Representation and Mind Hilary Putnam and Ned Block, editors Representation nd Rey ‘iey Putnam Esnng Behav: Reson ina Word of Coes rad Deke The Mtapiysis of Meoning Jeol Kate ‘A Theory of Contented Other Essays Jey A Fodor ‘The Rai Sprt: Wiese, Phosophy, ad the Mind Cora Diamond ‘The tiiy ofthe Sep Stephen L White ‘The imagery Dea Michael Tye A Sadi of Comes. {Christopher Peacocke The Reiser of the Mind Jon F.Searle ‘The Rediscovery of the Mind John R.Searle A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusets London, EnglandForDagmarContents ——— ‘Reknowledgments i Intoducton > Chapter t What's Weong withthe Philosophy of Mind 1 2 "The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake Gverand Over 27 “Append Is There a Problem about Folk Paychology? 58 Chapter Sreaiing the Hol Silicon Brains, Conscious Robots, and Other Minds Chapters ‘Consciousness and ItsPlace in Nature 85 Chapter [Reductionism and the Ireducbilty of Consciousness 111 Chapter “The Structure of Consciousness: An Introduction 127 Chapter? ‘The Unconscious and Its Relation to Consciousness 151 Chapters ‘Consciousness, Intentionaity, and the Background 175 Chapters ‘The Critique of Cognitive Reason 197‘Acknowledgments Ee have benefited over & period of several years from discus. Sons and conversations with friends, students, and colleagues “Shout the snues considered in this book. I do not suppose 1 on thank al of ther, but want to offer special expressions of. [gattude tothe following: M-E. Aubert, John Baal Catharine Extin, Anthony Dardis Hubert Dreyfus, Hana Tip Jemy Fado, Vinod Goel, Stevan Harnad Jennifer Hudin, Pal Kube, Ennst Lepore, Elsabeth Lloyd, Kik Ludvig, Thomas Nagel, anal Parker, Julle Prout, Irving Rock, Charles Siewart, ‘Melissa Vaughn and Kayley Vernal ‘These, however are only a few ofthe many who helped me so much, I have presente these ideas in lectures that U have ven aot only in Berkeley but a a visting professor atthe Universities of Frankfurt, Venice, Horence, Berlin, and Rutgers ‘kmong my best and severest critics have been my students, Sa T-em grateful for their relentless skepticism. Among, my Intttional benefactors | want #0 thank the Commitee on ‘Research ofthe Academie Senate and the Office ofthe Chan- ‘lr of the University of California, Berkeley, and especialy the Rockefeller Foundation Centra Bellagio aly ‘Some ofthe material n this book has appeared elsewhere i preliminary form. Specifically, portions of chapters 7 and 10, vere developed from my’ article “Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cogritive Science" (Boaoionl srl Brain Sci ‘rcs 1990, and chapter 9 is based on my Presidential Address {o the American Philosophical Assocation for 1990, ‘am especially grateful to Ned Block, who read the entre manuscript in drat form and made many helpful comments. Most of all [thank my wife, Dagmar Searle, for her constantAdon ntadceAastvays shes ro ny greet tele apatite of eSTragTEN aNd sel coher ht tas ook date Introduction ‘Tis book has several objective, some of which do not admit of quick summary but will only emerge as the reader progresses, ls most easly satable objectives ae these: I want oVaticze and overcome the dominant traditions inthe study ‘f mind, both “materialist” and “Avalist” Because I think co ‘Siousness isthe central mental phenomenon, I want Begin a rious examination of consciousness on its own terms, T want fs put the final alin the coffin of the theory thatthe mind i Computer program. And T want to make some propostls for feforming our study of mental phenomena in a way that ‘would just the hope of rediscovering the mind ‘Neatly two decades ago Ibegan working on problems inthe philosophy of mind. I'needed an account of intentionality oth te provide a foundation for my thoory of speech acts and to complete the theory. On my view, the philosophy of Tanguage i Branch of the philosophy of mind therelore no theory of language is complete seithout an account ofthe rela tions between mind and language and of how meaning—the dened intentionality of linguistic elements grounded in the more biologically ase intrinsic intentonality of the mind brain ‘When Tread the standard authors and tried to explain their views to my students, Las appalled to discover that with few txceptons thew authors routinely denied what! thought were Simple and obvious truths about the mind. Tt was then, and Sills, quite common to deny, implcly or explicty, such ‘lio as the following: We all have inner subjective qualita: tive states of consciousness, and we have Intinically inen- tonal mental tates such as beliefs and desires, intentions andst ton others an items are lg atic ene ere ot ithe ede © se puter, eaand ter cry ae cal conncted eens hc nto of an ncn esol tl hard more was dened by the prevaile ‘Msi consis of various versions ies clon Just as bad, the opponents of materialism pene see docine of “props dualism” this SR ihe caren apparatus tat | ad thowght long SERENE I ot Targucd fr then Seare1954) and repeat dares on cam cept the obvious facts of physics that Te By consis ent of physi paris i fils of Be rottinoo denying thot among the physi features of fed am bilo phenomena such as inner qualitative Sotto consciousness and intrinsic intentional. Stott same tne a my interest in problems of the mind scete new dsapie of og scence was bor. Cos Bie ccace rome » break with he Behavist tradition Biespaiogy because tained to enter the Black box ofthe onde einer workings Bat unfortunately mos airtream cognitive scientists simply repeated the worst mis {i of the betavorsts: They insisted on studying only obj: fy bene phenomena, thus ignoring the exsertal {fates ofthe mind, Therefore, when they opened up the Big ‘ac bx they found ory oof ite lack ove inside So go! lite help fom eter mainstream philosophy of mind or copnive scence im my investigations, and | went {endo ty to develop my cn acount of intentionality and ie relation fo language Geale 183). However, jst develop ing theory of neroality I many mar problems und used, and wore yet let what seemed to me the major frevag mistakes tranowered. Tis book isan attempt 10 Elst one her of he hadest—and mst important—tasks of phils plyna mae care tacon wenn fess of the word that are intrinsic in the sense that they exit indepen teers any observer and those features that are bse reli ter inthe sense that they only exist relative to some outside Gikermer or user For example, that an object has 2 certain SETS an intrinsic feature of the object. If we all die, it vrould wll have that mass. But thatthe same objet athe Tobie no an intrinsic feature; it exists only elaive to users hy Seservers who assign the function ofa bath tit, Hay i ines nein, but being a bathtub is observer relative, 18 eifoug the objet both has mass and ia bathtub. That is ‘Thy thee isa atural scence that includes mass ints domais ‘Dut thee is no natural science of bathtubs ‘ine ofthe themes that runs throughout this book is the anenapt to getloat about which ofthe predicates in the phils sep rand name featires that are inns and which SBedncr relative. A dominant strain in the philosophy of SUR sd copitive cence has been to suppose that comput TUNG inne feature ofthe world and that consciousness intentionality ave somehow eliminable, ether in favor of Aeething eae or because they are observer relative or reduc Bitte somthing more base, such as computation. In this book T argue that these suppositions are excly backward Cfacloumess and intentionality are intrinsic and inelimin~ Sind computation except forthe few cases in which the ‘“Sinputation actually being performed by a conscious mind is obeerver relative Here isa brie! map 10 help the reader find his or her way about the book. The frst three chapters contain criticisms of ihe dominant views in the philosophy of mind, They are an tempt to overcome both dualism and materialism, with more “tention devoted in these chapters to materialism. At one ime T thought of calling the whole book Wat's Wrong withthe Phi Tosh of Mind, but inthe end that idea emenges as the theme ‘Of the fat thyce chapters and isthe tle ofthe frst. The next {Ive chapters 4 to area series of attempts to givea charater- teaton of sonslousness, Once we have gone beyond both Thateslism and dualism, how do we leate consciousness insorte ete wo te rot ofthe wed caper How do we stn 1 Tope rect scording 0 the st et enceon tape 57 Mow ipo eet ae olor foros her rescence tn lon Bo oer And what are the elabionsBteen oes pully an the Bokground capacity ees i ancon as ercious beings i the world Bat Inthe coe othe dimuon 1 10 ver (care Canes sublets such property duals, ss seni, but the Pain effort in sore La tying to lcate consi Se te Tera concepton ofthe work andthe et of ree Chapter 9 extercs my caer Geale 1980 9 oa ete Ss ofthe dmnnantpraigm in cognitive a seas nal chee makes some sugesions 51 hve SEU Saay the mind witout mahng So many cbvious Sasi Tes book have more tsa aout he opinions of other va hanya my ter bok maybe mae tan allo Wodpshtener Tas rakes ne exremely nervous eease 1S foe that might be murdering them = asia they misunderstand ne. Chapter 2 gave me the most eadichy i sea and ca nl say that ed ard IS teoul to mated a sammany of whole fry of views that ed uncngenia Aa for referers: The books [ead in ty Pibsophal clon hose by Wiest, Austr Srzevon, fe, Hare, ee—conain few or no references ater nator think ucoacly have come to Believe tha pop gay vr avery wh he ume of cfc sd that no reat work of psa: Ee east ett What other Te yes Comet of Minds a model inthis regan: hs fone) Inthe pret itance, bower, there 90 epg Sigg enya lam i eed ove that hae eft han for what ae putin Introduction 7 ‘The tile isan obvious homage to Bruno Snell's classic, The Dicwvery of the Mind. May we in rediscovering conscious- ese the eal thing, not dhe Cartesian ersatz nor the behavior [Etdoppelginger alo rediscover the mind.Chapter 1 What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind [Te Solution tothe Mind-Body Problem and Whey Many Prefer the Problem athe Solution “The famous mind-body problem the source of so much con- Troversy over the past two milena, has a simple solution This sluion hasbeen avilable to any educated person since ‘vous work began onthe brain neavly a century agoand, ina SERS all know it fo be tue, Here iis: Mental phenomena re caused by newrophysilogical processes inthe brain and [Fe themecles features ofthe bran. To distinguish this view ions the many other in the eld, I all 1 "biological natura: fin” Mental events and processes are as much part of our logis! natural history as digestion, mitosis, meiosis, oF ‘Dhological naturalism raises thousand questions of its ow what evacly i the character of the nevrophysological proctsees and Rove exactly do the elements of the neuro Rhatomy-—neurons, synapses, synaptic cles receptors mito- Shondla,gll ells, wanemiter Nuids, et—produce mental phenomena? And what about the great variety of ou mental Ffecipainy, desires, tickles, thoughts visual, experiences, ‘lee, tastes, smells, ane, far, love, ate, depression, and ation? Flow does neurophysiology account forthe range of ur mental phenomena, both conscious and unconscious? Sach questions form the subject matter ofthe neurosciences and at T wate this, there aze bterally thousands of people Avetigating these questions! But pot all the questions are ‘Rouroblalogical. Some ae philosophical or psychological of Tew of coppitive scence gerealy. Some ofthe philosophical2 Copert a ee eee Se aes eeeerece st. es a _.. - eae Beeson Sa Ss See ec erect me a eee eee Bacal S rapa eg a ‘Bess really do exist and are irreducible to physical phenomena, thence rely mold bs df mnt Dody presen bak Seo ete tec ee Serer eat Spores sy often other mental phenomena commits one to some form of Car= ecm lig meee hc Teter a ay oa scenic word picture, mg Sa Seesertsnrban ede, So Nuc e aae are Sopa omen ats Wrong wth he Philosophy of Mind 3 exhaust the eld leaving no other options. Most of my discus ‘Sow will be dicted at the various forms of materialism ‘BeShe it fs the dominant view Dualism in any form is today fener regarded as out of he question because it assumed FS be inconsistent with the scientific word view. "goth question Twat fo pore in ths chapter and the nex is ‘What i # about our Ineleetual history and environment that trae i felt to see these rather simple points that have Tnade about the "mind-body problem"? What has made Titers” appear to be the only rational approach to the piulowophy of mind? This chapter and the next are about the Pirrent ation in the Philophy of mind, and this one might fave hed the tte, "Wha Is Wrong with the Materialist Trad toni the Philosophy of Mind” ‘Seen fom the perspective ofthe ast fity years, the philoso phy of mind, as well s cognitive sclence and certain branches Bi eychology, present 2 very curious spectacle. The most Sroking feature i how much of mainstream philosophy of rind ofthe past fifty years seems obviously false. I believe {hore is no ether area of contemporary analytic philosophy {whore so much i said that 90 implausible. Inthe ploso- phy of language, for example i isnot at all common to deny fhe eustence of sentences and speech aes; but inthe piloso- ‘hy of mind, obvious fact aboot the mental, such as that We realty do have subjective conscious mental states and that theve are not climinablein favor of anything else, are routinely ‘denied by many, perhaps most ofthe advanced thinkers inthe sbjet "How is i that so many phlosophers and cognitive scientists can say 50 many things that, «me atleast, seem obviously fate? Extreme views in philosophy ae almost never uninteli- fet there are generally very deep and powerful reasons why they are held. T believe one of the unstated assumptions ‘behind the curent batch of views is that they represent the tnly scientifically acceptable alternatives to the antscientism thot went with traditional dualism, the Deli in the immortl- ity of the soul, spiritualism, and so on. Acceptance of theet so much bya independent mayer fw ae apn ih th ay tbe eee ey sae en ei” appr pre ah ra ue vos ft soe Se ren ac al rts cone enn oe aay ee ed ad ats we Seely commited oe soda wa agree They realy ena, nO gee et ening aching ee duaiom’ “nenism” "Tater the aca von of ea the sue have fo Be Se Prt ne term Tey te we wows Fete a re mentor rony, ve of De ANY MS pa eth mee sw ht fh the asus Tae th iy undetod, many of the caret an mies, Pepe sem th hate know sb Se rao ewnexpetences ad fom the special Shee ena wea is fbe ue we ate NE Se EIS ensmptine btn’ he aon cc tay. A enyng ome of tee cred views, want to eis Satin stut pretation se Authors ho mais ay sonchang tse lly very sella come Spor and ay Ulysse or sy AB Sloe! toavod having toy itin word of one Tic Themen esol thaw deves isto Best rurale ech wis tf erase pe think ts obvows inthe estas of eel ator fer evap that they Hunk we Tab St fv mea tt che Ses rere they actualy 3) ts ‘ove Sti Be cnsnse vile dying tat tal eands or anything nthe ‘al mo door tral ie for gusty the implantes ge the cmmonsrs ew a are ah deny thy amend yc. Thi, very hare Whats Wrong wih he PilosophyofMind 5 sn the present era to come right out and say, "No human being, Make been conscious” Rather, the sophisticated philoso ts pres he view that people are sometimes conscious 2 Phet Stor example, “the Cartesian intuition,” then be or she rar ot hullenging, questioning, denying something Seecrbed as "the Cartesian intuton'" Again, itis hard £9 desert out and sy that no one in the history ofthe world SRar drank because she was thirty or ate Because he was Fungo but ive easy to eallenge something if you can label MMe ehoe ae folk paychology.” And. just to give this ae aeaEe a name | willcall ithe “pivesie-name” maneuver. TRaothor maneuver, the most favored of all, twill call dhe sree geatscience” maneuver. When an author gets #8 seeetiaa he or ae resto make an analogy with is or her deep um and some great scenic discovery of the past. Bes the view seem silly? Well the great centific geniuses of Dee pat sumed silly 49 their ignorant, dogmatie, and pre Ree Gatemporaries. Galileo is. the favorite historical Shalogy" Rhetorcally speaking, the idea is to. make you, the SRepte reader ee hati you don’t believe the view being, ‘breed, you are plying Cardinal Bellarmine tothe author's Gallo Other favorites are poston and vite spits, and Gin the denis to bully the rene into supposing tat if he oF SR doubts, for example, that computers ae actualy thinking, ftom only be because the reader believes in something as ttastenie as phlogston or vital spss. 1 Six Unliely Theories of Mind 1 will not attempt to provide a complete catalogue ofall the fashionable, implausible materialist views in contemporary Finlowophy’ and cognitive science, but will st only half & Pozen to give the fe! ofthe thing. What these views share isa fostiity toward the existence and mental character of our ordi ony mental life. In one way of another they all attempt t0 owngeade ordinary mental phenomena such as belies, ‘desires, and intentions and to cast doubt on the existence oftt hope sem tres of ti ments coco a > ae iocpobe tener never ently eh Seem fet Seah cre ht ty Penden pe Sete ge ats gba roi ets Fe rt iin et pace er a tp i Eo ey EAE i oS se sense acme Seg Soy ty ot en se se te a ae en ey Sn hn Sieg cents hr a ec a acs pen ree ot rata baer 2 ee a a eee ge ne ccc eee ee eS eon =a Ree eee ries es ae TS ie eee eden ‘right causal properties. Thus, a system made of nats irong with the Piesopy ofMind 7 stones ov beer cans, ft had the right causal relations, would glans have the some belies desires, ct, as we do, because Nave to ree i to Raving belies and desires, The most that ist ston of this view in called “functionalsm.” anit inuen iy Hel as to constitute a contemporary ofthodony. sy Nenanble view, and indeed he ost famous and waar Trt the caren catalogue, isthe view that a com ny po have indeed must hve though fogs and Pat on ne ally in vite of implementing an appropriate ander program wh he appropiate inp and XPS, f comer Pee apuzed this view “strong artifical intel ae eras aa been called “compute onetionall ence Put at ncredbiiy isto be found Inthe claim that wad ith form, Gh of our mental vocabulary of “belie” and Fe ge and "hopes" ee, a8 actually standing 08 ine cae mantal phenomena, bt rather aa just a manner of ce rs rt a uct vcs for explaining nd SPEDE pave nto be taken eal 5 refering fo Fe ee ubjectve, peychological phenomena. Adher aa are nk tha the se ofthe commonsense vorab> es of On ater of taking an “intentional stance” toward a tm other extreme view i that maybe consciousness 38 sath ity kink of Has inner, private, subpective, qual; Wecohtnontena of sentence or awarenese-does ot est at ive phenomer’ scidom advanced expiciy® Very few people a Mling to come right out and say that consciousness dons ae I bat ft has recenty become common for thors (0 tot ne notion of consciousness so that tno Tonger refers coe ecjou states, ha inner, subjective, qualitative, ‘pace m mental states, but rather to publily observable thunpemon phenomena, Such authors pretend to think that hint Pereead exits, but in fact they end up denying its tenes mistakes inthe philosophy of mind produce mis caemeiTihe philosophy of language. One, to my mind, takes cuable thesis in the philosophy of language, whichrecess tenants wert ton a eee ets ae aera © pay Sorsestey gare umouty Say Seti OB rte ant Gene ee lec en nk oe Bee ech nneuthcan ent = cereereen Bene gatcee case eee mrp tire beast wna tan senetece incest far ae rece ee ee SS es ees ‘Gear, thee isa simple and decisive refutation, and the refuta- eee tg ceetiiees co's eects vk etm pesncic es a remind them that they are conscious? Should I pinch mys 7 _and report the results in the Journal of Philosophy? as a ie ial that there be some common ground. Unless the aa Reino. re ee mires oe ce Secommon pond inte sy of mind would be. On a Meroe ehh cs Bee tase dae dco a svar Seman any ces ne nays Wrong with he Pilesopy of Mind 9 several years of debating these issues, btn in publi forums ae ee Tehave convinced me that quite often the fend ana Prt i the debate do not ise fo the surface, I YOu iment) tiple, fr example about strong ata inteligenes deat nay of alas, the sheer implausibly of 2 er giguised by the apparently technical character sac eerment banied back and forth, Wore ye its ed oe ie asumptions that Head t these theories ct fn te hen, for pampl, somebody fel comfortable Wit open, TSN a computer would suddenly and miraculously the ides Ua dates tin virus of running a carlin srt of ae Tithe cern assumptions that mae th ie! Oe pe are scidom sated explicit leet Sco Fone yan approach diferent from direct refutation Sn ween present one more “eftatin of function aa eo begin the task of exposing and thereby ism ath he foundations on which this whole tradition undermining. empted to funcionalism, I believe you do ot ond reftaton, you need help. ved refutation: Yor naton is massive, complex, ubiquitous soon ert, ks various elements—its attitude toward co aa conception of sletific verification its meaphy ‘ioe ory of knowleige—are all matually Supporting 50 rics ae Whey paris challenged, the defenders can exslly fall that ter otter part whose certainty i taken for granted vst ek rom personal experience. When you offer a refic Here eProng Al or ofthe indeterminacy thesis oF of fone: talon othe defenders do not feo t necessary to try £0 meet tonal arguments, because they kw in advance tha You aaa eearcang, They know that the materialist traiion Tit they ofen mistakenly call “eience”—is on their side etic ey edition not just part ok sete aac. ye hea lectres in cognitive sence oF Fed Pe mls on artical intelligence, you will ene: Pere ne tradition. It is too large to summarize in PSF wp or even a chapter but 1 believe that 1 continue fo——St 0 Chae se owl tt tn rude wil tave v0 SY ‘engi ag an mnt on te foundations | need ee Sr Sy omching abot i Story Te Funston of Mader Mateo py theron” Inun nage par tbe te of in ayaa presuppostons tat centers around the fl reg often unstated) assumptions aed these mg otc cine stay ofthe mind concerned, com ee ee pec fetus ae father NOT MOT esr pte pons, indeed desizabl, to give an account Megane cgnon, ae esta tas in genral witout dante acount consciousness and subjectivity > eg eae obpeive. Tee objective nek ony inthe sense anasto reach conclusions that ae independent of er Meat aces and pans of view, but more important, i Cm femal ali tat is ebpctve. Science i obetive because tuts objective. of ya sce resus tat the phenomena Webel Sapa obec and inthe case of cogntve SOS is ean hati ast aay objectively observable BEES rasa mature copie cence concerned the he ind and the soy of neligent behavior een th cusal onda of eho ae prety much these st. °C rom he hips, cbjcve pn of view, the on sai the cpa no How woul wen ‘fou he meal of another system?” is. We now iy otsening ser, Ths sth ol ston othe ther minds pen” "Eputemology plays 4 spec role in Epsemciogy cognitive science Bfctv sono cognition mus be abe to dis hats Wrong with he Phosophy of Mind TT anit tne eae ge Geet ety a ee oF a ig “Site tae Sa ne soutega n e o n n aen wenn men, en te em seul uit The Sa cuca2 Gupte ere beck meta star tata rally have men sete fc at the ally wimatly physica spr scomley tpn in a meat eeryting 8 elit knowable by Sra gay, one ngs vious Theres 0 place se ak ie pacer conciousness overall eure (pit ue ed ths book Tope oso that each of these oe fae and thatthe total picture hey resent is ely profoundly unscenl,#isincoberent 1-H Origins of te Fotos how di we gino ths aation? How did we wh pole cans) ng ta Seimei aos of epeene” Seat now ix Wha it about the Nstory of ony dc nthe pep of nd sha Sime and ariel imelignce that makes 90, Sere that ake tbem set. pricy SSS os macy any given tie in inetd TESS EEE States wong win cran traditions that Nests geod th ight ne fo ask a certain Tarren sum teeny pone snes in contemporary py made al cn Ning Secretar sng mati ocular that nae obvi ae hypotheses seem Seepable. The tadton bas risen from i early crude rcs teria ee ore ete present Fiat pt oso sn Now what ron hat makes 50 pera nich 8 conte eet toe men seven geal irc sft ae icc and sgestins 0 make abot the nae othe Spmploms sens me that here ae tt or fcr at anars Wrongwetne Pry oFMind 1? the sen wonave ee of tng no Catan Eerabet ipa wen, de 2 a rast eae Kode un serpent ne and “phys” pce inh wy sry a conc uch a so ey of Caesar, We fe te anything that might sponses acts that sound wean cma tate e et san be fe of aren me A er 1 at tn engi he Ov our existence 5 mel oy aoe, Ae ei ree ca a rac Palo ats ia the ne nes ein ae Ct Pal ees nes or pen ore anger He thera ee one ho chery chon sis evr by ts Euan ani dng uPpons NY the ouster ine eee of emelhng PNT! te ase Susne menal sas ee Oe Tue em tious ence, and pay ¢ al eal ning special td with Cartesian Guin ou Deni ed Rave To read he Meditations to be ‘feral ome oss Tsou ot tat ons ess, wb mE eco er unease gperemers or wnen oe reruns pRonpter ese enor a one fs mmediatly accused of Care Scares na rsnalyspesking, been acruced of Nlding anim, bate Poe of propery dual” and “pele some Cy Sogn “nkrospection” of “neovials oF Se en even though 1 have never, implcly op i eeosed ny of ese views Why? Pat 90 explly, erorigletal carcesness (@F Perhaps even double ofthe commentators bt theres also SOE: wore) one favelved. They Gnd diel t ae ha one thing deep vious facts about mental states without cou sc Cnn pparats tat wtionall went long accep sygment ofthese facts, They think the only4 Chapt reacties avaible are Between some frm of materi al che ofan. One of many ims in wring $28 a tats conepin mia, that one thsbookie fren acount af the facs about the mind ne oaingany of te dscredied Cartesian apprats a ong with the Crean aaton we have inhenited seat and with the vosbulay, «certain st of "Minin which we are history conditioned to GP Soe thse pote. The vocabulary not inact BREE SNe vocabulary are» surpeing name of SSSareims tat ee almost certainly alee, The vocab Pe'er a senes of apparent oppositions: “physica Hen” “body vers mind materi” versus SSotttam ater” versus “sist” Implicit in these oppo ‘ons athe thst he same phenomenon under the ame SESE Stnot ealy salnty both terms, Sometimes the {EStis and even the morphology seems to make hs opp ‘SEemenplc, soln the apparent opposition betren “ater Sion ahd ipmateraiont Thos we are supposed to beeve itor somethings net cannot be pista 9.8 ‘Sater of pit cannot be a mater of ater imax {Glut camot be tora Bt thse views em to me obvi Spaly fake given everthing we know about eirobilsy Se brain causes cran mena” phenomena, sich 3 r- Sous mental se, and thee consoous sats are simply igerdorel atures ofthe bran. Consciousness a hgher Ieftor emergent propery of he rain inthe tery hares terse of ger level of “emergent” in which sly s Figherlevel emergent propery of HO malecles when they deen a tice suctire ee) and gut i simiary @ Hgherevel emergent prop of H,0 molecules when they uy ain ling nd enh ir ‘Concounet ea mena an therefore ysl rope of thera inthe eae in wich guy ia propery of Sond he neh hate ne Sip simply th: The fot that 9 {etareis mental dosnt ply that tnx py he at hays Wrong withthe Piosophy f Mind 15 tat a feature is physical does not imply that ts not ment that fe Descartes for the moment, we might say not ony “L Revttferefore Lam" and “Tam a thinking being” but also dng being, therfore Lama physical Bang. ae aries how the vocabulary makes it fie, if not scusile to say what I mean using the traditional termina epee say that consciousness a Ngherlevel physical OB bot the brain, the templatin to ear that as meaning, ‘ese a-opposed-to-mentl a meaning that consioutest Pays pe decribed only in objective Behavioral or neurophys moet ters. Dut what {really mea is consciousness ut see seexes qu mental, qua subjective, qua qualitative is ipacal and phil Promise mental, Al of which shows 1 aleve the inadequacy of the traditional vocabulary. sees ath the apparent oppositions are names that apmarcuy exhaast the possible Positions one ca o:cuP: Fee oni versus dualism, materialism and physicalism there Mentalism and idealism. The eagemess to stick with We Uaditonal categories produces some odd terminology, ae aeepropery dualism,” "anomalous monism” “token SiShugee Be My own views donot fit any ofthe traditional dre cto many philosophers the idea that one might hold a tree at docs not fit hese categories seems incomprehens- Tae maps worst of all there ae several nouns and verbs re lock neu ey had a clear meaning and actually stood fr Mrelvdefined objects and. activities “minds “igtaspecion” ave obvious examples. The contemporay cf” nitve Boence vocabulary is no better. We tend to assume BeTocaly that expresions like “cognition.” “intelligence si cjotmaton processing” have clear definitions and acti- AN stand or sore natural kinds, 1 Believe such assumptions are nistaken. This point is worth emphasizing “intelligence” Mfualligent behavior” “cognition,” and “information proces ing’ for example, ae pot precisely defined notions. Even 18 genazingly, alot of very technical sounding notions are Toorly defined notions such as “computer” “compulsions Torogram,” and “symbol,” for example, Tt does not mich16 Chapter mater for most purpose in computer slence that thse Tote are i deted ust es snot important to fame unutourers at they donot havea phlowophicaly pecs {Enon of “char” aid "ble ether) but hen copies ‘Sent sy sch things a that rains are computer ins ‘Seprogrmss et, then the definition ofthese notions becomes co “hin there i persistent objecting tertency in conte snr Plbeopiy cence, tet ntl ie oneal We EXetheconricion hat ¥ someting sts tbe eualy acossble to al competent cbverers Since the seven Century, educated people in he West have come to acep an Soctuly teks meiopryical presupeaton: Realty © See the. This aenmpion has proved weal in many wa, butitis viol fleas moments relton on one's om faijesive sates tevin And ths assumption has led Pethps inevitably, tothe view that the only "scent" ways Ee the mind i as 4st of objective phenomena, Once we fcopt te exemption tat anything thst objective must be tually accesible any cherver, the questions ae automat aly aed away. from the subjeciiy of mental sates towan the objectivity ofthe external behavior. "And ti hat the consequence tat instead of eoing the question, “Whats ito haves ele” “What et fo havea deste?” “Whats it he to bein certain sorts of conscious sates?” we ask the third-person question, “Under what conditions would we from ese strut elit denies, ecto some her tem” This sce perfectly natural tos, because, of course, ont of the questions we need to answer about ‘nenal Phenomena concer other people an not ust ourselves But the third-person characer of the epistemology should aotin tothe fact the el nto of ena te ia fst pemon ontology The may ta the hindporen pot af ews applied in pracice makes dtl foros othe diterence between smething realy having a mind uch 364 human being and something behaving asf had and sath asa compuier. And once you have lot the Gstnction hats Wrong withthe Poop of Mind 17 between a system's realy having mental tates and merely act ings ft had mental states, then you lose sight of an essential feature ofthe mena namely that its ontology is essentially a first-person ontology. Belles, desires, etc, are always ‘melody belief and desires, and they ave always potentially ‘Conscious, even in cases where they are actually unconscious. present an argument forth at point i chapter 7- Now I am'tying to diagnose a historically conditioned patter of {vestigation that makes the third-person point of View seam the only scientifically acceptable standpoint from which to ‘amine the atind. Tt would take an intellectual historian to Ghnwer such questions as when did the under what- ‘onuitions-would-weatfibutementaltates question come to Seem the ght question to ask? But the intellectual fects of [persistence seem clear. Just as Kan’s commonsense dstne- tion between the appearances of things and things in them- elves eventually led tothe extremes of absolute idealism, $0 the persistence of the commonsense question “Under what Conditions would we atfbute mental states?” has led ato ‘ehavionsm, furctonalism, strong AL, eliminaive material: itm the intentional stance, and no doubt other confusions known only to expert Fourth, because of our conception of the history of the growth of knowledge we have come to suffer from what Aus- Fi called the “rest de grands profondeurs.” I does not seem rough somehow to stale humble and cbvious truths about the mind~we want something deeper. We want a theoretical Giscovery, And of course ou model of a great theoretic Uiscovery comes fom the history ofthe physical sciences. We dream of some great breakthrough’ inthe study ofthe mind, ‘we lok forward toa nature” cognitive scence. So the fact thatthe views in question ae implausible and counterintuitive does not count against them. On the contrary, it can even Seem great merit of contemporary functonalism and Artifical intelligence that they run dead counter to ou atu tons, For is this not the very feature that makes the Physical SSences so dazzling? Our ondinary stutions about space and=n 18 Cupeert tame or for tht mater, about the solidity ofthe able re eersien fo be oe Mccne rca uch deeper knowledge of the inner workings of the univ ‘Gould not a great breakthrough in the stady'of the mind oe larly show that our most firmly held beliefs about our nem states are equally illusory? Can we not reasonably expect grey discoveries that will overthrow our commonsense an tions? And, who knows, might not some of those discoveries be made by some of us? = Lndermining the Foundations ‘One way to sate sme ofthe sin fests of he angen that I wil be prsing i ose them in oppontion it seven principles mentioned erie Todo tne need take expt the ditincions Between inlay, poten tc extn. There a istncton beeen sree 10 What of Coinlogy How do we nd xt soe 3 tepantemology), and What dows it do? casa fot Sample i the ce ofthe heat he ontology hae Inge plece of male ae inte chest cavity the epien gy that we find out aout by ting sehescoyy Ey fina ich wean open up he chest ond hve ok nd the cusaton tat the heat pumps Hood troup Withthesedininctoneinmind wecan goto work 4. Conscousnes does mater. 