COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs.

HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION

G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012

[When laws take effect]

FACTS: Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes,
wheat was classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat
was 3%, for feed grade, 7%. CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases.

Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the
implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from
China. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the
University of the Philippines Law Center. Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged
it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite
having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment,
forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper; likewise, the respondent asserted that the retroactive
application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

RTC issued a TRO; Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging inter alia, that the remedy of
a petition for declaratory relief was improper; that CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and
not legislative in nature; they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that
the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared
otherwise.

The RTC held with regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not
followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise
held that petitioners had substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-
legislative predetermination.

The respondents appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that, since the regulation
affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication notwithstanding that the fact that the Memorandum was not legislative in nature? Whether
or not the action for declaratory relief is proper

HELD: Yes. The respondents should have observed said requirements.

The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be
ripe for judicial determination. The SC finds that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court
meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs. The Court held:

The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts,
including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.

Citing another case:

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether
it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the
desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment,
has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of
an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule.
As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of
law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate
degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)

Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily
imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.

Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-
2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has
actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003.
Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the
imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent
alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on
food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003,
which would undoubtedly toll its time and resources.

Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable19
for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour
millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a
protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the
case.

Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII,
Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction
against any party of persons.

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable,
publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their
views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.

Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera, the SC held:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
– no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less
a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis
supplied). Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised
Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
BPI, vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988

[Acts executed against mandatory or prohibitory laws]

1. An application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia, Assistant Branch Manager of
COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D. Dizon in the amount of $1,000.00. In the
application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar savings account of the
Zshornacks; the charges for commission, documentary stamp tax and others were charged to the current
account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.

On the same date, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V. Garcia, issued a check payable to the
order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000 drawn on the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, with
an indication that it was to be charged to the Zhornack’s dollar savings account. When Zshornack noticed
the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he demanded an explanation from the bank. In answer,
COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr.,
brother of Rizaldy, when he (Ernesto) encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by
the Manila Banking Corporation payable to Ernesto.

The bank contended at first, that the peso value of the amount withdrawn was given to Atty. Ernesto
Zshornack, Jr. when the latter encashed the Manilabank Cashier's Check. Then, the bank claimed that the
withdrawal was made pursuant to an agreement where Zshornack allegedly authorized the bank to
withdraw from his dollar savings account such amount which, when converted to pesos, would be needed
to fund his peso current account.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transactions between Dizon and Rizaldy; Ernesto and Rizaldy are valid?

HELD: Both explanations are unavailing. The Supreme Court ruled that COMTRUST should be made liable
to the Zshornacks. With regard to the first explanation, petitioner bank has not shown how the transaction
involving the cashier's check is related to the transaction involving the dollar draft in favor of Dizon
financed by the withdrawal from Rizaldy's dollar account. The two transactions appear entirely
independent of each other. Moreover, Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., possesses a personality distinct and
separate from Rizaldy Zshornack. Payment made to Ernesto cannot be considered payment to Rizaldy.

As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was such an agreement, the evidence do not
show that the withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record reveals that the amount withdrawn
was used to finance a dollar draft in favor of Leovigilda D. Dizon, and not to fund the current account of
the Zshornacks. There is no proof whatsoever that peso Current Account No. 210-465-29 was ever
credited with the peso equivalent of the US$1,000.00 withdrawn on October 27, 1975 from Dollar Savings
Account No. 25-4109.

Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, this Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of both the trial
court and the Appellate Court on the first cause of action. Petitioner must be held liable for the
unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from private respondent's dollar account.

2. As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that on December 8,
1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US $3,000.00 cash (popularly known as
greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the agreement was embodied in a document, a copy of which was
attached to and made part of the complaint. The document reads:
Makati Cable Address:

Philippines "COMTRUST"
COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY of the Philippines Quezon City Branch
December 8, 1975

MR. RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK &/OR MRS SHIRLEY E. ZSHORNACK

Sir/Madam:

We acknowledged (sic) having received from you today the sum of US DOLLARS: THREE THOUSAND ONLY
(US$3,000.00) for safekeeping.

Received by:

(Sgd.) VIRGILIO V. GARCIA

It was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the bank refused to return the money.
COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso current account at prevailing
conversion rates.
[It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny specifically under oath the authenticity and due
execution of the above instrument. Part ng issue ‘yung actionable document; check the full text]
During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 Zshornack indeed delivered to the bank US
$3,000 for safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on May 10, 1976, COMTRUST
explained that the sum was disposed of in this manner: US$2,000.00 was sold on December 29, 1975 and
the peso proceeds amounting to P14,920.00 were deposited to Zshornack's current account per deposit
slip accomplished by Garcia; the remaining US$1,000.00 was sold on February 3, 1976 and the peso
proceeds amounting to P8,350.00 were deposited to his current account per deposit slip also
accomplished by Garcia.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's current account at
prevailing conversion rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat private respondent's claim. It now
argues that the contract embodied in the document is the contract of depositum (as defined in Article
1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not enter into. The bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his powers
when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the bank cannot be liable under the contract,
and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transactions between COMTRUST and the Zshornacks are valid and authorized?
HELD:
[Nature of Contract; Validity of the Transaction]
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for
safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the
bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time, Thus, Zshornack demanded
the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with
the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is
not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign exchange. Hence,
the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and Foreign Exchange
Transactions, promulgated on December 9, 1949, which was in force at the time the parties entered into
the transaction involved in this case. The circular provides:
xxx xxx xxx

2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them of whatever nature, including, where
applicable their exportation and importation, shall NOT be effected, except with respect to deposit accounts included
in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, when such deposit accounts are owned by and in the name of, banks.

