Brigido SIMON, JR vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS GR No. On Sept.
On Sept. 25 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for
100150 – January 5, 1994 Vitug SUBJECT: Prohibition
FACTS: In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo
(one of the petitioners), in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the QC
Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor
and was sent and received by the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated).
In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within
which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the PRs were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their
stalls should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park.”
On July 12 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-
complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition.
On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and ordered said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200k in favor of PRs to purchase light
housing materials and food under the Commission’s supervision and again
directed the petitioners to “desist from further demolition, with the warning
that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.”
On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD) filed by the petitioners before
the CHR questioned CHR’s jurisdiction. It was stated that the CHR’s
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated
not such rights but privilege to engage in business.”
carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the “order to desist.” Also, petitioners’ MD was denied. It opined “it was not
the intention of the Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be
considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the PH.”
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights.
HELD: Yes! The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case
filed before it and from implementing the penalty for contempt.
The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted
by then Pres. C. Aquino via EO 163, in the exercise of her legislative power
at the time. It succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term
that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be
described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those
that relate to an individual’s social, economic, cultural, political and civil
relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted
traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered
to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of
life.
The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring: “to those rights that
belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection
of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are
rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. It may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
enforced or redressed in a civil action.”
Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government,
the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and,
in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship.
In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it apparent that the
delegates envisioned a CHR that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. One of the delegates, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoner and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public
trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvaging and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious.” In any event, the delegates did not
apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of
the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of
human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking
into account its recommendation.”
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by PRson a land which is planned to be developed into a
“People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of QC
which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb can not thus to be likewise simply ignored.
It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is
one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant.
Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed visavis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of the
PRs can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving
civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to
cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the
appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted
operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and
the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL vs COMELEC and JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for
the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled “People of the
Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon,
to former President Estrada. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former
President Estrada “received and accepted”6 the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. On October 2, 2012,
former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for local elective
post of Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC.). Risos- Vidal anchored her
petition on the theory that “[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run
for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. She relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC).
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that “having taken judicial
cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC) and SPA
No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution affirming it, this
Commission will not belabor the controversy further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal]
failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse the standing
pronouncement of this Commission declaring categorically that [former
President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since
this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in disquisitions
of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of government resources.” On
April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the
present petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former
President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD: The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada was
granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way
that will give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President,
instead of indulging in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair
or diminish the import of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the
President and duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said
codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress to
define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of
the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart
is that the pardon of the principal penalty does not carry with it the remission
of the accessory penalties unless the President expressly includes said
accessory penalties in the pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential
prerogative to grant executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon
the principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to pardon
both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon so decided
upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the
executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that “(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence,
even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr.,
521 SCRA 470 , April 19, 2007
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants
of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order
of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed
a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to
criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and
that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United
States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR
No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not
apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in
international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is
given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the
Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may
be allowed to post bail.
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN
THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO A.P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN
MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 2007
Facts of the case: This resolves a contempt charge against respondent
Amado A.P. Macasaet (Macasaet), a newspaper columnist, for authoring
publications imputing bribery to a member of the Supreme Court namely
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, amounting to P10 million allegedly
received in boxes by Cecilia Delis (said to be the secretary of Justice
Santiago), in relation to a criminal case which was decided in favor of the
accused, Henry T. Go (GR No. 172602). Justice Santiago denied the
accusation and Macasaet was ordered to submit an explanation on why no
sanctions should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that
“After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt; (d) Any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;”. Macasaet testified that the information was
received from confidential sources while Delis denied any knowledge of the
bribery. An investigating Committee was created to investigate the alleged
bribery committed by Justice Santiago. The Committee reported that the
columns of Macasaet appeared to be just mere hearsays and concluded that
the bribery story was “unbelievable” and further recommended that Macasaet
be held in indirect contempt.
