Research Article

India- Pakistan Nuclear Deterrence

By: Hira Javed

 Abstract

The study examines the manner in which India and Pakistan are
engaged in constructing a credible and stable deterrence
relationship, their emergence of as nuclear states, specifically their
nuclear doctrines and development of nuclear capabilities. Finally
the optimist and pessimist school of thoughts paradoxically view
the nuclear deterrence of rivalry states. Nuclear deterrent is good
for establishing strategic stability or is dangerous.
1. Introduction
South Asia is an important region in the world because of its complex
geographical location. And now it is a nuclear flash point. It is a gateway for
South East Asia, Middle East and Central Asia. China is its neighboring state and
also an emerging power. This strategically location also evoke the interest of
major powers in the region. South Asian states have been facing external and
internal problems.1

Peace and stability in South Asia depends to a very large extent on the status of
relations between its two largest neighbors. Unfortunately Pakistan and India have
been at loggerheads with each other ever since they gain independence in August
1947. An imbalance of power has existed between them. They fought number of
open wars and experienced several crisis. To counter irregularities between India
and Pakistan it was essential to obtain a balance of power and now both states
have nuclear weapons for balancing their position with each other.2

2. Theory of Nuclear deterrence

Deterrence theory consists of six key elements that are assumption of very severe
conflict; assumption of rationality; concept of retaliatory threat; concept of
unacceptable damage; notion of credibility and notion of deterrence stability.
Theory assumes centrality of survival as a core value.3 It is a prime factor in

1
Admin (2010). Geo Strategic Importance of South Asia: Views to News about
USA, Pakistan, India, World and Technology. Retrieved on 7 August 2012 from
http://viewstonews.com/index.php/geo-strategic-importance-of-south-
asia/pakistan

2
Giorgio, Maia Juel, (et, al.) “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment
of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict”, Roskilde
University, Autumn 2010

3
Sridharan, E., (2007) The India – Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, New Delhi:
Routledge
modern strategic thinking and governed by two elements that are risk and stake.4
Strategies of deterrence aim to influence the enemies a perception that they
believe refraining attack is in their best interests. It’s the way to prevent opponents
from using violence against vital interests of one who deters.5

According to Scott D. Sagan for stable nuclear deterrence prevention of

preventive war; development of second strike capability; and evading of
accidental nuclear war are required.6 Nuclear deterrence strategy consists of
specific military deployment and threats with object of deterrence potential attack.
It employs passive use of force to preserve the status quo and prevent war between
strategic competitors.7

3. Origin of Nuclear Weapons Program in India and Pakistan

Basically India started its nuclear program to overcome the threat from its rivalries
that are China and Pakistan having territorial disputes. There program was to
overcome Chinese nuclear test in 1964. And Pakistan starts its nuclear program
counterbalance with India because of threat perception from them having Kashmir
dispute and greater nuclear capabilities.8

India started its nuclear weapons program at Bhabha Atomic Research Center in
Trombay in 1954 for peaceful purpose that designed for civil use nuclear

4
Matinuddin, Kamal (2002) The Nuclearization of South Asia, New York: Oxford
University Press.

5
Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz (2009). Paradox of Deterrence: India-Pakistan Strategic
Relations. Strategic Studies, 29(4), 46-71.

6
Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:
A Debate Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton

7
Sridharan, E., (2007) The India – Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, New Delhi:
Routledge
8
Matinuddin, Kamal (2002) The Nuclearization of South Asia, New York: Oxford
University Press.
technologies with assurance that they would not be used for military purposes. On
May 11, 1998 India tested three devices at Pokhran underground testing site and
two more on 13 May 1998. Pakistan established its first Atomic Energy Institute
in 1955. In 1965 assist the supply of enriched uranium and platinum for research
reactors. On 1972 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapon
Program with a meeting of physicists and engineers in Multan. On May 28, 1998
Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests at Balochistan. One more test was conducted
on 30 May, 1998.9

After 1998 nuclear tests, deterrence was officially announced by both India and
Pakistan and according to Paul Bracken it marked the “actual beginning of the
second nuclear age”. For india and Pakistan centralreason for developing a nuclear
weapons program is to counter the capabilities of their adversaries.10

