JUAN G. FELICIANO, ET AL., vs. MARIANO ALIPIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-5656, March 24, 1954

Although the petition filed is for declaratory relief, yet prays also for the issuance of a permanent injunction, the same is
equivalent to an action for prohibition and the court should not dismiss the petition but should proceed with the case
considering the action as one for prohibition.

Facts:
The Director of Public Schools issued Circular No. 20, series of 1951, which was regarding the power of the Director of Public
Schools to require all pupils and students in public schools to salute the flag, on pain of being barred from admission to, or
expelled from, such schools.

The petitioners filed before the CFI (now RTC) of Tarlac a petition for declaratory relief and mandatory injunction, praying that
the above circular be declared null and void, that preliminary injunction be issued prohibiting the respondents Mariano Alipio
and other teachers of the Malacampa Elementary School, and the Director of Public Schools, from carrying out the provisions of
said circular, and that, after trial, the preliminary injunction be made permanent.

The Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that under section 2, Rule 66, it was not a
case in which a declaratory judgment could be rendered. The court dismissed the case. Hence, the petitioners have appealed to
this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI (RTC) erred in dismissing the case.

Ruling:
Yes.

The petition filed against the public officers is for declaratory relief, yet it also prays for the issuance of a permanent injunction
from carrying out the provisions of a Department Circular on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The same is equivalent to an
action for prohibition.

Prohibition is a special civil action seeking a judgment commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or officer to desist from
further proceeding in the action because it has no jurisdiction, is acting in excess of jurisdiction or has gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (Sec.2, rule 65, RC)

As such, the court should not dismiss the petition but should proceed with the case considering the action as one for
prohibition. The order of the court dismissing the petition is reversed, and the case returned to the CFI (now RTC) of Tarlac for
further proceedings as in an action for prohibition.

Semirara Coal Corp., supra

A lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in his possession and any disturbance of possession is a ground for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the possession.
Barayuga vs. Adventist University
GR no. 168008, Aug 17 2011

In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result to
nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.

Facts:
Adventist University of the Phils (AUP) is a non-stock and non-profit domestic educational institution. Barayuga
(Petitioner) was chosen Secretary and Private Respondent Dayson was the elected Chairman of such University. Later on,
Petitioner was elected President of the University as well.
An audit of AUP was conducted which revealed that petitioner Barayuga had committed serious violations of
fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement and use of funds of the university. A further investigation was made and
confirmed the findings of the said audit. The petitioner was then informed of the findings and the Board of Trustees of the
University required him to explain. He was also reminded of the possible consequences should he fail to satisfactorily explain
the irregularities cited in the report. He replied that he had already prepared his written explanation.
The members of the board then voted to remove him as President because of his serious violations of fundamental
rules and procedures in the disbursement and use of funds as revealed by the special audit.
The petitioner brought his suit for injunction and damages in the RTC, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO), impleading AUP and its Board of Trustees, represented by Respondent Dayson. He alleged that he was
relieved as President without valid grounds despite his five-year term by the Board of Trustees;
The respondents denied the allegations of the petitioner, and claimed that petitioner’s term of office had expired on
January 22, 2003, or two years from his appointment, based on AUPs amended By-Laws which ; that such amended by-laws did
not provide a 5-year term. that, consequently, he had been a mere de facto officer appointed by the members of the Board of
Trustees; and that he held no legal right warranting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

RTC issued the order granting the petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On herein respondent’s appeal,
CA rendered its decision reversing RTC’s order.

Issue:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner had no legal right to the position of President of AUP that could be protected
by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC.

Held: YES.
A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishing: (a) a present and
unmistakable right to be protected; (b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such right; and (c) a special and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive
writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result to nullification thereof. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for
a preliminary injunction.

In the case at bar, the petitioner rested his claim for injunction mainly upon his representation that he was entitled to serve for
five years as President of AUP under its By-Laws (otherwise called the Bluebook). In such book it was found that the officers,
including the President, were to exercise the powers vested by Section 2 of the amended By-Laws for a term of only two years,
not five years.

Ineluctably, the petitioner, having assumed as President of AUP on January 23, 2001, could serve for only two years, or until
January 22, 2003. By the time of his removal for cause as President on January 27, 2003, he was already occupying the office in
a hold-over capacity, and could be removed at any time, without cause, upon the election or appointment of his successor. His
insistence on holding on to the office was untenable, therefore, and with more reason when one considers that his removal
was due to the loss of confidence on the part of the Board of Trustees.

The order of the RTC granting his application for the writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with manifestly grave abuse of
discretion.

It is also worthy to note this part of the ruling: (hehe, pero I think the ruling above ang relevant sa topic) “The injunctive writ issued by the RTC
was meant to protect the petitioner’s right to stay in office as President. Given that the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-
extensive with the duration of the act sought to be prohibited, this injunctive relief already became moot in the face of the admission by the
petitioner himself, through his affidavit, that his term of office premised on his alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only until
December 2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC had expired upon the end of the term of office (as posited by him).”