1 wil argue that there is no way to study the phenomena ofthe mind without impli ee explicitly studying consciousness. The bsic reason for this > that we really have no notion of the smental part from out notion of consciousness Of cource, at any given point ina Person's life, most of the mental phenomena in that persovs stence are not present to consciousness. In the formal ‘ode, most ofthe mental predicates that apply to meat ay ven instant wl ave conditions of applicitonindependett my conscious slates at hat moment. However, hough mos ‘of our mental life at any given point unconscious 1 il Was Wrong wth he Philosophy ofMind 19 argue that we have no conception of an unconscious mental ‘Mule exept in terme derived from conscious mental tates. (1 Sim right about this, then all ofthe recent talk about mental Wstes that are in principle inaccessible to consciousness is realy incoberent (ore about this in chapter) 2 Not lof aly is objective some of is subjective. There is ‘Fernstent confusion between the claim that we should try as hich as possible to eliminate personal subjective prejadices fom the search for tath and the la that the real world con thins no elements that ane ieducibly subjective. And this Confusion in fur i based on a confusion between the epist= ‘ological sense of the subjective/ objective distinction, and the ‘nolegeal sense) Epistemically, the distinction marks dif. erent legroes of independence of claims from the vagaries of {pov values, personal prejudices, points of view, and emo tans, Oniolopally, the distinction marks different categories bf empineal reality (more about these distinctions in chapter {). Eplstemialy, the ideal of objectivity states a worthwhile even if unattainable goal But ontoogically, the claim that all ‘St realty is objective i, neurobiologically speaking, simply fale. In general mental sates have an irreducibly subjective tntolgy, 25 we wll have occasion tose in some detail later. TE Tam right in thinking that consciousness and subjectivity are essential to the mind, then the conception of the mental ‘rnploye by the tradition is misconceived fom the beginning, fort l essentially an objective third-person conception. The tradition ties to study the mind ae i t consisted of neutral phenomena, independent of consciousness and subjectivity. But such an approach eaves cut the cricial features that dls- tinguish mental from nonmental phenomena, And this more than any other reason accounts forthe implausblty of the ‘Views Emenfioned atthe beginning. I you ty to teat belies, {or example, as phenomena that have no essential connection With consciousness, then you are Hkely to wind up with the ‘en that they can be defined solely in terms of external tehavior (behaviorist), or in terms of cause and effect rela.20 Chapter ‘ions (functionals), of tht they do not really exist at all (eliminative materialism), oF that talk of beliefs and desires just tobe construed asa certsin manner of speaking (the inte ‘ional stance) The ultimate absurdity ist try 10 teat cons ssiousnest ite independently of consciousness, that i. to ‘reat it soley from a thid-person point of view, and that lads to the view that consciousness as such, a5 “inner,” “private ‘phonamenal evens, doesnot really exist Sometimes the tension between the methodology’ and the absurdity ofthe results becomes visible. In recent literature, there is 2 dispute about something called “qualia” and the problem is supposed to be, "Can functionalism account for (Qualia What the issue reveals s that the mind consists of qualia, so to speak, right down to the ground. Functionalsm Can't account for qualia because it was designed around a di ferent subject matter, namely attnbutions of intentonaiy based on third-person evidence, whereas actual mental Phenomena have to do not with aibutons but with the existence of conscious and unconscious mental stats, both of ‘which ae frst person, subjective phenomena, 3, Because i is a mistake o suppose that the ontology ofthe mental I ebjetice, it a mistake fo suppose tha the metdology of as lece ofthe mind mast concer sel only with objeto obseeale teaser. Because mental phenomena are essentially con nected with consciousness, and because consciousness is ‘Scentlly subjective, it follows that the ontology ofthe mental is essentially a fist person ontology. Mental tates are always somebody's mental states. Theres always a "frst person,” an “TP that has these mental tates, The consequence ofthis for the present discussion is thatthe first-person point of view is primary. In the actual practice of investigation, we will of course. study other people, simply because most of our "esearch s not on ourselves. But ii important to emphasize that what we are trying to get at when we study other people ‘is precisely the first-person point of view. When we study Mim Whats Virong ith he Posophy of Mind 21 cor he, what we ate studying the me that i him or her. And this aot an epistemic point. ih light ofthe distinctions betwoen ontology, episteology, and causation one had to summarize the rss ofthe trad toninone paragraph, would be this “The subjectivst ontology ofthe mental seems intolerable. It sccm intlerable metaphystaly that there should be reduc Thy subjective, “private” entities in the world, and intolerable ‘pstomologicaly that there should be an asymmetry between ‘Re way tat each person knows of his or her inner mental (Phenomena and the way that others ffom outside know of Thon Ths cis produces a fight from subjectivity and the “Srecton of the fight isto rewnte the ontology in terms ofthe (pbtomology and the causation. We fist get Pd of subjectivity By Redetiing, the ontology. in terms of the third-person, pistemuc basis, Behavior. We say, “Mental states jist are “Eapostons to behavior” (behavior), and when the absut- ‘Gay ofthat becomes unbearable we fll Back on causation, We iy "Mental states are defined by their causal lations” (func: ‘oralis) or "Meatal states are computational tates” (strong AD, “The taiionsssumes, falsely in my view, that in the study of the mind one is forced fo choose between “introspection” Sh “behavior” ‘There are several mistakes involved in this, mong them 4.1162 mise o suppose tht we know ofthe existence of mental Phenomena in others only by obsercing thir bear. 1 believe thatthe traditional “solution” othe “problem of other minds” though i has been with us for centres, will nt survive even f moments serous reflection. Twill have more to say about theve Issues Inter Gin chapter 3), but at preset just his: If you. think fora moment about hove we know that dogs and cats are Conscious, and that computers and cars ae not conscious nd by the way, there s no doubs that you and 1 know both of these things, you will sce thatthe basis of our certainty snot2 Chapter! tehavior” but rather a certain causal conception of how the ‘world werks One can sce that dogs and cats ae i certain [portant respects relevanly similar (0 us. Those are eye, thee skin these are ears ee, The “behavior” only nes ‘Src as the expression or manifestation of an underlying men fal reality, beonuse we can see the causal basis ofthe mental She thereby se the Behavior as a manifestation ofthe mental The principle on which we “solve” the problem of other minds, [shall argue isnot: same-behavior-rgo-simemental: Phenomena, That isthe old mistake enshrined in the Turing et Ir this principe were coret, we would all have to con: Code that radios are conscious because they exhibit ntligent Sertal behavior But we do not draw any such conchsion Decnuse we havea “theory” about how radios work. The pi CGplc on which we “solve the other minds problem” i: same Ghacsameetfects, and relevanty-similarcausestelevanty- Sirlareffecs. Where knowledge of other minds is concerned iehavioe By iss of no interest to Us 35 rather the combi om of eho wth te ode ofthe casa wnerpings of the benacior that form the basis of our knowledge. ‘But even the foregoing seems to me to concede too much to the tradition, because ft suggests that our Basic stance toward dogs, cats, radios, and other people is epistemic; It suggest thar in our everyday dealings withthe world we are busy solving the other minds problem” and that dogs and cas are passing the test and radi and cars ailing. But that sugges Eon is wrong. Except in odd cases, we do not solve the other ‘minds problem, because it does not arise. Our Background Capacities for dealing with the world enable us to cope with People in one way and cars in another, but we do notin add on generate a hypothesis tothe effect that this person i con Slows and that ca isnot conscious, except in unusual cases. 1 teil have more to say about this later in chapters 3 and 8) Ta the sciences, epistemic questions do of course ait, but epistemic questions are no mare essential to understanding he fefure ofthe mind than they are to understanding the nature (ofthe phenomena studied in any other discipline. Why should ats Wrong withthe Pilowphy of Mind 23 they be? There are intersting epistemic questions about ncvldge ofthe pas in history, of knowledge of unobserved ‘nutes in physics Bul the question “How isthe existence of {he phenomena to be veri?” should not be confused with the Gueston "Wha is the nature of the phenomena whose nstenc is veiled?” The crucal question is not "Under what Snditons would we atnbute mental states to other people” tut rates, "What st hat people actualy hve when they have Telal states?” "What are mental phenomena?” as distinct {fom “How do we find out about them and how do they fume tion cally in theif of the onganism?™ Tio not wan this pont to be misunderstood: Tam not saying that it ecy to find out about mental tates, and that we don have to worry about epistemic questions, Thats not the point Bratt T thnk that i is immensely dfult to study mental ‘Ghenomens, andthe only guide for methodclogy isthe univer- Brfone se any fol or weapon that comes to hand, and stick tnith any tool oF weapon that works. The point [am making fate i different The epistemology of studing the mental no more determines its ontology than does the epistemology of Shy other discipline determine its ontology- On the contrary, Inthe shudy ofthe mind as elsewhere, the whole point ofthe {plstemology is to get atthe preexisting ontology. 5. Behavior or causal relations fo behavior ee not essential othe fristence of mental phenomena, I Believe that the relation of ‘ental states to behavior is purely contingent. Is easy to see {his when we consider how its posible to have the mental ‘fates without the behavior, and the behavior without the men {al states will give some examples in chapter 3) Causally we Snow that Brit processes are sufficient for any mental state snd tha the connection betwen those brain processes and the ior nev ae a coningen nerephyslg <- 6.18 inconsistent woth shat we in fact know about the universe tut our place ito suppose Hat ceergthing is knowable by us.3 Chapeert co nr i re of tn ey ao Seieletevekienry pos at include he Gans ha ‘baboons, dolphins, ex. Now, no one supposes that, lor ent pile, dogs can be brought to understand quantum mechanioy ae ee a eae eee ee ee ee SieTpemen sence eget, ee eres eee hal checeract ct brane ea ee ee oe ae ee ae ae SS See SS oe ee ee ae re ee ee ee Se oe ee ae eo oe es ae ee ae ee oe “fost ereeepeemnoaatie ee ee ee 2 oe ee ae eat has Wrong withthe Piosophy of Mind 25 17h Cartesian conception ofthe ysl the conception of hs cairo as rex extent, stp not adeguate to describe te facts ‘hat cortepond fo statements about physical reaty. When se bine to the proposition that reality i physical, we come to Shot is pethaps the crux of the whole discussion. When ve Thnk of the physica” we think perhaps of things Uke eacales and atoms and subatomic particles. And we think {hat they are physical ina sense that opposed othe mental AIRY Wat things ike sensations of pain are mental And f we aro frought up in our eulfure, we also think these two Ropers mum exhaust everything. that exists, But the ovksty af these categories Becomes apparent as soon as You tt think about the diferent hinds of things the word con- ‘Eine tht, soon a you star to think about the facts that ‘ORE pond to varus sors of empisical statements, So if yu. think ‘bout balance-ofpayments problems, ungremmaticl ntenees, reasons for being suspicious of modal logic, iy ‘billy to ski Ihe state government of California, and points ‘Ror in football games, You are less inlined to think that Srerything must be categorized as ether mental or physical ‘rahe listl gave, which are mental and which are physical? "There area last thre things ‘rong with our traditional conception that realy is physical. First as Ihave noted, the {Sominelogy is designed afound a false opposition between the ‘physical and the “mental” and as I ave already claimed, hats mistake. Second, i we thik ofthe physical in Carte Sian terme as sexes then ts obwolete even a8 matter of physics to suppose that physical realty is physical on this Btkition, Since relativity theory, we have come to think of, for example, electrons as points of mass/energy. So on the (Cartesian definition of “physia,” electrons would not count Sephyscal Third, and most important for our present discus ‘Jon itis a very deep mistake to suppose thatthe crucial ues- tom for ontology is. "What sorts of things exist in the world?” bs opposed fo. “What must be the casein the world inorder that our empirical statements be tae” ‘Noam Chomsky once said (in conversation) that 28 soon a swe come to understand anything, see call it “physical” On25 Cape ‘his view, trivially, anything i either physical or unintelligible If we tink of the make-up ofthe world, then of course every: thing in the world is made of particles, and particles ate [among our paradigms ofthe physical. And if ware going to Call anything that is made up of physical particles physical, then trivially, everything inthe word is physical But fo say that is not to deny thatthe world contains points scored in foal! games, interest rates, governments, and pains All of these have their own way’ of existing-athletic, economic, pos Tica, mental ete ‘The conclusion is this: Once you see the incoherence of du Jism, you can also see that monism and materialism are pst as mistaken Dualists asked, “How many kinds of things and properties are there?” and counted up to two, Moniss, con: onting the same question, only got as far as one. But the real ‘mistake was to start counting at ll. Monism and materialism fare defined in terms of dualism and mentaism, and because the definitions of dualism and mentalism are incoherent, mon tem and materialism inherit that incoherence. It customary to think of dualism as coming in two flavors, substance dual fem and property dualism: but # these T want to add a thi, which I wil call “conceptual dualism” This view consists in {aking the dualistic concepts very seriously, that i t conse in the view that in some important sense “physical” implies nonmenta” and “menta” implies “nonphysical” Both tad sional dualism and materialism presuppose conceptual dual- fem, 20 defined. I introduce this definition to make it dear ‘chy it seems to me best to think of materialism as really form of dualism. It is that form of dualism that begins by accepting the Cartesian categories. I believe that if you take ‘those categories seriously—the categories of mental and physic cal mind and bedy-as a consistent duals, you will eventu- Sly be forced to materialism. Materialism is thus in a sense the finest flower of dualism, and to a discussion of its difculies and recent history nov turn Chapter 2 The Recent History of Materialism: ‘The Same Mistake Over and Over The Mae of Marion ‘What exacts the doctrine known a "matriaisn” suposed ere a Gre mht thnk at would const fn the wet ine mtu of the wor enti made UP SSMU Nie: te ailty however that this view SS mth ot ut any pny of wid at aes Chun ew that ado o phys Fi thre are “immatera” souls or mental substances, pit $e et at sure the desrton of our bdr and ve ‘eistetsy” Bet nowndaye, ov far as Ten tl no one See Caitence ef inmoral spina substance wean lous grounds. To my brow, hee ae m0 ‘25S Ghtstpical or scenic mations or accep the re niy iemoral mena subances” Slevin side Spats to rgiouy motted ele 9 imeoral sou REgoenvon semaine What exactly & materialism in the ph ‘off mind suppose amount? To what views st Partecedaoppoetl Fone reads the carly works of our contemporaries who dec temeles as ati). Sa (969) UT PES sen and D.Armatong C90 or example seems {ie tat when they ase the erty he ental eh the See hy re tmang someting wore han simply he Tina Concann subiance dosiam. Te seems to me ty wah fo deny. the evsence of any inedible mental Shennan he word They want deny that there are any Toluile phenamenlogis! proper, such as coneaox sees ful Now wy are they 20 anos Yo deny the28 Chapter? cevstence of irreducible intrinsic mental phenomena? Why ‘Sant they st concede that these properties are ordinary devel biological properties of neurophysiologial sy temesuchas human brains? Think the answer to that is extremely complex, but a least part ofthe snsorer has to-do with the fact that they accep the Easitonal Cartesian categories, and along with the categories the atendant vocabulary with its implications. T think from {his point of view 1 grant the existence and irredaclity of ‘menlal phenomena would be equivalent to granting some kind tf Cartesanism. In their terms, it might bea "property dua Slav rather than a “substance dualism,” but from ther Point of wiew, propery dualism vwould be just as inconsistent with tneteraism a8 substance dualism. By now it wil be obvious that Lam opposed tothe assumptions behind thei view. What T want to insist on, ceaselesly, is that one can accept the obvi ‘ous facts of physics—for example, that the world is made up (Saiely of physical particles in fields of force—without atthe SSme time denying the obvious facts about our own xperiences—for example, that we are all conscious and that tur conscious states have quite specific irreducible phenomeno- Jogial properties. The mistake is to suppose that these two theses are inconsistent, and that mistake derives from accept- {ng the presuppositions behind the traditional vocabulary. My ‘ew is emphatically nota form of dualism. I reject both prop- {Ey and substance dualism; bat precisely forthe reasons that eect dualism, [reject materialism and monism as wel. The deep mistake is to suppose that one must choose between these views. Tris the ailure to se the consistency of naive mentalism with naive physicalism that leas to those very puzzling discussions {nthe early history ofthis subject in which the authors try 0 find a “topicneutral” vocabulary orto avoid something they Call “nomological anglers” (Smart 1965). Notice that nobody feels that, say. digestion has to be described in a “topic: ‘neutral’ vocabulary. Nobody feels the urge to say, “There i ‘The Recent History of Matrlism 29 something going on in me which is ike what goes on when I ‘Tgest pits” Though they do feel the urge to say, “There s Seeing going on in me which slike what goes on when { Saoian ome” The urge ist try to find a description of the ‘enomena that does’t use the mentalist vocabulary. But Plats the point of doing thal? The facts remain the same ‘The face i tht the mental phenomena have mentlistic proper- tes pat as what goes on in my stomach has digestive proper tee Wedon’t get i of those properties simply by finding an dternatve vocabulary. Materast philosophers wish to deny ‘he custonce of mental properties without denying the reality One pinenomena that underly the use of our mentaistic Sobey. So they have to find an altemative vocabulary to Ucsaribe te phenomena But on my account, this salla waste Paine ‘One should ust grant the mental hence, physical) ‘Ghenomena to start with nthe same way that one Ean the Eigestive phenomena in the stomach. ‘Ethie chapter | want to examine, rather briefly, the history cof materialiam over the past half century. T belive that this Fistor exhibits a rather puzzling but very revealing pattern of rtient and counterargument that has gone on in the Philos ‘hy of mind since the postivism ofthe 1990s. This pattem i see kiways visible on the surface, Nor sit even visible on the inface thatthe same issues are being talked about But 1 Tulieve that, contary fo surface appearances there really has ten only one major topic of discussion inthe philosophy of thn for the past ty yeas o $0, and that i the mind-body problem Often philoophers purport to talk about something Ehesuch as the analysis of beliet or the nature of onsciousnes—bat st almst invariably emerges that they are ‘ot really interested in the specal features of belief oF con- TGowsness. They are not interested in how believing differs from supposing and hypothesizing, ut rather they want t0 {eat thei convictions about the mind body problem agains the ‘Sample of belief Similarly. with consciousness: There is Surprisingly litle discussion of consciousness as such rather,30 Chapter? materiaists see consciousness as a special “problem” for a ‘Raterialat theory of mind. That, they want to find a way 49 “fanale"conscousnes, given their materialism? Mine pattern that these discussions almost invariably seem to take if the following. A philosopher advances a materialist {Beary of the mind. He does this from the deep assumption that some version ofthe materialist theory of the mind must be theconect one—afterall do we not know from the discovers ‘Shasionce that there is really nothing in the universe but phys: ‘Gi parcles and fields of forces acting on physical particles? ‘Sind surely it must be possible to give an account of human binge inva way that is consistent and coherent with our Sccount of nature generally. And surely, does it not follow fom that that our account of human beings must be fhoroughgoing materialism? So the philosopher sts out to five a matcralist account of the mind, He then encounters Eicaites. It always seems that he is Teaving something ut The general pattern of discussion is that criticisms of the imatefalist theory usualy take a more or less technical form, Bot im fac, underlying the technical objections is «| much deeper objection, and the deeper objection can be put quite ‘Srsbly- The theory in question has left out the mind as ket Sat come essential fearure ofthe ind, such as consciousness Srsguala” or semantic content. One sees this pattern over Sha bver. A materialist thesis Is advanced. ut the thei ‘acountersdificulties; the difficulties take diferent forms, bt fhey are always manifestations of an underlying, deeper Aiffcalty, namely, the thesis in question denies obvious facs {hat wel know about our own minds. Ard tis lads to ever more frenzied efforts to stick with the materialist thesis and try fo defeat the arguments put forward by those who insist on reserving the facts. After some years of desperate maneuvers Prraccount forthe difficulties, some new development is put forward that allegedly solves the difficulties, but then we find that it encounters new diffcstes, only the new dificulies are pot so new-—they are really the same old difculties, ‘The Recent History of Matern 31 i we were to think ofthe philosophy of mind over the past fifty year as single individual, we would say ofthat person thet he is a compulsive neurotic, and his neurosis takes the form of repeating the same patter of behavior over and over Inmy experience, the neurosis cannot be cured by a frontal test Is not enough jos to point out the lial mistakes iat being made, Direct refutation simply leads toa repeti- onof the pater of neurotic behavior. What we have to dois fo behind the symptome and find the unconscious assump- ‘gnu that Ie tothe bebavor in the Rist plac, Iam now con- ‘inced, afer several years of discussing these issue, that with NESS Yow exceptions al ofthe parties to the disputes in the ‘atlen ues inthe philosophy of mind ae captives of ace thinset of verbal categories They are the prisoners ofa certain (Giinology:a terminology that goes back at least to Descartes Iie bold, and in onder to overcome the compulsive tetavior we will have to examine the unconscious origins of the disputes, We will have to try to uncover what iis that Chesyone fe taking for granted to get the dispute going and. keep going T ould ot wish my use ofa therapeutic analogy tobe taken to imply ¢ general endorsement of psychoanalytic modes of TS pingstion in intellectual mates. So lets vary the therape= Cermctaphor as follows: I'want to suggest that my present “Gierpite st bit ike that ofan anthropologist undertaking 0 “Stace the exotic behavior ofa distant tbe. The tribe has a Scot behavior patterns and a metaphysic that we must try £9 ‘Uncover and understand, Its easy to make fan ofthe antics of {he tbe of philosophers of mind, and T must confess that T have not always been able t0 resist the temptation t0 do so But atthe beyinning, at est, must insist that the tebe is s— we are the posseisore ofthe metaphysical assumptions that Take the behavior of the tribe possible. So before T actully present en analysis ana crtcisn of the behavior of the tribe ivan to prevent an idea that we should all ind acceptable ‘ness the denis relly par of our contemporary scientific32 Chapter? takers Arc yet I wil ner on argue tnt he tei incoherent is Simply anther symptom ofthe same nee eri te kien. We think th following qostion mont nag pe be eed eta ese Bor bk peek x toe ries gE ‘mater in ur brain to proce the itliget behavior at Seesenage nt Now tt ee fou kes precy El fate cect. Inet, tscens lke « very valuable ow Prokeand infact ti research poet tats wdely po ‘Sse andncdentaly very wel nde Ses ne nh nl id hee ing anover plasaible Urntliget bis of matter cn pedi intligence Because of thir organization. The uinfligen it ee ermi vege cl eN mame organization tht is conti of the neligece Indosk we can actly aifally reproduce the form of ynamiceranization that alee siligene pone The pe ct of tee orginal fate ot pgm te compar i ale aril tligence”: and when pertng, the cmp SS er ler prgrat withthe ight input and cup Now dow Wat sory sound atleast plese to you? | Se alee ede to ener very uci eect aed ren enya bieto you, you are probaby not a fly socaize member eee tal ctiere: Lame on L val Beart eer ooe inter Te ‘ne pone the question an pve tat aner in thee term, we Beda ere ate of wt we ae ling oad EK petal Hae epi re cece 1 ant it a Pata ine proms ach ro sida few pratraph bck tat the try of philosophic aateriism in the vente cetary exe nious pate, pater in which there a recaring tension teen the Theta’ ung to give xn account of etal phenomena tha The Recent History ofMatriaism 99 makes no reference to anything itsnsically or irreducibly thenta, on the one hand, snd the general intellectual require Trent that every investigator faces of not saying anything that TPabvlousy fase, on the other To et this pattern show itself ‘Sane now to give a very bref sketch, as neutrally and oe Thly ay Tat of the pattern of theses and responses that trates have exemplified, The aim of what follows is to Provide evidence fr the claims made in chapter 1 by giving ful illustrations ofthe tendencies that identified 1, Behaviorism In the beginning was behaviors. Behaviorism came in two Tiuintos methodological behavionsen” and “logical behay- Jaan Methodological behavioriam i a research strategy in Tctogy tothe effet that a scence of psychology should Peis in licovering the coreatons between stm Inputs $0 behavior! outputs (Watson 1925) A rigorous empirical “Elence, according to this view, makes no reference £9 3A) mY teviou introspective oF mentalist items Topical behaviosm goes even a step Further and insist that ‘ere ae no such testo refer, excep insofar as they exist {nthe form of behavior. According # lgial behaviorism its 2 matter of definition, a mater oflgical analysis, that mental ferme can be defined in terms of behavior, that sentences about the mind can be translated without any residue sto sentences Shout behavior (Hempel 1989; Ryle 1949) According to the Topical behaviorist, many of the sentences in the translation tle hypothetical in form, because the mental phenomena [Question const not of actual occurring patterns of behavior, that rather of dispositions to behavior. Thus, according to a atadard behaviorist account, to say that John believes tha 35 joing to sain is simply to say that John will be disposed to lose the windows, put the garden tools away, and carry an umbrella Whe goes out, Im the material mode of speech, techaviorism claims thatthe mind is just behavior and disposi tons to behavior In the formal mode of speech, it consist3M Chapter? te view that sentences about mental phenomena can be (elated int senfences about actual an possible behavior “Ghpatons fo behavior can be divided into two kinds: commonsence obpetions and more or les technica objections, SBRbiows commonsense objection is that the bekaviost ‘Mans toeave out the mental phenomena in question. There i ‘Sth let forthe subjective experience of thinking or feeling Prine enavionst account thee are just patterns of objectively ‘Shservable behave. 