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"It is not blindness or ignorance that ruins men and states. .. ; but rather there is in them an
impulse, favored by their nature and reinforced by custom, which they cannot resist and which
drives them ever forward as long as they have a bit of force left. Divine is he who controls
himself. Most men see their ruin before their eyes but they hasten to it s.nyws.y."*’ (p. 119)
GUARDAR PARA OUTRA PARTE: But under this apparent continuum of general orgaruzmg
particular gaps. " I t contains much that is entirely new, that has
rather the fact that ' 'what remains obscure is precisely that which
identified with the lack of " a complete insight. ' - Even when the
and nations but ako separately from each other. The nominal
manifestation of political decline and their complementary reprebut merely verbal i n its
historiographical effect. It led to a
states can be presented separately from the o t h e r s . " " His awareness
late 1820s.
was the discrepancy between his approach and its content—that is,
constitute the state [and, except for one 'digression,' were the
Ranke's
and to seek out single nodal events wherewith to answer them. The
result was, often enough, to leave a perceptible gap between the one rare occasion Ranke
himsetf admitted the gap openly. After
Behind this gulf lay Ratжe's incapacity, at this early stage of his
Ranke's pecuhar but crucial notion of "great facts" {grosse Begebenheiten), to which he was
addicted through his career, finds
its explanation here: the great fact is the fact which contaim a
have been penned around this time, its characteristic stress on the
feasibihty of "the research of the particular" and its equaUy
Ottoman Turks and the Spanish Monarchy. For i n the note Ranke
continuous with " t h e part and piece of the general'' t h a t ' 'lives in
in i t . ' ' This latter guise of the universal—in the particular detaU and
CAPITULO SOBRE AS OBRAS: With the rising strength of nationalism in the nineteenth century
this uniting tie of Ranke's work was frequently overlooked and Ranke was viewed less as a
historian of the ideas and values which kept Europe a unit, than as a political historian, writer
of national histories. (Gilbert, p. 365)
Skodra von Mahumed II. Die Schlachten des Kral je witsch Marko
1
Müller, K.A.V., 1935. Ein unbekannter Vortrag Rankes aus dem Jahr 1862 . Historische Zeitschrift,
151(2), pp.311–331.
slavische Barbarei der germanischen Cultur noch immer gegen
?ber: wie hat man vor kurzem das Jubil?um des Reiches mit
unterlegen
Schweden sogar eine Niederlage festlich begangen, weil sie wenig stens ein Moment des
Ruhmes und der Gr??e bezeichnet. Hier
Gestalt gaben.
das sie zur See so gut geltend machen wollten, wie es durch die
ehrung, die wenn sie gleich allen Deutschen gemein ist", er doch
macht worden, auf dem sich dieser ?einige biographische und lite
mehr sein als im besten Falle ein aufstrebendes Talent, f?r das
Bourne> Ranke himself wrote the " History of France," not as a German, but as a European. An
or thodox Protestant, he was suspected of a leaning toward Catholicism, a conservative
monarchist, he held the scales with wonderful evenness in the case of Charles I. and Cromwell.
His devotion to historic truth, holding every thing subordinate to showing " exactly how it took
place," exposed him to the charge of indifference to philosophical and religious interests. (398)
2
Bourne, E.G., 1986. Leopold von Ranke. The Sewanee Review, 4(4), pp.385–401.
one of them the inner decay of great states is pointed out, and in the other a not so
long ago rebellion is described, which equates Gentz and Metternich with the
liberal movements in Italy and Spain. Only through the experience of the Paris July
Revolution of 1830, which made alarmingly clear that the deadly French
Revolution could return again and again, did Ranke become a supporter of
conservative politics - or, as he put it: historical-political thought - and expressed
its opinion in this Meaning journalistic for a while.(606)
WELTGESCHICHTE: After a brief survey of ancient Egypt and the Middle East, largely centered
on the epic con tained in the Old Testament, the first volume becomes an examination of
Greece to the death of Alexander the Great and ends with an ex cursion to Carthage, heir to
shattered Phoenicia but, more to the point, also the temporary rival to Rome. Thereafter,
Ranke takes his readers forward in time, past the fall of the Roman empire, through the
medieval world of feudalism and the universal Catholic Church, to the emergence of the
European nations, so that by the time of his death the account had come all the way to the
15th century. From one point of view, the 13 volumes of the Weltgeschichte may be seen as a
long introduction to the age which had held Ranke's attention for six decades. - Ford, F.L., 1975.