(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held through, in, or with banks or banking institutions located in the
Philippines, including money, checks, drafts, bullions bank drafts, deposit accounts (demand, time and savings), all
debts, indebtedness or obligations, financial brokers and investment houses, notes, debentures, stocks, bonds,
coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security, expressed in foreign
currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the currency in which they are expressed, and belonging to any
person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation
residing or located within the Philippines;

(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or described in subparagraph (a) above, whether or not held through,
in, or with banks or banking institutions, and existent within the Philippines, which belong to any person, firm,
partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation not residing
or located within the Philippines;

(c) Any and all assets existent within the Philippines including money, checks, drafts, bullions, bank drafts, all debts,
indebtedness or obligations, financial securities commonly dealt in by bankers, brokers and investment houses, notes,
debentures, stock, bonds, coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of
security expressed in foreign currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the currency in which they are expressed,
and belonging to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated
body or corporation residing or located within the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central Bank by those authorized to deal in
foreign exchange. All receipts of foreign exchange by any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office,
agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation shall be sold to the authorized agents of the Central
Bank by the recipients within one business day following the receipt of such foreign exchange. Any person, firm,
partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation, residing or
located within the Philippines, who acquires on and after the date of this Circular foreign exchange shall not, unless
licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value,
nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is customary; Provided, further, That within one day upon
taking ownership, or receiving payment, of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such
foreign exchange to designated agents of the Central Bank.

xxx xxx xxx

8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and any person, firm or corporation, foreign
or domestic, who being bound to the observance thereof, or of such other rules, regulations or directives as may
hereafter be issued in implementation of this Circular, shall fail or refuse to comply with, or abide by, or shall violate
the same, shall be subject to the penal sanctions provided in the Central Bank Act.
xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations on Foreign Exchange,
promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to Philippine residents only. Section 6 provides:

SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm, company or corporation shall be sold to
authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the receipt of such foreign
exchange. Any resident person, firm, company or corporation residing or located within the Philippines, who acquires
foreign exchange shall not, unless authorized by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in
part, nor receive less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is customary;
Provided, That, within one business day upon taking ownership or receiving payment of foreign exchange the
aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.

As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended the bank
to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his complaint that he is
a Philippine resident. The parties did not intend to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum would never have been entered into at
all.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one
business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be
considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to
Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against
the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the
act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action
against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of the State to
prosecute the parties for violating the law.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second cause of action.
Petitioner is ordered to restore to the dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of
US$1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar savings
deposits. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as damages.
The other causes of action of private respondent are ordered dismissed.
NAMARCO vs. TECSON

G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969

FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment on November 14, 1955, entitled "Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. A copy of this
decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case.

On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and judgment
creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint against the same defendants, for the revival of
the judgment rendered in the aforestated case.

Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter thereof because of prescription. The Court granted the MTD based on lack of jurisdiction over
subject matter as the action has prescribed, stating that the decision of the Court became final on
December 21, 1955. The case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have
passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years
so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.

The National Marketing Corporation appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on March 20, 1969 certified
the case to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of
limitations.

HELD: Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code,
"commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn, took place
on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by the
defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus
confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, Tecson maintains otherwise, because "when
the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" —
according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in
both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December
21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view in its appealed order of
dismissal.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory
Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the
number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation. There is no question that
when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day
in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong?
Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year."

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of
Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is used
in our laws — to 365 days.

Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887,
that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of
express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain,
subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said
Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30
days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which
case "they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in
the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month." In People vs. Del Rosario, with the approval of the Civil Code
of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in
accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or
civil month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or
nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days."

The theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our
Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial
legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy
embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial
decree.

DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

[Prejudicial Question]

FACTS: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting through Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor
filed an information for bigamy against Donato with the CFI. September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's
arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil
action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. The
civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which
was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already
married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case
for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a
marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent
or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint
affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional
character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend
the proceedings of said case contending that the civil seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed
by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in criminal case for bigamy
citing Landicho vs. Relova. An MR was filed citing De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, a later ruling, which was likewise
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal case should be suspended after the judgment on the merits of the civil
case? (Whether or not there is a prejudicial question)

HELD: The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second
wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent
only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage.

The SC citing the case of Landicho vs. Relova opined that: “The mere fact that there are actions to annul
the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions"
are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary
and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. x x x

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has
been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

The situation in the case at bar is markedly different from De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, In the aforecited case it
was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage
while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for
annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private
respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that
petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the
civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the
civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question
to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage
was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The
preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the
criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he
had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years
without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage
is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that
they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private
respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact that it was only when Civil Case
No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization
of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was
secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued
to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that
Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC.

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976

[Commencement and termination of Civil Personality]

FACTS: The CFI pf Pangasinan rendered a judgment ordering the defendants to pay solidarily, Quality
Plastic Products a sum of money. The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the
said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that
bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente
Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking). The
Court ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
which was given as security. It was levied and sold.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in
Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the
bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf
and again signing for his co-defendants.

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs
in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment
of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land as there was a lack of jurisdiction over the
deceased Oria. It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-
873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven
and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.

The lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven et al. because of their voluntary appearance,
and that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of deceased Oria
HELD: No jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. As far as Oria
was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He
had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations,
was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in
section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a
dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the
judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that
corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was
unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant.

Young vs. Tecson*