DEC-04-2014 14:38 ACTS, EVENTS AND THINGS* Kit Fine ‘The objects that clutter up ou daily lfe—chairs, desks, slicks im water, bits of becs-w. have long been the source of philosophical reflection; and I hope that I may therefo be forgiven for persisting in further reflection of this kind. Take the statue before me. It is a handsome ereation, made of bronze and in the ima of Goliath. But what exactly is it? What is its nature or identity? ‘There are various ways in which this question may be taken. It might be, and often 1 taken to concern the nature of the matter that constitutes the statue. This is, to my min f deep and difficult quesiion. But let us take the identity of the matter for granted. Th the question might also be taken to concern the identity of the statue in its relation 10 mauer, OF course, it is not as if I have a spesial interest im statues. I take statues to be typi specimens of the material things we ordinacily talk about. What then goes for them shout ‘one hopes, go for those other material things. ‘One natural anewer to our question fs that the statue and its matter are one and the cam. Wis not as if we have a duality of thing and matter, of substance and stuff. We have mere fone item, referred to indifferently as the matter or as the statue. ‘There are various considerations that make this answer seem s0 natural, Firs, itis suggest by our ordinary judgement that the matter, the stuff over there, is a statue. Granted th the ‘ic? here ig the ‘is? of identity and that there is but one statue over there it then follo: that the statuc and its maticr aze identical. Second, there is what one might call a focation coincidence between the statue and tts matier; they occupy the same place at the giv time, One is therefore tempted to infer their identity from the wellknown principle that ts things cannot oceupy the same place at the same time. As two, the statue and the matt seem ta compete for the same pace; there it no r00% For them both In addition to the locational coincidence, though perhaps dependent upon it, is « enormous descriptionat coincidence, a coincidence of descriptive propetts. Observe supesticial properties of the statue and its matter; weigh them; sebmit them to the mc refined tests, No difference will emerge; and itis, of course, absurd that jt should, Now no coincidence, no matter haw vast, need imply an identity. There i, ia thic rerpe: an asymmetry in the application of Leibnis’s principle of the indiscernibility of identica for whereas one differing property will yield a non-identity, no number of shared properti need yield an identity. But even though we concede the lack of a logical guarantee, it s1 might be though that, in thif case, it is only the identity of the statue and its matter th can plausibly explain their coincidence of properties. Perhaps, thought’ the muin reason for denying a distinet identity 10 the statue is met physical, We conceive of the physical universe as consisting of matter or of whatever matt fs ultimately composed, The idea of material things, in addition to the matter, then scet strange and mysterious ‘This answer then is very natural. But sil it is wrong. Suppose that the bronze is melt down tomorrow, Then the statue ceases to exist at that time; but the bronze doet not. T fone has the property of ceasing to exist tomorrow; the other lacks it, Therefore the ts are distinct. ‘There is, of course, 2 standard response to this line of argument. What we have here, is said, is an intensional context. The terms ‘the statue" and ‘ihe matter" refer to the sat thing, but by means of different descriptions. What miakes it falee that the fatue ex: P.O01DEC-04-2014 14:38 i i t | I P.002 tomorrow is that the given thing ceases 9 possess the description associated with the term ‘the statue’, while what makes it true that the matter cxists tomorrow is that the same thing continues to postess the description associated with the term ‘the matter’. Thus what accounts for the aiffercnee in the trath-valve of the existence-daims is not a difference in the items referred to but a difference inthe descriptions by which ceference is made. It would take too long for me to comment on this response in detail, but let me merely note the following. If we do have aa jatensional context here, i is not of @ standard sort. ‘A standard example of an intensional context is provided by the sentence “the police are looking for the murderer’. Now the truth-value of such a sentence is sensitive to changes in coveferential definite description: the police are looking for the murderer; they are not, in a clear scnse, looking for the mayor, even though we murderer is the mayor. However, the contexts we have been talking about are not, in this way, sensitive to variation in definite description. The statue might be my most treasured possession, the light and joy of my hfe, the object of all my dreams. If the statue ceases to exist tomorrow, thea so does my most ‘reasused possession, the Hight and joy of my life, the object of all my dreams. If these contexts are intensional, thea some new account of their intensionality must be fiven, one that