4. Cost of Nuclearization
After the nuclear tests by both countries United States other major trading partners
imposed economic sanctions. These sanctions imposed through Glen Amendment
that requires President to impose sanctions when non nuclear state blows up
nuclear explosive devices. The sanctions imposed on both states were termination
of U.S. foreign aid programs apart from humanitarian assistance; deny export
credits and guarantees by any U.S. government department or agency; termination
of sales of defense articles and defense services; termination of all foreign military
financing; opposing extension of any loan or technical assistance by any
international financial institute; ban U.S. banks from making any loan to the
government of detonating state except purpose of food purchasing or agricultural
supplies; prohibition of export of specific goods and technology having both
military and other strategic uses by U.S. Commerce Department.11

9
Rana, Shazia, (2010) “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Relationship Establishing a
Stable Nuclear Deterrent and Prospects for Peace”, University of Manitoba.

10
Chakma, Bhumitra, (2009) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, New York: Routledge

11
Miller, Marcia E., (et, al.) Overview and Analysis of the Economic Impact of
U.S Sanctions With Respect to India and Pakistan, September 1999.
Later on these sanctions were eased by United States including Export- Import
Bank loans and credits, Oversea Private Investment Corporation funding, Trade
and Development Agency export support, International Military Education and
Training programs, U.S commercial banks transactions and loans, USDA export
credits from India. From Pakistan United States give up restrictions on USDA
credits and United States commercial banks loans and credits.12

These sanctions appear to have had minimal impact on India’s economy. India
experienced an initial downturn but Indian economy sufficiently recovered from
downturn by late 1998. But these sanctions have large impact on Pakistan’s
economy experiencing sharp downturn after Glen Amendment was triggered.13

5. India’s Nuclear doctrine

India prepared the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) which comprises four things
that are credible minimum deterrence, no-first use strike, massive nuclear
retaliation in response to first strike, and no use of nuclear weapons against non
nuclear weapon state. And for all that India needs sufficient, operationally
prepared prepared nuclear forces, forceful command and control system, effective
intelligence and capabilities, comprehensive planning and ill to employ nuclear
forces and weapons.14

According to “Draft Report of National Security Board of Indian Nuclear

Doctrine” India’s primary objective for its nuclear forces is to achieve economic,

12
Rennack, Dianne E., (2001) “India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic
Sanctions, Congressional Research Service.
13
Miller, Marcia E., (et, al.) Overview and Analysis of the Economic Impact of
U.S Sanctions With Respect to India and Pakistan, September 1999.

14
Sridharan, E., (2007) The India – Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, New Delhi:
Routledge and Cheema, Zafar Iqbal (2010) India Nuclear Deterrence: Its
Evaluation, Development, Implications for South Asian Security. New York:
Oxford University Press.
political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and
democratic framework.15

6. Pakistan’s Nuclear doctrine

Pakistan has not officially announced a nuclear doctrine, so there is lot of
ambiguity about Pakistan’s specific purpose for attaining nuclear weapons and
what is their actually goal and policy related to nuclear weapons.16

Pakistan has declaratory policy of nuclear deterrence to counter India’s

conventional and nuclear forces formulating plans to diversify its weapons,
develop comprehensive missile programs. Pakistan clears four major principles to
show its nuclear strategy. These principles include Indo- centric minimum nuclear
deterrence, principle of massive retaliation, policy of nuclear first use, and counter
value nuclear targeting.17

7. Nuclear Capabilities of India and Pakistan

The strategic thinking of Pakistan reflected in argument of Sammar
Mubarakmand, headed the nuclear test team in 1998, that 60 to 70 nuclear
warheads would be sufficient to give Pakistan a credible nuclear deterrence
against India.18

We can also evaluate Indian strategic thinking by K. Subrahmanyam current

debate on the acquisition of nuclear weapons as an “Indian Dilemma” buried
under an “enormous overburden of myths”. He said in current global strategic
environment it’s absurd for India to talk of non -alignment and keeping her
options open by renounce nuclear weapons.19
15
Rana, Shazia, (2010) “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Relationship Establishing a
Stable Nuclear Deterrent and Prospects for Peace”, University of Manitoba.

