitute a legal offer, the proposal must be certain as to
the object, the price and other essential terms of the
contract (Art. 1319).
c. BIBLE BAPTIST CHURCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R.
No. 126454. November 26, 2004
 OPTION CONTRACT IS AN ONEROUS
CONTRACT: The Court defined consideration as “the why of
the contracts, the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into the contract.” The definition
illustrates that the consideration contemplated to support an
option contract need not be monetary. Actual cash need not
be exchanged for the option. However, by the very nature of
an option contract (Art. 1479), the same is an onerous
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contract for which the consideration must be something of

value, although its kind may vary.
 RULE: An option contract needs to be supported by
a separate consideration. The consideration need not be
monetary but could consist of other things or undertakings.
However, if the consideration is not monetary, these must be
things or undertakings of value, in view of the onerous nature
of the contract of option. Furthermore, when a consideration
for an option contract is not monetary, said consideration
must be clearly specified as such in the option contract or
clause.
d. SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS | G.R. No. L-25494. June 14, 1972
 If the option is given without a consideration, it is a
mere offer of a contract of sale which is not binding until
accepted. If, however, acceptance is made before a
withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale even
though the option was not supported by sufficient
consideration.
e. SERRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 103338. January
4, 1994
 A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a
price certain is reciprocally demandable. An accepted
unilateral promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a
price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is
supported by a consideration distinct from the price (Article
1479). The first is the mutual promise and each has the right
to demand from the other the fulfillment of the obligation.
While the second is merely an offer of one to another, which if
accepted, would create an obligation to the offeror to make
good his promise, provided the acceptance is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.
f. VDA. DE QUIRINO vs. PALARCA | G.R. No. L-28269.
August 15, 1969
 In reciprocal contracts, the obligation or promise of
each party is the consideration for that of the other. As a
consequence, the power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.
 Article 1324 provides that when an offeror has
allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer maybe
withdrawn at anytime before acceptance by communicating
such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon
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consideration, as something paid or promised. On the other

hand, Article 1479 provides that an accepted unilateral
promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain
is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.
 In a unilateral promise to sell, where the debtor fails
to withdraw the promise before the acceptance by the
creditor, the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell
and to buy, because upon acceptance by the creditor of the
offer to sell by the debtor, there is already a meeting of the
minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and
the price which is certain. In which case, the parties may then
reciprocally demand performance.
g. E*ILO** vs. A**EL*

11. 1356:

Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they

may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present. However, when the
law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it
may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a
certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable.
In such cases, the right of the parties stated in the following
article cannot be exercised. (1278a)

a. U.P. vs. PHILAB INDUSTRIES | G.R. NO. 152411.

September 29, 2004
 IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT: A contract implied
in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing a
mutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of
the parties is not expressed, but an agreement in fact creating
an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and terms of
which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit
words between parties but is to be deduced from conduct of
the parties, language used, or things done by them, or other
pertinent circumstances attending the transaction.
 TO CREATE CONTRACTS IMPLIED IN FACT,
circumstances must warrant inference that one expected
compensation and the other to pay. An implied-in-fact contract
requires the parties' intent to enter into a contract; it is a true
contract. The conduct of the parties is to be viewed as a
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reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or

not of an implied-in-fact contract. The totality of the
acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine
their intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise
unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some intelligent
conduct, act or sign.
b. VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 92436.
July 26, 1991
 VALIDITY OF ORAL PARTITION: Partition among
heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the other,
but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir
accepting and receiving the inheritance.
 There is no law that requires partition among heirs to
be in writing to be valid. The requirement that a partition be
put in a public document and registered has for its purpose
the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
others.
 The intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there
are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.
Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution
in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
law.

12. 1390; 1397 – KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO | G.R. No.