makes them transparent to definite descriptions but not 10 other kinds of Singular terms, Now such an account can be, and has been, developed. But it is untatural, unwieldy and, in the last analysis, unworkable. Since there is a simple and straightforward liternative that squaies 30 well with the nguistic data, there seems t0 be very little reason, philosophical prejudice apart, for not preferring it. ‘Let us assume then that our argument from existence-conditions establishes the distinct~ ness of the statue and its matter. The question remains as to the idemtty of the statve, But a ready answer is at hand: the statue is a femporal segment of the bronze. Given any enduring ‘Object, we may retrict it 10 certain of the times at which it exists. Its as if we cut through the object at those tines. The resulting object, the segment or restriction, will be like the ‘parent object when it exists, Dut, unlike the parent, it will only eaist during the moments of Fesiriction, We may now think of the statue as the temporal restriction of the bronze 10 those times at which it has the right shape, (We should also insist that the shape have the right genesis; but let us, for simplicity, ignore that). “there Is one slight defect in this account as it stands, It rests on the assumption that the statue cannot change lis matter over tine. But this is = genuine possibility, what with wear and tear and minor repairs. And even though a statue cannot completely change Its matter over time, there are other kinds of object that can. ‘This defect, thovgh, is easily put right. AC different times, the statue is constituted by different matter. Restect each such parcel of matter to the times at which it has the right shape (and the right causal genesis). Then let the statue be the temporal aggregate of the resulting temporal segments. "The account. as thus amended, has many merits. It explains the difference in the existence conditions of the statue and the matter; for when the bronze is melted down, it no longer hhas the Goliath-shape and so the temporal segment which is the statue no longer exists. “The account explains the locational and deseriptional coincidence betwenn the siatue and the matter; for at any time al which the statue as temporal segment or aggregate exists, it ‘will share the locational and other properties of its patent, the matter. The account would iso appear to justify our ordinary judgement that the matter is a statue. For there is a hhatural sense in which a temporal cegment and its parent are parts of one another at any time at which they both exist. Taking the “is' to be the ‘is, not of identity, but of mutual pat then gives us the required conclusion that the mater Is, a¢ the given time, a statue. ‘The account. finally, is metaphysically appealing. It conforms to what One might call an extensional picture of physical reality, ‘extensional not in the logician’s new-fangled sense but in the traditional sense that relates to talk of a body's extension. In effect, each material thing is conceived of in terms of its occupancy of extension in space and time, so that things ‘with the same spatio-temporal extension are judged to be the samme. Such @ view thon seems oeDEC-04-2014 14:38 tc take the mystery out of the material thing as something additional to the matter. For We thay think of the material things as providing us with a way of talking about different matter miyiffefent times. Or if matter in its turn fs reduced to maze points, we may think of matter ara things alike as providing us with way of talking about the different congeries of mass points ‘Dut despite those many merits, the account is sill unsatisfactory. It is subject to a modal yarnant of out previous temporal acgument, Let us suppose that the bronze always has the Goliath shape. Pechaps God made the bronze that way and man, with uncharacteristic sloth. fas left it alone. Then on the extensional view, the bronze and the statue are the same, ince they fail to differ in theie spatio-temporal extension. ‘Dut imagine now that the bronze had been melted down. Then the statue would Nave ceived 10 ent; but not the bronze. So the statue has the counterfactual property that it Mrould cease to exist if the bronze were melted down, while the bronze lacks that property. Te put it in other terms, consider a possible world in which the bronze ie melted down. ‘Thee the statue, unlike the bronze, has the property of not existing at the given time in Iie given ponible world. Thus the statue and the bronze have diferent modal or counter~ factual properties and therefore are not the same. “As in the temporal case, one may attciap to alide out of this argument by appeal to inten ‘But the eificulies with this way out are the same; the given contexts are it ‘definite description. There is also a dislectical point vo be made, Some philosophers have been tempted to appeal to intensionality of context in {his bur not the temporal case, Yet given the complete symmetry between the wo casts, It is hard to see how any such attitude ean be justified. Let us grant then that, in the imagined case, the statue and the bronze are distinct. How is the distinction between them to be explained? 