'Several more of less technical objections have been made ‘pehaviorism. Fist, the behaviorist never succeeded in ‘Baking the notion of a “disposition” fully clear. No one ever, Socceeded in giving a satisfactory account of what sors of Shrccndents there would have to bein the hypothetical state iments to produce an adequate dispositional analysis of mental ferme in behavioral terms (Hampshire 1950; Geach 1957). ‘Second, there semed to be a problem about a cerain form of ‘Greularty in the analysis to give an analysis of belie in terms Gf behavior it seems that one has to make reference to desi fo pave an analysis of desire, it seems that one has to make {ference fo belief (Chisholm 1957), Thus, to consider our eat fer example, we are trying to analyze the hypothesis that John believes that tis going to rain n terms ofthe hypothess that i the windows are open, Jon will close them, and other sia Inypotheses. We want to analyze the categorical statement that olin believes that it is going to rain in terms of certain hypothetical statements about what Jokn will do under what, conditions. However, John’s belief that i is going t rain wil bbe manifested in the behavior of losing the widows only if we assure such additional hypotheses as that John doesnt ‘want the rainwater to come in through the windows and John believes that open windows admit rainrater. If there is nthy ing he likes better than rain steaming in through the windows, Ihe will not be disposed to close them. Without some such Inypothesis about John’s desires (and his other beliefs), it looks as if we cannot begin to analyze any sentence about his orig tal belief. Simular remarks can be made about the analysis of desires; uch analyses ser to requite reference to belies ‘The Recent Hatory of Matriaism 99 ‘A tind technical objection to behaviorism was that tft out the causal relations between mental states and behavior (Lewis 906) By identifying, for example the pain with the dispost tion to pain behavior, behaviorsm leaves out the fact that pain cate behavior Slay, we ty to analyze beliefs and Feaie in terma of behavior, we ae no longer able o say that beliefs and desires cause behavior, “Thou perhaps most ofthe discussions inthe pllosophical erate Concern the “technical” objections, infact isthe ‘ommonsense abjections that are the most embarassing. The Shuurdiy of behaviors lies in the fact that it denies the weulonee of any inner mental states in addition t0 external {ehavior (den and Richards 1926). And this, we know runs ‘end counter to our ordinary experiences of what it sik to eo human being, For ths teason, behaviorist were sarc! Cally aecused of feigning anesthesia" and were the target ofa ‘uber of bad jokes (eg. First behaviors to second behavior. [Rt ust after making love “Te was great fr you, how was iF mmo"). This commonsense objection to behavorism was some {nes putin the for of arguments appealing to our intitons (On ofthese Is the superactor/superspartan objection (Putnam. 1953), One can easily imagine an actor of superior abilities toh could give a perfect imitation ofthe behavior of someone Tn puln even though the actor in question had no pain, and one Can also imagine «supespartan who was able to endure pain wethout giving amy sig of being in pal Ih Type detty Theres Logical behavirism was supposed to bean analytic tath, Tt ferted a definitional cOnnection between mental” and. iehavioral concept In the recent history of materialist phi Tosophies of mind it was replaced by the “identity theory,” ‘Which lined that asa atter of contingent, synthetic empiri Cal fact, mental slates were ientcal with states ofthe Brain ind of the central nervous system (Place 1956; Smart 1965) ‘According to the identity theorists, there was no logical absur= Gity in supposing that there might be separate -mental3 Chapter? a, independent of mater reality it just tamed oat fs. matter of fact that our mental states, such as pains, were ‘Gentcal with states of our nervous system. Tn this case, pang were claimed to be identical with stimulations of fife? Descartes might ave been eight in thinking that there were separate mental phenomena it ust urmed Out a5 ¢ matter off that he was wrong. Mental phenomena were nothing but States of the brain and central nervous system. The identity [between the mind and the brain was supposed tobe an emp Cal entity. just asthe identity between lighting and eect ischanges (Smart 1965), or between water and HO molectles (Feigh 1958, Shafer 1961), were supposed to be empirical and contingent identities, It just turned Out asa matter of slentiic ‘discovery that lighting bolts were nothing but steams of eee trons and that water in all its various forms was nothing but collections of H,O molecules, 'As with behavioriem, we can divide the difcultis ofthe Identity theory into the “technical” objections and the com ‘monsence objections. In this case, the commonsense objection takes the form ofa dilemma, Suppose thatthe identity theory iS as its supporters claim, an empirical ruth. If so, then thee ‘must be logically independent features of the phenomena in (question that enable it fo be identified on the left-hand side of the identity statement in a diferent way from the way itis fentifed on the right-hand side of the identity statement (Gtevenson 1960), I, for example, pains ae dential with ne rophysiologcal events, then there must e two Sets of features, pain features and neurophysiological features, and these ts of features enable us to nail down both sides of the syr- thetic identity statement. Thus, for example, suppose we have a statement of the form: Pain event xs identical with neurophysiological event We understand such a statement because we understand that ‘one and the same event has been identified in virtue of two di ferent sorts of properties, pain properties and neurophysiolog Jeal properties. Bu ifso, then we seem to be confronted witha ‘The Recent History of Materialism 37 tema: ter the pan featres are ubjetv, ment nro Seetie ctr or they ae ok. Well if they are ten we BoE eaty goten ni ofthe mind. We are left witha Tae erstatan abe property dualin rather than substance ‘ks. We ast et ah eto etl propre en ea et have goten dof mental substances Ion the 2eeBhand we to eat “paras not naming a sjecive se etre of erin aarophysologal events then aan tu motes ad explained AS with TREE Stet out the mind. Fore now bare ro Sap thse subjective mental features of our exper "pe is clara this ust repetition of he commen ee tn beta. Inti ase we have put in ENRESES emma hor mates of the entity {85a aves out he mind or doe 0 it does tale: {Nowa iv nt materi. etn dent torte thought hey had an answer soit sbjeton, The saswer west ry to eset the = LCA metal features in 8 topleneuta” voeabulay. The aeNvatte gers descpion of the mental atures that not ‘Menon th act hat they were ental Smae 1965). This can ‘Rey be done One can mention pai witout mentioning the Rehr they ave pany ata one can tention airplanes Shout mentioning the fac at hey are airplanes. That SSPSEN Ironton sn aplane by saying a ean ple of Sroperty belonging o Usted Arie," and one can refer Fell grange atennage by saying“ cena ever Ng on Je tat ke te even that goes on in me when fee an Stange’ ‘Bat the fac that one can mention a phenomenon ‘oahout spciying is esentialcharacteriscs dost mean thar dotavtenet ard doesn’t have thse een charac ter stl spn ora afterimoge, or an arplae, even {Four deseritone al to mention thee fact SSroher move “echnical ebjecton to the Mentiy theory ws ses unltly that fo every ype of mental sae thor willbe ane and onl ane ype of europilogal tate sta whch tera. Bven my bb at Deve the38 Chapter? a ee ee ese ce ae ee oe ae te me cr sea os oa ie eteor cn ae ee ee ee SM cate nn ee ec SSAct faces a Linc ot “neuronal dal ee ee pce ey a from Leibniz’s law. 1f two events are identical only if they ee eens iceae te te. oe ce ae ee ee rae nescence cic ecipin teprecns cam el ara aaa aaa pete tin oo ceescce se ccna Sealer eee Be tesa scncnsccese socal Petes: a ec cj eet rr ect by Sea apes G07) we oving meal op li eal Gelatin berger = iets testis tee ee cnecocy cat eee nairnsienn or’: beaiged tects borers oct as ae ae etrenesen ss ae ace ot oe eal ee ae detec yucte aoe sol The Recent History of Matern 99 exploit pt 1 frm in term of ene tal properies Thus feng of pin that [now have seen tay telng of pain becouse anything identical with this feling woul have to bea pin an ts brain site se {Siy'S bron state because anything dential with i would fave bea bran ste. Soit pars that the entity theorist ‘eta that pan are cera types of rain tates apd hat {Hh pater pm seta wih ths particular bain state, steaks be ore to hod both that tsa necessary tah hat [ra pins ore bai stats, an that i necessary truth Ravthe paricular pain ea brain sate But nether ofthese eign doce nt som ight say citer that pais in ‘Soural dre necsarily bin state, oF that my present pain seetaly a brain sate because it seems copy to inagine Marcane sat of being cond have brain stats ike these (Rao faving pain and pains Uke these without being i TeeSiee of bean dats it even powsble to cone @ {Mfotion i which Thad ts very pain sathout Raving this Stier sate and in which 1 Had this very brain sate thot basing pin Debate about te force ofthis modal argument went on for comme years and sil continues (Lsean 1971, 1987, Sher 197. From the pont of view of Our prevent interests, want to call Menton fo the fat that i is seentlly the commonsense ccion ina sophisticated guise. The commonsense objection {ohn tlentty theory i hal you can en ating men {Erith anything nonmental thot leaving out the ment ripe's modal argument that the identfcation of mental ate with physi stats wouk! have to be necessary, and yet Femmot be neesny, becuse the mental could nt be neces ‘aly physi As Kripke ny, quoi Butler, "Everythings sha sand not another thing any cae, the de that any tye of mental tate is ideal with some type of neurophystlogice sate seemed relly Tnuchtoo strong, But t seme that the underlying pulwophe {Cat mesivation of materials could be preserved wth mich vreaer thesis the tess hat for every token instance ofa enChapter? tal state, there will be some token neutophysiclogical even, Bla wbich that foken instance is identical Such views were ‘SMitg "tekenstoken identity theories” and they soon replace Gipciype Mlnsity theories. Some authors indeed fet tata Ber taken identity theory could evade the force of Keipke redial arguments? 1 Token Token Identity Theories The token identity theorists inherited the commonsense obj: tion #0 type Mentity theories, the objection that they sil Seamed te'be let with some form of property dualism; kat they had some ditional difculties oftheir own. "Se was this If two people who are inthe same mental state are in different neurophysiological states, then what itis aboat thoce different neurophysilogical states that makes them te fame mental state? Ifyou and | both believe that Denver isthe Sipltal of Colorado, then what is it that we have in commen, Ghar makes our different neurophysiological squiggles the SER belie Notice that the token identity theorists canna ve thecommonsense answer to this question; they cannot ay Ei what makes two neurophysiological events the same type lof mental event is tha thas the same type of mental features Because it was precisely the elimination or reduction of the ‘renal features that materialism sought 0 achieve. They mut {End some nonmentalistic answer to the question, “What & bout to different neurophysiologial states that makes them {nto tokens ofthe same type of mental state?” Given the entre tradition within which they were working, the only plausible ltnower was one inthe behaviorist style. Their answer was thi neurophysiologcal tate was a particular mental state in Wir fc of ts function, and this naturally leads to the next view. V. Black Box Funetonalism ‘What makes two neurophysiological states into tokens ofthe the same type of mental state is that they perform the same function in the overall ie ofthe organism, The notion of & ‘The Recent History of Matriaien 41 function is somevhat vague, but the ten identity theorists fished i out a» follows, Two different brainstate tokens INOUID be tokens ofthe same type of mental state iff the two el lates had the same casa relations to the iat tims thatthe organ receives, ts varius other “mental” tate, td to ite output behavior (Lees 1972; Grice 1975), Thus, for Rompe my belie that it i about to rain wil be a state in me inl i cadsed by my peteeption of the gathering of clouds TSE thebnronsng thunder, and together with my desire that Tae ANS Not come in the windows, wil in tur cause me to ‘Sos them_ Notice that by ientiying mental tates in terms of the caumal relations--not oly to input stimuli and output ehceion but alo to other mental states—the token iden etek immedistely avoided two objections to Behaviorism. ete that Behaviorism had neglected the causal elatons of ‘Bontattates, ad the second was that there was a circa TRfehavionn in that belies had to be analyzed in terms of tfetues, deste in terms of belies. The token identity theorist orth foncionalist stripe can cheerell accept this circularity ‘by arguing thatthe enti system of concepts can be cashed out im terms of the system of causal rations, ction had a beat techncal device ith which to snake this system of relatos completely clear without invoke Ing any “mysterious mental enfties” This device is called a emecy sentence? and it works as follows: Suppose that John hs the ballet thet pan that this s caused by his perception that ps ands together with his desire that g the belief that 7 Coes his action Because we are dering belies in terms of {hie caumal relation, we can eliminate the explicit use of the word "blie” an the previous sentence, and simply sy that there is something tat stands in sih-and-such causal rela- tons, Formally speaking, the way we eliminate the exphit Thuntion of belts simply By putting a variable, “x” in place ‘Shany expression referring to John’s Beli that p and we pref she the whole sentence with an existential quantifier (Lewis {or2) The whole story about John’s Bali that pcan then be told as follows:2 Chapter? (Go (ohn has x & xis caused by the perception that ‘extogether witha desire that causes action) en = eee ae Ee eee sos ae eee ee ee eee ee ee Ecce eee ee eee eran eee" ee ae SU eee eee ee ee ee a rae eee eee rr ae ee ae ee ae ee ee ae Soe separa re Oe The Recent History ofMateralsm same color dscrimiations in response to exactly the same ‘Rin asthe ret ofthe population. When asked to put the suiclain one plleand te green pencl i another they 40 Ry what terest of us would dot obs ferent to ther cet inte, but tere ono way to detec this ference for theoutside Swf his posi is even ineligible to usand it sorely soe ie ow fetal us be wrong in supposing for nevtally specified casal relations are stfient Sant for mental phenomens; for such specications leave Sant crc Fear of many sentl phenomena, namely thet Suatative et ata wht huge pops theese Tut of china, might behave ao as to lita the func Pees egenzaion ofa human bran to the extent of having the tghinputoutput rations andthe right pattern of inner ee site relations But all the same, the system would Stir cel anything ssa ystems. The ent population of hina wouldnt fel pain at by imitating the functional Sreaization appropriate pin (lock 1978). "Kiother mere technical sounding objection to black box fanctonalim was tothe “Back bo” par: Funconalism so {fine aed to state in materi ems what tic about the die {erent physica tats that gives diferent material phenomena thoumbe ua teltons, How does cme abot that these quite dren physi srctares ae causally equivalent? VE. Stromg Art [At this point there ocurred one of the most exiting develop- ‘ets in the ene two-thousand.year history of materialism The developing science of artifical intelligence provided an. Inswer to this question: different material structures can be ‘really equivalent they are different hardware implemen- {sions ofthe same computer program. Indeed, given this Inver, we can ste thatthe mind jst a computer program sal ItligenceChapter? . eee enpanrhandwors (or “wetwarer) tat ca havea a Peeeiec etn eee cole Gs tnsa sa: ant gers ond toc reteset nner a Ean Seemed ent bore in Doce a ee ee eee ten ee oS eae ee Secrecy wet ee epeisec pit set acicnoed hia SS eee ieereiccuneyaccn rin are uh the mr dip of “ope eae teehee tsp Coin So Braet pa eacg tere va ane oen oe pleco digesta a eee ele eee eersees (hee te noone bcd elgese Ge oh So cate Samper tenn) Gipson sry Alton tone oi ah tar commerce eon eal oro as wl Sew tat oe our este cesT ta See Sed Scone aha! ligrc cr Seeger teak toh re mers nd eon vl See tmearce en npr hey hve ae Sec dca poate centers 09 Tat ou ee het a the sg Win Mr cat ict we ty disals ch Be Sra nde bli get deg scone “Sereda ccocrng at oul in a Carrer Fon soa he AI camp he wee co Sam aes o ate Daye C97 tthe eet a be ‘The Recent History of Materials 45 ‘way the human mind works quite different from the way 2 ‘Comper woes. Te commensense objection to strong AI was simply thatthe computalional model ofthe snind le out the crucial things Shout the mand such as consciousness and intentionality. 1 felleve the best-known argument against strong AT was my (Ghinese room argument (earl 1980s) that showed that. asy=- tem could instante a program so ast give a perfect simula tom of some human cognitive capacity, such as the capacity 10 indartand Chinese, even though that system had no under: Tonuing of Chinese whatever. Simply imagine that someone tno understands no Chinese is locked ina room with alt of Chinese symbols and a computer program for answering ques ‘Sora im Chinese, The input tothe system consists in Chinese ‘fmbolein the form of questions the outpat of the system con ERNE Chinese symbols in anewer to dhe questions. We might Subs ue thatthe program is £0 good thatthe answers to the ‘Quektons are indstnguishabe fom those ofa native Chinese ‘Beaker But all the sume, nether the pereon inside nor aay ‘Ger pact of the system erally understands Chinese; and frcauue the programmed computer has nothing that this sys tem does not Rave, the programmed computer, qua computer, {doesnot understand Chinese ether. Because the program i [purely formal or syntactical and because minds have meatal or FEmantc contents any attempt to produce a mind purely with cmputer programs leaves out the esental features of the sind Tn addition to behaviorsm, type entity theories, token ‘denity theories, functionals, and strong. AL, there were ther theores in the philosophy of mind within the general Imatcrialiat tradition. One ofthese, which dates back to the {any 196s nthe work of Paul Feyerabend (1963) and Richard Rony (1965), has recently been revived in diferent forms by Such authors as P.M. Churchland (981) and 5. Stich 1983) It fs the view that mental states don’t exst at all. This view is Called “eiminative materials” and I now tur tot$8 Chapter? VIL Elomnatow Materia In its most sophisticated version, eliminative mate argued as follows: our commonsense beliefs about the’ consitute akin of primitive theory a “folk psychology." Be 2s sith any theory, the entities postulated By the only be fustitied tothe extent ha the theory ita. Justa faire ofthe phlogiston theory of combustion rented it justification for believing inthe existence of phlopston ant failure of folk psychology removes the rationale for ine payehological entities. Thus fit tims out that folk pupa Ry 5 fase, then we would be unjustified in believing inthe exstence af boils, desires, hopes, Teas, ec. According the ‘iminative materialist, it sooms very likely that folk pyc ‘ogy wll turn out to be false. It seems likly that a hate cognitive scence” will shove that most of our commonsense beliefs about mental states are completely unjustified, Thy result would have the consequence that the entities that we hhave aways supposed to exist, our ordinary mental ene, do not realy exist. And therefore, we have at lng lasts ‘hory of mind that simply eliminates the mind Hence, te ‘expression “eliminative materialism.” ‘A related argument used in favor of “eliminative mateah fmm” seems to me so breathtakingly bad that [fear I must be misunderstanding it As near as Ican tell here is how it goes Imagine that we had a perfect science of neurobiology. Imagine that we hada theory that really explained how te brain worked. Such a theory would cover the sime domain as folk psychology, but would be much mone Powerful. Furthermore, it seems very unlikely that out ‘ordinary folk psychological concepts, such as belief and desire, hope, fear, depression, lation, pain, ete, would ‘racy match or even remotely match the taxonomy pro: ided by our imagined perfect science of neurobiology. In all probability there would be no place in this neurobiology for expressions like “belie,” “tear,” “hope” and “deste” and no smooth reduction of these supposed phenoment ‘would be possible. “The Recent History of Matenaism 47 ‘Thats the premise. Here isthe conclusion: ‘Therefore, the entities purportedly named by the expres Sons of folk psychology, biel, Ropes, eas, desires, tc, donot realy xs “To see how bad this argue realy just imagine a paral rumen fom PRY ‘Consider our exiting scene of theoreti physic, Here sec hae a theory tha explains how phys eat works Sra a wusy superior Our commonsense theories ball ‘Reval ener Physical theory eves the same domain Soar commonsee theories of golf ub, tennis rackets, Gacurer ston wagono, and splilevel ranch hoses fshcrmore our ordinary folk pista concepts such as Maul cub “lena rckeh” “Chewolet station wagon” 2Ea' Splcievel ranch house” donot excl, oF even semotly, match the taxnomy of eoretial physics There Simply 1s use in thereal physics for any ofthese Srpreslons and_ no amoth type reductions of thee Phenomena i possible The way hat an ideal physio Teed the ay that ont atl prysics—taxonomizes ea iy realy quite diferent fom he way out ordinary folk Physic taxonomies realty Therefore, splitlevel ranch houses, tennis rackets, golf ‘hubs Chev station wagons, ec, do not really exis. 1 have not seen this mistake discussed in the Iterature Pothaps its so egregious that thas simply been ignored. Tt fests on the obviously false premise that for ay empirical fheory and corresponding taxonomy, unless there isa tyPe- type feduction of the enitestaxonomized tothe entities of ‘etter theories of basic science, the entities donot exist If you. have any doubts that this premise i false, just try It out on anything you see around Youor on yoursell™ With eliminative materialism, once again, we find the same pattern of technical and commonsense objections that we Footed earlier The technical objections have to do withthe fact4 Chapter? ‘hat folk psychology, iF 1 is a theory, is nonetheless ng research project. list tela rival fleld of scientific resmagh fand indeed, the eliminative materlists who attack Ay Feychology, according to their critics, are often unfue According to is defenders, flk psychology isnt such a theory afterall; many ofits central tenets are quite Hip tum out tobe true. The commonsense objection fo eliminating materialism is just that it seems 9 Be crazy. It seems cry Sy that I never felt thes or desire, that never had a that [never actually had a bli, or that my belies and dein, dont play any roe in my behavior. Unlike the earir mat list theories, eliminative materialism doesn't so mich lee tout the mind, it denies the existence of anything to leave gat i the fst place. When confronted with the challenge tat climinative materiliam seems 10 insane {© meri serious con Sderation ts defenders almost invariably invoke the hee jgeotscience maneuver (P-5. Churchland. 1987) That they claim that giving up the belief that we have bells ‘analogous to giving up the belie in a flat earth or sunset fe compe It's wort pointing out in this entre discussion that a ceria paradovical asymmetry has come up in the history of mate in. Earlier type-type identity theories argued that we cold fe rd of mysterious, Cartesian mental states because sch Sates were nothing but physical sates (nothing “over and ove” physial states), and they argued this on the assump tion that types of mental states could be shown tobe ident with types of physical states, that we would get a makh between the deliverances of neurobiology and cur ordinary ‘notions suchas pain and belief. Now in the case of eliinatv Taterialism, it i precisely the alleged falure of any sud ‘atch that regarded asthe vindication ofthe elimination these mental states in favor ofa thoroughgoing neurobiology Earlier materialiste argued that there arent any’ such things separate mental phenomena, because mental phenomend idbntical with brain states, More recent materialist argue tt ‘there arent any such things as separate mental phenoment ‘The Recent History of Materialism 48 case they area! deta with brain states. find this pat Toon very revealing, and what i revels san urge o get id of thea phenomena a any cost VI Naturalizing Content After half a century of this recutring patter in debates about ‘Auteriatism, one might suppose that the matenalists and the {Tuas would think theres something wrong with the terms oti debate, But so far the induction seems not to have Secured fo ether side. AS T write this, the same patter is fing repeated in current aterpls to "naturaize” intentional ‘Strategically the ida so carve off the problem of conscious ross fom the problem of intentionality. Perhaps, one admis, [Etscousnens i iredubly mental and thus not subject 10 ‘Rennie weatment, But maybe consciousness does not mater ‘Eich anyway and we can get along without it. We ned only {ornatralize intentionality, where “to nafurlize intetionae {by" means to explain ft completely in terms oft reduce it {S--nonmmental, physical phenomena. Functionalsm was one ‘Sia attempt at natralzing intentional conten, and it has ‘Deen rejuvenated by being joaned to externas causal theories Chreterence. The idea bund such views is that semantic con ‘ot that ls, mennings cannot be entirely in our heads because ‘what isin Ou head fe sufiient to determine how language Teintes to reality, In addition to what is in our heads, “narrow Content” we need 2 sot of actual physical causal relations 10 ‘hjets in the world, we need “wide content.” These views ‘Were onginaly developed around problems inthe philosophy Ur Tanguage (Putnam 1975, but Its easy to see how they txtend to mental contents generally. Ifthe meaning ofthe sen= fence "Water is wet” cannot be explained in terms of what is trae the heads of speakers of English, then the Debi that rater is wet is not a mater solely of what isin their heads Uther, Ideally one would like an account of intentional content {tated solely in terms of causal Felatons between people, on9 Chapter? ee ‘the other. nie Fe anne ae ee ee ees Bee eo nn ne ee Snes ee ae ee ae ee ae et ae eee See ee pees ee ee oe = See en ae ce ee ae — See See SS ee ae ee eee eons ooo eee ee ee as “The Recent History of Matern 51 1 do not know if anyone has yet made the obvious common- cence objection tothe projet of natwraizing intentional con- ‘ent vurT hope it is ear from the entire discussion what it teil, Tn ease no one has done yet, here goes Any attempt rece intentionality #o something nonmental wil alway {ei because it eaves out intentionality. Suppose for example {at you had a pevect caval exteralst account ofthe belief that water b wet, Ths account Is given by stating a set of {al relations in which a system lands fo water and to wet Servand thew relations are ently specified without any ‘Ren component ‘The problem is obvious: a system could favwall of these relations and sl nt believe that water is wet. ‘Thsis at an extension of the Chinese room argument, but the ‘Moral ft poine to is general You cannot reduce infentonal etre (or puns or "qualia" to something else, because if you ‘ould they would be something else, and they are not some- fhing cse.