Province of North Cotabato, Province of
Zamboanga Del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province
of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality
of Linnamon, Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano and Sec. Mar Roxas
-vs-
Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec
DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping &
Resource Information Authority and Davide Jr.
and respondents in intervention Muslim Multi-
Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development
and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc.,
Facts:
Subject of this case is the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which
is scheduled to be signed by the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August
05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter
were consolidated by this court namely:-
 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato
and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to
declare unconstitutional and to have the
MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be
open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al
on its prayer to declare null and void said
MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the
respondents from signing the MOA-AD and
additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte et al, praying to declare null and
void the MOA-AD and without operative
effect and those respondents enjoined from
executing the MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel
III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and
permanently enjoining respondents from
formally signing and executing the MOA-AD
and or any other agreement derived
therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying
the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and
illegal and impleading Iqbal.
The MOA-AD is a result of various
agreements entered into by and between the
government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in
1997, they signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent
on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the
early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of
municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000,
they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte;
hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-
which tolled the peace negotiation. It was when then
Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation
regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was
hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when
the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace
talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military
actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the
ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF
Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position,
the crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.
 MOA-AD Overview
This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and
the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-
AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM,
IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention
169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e
compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty
and order). The body is divided into concepts and
principles, territory, resources, and governance.
Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition
of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people
have the right to self- governance of their
Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive
ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation
in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the
Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined
territory and with a system of government having
entered into treaties of amity and commerce with
foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants
the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE
shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region, involving the present ARMM, parts
of which are those which voted in the inclusion to
ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two
categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not
later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will
be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of
another separate agreement. Embodied in the MOA-
AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the
internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE
territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which
shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the
baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
south east and south west of mainland Mindanao;
and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and
the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
authority and management over all natural resources.
There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial
waters; but no provision on the internal waters.
Included in the resources is the stipulation that the
BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation
and trade relations with foreign countries and shall
have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries, as well as environmental cooperation
agreements, but not to include aggression in the
GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain
the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE
shall have participation in international meetings and
events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to
participate in Philippine official missions and
delegations for the negotiation of border agreements
or protocols for environmental protection and
equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving
the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall
also have the right to explore its resources and that
the sharing between the Central Government and the
BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources
is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have
the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.
And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that
the relationship between the GRP and MILF is
associative i.e. characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. This structure of governance shall be
further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a
stipulation which was highly contested before the
court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build,
develop and maintain its own institutions, the details
of which shall be discussed in the comprehensive
compact as well.
Issues:
1. WON the petitions have complied with the
procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial
review
2. WON respondents violate constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD; and
3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the
Constitution and the laws
Ruling:
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the
Constitution.
 On the Procedural Issue
1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld
that there is indeed a need for the exercise of judicial
review.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
or controversy, that is the court will decline on issues
that are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere
academic questions. Related to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is
no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is
only a proposal and does not automatically create
legally demandable rights and obligations. Such was
denied.
The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging
acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse
of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that
acts made by authority which exceed their authority,
by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the
petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act
of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete
acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to
render the present controversy ripe and that the law
or act in question as not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the
personalities of the Province of Cotabato, Province of
Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of
Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of
Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs
which will be affected in whole or in part if include
within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel
Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers,
assert that government funds would be expended for
the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score
alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar
Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And
lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-
Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an
advocacy group for justice and the attainment of
peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and
Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-
government organization of Muslim lawyers since
they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the
resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.
On the contention of mootness of the issue
considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already
been suspended and that the President has already
disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court
reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a
general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the
situation is of exceptional character and paramount
public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and
that where there is a voluntary cessation of the
activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it
does not divest the court the power to hear and try
the case especially when the plaintiff is seeking for
damages or injunctive relief.
Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD
and the disbandment of the GRP did not render the
petitions moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject
to further legal enactments including possible
Constitutional amendments more than ever provides
impetus for the Court to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and,
in this case, the government and its negotiating
entity.
At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if
not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable
expectation that petitioners will again be subjected to
the same problem in the future as respondents'
actions are capable of repetition, in another or any
form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to
the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot
and academic considering that parties have already
complied thereat.
 On the Substantive Issue
2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter
of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the State, which directly
affects the lives of the public at large.
As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to
information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, and integrated therein is the
recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The policy of
public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to
know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State
to be accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all
times accountable to the people.
Also, it was held that such stipulation in the
Constitution is self-executory with reasonable
safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await
the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep
open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will.
The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought
for since it is corollary to the twin rights to information
and disclosure. And feedback means not only the
conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of the
respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right
of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda
as corollary to the constitutional right to information
and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon
committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to
carry out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot
invoke of executive privilege because he already
waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to
the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD.
In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be
involved in matters related to such peace talks as
enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right
to participate fully at all levels on decisions that would
clearly affect their lives, rights and destinies. The
MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral
domain, hence it should have observed the free and
prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to
do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess
in authority exercised by the respondent—since they
allowed delineation and recognition of ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement and compromise;
such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.