118910. July 17, 1995

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable,

even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to a contract;

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,

intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a

proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification. (n)

Art. 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be

instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or
subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege
the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can
those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence,
or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon
these flaws of the contract. (1302a)

a. LEASE CONTRACT: A contract of lease may call for some form

of collaboration or association between the parties since lease is
a "consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by
which one person binds himself to grant temporarily the use of a
thing or the rendering of some service to another who
undertakes to pay some rent, compensation or price.
b. PCSO MAY ENTER INTO EQUIPMENT LEASE CONTRACT
WITHOUT PUBLIC BIDDING: The question is whether the
ELA is subject to public bidding. In justifying the award of the
contract to the PGMC without public bidding, the PCSO invokes
E.O. No. 301. E.O. No. 301, Sec. 1 applies only to contracts for
the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It does not
refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The
provisions on lease are found in §6 and §7 but they refer to the
lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use,
or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and
these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult
to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the ELA when the only
feature of the ELA that may thought of as close to a contract of
purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An
option to buy is not of course a contract of purchase and sale.

13. 1403 – MCIAA vs. LOZADA | February 9, 2011

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless

they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one
who has been given no authority or legal representation, or
who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set
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forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement

hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed

within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other

than a mutual promise to marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in

action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the
buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or
the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or
pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a
sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in
his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind
of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers
and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;

(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one

year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;

(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent

to a contract.

a. GENERAL RULE: Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, a

contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be
unenforceable unless the same or some note of the contract be
in writing and subscribed by the party charged. Subject to
defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or secondary evidence of its
contents.
b. APPLICATION: The statute applies only to executory and not
to completed, executed, or partially consummated contracts.
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 RATIO: In executory contracts there is a wide field

for fraud because unless they may be in writing there is no
palpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties.
The statute has been precisely been enacted to prevent
fraud. However, if a contract has been totally or partially
performed, the exclusion of parol evidence would promote
fraud or bad faith, for it would enable the defendant to keep
the benefits already derived by him from the transaction in
litigation, and at the same time, evade the obligations,
responsibilities or liabilities assumed or contracted by him
thereby.
c. CASE AT BAR: The agreement package between the
government and the private lot owners was already partially
performed by the government through the acquisition of the lots
for the expansion of the Lahug airport. However, the parties
failed to accomplish the condition, the expansion of the Lahug
Airport. Be that as it may, the two groups of landowners can, in
an action to compel MCIAA to make good its oral undertaking to
allow repurchase, adduce parol evidence to prove the
transaction. At any rate, the objection on the admissibility
of evidence on the basis of the Statute of Frauds may be
waived if not timely raised. Records tend to support the
conclusion that MCIAA did not, as the Ouanos and the Inocians
posit, object to the introduction of parol evidence to prove its
commitment to allow the former landowners to repurchase their
respective properties upon the occurrence of certain events.

14. 1409; 1410 – URETA vs. URETA | G.R. No. 165748.

September 14, 2011

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void

from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy;

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of
the transaction;

(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

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(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;

(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the

principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained;

(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to

set up the defense of illegality be waived.

Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the

inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.

a. CHARACTERISTICS OF VOID OR INEXISTENT

CONTRACTS:
1. They produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance with
the principle "quod nullum est nullum producit effectum."
2. They are not susceptible of ratification.
3. The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute
nullity cannot be waived or renounced.
4. The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence
or absolute nullity is imprescriptible.
5. The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be
invoked by a person whose interests are not directly affected.
b. IMPRESCRIPTIBLE: As the Deed of Sale is a void contract,
the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years
after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is
imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of
inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.
Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting
up the defense of its inexistence.
b. Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts,
because they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or subject-
matter. The article presupposes the existence of a cause, it
cannot refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in
reality non-existent. As it has been determined that the Deed of
Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot apply to it.

15. 1412 – BANCO FILIPINO

Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause

consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed:
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(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties,

neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other's
undertaking;

(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he

cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or
ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The
other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he
has given without any obligation to comply his promise.
(1306)

d. Article 1412 of the Civil Code provides in part: If the act in

which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting
parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking.
d. CASE AT BAR: Banco Filipino cannot demand the
reconveyance of the subject properties in the present cases;
neither can any affirmative relief be accorded to one party
against the other since they have been found to have acted in
pari delicto. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its
branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion
program and purchase new branch sites including its main
branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property
holdings limit under §25(a)and §34 of the General Banking Act
which it had already reached.
d. The Bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its
alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to
law. An implied trust could not have been formed because the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of
the party who is guilty of the fraud.

