Arceta vs. Mangrobang [GR 152895, 15 June 2004] ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling.
n view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V.
Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an Information (Criminal
Case 1599-CR), alleging in an Information that on or about 16
September 1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank check worth
P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro
payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have
sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said
payee with the face amount of said check or to make arrangement
for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice.
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the
Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional.
She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a
move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the
trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing
jurisprudence. On 21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and
pleaded ³not guilty´ to the charge. However, she manifested that her
arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to
any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial
court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining
order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP
22). On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan
filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (MeTC of Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183),
alleging in the Information that on or about the month of January
2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the amount
of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well
knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment which check was subsequently dishonored for
the reason³ACCOUNT CLOSED´ and with intent to defraud failed
and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount
of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that
said check has been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta,
Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground
that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move
on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said
petition with the Supreme Court invoking its power of judicial review
to have the said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.
Issue:
Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due to the
present economic and financial crisis, else due to the undue burden
made upon the MeTC by bouncing checks cases.
Held:
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it
is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an
actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very
lismota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the
Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or
invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsels
spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable to agree that
the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court
find the constitutional question raised to be the very lis mota
presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not
one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court
examined the contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still
have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation
transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy
that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to
declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves
but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during
trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen
faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending
to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be
deterred,to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities.
Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened
immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to
the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to
the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Earliest Opportunity
Art. 8 Sec 5(2)
Umali vs. Guingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)
Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos.
He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994
and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994,
President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the
petitioner for alleged violations ofinternal revenue laws, rules and
regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more
particularly the following malfeasance,misfeasance and
nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum,
former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the
preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the
Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly
informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in
his answer, copies of hisStatement of Assets, and Liabilities for the
past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set
on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August
23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the
evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September
23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the
twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October
6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then
President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing
petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits under the law.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security
of Tenure.
(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law
(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government
agencyand whether the petitioner can raise the issue of
constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts decision.
(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the
charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's
dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152
Held:
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can
only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of
1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds
for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of
loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner
theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion
that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To
be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the
PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other
pleadings with respect to his alleged violation ofinternal revenue laws
and regulations, and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body.
It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of
due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be
said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his
security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of
Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security
of tenure.
However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of
evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a
CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient
evidence on the matter.
His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of constitutionalityof
the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was
certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings.
As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under
consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was
taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges
included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results
of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal
charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petitionis dismissable
on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not
constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and
conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into
account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the
Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider
the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the
Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no
longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the
Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order
No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot
be overlooked.
Brief Summary: The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the
petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner
against the respondents. It was on October 27, 1993 when Osmundo
Umali was appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received a
memorandum alleging against the petitioner in violation of internal
revenue laws during the incumbency as Regional Director. On
October 6, 1994, President Ramos issued an Administrative Order
No. 152 dismissing the petitioner from service with forfeiture of
retirement and all
benefits provided by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the Office of the President denied the motion for reconsideration.
December 1, 1994, a petition is brought to the regional Trial Court of
Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of
Administrative Order No. 152.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the
petitioner's right to security of tenure
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the
issuance of administrative order no. 152
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency
and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of itsconstitutionality
belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution
dismissing the charges against petitioner, there is still basis for
petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in
administrative order no. 152
Ruling:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the
petitioner's right to security of tenure
NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what
petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. The petitioner claimed
that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he is CESO
eligible entitled to security of tenure however it is anemicof
evidentiary support. But it was fatal that he wasn't able to provide
sufficient evidence on this matter.
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the
issuance of administrative order no. 152
NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to
be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due processes before
the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and
other pleadings with respect to his alleged violations of internal
revenue laws and regulations and he attended the hearings before
the investigatory body.
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency
and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality
belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in
his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such
late stage of the proceedings below.
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution
dismissing the charges against petitioner, there is still basis for
petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in
administrative order no. 152
The administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the
institution of the criminal case. Administrative Order No.152 were
based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and
not on the criminal charges before the ombudsman.
Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues raised by the
petitioner does not constitute any valid legal basis for overturning the
findings and conclusions by the Court of Appeals. However
considering antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has
decided to consider the dismissal and because the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. Finally the Solicitor General has no more basis to enact
Administrative Order No. 152.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive
supervening events, and in the exercise of its equity powers, the
Court hereby GRANTS the petition Accordingly Administrative order
no 152 is considered LIFTED and petitioner can be allowed to retire
with full benefits No pronouncement as to costs.
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19,
2001
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court
that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said
law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the
alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this
terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the
petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned
law.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to
attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge
.Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series
does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it
would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness
doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioners reliance since
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a
saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may
not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, over breadth doctrine
decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial
challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances
as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial
challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such
statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute
is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On
its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely
on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than
real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been
resolve in the Congress decision to include it among the heinous
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court
holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for
lacking merit.
PP vs Vera 65 Phil 56
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He
filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila
CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request
by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No.
4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a
city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides
equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of
power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of
the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of
legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the
laws
Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does
not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving
commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does
not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws. The classification of equal protection, to be
reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the
law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes
an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to
the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation.
The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so
protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No.
4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
 probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice
and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces
or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the
salary of a probation officer.