3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-
AD, there can be no question that they cannot be all
accommodated under the present Constitution and
laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them:
 On matters of the Constitution.
Association as the type of relationship governing
between the parties. The parties manifested that in
crafting the MOA-AD, the term association was
adapted from the international law. In international
law, association happens when two states of equal
power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one
state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities
to the other, principal, while maintaining its
international status as state; free association is a
middle ground between integration and
independence. The MOA-AD contains many
provisions that are consistent with the international
definition of association which fairly would deduced
that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an
associated state, or at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The court vehemently objects
because the principle of association is not recognized
under the present Constitution.
 On the recognition of the BJE entity as a
state. The concept implies power beyond
what the Constitution can grant to a local
government; even the ARMM do not have
such recognition; and the fact is such
concept implies recognition of the associated
entity as a state. There is nothing in the law
that contemplate any state within the
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence. The
court disagrees with the respondent that the
MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is
a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government,
 and a capacity to enter into relations with
other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly
runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
 On the expansion of the territory of the BJE.
The territory included in the BJE includes
those areas who voted in the plebiscite for
them to become part of the ARMM. The
stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-
AD that these areas need not participate in
the plebiscite is in contrary to the express
provision of the Constitution. The law states
that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region." Clearly, assuming that
the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it
would still run afoul the wordings of the law
since those included in its territory are areas
which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and
not to the BJE.
 On the powers vested in the BJE as an
entity. The respondents contend that the
powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD
shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20,
art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere
passage of a law is necessary in order to
vest in the BJE powers included in the
agreement. The Court was not persuaded.
SC ruled that such conferment calls for
amendment of the Constitution; otherwise
new legislation will not concur with the
Constitution. Take for instance the treaty
making power vested to the BJE in the
MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear that only
the President has the sole organ and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign
nation. Should the BJE be granted with the
authority to negotiate with other states, the
former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be
amended—the provision of the law that
promotes national unity and development.
Because clearly, associative arrangement of
the MOA-AD does not epitomize national
unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The
associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a
portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally
been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
 On matters of domestic statutes.
o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM.
RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD. Said law
specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro
people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the
definition of the MOA-AD which includes all
indigenous people of Mindanao.
o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the
delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is
a clear departure from the procedure embodied in the
IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference of
the MOA-AD.
 On matters of international law.
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principle of international law as part of the law of the
land. In international law, the right to self-
determination has long been recognized which states
that people can freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development. There are the internal and external self-
determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of
man and the external which takes the form of the
assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This
principle of self-determination is viewed with respect
accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states.
External self-determination is only afforded in
exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the
meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-
determination. International law, as a general rule,
subject only to limited and exceptional cases,
recognizes that the right of disposing national territory
is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every
state.
On matters relative to indigenous people,
international law states that indigenous peoples
situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under
international law, but they do have rights amounting
to what was discussed above as the right to internal
self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing
their autonomous functions; have the right to the
lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired.
Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the
State to guarantee the indigenous people their own
police and security force; but rather, it shall be the
State, through police officers, that will provide for the
protection of the people. With regards to the
autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not
obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-
independent status of a state; since it would impair
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign
and independent states.
 On the basis of the suspensive clause.
o It was contented by the respondents that grave
abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the
provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not take
effect until the necessary changes to the legal
framework are effected.
The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause
runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from the
President stating that negotiations shall be conducted
in accordance to the territorial integrity of the
country—such was negated by the provision on
association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from
this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid
because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace
panel to advance peace talks even if it will require
new legislation or even constitutional amendments.
The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges
on the query whether the President can exercise such
power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace
Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President
cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
possess. The power of the President to conduct
peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution but is rather implied from her powers as
Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief
Executive, the President has the general
responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty
to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence.
As such, the President is given the leeway to explore,
in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that
may require changes to the Constitution for their
implementation. At all event, the president may not, of
course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable; but she may not be prevented from
submitting them as recommendations to Congress,
which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision.
While the President does not possess constituent
powers - as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
through initiative and referendum - she may submit
proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a
manner that does not involve the arrogation of
constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be
inferred that the President - in the course of
conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider
implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, but she may not
unilaterally implement them without the intervention of
Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that
body were assumed as a certainty. The President’s
power is limited only to the preservation and defense
of the Constitution but not changing the same but
simply recommending proposed amendments or
revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a
suspensive condition but is a term because it is not a
question of whether the necessary changes to the
legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the
stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the
changes to the legal framework –which changes
would include constitutional amendments. Simply put,
the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of
the President's authority to propose constitutional
amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all
the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence,
it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an

international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by
itself, already a constitutional violation that renders
the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being
a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to
the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in
the fact that they considered, as a solution to the
Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state,
but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that
Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would
give their imprimatur to their solution.Upholding such
an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of
the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that
the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.