ESTOPPEL

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is

rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
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Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as

they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Code, the Code of
Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.

PASION vs. MELEGRITO | G.R. No. 166558 | March 28, 2007

 PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
sometimes called estoppel in pais are part of our law by Art. 1432
of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is estoppel by silence –
o Estoppel by silence arises where a person, who by force
of circumstances is under a duty to another to speak, refrains
from doing so and thereby leads the other to believe in the
existence of a state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his
prejudice. Silence may support an estoppel whether the failure
to speak is intentional or negligent.
 Inaction or silence may under some circumstances
amount to a misrepresentation and concealment of facts, so as to
raise an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of such a character
and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the
other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his
silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate
as an estoppel.
 CASE AT BAR: Petitioner had, by her silence,
induced respondent to believe that she did not have any interest on
respondent’s property other than being his tenant. Thus,
respondent rightfully acted on this belief and filed the forcible
entry case only against petitioner’s sisters whom he thought were
the owners of the structure constructed on his land. Verily, to
permit petitioner to deny the fact that she does not own the
structure would work to prejudice the rights of respondent as the
winning litigant in Civil Case No. 1243-99. Indeed, petitioner is
conclusively estopped from interposing her claim of ownership
against the writ of demolition issued to execute the decision in said
case.

ILANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 104376 | February 23,

1994
 The Court sustained the appellate court’s finding that
private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and
paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latter’s
public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child
through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was
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fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled

that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
 Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of
Article 283 of the Civil Code. The legal provision provides that the
father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child “when
the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father.”
o The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket
provision that practically covers all the other cases in the
preceding paragraphs. ‘Any other evidence or proof’ that the
defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary
the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not
sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as
provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation.

[Comment: There are several cases that cited the ruling in Ilano vs.
CA, but it is mainly a PFR case. I found a case citing Ilano regarding
estoppel involving movable property.]

MENDOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. L-31618 | August

17, 1983
 Article 1437 of the Civil Code on ESTOPPEL
INVOLVING IMMOVABLE PROPERTY provides:
When in a contract between third persons concerning immovable
property, one of them is misled by a person with respect to the
ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded
from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these
requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful
concealment of facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act
upon the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts;
and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the
representation.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

 The principle of estoppel rests on the rule that

whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led the other to believe a particular
thing true and to act, upon such belief he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.
 WHO CAN INVOKE: Estoppel can only be invoked
between the person making the misrepresentation and the person
to whom it was addressed. It is essential that the latter shall have
relied upon the misrepresentation and had been influenced and
misled thereby.

Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the

thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.

SANTOS vs. NSO | G.R. No. 171129 | April 6, 2011

 CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS – §2(b), Rule 131,
ROC: What a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant
relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been
acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the
landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself;
and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been
ousted or evicted by title paramount.
 EXCEPTIONS: It does not apply if the landlord’s
title has: (a) expired or (b) been conveyed to another or (c) been
defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of
lessor-lessee relationship. If there was a change in the nature of
the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then
the presumption does not apply.
 CASE AT BAR: While petitioner appears to have
already lost ownership of the property at the time of the
commencement of the tenant-landlord relationship between him
and respondent, the change in the nature of petitioner’s title, as far
as respondent is concerned, came only after the commencement of
such relationship or during the subsistence of the lease. This is
precisely because at the time of the execution of the second and
third contracts of lease, respondent was still not aware of the
transfer of ownership of the leased property to China Bank. It was
only in November 2003 or less than two months before the
expiration of said contracts when respondent came to know of the
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same after it was notified by said bank. Thus, there was a change
in the nature of petitioner’s title during the subsistence of the lease
that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this
case. Petitioner’s reliance on said conclusive presumption must,
therefore, necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of
the CA when it entertained respondent’s assertion of a title adverse
to petitioner.

Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title
thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.

*MARTIN vs. REYES

TRUST

Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the
legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for
the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The
former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if
the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or
illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the
child.