2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions
of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of
the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be
said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the
petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may
appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do
so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in
the former province but not in the latter. This means that a
person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be
liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while
another person similarly situated in another province would be
denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation
officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality
would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in
operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of
appropriation by all the provincial boards.
Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)
Facts:
Senator Blas Ople prayed to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on the following
important constitutional grounds:
a.) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate;
b.) it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy.
He also contended that the appropriation of public funds by the
president for the implementation of
AO 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive right of
congress to appropriate public funds
for expenditure.
AO 308 aims to establish a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify persons seeking
basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations.
Then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the
government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, the
respondents have the following counter
arguments:
a.) The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a
judicial review
b.) AO 308 was issued within the executive and administrative
powers of the president without
encroaching on the legislative powers of congress. They also
contend that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
c.) The funds necessary for the implementation of the ID reference
system may be sourced from
the budgets of the concerned agencies
d.) AO 308 protects an individual’s interest in privacy
 procedures designed to serve the people." AO 308 establishes for
Issues: the first time a National
a.) Whether or not Senator Ople has the standing to sue and the Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
justiciability of the case at bar. requires a delicate adjustment
b.) Whether or not AO 308 is not merely an administrative order but a of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security,
law and hence, beyond the the extent of privacy
power of the President to issue (encroachment of legislative power) interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
c.) Whether or not AO 308 violates the right to privacy. policies, etc.
They also argue that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
Held: right, imposes no duty,
a.) Petitioner Ople as a Senator has legal standing to bring suit affords no protection, and creates no office. However, without the
raising the issue that the ID, a citizen will have
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this
taxpayer and member of the reality, the contention that
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to c.) AO 308 is a violation to the right to privacy. The essence of
implement A.O. No. 308. privacy is the "right to be let
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not alone." The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined
affected by the fact that the in several provisions of our
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Constitution. It is expressly recognized in several provisions of the
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. Bill of Rights, Civil Code
No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not and even the Revised Penal Code.
premature for the rules The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the Constitution, hence, it is the
respondents themselves burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for compelling state interest
the rules and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need
b.) An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
which relates to specific transact business with
aspects in the administrative operation of government. basic service and social security providers and other government
The respondent’s argument that A.O. No. 308 implements instrumentalities and (2) the
the legislative policy of the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
Administrative Code of 1987 was rejected by the SC because the misrepresentations by
Administrative Code is a persons seeking basic services.
general law which "incorporates in a unified document the major The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
structural, functional and Population Reference
procedural principles of governance" and "embodies changes in Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a
administrative structures and linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
that the candidate garnering the 13th highest vote will serve for the
application designs." It
is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific unexpired term of Guingona. Petitioners, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo
biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming the winner.
identify people who will seek its They contend that it is without jurisdiction because it failed to notify
coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the
implementors of A.O. No. 308, the electorate of the position to be filled in (special election) due to
the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not this the people voted without distinction in one election for 13 seats
groundless.
It also does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological irrespective of term.
information alone for Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s have standing to maintain suit?
identification purposes. The SG claims that the adoption of
the Identification Reference Decision: In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners
System will contribute to the "generation of population data for assert harm classified as “generalized grievance.” They failed to
development planning." This is
an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification establish direct injury they suffered from the said governmental act.
but for the generation of However, the Court relaxed the requirement on standing and
other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of
A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the exercised its discretion to give due course to voter’s suit involving the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving right of suffrage.
authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his Jumamil vs. Café, et al.
PRN.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Jumamil vs. Café, et al.
Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a [GR 144570, 21 September 2005]
National Computerized Identification Reference System" Third Division, Corona (J): 4 concur
declared null and void for being
unconstitutional
Facts: In 1989, Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory
TOLENTINO V COMELEC relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining
order against Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the
Facts: After becoming president on January 2001, Gloria Arroyo
Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the
nominated Senator Teofista Guingona as vice-president. After constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution
7). Resolution 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance 111, provided for
confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was passed by the Senate calling an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls
the COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a special election tobe held around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which
was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the petition was amended due
simultaneously with the 2001 May regular election. It also provided to the passage of Resolution 49, series of 1989 (Resolution 49),
denominated as Ordinance 10, appropriating a further amount of
P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public
market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Cafe had
already entered into contracts with those who advanced and
deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the
sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or
relatives of Cafe, et al. The construction of the stalls which Jumamil
sought to stop through the preliminary injunction in the RTC was
nevertheless finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and
academic. The leases of the stalls were then awarded by public raffle
which, however, was limited to those who had deposited P40,000
each. Thus, the petition was amended anew to include the 57
awardees of the stalls as private respondents. Jumamil alleges that
Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were
passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of
private respondents, some of which were close friends and/or
relative of the mayor and the sanggunian, who deposited the amount
of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a
prior contract to award the would be constructed stalls to all private
respondents; that resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any
notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted
benefits conferred on the private respondents may be availed of by
anybody who can deposit the amount of P40,000; and that nor there
were any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered
into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to
be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of
by anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed Jumamil’s petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered
Jumamil to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000 to each of
the 57 private respondents. On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR
CV 35082), the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Jumamil filed the petition for review on certiorari.
