People vs Batin
Facts: Castor handed the gun to Neil and urged the latter to
fire at the Refugio spouses. While Castor was indeed heard
to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as
reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the
gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed
back the gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio
spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-
examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the
car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil
was aiming the gun at the spouses. As concluded by the trial
court, the circumstances surrounding Castor's utterance of
"Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the
same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to
leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances
only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in
committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun
and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give
the gun to Neil — a crystal-clear expression of the
agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a
felony. Neil Batin asked his father before shooting: "Tay,
banatan ko na?" Neil Batin was clearly seeking the consent
of his father before proceeding with the act, and it was
Castor's words "Sige, banatan mo na" 25 that sealed
Eugenio Refugio's fate.|||
Held: Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the
appellants before, during, and after the commission of the
crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action, and concurrence of sentiments. Inducement may be
by acts of command, advice or through influence or
agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the
influence must have actually moved the hands of the
principal by direct participation. We have held that words of
command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime.
In People v. Tamayo, 24 we held that the moral influence of
the words of the father may determine the course of conduct
of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a
stranger would make no impression.
People vs Ragundiaz
Facts: From, this testimony, it is clear that accused-appellant
Flores was a mere bystander when the altercation between
accused Ragundiaz and Billy Cajuban was taking place.
Likewise, it was accused Isabelo Ragundiaz and not
accused Rolando Flores who boxed Billy Cajuban on the
face, poked a gun at him and dragged the victim to the El
Salvador taxi. As such, from Castillo's testimony, it cannot be
inferred that accused-appellant took a direct part in the
execution of the crime or that he forced or induced others to
commit it. The only participation of accused-appellant Flores
was that he allegedly helped in dragging the victim to the
taxicab and that he allegedly drove the taxicab away from
the basketball court. These acts however have not been
shown to be indispensable to the commission of the crime so
as to consider him as a principal by indispensable
cooperation.
Held: conspiracy must be shown to exist, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself. 19 Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it or if at the
time of the commission of the offense, the offenders have
the same criminal purpose and were united in its execution.
Therefore, in order to hold an accused liable as co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 20 The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.
We have previously held that the liability of one whose
participation in a crime was limited to driving for the
killers, 25 or one who himself tied the victim's hands and
joined armed men in taking the victim to the hills, 26 is only
that of an accomplice. The rationale for these rulings is that
where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy
is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as
principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the
milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice.
People vs Dumancas
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order
supposedly given by Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche
"to take care of the two" constitutes words of command
which may be considered sufficient basis to convict Jeanette
as principal by inducement. prLL
In order that a person may be convicted as
principal by inducement, the following must be present: (1)
the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime, and (2) such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission by the material
executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To
constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the
inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent
effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with
the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation to commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette
to "take care of the two" does not constitute the
command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty
as a principal by inducement. As we held
in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, "a chance word spoken without
reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical
phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or
even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some
independent reason predisposed thereto without the one
who spoke the word or performed the act having any
expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the
expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the
extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or performed the
act) would not be guilty of the crime committed" (p.
219). LLjur
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly
the act of inducement, should precede the commission of the
crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case
at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the
crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has
already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-
appellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance
could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit
the crime charged in this case.
Accomplices
People vs Yau
It must be emphasized that there was no evidence
indubitably proving that Susana participated in the decision
to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the
prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to
the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave
food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he
would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence 25 is instructive of the elements
required, in accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order
that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there be a community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates
in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution
of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal
design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never
reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she
stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the
victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to
the victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus' illegal act,
but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has
been held that being present and giving moral support when
a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed. 26 As keenly observed
by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim
was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression
of sympathy or feeling of support to her
husband. 27 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling
in People v. De Vera, 28where it was stressed that in case of
doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as
that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Garcia vs CA
Facts: That petitioner Fidelino Garcia was stabbed by
Paulino Rodolfo is perfectly clear to us. What is doubtful is
whether he had an active, direct and personal role in the
killing of Paulino Rodolfo. On cross-examination, it appears
petitioner was still approaching the deceased when the latter
was stabbed by co-accused Wilfredo Garcia. Cpl. Rollera
stated under direct examination that Fidelino had hit Rodolfo
with a bottle. But Cpl. Rollera did not say where and when
petitioner struck the victim with a bottle, or if the blow was
hard or not. Further, the prosecution's evidence does not
establish any direct link between the petitioner's act with the
bottle and any injury suffered by the deceased, much less
the mortal wound which caused his death. If we are to
believe Cpl. Rollera's account, petitioner was merely
approaching the victim, who was then trying to get loose
from Leopoldo's hold and ward off Wilfredo's attack. It
appears unclear to us, however, whether petitioner
succeeded to hit the victim, Rodolfo, with a bottle. As it
turned out, it was petitioner who was stabbed by Rodolfo,
using Wilfredo's balisong, with the result that petitioner was
hospitalized.
Held: the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction for homicide. There appears no proof to show the
connection between the acts he allegedly committed and the
lethal injuries sustained by the victim.
People vs Roche
Facts: there is no proof to show accused-
appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to
attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on
Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes
borne out of the desire to get even with him for the offense
committed against his brother. In no way can such act be
attributed to accused-appellant.
Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an
accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites
must concur in order that a person may be considered an
accomplice:
(a) community of
design, i.e., knowing that criminal
design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous
or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation
between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice. 32
There is no evidence to show that accused-
appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act to
assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has
not been proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes’ plan
to attack and kill Roderick Ferol.