**EMILIA O'LACO vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT | G.R. No.

58010| March 31, 1993
 CASE AT BAR: A resulting trust was intended by the
parties under Art. 1448 of the Civil Code. As stipulated by the
parties, the document of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the
certificate of title, insurance policies, receipt of initial premium of
insurance coverage and real estate tax receipts were all in the
possession of respondent-spouses which they offered in evidence.
As asserted by respondent O Lay Kia, the reason why these
documents of ownership remained with her is that the land in
question belonged to her. Indeed, there can be no persuasive
rationalization for the possession of these documents of ownership
by respondent-spouses for 17 years after the Oroquieta property
was purchased in 1943 than that of precluding its possible sale,
alienation or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any machination
or fraud. This continued possession of the documents, together
with other corroborating evidence spread on record, strongly
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in

trust for respondent-spouses.
 TRUST: Trust relations between parties may either
be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created
by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or
deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust.
Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent,
or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law
as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties.
 IMPLIED TRUSTS – RESULTING and
CONSTRUCTIVE:
 Implied trust may either be resulting or
constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of law.
 Resulting trusts arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction
whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title
but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of
another.
 Constructive trusts are created by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence,
obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not,
in equity and good conscience, to hold.
 EXPRESS vs. IMPLIED TRUSTS CONCERNING
IMMOVABLES: Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or
any interest therein which cannot be proved by parol evidence,
implied trusts may be established by oral evidence. However,
in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol
evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts
giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic
document. It cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive
proof.
 CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST SUBJECT TO
PRESCRIPTION: Once the resulting trust is repudiated, it is
converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription.
 A resulting trust is repudiated if the following
requisites concur: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is
clear and convincing.
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.

***IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs. TAEZA | G.R. No.

179597 | February 3, 2014
 CASE AT BAR: Respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Bernardino Taeza, had already obtained a transfer certificate of
title in his name over the property in question. Since the person
supposedly transferring ownership was not authorized to do so, the
property had evidently been acquired by mistake. The applicable
provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
 IMPLIED TRUST: Those which, without being
expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by
operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either
resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from
each other as follows:
 Resulting trusts are based on the equitable
doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title
determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed
always to have been contemplated by the parties.
 Constructive trusts are created by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice
and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence,
obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not,
in equity and good conscience, to hold. Unlike in express trusts
and resulting implied trusts, in constructive implied trusts, the
trustee may acquire the property through prescription even if he
does not repudiate the relationship. It is then incumbent upon
the beneficiary to bring an action for reconveyance before
prescription bars the same.
 ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The ten-year
prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of
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the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the property.

CAÑEZO vs. ROJAS | G.R. No. 148788| November 23, 2007

 CASE AT BAR: An intention to create a trust cannot
be inferred from the petitioner’s testimony and the attendant facts
and circumstances. The petitioner testified only to the effect that
her agreement with her father was that she will be given a share in
the produce of the property. This allegation, standing alone as it
does, is inadequate to establish the existence of a trust because
profit-sharing per se, does not necessarily translate to a trust
relation. It could also be present in other relations, such as in
deposit.
 In EXPRESS TRUSTS AND RESULTING TRUSTS,
a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property entrusted to
him unless he repudiates the trust.
 A trustee cannot acquire by prescription the
ownership of property entrusted to him, or that an action to
compel a trustee to convey property registered in his name in
trust for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe, or
that the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to
recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of
another, or that property held in trust can be recovered by the
beneficiary regardless of the lapse of time.
 The rule applies squarely to express trusts. The
basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee is not
adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription
the property held in trust.
 The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to
recover property held in trust may possibly apply to resulting
trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust.
 BURDEN OF PROOF; EXISTENCE OF TRUST;
PROOF: Party asserting its existence and such proof must be clear
and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.
The presence of the following elements must be proved:
1. a trustor or settlor who executes the
instrument creating the trust
2. a trustee, who is the person expressly
designated to carry out the trust
3. the trust res, consisting of duly
identified and definite real properties
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4. the cestui que trust, or beneficiaries

whose identity must be clear
 The existence of express trusts concerning real
property may not be established by parol evidence. It must be
proven by some writing or deed.