Issue [1]: Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the
petition for declaratory relief
Held [1]: Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being
challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The
term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s
constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or
ordinance, he has no legal standing. Jumamil brought the petition in
his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del
Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the
official acts of the the mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in
passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with
private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract
to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically
prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being
assailed were appropriations ordinances. Jumamil alleged that these
ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment
and benefit of private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private
benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed,
Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease
contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private
respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the
municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the
municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits,
however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls
after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the
award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who
advanced their personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did not
seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only
in the “Remark to Comment” he filed in the Supreme Court did he
first assert that “he (was) willing to engage in business and (was)
interested to occupy a market stall.” Such claim was obviously an
afterthought.
Issue [2]: Whether the rule on locus standi should be relaxed.
Held [2]: Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty,
personality, standing or interest are procedural matters. Considering absent any showing to the contrary.
the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of
a tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in ITF V COMELEC
the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which
branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits
authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a
of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test
discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in
technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit. There Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-
Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing System;
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.
raising the questions being raised. But, even if the Court disregards
Jumamil’s lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. The
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
subject resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000 for
Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to
the construction of the public market stalls. Jumamil alleged that fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of
these ordinances were discriminatory because, even prior to their Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
enactment, a decision had already been made to award the market
stalls to the private respondents who deposited P40,000 each and
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to
who were either friends or relatives of the mayor or members of the
Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".
Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted that “there (was) no publication or
invitation to the public that this contract (was) available to all who On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the
(were) interested to own a stall and (were) willing to deposit
herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the
P40,000.” Respondents, however, counter that the “public
Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
respondents’ act of entering into this agreement was authorized by
Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos
the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution 180 dated 10
Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC
October 1988” and that “all the people interested were invited to "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding
participate in investing their savings.” Jumamil failed to prove the process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with
subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory.
eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of
Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the acts of the
which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a
local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should
re-bidding.
have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly
against those who were not notified and who were thus not given the
opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;
that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore, there
Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature. B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the
DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec
Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby and DOST after the award, and their effect on the present
declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding controversy
the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium
(MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed In view of the bidding process
between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what
is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract manner and by what standards or criteria the condition, performance
or agreement entered into with regard to this project. and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-
appraised and thereafter given the passing mark.

Ratio: Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not
inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing only the manufacturing of the ACM hardware but also the
mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for
accepted the proferred computer hardware and software even if, at use in the following:
the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical 1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections: 2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even 3. Election Day Use."
participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the
to meet the mandatory eligibility requirements decision to award the Contract to the "winning" bidder partly on the
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That
to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of its Report, which formed software was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo" software,
the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31 which would not be the actual one that would be used on election
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during day.
the bidding process, there were violations of the mandatory
requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the
Request for Proposal on the automated election system IHaECA software that was the subject of the Contract was still to be created
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re- and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being
bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the technical tests considered as being in final form?
conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the In view of awarding of contract
conduct of the bidding for the automated counting machines The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised (Request for Proposal for the Automation of the 2004 Election)
during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it sufficient to focus mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's
discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on first envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to establish its
the issue of grave abuse of discretion: eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of contract if its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be
MPC as a bidder the Bid Envelope itself.
 In view of prematurity
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May
articles of incorporation, business registrations, licenses and permits, 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an
mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award
containing documentary evidence to establish the track record of the the Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein
bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the
contract; and financial documents, including audited financial Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
statements for the last three years, to establish the bidder's financial Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the
capacity. requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because
it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.
However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture
agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of agreement, or Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule
business plan executed among the members of the purported on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as
consortium.So, it necessarily follows that, during the bidding process, follows:
Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged "(1) when there is a violation of due process,
consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
arrangements among the members were satisfactory and sufficient (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
interest. (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned,
In view of standing (5) when there is irreparable injury,
On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens — respond that as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and approval of the latter,
of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would
questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would be unreasonable,
impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic proceedings,
system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in adequate remedy, and
gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
governing the transaction must be followed strictly. judicial intervention."

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue
when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or
if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or
when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."
KILOSANBAYAN V GUINGONA
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and
conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on
-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base
and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993,
after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line
lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company
and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,” “became
interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial
step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees)
organized with someFilipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine
corporation known asthe Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through
which the technical and management services required for the
project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request
forProposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery
systemfor the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to
thePCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of -line lottery system and
that the correspondingimplementing contract would be submitted not
later than 8 November 1993 “for final clearance and approval by the
Chief Executive.”
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter toPresident
Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery
system on the basis of serious moral and ethicalconsiderations.
Considering the denial by the Office of the Presidentof its protest and
the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that
“only a court injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the imminent
implementation of the Contract of Lease inFebruary 1994,
KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28January 1994 this
petition.Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic
corporationcomposed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns,
and layleaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie
Webband WigbertoTañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are
suingin their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees
ofKILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
SenatorsWebb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in
theircapacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and
concernedcitizens of the Philippines Sweepstakes Office.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi2. Whether or the
Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCS
O from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association
or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and valid.
HELD:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to
the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect thes
ocial, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in there
motest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside
the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of.
The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear.The
PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of
collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is
one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent
contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which
may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus
hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the
instrument. Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the
PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them
would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and
management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO
would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of
Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein
are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention
of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight
years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery
system.We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease
violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169,as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for
being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary
furtherdiscussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.
Facts:
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up
an on-line lottery system which will establish a national network
system that will in turn expand PCSO’s source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC
as it alleged that: PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement
because it is 75%foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya
Group Berhad);PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is
prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company
or entity”; The network system sought to be built by PGMC for
PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No.