Accessories
People vs Antonio
Facts: grounds for finding Nieto guilty are: (1) he failed to
arrest appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information
tending to deceive the investigating authorities.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right
before the shooting, appellant Antonio called him and he
immediately went upstairs. He saw that appellant shot
Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he failed to arrest appellant
and, instead, left the crime scene together with the latter. To
this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.
Held: The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an
accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of
the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal
or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2)
concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects
or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and
(3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of
the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime. 63
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of
which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in
the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have
acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime
committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a
light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer,
and he abused his public function when he failed to effect
the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a
speedy investigation of the crime committed.
SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not intentionally conceal or
destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed to prove
that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the
principal accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight
was an accessory device attached to the gun, it was not
essential to the commission, investigation and prosecution of
the crime. The gun itself, which was the instrument of the
crime, was surrendered to the authorities and presented as
evidence in court. The failure of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr.
to present the laser sight as part of the evidence did not in
any way affect the outcome of the trial, much less prevent
the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing
that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-
presentation of the laser sight.
People vs Verzola
An accessory does not participate in the
criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the
felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the
crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a)
by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by
concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime
in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in
the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime,
provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or
the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. The
main difference separating accessories after the fact
the responsibility of the accessories is subsequent to
the consummation of the crime and subordinate to that
of the principal.
According to the trial court, "the bringing
down of the body of the victim . . . was to destroy the
body of the crime, or its effect, that is, to make it appear
that the death of the victim was caused by an accident."
We disagree. There is no iota of proof that Josefina
Molina ever attempted "to destroy the body of the
crime" or to make it appear that death of the victim was
accidental. It must be noted that Josefina testified that
she helped her co-appellant bring the body of the
deceased down the stairs accuse of fear. Even if she
assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply
assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the house
to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for
anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to
conceal or destroy the body of the crime, the effects or
instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the
discovery of the crime. In the case at bar, the body was
left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it was
easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances,
there could not have been any attempt on the part of
Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime.
People vs Mariano
Facts: . since her act of driving the car where the corpse of
Michelle was hidden, her resistance to stop the car when
chased by the police and to immediately open the luggage
compartment as requested by the police, her act of lying to
the police by claiming that the box in the compartment
contained only dirty clothes, and her refusal to open said box
sufficiently indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to
Ruth Mariano in concealing the corpus delicti to prevent its
discovery.
Held: Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of
accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. As such, their relationship
exempts appellant Ruby Mariano from criminal liability under
Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code —
ARTICLE 20. Accessories
who are exempt from criminal liability.
— The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed
upon those who are such with respect
to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural and
adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same
degrees, with the single exception of
accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the
preceding article (italics supplied).
The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of
blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of one's name,
which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives
so near as those mentioned in the above-quoted article. This
Court is thus mandated by law to acquit accused-appellant
Ruby Mariano.
Ong vs People
Facts: Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires
for the past twenty-four (24) years, 18 ought to have known
the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an
unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered
to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof
of ownership of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the
proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just
one day. 20 His experience from the business should have
given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and
the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the
thirteen (13) tires in the streets.13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds
that the serial numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those
found in Ong's possession. 15Ong likewise admitted that he
bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount
of P45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980.
Held: Fencing is defined in Section 2 (a) of P.D.
1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or
in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are
as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals
in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for
oneself or for another.
Francisco vs People
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that
the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the
prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances
from which it can be concluded that the accused should have
known that the property sold to him were stolen. This
requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of
the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the
trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime,
since the penalty depends on the value of the property;
otherwise, the court will fix the value of the property at P5.00.
Tan vs People
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items
and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items
and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never
reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted
that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee,
confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave
him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can
be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As
complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for
certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the
first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime
of robbery or theft has been committed.
Complex Crimes
People vs Esugon
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
Prosecution must prove the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4)
the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery. 22 A conviction requires certitude that the robbery
is the main objective of the malefactor, and the killing is
merely incidental to the robbery. 23
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-
bladed weapon. The fact that the appellant was armed
with the long-bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a
deadly weapon, competently proved the presence of
violence or intimidation against persons that qualified the
offense as robbery instead of theft. For sure, too, the
patent intent of the appellant was originally to commit
robbery, with the homicide being committed only in the
course or on the occasion of the perpetration of the
robbery. As the records show, Dennis was awakened by
someone shouting "Magnanakaw!" The shout was most
probably made by the victim, whom the appellant then
stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that
the original criminal design to rob had been consummated
with the taking of the money amounting to P13,000.00, the
killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide. EDCcaS
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known
as a special complex crime. It is composed of two or more
crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and
unique offense for being the product of one criminal
impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty
provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a
compound or complex crime under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. 24 A composite crime is truly
distinct and different from a complex or compound crime.
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is
fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the
combination of the offenses is not specified but
generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one
offense being the necessary means to commit the other.
In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified
combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or
compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of
a complex or compound crime may be made the subject
of a separate information, but a light felony that
accompanies a composite crime is absorbed.
People vs Sanidad
We fully agree with the lower court that the instant
case comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised
Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides
that when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed in its maximum period." In
a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender. 25
Although several independent acts were
performed by the accused in firing separate shots from their
individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who
among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover,
there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire
at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly
from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows
a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a
whole. 26 Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in
frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not able to
kill all of them." 27 Where a conspiracy animates several
persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act,
the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.