Art. 1454. If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to

secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the
grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the
obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property to him.

*MCIAA vs. LOZADA | G.R. No. 168770, 168812 | February 9,

2011
 CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST: The right to repurchase in
this case is referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the
implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose
of which is to prevent unjust enrichment. Constructive trusts are
fictions of equity that courts use as devices to remedy any situation
in which the holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not
retain the beneficial interest. However, the party seeking the aid of
equity––the landowners in this instance, in establishing the trust––
must himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and
reasonable.
 CASE AT BAR: The Ouanos and the Inocians parted
with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging
itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing
to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the
former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them,
otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a
state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated when the
expropriation was authorized. In effect, the government merely
held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed
public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned
was actually consummated by the government. Since the
government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the
transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians
can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the
payment of the condemnation price.

SALES
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**Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right
to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. (n)

**Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property. By future

property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at
the time of the donation. (635)

Contract to Sell vs. Contract of Sale

**Art. 1534. An unpaid seller having the right of lien or having

stopped the goods in transitu, may rescind the transfer of title and
resume the ownership in the goods, where he expressly reserved the
right to do so in case the buyer should make default, or where the
buyer has been in default in the payment of the price for an
unreasonable time. The seller shall not thereafter be liable to the
buyer upon the contract of sale, but may recover from the buyer
damages for any loss occasioned by the breach of the contract.
The transfer of title shall not be held to have been rescinded by
an unpaid seller until he has manifested by notice to the buyer or by
some other overt act an intention to rescind. It is not necessary that
such overt act should be communicated to the buyer, but the giving or
failure to give notice to the buyer of the intention to rescind shall be
relevant in any issue involving the question whether the buyer had
been in default for an unreasonable time before the right of rescission
was asserted. (n)

**Art. 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may

have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time
agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place,
the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as
no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him
either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the court may
not grant him a new term. (1504a)

LAFORTEZA vs. MACHUCA | G.R. No. 137552| June 16, 2000

 CASE AT BAR: There was already a perfected
contract. The condition was imposed only on the performance of
the obligations contained therein. Considering however that the
title was eventually "reconstituted" and that the petitioners admit
their ability to execute the extrajudicial settlement of their father’s
estate, the respondent had a right to demand fulfillment of the
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petitioners’ obligation to deliver and transfer ownership of the

house and lot.
 CONTRACT OF SALE: A contract of sale is a
consensual contract and is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price. From that moment the parties may
reciprocally demand performance subject to the provisions of the
law governing the form of contracts. The ELEMENTS OF A VALID
CONTRACT OF SALE under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are –
(1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter
and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
 CONDITION IMPOSED UPON THE PERFECTION
OF CONTRACT vs. PERFORMANCE OF OBLIGATION: Failure
to comply with the first condition results in the failure of a
contract, while the failure to comply with the second condition only
gives the other party the option either to refuse to proceed with the
sale or to waive the condition. Thus, Article 1545 of the Civil Code
states: Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is
subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may
refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance
of the condition. If the other party has promised that the condition
should happen or be performed, such first mentioned party may
also treat the nonperformance of the condition as a breach of
warranty.

NAGUIT vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 137675| December

5, 2000
 COMMENT: The case is a CivPro case which
provides remedies under §16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court – (1)
terceria to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly
taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or
obligor and (2) an independent "separate action" to vindicate their
claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.
 A THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT OR A STRANGER to
the foreclosure suit, like respondents herein, can opt to file a
remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the
writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof
upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages.
A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent "separate
action," the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
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arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite

the third-party claim. If a "separate action" is the recourse, the
third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in
which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need
of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are
cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately
from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua
non to the institution of a "separate action."

**Art. 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of

which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the
following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfillment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to
pay;
(2) Cancel the sale, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two
or more installments;
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has
been constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more
installments. In this case, he shall have no further action against the
purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement
to the contrary shall be void. (1454-A-a)

MAGNA FINANCIAL SERVICES vs. COLARINA| G.R. No.