Ranke: Setting the Story Straight . Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, 87 ,
pp.57–75.
VER OBRA DE RANKE: „Geschichte des westlichen Europa mit Einschluss von Literatur und
Kirchengeschichte".
Herkless, J.L., 1970. Meinecke and the Ranke-Burckhardt Problem. History and Theory, 9(3 ),
pp.290–321.
The relation of state power to history and historical writing. In 1948 Meinecke stresses the
importance to Ranke of ordered and systematic development for historical understanding. He
cites Ranke's lectures to King Maximilian II of Bavaria in 1854,15 in which Ranke had declared
that it was "a happy thing," at least for the historian, "to live in these times," when the
dialectic between state power and the latent revolutionary movement in Europe - a process by
which one force could never overcome the other entirely -guaranteed a certain continuity in
"the development of historical forces.""' Without this continuity, which in the last analysis was
produced by the arresting power of the old establishment, it would be impossible to view
these historical forces objectively. Nor had Bismarck's "methods of violence and force" really
altered this dialectical pattern.17 So it was that Ranke had assuaged his doubts about the
engineer of German unity and declared in 1885: In the events we have experienced, we may
see principally a defeat of the revolu- tionary forces which make impossible regular continued
development of world history. If these forces stood their ground, there would have been no
question of the continued creation of historical forces, or even an unpartisan examination of
them.18 This is the familiar Hegelian notion that the spirit or the moving force of things can be
understood only when it has achieved some objective form in the real world. According to
Meinecke, Ranke thought such an objective form was in fact the state and could thus only be
effected by state power.' (293)
In "Die grossen Michte" Ranke is notably optimistic. While the danger is certainly present,
Ranke trusts in the "genius of Europe" to prevent the evolution of violent leadership.43 Even
later, after the tumult of the nationalist movements in the latter nineteenth century, Ranke
believes he has seen, in the victory of Prussia in Germany and in the change to a conservative
policy in 1878, the triumph of the old order over the revolution. (299)
Ranke believed that the impelling force of history in the nine- teenth century was the
antagonism between the forces of monarchy and democracy. Ranke placed the development
of material forces only in the second rank. With respect to these material forces, says
Meinecke, Ranke paid homage, "in terms of astounding vigor and unanticipated optimism," to
the onward storming "civilizing genius of the occident" which put the world to serving it.6"
But, however astounding this civilizing "genius" and however great its effects, it must be
subsumed and understood, as far as Ranke is concerned, under the more general dialectical
development which is mani- fested in history. In this way Europe's imperial expansion in the
nineteenth century is merely a counterpart to the tribal migrations of the fifth century - the
Crusades, the discovery of the new world, and so forth.67 They do not represent anything
which can be called progress. (303)
We should also remember that Meinecke never abandoned Ranke for Burckhardt. He never
blamed Ranke and his historical outlook for Germany's difficulties in the way Ludwig Dehio has
done. Meinecke concluded only that Ranke could not offer a complete picture of the European
past, because of what the war had revealed. (319)
ORIENTALISMO: Among the scholars emancipated from the Rankean limitations was Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, who published a series of books, most notably The German Empire, 1871-1918
and Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Bismarck and Imperialism), that further catalyzed debate
within the historiography of German colonialism. (15) (iilich)
For Wehler, Germany’s aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic activities became Bismarck’s
tool for re-directing pressures for further domestic political emancipation abroad (giving riseto
3
Herkless, J.L., 1970. Meinecke and the Ranke-Burckhardt Problem. History and Theory, 9(3 ), pp.290–
321.