1¢ is tempting, at this point, to make use fof modal segments, somewhat in analogy 10 temporal segments. Just as we allow that sn Object may be restricted to some of the times at which it exists, so we allow that an object thay be restricted to some of the worlds (or wortdtimes) at which if exists. We cut through the object not just in the temporal sphere but also in what might be called the modal sphere. ‘The resutting object, of modal segment, will then be like the parent object at those worlds {or world times) in which it exsis, but will only exist in the worlds (or world times) of the ‘We may now think of the stalue a3 the restriction of the bronze fo those worlds, or rather world-times, at which it tas the right shape. Or if we allow the matter of the statue to vary, From world to world, we may let the statue be a modal aggregate of such restrictions, "The above account solves our present puzie; for although the statue and the bronze coincide in this world, there will be many other worlds in which they do not coincide, The seout also has all of the advantages of the previous account. It explains the temporal divergence in existence conditions, the coincidence of properties, and the apparent judgement Of identity, In addition, it too conforms to an extensional picture, but under a broadened Conception of extension for which modality also provides a sphere or dimension in which Objects exist, Indeed’, the progress of our theories—from the identity theory, through the Tempore! siew, to the present modal account—can be seen as arising from a successive brondening in the notion of extension, from spatial, to spatio-temporal, to spatiotemporal modal. “The extensional view is so appealing that itis hard to give up, But even this new secount har a fundamental flaw. 1 have talked all along of matter constituting @ material thing. But what exactly is this lation? What do we mean when we say that such and such a matter ‘constitutes a material thing? ‘On the face of it, we have bere a relationship of part (o whole; the matter ‘makes up", it a part of, the statue, Now on the segmental or extensional view, we can indced distinguish relationships + partewhole. Ascun. for sixelicity, that the statue enjoys (be same matter Goughovt ils career, Then we may say without temporal qualification shat the statue, % P.003DEC-04-2014 14:38 i y P.004 as a segment, is part of the matter. But we may also say, relative 10 a time at which the statue exists, that its a part of the matter and the matter a part of “However, neither of these relations is the relation of constitution. The relative noti par is wo-way. However, the relation of constitution is one-way; the matter constitutes the statue, but the statue does not constitute the matter. The absolute notion of part if onc- way, but itis the wrong way. It makes the statue a part of the matter but not, as a rule, the matter a part of the statue. The extensional view seems powerless to explain the relation of constitution, | propose to solve this problem by making a fundamental break with the exteusionsl view. We stall suppose that many material things have not only an extensional aspect, but also a bs iensional aspect, ‘intensional" now in the sense which applies to properties and relations. Given any object x and deseription (property) ep possessed by x, we shall suppose there is & new object x qua y or x under the description «. Thus if x is Soerates and ¢p the property of being a philosopher, then the new object is Socrates qua philosopher; while if x is Mrs Thatcher and @ the property of being @ Prime Minister, then the new object is ‘Mrs Thatcher qua Prime Minister. Given tach an object x qua , we shall call x the basis and @ the gloss. The resulting ‘object itself will be called a qua object, and the operation by which itis formed glossing. ‘One should not identify a qua object with its basis—Socrates qua philosopher with Socrates, or Mrs Thatcher qua Prime Minister with Mrs Thatcher. Rather, the qua object should be regarded as some sort of amalgam of the given object and the property, like the given object but wearing the property on its face. Not should a qua object be identified with he corresponding segment, When one restricts Mrs Thatcher to the times (or world- times) in which she is a Prime Minister, then the property of being Prime Minister has a merely extcrnal relation to the resulting object. On the other hand, in glossig, the property is integral tothe resulting object itis part of the total package. itis alo important to note that nothing has 40 fat been sald about reference to qua objects in ordinary ditcourse. In particular, I would not want to be saddled with the follow. ing two claims; first, that definite descriptions are used to refer to qua objects; and second, that phrases of the Torm ‘x qua" are ordinarily used 0 refer to qua objects. 