158635| December 9, 2005
 CASE AT BAR: Based on the Complaint, petitioner
preferred to avail of the first and third remedies under Article
1484, at the same time suing for replevin. The Court of Appeals
justifiably set aside the decision of the RTC. Perusing the
Complaint, the petitioner, under its prayer number 1, sought for the
payment of the unpaid amortizations which is a remedy that is
provided under Article 1484(1) of the Civil Code, allowing an
unpaid vendee to exact fulfillment of the obligation. At the same
time, petitioner prayed that Colarina be ordered to surrender
possession of the vehicle so that it may ultimately be sold at public
auction, which remedy is contained under Article 1484(3). Such a
scheme is not only irregular but is a flagrant circumvention of the
prohibition of the law. By praying for the foreclosure of the chattel,
Magna Financial Services Group, Inc. renounced whatever claim it
may have under the promissory note.
 ARTICLE 1484(3) provides that if the vendor has
availed himself of the right to foreclose the chattel mortgage, “he
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shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any

unpaid balance of the purchase price. Any agreement to the
contrary shall be void.” In all proceedings for the foreclosure of
chattel mortgages executed on chattels which have been sold on
the installment plan, the mortgagee is limited to the property
included in the mortgage.

**Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
With regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made
by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored
or kept. (1463a)

BEATINGO vs. GASIS| G.R. No. 179641 | February 9, 2011

 GENERAL RULE: The execution of a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is
the object of the contract. However, the execution of a public
instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery.
It is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
possession of the land sold.
 CASE AT BAR: Though the sale was evidenced by a
notarized deed of sale, petitioner admitted that she refused to
make full payment on the subject property and take actual
possession thereof because of the presence of tenants on the
subject property. Clearly, petitioner had not taken possession of the
subject property or exercised acts of dominion over it despite her
assertion that she was the lawful owner thereof.

***Art. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the

seller's risk until the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer,
but when the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer the goods
are at the buyer's risk whether actual delivery has been made or not,
except that:
(1) Where delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or to
a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the contract and the ownership
in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure
performance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract, the
goods are at the buyer's risk from the time of such delivery;
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(2) Where actual delivery has been delayed through the fault of
either the buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the party in
fault. (n)

RES PERIT DOMINO

 DEFINITION: The thing is lost to the owner. This
phrase is used to express that when a thing is lost or destroyed, it
is lost to the person who was the owner of it at the time. Ownership
is the basis for consideration of who bears the risk of loss.

**Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith. (1473)

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE vs. PALILEO| G.R. No. 83432| May 20,

1991
 DOUBLE SALE: In case of double sale of an
immovable property, ownership shall be transferred: (1) to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in
good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
 LANDS REGISTERED UNDER THE TORRENS
SYSTEM: §51 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that the act of registration
is the operative act to convey or affect registered lands insofar as
third persons are concerned. Thus, a person dealing with
registered land is not required to go behind the register to
determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face
of the register or certificate of title. Following this principle, the
Court has time and again held that a purchaser in good faith of
registered land (covered by a Torrens Title) acquires a good title as
against all the transferees thereof whose right is not recorded in
the registry of deeds at the time of the sale.
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 LAND REGISTRATION – MEANING OF PHRASE

"WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO A THIRD PARTY WITH A BETTER
RIGHT": Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is "without prejudice to a third party with a
better right." The phrase means that the mere registration of a
sale in one’s favor does not give him any light over the land if the
vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.
 Article 1644 of the Civil Code has no application
to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar,
Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered land.
The first sale was made by the original owners and was
unrecorded while the second was an execution sale against the
said original owners. The Court held that Article 1544 of the
Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at
the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good
faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was
explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land
at a sheriff s execution sale only steps into the shoes of the
judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.

MIRROR DOCTRINE: LUCENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R.

No. 77468 |August 25, 1999
 GENERAL RULE: A purchaser may be considered a
purchaser in good faith when he has examined the latest certificate
of title.
 EXCEPTION: When there exist important facts that
would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go
beyond the present title and to investigate those that preceded it.
Thus, it has been said that a person who deliberately ignores a
significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. If the buyer
fails to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent man would
have taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece of
land in the actual, visible and public possession of another person,
other than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to
bad faith.
 Where, the land sold is in the possession of a person
other than the vendor, the purchaser is required to go beyond the
certificate of title to make inquiries concerning the rights of the
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actual possessor. Failure to do so would make him purchaser in bad

faith.