‘The opposite of my vew is stated very sucintly by fodor, “I eboutness is real, 3 must really be something Le" 987, p97) On the contrary, aboutness (intentional iy) is rea and itis not something else, *, Symplom that someting is radically wrong with the pro- sect tat the intentional notions are inherently normative ‘They set standards of truth ratonaiy, consistency, ete, and herein no way thot these standards can be intrnse to a sys- fem consisting eel of brte, blind, nonintentional causal ations There is no normative component to ilar ball c= Silom Darwinian biologic attempts at naturalizing content {ey avoid this problem by appealing fo what they suppose fs the inherently teleological normative character of biological volution, Bet this isa very deep mistake. There is nothing ormative or teleological about Darwinian evolution. Indeed, Darwin's major contribution was precisely to remove purpose land teleology from evolution, and substitute for it purely tual forms of selection, Darwin's account shows that the parent teleology of biological processes san illssion. Te i a simple extension of this insight to point out that notions such as “purpose” are never intrinsic to biological Unganisms, (unless ofcourse those organisms themselves have2 Cape? onsous inet states and process) Ar ven notions Gieege nor ae aye mae rate on Bg “ote! figs u rome value (0 the cal ee es tal erence abou! the fet at Eran eeenes between 88 1, Theheart causes the pumping of blood. and eying, 2. Thefunctionf the hearts to pump blood ut 2 assign a normative status to the sheer brute causal fact about te heat and it does this beause of our interest in {be lation of hs fact toa whole ot of other facts, such as our hrcrest in survival In shor, the Darwinian mechanisms and teen tologialfartions themselves are entirely devoid of fF teleology. Al of the teleological features are Entity inthe mind of the observe. {The Moa Far My aims arin tis chapter has ben to istratereuring Patter in the history of materia. This pater is made Bape in able 21. have been concerned ot so much fo ZENE or refute materia ato examine i Vcsitudes in the face of ceri commonsense fact about the mid, such 8 the ot hat mst of us are for mt of ou lve, conscious Wiat we find in the Matory of mater 3 eecrsng em Son between he urge to give an account of reality that eaves tt any reference othe spec fetes of the mental, sch a3 ensciounes and subjectivity and atthe same tine account foroar “ination” about the mind. 1, of course, impossible to do thee to ings. So there ares sence of atemps alast neurotic in characte, to cover over the fact hat some rca element about metal states Being Ie out. And when itis pointed out hat some vis uth sing dried ty the miter philophy, the upholds oth ve fovarbly Teor 10 certain hvtrkal_ strategies eae sypeidentty ty Token deny theory ack x sro Al ftunngmachine ‘encom Biniative (teeson of fopeycology) Naturaizing Intentional ea pte ea obpsHons opersparan super ‘Leaves oat the min reseed to prope dualism Leaves ut he mind soon ala ‘eaves othe min eent qualia ac {pecumn nveson Leaves othe mind (Chinese oom Denis the este hike mind: unst tovelepayehology ‘Leaves out intentorley le by eset materia. Tetnial 1. Gra ees ese tocapan les and conversely 2 Cand the fenton 1. New cauvinisn 2 Lani awe 8 Gantaccount Feel properties 1 Meal afgumens Cantey the ‘penta fares elton of tacture fenton Snexpte Human cognitions rowenta4 Chapter? to show that materialism must be right and thatthe ay who bets to materialism must be endorsing Pasertnson of dualism, mysticism, mysteriousnes, or ger SBtossenegc as, But the unconscious motivation forall Pie the motivation that never somehow manages to sur ee the sosumption that materialism is necessarily incon- Sseot with the reality and causal efficacy of consciousness, Sinpctty, ct That the Basic assumption behind materia Bas catnially the Cartesian assumption that materialism feplesantimenaism and mentale implies antimateralism "Phere i something immensely depresing about this whole story because itll come so pointless and unnecessary. Its {il bed on the false assumption thatthe view of reality as ately physicals inconsistent with he view that word realy ents subpetive "qualtaive” "private" "touchy-feely Simmatesal “"nonphysiel”) conscious. sates such as Bought and feelings "The weird feahre about this entire discussion is that mater lism inert the wort assumption of dualism. In denying the duals clan that there are eo kinds of substances inthe ‘world orin denying the property duals’ claim that there are theo Kinds of properties im the worl, materialism inadver fen acepis the categories andthe vocabulary of dualism. It the terms in which Descartes st the debate Taccepts, im shor, the idea thatthe vocabulary of the metal snd the Physical of material and immaterial of mind and bodys pet feciy adequate seit etande.Ie accepts the iden that i we ink consciousness exists we ate accepting dualism. What 1 Beles cvs fr hi ene dsr hat he ‘orabulary, andthe accompanying categories, ae the source ‘of our deepest philosophical dffcutes. As Tong as we use words like “materialsny” we are almost invariably forced to suppose tht they imply something inconsistent with naive ‘menilsm. Ihave been urging that in this case, one can have ‘one'scake and et ittoo. One canbe 3 “thoroughgolng mater ‘le and not in any way deny the extence of cube, ‘tera, intrinsic, offen conscious) mental phenomena. How. ‘The Recent History of Materia 55 vance my we of hte tem rns dead cout © oe ered yrs of Pilosophical triton it would fh deh nso ath oy nd to describe the deepest motivation for materi cha is simply ater of onan si pao Why should materi ve fe of Batson Ey dont mates chewy embrace comune ane ate propery aang tens? orcs cha Aratrong ad Dene ch 0 00 See sy co den “consciousness” aso dey atthe of concisely sce a dee sen fer he ro ons an Sec the ential trying feature b= Scare reactant Yo asp tat fie ietiiy Move that fo accept the esece of uae Secs he are inconoient ih ther conception of csc tbe ike, Many think thal, gen he iat rye scence 2 eoncepion of eal th Selsey ithe ony oe thats pos der tua wh “conscouses- One Way © SPE ete Rpts that in longer meas ae Stora ant comelhing cbcve (or an amp, See Tye 9500) eal ofthis amounts t0 avery large mistake and in es 2 Suro wl examine nome deta the character esc oncloial ats of emscosnes X.The lof the Tribe ‘i earlier in this chapter that I would explain why a certain faturabsounding question Was really incoherent, The quer Ton ie How dor unintelligent bits of matter produce intel ovee? We should frst not the form ofthe question, Why are prot asking the more traditional question: How do uncon UGous bits of matter produce consciousness? That question seems to me perfectly Coherent. Its a question about how the fain works to cause conscious mental states even though thescp? Individual neurons (or synapses oF receptors) in the brain tnd penacives conscious But inthe present ca, we are SrePt te ak the question in that frm because Wwe lack Tiber tein of consciousness. Consciousness has an PES Sitetve ontology, 20 we think it more scientific ime the question ss one about intelligence, because we {hint tat for intligence we have objective, impersonal cr TE But now we immediately encounter a difficulty. If by Prelgene” we mean anything that satis the objective ‘had: peron criteria of inteigence then the question contains 2 tbe tion, Besse $f intelligence is defined Fehaviodatcally then it issimply not the ase that neurons are Potintligent. Neurons, hike ust about everything els inthe trond, behave in eran regular, predictable paters. Furth Ginore, considered in a certain way, neurons do extremely Sophisisted “information processing” They take in rch et ‘thignals fom other neuron a thelr dendritic synapses: they ‘process this information a thelrsomae and sen out informs Eon though their axonal synapses to otber neurons. 1f intel {sto be defined behaviorally, then neurons are ety intligent by anybody’ standards. In short, if our cr feria of inteligence are ental cbetive and third-person— fd the whole pont of posing the question inthis way was to fet something tat suited those codiions—then the ques tion contains a presupposition that an its own terms is false. ‘The question aly presupposes that the bts do not eet the rte of itligence The answer 10 the question, not surprisingly, inherits the sane nti. Th ae to diferent So cater Applying the expression “inteligent behavior” One of these ‘ses consists of third-person or “objective” criteria that are not cosy of any poyogialneet whatever, Bul te ge eet tele vcr te St enon’ “Tntligent behavior” on the sacond set sen nvireshking ad Nnking set» men process Now, if we adopt the third-person criteria for Jnteligent behaviog, then ofcourse computers not to mention The Reent History ofMaterism 57 sit clelstrs, crs, seam, shovel, thermostat and a pout eveything inthe worden ie inde! a ee cman adi he Tun tee ete cater for inelient Bea oe et rach questions a Can unite is of the he lige behuvin” and even ow aly sate ee iro chou, Any thermos eyo waterall produces itellgent kao Pa ca cae how woe Carta arnt ate sed we eve an hey wee nlignt ane nce evay- ened sa ature, hen everyting lave ae hg er which it have orf werenligent: Ba der eligrt behavior” of 80 pyeologial feevance at all eran oar bath th gusto and the newer 8 init Sevecen two. dflrent poe: a) How do uncon culating beer prodacecnscouses a perfect gtd se ich ihe answer In vite of elo een Jon nereea ious of the bran at sre nes rnteligen (by Risto hidperson eri?) Hen duce ineligent (by first hir-person ton? tothe extent that we make he eters ete person entra, the question connie & eon and tins concealed om ws bene we fg Per tne question on interpretation.Appendix Is There a Problem about Folk Psychology? The dn of opler 2 was ot 6 much present my own Tato deurte the contemporary Nstory fa philoo ee pow se ce ef wy cnn vines eat flk poychology EP), because Ido not believe they Rane been reprecrtdin the erature so far. ‘The standard ‘Bicucdons, fo po and con (Chuschland 1981, 5th 198, Horan and Weediward 195, and Fodor 186) Rave been srihine dton T wil state the argument stepwise a Series of theses and Tess: FPisan epithets ke any other, ancl as such i bet tocar contmaton nd daconfimaton drsoer The actual capaci that people have for op ‘tik tenelves andes afer the met pt 989 propo Sonal form They ar, in my sense, Background capaci For example, Dow we tepond io fac expression, wht we fd mtn intehavio, tn even tow we understand er ces areinlags prt ates of know-how, not theories. You ‘ison these pace you hk of hea theories Set ‘hapter for more bout TiAl i oul ste tert oreo apace, Thi would constitea {ot peycogy and lin Eakin alacd ht, sm ‘Answer You cn, with some dtorton ate a theoretical fesoge 1 pall. Buti wou be miacaous Senin ener ale. Where rely maters, where ib Therea Frblem about FlkPayclagy? 5 someting a ste lk hore havea ein gee ue or something ve survive. Fok phys a be Wrong we wou perl ec, such the movement of he cei ee TE he ogi ofthe cary eeu et eh sphere a hen nce to which way your body moves Fa acl or what apps ia huge ak aon Yo a? cad beter be mgt oF we would no ave Sine ser ge becomes 2 specifi matte or cog cence Ths Wore ch these fF are te and wh of (C9 to Segara are warranted For eample FE eng om acum be, bu tates te CS acount of behavior ncndstent with tam Seles and desires do not exis. sna abot everythings wrong with this ca, Bis Ae lt band desires o account for anything vedo Feperence conscious bales and dese: Thi We sit ramp, Ib a hot day an you are diving § set chin ne dre outed of Phen. NO ac Bear ve cant remember when you were his and 5 No eo bad you could scream. Now wheres Yo wan ation of 2 dese? Concous ders are expe ae ere yo more postulated than conscious pals ned isan drs sometimes aust acon, ut Are, chetl connection. Most bell and desires eter Se For name, [believe that the sun i 4 ml iste ary, an | would like tobe aailiona, Which f don ash do hs ble and this dese expan? That Want my as ato te sun wl be sureto gta enone tobe) Spa the nent te somebody givesme aio. ent refs? Ties All the same, postulated or not there sunt Be acon of the entities of Ft the more base ausmoath biology, sot seems that eimiation i the only fernaivea Capler2 Appen anwne [have akwady said what bad argument this is ese LM nin fom apitevel ranch hovses Mos fea om inter ratest football games, do ot Son tooth eduction tothe entities of ome fundamen Sram ny should they? 1 guess [have a “theory” of tT hee at east as uch as havea theory of “ok Sad cocknl pares certnly const of eee ovement but my theory of cocktall parties fe fowhere ear as good a theory as my theory of molecular Bete and href no type edeconof coca pares the Bion of pays, But alte same, cock aris really Grea Tn question ofthe redcty of such emies ilevantto he question of tht ese. Why would anyone ake such an egregious mistake? That isi would anyone suppose thatthe “sneth rection” of Tite and dees to nesrobiloy is even relevant to the (kitence of belis and des? The answer tht they are rain 2 fase analogy withthe history of certain parts of Ghurcland nk tht “ele” ana "desire have he ihe statu inthe theory of folk prycholgy that “phogiston™ fee “alone Hunt” fad in physic‘ the analogy breaks om inal srs of ways: Beli and desires, unlike pRogis fonand lors Ho were ot postulated as prt of some pe Sl hor, they ze actly experienced sur of our mena Me. Thor etene Is no more theoreti than sy the ‘tence of ranch howe, cecal partes,fotbll games, Sstert rates or ales and cai One can alr deste ns commonsense bel bout such things as 4 “theory, but the exten of the phenomena is proto the the” ‘agin, aye thnk abou cules. My theory of coe lis woud ince such things a that ig coca! poten telly to beroter than salons, and my theory of rach fuses wou include the dai tht they tend to spread out ‘ore than most oer types of houses. Such "heois are no doubt hpelestyiadegute, andthe entities do not undergo pou redain to phys, whee I have | much beter thes for desing the same phenomena. Bt what ha al ao ge ee a ee again te ne ena Tae, Yo ee a ree a ee fame i ie eee fiber a arg Sere ete or eee ‘diective demand, marginal propensity to consume—are_ all sie den arn er 9 Sane mer nin ante cote cues ers en on yal Sanne eae Me ae ae se i dP fat cotingtr ne ee se a clon nhshoved am dtl el ee Poitier era Dee ee ea eee ats aa Se eee de, ys tk ee poreGe Chaerr2 Appendin 4. Ingeneral beliefs an be ether rae o alse J Soeetes people get hungry, and when they are frungy they often want teat something 3 Pulse clten unpleasant. For this Teason people ‘entry to avoid them this tard to imagine what kind of empirical evidence could elt these propstions. The feason is that on a natural con ‘raul they se ot empiri hypotheses, or not just empirical PRUE Trey etme HAE connie princes of the iiiquaton postion for empl sore Eu snypete” tat a ochdown in Arercan fot Berane you are ld that sense sty has SEES Tal towns sual court ony S559 lnm yt now tat somebody serouny conned. is Pe ect dation of tcchowen ati counts sx Bika Weems change the dfion but not cover» e etic, Simin tis part of he inion of “elie” that fetes are caida for tho sy. We could not “ie {Sie that tsar ma nee o eng re ose TT you ok thts of anaes tht hate been given oF Zane of Fhe end tober viol fae om ther fet or they ee cosine panes. For example, Chireh- land (B8 ns the prince hat Rarcng contin. sta ton ee” anyone wo bere p and then sieves ¢ {pin iycan 9). Ass canis for a commonsense Eich heel net I were te, then proving eld Gn coins oes et without “onion dracon ete" I ery cosy fret FPF you my consis of uch lise pines "0 Sari 7 cade or consuive principe is Churchlnd's zal ht anyone who fears p wants othe ce hat ‘How woud yo lok for empl evidence tat this fae Its pct ofthe defo of ent” So te deeper mi fee not st supose tht Fis theory but tha al he ropstons othe thy are empl hypetines In ThereaPblem about Fok Poychalogy? 6 Since thee would be © show that they have no ange of hese we tthe pcr application ey apply to anything because there arent any Theat io oe i ee ed Bes “do not exist in the way that you can show that witches: fee tn er oe aes le sennot make the usual appearance reality distinction for con- canna mat ences ore about thisin chapter) Fe heen sown seg omnena ent na pena Pe ‘common sense was wildly wrong about some a of Pn hc oh the retin OS nso cul ot shove rn nd yippee se gem th png a omen el cma owt Sr mem fe dct ee he dat a oiiChapter3 Breaking the Hold: Silicon Brains, Conscious Robots, and Other Minds ‘The view of the world as completly objective fas a very ful kd on, though st inconsistent withthe most Fevious facts of our experiences. As the picture Is false, we ‘ugh fo be able to break the hold. T don't know any simple ‘ay to do tht, One of the many aims of this hook, however to begin the tsk. In this chapter T want to descr some thought experiments that will challenge the accuracy ofthe picture, Initally the aim ofthe thought experiments so chal- FEnge the conception ofthe mental as having some important {nteral connection to behavior. "To begin undermining the foundations ofthis whole way of thinking want to consider some ofthe relationships Between Consciousness, behavior and the bran. Most of the discussion ‘lleoncer conscious mental phenomena; but leaving out the leophy, and Ido not knaw who was the fst ose it tren using it in lectures for years, and assume that ‘who thinks about these topics s bound to have some these ideas occur to him at her eventually. 1. Sion Brains Here is how it goes. Imagine that your deteriorate in such a way that you arece Capers Imagine that the desperate doctors, anxious to alleviate your enlten uy any method to restore Your Vision Ass bat Srey by pruging slicon chips into your vival coer Hmapie at to you amazement and ther, i turs out tat {fen chip restore your vision to ts normal state, Newt Seapine furtber tat your brain. depresingy, continue ts deter and the dacors continue to implant more sien Mfou can see where the thought experiment Is gou Shain he end, we imagine tat your bran is eee Beaten you pba your head youre, Tear the chips rating around inside your skll In such's Siuation there woul be various posites One logical pow Sli, not to be excladed on anya prior grounde none Sure ths: you continue to have ll ofthe sorts of thought ‘perences, memories ot, tht you had previouy the Sequence of your ment fe remains snafacted. In this case ‘wear imagining thatthe slicon chips have the power mot tly to dupliate your nputouiput functions, but alo To Auplcate the mental phenomena, conscious and otherwise, that are normally sponsible for your input-output fonctions hasten toad that dont for a moment think that sucha things even remotely empirically ponsible I thisk tis empar taly absurd to suppor tat we could duplicate the casal ower of neurons ene in slcon. Bul tat san emparal Simon my past. Iis not something that we could establish Fron, Sothe thought experiment remain ald as statement {flogial or concep pss. Bat now le us imagine some variations on the thought periment A second posblity alo not fo be excluded on ‘ny 4 prior grounds this as the slicon is progressively implantes no your vinling bain, you ind that hears of 3p concious experiences sinking ut tat hs shows m0 gs Jus eal behav, "You fin, fo your tol {szement hat you are indedlsing control of your external ‘hv. You find for example, hat when the decor est You vision, you hear them sy, “We se held sed etn ot of you et tel swat you se You want SY us Tea sec anything, Fm going totaly bind” Bat sition Bein, Conscious Robots and ther Minds 67 i rea ace ated bjt in ent of mer Ire cy ae ne aint, "What would ibe lke for me2" and you wil see that Jeefelyconcesvable for You to imagine that your external Honhior remains the same, but that your internal conscious ite ae Oe eee ae Sp Oe peer ee ee con ae Se ee cee tenn ee Ae re ee Sr one ee ee erie Now eoesker a isd version ncn wei at poe tt oe ee (adge in your mental if, but you ae progresively more a Sn re eee en ini, oa gs et En nr ice oa pe ay ao ae ‘Unchanged So in this case, you might hearth doctors 495g,6 chp ‘The sco chips ae able to maintain be ot tio anc eter ital process, but the patient is ebvioualy Fethdood We might os well unplug the system, becuse the ptient has no mental ie at all. Now inthis ese, you would know that they are totally mis faken Thats you Want to shout ou, ‘No, Im sill conscious! I perceive everything going on found me Its st that I cant make any physical move tment Fve become tilly pralyzed. The ott ofthe thee arias onthe thought experiment ‘stone the al rents between Drain proces, teen pres and externally observable behavior Tn he Fiateae weimapned hl thesticon chips had seal powers cpl! othe power ofthe Brn, and thus we agin {i they coud Sth the mental states and the behavior fat Train proces normaly cause. In he normal case, such men {Sst met he estonshp between inp tl and oupatbehavcr Inthe and ase we imagined that he mediating ation stip beween the mind nd the behavior paterns was Broken in ths case the son cps dd not duplicate the causal Powers the Brain to prodice conscious sera state, they fly depicted cerain input-output furcons of the brain Theundryng concious mentale was ot Inthe thd ase, we iin a stuation where the agent ‘ad the same menial if as before, but in this case the men Phenomena had no behavioral expression. Atul Yo age fe these eto een ae agi he since Toul ave been ver easy to iagne person with the ator nerves et in such 3 way tht he orshe es totaly lyn, while conscious and ther mental phenomest Femainedurateted. Smsthing ike thse cases extn cli ‘eal, Patents who sate from the Guilin Bacré sym. roe az compltely parle, ut alo uly conscious Plosophial ignifcance of these tre thought ‘perinenis? It seems to me there isa numberof lessons 0 sion Bris, Conscious Robots and ther Minds 6 eeroed. Te set ior ott oy ey bane Bg 2 ee nee Wa ot er iy oneal ae Coleen Ee i we calen elee oar eral ses part tom thc behavior, nly Se ee ee os alee Se Oe rat enrol FELL" Snag peng the phenomena guar operate res ee eee Sot ht ee ee 1. Bains cause conscious mental phenomena, There Ss some sort of conceptal of Togeal connection fetween, conscious mental phenomena and exeral ehavioe ut what the thought experiments illustrate is that these to anno be held consistent witha third {3 The capacity of the brain to cause consciousness con- Ceptully distinct from 86 capacity 10 cause motor fiuvior A system could have consciousness without Fehavior and behavior without consciousness, ‘But given the truth of 1 and 3, we have to give up 2. So the fist point fo be derived from our thought experiment is what tre ight cal “the principle ofthe independence of conscious Ines abd behavior” In case number two, we imagined the ‘reumstance in which the behavior was unaffected, but the tpental sates disappeared, s0 behavior is nota suficintcon- Aion or mental phenomena, In case number three, we imag” Ind the circumstance in which mental phenomena Were present, but the behavior disappeared, s0 behavior isnot & necessary condition forthe presence ofthe mena either7 Chper3 Nn 2m ah ores Secteres eeaety Sa rc meee a or tacey el too ety ry, a ars ee aces sce tomer wenn re eres te eres Se ac eos Cocos Rabets want oitoduce a scond thought experiment to buttress theconclaons provided by the frst. The aim ofthis one 8 th the fs st we our inion ty to drive a wedge etween mental stats and behavior. Imagine that we ae eign ats fo werk ona production line sagine tat Gur abo are ely too crude nd tend o make 2 mess ofthe hore refined deren of heir task, But imagine that we know rough about the electrochemical features of human com closes to kaow how to produce robots that havea rather Tow level of cnscousnes, and. so we can design and ‘nafacureconscous ros, Imagine further tht these com So obs ar eo ake darn tat oon ‘cious robots could not make, and 30 they doa beter job on the production ne there anything ncheret nthe above? have fo say that according to my “intuitions,” ts pertectiy erent. Ofcourse ts scence tion, ut then, many the ‘Bot important thought experiments in phlosophy ard sc “Tetrion norte ot inagine an further feature of ou com sous robots: Suppose that they aze absolutely miserable I, Emprkism and the “Other Minds Probe Many empirically minded philosophers will be distressed by there wo thought experiments, especially the frst, It wil (Reto them that Lam alleging the existence of empirical facts ‘Show the mental states ofa stem that are not ascertainable iy any empirical means. Their conception of the empiical Poa for ascertaining, the existence of mental fet ress htvy on the presupposition of behavioral evidence. They believe that the only evidence we have fr attsbuting mental testo other systems isthe behavior of those systems in this section | want to continue the discussion ofthe other minds problem that was begun in chapter 1. Part of my an twill beta show that there is nothing, neoherent oF objection {ble in the epistemic implications of the two thought expe tent I just described, but my primary aim wil be tg| | | Oped asc ft epi we er using ta Sia pre and higher snimals have consun tena eu or ores ik ou : Arm emphasing st the boning of he discussion trntichiny af ental phssophy and ofthe pile Separate says ambi nthe ee Ba empeial an amigy bowers on otslopea se Takencpcnc sone. When pope spa of empl ca Sey soetmes ncn a concer facts nthe wor petty fa of maeatsof lacs of tpe.Bt Sits ws people spe of empiric, the meen ist are tale by thid-penen cans tats by empl and “pal methods they mea ace anlmtnds tn are aie fall competent snes ‘Now thissystematic ambiguity in the use ofthe woed “empire Groep somthing ht cers fe that al empae Siac inthe cnloial ee of tng facts nthe we, Steely csc cpa 0 allot! servers ‘We now independently tt thi false Thve ave os ‘pial cts at art eal scl 1 cess “he previonsoions gave vs some tht esperment Aigo show ths bine sty Rac Stata stpgst exact hese oul Gnider te folowing eample! We can with some diesty imagine what wold ike to b's 8 ying Sy ith seme” bene ofcourse, the tmpaton Alnys to maine wit woul ke fru i we mee Apna not scl speaking what t's he for robe Sig Beene ret wh no ee see bs tat ravine by etetng the eath’s magic et Ls spot a the il + cons perience of fang is wings or feting the wind re eee ce of feng of mapneitnsuyng though is boy. Now keto fea surge of magnet” nti cose do Zot hare tea Se hat Soutitwold betty fo dupe he actual neurcbslogia fais tht conscouaneas has In organisms Ie ourselves. Beeston donk ci what at Brolga tas the props for such “artical inl Bene re very rents, Fathennore as suggested eer Bight be pose to prcice consciousness tein some alk Ste dfrent sro chemist fom the one tht our ns Infact se However netting we naw before we ven vega the investigation tht ay yt lef cus cose sm caplet of era Seep dn ihren pt of ray ‘mnt bcs fhe licon chips apa of Aapcting he speci asl power euros a case sone Scousness Is vial logical cnsaquence of he fc tat Bran cate conscious tht any cher system apt of ‘ain coneouses, bt ung comply aie sh ‘sms would have to have atest the eqivlent power of Inns doit. (Compare spines dont fave to have eth 5 10 fy but they do hae fo shave with bids the cual capicty fo overcome the force of gravity nthe cas Sthowphere) Tosummarize:Our word pcre, though extemelycompl- ‘ated inetalprovides arate simple ent of ese Consciousness and Is Place in Nature 93 tence of consciousness. According tothe atomic theory, gate is made up of particles. These particle ae orga the wer aystems. Some o these ystems ae living and these id poste have evolved overlong period of ine Piper ee Cae ee Se ee nena ae nae bloga features of ogni Fe ete ie polion aae eee ey ee Fe Son, hayone vio has Me Fe eee sie ao age Se ee rare a tga ata oi as beeta Be gn ten Coe eo doalam, mest, ealany oa Bee oe rater one eee See omar heey cig ce Reppert Se eceencs alte ee Susie te inthe avn ony eet Speen Fe ir cccusen nes ntl a aed fee hb ete tat comesonss not prt of he ese ane eect ae ae tice ely feng ceca Sino avelbe went tools as preenel amar Tyurencndestanding of once Subjectivity Conscious mental sates and processes have a special feature rot posessed by other natural phenomens, namely, sues tivity. Testis feature of consciousness that makes is tad $0 realstrant to the conventional methods of bielogial and Pythological research, and most puzzling to philosophicalA Cptert nc of herent rand new 0 sya ast» eb =o Decause the truth or falsity is not a simple matter of fact, but ee eee: oer Se eee ey eee. es... - See ea Topical category, not to an epistemic mode. Consiler: Yor Sample, the statement, "Inow have a pain in my lower back” eect ae SS 0 Saabs eae atjecive al aaa seeicaaarons cers me eee rs tae For ito bea pin mt oocyte Consciousness ands ice in Nature 5 ntl to exagerite the atone effect tat EB Ra come to terme wth the subject of ona shal onthe pesos! and payholgial work af Beacon: Tn way that are nokta vis on the aa ch ofthe Bankruptcy of mast work nthe oso sey Mind anda peat deal of the ster of aademic scion over the pst fity yeas, over the whole of my patch time, Bave come ftom persistent aur to ead come to rere with the at Ca he nology ot Teeter an ureducly fistperson ontology. There are eae reasons, many of them embedded In Our uncon Wout Shay hy we nd ticle i nt imposible fo ee the tea thatthe fal work, the word decd By Spyies and chemist and biology, contains an inelininaly Weve cement, How could su thing bet How can we foray gata coherent world picture the wor conais Tie nayrioes conscious entifes? Yet we all knw hat We fre or most of our lives conscious, and Ut ober People ound ws ore conscious. And tins we ae Bhndd By bad Fllsapy or some forms of academe pyehoony, we rely Tent fave any doubts that dogs as, monkey, and seal fhlren are conscious, an thatthe consciousness 38 snbeve aor own So et us to esrb na te more etal he wold ture ht confanssujectviy as a rock tom eee and then to dese some of he ilies we ave in CR,Chapter to ers with this work pictre If ve think ofthe word as SeSimne ot paris, ard thnepertices 3s organized nto Bt Fame of hae syste: biologic stems, and Borers kgial ost a8 conscious ancl conscious Se sSemiaty sabpcive-then what st that we are being Tet ging when we inagine the subject of cor Seine? Ate a al thowe other things we imagined ansin jtens organisms ee—verecomplctcly ete Frcsecegtace they are equlyaccosbe to all competent Shoes, So what are we being ashe to imagine # we ae Seve t how ino he etapa pot some What ineiociy bjt? Thc what were being asked to “Imagine” is imply the seed al wre Know text know, for example: ht tam Tow conscious and tht this conscious tte that {amin han the oatecsy Lave been fring oan know thats very Inne number fot organisms ike myself re srry com Susan have sia sobpctive states. Then why docs ‘Somat am asking ust smagine something tht dificl Grim some way coterie, when all lam doing ie feenting wfc tht ae rig in font four face al aloog? FParttut only prt—of the answer ha odo withthe ft ht fats ively invoked the word “observer” inthe previous Fargrph. When we ae ashe to form a orld ors ora pty we hm acon he mel of ion ted to form an mage of elit a onstingovry sal tie of mater "the parle,” and then we imagine thee ganze it syste, gain with gros visible fests. But when we visual the word with thinner ey, we conte ‘onacounen Indeed tis the ery subjectivity of consciou secrecy ifvety todo A ptarof somone dscns end an he Ather peso perhaps with ballon growing oto his oF het Head Ife ry one ere coins, ee da Jing that ware concise I consciousness the "oeketiom epistemic bass for geting a rely, we cannot {atthe reality of consciousness in that way. (Alternative for We anne get atthe reality of consciousness in the Fe rey aa beeen Seer peice. Rete See nearer emetomrer ne Ca eae oe apes Se a a oe ae Septet amantoentada Firion and the thing observed, between the perception and the pat bs pe acon between he hing sen and he Se en eee Bee iate one! ee Se i ee Speier Bo na ee eee Seer ae —Gpigeppereere ee a ee eee “Gliese at Fat hav ome 0 wa ee “leferenspempeermns ie ee opuy ee OkSs Chpert tecrue our iden ofan objectively observable reality prsup he tn of chervatn thot el ncn Erte and atconne tl be made the bet of breton way tha cbpctely esting objects and states of asin fhe odld can. Thee isin short no way for to pcre su Jetiy as pr of our worldview becuse 0 0 speak, the Bipecay i question ste picturing The solution i note try develops spec mode of plcting. a ind of super ut tt to stop pictaring altogethor at ths oid is achoowicdge the acs. The as ae thst bog Teal pecscs poface Conscious mental phenomena, a {hecare eden suber Phosphes have invened another tapos for describing cern ftres of sujet that seems me een ane Sofas than the commonsense metaphor of inspection, fd that is "priviged access” For the tual metaphor of isrespection we ae tempted to subsite the stud et Bor of prvioged seca a model that suggests that con ious ke a private room into which only we are Bowed enter Only I can go inde the space! my own Geeaconess. But hs metaphor doce work citer because for here tobe someting to which Ihave pviege acc ould ave to be dferent rom the pace in wich Tent But sts the metaphor of introspection broke dawn when the ‘nipthng tobe observed waste observing isl so thet Por ofa private inner space breaks down when we unde: Sand that here anything ike a space into which I an fer, Feause I cannot make the necessary distinctions ‘tren the tre ements of myself. the act ferrin, and thespacein wich Lam suppose enter INE igh sammie the pots by saying that our ‘modern model of realty and ofthe relation Between rely 4d oberaton cannot ccommadate the phenomenon of sub- Insiky. The model sone of eben inthe eps snse) Servers observing an eiectively inthe ontlogial sence) sisting ey Bat here no ay on hat mote bse obvi sell. Fo the ac of caving ste sub Consciousness and PlaceinNotre 99 se ono sense accesso objective wally. Though eee another Person, 1 cannot observe his or et i an eye | cannot observe bee 2 od wore YT cannot ere my own ab siti observation tat | might ef make i al a ob ved The mie eo ati Seon ally beta thee Line opntatons ey. ee pps Srepotenoepy 2 pe 2 mtlogy of subectvity. Observation ts always yt Shvervation te in general conscious it is always aoa tof view; thas a subjective felt Pr oe na Foe eh cl me pa ie ce re pod ed a dy the ee the ban ay the ba ee ee Sat et coe aa pe Seer pe Se rien aay a epee ee oc ee ee eer eS ar nee oa ea Ge veneer we a ka at ou Fe wes ene Seater cea act ewe tata Fe ee ee enka cee Satin he ng get Fae ee re clan depo seein Once you sop ese he Bea aa patsy od fe paam Chapters year it ten becomes impossible to describe conscious, Fe YT eecomes iterally impossible to acknowledge the Bespin af coneiousness Examples ofthis are realy too $uRoos to mention, but I il cite two authors who exphe Riana the problem of consciousness. Armstrong (1980) i ctunnates subjectivity By tenting consciousness simply SPB ai for mating disriminations about one's own Hhcrstes and Changes, the French neurobiolgist, defines sciousness simply asa “global regulatory system dealing Seth mental obec and computations using these objets Woes, pS) Both of these accounts presuppose a thi: ero cncrption of reality a conception of reality tha is Fer menly epitemically objective but ontolgically objective Be vell andsuch a realty has no place for consciousness ecru thas plac for ontological subjectivity 1 Consciousness andthe Mind: Baty Problem aves repent that think the mind-body prob has ater simple ston testa brond cin that he iy clout our having» fl understanding of mind fay pelts re our Pailpical peje sn SupPosing tart mental and te pyle two cin reine and tar ignmanel the wortngs ofthe brn. Ir we had nade {Qn scence of than acount othe tin at al reco exlinaton of coneoures alts forme and Stic and we ovrcie oor concept istakcy m IntSiy proba would rman. However, he posit any sltion to the mindy potiem ban boon very challenged oe th erty the wings of To- IirRugl rte Hemp tw a ree sy concapial sparta even conccve sfaslaton the mind Say problem. This forthe follow ingen Cul apa inte mfr 2 causal neces. We understand fr example bow the Ieaorof HO moles oes waterto Final or, treaue weer at the guciyi a necesaryconsguenc of Consciousness and sae in fore 101 snr beta, The wer sey oa abe ac yl ae aa son at oer hows othe syste a oe tin conor: fat we understand the pry in que: Ho reat ta the mole sui aren AN eS i an nm ins a atime pty cy see cont acre epoca ae Nae se conan No thereof pearonl behavior would expan hy, eel Borage pam. Neem a asa noma clea fe ca ein oe To re co es Ma oo oo tae can avapremceee meget pec aaa nh Fr ne ae ay You ew HE tc cycen orn ja Madea spel Pixglanation implies necessity and necessity pis seni cotta then Oy cnapton eecbty of th Cae np at ed ee Seca teva we nt Rae ah eet an rng cml a we Weald ecpintin, Noses era Scop ppl eet ae ore mind SOy robe ce fs agama we teal mt sere rs ee hve he Kd ee ito ae ntwen moked ovement an a te our mw neat why bas he ie ee ee tart eo aan yb at acon fe att Cee rey Zoning tt we coe a A ee olaals ving ina prea ya BE ata pon antuy rt Mle rare ees Ncloun ec expan ater oe See ons fay nourm Oped tame sage tthe mys fie was bere the deve Sct tego te mya teiroagnes ele Cart Masts euros. soos myn Te ret tw ow the anemone Msp) encoun wk anda eget ow Bowers meld vee mysey.Frhermore Sdtiee cold ary cone he pony ht ane Sonics my at ee sprope cosclnn s ‘Sim sy apd om ur geen of how he Sry s.r ll unersaning he rants te Tyre ul nk tenon ha te bran ina fees St ft be coscous Noee tat me tidy eet rr coil ey of omc a fap melas pormen, For compl sees sear Serre cgi ina punch pres, ten Knot Sanmstteint pins mse nonce Seti mera mma ig shoud en such» station hina idatersle pin Te py cannes te Hore Kt gant Nages point forthe sae of aque [Nothing follows about hw the world works in fat. Thelin ttn Ng pon oot only aon of our powers thconepon Eon suing he ght wha hs armen ‘Sorin tne he eaten a ‘utr phenomena, we can tatavely Petre ‘eso tert bat ni ee finest tren otal and mena pheraens nese ote elation Say pga errr re ato ater the way te we can Pure the clone Nagtv angina shor o cannot ge Retention ely ho at const ot ok ety choe cmcetrmtss 0 ec > neces ry tons mera ss We fom » ptr of Tce etry int we ‘cannot in that way form a caro th neces frelon between suet and phenomena, eine we ate aready inthe subject, and he plctring relation would require that we gost ty ware cons would em oi setouide wae caused by vibratory movements of * n solidity.) Fentselan ote this objection to Nagel i you imagine Cr a ncaa oo eee ito ane arse x Ca ot el poe cee ee ipa ey i tc eieen See ey een ty ome Se ih a anton104 Chapter tus not shown the mind-body problem to be insoluble, even ithncur curenconceptal apparatus and world view “Cam Mating (991 caries Nagel's argument a sep further anh angucs hat tis ipossble in principle that we should ever rae understand the soktion to the mind-body problem, Fis angument goes beyond Nagel's and involves astmptions fut Nagel dows not make, at leat not explicitly Because eGinn' assumptions are widely shared inthe philosophical tradition of dalam, and because inthis book {aman her things—tying to overcome these assumptions, [wll Gate them explctly and ty to show that they are fale McGinn assumes 1. Consciousness isa kindof “tu"* 2 The stuf is Known by "the faculty of introspection” Consciousness the “object” ofthe introspective faculty, Jest asthe physical world isthe object of the percepral faculty (pf and p61) Ik is a consequence of 1 and 2, though I am not sure if ‘Meinn endorses i hat consciousness, a sch, as known by Introspection snot spatial im contrast to the physical wold ‘ica such as known by perception, s spat 3. In onder that we have an understanding of mind oxy relations, we would have to understand "Whe link” between consciousness and the brain (passim) Mecinn dows ot doubt tat heres such 9 “ink” but he Iatlene ha simple in principle for sto understand He spy ung Kant term Wat for the ston i “roumenal” is impossible for v0 nde th nk. a theroreimponbleo understand mind Dy selon Metis greta te inks proved bya hslsen struc fureof eomacosnes tats ince fo ntorpcton These te are Cartesian sumption he Pr “slain Cartesian seston ith the as} Sad Yarsetathchiien rc of cancouses won Broce, At est the pineal gl ws aces) However 5 with the pineal lind the ston sno on Consciousness and ts lace in Nature 105 iyo ee Perce the hidden structure of conscousst ee eee ‘Consciousness isnot a “tu” tis a fire or operty 1 Corpfain inthe sense, for example that Lquiiy is & fiwere ‘The rel 2 Conse oy eben he wor ae oon BF slog evap the pt nthe ex chp and ron dice tin hs oe soe ey The move! o spectng ro a sae ak ome inspection, reqles a disineon Be ee ay aopeting andthe oc ip and er any such tinction for eons nn me nronpeton a good example of Wha Te ose oh the bewchoent of or ineligence By eno lnguaae ek once you gti of he ea that onsooe arate has tej” of tespecion is iy re put because ted nthe brain We soe ae conseous experience of be th pati Wee heaimerslons of eur conscious experienc bat tol we be Tis an extremely icky ReuOpHYS- TesP uct ane ove ae along Wa om ating 1 Pie ae what the los of conscious xpeniense it Nese might oral weknow be dita oe Seryage porto ofthe ran. STTREE E ho “imi terween consciousness andthe ral day more thn here oa ink between he gudy of Walt TEV'HIO leat. conscousness isa Biber etn the bain then there cannot be any gusto of there Bing nk fetween the feature and the system of whihitioa ature |105 Capers Consciousness Seton Advanta pp aprsech oth plop of min, boogie natal, BU Geared wih ihe follwing challnge ey M rtmagne te same ost behavior bing proce’ by SPtmcmatons sme then why did evolution produce cor Shsmnce a ar decd ths i often presente by ay of SRaperng that maybe consceusness doc not even ent T Ech cure, ot pang to atempt to demonstra the Soacreofeonacousnes somebody isnot conscious, thee Perey Tern cenenstne the ccstence of concious am ihe is cansoous iis pretty mich inconceivable hat he {ould seriously doubt at he wan conscious 1 0 ot any there are mo people wh are 20 mule philosophical tht they cy te lub tat they ae conscious, but do find It Rtttalesochstements very cris Inanoweing the question 1 the evolutionary rol of con scansocss IWant ec the implicit asimpton that every Sigh, iri tl man pe ore cry ange to the oranon. This scene to me exert Gude Darwin, snd we now have all sorts of good reasons foratandonng Hi were tie tht every inate precy (om ofen orga were the rn of some sletonal pr fi then I woul have to conde that my dog has been {Sestel forcing emi ble He asa pasion for chasing ferns alle and t's obviously not someting he hs lerned Tut tat isn eon for supposing it st have some bil {a payor, oer home, he psion tat man ings ave for alpine sing I believe fas a Boga basis hat fothe raul of waning or condoning, The spread o sing fasten simply phenomena and the saifices that people ling to make In money, comfort and time fr the sake of few hous on sap int east prety god evidence that they deve safc rr thal ae Inherent to hs Dl logeal nate. "But its simply not the case thal te Were ee tata or ‘our predilection for alpine skiing.” ith thee qualifications we can sil adres the ston “What isthe evluonry advantage to consciousness” And Consciousness and Is Pisce in Nate 17 in wearing, taste, smell, thirst, pains, tickles, itches, and Scand, within tach hee aes tere mola a variety of functions served by the conscious forms of La a lowerel epeating i Cet the eet cape a tat cohcues see Si ct an ov ses aan yee, em nen mg seating 7 Brresrtaions By ay tthe Say aa ae won than ey Fa fan fl of ol et ct fre of ene Se os sey ope, eee oo Thee fos coscu Mat a A pon gig eran a ser a he he wow pode es i the th ee a ry oughly aad we wl cas re een ore reed terms latr—ne can say that Be te gana has epee ae See er the word and inthe of sin yet ff wets aa te WO Bet ecttios epreeinions Fc Pee we can make a neal a re savntnge of conscnamn Canc dos the lector eater powers of dacimiaton ak Bee es chen vould ave Fe ce ues ber hs out Some of Pe tere miter om a fon of pepy How rere tain of these cates the epee eae AT, actly ences yet hee contin eniat what would somal be calle go eee ee ee sone oper105 Chaperé ‘One tent whom Isall all A, was a serious studen of the pano and subject fo automatisms ofthe type ead Jetta, He was apt to make sight interruption i ing, which his mother recognized a5 the beginning Btavabeence” Then he would continue o play fora ting th considerable dexterity. Patient B was subject ty automatism that began with discharge inthe tems oral lobe. Sometimes the attack vwould come on him ine walking home from work He would continue Irak and to thread his way through the busy streets on his tray home, He might realize later that he had had an Uack because there was a Blank in his memory fora part ofthe journey as from Avenue X to Street Y. Tf patient © tvas dvi a car, he would continue to dive, although be Iught discover later that he had driven through ane or smorered igh. (p39) Ina tee carer, we have complex forms of apparently evir witout any conscousnes. Now Why uid all behavior notte ke tha! What does consciousness Sa? Note that in the cases, the pin’ were pertorang Iypes of acon that wee faba, routine, and memories “Thre were presamably welbetablished neural pathway a the mans bran coresponing to his knowledge of the ute ome, and sma the pianist presumably Rad the wedge o ow to pay the paricular piano piece realized fn neral pathways in his brain Complex behavior cin Be Peprogranmed in the srctre ofthe brain at leas 0 a 6 Ie know anything about ow the brain works in such cases ‘Apparently once Sarthe acy can ran course even ih imal ezare. Bat normal, human, consis behavior 8 4 degre of fect and ceatvty that bse fom the Pend cases ofthe unconscious diver an the unconscious St. Consciousness adds powers of discrimination and ity ven omen rine atin parently, just a fact of ilogy that organisms hat fave concustess have in general mach greater poses of Aisrminaon than those tat do not Pant tropism, fot ceample, whi Srminations and much les flexible than, for pam he Oefhat one of the evolutionary advantages con sing then 5 Ur clousness is the much greater flexibility, 1 ee Tacs indeed, they make it imposible evento Sa Fe Or ad se pes that ar ruc for wndertanding consciousness tesa ereativity for exampleChapter 5 Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness Heer fh wos botren ic FT Ee ore © aoa oan eS reduc" Tt oben lel pb geely epic esr gee eee ae er or of nie nce ha er iy dope I wilerpor sonect ea Emergent Properties Suppose we have a system, S, made up of elements 4, ¢. Tarexample, S might be a stone and the cements might be arcs In geal there wll Be eres ofS a ant tr ot necesanly, features ofc... For example, § might treigh ten pounds, but the molecules individually do ot tne en pounds. Let us call such features “sytem features” ‘The shape and the weight of the stone ate system features Some system features can be deduced or figured out or eal. ‘ied tom the features ofa... just fom the way these are composed and arranged (and sometimes from their {othe rest of the environment). Examples of these shape, weight, and velocity. But some other sytem ‘annot be figured out just from the composition of ‘eis and environmental relations; they have to be em2 Chaps | See cs ee er ee mie aS ace eo aa Dremel: tone Senet ei crtene se ertemer gr ceae rstae BS 1 Reaction Madcon of rictonism are extremly confusing aan el ees to hae ben eres poe vt phlisophy of scene, a phlsopy’ so tapes dictate. However, done of taurine {ilsumiv and he basic non ta uric he eg eens ob the iden that certain gs ght shown lobe ohing ucerain other sors cf thine es Hert then leds a pcr form of he och en _ esuctonsm ad the leeds of Consciousness ea ever even within he rothing ut relation; people mean Hwy diferent things by the notion of “reduchon® tata tommy pegin by making, several ditinctions, At the aiigon are, What ls its domain supposed tobe objets, p ee farad boy prosen ems rons Fore re em of acon om Sees Be mstine ou copes cu ou Ps toe te waiee eo een b Soy oan nt ay oe ee ai ers in gene ce be pe cain encloses tig ist DNA moore. nsec Oa a 2.Prperty Ontolegial Recto Thsisa form of ontological reduction, but it concerns proper: fe, For example, heat (of « ga) is nothing but the mean Fate energy of molecule movements, Property reductions far propertis corresponding to theoretical tems, auch a8 “heat Fight" etc, are often a result of theoretical eutons. 2 There Reduction ‘Theoretic reductions are the favorite of theorists inthe itera- fue but they seem to me rather rae in the actual practice of cence and i is perhaps not surprising that the same half owen examples are given over and over inthe standard text> twos From the point of view of scientific explanation,Te Chapters tea ni mnt hy a less rineray wren between eons, eal eet cry cn mee cote Se ee SR soceg tee. Ts moore erate ect Senay gore ees teodynamic. 4 Loa or Defition! Retcton Ts frm fection ued fo bea grea favorite song pi Inspr but in recent decades it as alien oat of ate Salton betwen words ad senfeccs whee rn Beene larg to ore pe of rtty on oe Wrifout any rake into how eerng to anther tat. For comple sentences about tn average nee Tasik are etcie fo sentences abost pect at lamba in Berkley cotene bout tunes, soe tue ary can be sited into and hence we sae Srnec bout ts. Since the words and sntenee se {aly oF rinly reduce. the coreapondig aks ‘fered toby the words and sentences ae orfloiay roles De Forexampe numbersare nothing bute sae 5G Rotation Tis i maton between any two types of things that can Nove cual Povey whe the execs and 2 fron he {tial power of the edued entity ae shown to Be cts plicable in tes ofthe causal powers ofthe mane, Plenomens Thus for sample ome cect ae sold smd oe as causal consequences: Sod ebjects are imponctatle tthe object they ae reas topes Bat thee atuctolam ad the led of Consdoreness 448 avous seras do te accusers hve a mind Td maa! reduction ard logical ted ate neh Bate apparently the question is whether the causal sore: | had view of mind brintltiong that eh redcion, a | have defited te nelne Beal Se nee for lopeal rection? sea nh yf re cll ae Feed to ontological redutons, Because whan fo accel coal eduction. we simply nedeine ie ietatdeote the reiuced phenomena gfe ibe phenomena in question can now Be sented wi Be rinse ocnpke coor coe a a Gobet interme of the subjective experience of ealor per see example “red” was defined cxenivel by pa fie amples, and then real red was defined as whtever Etcd redo “normal” observers undet “norma” conden Fecal re havea casa rection of cae aaa Igireance, the, according to many thinker it becomes Pasbie fo retin color exprestong In tema. of ght Tener, We ths cave off and eliminate the sabjcive (pete of coor rom the “rea color, Real elt has oe fre. propery ontological reduction to light retaneen Etta remaris could be made about the rection af eat fic moton, the rection of city to molecular move. densi tice structures, and the redton of sound toa tat Ineach case the causal reduction lads naturally © af Canby reduction by way of a reefinton ofthe expres Sn tat umes the reduced phenomenon, Tau f connae ahtheeample of rec” once we know tha the oor exper Exar caused by a certain sort of photon emasio, we fe tee te word in ems ofthe specifi fares ofthe pho Semin. “Red,” aconding to some theorist now refs Spleton emissions of 500 nanometers It thus follows ie Aly the color red is nothing but photon emsons of 00 smn6 Chapters ‘The general pincipl in such cases appears tobe this: Oncea propery een tbe ener! we automaticaly get a ou Perera, and that leads to an ontological refucton: by Feicinon if necesary. The general wend in onologial Fetucons that have a sclentific tals Is toward greater sey Grip objeiiy and redefinition in terms of underlyingean soon Soars good. But now we come to an apparently shocking ‘When we come to consciousness, we cant pet fom the tnologcal reduction. Consciousness is 4 causal Cencigent property of the behavior of neurons, and so con Sones causally reduable to the brain processes But Sd this ts what seems 30 shocking™a perfect scence ofthe ‘pain would sil ot lad to an ontological reduction of cone sciousnss inthe way that our present scence can reduce hat, Satity, color or sound, Itseems to many people whos opin fons respec tht the irecucblity of consciousness is pe ‘mary razon why the mind-body problem continues #9 sem ‘Sinteacable. Dualit teat the ereducblity of consciousness ‘3 incontzovertible proof ofthe truth of dualism. Materials inset that conscious must be reuible to ratera ely td hat the price of denying the reducblty of consciousness would be the abandonment of our overall scent word T ll bre discuss two questions: Fist, 1 want to show iy conscousnes i reducible, and second I want to show Wwhy i doesnot make any difference at all to our sletiie ‘word view that should be edible. It does not force sto [ropety dualism or anything ofthe sot. It sativa conse: ‘quence of certain more ener] phenomena, 1 Wy Consciousness reuse Festureof Psi Realy ‘Thereisastandard argument to show that consciousnessis nat soci the way that eat ec are, In diferent ways the ‘argument occurs in the work of Thomas Nagel (1979, Soul isd NONE temic and not ontological. tis sometimes eas mer ic argument tothe effect that, for exam tre a5 an SPAT person, objective knowledge we might eso or crpogy mel tl a Fat re chem sje experince wa fs Fa ee rfc parpons he pel he tae rment is ontological and no! ee Itisa pole ead = Act in the world and not, except derivar eae Serer fin st mele ei it goes: Consider what facts in the world make it a coaponde® youre ae fa, Wt ka tee eo en ean end oe porate pe fam and you are experiencing thee sensations fom your et ices apc eer your peset pun. Dut the paints a0 ane Seing neophysagell poco et fae of pre of neg Your Be evo tin, Now pea es concn, Speen enon ee rd pron ptr teron gs Fe re ay te pan aly “tang te Br aa) cn we til chm eg Fle of te pa a a hacer cf ce tatpenon oer, pe Meee rcp tac fecpeon cancer te Ee laeey coon ie npr we Ten eliltpron ues: Roget eats pt com ‘Blog ny of he tpn etre th he Mtaitke fates of he supave stro conscou te Joon sts he same yt hy ang tenon the uiomane wie hats ompise knowkdgeat he hear ‘pgs meri phsemenon sch pn woo18 apes ot know what a pain was if he o she didnot know what it Patron Sipke makes the same point when he sys that paling Fane got be identical with neurophysiological states such a Scull ngs im the thalamus and elsewhere, Decne any Pest pentiy woukd have to be necessary, because both sides Si he Many statement are Tigh designators, and yet we how thatthe identity could not be necessary.) Tis fact has Baio epistemic consequences my knowledge that Lam in Bina cferent sre of bois than my knowledge hat you eis pam. But the antiredctonist point of the arguments and not spstemic TSomuch forthe anieductonist argument, Its ludierosly sample and quite decsive, An enormous amount of ink has ‘pen shed trying to answer it but the answers reall so mich trased isk But fo many people i seems that such 2 argu: pent pains us info a corner To them it seems that i we Srcpl bat argument we ave abandoned our scientific wot ‘ew and adopted property dualism. Indeed, they would ask, whats property dualism but the view that there ae reduc le mental propertica? In fact, doesn Nagel acept property Galism and Jackaon reject physicalism precisely because of this argument? And what isthe point of scientific reduchon- fam ft stops atthe very door ofthe mind? So now turn to themain pant ofthis discussion 1V, Wy thereof Consciousness Has No Deep Coneuenes “Tounderstand uly why consciousness isireducible, we have to consider i a ile mare detail the pattern of relucton that ‘we found for percevabe properties such as heat, sound color, Salty, Luly ete, and we have to show how the attempt to reduce consciousness diflers from the other cases. In every ‘ase the ontological rection was based on 2 prior causal eduction. We discovered that a surface ‘eature of & ‘Phenomenon was caused by the behavior of the elements ofan ‘underlying micstracture. This is true both in the cass in ction andthe reduc of Concouent 19 ain the cases th an element of subjective appearance sare apentate ther sd pc), Butincach Ee ea ec en fn featere the surface feature is 2 subjective apperane Gale Se ann per oo se ee ee eer a ead irre enn ee Ss eae papper tie el a ee a ee De ee er “Coetrepeetgereren Sars oe So aaa CU Rtapeeammeeseyam Chapters ty by oer obj, a 0W Sen a8 sce impenerY Saering aly. Sich retetons ae fs of arvana ofthe surface etre the ser jeier mp oop, and eg Biter berating mt Tp cual pte ofthe facts nthe word tara TMatenets sow! parc fome of fet Bar npr ae gate sila to the Paterno mena ee dar coreend wo statemens about pra Sess nha pa Il now my, shot ee eae the fac? Wel fst ther stot Bs wring the movement of lec, an Rate ror nace voting ny bce Send aces cused by the impacto he moving ere scout But sly th pn ma ram in pains what artefacts? Well fit thee DEY cpap taco invaving my thalams and her teria and eco thre ot of "mentale Seer my abv experience of pun. So why do we Tari raectic ard puinasiredocble? The asher Titiwintinerets us aboxt heats othe suketveappear seed undetyingphyocalcausen Once we gta causal incon wesmply rede he oon 0 enables tan Tittopalncuchon One you know ll the acs about Seni shout mine movements impact om ssn Nee nings nice fekngs ce —the reduction of fat {Senleale movenens involves 0 new ft whoever Is opine teal coweyens fhe edetiton. We dow fest Gfsveral hace nd then covers nev fact the at at fearful thr we simpy eine heat tht he eduction fll fon the efit. But ths refniion Ses ote and was not intended to iminate the ub- iene expres het or clr, et) rom the word. They etter: We might not have made the eefiiton. Bishop Berkey, Sereampe aed os sh efniios. Bat se) tooee hy tiratoal oat ach redefinition and cet tucson andthe truly of Conousnes 12 nunc T ts rer ndentanigandot terse eo kn how we aly ade mage ete" nine ne cn a ie mee of ca moe eat enc ape! eh Be st Sevan ec a ta dee: Sah de a re iy eo neal x ne St ge towed a ema i Somes nc oe thing bot conaoses ihe owe ne he dae een he of cna igesbgene mena erin “Pe pec ess tie ner a ee yi ay tat we redeted at Paso Fang pivsical process? Well of coune we Feo eon we co. Weel ae ep paterson oy Byatre e cane econ of pam, Aad ch Bat a a ul have achieved these st scion ta ear ea Bt cue Seca ey al ees lee dint Pl ce, atthe recon Se ceo hat urea, Par of te em to ae of he ne PS otf he or tom the defon of the el ew dined in rma fos eae re onere the phenomena that Se te cxpenens tenets ere Sn ee sa tne poof be reauon ih eee tgs beeen the ce te ce ot et fa and the undying phys See an cll itis a gene fue of uh a eon dined nemo thea eee yh “appearance” Bul we ant make atrm Chapters Be eiipeceralty aircon for conscounes Bettina nis tte opposes cnc Veep comcnet we cnt male te appar ay alc cu pec ea iar can nai Ws pot Haters tot retucie nth vay ansg fee rte ot bcroe the patie of ace Bea wat aves snytng spcal but Beaune eaten picnics deported input om nan Fishngberveen “pce yi ely ofthe neh Bees spctrenpyretne” onthe San cae es es te Poerrens er nee to Peet arnt cae of concurs, tn rany we Be ey ete retin would belong Peecd cans fl the appearance and Snpy detest Petar oc votrying pata ay Date cursetaciow Sar on ropang ts Spates for prec a propery apt ithe contort of hat proper) Ne Sd ot at Tester by lelng and sec but we then dene he ee et nestor one epunenclry. tsa sam cpt fo is pater for til fe hers tegen ta the toe tat eae ot the epee hse the appearance, can work for he Gemma Toc ase he pane et hs shows hat he rd of conscouses tal onsuenc of the Pragati of eur Jina pac: Se Ao ny cen 0 dep metphial consequencts or he nyo ot elle wold iw. ot sho at conciou sist pare he ltt ite of ety o canoe be 2 sje of scene nvetiatin or cannot be ough 0 Sx Oval pal compton of te uve, ely Sows hatte way that hve dace to cary out eo or concn, by defini exiated ro» cotan ate of rducion. Consus as toe reduce, nt pads andthe Ineo Conaousss 12 a uid the patter of reduction that we have hse 1 sold, oa surface feature of certain physical Sr Ae lke soli, conscoumess cannot be steea in terms of an underlying microstructure, and the peas in the first place. sol, th ae ie of he mae. We an to meee Be ere dosnt cate cc cppheromena cat Be cretccpercics oy pen tock puns Serpe sms ain Gea epptinca = eS Betacam teary fore of cannon evan ey ve perry Pelietmne of tion ae sca presenti ncaa Sa eres Seer cstron, Te rt Beeston bss ts nice nea aay ea ec scaton ot gootnes wo grt _ bei eer Hapnaysmmeiey yy doin iateceag sr som a chapter 6 se structure of Consciousness: an introduction Zwaan ping various dims boa eat of ade in Ps te to alent a mote Eee sn can scent mpl i ad pat, Suh nu enue feral ot ey of Showa Pie sor of cur whole et And sy osc ello fo conscious ha Ie fe rg he Ces io, wee sh stn of ur own cons ta ai easy, in tot For example a sh ne a eon the ale ont of eB a Se oe oaditon, woud I dace my on da sere ol thane bt SE | to consciousness, at wll have Tro PESS cy tecanse dono yet understand the seo ay stout eS temporty. nce Kant we ve sehen Th roel te way tht concousess Bem man of wd oume, Although we experience Mate a aptaly evened and of temporal ds a re ees eels ot experiences al rete av temporal extended, Inde, he th Ee ordering ne sec ast neil Feet fell es hen we speak or eample oe sie oumness” Netorouly,phenomenolgl Rossi mach re tine ba do not kw RO tessa ot he syematc racer ofthe dispar! ee reac topic soc. 1am canine Hat hater of ther people” plays a sped rein he ae eater tenacious cxperence ae unk that of ts ‘mise tains an beleve hat hs apa oaras Capers nga spin stats 1 ther Jc of consciousness both Pe scd and ls Background presupposition for al Hoey callecive intentionality (Searle 19%) But donot yet form et demontrate hese claims, nor how to analyze ie oom ofthe socal element in individual consciousnes 1LADese Srl Features In what follows, I will atempt to describe gross structs Tae ft momma, everyday consciousness. Often the argu Be al ue for ideniiying feature isthe absence ofthe feature inpobological forms. 