Issue: Whether or not Macasaet is liable for indirect contempt under Section
3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Held/Rationale: Yes. Freedom of speech and of the press is a public right to
scrutinize and criticize government. However, many types of criticism
become harmful and irresponsible attacks which threaten the judicial
independence. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when public
confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and
the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. These kinds of
personal attacks damage and threaten the integrity and indepedence of the
judiciary. In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, Lagunzad v. Vda
Gonzales and Zaldivar v. Gonzales, it was stated that Freedom of expression
is not absolute and not without limitations.
Upholding the findings stated in the Comprehensive Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Committee which enumerated the
gross inconsistencies and assumptions of the respondent which lacked
veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was
false or not, the Court held Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court. The
Court also cited Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) which states that “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries
with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Hence, it is the
obligation of the Court to sanction those who wantonly obstruct their
processes.
Separate Opinion Associate Justice Antonio Carpio had a dissenting
opinion. He stated that there was denial of due process on the part of Macasaet
because when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the
Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses,
denying to Macasaet such right. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected
to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize.
However, it was disagreed on the following grounds: (1) the proceedings of
the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove
otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee. (2) assuming arguendo
that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does not
necessarily mean that his right to due process of law was violated. Further,
Macasaet never assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
(3) the Court has the power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting
as his counsel, which is absurd.
Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA
Facts: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to
the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him,
among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that
he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for
the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and
payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government
agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public
utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail
address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of
simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system
since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to
use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another
or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people
can read. And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the illmotivated can use the cyberspace for
committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank
account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations. The
wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet.
For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of
cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause
havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly
useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and
memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending
electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems,
networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty
and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on
February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary
restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law
until further orders
Issue: Whether RTC has jurisdiction of Cybercrime law?
Held: The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not outside
our power to undertake: Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law grants the
Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any violation of the Cybercrime Law,
and provides that special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained
judges should be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
on the other hand, empowers this Court to promulgate rules on the pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts.
*Military Court Jurisdiction: Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 lays down the
general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military
law who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried
by the proper civil court, except that, where the civil court, before
arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the
offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial, and with the further
exception that, where the President, in the interest of justice, directs before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited
to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 70 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97
of Commonwealth Act No, 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may
take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal
Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. BSP (2004) |
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
February 5, 2017
G.R. No. 148208, 446 SCRA 299, December 15, 2004
Doctrines:
1. Elements of valid class legislation: (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class
2. Relative Constitutionality. The fact that a statute is
constitutional at first does not mean it is constitutional forever.
The subsequent changes in the original circumstance
surrounding the law would affect its validity.
Facts:
1. The new Central Bank Act took effect and gave way for the creation
of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
2. Other Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) also amended
their charters.
3. After almost 8 years following the amendment of the GFIs’ charters,
BSP’s employees, through petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition
against the BSP and the Executive Secretary to restrain the
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Sec. 15,
Art. II of the New Central Bank Act (i.e., the exemption from the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) of all employees with salary
grade of 19 and the non-exemption of those having a salary grade
under 19). They alleged its constitutionality for being an invalid
“class legislation”.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
1. The said proviso violates equal protection clause because only the
officers of the BSP (those holding the salary grade of 19 and up) are
exempted from the SSL.
2. Those belonging from 19 and up and those 19 below do not really
differ from one other in terms of the nature of work and expertise.
3. Other GFIs, which are the same as the BSP, exempt all their rank-
and-file personnel from SSL without any distinction.
BSP’s contention:
1. The proviso is not unconstitutional as it can stand the constitutional
test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the
same law, such as the mandate of the Monetary Board to “establish
 professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with
sound principles of management.”
Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary:
1. The proviso is not unconstitutional as the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated
policy of the new SB Act to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of
the national government.
Issue: WON the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of equal
protection clause.
Held:
 YES, the proviso is unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal protection clause.
 Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate – so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons themselves, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights.
 The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e.,
express authorization to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure, and explicit exemption – without
distinction as to salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI
from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive results of Congress’
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file
and those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely
the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-
and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file
employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC
getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-
file and the seven other GFIs.
 The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs
and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the
exemption from SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
 The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but
it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.

 In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the

exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended
to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to
discriminate against the rank-and-file and the resulting
discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably,
purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, in
the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters of
other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case changed.