LEASE

**Art. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent
of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. (n)

**Art. 1650. When in the contract of lease of things there is no

express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole
or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance
of the contract toward the lessor. (1550)

BANGAYAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS| G.R. No. 123581| August

29, 1997
 CASE AT BAR: Article 1311 of the Civil Code
provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
lease contract reveal the intent of the parties to limit their lease
relationship to themselves alone. Paragraph 4 provides that "the
leased premises shall be used exclusively by her," referring to the
late Teofista Ocampo. Paragraph 5 prohibits Ocampo from directly
or indirectly assigning, transferring or conveying her right of lease
over the leased premises or any portion thereof under any
circumstances whatsoever.
 Ocampo's right of first option to buy the leased
property in case of its sale is but part of the right to lease said
property from Lingat. The option was given to Ocampo because
she was the lessee of the subject property. It was a component of
the consideration of the lease. The option was by no means an
independent right which can be exercised by Ocampo. If
Ocampo is barred by the contract from assigning her right to lease
the subject property to any other party, she is similarly barred
from assigning her first option to buy the leased property.
*Art. 1652. The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any
rent due from the lessee. However, the sublessee shall not be
responsible beyond the amount of rent due from him, in accordance
with the terms of the sublease, at the time of the extrajudicial demand
by the lessor.
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Payments of rent in advance by the sublessee shall be deemed

not to have been made, so far as the lessor's claim is concerned,
unless said payments were effected in virtue of the custom of the
place. (1552a)

WHEELERS CLUB vs. BONIFACIO| G.R. No. 139540| June 29,

2005
 The sub-lessee is not liable to the lessor upon mere
demand by the lessor on the sub-lessee. The sub-lessee is primarily
liable to his sub-lessor and only a court order can extinguish or
modify this primary liability if the sub-lessor contests the pre-
termination of the principal lease by the lessor.
 Article 1652 of the Civil Code permits the lessor to
proceed against the sublessee for rent due from the lessee.
However, this is only on a subsidiary liability basis. There must be
a judgment cancelling the lessee’s principal lease contract or
ousting the lessee from the premises before the sub-lessee
becomes subsidiarily liable.
**Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in
such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary
repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been
devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. (1554a)

**Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the
following causes:
(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the
duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the
contract;
(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or
service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he
does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards
the use thereof.
The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by
special laws. (1569a)
**Art. 1657. The lessee is obliged:
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(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the terms

stipulated;
(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family,
devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to
that which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased,
according to the custom of the place;
(3) To pay expenses for the deed of lease. (1555)

MAMARIL vs. BSP| G.R. No. 179382| January 14, 2013

 CONTRACT OF LEASE: The owners parked their 6
passenger jeepneys inside the BSP compound for a monthly fee of
P300.00 for each unit and took the keys home with them. Hence, a
lessor-lessee relationship indubitably existed between them and
BSP.
 LESSOR’S OBLIGATION IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 1644: The obligation of the lessor is provided in Article
1654. In relation thereto, Article 1664 provides that the lessor is
not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third
person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee
shall have a direct action against the intruder.
 CASE AT BAR: BSP was not remiss in its obligation
to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys
as it even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it
should not be held liable for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.

***Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the
lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has
previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new
lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time
established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original
contract shall be revived. (1566a)

SAMELO vs. MANOTOK SERVICES | G.R. No. 170509| June 27,

2012
 IMPLIED NEW LEASE: An implied new lease or
tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are
found to exist: a) the term of the original contract of lease has
expired; b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate;
and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for fifteen
days with the acquiescence of the lessor.
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 NOTICE TO VACATE: Constitutes an express act on

the part of the lessor that it no longer consents to the continued
occupation by the lessee of its property. After such notice, the
lessee’s right to continue in possession ceases and her possession
becomes one of detainer.
 ARTICLE 1687 provides: If the period for the lease
has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly;
from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the
rent is to be paid daily.
 CASE AT BAR: Since the rent was paid on a monthly
basis, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month.
A lease from month to month is considered to be one with a
definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a
demand to vacate by the lessor. When the respondent sent a notice
to vacate to the petitioner, the tacita reconduccion was aborted,
and the contract is deemed to have expired at the end of that
month.

CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No. 106573| March 27,

1995
 CASE AT BAR: The contract provides that if "no
written notice is received from LESSEE of its intention to renew
the contract," the contract terminates at the end of the lease
period. It is also stipulated therein that upon termination of the
period of lease and "unless LESSEE has indicated its intention to
renew the contract," the lessee has to surrender the leased
premises to the lessor. The notice must be given 30 days before
the expiration of the lease period, which was on August 30, 1989.
The notice to renew dated August 18, 1989 sent by petitioner and
received by the lessor on August 22, 1989.
 There is a difference between a waiver of the right to
enforce a condition stipulated in the contract and a waiver of the
stipulation itself. The renewals of the lease contract, in spite of the
lack of or tardiness in giving the written notices, were mere acts of
tolerance on the part of the lessor.
 NOTICE TO VACATE: Assuming that the provision
Article 1670 is applicable to petitioner's case, still that law does
not require that the notice to vacate be given before the lease
expires. The notice required under said provision is the one given
after the expiration of the lease period for the purpose of
aborting an implied renewal of the lease.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

 PAROL EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE: There being

no ambiguity in the applicable provision of the lease contract, there
is no basis to allow oral testimony whether under the Statute of
Frauds or the Parol Evidence Rule, to prove that petitioner was
given verbal assurance of a renewal of the lease and "first priority
to buy in case of sale of the leased premises.”

DIZON vs. MAGSAYSAY | G.R. No. L-23399| May 31, 1974

 CASE AT BAR: The two-year term of the lease
contract expired on April 1, 1951 without the parties' having
expressly renewed their agreement. Bernardo Dizon, however,
continued to occupy the leased premises, paying the same monthly
rental of P100.00, which Ambrosio Magsaysay accepted.
 MEANING OF "the other terms of the original
contract" UNDER ART. 1670: "The other terms of the original
contract" which are revived in the implied new lease under Article
1670 are only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right
of continued enjoyment of the property leased. Necessarily, if the
presumed will of the parties refers to the enjoyment of possession
the presumption covers the other terms of the contract related
to such possession, such as the amount of rental, the date when it
must be paid, the care of the property, the responsibility for
repairs. However, no presumption may be indulged in with respect
to special agreements which by nature are foreign to the right of
occupancy or enjoyment inherent in a contract of lease.

DIZON vs. MAGSAYSAY | G.R. No. 70360| March 11, 1987

 APPLICATION OF Article 1670: Article 1670
applies only where, before the expiration of the lease, no
negotiations are held between the lessor and the lessee resulting in
its renewal. Where no such talks take place and the lessee is not
asked to vacate before the lapse of fifteen days from the end of the
lease, the implication is that the lessor is amenable to its renewal.
 FORMAL NOTICE TO VACATE: Where the lessor is
unwilling in any event to renew the lease for whatever reason, it
will be necessary for him to serve on the lessee a formal notice to
vacate. As no talks have been held between the lessor and the
lessee concerning the renewal of the lease, there can be no
inference that the former, by his inaction, intends to discontinue it.
In such a case, no less than an express notice to vacate must be
made within the statutory 15-day period.
 CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

 CASE AT BAR: Weeks before the deadline for the

notice to vacate, the petitioner had already communicated to the
respondent its intention to increase the rental. This increase had to
be accepted by the respondent if he wanted the lease to be
renewed. In its letter to the respondent, the petitioner again
rejected the latter’s counter-proposal and declared that the
increased rental was "no longer negotiable." Since this was a reply
to the respondent’s letter of September 14, 1979, 14 it is obvious
that the increase in rental was notified to the respondent on an
earlier date, and before the expiration of the original lease. As of
that date, the respondent was already being informed that he
would have to vacate the leased premises on August 31, 1979,
unless he was willing to pay the increased rental demanded by the
lessor.