3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before
any person may be allowed to set up such; PGMC’s articles of
incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No.
7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line
lotto and telecommunications systems. PGMC and PCSO, through
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and
Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a
collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the
building of the network; thatP GMC is a mere lessor of the network it
will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon,
i.e., Contract of Lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
HELD:
Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMC’s foreign ownership
was reduced to 40% though. On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A.
No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether
domestic or foreign.”
There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and
not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and
PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e.,
acontract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement,
PGMC at its own expense shall
build, operate, and manage the network system including its
facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO
bears no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise – in violation
of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a
violation of Act No. 3846.
Executive Secretary vs. CA GR No. 131719
Topic: Standing
FACTS: The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
took effect on 15 July 1995and its Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Act was published on April 1996.However, even
before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine
Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on 17 July 1995, a petition for
declaratory relief to declare some parts as unconstitutional and
prayed for a preliminary injunction enjoining herein petitioners from
implementing it. On 1 August 1995, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order effective for a period of only 20 days therefrom.
After the Executive Secretary, et al. filed their comment on the
petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments
consisting in the inclusion in the caption thereof 11 other
corporations which it alleged were its members and which it
represented in the suit, and a plea for a temporary restraining order.
Arco-Phil averred that the provisions of RA 8042 violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution (i.e. discrimination against unskilled
workers, discrimination against licensed and registered recruiters,
among others). The RTC eventually granted the writ so the ES filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, asserting that
“…Acro
-Phil is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court,
as it was inconceivable how a non-stock and non-profit corporation,
could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law.
They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the
implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered
recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant workers
discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or damage,
not Acro- Phil.”
The CA dismissed this, hence the present petition.
ISSUE: WON ACRO-Phil has locus standi
HELD: Only insofar as the 11 licensed and registered recruitment
agencies impleaded in the amended petitions but not for the
unskilled workers it was claiming for. The modern view is that an
association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This
view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its
members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers
despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the
action. The Court note that, under its Articles of Incorporation,
ACRO-Phil was organized for the purposes inter alia of promoting
and supporting the growth and development of the man power
recruitment industry, both in the local and international levels;
providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the
exclusive benefit of its general membership; enhancing
and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers;
and, to act as the representative of any individual, company, entity or
association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry,
and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the
purposes embodied therein. ACRO-Phil is, thus, the appropriate
party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members
are in every practical sense identical. However, with respect to the
unskilled workers, the Court finds that ACRO-Phil cannot file
the petition on their behalf and that it even failed to implead
such unskilled workers in their petition.
IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summary
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the
Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police (PNP) in
visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising
violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through
Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent
(LOI) dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols
called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a memorandum
Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000,
the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the
deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by
the military on the civilian functions of government as embodied in
Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: (1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?
(2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces subject to judicial review?
(3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violate constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP?
RULING: In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the
requisites for legal standing in the case at bar in that it has failed to
conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in any
way. It’s contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the
constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague. As to the
second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the
Solicitor-General that the president’s act is a political question
beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of power
is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the
prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question
of legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then
subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third issue, the
Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In fact,
the PNP Chief is the leader of such patrols and in no way places the
over-all authority in the Marines.
Petition is dismissed

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION v. VICTOR LIM,
GR No. 119775, 2003-10-24
Facts:
R.A. No. 7227,... 460
Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992... set out the policy of the government to
accelerate
460 Phil. 530... onvers... conversion... into alternative productive
uses of the former military bases... namely, the Clark and Subic... as
well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John
Hay or the camp) in the City of Baguio
R.A. No. 7227 created
BCDA... likewise created
Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ)... granted
the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and
national taxes... ave authority to the President... reate through
executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local
government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military...
reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and
Camp John Hay.
August 16, 1993
BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
Tuntex
Asiaworld... corporations registered under the laws of the British
Virgin Island... or the development of Poro Point in La Union and
Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations... on December 16,
1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture
Agreement... o put up a joint venture company... lease areas within
Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such
places into... principal tourist and recreation spots,... Baguio City
government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City... asked BCDA to exclude
all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from
the reach or coverage of any plan or... program for its development.
quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by
residents of nine (9) barangays surrounding the military reservation.
submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp
John Hay.
protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of
tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio
residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation
of the city government in the management and operation of the...
camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the
area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be
established within the camp.
BCDA, Tuntex and AsiaWorld agreed to some, but rejected or
modified the other proposals of the sanggunian.[11] They stressed
the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent
to its full development in accordance with the mandate of
R.A. No. 7227.
e sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255, (Series of 1994),... the
issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation
declaring an area of 288.1... hectares of the camp as a SEZ in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
resident Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420,[16] the title of which
was earlier indicated, which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp
John Hay and which reads
John Hay Special Economic Zone
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present
petition[17] for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which
was filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its
constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between
public respondent BCDA and private respondents Tuntex and
AsiaWorld... he questioned Memorandum of Agreement and Joint
Venture Agreement having already been deemed abandoned by the
inaction of the parties thereto prior to the filing of... the petition as in
fact, by letter of November 21, 1995, BCDA formally notified Tuntex
and AsiaWorld of the revocation of their said agreements... n
maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents
contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives
similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established
under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the
legislative intent... of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs
of business activity or investment... respondents assail petitioners'
lack of standing to bring the present suit even as taxpayers and in
the absence of... any actual case or controversy to warrant this
Court's exercise of its power of judicial review over the proclamation.
for having been filed in disregard of the hierarchy of courts and of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Nonetheless, as it is only this Court which has the power under
Section 21[23] of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin implementation of projects
for... the development of the former US military reservations,... Over
and above this procedural objection to the present suit, this Court
retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition f...
iled directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and...
importance of the issues raised, warrant.