1 hold an ‘orthodox view of definite descriptions according to which a description such as “the Queen of England’ refers to a certain person and not that person under the description of being the Queen of England. I am alto happy to believe that many uses ofthe phrate ‘x qua ‘p” are not refereatial at all but are to be broken up into a genuine subject term ‘x? and a modifier “g", The purpose of my theory Js aot to provide a ceference for ordinary uses ‘of a quaphrase but 10 account for the identity of certain other objects—chairs, tables and the like—to which we clearly do refer. Qua objects are governed by certain principles; and best understood, Existence, The quia object x qua crists at a given time (worldsime) if and only if x ‘exists and has @ at the given tite (world-time); Identity, (@ Two qua objects are the same only if their bases and glosses are the same, Gi) A qua object is distinct from its basis (or from the basis of its basis, should that be @ {ga2 object, and £0 on). Inheritance, At any time (world-time) at which a qua object exists, it has those nocmal properties possessed by ts bass, ‘According to the first of these principles, a qua object exists just when its basis does and satisfies the gloss. According to the first part of the second principle, the identity of qua objects requires both identity of basis and gloss. Thus Socratet qua philosopher ie distinct from Socrates qua Oreck, since the propestcs of being a philosopher and being a Greck arc distinct; while Socrates qua philosopher is distinct from Plato qua philosopher, since Socrates and Plato are distinct. According to the last principle, a qus object inherits its properties from its basis. However, not all properties are inherited. Mrs Thatcher existed ten years ag0, is in terms of them that they are 100DEC-04-2014 14:38 Mts Thatcher qua Prime Minister did pot, Again, Mrs Thatcher is not # gua object with Mrs Thatcher as basis, but Mrs Thatcher qua Prime Misister is, We exclude these cases by requiring that the property not be formal and that its application only concer the time (or world time) in question. This is the force of the qualification “aormal’, "Armed with the theory of qua objects, we ea now give an adequate account of the fdentity of the statue and of material things in general. Under the simplifying assumption that the matter of the statue does not change, the statue may be identifed with that matter under the description of having the Goliath-shape. In case the matter is allowed to change, we should First take any matter that ever constitutes the statue: gloss it with the property Of having the Goliath-shapey restrict the resulting qua object to thoce world-times at which the matter consticutes the statue; and then aggregate all of the resulting segments of qua ‘objects. This then is the statue. The form of other material things will be similar, shough perhaps with greater complexity in the structure of the basis and the gloss. ‘Thi account, with the help of the Existence Principle, can solve the various puzzles over the existence-conditions, It can alzo explaia, with the help of the Inheritance Principle, the remarkable coincidence between a material thing and its matter. But, in superiority (0 ‘the extensional view, it is able to provide am adequate account of constitution as a rclation ‘of part to whole, For since the qua object is built up from the basis and the gloss, it will hhave its basis as'a proper part. Thus the matter, as basis, will be part of the statue; but the statue, as qua object, will not be 2 part of the matter. The asymmetry of constitution is explained. T may have made It appear as if constuution posed an isolated threat for the extensional theory. But once we look around, we see that there are many related dificulties for that theory, all of which ere readily solved on the qua object view. Let me mention one—the problom of ereation. A eculptor creates 2 statue. Now we all know what this involves, even if we aie not very good at bringing it off; the sculptor must give the material the right shape, The problem is not to say more exactly what it i (0 cteate a statue, Rather itis to sive an account of creation in general and of the identity of statues in particular from which i will follow that the sculptor creates the statue just in the circumstances that we recog: ‘as appropriate for the ereation of a statue, ‘This problem isnot ae simple as it might appear. We cannct say that the statue is the matter, for the sculptor does uot (as a fue) ereate the matter. Nor can we say that the statue is & temporal segment of the matter, for a long as the matter continues to cxist, the temporal segment will be there, regardless of what the sculptor d5és, ; _Onthe qua abject view, the problem may be solved as follows. When we say that a sculptor £ ereates a statue itis understood that he creates it from given material, not ab novo; he is allowed a lite help from God. Now to ercate one thing y from another x is to bring about, {in an appropriate way, a transition {rom a state of affeirs in which x exlsis 10 a state of affairs in whi be a qua object, the sculplor must bring about 2 transi the matter exis to one in which the qua exis. But what is that latter state of affals? Given the Existence Principle, it is most plausibly taken to be the ztate Of affairs in which the matter exists and has a certain