16
Ibid
17
Chakma, Bhumitra, (2009) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, New York: Routledge

18
Ibid
19
Cheema, Zafar Iqbal (2010) India Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evaluation,
Development, Implications for South Asian Security. New York: Oxford
University Press.
India’s nuclear delivery system consists of assault aviation French Mirage 200 H
fighters, which will be increase by Russian Sukhoi SU-30 MIC multi role fighters,
along with a limited number of Prithi-I and II short range ballistic missiles as well
as Agni and Dhanaush medium range ballistic missiles. While none of the nuclear
delivery systems it possesses is capable of providing deterrence against China,
India has been developing a long range ICBM version of Agni with a range of
5,000 km in early 2001 and 12,000 km by 2003 to fill the vacuum. Jane
Intelligence Review’s report published in March 26, 2001, has stated that
Pakistan, India’s traditional adversary, has nearly completed development of a
solid fuel missile that could strike key Indian cities from deep within Pakistan
territory through Ghauri-series of liquid propelled missiles in a offensive
operation and Shaheen-series weapons as defensive measures. On May 24, 2002,
Pakistan also tested Ghauri missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometres (1,000
miles) that can hit most populous cities of Northern, Central and Western India.
Pakistan has also established the nuclear command authority and the Pakistan
nuclear regulatory authority to bring coordination in its nuclear program.20

According to the estimation of august 2010 India had assembled 60 to 80

warheads and produced enough fissile material for 60-105 nuclear warheads.
Pakistan is estimated to have assembled 70–90 warheads and produced missile
material for as many as 90 warheads.21

8. Optimistic View on Indo - Pak Nuclear Deterrence

20
Alam, Muhammad B., (2002) “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Context and
Constraints”, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics.
Retrieved on 16 December, 2012 from http://archiv.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/volltextserver/ volltexte /2003/ 4122 / pdf/hpsacp11.pdf

21
Miglani, Sanjeev, (2011). India, Pakistan and their growing nuclear arsenal, 12-
17. Retrieved 14 December 2012, from
http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2011/01/02/india-pakistan-nuclear-
arsenal-whose-is-bigger/?print=1&r
Deterrence optimist is the first school of thought following logic of rational
deterrence theory argues that gaining nuclear weapons by more states create
conditions for more peaceful world.22

This theory indicates that the possession of nuclear weapons by two states reduces
the likelihood of war between them primarily because the costs of war and its
consequences are immense. Basing his arguments within the neorealist structural
theory, Kenneth Waltz strongly advocates the view that more new nuclear
weapons states would actually lead to greater stability on a systemic level. 23 Bruce
de Mesquita, Peter Lavoy and John Measheimer also equally believe that nuclear
weapons are a superb deterrent.

The realist claim that India and Pakistan are more secure after May 1998 nuclear
explosions based on the assumption that nuclear weapons are a peace because
their overwhelming destructive capacity has stabilizing effect on international
relations and regional balances of power. There is consensus among nuclear
analysts in India and Pakistan that nuclear weapons are the surest guarantee of
national security.24

Rajgopalan another optimist in “Second Strike Arguments about Nuclear War in

South Asia” supports that nuclear weapons have acted as a deterrent in the India-
Pakistan context. The dominant view emanating is that the rhetoric of threat
between the two countries is nothing more than simple rhetoric to deter the other
from considering the nuclear option. The two states might experience a sense of
desperation because of their vulnerability to conventional attack but in crisis
situations, both countries have exhibited a greater sense of desperation to avoid

22
Cheema, Zafar Iqbal (2010) India Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evaluation,
Development, Implications for South Asian Security, New York: Oxford
University Press.
23
Waltz, Kenneth N., (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton

24
Carranza, Mario E., An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence After the
Indian and Pakistan Tests, Spring- Summer 1999.
the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Also Ganguly and Hagerty in their book
“Fearful Symmetry India- Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow of nuclear weapons”
discuss that nuclear weapons played a strong deterring in Kargil Issue of 1999 and
Parakarm of 2001-2002.25

As waltz describing conflict between India and Pakistan said stability in continent
exist, with nuclear weapons and three is no longer fight even conventional war on
Kashmir. The Mumbai attacks in India create extreme tensions between both
states, but they avoid from using military force. He said India and Pakistan
contain their nuclear arsenal to the requirements of second strike capability. He
claims that India understands that making large arsenals are the waste of resources
and the chief purpose of Pakistan nuclear strategy to deter India’s superior
conventional capabilities not to use as weapons of oppression.26

9. Pessimists View on Indo- Pak Nuclear Deterrence

Deterrence pessimist is second school of thought following organizational theory
believe that nuclear proliferation have destabilizing effects in South Asia and can
lead to crisis, accidents, and nuclear war.27

Pessimists make several interrelated claims. First, they argue that nonproliferation
and nuclear disarmament are better than nuclear deterrence for the simple reason
that the latter can fail, and nuclear proliferation could lead to regional nuclear war.
Second, they challenge the rationality assumption of deterrence theory. 28

Pessimists argue that the nuclear behavior of new nuclear nations will be
constrained by their geopolitical environment, particularly if their relations with
hostile neighbors escalate to the point of crisis. If their strategic environment

25
Goswami, Namrata, (2006) “The Essence of the South Asian Nuclear Debate”,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, Vol. 30, Issue. 3

26
Waltz, Kenneth N., (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton
27
Ganguly, Sumit and S. Paul Kapur (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia,
New York: Routledge, 2009.
28
Goswami, Namrata, (2006) “The Essence of the South Asian Nuclear Debate”,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, Vol. 30, Issue. 3
worsens, they will face tremendous pressure to weaponize their initial nuclear
arsenals.29

Scott D. Sagan is the principal proponent of the second school. He strongly asserts
that such an optimistic view of nuclear weapons is dangerous for the world.
Placing his arguments within the theoretical underpinning of organizational
theory, he argues that military organizations in nuclear weapons states suffer from
certain common biases: inflexible routines and parochial interests. Such patterns,
swaying on the side of inflexibility, could lead to the breakdown of deterrence and
trigger off a major nuclear exchange with catastrophic consequences. He claims
that states like India and more importantly, Pakistan lacks institutional
mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision making. Military
organizations are also inward looking, heavily influenced by domestic politics and
therefore, decisions regarding nuclear weapons would be taken based on issues of
domestic stability, rather than systemic threats.30

Sagan argues that India Pakistan historical rivalry, extended ideological and
territorial disputes may impel them towards nuclear use during crisis, found
evidence that Barrasatacks crisi of 1987 had potential to go up to nuclear conflict,
although Kashmir crisis of 1990 had direct nuclear dimension.31

10. Impact on Their Relations

India Pakistan because of their nuclear weapons prevents to escalate conflicts into
wars. These weapons assist to normalizing their relations because balance of terror
compels them to keep their emotions under control.32 Both states aware from the
fact that if they start nuclear war that results as immense destruction not on

29
Ibid
30
Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:
A Debate Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton
31
Ibid
32
Matinuddin, Kamal (2002) The Nuclearization of South Asia, New York:
Oxford University Press.
regional level only but also on international level. So both states try to relaxing
their relations by other means including CBM’s and trade relations.33

11. Regional Impact

Now from the nuclear doctrine and capabilities of both states we can analyze the
stability in South Asia. In South Asia, India and Pakistan derive deterrent security
from their nuclear capabilities, while the fact that their weapons are unassembled
minimizes the likelihood of nuclear accidents or unauthorized nuclear use. The
existing deterrent standoff is a pure, aircraft borne, counter value balance of terror.
Each side completely threatens to cause massive retaliatory punishment on the
other side's cities.34 Regional stability in South Asia requires formal agreements,
not to change territorial status quo in sensitive areas by military means. Successful
regional stability requires collaborative as well as unilateral actions.35