As far as the questioned agreements between BCDA and Tuntex
and AsiaWorld are concerned, the legal questions being raised
thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and
academic by the revocation of such agreements.
460 Phil. 530
THIRD DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003 ]
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO
CARIÑO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN
REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA
BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY
HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA
LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER
MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C.
PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C.
GIRON, URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE
MONDOC, PETITIONERS,... VS. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT,
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY
PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF
BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD
INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory
relief with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in the main, the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No.
420, Series of 1994, "CREATING AND DESIGNATING a portion of
the area covered by the former Camp John [Hay] as THE JOHN HAY
Special Economic Zone pursuant to R.A. No. 7227."
R.A. No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF
MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER PRODUCTIVE USES,
CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as
the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," which was enacted on March 13, 1992,
set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and
balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former
military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America
Military Bases
Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well
as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay
or the camp) in the City of Baguio.[1]
As noted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created public respondent Bases
Conversion and Development Authority[2] (BCDA), vesting it with
powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the
ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in... accordance with the
declared government policy.
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and
Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to
be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the
Philippines.[3]
R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax
and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from
local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial
and business climate.[4]
And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to
create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of
the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military...
reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and
Camp John Hay.[5]
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private respondents Tuntex
(B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc.
(ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands,... preparatory to the formation of a joint venture
for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay
as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. Four months
later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD
executed a Joint Venture
Agreement[6] whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint
venture company known as the Baguio International Development
and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp
John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places
into... principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned
by the parties under their Memorandum of Agreement.
The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of
resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay.
By Resolution[7] of September 29, 1993, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Baguio City (the sanggunian) officially asked BCDA to
exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John
Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or... program for its
development.
By a subsequent Resolution[8] dated January 19, 1994, the
sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of
its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of nine
(9) barangays surrounding the military reservation.
Still by another resolution passed on February 21, 1994, the
sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for
the development of Camp John Hay.[9] The sanggunian's vision
expressed, among other things, a kind of development that... affords
protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of
tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio
residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation
of the city government in the management and operation of the...
camp, exclusion of the previously named nine barangays from the
area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be
established within the camp.[10]
BCDA, Tuntex and AsiaWorld agreed to some, but rejected or
modified the other proposals of the sanggunian.[11] They stressed
the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent
to its full development in accordance with the mandate of
R.A. No. 7227.[12]
On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting
the Mayor to order the determination of realty taxes which may
otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay.[13]
The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the... sanggunian in
determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a
SEZ, it (the sanggunian) being of the view that such declaration
would exempt the camp's property and the economic activity therein
from local or national taxation.
More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed
Resolution No. 255, (Series of 1994),[14] seeking and supporting,
subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of
a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 288.1... hectares of
the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the
proposed proclamation for consideration by the President.[15]
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No.
420,[16] the title of which was earlier indicated, which established a
SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads as follows:... x
xx
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of
concurrence by the City Council of Baguio, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby create and designate a
portion of the area covered by the former John Hay reservation as
embraced, covered,... and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of
America, as amended, as the John Hay Special Economic Zone, and
accordingly order:
SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay Special Economic Zone. - The
John Hay Special Economic Zone shall cover the area consisting of
Two Hundred Eighty Eight and one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or
less, of the total of Six Hundred Seventy-Seven (677) hectares of the
John Hay
Reservation, more or less, which have been surveyed and verified by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as
defined by the following technical description:
A parcel of land, situated in the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet,
Island of Luzon, and particularly described in survey plans Psd-
131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030 as approved on 16 August
1993 and 26 August 1993, respectively, by the Department of
Environment... and Natural Resources, in detail containing :
Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15,
and Lot 20 of Ccs-131102-000030
-and-
Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lot 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14,
Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 17, and Lot 18 of Psd-131102-002639 being
portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 87.
With a combined area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND
ONE/TENTH HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided that the area
consisting of approximately Six and two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or
less, presently occupied by the VOA and the residence of the
Ambassador of the United States,... shall be considered as part of
the SEZ only upon turnover of the properties to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone. -
Pursuant to Section 15 of R.A. No. 7227, the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority is hereby established as the governing body
of the John Hay Special Economic Zone and, as such, authorized to
determine... the utilization and disposition of the lands comprising it,
subject to private rights, if any, and in consultation and coordination
with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its
inhabitants, and to promulgate the necessary policies, rules, and
regulations to... govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay
Poro Point Development Corporation, which is its implementing arm
for its economic development and optimum utilization.
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. -
Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of R.A. No. 7227, the John
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all
necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone,...
including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent
government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12
of R.A. No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the
Export Processing
Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may
hereinafter be enacted.
Sec. 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and
Instrumentalities. - All Heads of departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the government are hereby
directed to give full support to Bases Conversion and Development
Authority and/or its... implementing subsidiary or joint venture to
facilitate the necessary approvals to expedite the implementation of
various projects of the conversion program.
Sec. 5. Local Authority. - Except as herein provided, the affected
local government units shall retain their basic autonomy and identity.
Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. - All orders, rules, and regulations, or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Proclamation, are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 7. Effectivity. This proclamation shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of July, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-four.
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present
petition[17] for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which
was filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its
constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between
public respondent BCDA and private respondents Tuntex and
AsiaWorld.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the
following:
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic)
IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS IS INVALID AND
ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE
PRESIDENT OF A POWER GRANTED ONLY TO THE
LEGISLATURE.
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT
LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE AUTONOMY
OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID, ILLEGAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE RULE THAT
ALL TAXES SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENTS BASES
CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING BEEN
ENTERED INTO ONLY BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC RESPONDENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY IS (sic) ILLEGAL.
THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS
NOT HAVING UNDERGONE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT IS BEING ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A
VALID ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
was prayed for to enjoin BCDA, John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation and the city government from implementing
Proclamation No. 420, and Tuntex and AsiaWorld from proceeding
with their plan respecting Camp
John Hay's development pursuant to their Joint Venture Agreement
with BCDA.[18]
Public respondents, by their separate Comments, allege as moot and
academic the issues raised by the petition, the questioned
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement having
already been deemed abandoned by the inaction of the parties
thereto prior to the filing of... the petition as in fact, by letter of
November 21, 1995, BCDA formally notified Tuntex and AsiaWorld of
the revocation of their said agreements.[19]
In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents
contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives
similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established
under R.A. No. 7227, the proclamation is merely implementing the
legislative intent... of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs
of business activity or investment. They underscore the point that the
government's policy of bases conversion can not be achieved
without extending the same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No.
7227 to Subic SEZ to other
SEZs.
Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in derogation of the local
autonomy of Baguio City or that it is violative of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, respondents assail petitioners' lack of
standing to bring the present suit even as taxpayers and in the
absence of... any actual case or controversy to warrant this Court's
exercise of its power of judicial review over the proclamation.
Finally, respondents seek the outright dismissal of the petition for
having been filed in disregard of the hierarchy of courts and of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Replying,[20] petitioners aver that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies finds no application herein since they are
invoking the exclusive authority of this Court under Section 21 of
R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin or restrain implementation of... projects for
conversion of the base areas; that the established exceptions to the
aforesaid doctrine obtain in the present petition; and that they
possess the standing to bring the petition which is a taxpayer's suit.
Public respondents have filed their Rejoinder[21] and the parties
have filed their respective memoranda.
Before dwelling on the core issues, this Court shall first address the
preliminary procedural questions confronting the petition.
The judicial policy is and has always been that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be
obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling
circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for
the... exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.[22] Neither will it
entertain an action for declaratory relief, which is partly the nature of
this petition, over which it has no original jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, as it is only this Court which has the power under
Section 21[23] of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin implementation of projects
for the development of the former US military reservations, the
issuance of which injunction petitioners pray for,... petitioners' direct
filing of the present petition with it is allowed. Over and above this
procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it
if compelling reasons, or the nature and... importance of the issues
raised, warrant.[24] Besides, remanding the case to the lower courts
now would just unduly prolong adjudication of the issues.
The transformation of a portion of the area covered by Camp John
Hay into a SEZ is not simply a re-classification of an area, a mere
ascription of a status to a place. It involves turning the former US
military reservation into a focal point for investments by both local
and... foreign entities. It is to be made a site of vigorous business
activity, ultimately serving as a spur to the country's long awaited
economic growth. For, as R.A. No. 7227 unequivocally declares, it is
the government's policy to enhance the benefits to be derived from
the base... areas in order to promote the economic and social
development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in
general.[25] Like the Subic SEZ, the John Hay SEZ should also be
turned into a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment... center."[26]
More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp
John Hay as well as of the other base areas unquestionably has
critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns.
Whatever use to which these lands will be devoted will set a chain of
events that can... affect one way or another the social and economic
way of life of the communities where the bases are located, and
ultimately the nation in general.
Underscoring the fragility of Baguio City's ecology with its problem on
the scarcity of its water supply, petitioners point out that the local and
national government are faced with the challenge of how to provide
for an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable...
transition for the city in the wake of Camp John Hay's reversion to
the mass of government property.[27] But that is why R.A. No. 7227
emphasizes the "sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extensions... consistent with
ecological and environmental standards."[28] It cannot thus be
gainsaid that the matter of conversion of the US bases into SEZs, in
this case Camp John Hay, assumes importance of a national
magnitude.
Convinced then that the present petition embodies crucial issues,
this Court assumes jurisdiction over the petition.
As far as the questioned agreements between BCDA and Tuntex
and AsiaWorld are concerned, the legal questions being raised
thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and
academic by the revocation of such agreements. There are,
however, other issues posed by the... petition, those which center on
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, which have not been
mooted by the said supervening event upon application of the rules
for the judicial scrutiny of constitutional cases. The issues boil down
to:
(1)
Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this
Court's exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues;
(2)
Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for
national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic
incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and
(3)
Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or
interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City;
It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the...
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[29]
An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory.[30] The controversy needs to be definite
and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who... are
pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests.[31]
There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights
between petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a
presidential proclamation that converts a portion of... the area
covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such
proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming
otherwise.
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected
local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base
areas in the country.[32] The grant by the law on local government
units of the right of concurrence on the bases'... conversion is
equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a
recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or
surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the
interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in... assailing the
legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such
that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government act being challenged.[33] Theirs is a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by... the proclamation and not merely an
interest in the question involved or an incidental interest,[34] for what
is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very
economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.