shape. Thus what the sculptor mest do is to effect the transition from the matter’s existing to the mattcr’s existing and having £ meertain shape; and this presumably is just to give the matter that shape. "There are other problems concerning material things that our theory can help to solve. can throw light on the identity of particular kinds of matorial things, such as works of art atid persons, and if can also throw light on the genetal classification of © or kinds. But 1 want to pass on now to what might appear to be a different subject—the identity of acts. Liraise my arm..There is a certain act—the act of raising my the idcotty or nazive af this act? “Again, there ace different ways of taking this question, There arm. But what exactly is question, sometimes 101 P.005DEC-04-2014 14:38 t f P.006 called the fundamental problem of action theory, of saying exactly what goes on when ir ise my arm, Does a volition cause @ physical motion? Is there mecely a nevro-phrsiological train of evenls? Or what? But let us take for granted the answer fo this question; let us ‘assume that we know what occurrences are involved in raising my arm. Still a question arises [sto the idcatty ofthe act. 1s it one of those occurrences, all of them, or something else? ‘The paralic with our question about material things is striking and, as we shall see, it runs very deep. ‘Now one very natural answer to our question is this: any act, or at least any bodily acty is identical to the underlying bodily movement, For example, underlying the act of my ‘aising my arm i a certain bodily movernent, my arm rising: these two are then the same. ‘What makes this answer so natural is much the same ar what makes the identity theory for material things 30 natural. There is our ordinary judgement that the bodily movement isan act. There i a locational coincidence between the act and the bodily movement, although we may have some qualms over attributing exactly the same location to either one, There iz algo something of a descriptional coincidence: itis not as if we could observe, or discover by test, some sublle difference in the two things. Finally, there is the metaphysical mystery of the act being something over and above the bodily movement or the associated occurrences. ‘But natural as this answer is, again it cannot be sustained. Perhaps we cannot distinguish between the act and the bodily movement in tems of their temporal location; but there 3 difference in what one might call their modal location. Take again the act of raising my fem. Suppote row that the rising of my arm had been a reflex action. Then the bodi movement would sil exist, but not the act. Consider, if you lke, 2 possible world in which the bodily movement is a reflex action. Then the bodily movement still exists in that world Dbut that which we call an actin this world no longer docs. ‘There are those who claim not to detect the disappearance of the act from one world to the other. But they have, it seems to me, already decided that the act is the bodily move- iment, it is on ihe besis of this decision that they make their modal judgement. If one ipproaches the question without philosophical prejudice, it seems quite clear that there is something, the act, that no longer exists in the other world. ‘One mizhi sill suspect some intensional trickery here, of course. But without rehearsing the reacong, t seems to me that the difficulties of this approach are just ax great as before. ‘La ur grant then that the eet and the bodily movement are distinet. What should be said as to the Identity of the act? We might try once more 10 think of the act as a modal ‘segment of the bodily movement. But there is, it seems, 2 relation of underlying between f boulily act and bodily moverseat somewhat analogous to the relation between @ material thing and its matter. The modal segment view scems as powerless ia this case as in the other of explaining what that relation ic. ‘We are iherefore again led to the view that the act is @ qua object—but in this case with ‘a bodily movement as basis. There is some problem as 10 what the gloss or description Should be, But we can take it, very roughly, to be the property of being intentional. Thus the act of raising my arm is the movement of my arm under the description of being in- teational. “There is, on this account, a striking parallel between the relationship of a bodily act to its bodily movement, on the one hand, and the relationship of material thing to its matter fon the other. It is not just that the two relationships are analogous; they are exactly the ‘same. We might put it this way: a bodily movement is the matter of @ bodily act. ‘Oui new theory of acts is able to solve our previous puzzles concerning modal location ‘and the nature of underlying. It is also able to throw light on topice familiar from the literature on action theory: the intensionality of acts, their obsecvability, the analysis of the by-relation. Let me discuss just one such topic, the Felationship of an act to the intention with which or the reason for which it is done, Take, as an example, an act of murder. “This act was done