1. Fine Mites fiuman consciousness i manifested in_a strictly United Pur of madalines. In addition tothe five senses of sigh fovch smell fat, and hearing, and the sixth, the “sense of falssoa” there are also bodily sensations ("proprioception") Mai the steam of thought. By boy sensations, I mean not tly obvious physical senctions, such as pans, but also my Satoryanrarenes for example, of the poston of my arms ou lags the fesing in my right nce. The stream of thought (Genta not only words and images, both visual and other vise but other elements as well, which are neither verbal nor Tmagitic For example, a thought sometimes occurs to one Suddenly, “in a Gas,” ina form that is nether in words nor images Furthermore the team of thought, as [am using this includes fclngs, such as those generally called Semetions” For example inthe stream of thought might fet ‘seddensnge of anger ora desire to it someone or 2 tong ‘ist for a las of water. “There n0 prior reason why consciousness should bel ‘ted oes forme, It just cems to be a fact about human evo Ieee aye me a rc = that certain other species Hae ther scr modes. Vision especial imprint Tnuman beings, and acording to some neurophysioloial rresrucre of Conasousness: Antneducon 129 wt" Empl lt oe rt peat 2 fy geal tie nestalty eal oe Ce a ee caw armel Oe Cone that are the source of the pleasant or a et ae ee ee, Oe Sere an te en eee ree eT al cae ee ‘uy IMs haracterstic of nonpathological conscious states that they tame tous as part ofa urified sequence. 1 do not just have a (periece ofa toothache and also a visual experience of thero Capers cm ar state fe ft om nan oat ag Btn rec ca ny veh. inte vey ati ais Besse tie ces idee: bus Thorn Seeley and tie tootacte try MU eterhtctecs cod ncceme coesioe es RE gree cinco vic, conse edieerien Uc -hvsonta adverts Bo Ee paeernrentd este con ny swcrcn clog Rete nphtcmtmisers vicar ie Stearetaiieaierties By cecriocnes, od pene oe Beer intescal Vocotcy Came RE eetercstal reves concert Bee et yy comic ofc coat eee ectncne Wie loec lac western ator ee Rot in cirptysnegy Niocad Beret Kan crc! neva hececona ie eet ofp” ees ate heron ony of te eet erence ty of tne ingot eck tees re coat rt mate oe eerie: Tse ilecrnied ry tre ves Heese ota paneer migrant eraovosyndtore Gest 59) 4 ‘Most, but not all, consciousness is intentional. I-may, for ‘example simply bein mood of depression or elation without being depressed or elated about anything in particular In these cases, my mood, as such, snot intentional. But in ger- ‘zal in any concious sate, the sat is directed t something ot ‘ther, even if the thing its directed at does not exit and in that sense it has intentionality. For 2 very large number of consciousness 1s indeed consciousness of something, cass, conacionsr ciousness of” is the “of” of intentionality any experiencs Of Conltions of satisfaction of my conscous are Prvpces of them. So the vocabulary I use to describe the rea amp onthe right anda vase on the leftanda te There the midde”—is precisely tat which Lwse © Sean my conscious visual experiences of the table. To tee he aa Fe carreras aaa Ati touch the table, I experience it only under certain eran rot ee oo ae a nyt rnd uses that all toy pe ee te See eran aspects and ot oter. i Hs Sense, all See fe aly cone ee ee faa apt shape sation Feng The dscussion of intentionality naturally leads into the subj the fel of our conscious states. 1 had oceason, in ealer hapten to discuss subjectivity at some length, $0 1 wil notre Capers Be eatery ter ta a Se yt the waite oper ete i eretaineniiy Oe gree een soy cae ete onto et sectiiacisees vende: whet eta rere entero ee es eertelag ta penis ce ra tr recrnecttes sang tees ngs incon rae rsp poston coma feocoone 5. The Comneton betes Consciousness and Intentionally Thope most of what Ihave sid 50 far seems obvious. I now fvaak tomake avery strong claim, one that wll not fly se ‘Zenit nfl the next chapter. The claim is this: Only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have ier: thnal ats tal, and every unconecious intentional sat sat Jest potenally conscious, This thesis has enormous conse (quences forthe sty of the mind. It implies, or xample, hat Shy discasion of intentionality that leaves out the question of Cancciousess willbe incomplete, Its possible to deserbe the Jogi structure of intentional phenomena without discussing fomsciousnessindeed, forthe most part, I did so in It tinal (Serle 1963), but there 1s 2: conceptual connection ‘betwen conciousness and intentionality hat has the conse- epee ht ecampl thory of netnaly requis 09 {6 The Figure Ground, Gestalt Structure of Conscious Experience Itisa familiar pont rom Gestalt paychology that our percep tual come Yous as a figure against a background For example if Lse the sweater on the able in font of me, se the sweater againe the background ofthe tale. IFT see the aoe he choad f the whole rom un fay) B28 fy va a a hme oy a watever {fons my atenion om Se het cg ec at as ae an Se eg eco ene a talpwcpum area Se ee hl ona a Ie oe epg ad ea A rcoconenes of samen as such ich a Bet ee ee a i cao oe epee Se on on Tonka germ TT Ce ee eee Te eee 1.0 Aspe of Faaiaity Gen the temporality, socalty, unity, intentionality, subjes thay and structurednes of consciousness, it seems to me the bn pervasive feature of ordinary, nonpathological tates of feraclous awareness what Iwill al the aspect of familiar ti" Ava conscious intentionality is aspectual (feature), and. trense nonputholgical forms of consciousness are strtured ‘rorpanized feature 6), the prior possession ofan apparats faficen to generate aspectual and organized consciousness Automatically guarantes that the aspectual features of cm134 Capers eee. ee = ee aetna Sete, Inpoed or if somebody had put in completely diferent furs ee ee aS ee ete ns esr st re es ET enter as ieraielpes eerie eee eee casas’ eS ee too in : eens te eee geen ee Tee aetea reese ron! eles ‘drooping watch is still a watch, the three-headed spesiratureof Consciousness: An niaduction 138 ‘woman. It is this aspect of familiarity more rnJuctive predicablity—that prevent con- ing the “blooming, buzzing confusion ss Se eampl ae om am me. fe by Wa ty wing the expres “aspect of ye een than the more colloquial “eeling of familiar aii ro ermpasize that the phenomenon fam beans a eparate feeling. When I see my shoes, or oa he tho wal experi of the show eer go amity, tater the shoes at once ee ne The spect of filianty 6 nota separate He Tigh Witgentein Is ght in ang pac an et ognton when seem room. Nonethe- theres 0 24 tp me lke my room, and 1 do perceive it th ee een rt nee Nore ee ee ee ears eS se a or ee eae ase ee ee ee SE Geer ee ore eeshape tea Or oan ee Seite te tame! Bete ee ee acne eee Saat | Seagal srs cco oe Sea ee es ee as ee oe ee ee oe ner er ren ne Sees eee eo ae eats ee ee ns ne een eae eae ee mee ot here making the fallacies argument that case Tunder familar aspects, we therefore experense nity. That snot the point at al. The poi ological forms of consciousness do infact smsraure of Cocos: An traduction 197 sh lomianiy ad this aco oy the to a gpl, aoe euro ie rena ch satel a ns re pei scr and apes ae a of sa re union a nt pt of eo ea ota meat the Background (more about the Sipgound in caper 8). soxfie Bet gin ener bjond hit ca Gag nove” Conran ene sa custom ae sun hana gti eh tte te though ake BM eg feat aed tt or the ast ihe on Rae yen reo wih mene a opin fo me, hat haere i er so ay PE ham ws founded om a fhe my tn dey ace tome tat cold ei Fig vntnap wh the end of a 00 raf, anges bran” Anson apes hs reds contet tends to spl oe, © a ought ha in seen were pat he xe i sc waren, Thoogh its best stated suet i ihn the phenomenon gee sane ok cut the window now athe ee aN oto decive what | ste answer Would a nentendoy, {dot ost sve hee a es, aaa the peso California btn some Wye Tee a nthe erp but liken thor frre 4TieCeter ond the Periphery Wikn the fld of consciousness, we need to distinguish Fetveen those things that are atthe center of our atenton and tho tat are at the periphery. We are conscious of Very Tage numberof things that we are not attending to or focusing tar atiertion upon. For example, up to this moment I have teen frisng my attention on the Philosophical problem of .18 apr consciousness, and I have net been paying Reston te feng ofthe chat aginst my back, height $eerePiny shoes or the sight headache Ihave fom ding rer teenies alert net Sefer ot my conscious awareness. In colloquial peer ot lees eens cmeclos Ln erbeg SGou bur tis mistake to sy tha, for example, Tamm uncon Sialic ekg of my shire against my skin nthe sere Shen ram unconsou ofthe proveth of my toenails inshors Tperned to cntguish the conecous/ unconscious disacioy Teun te centr of attention/ periphery distinction ‘Consider anther example. When {rove to my office today, ‘mont of my attention son plosophicl thoughts. ow tre emt true to say that T drove unconsciously Uncon Sous dating would have led to automotive disse. Twas ‘ecious throughout the Journey, But the center of ty con frm was rot with the trafic and the route rather i was wth thoughts of plesphial problems. This example lutte that tf exental fo distinguish between diferent levds of attention within conscious sates When I drove to the ofr thismoming my highest level of attention was on phlosoph Cal problems that are bothering me. Ats lower level of ate ‘Son but sila level that antral be described as attention ‘was paying attention tothe driving. And inded. on ocason thinga would happen hat woul equine my fl ateton sich thst woud top thrking abost piesophy and focus all ot ay senn eee nao thet enh ‘tention there were sso many things tat vs pepe tovare ot that were nowhere neste enero ate fon. These would cade such things athe ree and houses nthe side ofthe ronda | passed, te fling ofthe setback ‘the car against my back andthe steering hel n my hands ‘sd the msi pying from theca radio. itis imporant try to get there distinctions righ bose thetemplaton steno say that many things thet ae 0 he riper of ou concosness are really unconscious. And 5 wrong. Dreyfus (991) frequently quotes Heideges ‘amplcf the skilled carpenter hammering, The carpet, 36 restructure of Consciousnens An tnvaducon 139 Din oy toting nl boat hu or ssi totally wrong to suggest that he is om ‘of hammering, Unless he isa total zombie or an snd curse Tot needs” I think itis beter expressed a Aa an ny show, the presureand the feof sagt ron conus when at est th fing he chat at the ceo my me atthe fcusings realy ae nl necessary 1 cmcnenes Cope with the word, and after wile the ce Secs hae reteat othe periphery of my cone zt en iongerat the center. geta malin my Soe a he cat the such experiences move the eee HT consciosnes 1 bebeve that James Pint a cand periphery of consciousness ater than otconeoueness 28 ch sn.Basry Cndions easy rece abot the presen, T have atm point incur concering where am cated, what dy of ar hat time of yea i how Tong ts ice fee dat hat myname and pst history ar, which a, Sizer of and coon. Yet sem to mello Serle fe tstetnes prt fhe apattempa Soin tcaon of my present conscious sates ANY Sree sina nay carter Tote Bebloraton muy isl ot beat ll the objet of ons ts notcvenst the periphery ncn to notice te pervasiveness of he boundary oon scusn pin ass of breakdown. There for ample Ten of dsorentaton tht comes over one when onesie tye unable to eal what mont or where oe oF ine fayna chupers RN se te mt Ltr al though they ae cress Ton eety mood ota depressed mood: a cheerful aaa an ited wo hee need ot De consciously dt Sets cso scion “A ee ya, any ane whol coer of 2 conscO sa a ttn or clr ta charterer ae rss sn ore of conscious bie psme nor ther? The anower depends ee en To contre the nono toed, Me Seep winecd tat hes «nora Se Reg At pret, am nether pecly asin Me ly depstd am nether estate ror gut extant amply Sah. Yt seen tome te Sere calla “tenet My Preset expen, oe mete pope amiable to the gee AOE The ac hat my present experiences haves reel toe des not mean they have m0 tore 0 FESTA Wineurcertic of eds that hey pede tient tmcios xperences, For he man who cated Sete tre ansepe and the sky ra uc ok Ben ler hema in despite very sae sgh prods See lion, Ise te character soy nanan focus ie tht we re aay in some nod Wher and that ts ood pervades all f our concoas Hosea nay even though no scl or ed rot ‘be tention Noting mules one sore aware of the pervasiveness of mol thn a ies shit: When one's normal mond a Ty shed citer up or down eer noon unexpected Se fewer depo, ove suddeny becomes arate ot he st Se Pays bane mod and at oes non pe Fs cnscous ster For many People depression, eee Tent us that we wl get» good neurobiologal cet ote esr ssn tees No Ste pena they ar rather simple opi bcs hey rmsrucure of Concounest.Antnieducton 16 sam ort ome mele Neely Seis nt levine pean sn Pasar ondering the whole of conscious pete ea enn fl sch pre Ore ca ays ak at es se gs eclarpien,ote“vasstmer Seite mr opens aoa a a ey ano Rate vi ee, ph seme ay nite enn deg py pa Sing mune oping Arh ec nls posto ee an Tee Tratitional Mistakes Tow turn to thvee theses about conscious states, which, tough they are quite widely accepted, seem t0 me, on 8 far interpretation, false. They are: 1. Allconscious states are self-conscious JZ Consciousness is knoven by a special faculty of into- ‘pectin, FP Kaowlege of our oven conscious states incoriible Wecannot be mistaken about such matters Ietus consider each in turn. 1. Si Contiousness [Ris sometimes argued that every sate of consciousness is tho a state of seltconsciousness; that itis characteristic of ‘emis mental states that they are, soto speak, consciows ofeens nen Ie enced to dstingush he ordinary unproblematic mre EPrconsciousess fom the techrical philosopher aprinary sense, there clearly are Sater of em Tm which 1 am conscious of my own paren, See erat neces conscious of my oe cons Pern can lista these points with examples, at ne Tam siting in ¢ restaurant eating tak In eer ense, | would characerstialy not be toe ous a all. I might be conscious that the steak tates es dhe wine [em washing it JOWn with i t00 young Hee pots are overcooked, etc. But there is no a consciousness. Serer mappose that I suddenly notice that everyone in the retiunnt faring at me. Light wonder why they ae all Sn that way until discover that in fit ofabsentinde. Sep Thave forgoten to wear my trousers. Lam siting therein Mundermenr Such a cicumsiance might produce fcngs Bae we would normally describe as “acute selfconsioay ios. Tam aware of my own person and the effect lam having Ghothem: But even here my self-consciousness i not diectel sty own conscious sats. “Tied imagine tat 1am now inthe restaurant fll clothed sand Fsuddenly focus all my attention on the conscious expe: pcestam having inthe restaurant eating the meal and dike The wine. Suddenly, for example, it seems to me that | Fike been inexcusably wallowing in 9 kind of hyperstetic tlindlgence to have put 20 mach time, efor, and money Into securing thse gastronomic experiences. Suddenly tall seems eto “Tis case alo seems one of sel-consciousness in the ork ‘nary sense, but it differs from the second in that the sel “conscious edict at the states of consciousness ofthe “agent himself and not at his public persona. im the ordinary sense of self-consciousnes, a by cases to and three it just seems false that spesiruure of Consciousness Anintadton 18 areal consiouses san extremely sph Sie poate peace cated fom ema a few othe species orkut he ON teed in technical sense, What i sient re itt cua Sectors sn nee eines le co tly Sa orden ea peuen F nel a Bene tse a afeetees pinata tee Me psn oat ee ec re Sota Se nS ee Be car tone tee eager lca ont pea ras been ae eae Bre oe eel eo a 2 iosection dre conbeious mental states known by a special capacity the Capac for intospecting? In easlier chapters [ have tried to ‘astubt on this view, which s prevalent both in philosophy nd in common sense. As in the case of selconsciousnes, theres both a technical and a commonsense notion of into= spation, Inthe ordinary sense, we often introspect our own.1 chapers encious states. Suppose, for cample, tht Slly wank Cre fether er not she should mary Jimmy, who has at Well one of her procedures might reasonably bet Bees per feaings very closely. And this, In ondary he would call’ # form of introspection She aay Feet such questions a5, "Do I really love hi, and if peri ma” *What are my deepest eclings about him?” Sete pmablem, I believe, is not with the ordinary we of ‘Ge nsten of intospection but with our urge as philosophers pete the metaphor Itealy. "The metaphor sugges, hat ine have a capacity t0 amine our own concious Ses capecty meet om ison Bt hat ede Shslogy surely wrong. In the case of vision, we have a Siar Bsintion between the objet seen and the visual exper ace at he as when he perceives the objec Bt ‘Meant make that distinction forthe act of introspection of Goes own conscious mental state. When Sally tums her ‘Menton iaward to introspect her deepest feelings about Timmy she cant step back to get a ocd View and diet ber foes te indepecenty exiting object of her feelings for Fim. In sort if by “introspection” we mean simply think {ag abot our own mental tates, then there is no obftion to Imtrospecton. It happens all the me, and is crucial for any form of sel-knowledge. But if by “introspection” we mean 3 special capacity, ust ike vision only less colorful that we have {0 yet nr, then seems to me there i no Such capacity ‘Tere could not be, Because the model of specting into ‘teguires a distincon between the object spected and the spect fg of and we cannot make tis distinction for conscious Sates, Wecan direct one mental state at another; we can think Aout our thoughts and feclings; and we can have feckys shout our thoughts and felings: but none of these involves 3 special ficult ofinrospecton. a ‘is fen said that we can’t be mistaken about the contents of ‘our own minds, On the traditional Cartesian conception of the resratureof Consciousness: AnInrtion M8 eon reports of mental slates ate somehow ina as 0 Pn hee have a cetain Kind of int Aer eps of ur ental ates. has even jee stn hat ths incor a sure sign that emia sey 970). But if you think about it for acing igi snes oles ia mt amy. Sally might later come fo realize ray lke when she thought she was in sr AF the elng wos incorrectly ascribed va i orm of infotation. And someone who know frm the begining that she was Tooter well mi ee ore ete alee See cen > ere ee cea || enters eterr es eee ee ees ae erent pees fees ro Seo eae146 Quays See et Tan envoy cei piel ato tr! ror ee pent eno Bene ees ee een eee = a See Se a ee Someta mene a eee ie eS a ee ered = se eee a eae aiid snesiucre of Consounness:Antntoducion 147 so utes on mental ate? Wha, 1 speaks the ising ate it a jomaf the yy mistakes we make about the world at peas ea gu appearances are themselves part of reale eet en rnc’ Wecan bento aoe thei emt ne ane see i oe As emle en Lg et Se ae oe tpl cn eo et ote id nner Ta oe setlist Oy go “prove” the impo of sl sy ilps sons pee er erie her mas es yenlonal Py the prot The prot goes as follows In He yn ih ee uve ele tt panda ia at er tiny etal np, Da a a ip soled tee a pan Bi Ae ten pombe, Nee at Se ron in ie eg Be a Cored ce rar ee Fe es oe cain onal autem set ct har hesangy oti hae cain Sarees Sane oe ude dou con ct he ppc Fe er gh of es te oe eatin ne convene sue at he wis he Silt Zoro athe hte te member fs inst Pearbats ined he rhe nd come wiet rie scr have tus fated When conned wth the ites ar pou, he simply ose fo am 8 ad148 Ouyers inden vehemently and sincerely denies it. The agent has fesst gee witha desire otto have that hated that Perot shame aout that hatred. To recone thes wo, the {Rare avoisconciouly hnkng about his hatred and sy FB eitery wo refuse to adit the existence of this hatred ce confronted with evidence TM surely one common [bemofseltdeeption *Reecnd form of “stake” that one can make about one's cm'menal remenss misinterpretaton. For expe in hebest ofa psson a man may think he iin love, inde, ute sincerely thine isin ove, But ater come o reais hat ike tne he simply misinterpreted his felings. Cru to ths srt of esis the operation ofthe Network andthe Back. found. Justaspeson may misinterpret a fext by ting Seow th clement ofthe fst relate to each ther, andy idting to undersand the operation of the Background cr ‘amauncs in which thefext was composed, soa person may tribnterpret his own intentional states by fling to se ther and by fling oleate them correctly rae fe fo the Background of nonrepresentational mental capac tes In such cases we do ot have the traditional epistemic trode of making incorrect reacts onthe Basi of rset (endo ns nota question of getting fom appearence 0 rae iy but ther ofloctingsplee in a puzzle relative toa whole taf ter pes ’ final abd indeed obvious case of “mistake” about one's cn mental aes espe intention. In the sheer chee ‘syne fe we often donot pay close attention 0 UF con Sous sates For example, » famous politica recerty ‘tanouncedin the pres that she had ben mistaken thinking rarer ce Dencat, Whur eo sympathies ha shifted tothe Republicans. What we tate in her cave a whole Netork of inenionalty—such ‘things as atitades toward lpination, sympathy. with ceain ‘sss of politics and host foward ater, ecto 0 in foreign policy, ete—and this Network had her being aware off In sUch cases our ms conatouness: An introduction Pe ’ men ie vest and perhaps all three, mistakes Nave int aan heap te ae on ty wate concent Po, Fan nie. Bat fr cocoa 0 eat ation for kore, we mus ist Ne asset Oy concise Recs the doing Ino cures wih cenit mu AE some special faculty that gives Us fase of Sn ofirespecion And_though sansa tea « oil apne the Beast me ond en se ano consist the fee oN te sarees conmeston seal in Oe gpemacioenes ence the doctne of Stones. 3 g el cet stacks on consciousness Such 38 Pee scone onthe mistaken assurpeion hat if Dee tether ssomething song with the doctrine a vor norpecion, we have shown that there i Saye wih coniousnes. But noting could be Beet outh,Incomablity and introspection have Stes e do wih the cena features of consciousness. Jee singi elements of mistaken philosophical theories Hey= Chapter 7 ‘The Unconscious and IigRelation to Consciousness Fem dike dope hw epin the ne Bese dates and consciousness. The explanary mentor the unonavsns get at wea Fal pre notion ar fom de. This dar Ls Safran consequnery as we Wil fy ha so Rng abou the radian concn ofthe si si 2 orn and the uncon ees Bence tio incoherent. {wil make heavy use of Sage beeen cpistemolgy, causation, and ont ie thttexlaincdinchaper 1 Mh Unoscios eer peertions—proe to the tenth entry, Seeger Be roton of te unconscious mind puzeling,pethape we Nifeoadiory. We have reversed the ois. After {ila we ately invoke ncorscous meatal phenomena 1 ‘tan beings and wend the notion of conciousness Shaing and perhaps even neni Ths shit in explana Ervenhass as ken diferent forms, but the general en Sng can eno sien ede hesv2 Cpe? seme als tao)" Anther eXTeMe Yeon of th secu in ay Jason's (98 the spre mations Of mind” the “computed fe re phenomenological ind daar tro OU cOMplcency i Wing the con eens, we do ot Rave 4 cea nt gf ea eset! ny ft tok ncaton sesso tener the urconston ann, eerie rats can said in coe ot SS oe wnncns netl e npn wes We tere re rocon of te unten, 8 atic potential conscious. Te ae pesicrecal nto ofan concos meal soa dn os corctus mental tate minor econ Bee att acy doce tat ean? How coud we Sete emesis fom aerial state and sil haves Sean ont Since red, we hae grown 20 aco specs metal aes hat we ave sgh Ee tht in aaer tothe question by no meaner ibe itt cen that we do thi ofthe uncorcious on the S15 the conscious Oar of ncoracions state he Ticats mental tate tat ost happens then and there tobe Set at we sll understand om the model ofa aint cre ta ve thik of as being jm es satan aoe tht in sme sense cul have en Secies Tis aeaty toe, for example, in Freud whe Sie of beth wate cals precoscious” and “oreo Traut bul on a rather simple model of conscious ate read 190, ppp 19-25). Ato most nave our pe fae somthing ike i: Unconscos mental safes inthe tind are ef dep inthe so ‘The Bh hate cant ‘Shem ce Me cay he me Spey he hey surface. The fish do ose the shapes. ee ha set cetinn ere nat ite ots sored inthe dak atc of the mid. These ots ave ter shape all slong even when you can se tem. We Ae semped osm at espe mds, but hike ‘the Unconscious and Is Relation to Conscious 159 fo ye connection between the two i being gradually Fn et endo pa tipo ee Melo eae tcp geno anes eee Shee prulneeeatn ae sere hn a ree oiler ee dap TS oc me a Sere ce sce one rr a ae Soca ieee na neat aay ‘hi i1st Caper? eset cece (roe acne ey ce ped med hens wos forest think of them, for example. Nonetheley Baevery ste ofan agent isa mental stat and not even eve eee ta eters create pecans = Seales eerste cect cicero Seite caterer ve we Serer a ee ctr mce ec area etree cree og egies oe cece eee ener cere eres ce tare eee tuctegaear occ te Canc ao eR asec ae ecco er rea toon in eae en ee act cectcs cas tigate nna ser ten Tosca er iteycnten sion aay er mele even yc Reese cerns vento Mee sat cce eae tre acral Nevers ace ‘scious feature of my brain that (like myelination) functions Seta nny mete eel scl emer Bar oe Tittle Ei Towerbin Pas ivegenuce nena te thughtappento be't metal ste tat moo ee eaten vero fem bet ad ny xm mycin eth have snetng {io mihny bra on ner econ Bt ely ne 8 ten andre ne gut car sou wht make en telecast bn rec sd texscoumen ut oop ths tncon es poyoe {isp tcl penne yeni whee nt {a the menial ine of business atl, “nonconsios” and ste Unconscious and Is Relation to Consciousness 155 sa tke met states tht Tam not thinking abot or 2 et gncnscious” ne econ om ou conception of ite: aay ofthe nna mst able 0 that any hr beable to acount for the sino account for Tpomena that are genuinely intentional and those areen phenotts behave aif they were, but in fac are no Se PT locas atthe nd of caper 3 Ts trinsic and as-if forms of intentionality? And second, ete account forthe fat that ntentonal tates Eee conaine of satacton only under cern spt Upc aspects must matter to the agent. My Sa tha Ell Toes nat tiie a ‘conditions, My having that belief is a matter ho cay and nota mater of what anybody ele ‘airs wo say about me or how I behave of what sort of a reone might adopt toward me. And the belief that the cre Pars repecetst conditions of stein So apes and ot others efor eae dis Sa Ese tat the tallest on stracere bal ia gis ead in he Pench apt even ass Fash el Tower ental withthe tallest on stra Bein Frnce before 190, an Pais dental with the aA We might sy that every intentional state asa vr ital supe and tis espectal shape Is Pat of HS ‘Sy prot what makes the state haiti ero rene samy ha The Argument forthe Connection Principle ‘hese two fetures—the fact that an unconscious intentional Sate must nonetheless be intrinsically mental, and the fact that itmust havea certain aspectual shape—have important conse {fens for our conception of the unconscious. They wil pro= ‘ide the basis fr an argument to show that we understand the ‘tion ofan unconscious mental state only as a posible con- tetof consciousness, only asthe sort of thing tha, though not186 Chaps conscious, and pethaps imposible 1 bring to consciousness for aries masons, nonetheless Is the Soto thing that coast feor ould have been conscious. This idea, that all uncon: Sus intentional sates are in principle accesible to con Sousness Feil the connection principle, and wil now spel (ut the argument fort in more detail For the sake of rtp ‘wil mmber the majo steps in the argument, though | do rat mean fo imply that the argument i 4 simple deduction feet sions. 