12. Conclusion
India and Pakistan both are rivalry states and have many conflicts. Now both
countries are nuclear power this status give them a huge reasonability because a
small misjudgment of event, a wrong decision based on flawed information, and
shock or a display of temper could result in only destruction. Both states adopt the
policy of minimum nuclear deterrence to deter its regional enemy. They balance
the nuclear deterrence in South Asia by maintaining their nuclear capabilities and
establishing strategic equilibrium.
They must find ways to solve their problems. Both states must move beyond the
bound of distrust and hostility. They must eliminate Indo-centric or anti-Muslim
culture and policies. Instead of viewing each other as an adversary, they must
move together in pursuit of their common objective to get rid constant poverty,
promote higher education, better health care, economic sustainability and
government accountability.

33
Rana, Shazia, (2010) “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Relationship Establishing a
Stable Nuclear Deterrent and Prospects for Peace”, University of Manitoba.

34
Ibid
35
Krepon, Michael and Chris Gagne,(ed) (2003) Nuclear Risk Reduction in South
Asia, New Delhi: Stimson Centre
Both India and Pakistan have relatively small nuclear arsenals. Pakistan has
attempted to offset India’s conventional advantage by building a nuclear force,
while India’s nuclear deterrence is designed primarily to deter nuclear attack.
India has a retaliatory doctrine, while Pakistan reserves a first-use option to deter
India’s conventional superiority. Pakistan adoption of no-first-use (NFU) policy
has the effect that conventional war can be fought between India and Pakistan that
probably not involve nuclear weapons.

Bibliography
1. Admin (2010). Geo Strategic Importance of South Asia: Views to News
about USA, Pakistan, India, World and Technology. Retrieved on 7
August 2012 from http://viewstonews.com/index.php/geo-strategic-
importance-of-south-asia/pakistan
2. Alam, Muhammad B., (2002) “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Context and
Constraints”, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics.
Retrieved on 16 December, 2012 from http://archiv.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/volltextserver/ volltexte /2003/ 4122 / pdf/hpsacp11.pdf
3. Carranza, Mario E., An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence After
the Indian and Pakistan Tests, Spring- Summer 1999.
4. Chakma, Bhumitra, (2009) Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons, New York:
Routledge
5. Cheema, Zafar Iqbal (2010) India Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evaluation,
Development, Implications for South Asian Security. New York:
Oxford University Press.
6. Ganguly, Sumit and S. Paul Kapur (ed.), Nuclear Proliferation in South
Asia, New York: Routledge, 2009.
7. Giorgio, Maia Juel, (et, al.) “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An
Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict”,
Roskilde University, Autumn 2010
8. Goswami, Namrata, (2006) “The Essence of the South Asian Nuclear
Debate”, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, Vol. 30, Issue. 3
9. Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz (2009). Paradox of Deterrence: India-Pakistan
Strategic Relations. Strategic Studies, 29(4), 46-71.
10. Krepon, Michael and Chris Gagne,(ed) (2003) Nuclear Risk Reduction in
South Asia, New Delhi: Stimson Centre
11. Miller, Marcia E., (et, al.) Overview and Analysis of the Economic Impact
of U.S Sanctions With Respect to India and Pakistan, September 1999.
12. Miglani, Sanjeev, (2011). India, Pakistan and their growing nuclear
arsenal, 12-17. Retrieved 14 December 2012, from
http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2011/01/02/india-pakistan-nuclear-
arsenal-whose-is-bigger/?print=1&r
13. Rana, Shazia, (2010) “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Relationship
Establishing a Stable Nuclear Deterrent and Prospects for Peace”,
University of Manitoba.
14. Rennack, Dianne E., (2001) “India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic
Sanctions, Congressional Research Service.
 15. Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz (2003) The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: A Debate Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton
16. Sridharan, E., (2007) The India – Pakistan Nuclear Relationship, New
Delhi: Routledge
Matinuddin, Kamal (2002) The Nuclearization of South Asia, New York: Oxford
University Press.

17. Waltz, Kenneth N., (2003) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed, New York: W.W. Norton