with the intention to Kill. Our question then concerns the relationship Detween thsvact of murder and the associated inten 102DEC-04-2014 14:38 “There are roughly two min views om this question, The concepuulists believe that there vs conceptual relation between the act and its jolention. It is somehow essential 1o the act (murder, say) that it be done with a particular intention (to kill. The cawsliss, on the ‘other hand, take there to be # causal connection between the act and the intention. The intention is @ cause oF, at least partly a cause ofthe act. “The most the causalist has usually been prepared to concede to his foe is that there may be 2 de dicto necessary connection between particular kinds of acts and particular kinds of intention, It is necessary, for example, if an act is (0 be one of murder that it be done ‘with the intention to Kill, Now all this is undeniable, Dut there is also, it seems to me, a ‘ore interesting de re connection between an act and its intention, It Is essential 10 this particular act of murder that it be done with this particular intention; if would not have occurred had the intention not been present, Suppose we go to another possible world in intention or no intention ‘at all. Then, in that world, shere would not be what, In this respect, then, the canceptualist is right. But what of the causalist? It has commonly bbcen supposed, by both sides to the dispule, that a de ze essentialist connection between act fand intention rules out any sort of causal coanection. Afterall, if itis estential to the act that it be done with a particular intention, then the existence of the act necessarily requires the existence of the intention. But ever since Hume we have learned to be suspicious of any ind of causal connection between one event and another upon which it necessarily depends. It is possible, however, to reconcile the mas of the conceptualist and the eausalist without giving up basically Humean postion, Take the act of murder to be the bodily movement under the description of being done with the particular intention to kil! which ‘operated in that case. Then itis essential to the act, as s0 construed, that it be done with that intention. It is perhaps worth detailing, on the basis of the es of our theory, why this should be so. Take any possible world ia which the act exists, By the Existence Principle, the bodily movement exists in what world and is done with the given intention. Let us grant tlat being done with that particular intention is a normal property. Then by the Inheritance Principle it wil follow that the act is done with that intention. Thus in any possible world in which the act exists it will be done with the given inteation, and the essen- lialist connection is established, Let us now ask whether the intention causes (or is otherivise causally related (0) the act. Let us grant that the bodily movement is caused by the intention. This, after all, is the fundamental intuition of the eausalist. Then as long 2s the property of being caused by the intention is x normal property, it will Follow by the Inheritance Principle that the act it 21:0 ‘caused by the intention. ‘Thus by adopting a particular analysis of the act as a qua object, we can derive and hhence reconcile the respective intuitions of the conceptual and the causalis. The reason ‘why this reconciliation is compatible with a basically Humean position in this. The acts, fas qua objects, are in an obvious sense astificial and derivative, They are not genuinely “out there” in the world, but are formed from what Is out there by means of an alliance with 4 purely intensional clement. (It is tempting to say that they are parily formed in our own ‘minds, but this would be too psychologistc.) We may now suppose that the Humean strictures fon cause apply not to these derivative of artificial events but to thote that are genuinely ‘out there, ‘Our analysis of acts is one that applies 10 eveuts In general. Take, as an example, the event of Sir Lancelot losing his virginity, What is it? We might try the hypothesis’ that the event is ideatical to the underlying cerual activity. After all, they occur at the same place and time, and have many of their other properties in common. Rut this will not 0 for reasons that have now become familiar. It is essential to the event that it be the first of its Kind; but this is by no means essential to the sexual activity itself. That 103 P.007DEC-04-2014 14:38 P.008 very same activity could have been part of a long history of such occurrences. Tins the event has a certain essential property, being first of its kind, that is lacking In the activity. ‘Suc considerations a6 these quickly lead to our favoured hypothesis that the event is a ‘certain qua object, viz. the activity under the description of its being the first time. In this way it is readily intelligible why the event should have the same spatio-temporal location as the activity and yet require @ certain priority for its ozcursence. T should like to apply a similar analysis to most of the events that we ordinarily talk about~-marriages, battles, epidemics and what have you. Indeed, 