Petitioners' locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other
residents of Bataan, specially of the town of Limay, in Garcia v.
Board of Investments[35] where this Court characterized their
interest in the establishment of a... petrochemical plant in their place
as actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect not only their
economic life but even the air they breathe.
Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon
were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the
local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding
for and on behalf of their constituents the question of whether to
concur with... the declaration of a portion of the area covered by
Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and
Yaranon, as city officials who voted against[36] the sanggunian
Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the...
now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring
the present petition.
That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus
beyond doubt. The mootness of the issues concerning the
questioned agreements between public and private respondents is of
no moment.
"By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to... awaken
judicial duty."[37]
As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is
likewise no question that they have been complied with in the case at
bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional
issues, ruling on which this Court must take up. Besides,
respondents... never raised issues with respect to these requisites,
hence, they are deemed waived.
Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 420, as framed in the second and third issues
above, must now be addressed squarely.
The second issue refers to petitioners' objection against the creation
by Proclamation No. 420 of a regime of tax exemption within the
John Hay SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is
there a grant of tax exemption to SEZs yet to be established in
base... areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax
exemption and investment incentives to the therein established Subic
SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ, petitioners
conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the
Constitution which provides... that "No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of Congress."
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the challenged provision, reads:
Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. -
Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of R.A. No. 7227, the John
Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all
necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone,...
including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent
government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the
applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12
of R.A. No. 7227 and those applicable incentives... granted in the
Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987,
the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that
may hereinafter be enacted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:... x x x
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations
of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local
Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be
developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial
and... investment center to generate employment opportunities in
and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments;... b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be
operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free
flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out
of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives
such as tax and duty free... importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the
Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and... other relevant tax laws of
the Philippines;
(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the
contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be
imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying
taxes, three percent (3%) of the gross income earned by all
businesses and... enterprises within the Subic Special Economic
Zone shall be remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%)
each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the
zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In
addition, there is hereby... established a development fund of one
percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and
enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for
the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to be
base areas. In case of conflict between... national and local laws with
respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special Economic
Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for
foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall be allowed and
maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise
and regulate the operations of banks and other financial institutions
within the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and Finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of
foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and
offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank
regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose
continuing investment shall not be less than Two Hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children
under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent
resident status... within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall
have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special
Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority referred to in Section
13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2)
years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-
technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic
Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and
Employment. The... names of aliens granted permanent residence
status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within
thirty (30) days after issuance thereof;... x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic
SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment
incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the
aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the... time via
presidential proclamation.
The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ
of the tax and investment privileges accorded it under the law, as the
following exchanges between our lawmakers show during the
second reading of the precursor bill of R.A. No. 7227 with respect to
the... investment policies that would govern Subic SEZ which are
now embodied in the aforesaid Section 12 thereof:... x x x
Senator Maceda: This is what I was talking about. We get into
problems here because all of these following policies are centered
around the concept of free port. And in the main paragraph above,
we have declared both Clark and Subic as special economic zones,
subject to... these policies which are, in effect, a free-port
arrangement.
Senator Angara: The Gentleman is absolutely correct, Mr. President.
So we must confine these policies only to Subic.
May I withdraw then my amendment, and instead provide that "THE
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES." Subject to
style, Mr. President.
Thus, it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable
only to Subic as a free port.
Senator Paterno: Mr. President.
The President: Senator Paterno is recognized.
Senator Paterno: I take it that the amendment suggested by Senator
Angara would then prevent the establishment of other special
economic zones observing these policies.
Senator Angara: No, Mr. President, because during our short
caucus, Senator Laurel raised the point that if we give this delegation
to the President to establish other economic zones, that may be an
unwarranted delegation.
So we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of powers and
description of the zone to Subic, but that does not exclude the
possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands.
Senator Paterno: But if that amendment is followed, no other special
economic zone may be created under authority of this particular bill.
Is that correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara: Under this specific provision, yes, Mr. President.
This provision now will be confined only to Subic.[38]... x x x
(Underscoring supplied).
As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the
privileges given to Subic SEZ consist principally of exemption from
tariff or customs duties, national and local taxes of business entities
therein (paragraphs (b) and (c)), free market and trade of specified...
goods or properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking and finance
(paragraph f), and relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
(paragraph g). Yet, apart from these, Proclamation No. 420 also
makes available to the John Hay SEZ benefits existing in other laws
such as the... privilege of export processing zone-based businesses
of importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes,
duties and other restrictions;[39] tax and duty exemptions, tax
holiday, tax credit, and other incentives under the Omnibus
Investments
Code of 1987;[40] and the applicability to the subject zone of rules
governing foreign investments in the Philippines.[41]
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the
creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the
grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The
incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ,
hence, the... extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no
support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the
John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section
3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before
the issuance of the... proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No.
7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one
of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of
the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to... exempt
being as broad as its power to tax.[42] Other than Congress, the
Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions,[43] or
local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from
local taxes.[44]
The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the
Constitution's imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must
have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges
extended... to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for
Congress to legislate upon.
Contrary to public respondents' suggestions, the claimed statutory
exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest
and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based;
it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too
clear to be... mistaken.[46] Tax exemption cannot be implied as it
must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.[47]
If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the
same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would
have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political
departments of the government on either of two grounds-
infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.[48]
This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of
tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for
being violative of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still
dwell on petitioners' claim that the same grant violates the equal...
protection guarantee.