the idea of primat der Innenpolitik, or the primacy of domestic politics, which differed
dramatically from the foreign policy focus of the Rankean historians). (p. 16)
However, the work of these historians re-energized the debate about nineteenth- century
German history and the German imperial system. Moreover, the renunciation of the Rankean
limitations permitted latter historians to consider a wider array of evidence and topics. (18)
LIGAÇÃO COM O ROMANTISMO: Ou seja, sua compreensão da história está sustentada num
pressuposto concebido no interior do movimento intelectual de caráter europeu que foi o
Romantismo: a idéia de nação. (Fernandes 4)
Ou seja, se com o grande movimento cultural europeu, que foi o Romantismo, a idéia de nação
surge e triunfa contra as tendências iluministas do cosmopolitismo, do universalismo, que
ditavam leis abstratas válidas para todos os povos; se nação significa sentido de singularidade
de cada povo, defesa das particularidades de seu caráter nacional, reinvindicando ainda os
direitos do sentimento e da imaginação, Ranke pensava que os Estados nacionais deveriam
apenas ser conseqüências políticas de uma reconhecida individualidade moral e cultural da
nação. (5)
4
Berger, S., 2005. A return to the national paradigm? National history writing in Germany,
Italy, France, and Britain from 1945 to the present.
CONSERVADOR: Assim, no ensaio sobre as grandes potências, Ranke, então, imerso nessa
problemática, expressa sua convicção do perigo que que se constituía para a Europa o
racionalismo nivelador da Revolução Francesa. (FERNANDES 5)
Mas, se Leopold von Ranke era pessimista em relação à Revolução Francesa, era otimista no
que diz respeito à Europa. Ainda em As Grandes Potências, ele afirma que a Europa, para
enfrentar essa potência militar (a França de Napoleão), que avançava destrutivamente sobre o
princípio das individualidades nacionais, vale dizer sobre o intrínseco equilíbrio europeu, teve
que rejuvenescer o espírito nacional de seus povos. Ele observa, após a catástrofe da
Revolução, que culminara em Napoleão Bonaparte, que a Europa conhece uma Restauração: a
restauração de força dos Estados através do incremento do princípio das nacionalidades. Era a
restauração de um princípio subjacente aos povos europeus, que, após a derrota de Napoleão,
a política soube de novo construir. (6)
Era, de fato, uma alusão à idéia de liberdade subjacente ao espírito da Revolução, que Ranke
observava como desagregador, como uma ameaça ao equilíbrio intrínseco à alma européia, ou
seja, ao equilíbrio presente no princípio individualizador das nações na Europa. Esse equilíbrio,
que o historiador percebia como algo dado no espírito europeu, deveria se efetivar na história
através do papel da política de aglutinar em unidades estatais as totalidades históricas
inerentes à Europa moderna. Uma nação, para Ranke, somente deve ser una e independente,
constituindo um Estado, se for de fato uma individualidade histórica, com características
próprias, características étnicas, lingüísticas, mas também de tradição e de pensamento. Ranke
acreditava que nenhum Estado jamais poderia existir sem um fundamento espiritual que o
sustentasse, e que, portanto, na potência nacional, constituída pela esfera política, aparece
uma essência espiritual originária que tem vida própria. O império de Napoleão Bonaparte,
para ele, avançando sobre as potências vizinhas, ameaçava o princípio natural formador da
Europa, o princípio das nacionalidades. (6)
ROMANTISMO
Reill, P.H., 1975. The German Enlightenment and the rise of historicism, Univ of California
Press.
P. 156
Prussophilic modern histories – Marchand 72
TEMAS:
https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/64/3/609/95942
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1905183?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://www.zvab.com/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=30311209538&searchurl=hl%3Don%26ds%3
D20%26sortby%3D20%26kn%3DDie%2Bweltgeschichtliche%2Berfassung%2Bdes%2Borient
s%2Bbei%2Bhegel%2Bund%2Branke&cm_sp=snippet-_-srp1-_-title1
Hegel et l’Orient : suivi de la traduction annotée d’un essai de 1979 [FFLCH-Fac. Fi. Let. C. Humanas] 193.5
Hegel sur la Bhagavad-Gita. H462hm 1979
[FFLCH-Fac. Fi. Let. C. Humanas] 193.5
H462hm 1979 e.2
https://www.amazon.com/Die-Entzauberung-Asiens-asiatischen-
Kulturwissenschaft/dp/340644203X
5
6
Ranke, inclui-se Walther Hofer7, que acreditava que “a ênfase de Ranke do Estado for a
suavizada pela sua concepção de religião como uma força igualmente determinante e por sua
perspectiva europeia”(1962, p. 37).
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