1 would want it to be ecognissd that there is a special subclass of events, call them occurrences, at the bottom of other events in much the same way 2s matter i at the bottom of other material things. ‘Oceurrences are the matter of events; and just as all material things are ultimately formed from matter with the help of such operations as segmentation, aggregation and. glssing, 80 are all events ulimately formed from occurrences. ‘Such an account is able to throw light on a good many of the problems that hs the literature on events. It is, first of all, ralevant to general questions as to the ideality of events. Once occurrences are distinguished from events in general, it becomes clear that most of the proposed identity criteria are only plausible for occurrences. It also becomes clea, ‘once the operation of glossing is taken seriously, that some quite distinct kind of identity Stiterion is required for events in general, one that is genuinely able to articulate theie rle- vant structure, Our account is also relevant to questions concerning particular kinds of events. A good ‘example is emotions, There has been much dispute in the Wverature a to the relalionship between an cinotion and its object. The conceptualists nold that there is a conceptual re- latdouship, the causalists that there i a causal relationship. By analysing an emotion as 3 suitable kind of qua object, we can reconcile the two positons in this dispute in mauch the same way as the corresponding positons on the relationship between an act and its reason Were reconciled. The theory of qua objects has some other applications worth mentioning, First, the qua objects are very like Aristotle's compounds of matter and form, with the matter covres- ponding to the basis and the form to the loss. Aristotle's views, it seems to me, have not ‘been taken seriously enough: many of his more distinctive doctrines have either been for fotten or fallen into disrepute. A modem version of the Aristotelian theory should give us the courage to embrace some of those docisines and the means 10 articulate them more clearly. il Secondly, the theory of qua objects is able to throw light on the quest for necessary truths. There is a tradition according to which all necessary truths are analytic, ‘arve in virtue of ineaning’, This view founders on the question, among othels, of de re ‘essentialist claims; for the meaning of the singular term by whieh reference ig made in such claims would appear to be ferelevant to their truth, But let us take a broader view of an ‘analytic truth: Following Russell, let us conceive of a proposition as something that may contain the objects of reference as constiwents. Then we may call a proposition analytic if upon analysis of its constituents, including the objects, it can be seen to be true. Take ‘now the proposition that the statue of Goliath has a certain shape. Upon analysis, we obtain the statue itself as subject and the property of having a certain shape as predicate, ‘The slatue, in its turn, breaks up into the matter and the property of being 2 certain shape. ‘Thus we can discern the predicated property in the subject. It therefore seems reasonable {0 suppose that the proposition is analytic in our broader sense of the term. Indeed, the Proposition might even be thought to br analytic in something ke Kans original sense that the concept of the predicate is included in the subject. This analyticiy might then be ‘shought to provide a relatwvely innocuous ground for the essential truth of the given ropo- sition, 1 do not think that all essentialist truths can be reduced to analytcitis in this way, but certainly a large and interesting clase of them can be. of the ground osDEC-04-2014 14:38 Peshaps more intercating, though, than this application to particular problems is the Saoaciy of the theory t0 uncover deep analogies in widely dsparste fields, The things anal events of the world, forall their apparent diversity, are seen to be held together by the very same threads. Department of Philosophy University of Michigan ‘Ann Arbor, Michigan usa NoTEs * This paper outines one cena strand of thought in 3 book, on which I have bees working since 1976: Tihs fear shoul bear In sind tat many points merly touched pon hers are developed sf gees Keg in the Doo anu that many topics considered in the book are not even menicned het Lech hn woes {sssied In Gill are wot sivays stated withthe qulifeains or commen! that stikt actors Pett require. iis paver js writen to an ahistorical style, but some ofits ideas havea Jong history, dating back to ‘Aeutee and secmerging by the work of the phenonenaloxial ach hor tecesiy eee te sation thet some other contemporary philosophers have written on realed ideas. I shea neue, pares’ Ph. thers (Rockseer Univrsy 1377) and K. Miligen, P.Sincna; and Sect tact EEE Std Memon (onic 1982, Uiope elewtere 10 des in dtl wih the connection Rane so) leat ond thie, ‘The paper would not have been possible without the and diseusions, helped me think throush my hess litosopty. fof many friends who, in Ieetces, seminars ‘eir applistion to the different fields of tos P.009 TOTAL P.009