1 Teri a distinction beuven intrinsic intentionality end ast intentionality: only intrinsic intentionality & gency ment | awe argues at some length fo this ather obvious cistron, ‘oth in this book and in the writings previously mentioned fd sl will ot repeat the arguments her, I believe that he istinton is correct and that the price of giving up would be that everthing would become mental, because relative to some purpose or other anything can be teatod a1 it were ‘menial Forinstance, water flowing downhill canbe described i fithad intentionality: It rit gt to the bottom ofthe ll. by ingeniously seeking the line ofthe least resistance it does Sion rewig ie eet mcs. ng lope, vty et. But if water is mena then eveytingisnentl. zr" 2. Unconscious intention states are intrinsic. When say of Someone who is asloep tht he believes that George Bush is [resident ofthe United Sates, or when I sty of somcone who ‘awake that he hasan unconscious but repressed hatred of ‘is father, Tam speaking quite erally. There is nothing meta vel or a aout ths atsbtons Aiuto ofthe peers ‘explanatory power if we do not take 3 Intrinsic intentional sees, whether conscious or unconscious, hays hae aspect shapes. Ihave been using the erm of at, ‘aspectual shape” to mark a universal feature of intentional: Ay. Itcan be explained as follows: Whenever we perceive any nts Relation to Consciousness 157 she conacious a e always do so under some anything, we always d aroha gopectua features are essential a 08 Nae pat of what makes the men- feimentiona a Cpl shape Is most obvious in the ase sat think of seing aca, for example think about ung tink petioal Loess Fe not simi aa fa objet being Wien or perceptual appara: ater, you actualy ev apenence of the objet fom a certain point Javea contin eon features. You see the car as having & ee ‘as having a certain color, etc. And what is true ree oe cree anni Gon a Pas of HO. There san indefinitely large a of ie esc tor deste about hem only ae ae era pee tape mut rate ee seg ve reac Sore ee st or pe ts re eee eer oe ae a ct ae eee orci oar eae eer 4 Theespectual feature cannot be exhaustively o completely charac- feral in terms of third-person, bevioal, or even newro-58 Chay? ie ote» eine pee era etfapetan supe Detaviral cree! theater Scie econ of rors ur no ee see ps cee Sie eee al pertiete ier pte rk var ecing icte ta I errs wi arstst-eokee anna ete cout tec oe Se Bee cainccssettisetenegr cerees et orp ttt iccur ee nr cal aepcnnyoeeeec ced mene te tere wa rere Beare cece ct epee Ieee te pee Feyecs te con ant Sect ey pn bahar ucts erent 0" what mesa y er eeepc ere ver wart ey toc ce cet tn tt I eat anter one pet nt tities greener i aie corto meet ~ aeheleredept ee re ore ne tad pe teen rch apes ice ct Sateen tie pers sal sl Ppt va to 1,0, ote ae ce ee eet tare staves ear re tle wet seer ow Ieee cite ns ens it thoy were eee th ee for water and notte seers. eset te mcopholgea facts ae lvays nly suficetfor any st of metal facts? someone vith pert ‘te Unconscious and Ils Relation to Conasosness 159 ere Cre and the facts speed in intentional terms ave neve case, there are any, there i ill an inf Sh at pacha ea : tenomena, Imagine that a man is ina sound dreamiless fe lee ae So Seen eee ieee ee cre ee a ee ee er ee So oe Ss eee 6 The oton of en unconscious intentional slate is the nation of filet sa possible conscious thought or experience. There are piety of unconscious mental phenomena, but tothe extent Phat they are genuinely intention, vhey mst in some sense preserve their aspectual shape even when unconscious, but the nly sense that we can give to the notion that they preserve16 Chap? hie aspecual shape when unconscious is hat they are pos ‘recone of consciousness. earns Bint main conclusion. But this answer to our ist que immediatly ives nie fo another question: What SESE, posable” inthe previous two sentences? After al ign be qie mpi forthe state to occur consciously Fare bmn lesion, repression, o olher causes, Soin what Bearesicty must it be a possible content of a thought or 2 Ths question lead to Our next conclusion, which (GESp a further explanation of step 6, and is implied by Sand Gtogeter: 2. Te ontology ofthe unconscious consists in objective fetes of fhe bai copa of esing subjective conscious thoughts. When Me dasribe something ss an unconscious intentional tate, we echaracterzing an objective ovelogy in virtue of its causa fuaty to produce consciousness. But the existence of thee ‘ital eturesis consistent with the fact that in any given case thei causal powers may be blocked by some other interfering, (uns sochas psychological represion o brain damage. “Te possiblity of interference by various forms af pathology doesnot ater the fact that any unconscious intentional sate thevort of thing that isin principle accessible to consciousness Ttsmay be unconscious not only inthe sense tht it doce not ‘apport be coneciogs then and there, but also in the sense tat farone reson or another the agent simply couldnt bring it to ‘omsciousesr, but it must be the sort of thing that can be trough to consciousness because its ontology is that of anew physiology characterized in terms of is capacity to cause consciousness. the naive mentalism of my view of the mind Jeads ta kindof dispositional analysis of unconscious mental ‘only it is not a disposition to “behavior” but a aspestion’—if that 8 realy the right wordt conscious thoughts including conscious thoughts manifested in ‘havior, Tiss paradoxical, even ironic, because the notion ofa dispositional account ofthe mental was introduced pre -mmeVaconcous and Its Relation Consens 16h a Soh re Seta ecard cemsons Pees i gute familar tos fom common see Siosor toe ‘rreig a ene ee a who unconscious that he believeth Bushis ssyotthe a re asribing to a neurobiological ontology the feces ae Spee ope rt a neh me "nme ae a oa omen ote aaa Be a ete oe eterno, Me Tea Se rence merely er Seg cr mars angele aie cen geet eect cer a ar Seen eae cae a ra Se See i ere oe ee Sr cee ia Tae enn ese ee ane ne ee difference between them is not in consciousness, because, BY eects on ee Fae re eee ey aly 52) ee ‘ite? ee two Sina peas ates and those: ce Sheets pom eat ee See tees ee nal a nt Te Objections othe Connection Principle Bt ct tces. That! onghe of my Though several other people! also gave me diferent versionsof oacoedisdecto Net Bock Ie omc pres sere o he et ta ec put ons traccoernch Sete tate entet vate Nownataon mer cuttin ne ran vrs he eect a iy fave ontgnraton, Tae er fonc tat e's racr’ Nowierae Beg octets of porcini ett Ie eter cok vat ence hg Seen Sign thy wen we Dee et nce toe ting pacing fate tetra ve Sra Desiree en nh soc toen we have aad eae Ratamniahiaigeire Ppa cen concn defor wate ats I eect coeconcnce Tike the example, but { do not think it isa counterexample, Charney nthe ences we define surtce phones Inter oft miro came ye an define oon teat Danco ot ctn mcr of nasociers for exp Awad prac ecencs ofthe ban sora ve ‘me Unconscious an It Relation to Conaoumes ii wont ol 2 baa at Sprints ea emer Se ec a ee Fe ceo eee iepeomerer rs Cite i eae comet ee ee ee Seep epee Ce eae aoe Gir Siete oes jeer aoe Se a ms eter a awa ten ene Sn ee on ee ee See SS an pepe eet ier See ee peer as ae ree Sec ae soils et Saa Caper envoy tarsver ths question there il yay Sa crea etal Daaror at ae ana wah alte acs aout vertl behavior Bt ta ese et atu of meaning and enone lcs Guin fs sven in laborious detal mi kt we cold nt Know forse that the ane Sot ree et 2 erp Sane Ba arbi. or water” a opposed 0 “Ty et MeN fact ofthe nator at all about which the rome thre athe thre fot fhe mater bout specu BE hte no aspects shape, and Where there iy no Shape nae no inetonallty." Quine, we mig SPS Ret mening appropriate for verbally behaving SEGRE pur wear not mbes and our utterances doen Raat att have determinate mesings with determine SSeceat shapes, at as our ttetioal states often hive GESmetoe menonal contents seth determinate aspea SES ene but all ofthat presupposes conscotnnen 1. Col There Be Unconscious Pains? want outa the connection principle further by imagin ing a case in which we would have 2 use Tor the not of tnconscious pai.” We dont normally think of unconscious ‘pains and many people believe, would accepe the Cartesian oton tat for something to bea genuine pai, it hast be con Sous, Bat | think i © easy 10 invoke contrary inulens Consider the following It a very common occurence fot wo suffer from chronic pains, say, chronic back pals, That sometines the pain makes it dificult for them to go sleep. And indeed, once they have fallen asleep, there some. times are occasions during the night when thir condition cues them to se up. Now, how exactly shall we describe these tases? For the sake of this example, we are assuming thatthe fallents are totally unconscious during seep: they have no oneiousness of any pain whatever. hall we say then, that ‘The Unconscious and It Reltion to Conoumes 45 se ee pee ee Speer Se ee Be! fe ne ce Nee eae et te ee fessor On ie ole gee Ea noe, pe oe eee eee See eee ee ee bee Sales See ee oe ee eo ee Po ee aie as Ses ae Se eeWe Chater? eg rence Se oe ere ae ee er eo es oo eee aes I iemcce esr eo a ers ee trot eee inner er he Unconscous and ts Relation Conon te es ee eee cat fiers on a sce oa i Se ea ee oe ee a ep eee peas tn nee Be eee ee ee psiolieal nor conscious. Fron the Unconscious Tanto conclude this chapter by comparing my conception ofthe unconscious and its relation to consciousness with Fread’s. On my view, inside ou skulls there ia mas of mete ‘ons enbedidd in gil clls, and sometimes this vast and it fate system is conscious. Consciousness is caused. by the Iavor of lowerlevel elements, presumably at neuronal ‘synaptic, and columnar levels, and as such its a hgherdevel Feature ofthe entire system, 'do nat mean to imply that there ‘anything slmple about consciousness or about neurophysior168 Quy? tome immensely complex, and consi oy. Both seem iousnes, {Byrne comes bs we have seen variety of modal “cnotion thought, pais, ec But on my view, hat Fai png ole iain ner A @kass and conscoumess On my account tak of te Prosteces mind is simply talk of the causal capacities of $Eortaclogy to cause conscious states and conscious Se Eee See ree se So aa ea ee ees nt ee se SS See ee ess: Se eaeedes ee Sareea eect See Se iets os eee ot a eee a eores SSeS ecg ra rts yr ey ec ‘he Unconscious an Is Ration Contours 169 eye 2 cee rere om a be ee ee poet meng wn ae ee yo ee Se eee Seprcey wore ele teoier ocoere et eee Bees cee nee ee oe Pee ee ‘Sa ee ee pe ete eeam Chats? wir events oul be gong on inthe brain in ition t the events to constitute UNCOnScOUs Subp iy and intentionality, tat Freud gives us for the existence of the ai invariably that the patient engages in behavig ames he ad a certain mental Sate, but because we kno fy thatthe patent does not have any such on Insepemienal state, Fred postulates an nconscious mental Soom Mh cause ofthe behavior. A verfiationist would Have foany thatthe only meaning there isto the postulaton is hat fhe cn behaves in such and such wos and that sich i sPine would normally be caused by a conscious sat ut Panetta vericationist. He thinks that there is soning Fae ang the behavior that snot just neurophysiclogia {Pare not coicous ether, [cannot make this consistent with Bhat we Kao about the bran, and Ws hard to interpret t rept as implying dualism, as Froud is postulating a case of ‘Eencurophlologcl mental phenomena; and this seems fo connie an abandonment of Freud's earlier project fora scent (1355). ‘Wha about the analogy Betieen consclousness and percep on? Once one ads the view that mental states ar bth femelos mental andi thmscles unconscious, then isnot to be easy fo explain how consciousness isnt the p> Fare looks a ifthe view that mental states are unconscious Inthemselveshas the consequence that consciousness tally ‘ernie, not am eset pat of any conscious state or event seems to me that Freud acceps this consequence, and he analogy betwen consciousness and perception isa way of try Ingto it conciousness nto the picture given the consequence that consciousness an extrinsic, nonessential feature of ary consis state Once the theory of the unconscious is spelled tithe analogy with perception looks inevitable. To account forthe fact of consciousness together with the theory of the tunconscious, we are forced to postulate that consciousness isa Kind of perception of states and events that in ther intrins ‘ature are unconscious. spe Unconscious nd ts Relation Consciousness 71 sii sO ur discussion of introspection, the model ‘ge As we M yorks on the assumption that there is a distinc fT jet perceived and the act of perception. z Sacer tt See gy say eel so ha prc ition thee ina ding se paced and the at of perception. fete cp, am le ha Dk ke aay Halas eh 2 perception tat hs no ot i 1 on, Ba precy tee dscns Ge ah rte concous thought ry fo take are o nkng of ths taken tough ay, ha 2 re have nothing ee I yt tke away the fh pee tought om the concious tisking of din aking anyhng ave) The distinction Ee ar pereiing amd the ob peeved does Sette concious thoush. Seem ope vicious repessf we old that errr of brnging unconscious sats to concious Sepeeen perceng prevousiy unconscious meta 2 aha themselves are unconscious. For the que Ser rbes hr about the act of perceiving —is this 9 sae enon? so, t must be in el unconscou, BETREL appear that forme to Become conscious of tht Ber dais nd some higher level ac of pereving of my act Scccing, Tam not sure about this, but oaks ike an Seater argument heaters Affe with tis percepts analogy i the follow sng Reception works on the assumption thatthe Ot et {Gielen cou impact on my nervous sytem, which hus my eeince of so when {ouch something of el Sot the abet ofthe perepton ees a certain exper tBu bow cou thi possibly workin the ase In Which Aetietpeceived itself an unconacios experince?a Chaps? BI ce veeun re cic g rnc ene See ee cee oe oe VE Remants ofthe Uncnsios ‘What is ef ofthe unconscious? Isai earlier that our nave ra notion of the unconscious was like the notions of Bini the sa or furniture inthe dark atic ofthe mind. They ee thee shapes even when unconscious. But now we can (Brihar these pctures ate inadequate in principe brnuse they ‘Fe sasaf onthe den of «constant mental reality that appear Gnd hen dnppears But the submerged belie unlike the sub sh can't kep its conscious shape shen unconscious, forthe onlyoccurent reality ofthat shape isthe shape of con Scous thoughts, The naive picture of unconscious sates cot faues the causal capacity 1 cause a conscious intentional ate witha conscious sat tel thats, lt confuses thelateny with itsmaniettion, Ie asf we thought the bote of poison on the shelf had to be poisoning something all the time in order real tobe poison. To repeat, the ontology of the unconscious is Sly the ntloy of «rears capable of generating te “Te final conclusion I want to draw from tls discussion that we have no wifed notion of the unconscious. Ther are atleast four different notions int, there are af metaphorical atibutions of intentional Sty the Bain, which are not to be taken literally, For exam~ Crete tte rte aap iva us breathing even while we ate asleep. ‘Second, there are Freudian cases of shallow unconscious estes, beliefs ec. It is best to think of thee as cases of me Unconscious ar Ii Relation Corsa Ei et rnc! nrg ie soi ee nonin the eal ope t ian Nee cay price ae se hee ht at oe Fo fon el, dene ory en emer ee ny conscouren uty Be eee Se oe: Nowthce ty a l e Te Oe er have expo OF ne Fee vt heii nent yi eee Fe erroel fo ce ct Berens hat ce ec eet ee a er cis Not ony o tee soc cn cee eeChapter 8 Consciousness, Intentionality, and the Background Fraction to the Background eam ofthis chapter i to explain the relationship Between ve and intentionality on the one hand, and the rte abies, and peneral know-hove that erable Out gates to function on the other, T call these capacities, sete,“ Background.” with capita B" to make ee at use the word as a technical term. Sine my views ihe Background have developed in some veel Ghee wie Ineniouly (9, 1 wl aon the nd the motivation for them. : Teibecarly 197051 began snvestigating the phenomena that tir came fo call "the Background” and to develop a thesis uttcall“the hypothesis ofthe Background.” The thesis ‘nally a claim aboot Uteral meaning Geatle 1978), aleve what applies to. literal meaning applies also speakers intended meaning, and indeed, to al forms ‘Realty, whether Linguistic or nonlinguisti. The figround is simply this: Intentional smemings understandings interpretation, only function within a set of “tes that are not themselves intentional.sm Capers een =e ae Se eed ee ee eee ee eae Seeger an Date an ee ee ere heen ee ns ee ee er esa en ts involves atleast the folowing: consousnesIteonalty, andthe Background 7 1 tmertional states donot function autonome They 1s rmine condton faaton neal ne al tat ees ft ts uncon Net 2 a he nentioal States. Conon of faction or lined only relative to the Network ede Network i no enough The Network ony 2 en rave toast f Background capaci fantong pcs ae nt apd eanoot be Wee a re 4 These pe ora pat f the content of ny paca meron tat. interto ee intentional conten can determine diferent 3 wf sttacton (ich os uth conditions) rate cee Background, and relative t0 some Bade wen determines none tall pak ofthe Background navy think of Wigs’ ee he pete of he man waking up Rel be came Pian siding tucward downhl Nath sae pire, even conetie 9 tora Teper incl tat poo forces the inerpeaion We aa ae iden ofthe Siground i ht wha oes oe Baire goes for tentonlty in geeral Pe Ftry oro, the sor of poermena Lal Back anes ecm copied bys numberof diferent pis Bo gute cert commitments. Niches etaiy fhe Tn have recone the eramenon, but hes ene iit aware le cnkngency The Background doe Toe he way ici There are no poo tothe it Melmcbncgeound we haves one we must have of mse tat one iner Wittgenstein ge prt abot the Bigonad” Among contemporary ery seams oe at Bouders nth of hes G94) nec rate potion of the Background Trihcupe Til fist sketch an argument or he esi se acgroundand ths tempt ose posta coud phenomera os separate catagory Rr vest fon Sond! Tl restate the tens of he Background 91m Chapters ee Some Arguments or the Hyp ofthe Background i erler works Gearle 178, 1960, 1983, 1950) 1 have BBimens or all ve theses, and wont nepeat Fee: However fo give a fel fr the theses 1am Tisch a couple of the considerations that Prete me, Thesinpest way t se that representation s nonepreserational Background of apactes Bear a cnlesanding of sentence. The beauty of Mescnenss tat they ae wel-dcined Stacia StF nts tobe learned rom them can Be applied ma benral phenomena. Pint number 5 gts us etnnclng wedge of te argument: The sme eral meaning Silaeemne diferent conditions of satsaction for example ret uth conditions atv 10 different Background rd some Iter meanings wel determin no Eoin Pecions because ofthe absence of appropriate Back ad tons, Farthermore (pot 1), those Back (Bound presuppositions are not and could not be included in eatmeaning, 5o, for cape if you consider occurrence, fhe word “eu” in sentences suchas “Sam cut the grass” Sally cat the eke” “Bl ct the cloth,” “Lust cut my skin sou willsce tat the word “ct” means the same in each. This hown, for example, by the fac that conjaneson reduction twos for the cerrence fhe ver with these ditt objets. For eample one can say "General lect has invented a new levee ht wil at gn, ct cakes, cut cloth, and cat skin” ‘One can simply then eliminate the lat thre occurrences of "ut and put “Gana Electric as invented anew device that ‘Cone.ousnen,Itentonally aed Baka teat gras, cake, cloth, and skin” Notice tat the word vl rn these ocurrences rom ts genuinely apa fea ences 119 "Sally cut to cases lat week tal eeedent cut the salaris of the peoeson” oF The FEES the roster to forty-five” in each ese, the word tide ea nonlteral use. Once again, conjunction reduction RCs Ir say “General Hectic has invented device that sheet grass cake, cloth and skin” and then add “and Yala itses, and rosters the whole Becomes a bad jhe Bane" itrances contain the literal occurence ofthe ver © the that word, cna normal interpretation, ntpetd TRE hy imeach sentence. You can also see this you image en reaponing imperative version oF these trans vary ut the grass” and you rush out and slab t with a Hie bei say “Cut the cake,” and you run over it witha (Re ower, there isa perfectly ordinary sense in WIh You {tnot do exactly what asked you to do, ‘foe ksson to be learned from these examples is this: The ome Ira expression can make the same contribution tothe Fiual utlerance of variety of sentences, and yet alfiough those sentences will be understood Iterally-there sno ques fon of metaphor, ambiguity, Indirect spech acs, et—the ‘rpension wil be interpreted differently inthe different sem felom Why? Because each sentence is interpreted agunst a Bickgound of human cspacitis (abilities to engage in ean puscees, know-how, ava of doing things ete), and those Epsctics will fx ciferent interpretations, even though the Hea meaning ofthe expression remains constant ‘Now why is this an important resl®? Well on our standard count of language he meaning ofa sentence i a compost tinal function of the meanings oF is component parts and tha syntactical arrangement inthe sentence. Thus, weundet= ‘andthe sentence John loves Mary” differently from the Way Wwe understand the sentence "Mary loves John’ precisely Tecause of the application of compostionality Furthermore ‘we are able to wrestand sentences a all because they are Composed of meaningful elements elements whose meanings0 chapters etary i sou language ms = ational Background. ia maple ee arn a ck ees ican Beene em oar es Pee easing erly, “Bring me a steak with fed cee eso microtome eter meget ak ea ee es ee! int fled ny i ond SS Bey Seay ins en on Se ee ee ee ee ee an ses oe 6 ee es: se ae eee ee eos mos eet n ss cite Cconsousnes Intentionally and the Bakgrosnd 1 raven Background practice that would fa literal ees hw wo i ang Sen nc ecognton of Background problems in eet Tt cls in ave 19, by Roby Caton Lapis cat for xampe tthe dca at a a ah he sslac of the problem. For eample Hoesen an concer the retorts beeen he 2 of tne setece teed the content of wha he Bm te spar ie by aking he sgt or camp nthe sentence," hate had Se eral meng ofthe Sentence makes no ele ak fy ofthe trance but ve would poral it tot ey geen conveying the content tha the speaker Fo ety, thatthe day of theuterance. TA, da int conta ith T hae bent Tet ‘Tre Pa Mu does not communicate ht ave Ben see Or consider anther muchdiscussed selene, Teel y phe Hey. and be opened the dor” An et Sabri tence welt nommaly convey tat ft Sly a Says and ae hooped the dot, and hat Ne Be Nor the ay Theo much seusion abt Fe ts by which this addonal contents conveyed Pepa tis no encode Sn the ral meaning of the se Bee Oe suggestion surly core that erence mean TES ater underetrmines what the peers SRE asthe sentence. Now, the ca Tar mang Sete mening rally underdetermines the cone of Sir isasd Concier te examples ust mentions, Noone Tul! consrve I Rave had brskfant on analogy wih“ Tove had ins” ‘Thav i given our present Background, no fee would Inerpret the uterance ean “have st VE. tethteBreaan bu noice there thing whatever the sean content of the sentence hat blocks tht interpretation even compels the interpretation that Lave | Hovey ny though aboene,toimagine cle where theie Cups of Uhave bas" are reversed. Sitar ease. Cale, “aly pero Fen he dor” There oth hate fhe and oe contre tha Scmtence to Heck the ine fn pened the dor wh the ley by bate sper Jey wan erty fot log eo cat indore hundred poses” Nothing ek he etry oe dae vith the bey by oat Fa and ey and moving the ey noth lok sn ae cnraciono is gu Ofcourse sch Ee aula be cary, but there nohing in the peratticer of the setence corre by Hse ht ots thse cay interpretations erage cul count fr the al thee in Teer ils ctene a the thesis ofthe Bc Geer on to Frm Fey Wt aay aca svaton admits of anit Meet ise lecrptony 20 ar lings representation mart i ncomplte sonwone "evs the ake by ra were ener tin tae toy, ect he ake” Bees ria surpad to have this ever reported by ths Beira ur suse, however, fas nothing to do" wih SESS Grscocrang ce. We simpy have an inducvely SESS Seton and the port thoogh tue was fa leng out an acount of how the cuting i ‘ei te way we woul normaly expect Tanta dws ot gre with hs view but od Topo and chang co want to consider Fhe Tetgetins alma rh cnn companied by syste of expectations {hovjnem wert alongieliwal meaning, The el prebem soxgnted byte eapls that once ll geine ambiguities fave een removed fom a sentence, we ae sll ef with Aogutnes and completeness. Words ae ihre vague Tnldoarptone ave sivaye incomplete Bt farther prison ‘Sc compen ae aed to understanding bythe fact tt ieanings are siplemented with a 2 set of habitual tons. So we should not say re consciousnes,Inentonalty, andthe Background 18 eral meaing onl determines truth conditions save to a Background. pater we should 30 tevin ndesicaty and oer contex'ependent (een de) eral meaning determines tah cone feature Peotutely and in isolation, Ba eral mean ion og, ah eal description arealays ing a ate Creater precision and completeness are Secor supplementing iteral mening with cola arse mplens and expectations. So for example, coasting however you do but we expect nto ct one way, and cake another. Sot Fe i paaye ‘Go ct that mountain” the comect Tampere not do not understand” Ofcourse You Torta the English sentence! Rather the comect aaa "How do you want meto cat" 1 think this is a powerful and appealing argument. The aos sald give tot ae two. Fs, the question wee an completanss, then we ought in principle fo appr (ee icons by adding farther sentences, But we cannot, AS Famed outer, cach sentence we adds ube 1 ah rao cancings unless xed by the Background, Second, Panmure asada break between iteral meaning a el ye aacoumptions” then you ought to beable to apply Mera scring no matter what the assumptions, Bat you cant, So Proatple the application ofthe word “cut” proceds agains jet in the world are slid and A presupposition that some ol SEs aetraton by the physical pressure of isruments Witout drat assumption 1 canot interpret most Scurencs Ut Bur that assumption isnot part of itera meaning ff were, then the introduction of laser cutting Sevies fave involved a change inthe meating ofthe word, and Git Tot Furthermore, I can imagine literal uses of “eat Universe where that assumption i false, One can maine a af Betoun capacise Capers Soe Testis seen clot Se ae Sr ste gees cece ms Net earns ot oy Sete Se ae question lo posed by Récanal is this: What the AEST erring om Vera meaning al forms of Fear tic ely argument woul fers hat tis a tive» taxonomy tht captures our infin Bat Het Sethiereen ought and meaning. Foreamped sa en ur ediay nition ht the man Who has TPE aty ct the cate has» Dele! with esa the a eeostinal content ox the eal assertion “Sale SESED Eau we are appying the tcc terms “Bad ‘sel intenoality ovary age il ot ste $e bur you ase the notion of ientonal conta it Be fSiy tht eal meaning an expression of tention BEL” hen fli that Background contin spe Mt bth T ean imagine ther toxonomis, bu his oe Sensto work bes. Treo onan te Dac ny ae owt An oampe wl sate tis A visting peop Gi Ryo ated one sane Sra unconvinced by the arguments One dy Soa earthnieacured This convince hin beats, te Consciousness, ntentonliy, andthe Backroand 185 tne told me, he had not, prior to that moment had bli oF late ion or a hypothesis thatthe earth does nat mov; he an taken it for granted, The point is aking sme sa ae granted” need ht rae an intentional tate on all Ta sith believing and hypothesizing Mr al scp in understanding the Background isto ee that oon ie commited to the tath ofa propstion seithout Oe any intentional state whatever wih that proposition 35 ‘having 27Y can, for example, be committed to the proposition {huts caused by and realized inthe neurophysiology. So cts we ever get stared on computer modeling, we know te there ar to sets of levels: mental levels, many of them Conscious aad neurophysilogical levels ‘Now where ave the formal symbol manipulations supposed. to Bt ino this picture? This Is a fondamental foundational URvation in cognitive sclence, but You would be amazed et eet le stenton is paid to it The absolutely racial question for any computer mode is, “How etl does the model relate foe reality Being modeled?” But unless you rend skeptical ‘Sine Hie the present author, you il in very litle discs Sono this soue. The general anser wthch is supposed 10 ‘Se the demand for more detailed specific answers that Rbvcon the level of intentionality nthe human (what Newell [1982 calls “the knowledge lve” andthe various neurophys {blogic level, theresa intermediate level of formal symbol ‘manipulation Now our questions, empisally speaking, What could that poss mean? If you zead byoks about the brain (ay, Shepherd 1983; oF plocenand Lazzrson 1968), you get certain picture of what is ffong oni the brain. Ifyou then turn to books abot compu ck ay, Booos and Jefey 1989), you get picture of the [ogi srcture ef he theory of computation. Ifyou then en {Coke about cognitive scence sy, Pylysiyn 1988, they tell yet ine computation Books were describing, Philosophically ‘petking hedges nt sel gt ome and Thavelamed at Pea Re beginning ofan investigation to follow my sense of sel0 Caper? Strang Al, Watk AL oe C Th nde ofthe computer mov! ofthe mind i hat Pts progensond e bran the Mardie of weet tonal system, A slogan one often sces is: “The mind it feanathe progam st the hardware Tatas bp investigation ofthis ci by isting see guess : 1. Isthebraina digial computer? 2 Igthe mind a compater program? 