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46 PAGES League of Cities of The Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission On ELECTIONS
46 PAGES League of Cities of The Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission On ELECTIONS
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 643, FEBRUARY 15, 2011 151
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RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For consideration of this Court are the following
pleadings:
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1 Republic Acts 9389 [Baybay City, Leyte], 9390 [Bogo City, Cebu],
9391 [Catbalogan City, Samar], 9392 [Tandag City, Surigao del Sur], 9393
[Lamitan City, Basilan], 9394 [Borongan City, Samar], 9398 [Tayabas
City, Quezon], 9404 [Tabuk City, Kalinga], 9405 [Bayugan City, Agusan
del Sur], 9407 [Batac City, Ilocos Norte], 9408 [Mati City, Davao
Oriental], 9409 [Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental], 9434 [Cabadbaran
City, Agusan del Norte], 9435 [El Salvador City, Misamis Oriental], 9436
[Carcar City, Cebu], and 9491 [Naga City, Cebu].
2 Penned by J. Carpio, with JJ. Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., and Brion, concurring; dissenting, J. Reyes,
joined by JJ. Corona, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro;
C.J. Puno, and JJ. Nachura and Tinga took no part; J. Ynares-Santiago
was on leave.
3 Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices
Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro. Chief
Justice Puno and Justice Nachura took no part.
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4 Justice Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices
Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Leonardo-De Castro, and
Bersamin. Chief Justice Puno and Justice Nachura took no part. Justice
Quisumbing was on leave.
5 Citations omitted.
6 Penned by J. Velasco, Jr., with JJ. Corona, Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, Abad, and Villarama concurring; dissenting, J. Carpio, joined
by JJ. Carpio-Morales, Brion, and Peralta; C.J. Puno and JJ. Nachura
and Del Castillo took no part.
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1.
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Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30,
2001, viz.—
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8 II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, p. 164 (October 5, 2000); Rollo (G.R. No.
176951), Vol. 5, p. 3765.
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11 Id., citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948; 293 SCRA 141 (1998).
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2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August
24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate
the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution.
Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was
violated because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the “just
share” that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall
receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically
released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we
declare that there was valid classification, and the
Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of
the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification,
provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all
members of the same class.12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for
the purpose of the income requirement. This contention
misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of
the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator
Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No
9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities” and the apprehension
that before long the
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12 De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 70, 79; 336
SCRA 188, 196 (2000); Tiu v. Court of Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229, 242; 301
SCRA 278, 289 (1999).
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17 Mat. 20: 1-15.
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186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission
on Elections
CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
The Court has received flak on this case for supposed
“flip-flopping.” But its shifting views are understandable
because of the nearly even soundness of the opposing
advocacies of the two groups of cities over the validity of
the sixteen cityhood laws.1 It also does not help that the
membership of the Court has been altered by retirements
and replacements at various stages from when it first
decided to annul the laws, to when it reconsidered and
upheld their validity, and to when it reverted to the
original position and declared the laws involved
unconstitutional. This to me is a healthy sign of democracy
at work, the members being blind to the need to conform.
In its Resolution of August 24, 2010, the Court reversed
its December 21, 2009 Decision and denied the quest for
cityhood of sixteen municipalities on the ground that the
laws creating them violated Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution2
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1 Republic Acts 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9394, 9398, 9393, 9404, 9405,
9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9436, 9435 and 9491.
2 Section 10: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the
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Discussions
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9 G.R. No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (1952), citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.
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I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that
they should be given a legal remedy by which they could
be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth
under the Local Government Code prior to its amendment
by R.A. 9009.
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In essence, the Cityhood bills now under consideration
will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution
No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the
higher income requirement of R.A. 9009. The proponents
are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and
fairness. x x x”10 (Emphasis supplied)
What makes the injustice quite bitter is the fact that the
sixteen cities did not merely have pending cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress. They also met at that time the
income criteria set under Section 450 of the then Local
Government Code. The Court owes to these cities the
considerations that justice and fair play demands. It can
not be denied that substantial distinction sets them apart
from the other cities.
Further, petitioner League of Cities failed to show that
the creation of the sixteen new cities discriminated against
other cities. As the respondent cities point out, the majority
of the present cities in our midst do not meet the P100
million minimum income requirement of the Local
Government Code.11 It boggles the mind how these
deficient cities can complain of denial of equal protection of
the law.
Besides, assuming an improper classification in the case
of the sixteen cities, petitioner League of Cities can not
invoke the equal protection clause since it has failed to
show that it
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12 Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA
201.
13 The Entry of Judgment of the Decision dated November 18, 2008
was made on May 21, 2009 as per Resolution of the Court dated June 2,
2009.
14 See Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468.
15 Javier v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September
22, 1986.
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DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents argue
that: (1) the petitions on their face do not call for the
exercise of judicial power considering that the share of local
government units in the Internal Revenue Allotments does
not constitute rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable; (2) the 16 Cityhood Laws are not
unconstitutional; and (3) there was no violation of the
equal protection clause.
The crux of the controversy is whether the 16 Cityhood
Laws are constitutional.1
As I have consistently opined, which opinion is
concurred in by the majority members of this Court in the
reinstated Decision of 18 November 2008 and in the
assailed Resolution of 24 August 2010, the 16 Cityhood
Laws are unconstitutional.
First, the 16 Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution. This provision reads:
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196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission
on Elections
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