With respect to the final issue raised by petitioners -- that
Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional for being in derogation of
Baguio City's local autonomy, objection is specifically mounted
against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA is set up as the governing
body of the John
Hay SEZ.[49]
Petitioners argue that there is no authority of the President to subject
the John Hay SEZ to the governance of BCDA which has just
oversight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to diminish the city
government's power over an area within its jurisdiction, hence,
Proclamation
No. 420 unlawfully gives the President power of control over the local
government instead of just mere supervision.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit. Under R.A. No. 7227, the
BCDA is entrusted with, among other things, the following
purpose:[50]... x x x
(a) To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John
Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station,
San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station
(Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila Camps
which... may be transferred to it by the President;... x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in
BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it,
subject to certain limitations provided for by law. By designating
BCDA as the governing agency of the John Hay SEZ, the law merely
emphasizes or... reiterates the statutory role or functions it has been
granted.
The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial
incentives as contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed
proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts
thereof not being... repugnant to law or the Constitution. The
delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do
so by means of a proclamation.[51] The requisite prior concurrence
by the
Baguio City government to such proclamation appears to have been
given in the form of a duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian.
The other provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be
consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other
provisions in Proclamation No. 420 converting a... delineated portion
of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the
invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation
No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly
declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby
enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provision.
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid
and effective.
SO ORDERED.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the
PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB
Chair Remedios Fernando to allow provincial bus to change
passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or below the LTFRB
official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of
regulation in the transport sector which the government intends to
implement and to make progress towards greater reliance on free
market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public
Service Act requires publication and notice to concerned parties and
public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus Operators Assoc. of the
Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec.
Garcia issued a memo to LTFRB suggesting a swift action on
adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order & to lay
down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP,
w/o benefit of public hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a
petition before LTFRB w/c was denied. Hence the instant petition for
certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily granted by the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a
fare range above existing authorized fare range is unconstitutional
and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is
unconstitutional. The doctrine of Potestas delegate non
delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is
applicable because a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate thru instrumentality of his
own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge
such duty. Also, to give provincial buses the power to charge their
fare rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this would leave
the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can
increase their rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they
deem it necessary.
Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July
9, 2002.
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one
million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without
public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in
its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation
in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.
Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands
PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the
certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task
Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force
were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,
and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force
upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by
the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for
brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government
stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and
Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the
President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as
follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because
of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe
the principle of governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes
information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture
agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and
still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the
amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA
and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot
the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the
meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation
of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of
the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not
an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title
and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged
areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a
wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as
proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart
provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to
private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional
issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any
time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the
reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to
transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in
the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended
JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed
area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this
case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also,
the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the
original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the
instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public
the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated
PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from
petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure
because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a
negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and
was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek
direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional
question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of
AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban
prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because
the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the
right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second
is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute
actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount
public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic
and moral well being of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen,
involves the enforcement of constitutional rights — to information and
to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of
transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite
locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving
public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters
of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information
"contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation
of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise,
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the
public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation
of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents
and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and
papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to
reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records
and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public
dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks,
shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being
of general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and
other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted
to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use
by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred
to property used for some specific public service and open only to
those authorized to use the property.Property of public dominion
referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to
property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.
This class of property constituted property of public dominion
although employed for some economic or commercial activity to
increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted
to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of
the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not
self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant
to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the
property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being
neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for
residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to
disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions
of this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural
purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service.
This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only
allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always
reserved these lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although
subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could
only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No.
2874.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973
Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands
of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired
the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could
easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow
him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by
putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public
domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of
a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an
official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral,
nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily
fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain.
Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain
are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays,
are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public
domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the
reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the
power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water
whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also
empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore
or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands
of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of
lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No.
525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely
transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from
Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed
by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter,
however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by
the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether
patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to
private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA
charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as
the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell
valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of
PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction
fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may
be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by
the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only
the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be
reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350
hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the
reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid
justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the
area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or
issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public
domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to
government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance
with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert
alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands.
The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to
qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private
or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain. This scheme can even be
applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA
can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio,
there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is
not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of
factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates
Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab
initio.
TAÑADA Vs TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24,
1985)
Facts: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was
sought by Tañada, Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc (MABINI) seeking a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
There is a need for Publication of Laws to strengthen its binding
force and effect: giving access to legislative records, giving
awareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette,
however, does not contain publications of administrative and
executive orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The
Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all presidential
issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability.” Also,
Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly recognized that the rule as to
laws takes effect after 15 days unless it is otherwise (for some do
specify the date of effectivity) following the completion of the
publication in the Official Gazette. However, the decree has been
misread by many; for it has no juridical force, but a mere legislative
enactment of RA 386.
Issue: WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from
the Official Gazette, as it would be essential to the effectivity of the
said legislative or executive act that regulates the acts and conduct
of people as citizens.
Held: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished
issuances in the Official Gazette, serving as a response to the maxim
“ignorance as an excuse for noncompliance.” The effectivity of laws
shall follow the notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right.
There will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates which applied
the 15-day rule of publication in the Official Gazette.