3. Gan the operations ofthe brain be simulated on dig talcomputer? In this chapter, willbe addressing 1, and not 2 073. In eig wen Genre 1980, 1806, and 19843), I have given ep te ancwer to 2. Because programs are defined. purty fr tmaly or syntactically, and because minds have an inne tnenial conten follows immediately that the program by fell cannot constitute the mind. The formal syntax of he program doesnot by itself guarantce the presence of meta ines shoved this a decade ago the Chinese rom ag then! (Searle 19808). A computer, me for example, cold an the steps inthe program for some mental capaci, sich understanding Chinese, without understanding. a word of Chinese. The argument rests on the simple logical truth ht flax i not the same a5, nor is it by itself sufcet fr, Semantics So the answer to the second question is deman fe ‘The anster to 3 seems to me equally demonstrably "Yes" st least ona natural interpretation. That is, naturally interpret the question means there some description ofthe bran sch that under that description you could. do 2 computational ‘simulation ofthe operations of the brain. But given Chur ‘hess that anything that canbe piven a precise enough charac terization a 4 set of steps can be simulated on a digital cm ute, it follows trivially thatthe question has an affirmative Answer. The operations of the brain can be simulated ona computational simolation is acai dup ing end not merely modeling the futon properis of {he bran The reason that the bran, nike Be thee Systeme, sam sformation pce sytem. And thi fact Shout the bain fin your words, “inns” eis usta fact about logy that the ban neon poss AF ration, and as me can also proess the same information ‘Cnpwlatnally, computational made of rain proceses five diferent ole aogeber fom computaonal model tis for example the weather ‘So thre ba well defined research qostion: Are the com ‘putational procedures by which the rain procesesinfor- ulm the sume asthe procedures By which computers ‘process the sare information? ‘What {ust imagine an opponent saying embodies oe of the worst mistakes ncopnhe sence The mistake sf p= pce at inthe sense in which computers ave ad f proces ‘Rfomation baie ls proces norton. Tosec tha aie 1 rake const wha gos on in the computer with what ows om in the bain In the cs ofthe compute, an oxide Pen cncodes Some ivortaton ina form tat can be pro Ese by the cei of the computer, That i he oF abe frovides' syetacta elation ofthe information tht the ompatr cal implement infor ample; diferent valge le See computer ten goes tough a series of cca ger that te outs agent can interpret both syntactically “uF Scanaeaty even thgh of ours he ardwrare Bis no sap conan es al inthe eye ofthe bode ‘rene Payne dacs not mater, provided ony tat you can24 Chapers| Bt now contrast hat with the rin. Inthe case ofthe brain, ‘none of the relevant neurobiological processes are observer rehtive though of course lke anything they canbe dest from anctserverslative point of view) and theres nt the neurophysiology matters desperately. To make tn tes fee den lt us go trough an ample. Suppose Iveco coming toward me A sandsrd computational ocie ot ‘sion wil fake in information about the visual aray om not Feina and eventually printout the sentence, "Ther oy coming toward me” ‘But that is not whet happens i 4 Actual Balogy. In the biology a concrete and specie sees slecochemial actions are twp bythe ana of he tons on the photo receptor cel of my rein, and the coe ross evenually results ina concrete visual experience ie Bolopalreaity is not that ofa bunch of wonde of entos being produced by the visual sytem: rather tsa mane re onerete specific conscious visual event ths very ice experience That concrete visual evens as spol, a fence asa hurcane or the digestion of'a Seal We san rth the computer, make an inortatonprocenng ele that event or ofits production ss we an Make an ore gi, Processing model of the weather, digestion, cr toy they Phenomenon, but the phenomena themselves ar nat thoy ‘tration rein shart the serse of information processing that i used fm cognitive scence at much loo high «level of absent ton 0 capture the concrete bilopal fealty of erin fesionality. The “ivormation” inthe brat & ateare oe ‘ile fo some modality or oer. Its specie Ineegh ry ‘isln, or hearing, of touch, for example: The nel of ie tion described in the cognitive scence com. The Critique of Comite Reson 235, tional model of vision. But this should not obscure the fat thatthe visual experience sa concrete consciogs event and ie rodced in the bran by specie electrochemical biologi processes, To confuse these events and processes with formal ‘Symbol manipulation sto confuse the reality with the model The upshot of this prt ofthe discussion i that nthe sense of rnformation” used in cognitive scence, its simply false #9 sy thatthe Brain a information proceasing device, 1K, Summary ofthe Argiement 1. On the dandard textbook definition, computation dtfined syntactically interme of sy bol manip bu yan and syne are tt defied in terme of ye ic Though syebel flans ae lays pile kg ye toi and sane symbol re nok defn! in ers of py Sve Spt nso et ona ya This has he consequence, tat computation Is not discovered inthe phys rls asgned tf Cea yale] Phenomena are wed or programmed or interpreted sya {ly Sytocand aymbot ae ceerver eave “flows tht you could not dane tat te bran ray ig ee a italia cont ath Could asgn a computational interpretation oi on toanyhing ee. The pon isnot a the ain The brain igi computer ls slnpy fale. Rater, t des nt ge upto thelevle ated, docs not havea etree Tees thon ts the bain gl compute” il define, I a, “Can we ang 9 computational interpretation to the Bs the anwar ily Ys, bectse we ea cg a compas tena nepeatn fyig He ek“ roete ifialy computational? the anes tvaly fe bens nothing sintinsally computational except of ‘use concious agents netonly gong trough compa: tone 5 systems fctate the computational use res he ten oe Ta hy ec ey26 Capers ‘se them, In sich case we are the Homunculs inthe sytem interpreting the physics in both syntactical ad semantic emma 6 Butthecousal explanations we then give do ote sual properties diferent from the physic ofthe implementation na rom he tenon ofthe Romane 7. The tndar, though tac way oto hiss to commit. ‘he homuncuis alley. The homuncuks fallacy is endemcto computational model of cogntion and cannot be removed ty the Standard recrsive decomposition arguments. They are sedate toa diferent question. We cannot avid the foreing results by supposing that the brains doing “information processing” The Wain fos 2 topes ae cone ow no ination Prcesing tia spc bslogesl organ ands spice ‘Rbiolpial proses cause specific forms of infetonalty In the brain intial there are neurabislogal precy a sometimes they cause conscowaness. Bt that ithe en of te Sry. Allother mental aibutons are either dispose as When we ascbe unconscious sates tothe agent or they are fers lative as when We assigns compulatonal nee tation hist proceses chapter 10 ‘he Proper Study nda Nate she plosophy of mind, the author, exp Iason Pal on fhe mind an elton cpl erature word. The reader who has followed Ben or ly ecm ay esr moran ra av morgan ke nyt 8 Le ig pecalfentre, afar the mind i one vate nh fee rmarkabiy fom her gi tne ists capecty to produce and sustain all Seog oF ty of our conscvsnes fe! By conscious Ss nen te passive subjectivity of the Carean See tthe forms of our conscious lfe—from the Petco £6 of fighting ewig, eeing, ane foriating $togears wring books, and scratching our itches. Allo Repos Ga we thnk of as especially mertal—wheter pecgten iuing inference decision making, problem sl Be emctionsctcvare in one way or another rucally Med fo conecousness Furthermore, all of those great fates tt phosophers have though of a5 special 19 the fd we saly dependent on consciousness sje, felt, atonal, fee wil Gt there is sucha thin trial cosation More than anything else, ts the neglect stemeorsress that accounts for so mach barrenness an Ain ploy the spy mind a og iin: The stu ofthe mind isthe study of consciousness, in mach Ihesame sense that biology is the study of ie. Of couse, Bik Ais do not ned to be constantly thinking about life, and indeed, most writings om biology need nat even make use of228 chapert0 the concept of life. However, no one in his right mind denies thatthe phenomena stein biology ae forms of Ide Nee similarly, the study ofthe mind is the study of conscousnny even though one may not explicitly make any mention of coe Scousness when one is doing a study of inference percep, decision making. problem saving, memory, speech ts ee Noone can or should try to predictor legislate the fare of esearch whether in philosophy, science, or other dicipings New knowlege will surprise us and one ofthe surpoies ee should expect is that advances in knowledge wil give se sok ‘only new explanations, but new forms of eeplanatons ia past, for eample, the Darwinian revolution produced cere {ype of explanation, and I believe we have not hilly unde stood its importance fr our present situation. In this final chapter I want to explore some of the conse. ‘Guences ofthe general philosophical position tht 1 have mon ‘advocating for the study of the mind. Ibepin witha dncussise ‘ofthe connection principle and its implications I. The incr of Expianation Ubeieve thatthe connection principle has some quite striking consequences, Iwill argue that many of our expanavone cognitive science lick the explanatory fore that oe though they had. To rescue what can be salvaged from them, we arto pero an inversion on hoists sl. Inversion that Darwinian models of biclgical Sxperatin forced on the old teleological boogy that ere Jour skulls there just the bran with al of its intricacy, nd consciousness with all its color and varity. The Seog, The Fropersiady 229 sciosnes, ther nothing there: no rule following, ment inlarmaton processing no unconscious interence no mental ‘olel no pial skcches, no'2 1/2 nage, mo Ue ‘mensional description, no language of thought, and no ‘rivera grammar In wt flows wing tat ihe ene ogra story thal poster all these feces ment fhenomens is based On a pre-Darwinian conception of the Fino ofthe ea ‘Consider the case of plants and the consequences ofthe Darwinian revolton of the explssory appa Wat we ‘sto acount for plane behavior Prof Oui it was oa ‘non o antropomorphie plant behavior nd sn sch tings [that the plant turn is eaves twat thes fod Survival The plant “wash to sure and fou and“ Sit flit On hi pre Darin snepon there wae suppor tebe a level of ftentnalty ite ‘havior of the plant Ths evel of supposed inenonaty has ‘ow been replaced by two olber evel of explanation “adware” level and & funconal” level. Atte ard level we hive lcovered tat te actial movements ofthe ‘Pn’ leaves in folowing the sun ae cased by the scream Ea spec Hormone, sux Varable scene of aon “Seount forthe plan's havior, without any exa hypothe or purpose, tology, or inlestnay. Noe fithermore tha tl behavior pays ruc ole inthe plas survival so tthe functional vel we an sys ings that te ih Sng behavior ofthe plat futons help the plant sr ‘iveand repre, “The egal itentonale explain’ of the plants tctuvior ume Out fe fale, Bett was not st fae fe ctr of thententnality ad invert the order ofthe explana. Eon the itentonale aim emerges a ying to say come {hing ue In onder that what happened should be blue {leah | want o show ow in replacing the orginal intenonak ‘Sac eaplanton by a combination of he mechanical hardware Splint anda fancional explanation we are iverting the Stinatory sac of the orginal Intentional explana on20 Couper ‘a The cryin intentional explanation a rie estore the pant Ws its aves toward the sun tr tosarie the plant turn ts eaves toward the $2 peaechanical hardware explanation: Ths mceions of auxin couse plants tour their Jenvestoward the sn Othe funcional explanation: Se fettum theieaves toward the sun se ore Taal to seete ha plants hat oo. tn G) the form of the explanation is tlelogial. The fthe goal thai survival, functions asthe crise ao, naely turing toward the su. Bat is (the giants eninated andthe havior that row, by has real explanation, causes the brute fat of survival ae an no lnger a goal, but just an eect that simply apper =P 1 wil later draw fom this entire discussion can a eited atleast in preliminary form: Wher nonco Be acs re concer, we ae sil ntiopomariig Fe Fine sae ay ich were anthropomorphizing plans The Darian rout. Iti easy to see Why we make ee ake of antropomorphizing the brain—after all, the ein the Bome of anthropos, Nevertheless, to ascrbea vast Sry of nentional phenomena to a system in which the on. Faces on that sscription are being violated isa mistake, Just ithe plant has no intentional states because it doesnot mest the cobdiions for having intentional states, 30 those brain francs that are in principle inacessible to consciousness Foveno intentionality, because they do not meet the conditions for baving intertionalty. When we ascribe intentionality € yn the bran that ae in principle inaccessible to con: SScusnes, what we say is ether metaphorical—as in mete ‘Phorlel ascriptions of mental states to plants—or fale, Fserption of intentionality to plants would be false if we tok ‘te Properstudy 231 them literally. But notice that dey are nots ale they are rae to say something true, and to gett whats truin them, ‘eye favert many ofthe explanations in cognitive science Sree did in plant biology” “redid Et ths hess in deta, we vail have 4 consider son tt ceases. Il start with theories of perception and “Rim Res to theories of language o show what a cognitive te echt respects the facts ofthe brain and the facts fc SSousness might look ike io loncludes his exellent book on perception (Rock ap vith the following observations: “Although perception ane ect respect to suck higher mental faculties a8 a gutonomo\® Conaciows thought and in the ase of conscious raereyee T would stil argue that is inteligent. By calling voor issintligent ean 1 ay that iis based on such rere mental process description, infeence, and ‘rete solving aough these processes are rapid ite ‘robles ard nonverbal... ‘nferenes! implies that et areerceeptal properties ae computed from given snsary sa er iag enconecusly known rules. For example, ined se sierra rm the object’ sual ang PoE Parc geanc, andthe lw of geometrical optics eating the ‘oual angle to objet distance” (P23. aan ae apply this thesis fo the explanation ofthe PPonzo illusion as an example i gure 0 Ponzosion|am Chater10 BRE War Acoring he sa oan, a cn preed ann cee cocoens ae cn oe re cy tae poste ate seat acacia a ae ce nts sonnet ots ae an ve ret Seema RE eae s te vn oad a used yb oe etc ors creed to aan ae oder: We we Soin logical operations performed over retinal images, but who petri ce cron cae I ee it eaten vey on acca posers a ea tcp ees epitome ere e nnone on cps Spm The Proper Study 28 The problem is not, a8 bs sometimes claimed, that we lek salfcient-empiscal evidence for the postulation of mental process that are im principle snacesable 10 consciousness Fiver snot aa clear what the portalation is supposed to tmean, We cannot make coherent with what we knve about the nature of mental tates and what we know about the ‘operation of the brain. We think, in our pathetic ignorance of brain fonctioning tat some day an advanced brain science willocate all of these unconscious intelligent process for us But you only have to imagine the deals of a perfect science of the bain to we that even if we had such a science, there could tae no place in it forthe postlation of such processes. A per fect scence ofthe brain would be stated in neurophysologcal (Ge, hardware?) vocabulary. There would. be several hardware levels of description, and as with the plant there twould als be functional levels of description. ‘These fun Tonal levels would entity those features ofthe hardware that. Wwe ind intresting in the same way that our funcional {lsciptions of the plant deny those hardware operations in ‘rhich we tke an interest, But ast asthe plant knows nothing Ursurval so the nonconslous operations of the brain know fothing of inference, rule following, nor size and distance Judgments We atrbute these functions to the hardware rla- {ive to our intrest, but there are no additonal mental facts involved inthe functional attbutions "The crucial difference between the bran onthe one hand and toe plant on the other is thi The brain has an intrinsically tnental level of description because at any given point it is ‘Causing actual conscious events and it capable of causing further conscious events, Because the bran hs both conscious nd unconscious mental states, we ae also inclined o suppose that inthe Brain there re mcntal stale that are intrinsically inaccesible to consciousness. But this thesis is inconsistent tvth the connection principle and we need to make the same Inversion of the explanation here as We di in the explanations Othe plant's behavior. Instead of saying, "We se the topline24 Ouperto a Inger because we ace unconsciously following to rls Shaking two inferences” we shoul say, “We Conscioualy ihctopiness farther away and larger” Period End of the iSemonai sty seth the pla here a functional story and» argly unknowa) mechanical hardware story. The brain functions in Sacha way tat lines converging above appest to be ging tray from us inthe decton of he convergence ad copes haptic he ses of eal nage wil pea ory ins they ae perv to be at diferent tances tay fom us al fare no mentl content wc hs cna ie nsach cae the ste functons fcc sorts tf conscious inentonay, bat the casing no el infer ona. And the pitt repeat not tat the sscnption oF sep unconscious intentionality i intent supported by Senpil evdence, ba that it cannot be made to here with Sat wealeady kaw fo be thease “Wel you might say, “he distinction does nt relly ake sch diteneto copie cence We continve fo 3) what ste have aways said anc do what we Rave alas done, we Simply subsatethe word “tunina” forthe wor "mental In hese cases. This sbstittom many of us have been doing unconsciously anyway, as many of us ten ose these ‘word intrchangesy” Think tht the dim 1 am making does have important Implations for cognitive science research, base by invert ing the order of explanation we get a dfrent account of SSS thats “pur” ment we might ink of something ike ‘onwnng a fare sounds to oneself n one’s head Here there is clearly a process and it hasa mental content. Bt there i2'tko a senge of "mena proces” Where does not mean, ances th ental contest” Bt ater “process By hich ‘Etat phenomena are related” Processes ths second sense sere ey not havea mental Content For example, onthe “HU stots pychoogy there was supposed to Be a po- oxy wae hich poco of Arends mea Band Terre rks onthe poncipe of etrblance. IFT ste A, ce emblesB,then {will have a tendency to form an ee A Inthiscase he proces by whic go from the per arate aoe image of 8 does ot necessary involve any sere nal content all Thee Hs supposed to be & io on which the process Works, namely resemblance, Bir ere oft proce acorn he rl det sya there hast be any farther mental content other Tate Perception of Aan the thought of B or the though of than Feblng Ain ptr i does not imply that when se and remind of Bone flows rae whose con-29 Caper tent rue that se A and A resembles then should Ist aehore epee by wth eee ord Serhseikee ay mend cntetoal' ton that fhe Pear beat cfcoure ov tinea tc and tugs Sets pape wil haves content ering 0 the prince Petiinctirin gang prove impoant bese ay of te dacucons in optive ence move from he la that tere are pecs tat ae “neil inthe sees of causing se ect cnt prot inal otpences fr crampl) to the chin hat thee ross re mental posene nthe sme of having meta Elet informations ifernce, st The noncincious Se eet at ee Youn experiences ne cr Tiny ment one sense bt they have no ment content 3 Mee tsi tat seme sre nt neil process Somat Gis dindncion cin, nt wt singuch botreon fhe process sch saeeloring that have eral on eet retecion of bahar on fine procs that do nt fave metal content bu hat leet vr ontpat bavi, Src ether menial contents The er cl wil al soc espana whenever eto ch piss ft slomachache, tee defini an ssn Pte Erenorle flowing, Ido not flow ale When yous rachpisza get sachache st apps tt a 1V. Some Consequences Universal Grammar, Asaition Pater, ‘nut Connections It is characteristic of intenionalistic explanations of human And animal behavior that pts inthe behavior are explained by the fact that the agent Ras avepresentaton of that very pat tem or a representation logically related otha very pattern in iis intentional apparatus, and tht representation functions ‘causally inthe production of the patter of tehavior. Thus, we Say that people in Britain drive onthe left because they follow the rule: Drive on the left and that they do not drive on the ‘TheProperSedy 241 right because they fll that same rule. The intentional con- ‘eat mctions causally in producing the behavior it represents “There ae two qualifications immediately. ist the intentional intent of the rule doesnot produce the behavioral by isl Nobody, for ample, gos fora drive just o be fllowing the Meet nobedy falls jst for the sake of following the rles Br English And second, the niles, principles, et may be ‘Ghcorecious and, forall practical purposes, they ae often na aisle to consciousness, even though, as we have seen, if here really are such nals, they must bea least in priniple secessble to consciousness. ‘typical suategy in cognitive science has been to ty to dis cover complex patterns such a those found in perception or Tinguage and then to. postulate combinations of ‘mental ‘Rpescttations that wil explain the patter nthe appropriate weap. Where theve 4s no eonscious or shallow unconscious TRpmesentation, we postulate a deep unconscious, mental TRefesentation. Epistemicaly, the existence ofthe pattems is {akon as evidence for the existence of the representations. ‘Coumally the enstence of the representations i supposed ‘ihn he exten ofthe paterns. But both the epistemic ‘Sur ie enusal ims presuppose that the ontology of deep aRtomscous rules is perfety im order asitstands, Thave red te Ralenge the ontology of deep unconscious rules, and ifthat ‘alleges successful the epistemic and the causal clams col- sre Seeier, Eputemicaly, both the pnt and the VOR dep ebiobstemate patter, but that provides no evidence at all ean oe of deep unconscious rles—an obvious point for the ete plant less obvious but sil tre in the case of in the cae oy ithe pater of behavior plays a functional ito fe overall Behivor ofthe system, but the reprsenta- role iterate in our theory does not idenly a deep dn otis Fepresentation that plays a casa ole nthe Pro- acai patter of behavior, because there is no such duster consaus representation. Agi ths i an obvious orig case ofthe plant les obvious but sil true in the Basa vison22 Chapert0 ‘Now with his apparatus in hand, let ws turn to a discussion ofthe ates of the allege ules of universal gram com ‘Strate my atention on universal grammar, beause grat thar of particular languages, ke French or English whatever {oe they contain. cbviousy contain a lange nimber of rule fat are acomible to consciousness. The Waditional argument forthe existence of universal grammar can be stated quite sit Diy The fact that all normal chiliren can realy acquie the Exiguage of the community in which they grow up without spec ieraction and om the basis of very imperfect and degenerate stnal and further that children can learn certain sors of languages such as are exemplified by natural human Tnnguages but cannot lam all sorts of other logically posible lnguage systems provides overchelming evidence that each formal cud coniains in some unknown way in his or her Tran a special Inguage acquisition device (LAD), and his guage agus dere cont Ist npr! of et of dcp smc ule ‘With the exception of the last italicized clause, 1 agsee ctrl withthe foregoing argument fr a“anguage acquis ‘Son device” The only problem i with the postulation of deep ‘unconscious rules. That postlation is inconsistent with the ‘connection principe. Is not surprising that there has been eat deal of discussion about the sorts of evidence that one tight have for the existence of these rules, These discussions _are always inconclusive, because the hypothesis i empty. Years ago, I raised epistemic doubts about Chomsky’s ‘confidence inthe attribution of deep unconscious rules and suggested that any such attrbution would require evidence that the specific content, the specific aspectual shape, ofthe ‘ule was playing a causal role in the production of the behavior in question Gearle 1976) I claimed that simply Predicting the right patterns would not be enough to usiy the ‘chim that we are following deep unconscious rl em we mould ned evidence tat he rales cicacious” in the production of the patter. With certain ‘qualifications, Chomsky accepts the requirements, Since we The ProperSeudy 265 tare agreed on these requirements, it might be worth speling 1. The use of the word “rule” is not important. The ‘Phenomenon in question could bea principle, of» parameter, fra constrain, ad so on. The point, however, s that ts at level of intrinsic intentionality, For both Chomky and me tis not merely a matter of the system behaving ay ft were follow Inga rule. There must be a difference between the role of ules inthe language faculty an, for example, the role of “ales” in the Behavior of plants and planes 2. “Behavior” i not at issue, ether, Understanding sen- fences, intuilons of grammatalty, and manifestations of Iiguitie competence in general are what we ate refering tO by the use of the shorthand term “behavior.” There #10 ‘beaviorise impli in the use ofthis term and no confision ‘berwoen competence and performance 3 Nether of us supposes that all of the behavior (in the ‘elevant sense) caused by the ees (in the relevant senso) ‘The point however, stat inthe best causal explanation ofthe phenomena, the rules “enter ino” (Chomsky’s phrase) the ‘heory that gives the explanation. ‘Nov, with these constraints in mind, what exaclly was Chomsky’ answer tothe objection? Suppose that our mos sucessful mode af explanation and description atibutes to Jones an initial and stained state Including certain rues (prinspes with parameters fixed oF rules of eter sors) and explain Jones's behavir in these terme that Is, dhe rules form a cental part of the Best count of his use and understanding of language and are ‘rectly and crucially invoked in explaining it nthe best theory we can devise... -Teannot see that anything $6 Javolved in atributing causal ecaey to rues beyond the ‘aim that these rules are constituent elements ofthe states postulated in an explanatory theory of behavior ad enter {ito our best account of this behavior (Chomsky 1986, ‘pp. 252-253)24 Chapter 10 Ip the same connection, Chomsky also and Mathers (1989, ‘As Demopoulbs and Matthews (1983) observe, the appar theoretic ingens of appeals gr ‘ata characterized internal tates n the explanatory lngubtibehavior is surly the best sort of reason ora Bang ote Stes and we may a ool he constuetcemen’} 4 caoml role in the produce Shaver” (Chomsky 198 p25) 3 Se ee ea res are coma — justified by the fact that the rules are constituent ‘elements of the states postulated by the best causal theory at thebetuvor The option hat ato make Said now be cvs n Sng are eat tips dn wis eo ‘grammar, all three authors. la = erry cca ofsuch rales perfec legitimate to begin orth Be sot dnt on te eit a tas se ns Tete tatty met wel ae set dees encitonptors Ie ney ay eh Fens ome ays ee Pod by neopyspelsesune Boe eae ‘em tthepatme al. There oie tere of socaton inte sue deel sn ne Aerolentn pro aa list roe oS emote jatar eee pe Srey. he endo or eave quotes Demopoulos Steen Se hanno te futher predictive or explanatory power ded by saying that there ie in aditon seed et TheProperSudy 25 conscious rls of univer grammar, and ined ave tied's suggest at that potaton i inherent anya, fee example suppor that children cn only lea languages Tico tome peli omal propetyF Now Gals {cat the LAD makes poubleo em P lingaagesand set poi arn Non languages, Bi that st Thee welder evden tat the ch hes dec condos ale fear languages and don ean Nom anguges” And n0 serochas oun vent that upponison aya “The ntution exc analogos the lowing: Hermans arvte to perceive calas on within ceran range of he Spectrum. thou! ora ining hy can eee nid ed fbrevample but they cannot se ineared or ulsavolet, Thisis Srerulngevdence that hey have von facal” tha Sra what wor of clo they cn ace But now is ‘cents hey are following fhe deep cones aes "Eis Sore. contne tor nse OR ou? Toy rowiedge no angment hs ever ben preted to show Theale. aera Ingutic grammar havea diferent {eho hc ule of aniversloal grammar® Now ask ous why eae ae you sing that thee a TOT univer vl gamma Aer al the evden DANES indeed ental norm wth the er Soe Tae te sles of universal ingite grammar The see gave tat gle Obvious tos fom evry ‘Ringe we knw at thre tno sch metal eve, There ‘Spare mens at tne a ena Set kein othe Tam sggrtng here that here sno ie Tra Blste the sts of dep tnconscous universal vial ree Sep anconsos nivral ngs rama Sitters eee pani tet ar tat sce the cognitive sence pari i es ay tt ween ply dct et the atin: Sere ed pins a ay intentionally, eeu if sora not bang ra have no cna powers what sre cxln main. The prose ith ei nee Seg non eely ats igo ehich tbat26 Chapert0 ernie tence sory su ‘to solve. Let us see how this point applies in the eee Seppe se = ES een aes elton cir sas ght, we hay ee ningun Saeed SS Seles TE eile ‘processes in cognition. But where we are unable to find mean- Ee eee as oe crcl On eal eee Spence nec esr er eeieged prigiore i aaatifatee atta a << ec irae ee Seb Sees ete fg te Sib Siete Aon = See ee ee cee The Proper Siady 247 esting connection model are corect—perhaps the ae all ect ot st sy tat they are nt all obviously false oF roe ant inthe way thatthe traditional cogntivst models ‘fat violate the connection principle ae, ¥.Conclsion trope of our modem arogance about haw mich we KA, tri fe anoronce an universal of a sence ee ine oncemed we ae chafoctnstalyconused and the ind Like the proverbial lind men and the 1a Ane cgsp onto sme liege fentie ad pronouns cepa eB petal Thee are inv Sentnees toe eee finguage of though Ther compat PO ta ecg). Thre aol xsl tons Ba i rum) Tere nothing ther” (eli Saws) Aids, depressing o wt cur reer mets date he ett ee sais converse Like the dunk who lost is mate, he art bushes bt ks for them under the ne STR the pt ber ere wey oct hom a ate our computational delat Ban uma mi Tout how he concos unan ind acl ying to ire ot ashe, “But how cold you sty oP or a ere? How cold terebe a thar ous ee any ample orale pth 10 Be iacvery of op saying tr tat arrose hime oat tn maxim might revelation the dy ofthe mie Send, we ought o Keep sec for sure. For exam emincing ote of win ne wr sae ie so ons conus and Ean ee Soon nica si king oes wt acl Ph eo to crtspnd fe cine yt male ne nn ae Se mes whet “ue me28 Chapter comesponds to the facts, because “corresponds tothe fat does mean corespords to the facts, and’ any discipline that tims to decibe ove the world is aims for this correspon ‘dence. I you keep aking yoursel this question in the light of the Knowege thatthe brain isthe ely thing in there, an the brain causes consciousness, I believe you wil come up wih the reslis Ihave reached in this chapter, and indeed many’ of ‘thereslts Ihave come up with in this book. But that is oly to take a fst step on the road back to the ‘mind. A fourth and final guideline i that we nee to resi ‘over the sci character ofthe mind Notes 1 dy re vetting te pear of uch oon, 8 orn a ctenoray erase eae ev 2 eon hr ea Thm Nagel O96 So “emi mle phiczphe bat appre he SST pint affects svcd Continents plop, Asso sare Seaton Hetdeger and Ns lowers alo ext he imparts Coes a pitean np tatemet oe Gora By 8) 7 peri een tn one by Arming 98 1780 eA enc a rent aloe mation 9 ans, he compen emai ce Se, So tema Noam Cnso NeswpeY ong? Ant manele Reed a iy ct ae toes Sea img arte tur eons se ure oer eta cin eal ten pate oo Te San came mp ohn eh Se es ir Sn neem rare Bhpurseral tenon ae Seas ar et fw rin Sa es et mash rns rr Caine ister cen rc, ge caso. Continents by at Seem cgie is ater oss snarag ‘cacenate pep ote Terese ey ie ayo tert vars Seems one mer ne Alene nen ped Teter ca as ta ny Sars om ete cams “cae pel FTES SA echt ak we enteratnent tease the SEFies Sincsemc reef te mer or cert af ere pete ray menpicge acme eee oem ee eect rind nee ners eet dae facgat ees = Sa eeenien See eee etre ioe reins, Se veceryscrgl eect ari ttn ey SSiaweomy ane nf oy sh mp oy Gin pertain er ted yn ote indy eer eeieemeeraerc tings otc Eapctsicomantbon cei vtiny won cpr ieteeeecetet peta ancge Oye ee (eee aay vey ret sae panna tigierice ts eeeneeereetina tines acta iaire ay fe sey ek Epi sy kt thy ot fears yb ag cn by rane ee etic ate ghd yh ofr nea ll abated Notsto pags s050 251 eco teen pn a i, Everything tt and Lt hte Se aor? am SO Cet ee paar Be ond ns mo Oe cet ae Oe ra Srnec ee ana Chapter Soe" one mh spc cl hie ee me spect oe ce BT on a ad ron ads state naan eee ee ies miscnzcnandag one Mand PS Chin 1 peo Dan Rasen or caling my teatime coer Oe etna oes re hone gle» te ae te sora See rie at eee fori cose eet serait ate cca enor on rey an nc ee Siem eracsnsueg oe aia veces ee eceeaee e Senne tae acre See ay caterers sits eco eee ochneteatetanteas eencae — sm ae” od hing "tan caging tt consonant Soper cioe aie Compre ce Ser Sides cnr 38. ch pinta at when ne tre, “ine pss mone Depa enantio Why sould ine pam mae ‘sesh Sc 180,190, ond pec {Bethe rps lam onrating “ewphilaga Fo tee en of in ody eat ft That Se arena ‘ea nh hae mpg eit seal no ual ngs ye Nn ‘$Sthcy nas Armstons. son Cope and atta SESS uluson am ener ea deo beer Se for pt pea th chapter 1 pcly On Co Pia font whan Hise Chapter 1 SOARis sytem delp by Alon Nowland Haney icesy Tee same an comm fr “Se BINS Rerun aucune Walp 1908 i ven i annouo! and dened ng samba “many of whith spear to hve mr ore ee SST treet ant Fela de 8, ‘Sharla nh, Te Conia he ind SePiercogunon yen 1980, “Te Comps {Buck i, a tue, “Compusing Nace andsay ttn woud ven 80 el eat rece eh ties ur, tn Saas amigo ten hs ae ye Bo ony tf el at hve noting Fenn me plates resthigeen when om lke tn Peo 148, Leap ranted ssn, Bibliography ag, HO A Ma Te Keg Pol pet DM, 880) The Notre Mik yey og 8 “robes with Fannin Mima Sebo fuanct nee aoe aa “LL Se Reng Psa of Py aL ‘intr Unies Ps suo an) The Computer Motel ofthe Main en se ious Ceti st 20-28 Mires ‘ suo cope “ws Cones af Canaan SN as won ap oe me se a i i GS lity C98) Comptia ‘Cantige Universtiy Pos dn Sr aie oe They of Pri Tre Unerty Pree rts P00 Te Lagi of Pre RNete ‘te. 10,27 2554 ta 129 208Sumas Kt Sate LCS 5.90.12 5, RAN Jot 2 Min ‘cs