Orthodoxy and Enlightenment: Debut - FM Page I Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:33 AM

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ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

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McGill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Ideas
1 Problems of Cartesianism 9 The Jena System, 1804–5:

Edited by Thomas Logic and Metaphysics
M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, G.W.F. Hegel
and John W. Davis Translation edited by
John W. Burbidge and
2 The Development of the Idea George di Giovanni
of History in Antiquity Introduction and notes by
Gerald A. Press H.S. Harris
3 Claude Buffier and Thomas 10 Consent, Coercion, and Limit
Reid The Medieval Origins of
Two Common-Sense Parliamentary Democracy
Philosophers Arthur P. Monahan
Louise Marcil-Lacoste
11 Scottish Common Sense in
4 Schiller, Hegel, and Marx
Germany, 1768–1800
State, Society, and the
A Contribution to the History
Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient
of Critical Philosophy
Greece
Manfred Kuehn
Philip J. Kain
5 John Case and Aristotelianism 12 Paine and Cobbett

in Renaissance England The Transatlantic Connection
Charles B. Schmitt David A. Wilson
6 Beyond Liberty and Property 13 Descartes and the

The Process of Self- Enlightenment
Recognition in Eighteenth- Peter A. Schouls
Century Political Thought
J.A.W. Gunn 14 Greek Scepticism
Anti-Realist Trends in Ancient
7 John Toland: His Methods, Thought
Manners, and Mind Leo Groarke
Stephen H. Daniel
15 The Irony of Theology and
8 Coleridge and the Inspired the Nature of Religious
Word Thought
Anthony John Harding Donald Wiebe
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16 Form and Transformation 24 Kierkegaard as Theologian

A Study in the Philosophy of Recovering My Self
Plotinus Arnold B. Come
Frederic M. Schroeder
25 An Enlightenment Tory in
17 From Personal Duties Victorian Scotland
towards Personal Rights The Career of Sir Archibald
Late Medieval and Early Alison
Modern Political Thought, Michael Michie
1300–1600
Arthur P. Monahan 26 The Road to Egdon Heath
The Aesthetics of the Great
18 The Main Philosophical in Nature
Writings and the Novel Allwill Richard Bevis
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi
Translated and edited by 27 Jena Romanticism and Its
George di Giovanni Appropriation of Jakob
Böhme
Theosophy – Hagiography –
19 Kierkegaard as Humanist
Literature
Discovering My Self
Paolo Mayer
Arnold B. Come
28 Enlightenment and
20 Durkheim, Morals, and Community
Modernity Lessing, Abbt, Herder, and
W. Watts Miller the Quest for a German
Public
21 The Career of Toleration Benjamin W. Redekop
John Locke, Jonas Proast,
and After 29 Jacob Burckhardt and
Richard Vernon the Crisis of Modernity
John R. Hinde
22 Dialectic of Love
Platonism in Schiller’s 30 The Distant Relation
Aesthetics Time and Identity in Spanish
David Pugh American Fiction
Eoin S. Thomson
23 History and Memory in
Ancient Greece
Gordon Shrimpton
debut.fm Page iv Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:33 AM
31 Mr Simson’s Knotty Case 32 Orthodoxy and

Divinity, Politics, and Enlightenment
Due Process in Early George Campbell in the
Eighteenth-Century Eighteenth Century
Scotland Jeffrey M. Suderman
Anne Skoczylas
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ORTHODOXY AND
ENLIGHTENMENT
George Campbell
in the Eighteenth Century
Jeffrey M. Suderman
McGill-Queen’s University Press

Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca
debut.fm Page vi Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:33 AM
© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001

isbn 0-7735-2190-9
Legal deposit third quarter 2001

Bibliothèque nationale du Québec
Printed in Canada on acid-free paper
This book has been published with the help of a grant

from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of
Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada.
McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the

financial support of the Government of Canada through
the Book Publishing Industry Development Program
(bpidp) for its activities. It also acknowledges the sup-
port of the Canada Council for the Arts
for its publishing program.
National Library of Canada

Cataloguing in Publication Data
Suderman, Jeffrey M. (Jeffrey Mark), 1965–

Orthodoxy and enlightenment: George Campbell in the
eighteenth century
(McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas; 32)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 0-7735-2190-9
1. Campbell, George, 1719–1796. 2. Theologians –
Scotland – Biography. 3. Philosophers – Scotland –
Biography. I. Title. II. Series.
b1409.c344s83 2001 230′.5233′092 c2001-900145-2
This book was typeset by Dynagram Inc.

in 10/12 Baskerville.
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For my mother
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Contents
List of Figures x
Abbreviations Used in the Notes xi
Preface xiii
Introduction 3
A Note on Terms 7
part 1 george campbell: life and works 9

1 The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 11
2 The Years of Achievement (1771–1790) 31
3 The Height of Reputation (from 1790) 52
part ii
natural knowledge: the enlightened campbell 69
4 Philosophy in Theory 71
5 Philosophy in Practice 121
6 The Limits of Enlightenment 159
part iii revealed knowledge: the religious campbell 179

7 Campbell’s Theology 181
8 Religious Problems and Controversies 208
9 The Limits of Moderatism 236
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x Contents
Conclusion 254
Appendix 1: Schedule of Divinity Lectures Given by George Campbell
and Alexander Gerard 263
Appendix 2: Campbell’s Creed 267
Appendix 3: A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence 268
George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century:
A Bibliographical Essay 273
Index 290
figures
Figure 1: Campbell’s lecturing scheme (with related publications) 64
Figure 2: Campbell’s theory of evidence 93
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Abbreviations Used in the Notes
archives and libraries
aca Aberdeen City Archives

aul Aberdeen University Library
bl British Library
eul Edinburgh University Library
ncl New College Library, Edinburgh
nls National Library of Scotland
sca Sheffield City Archives
sro Scottish Record Office (National Archives of Scotland)
writings by george campbell
cmg The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern

(Aberdeen: James Chalmers, 1752).
dm A Dissertation on Miracles (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1762).
fg The Four Gospels, 2 vols, 7th ed. (London: T. Tegg, 1834).
leh Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, 2 vols, 2nd ed. (Aberdeen: A. Brown;
London: T. Hamilton; Edinburgh: Oliphant, Waugh, and Innes,
1815).
lpc Lectures on the Pastoral Character, ed. James Fraser (London: Black,
Parry, and Kingsbury, 1811).
lstpe Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence (London: T. Cadell
and W. Davies, 1807).
pr The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer, 2nd ed. (Carbondale
and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988).
st A Dissertation on Miracles … To Which Are Added Sermons and Tracts,
2 vols, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, and W. Creech;
London; T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1797).
contents.fm Page xii Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:33 AM
preface.fm Page xiii Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:34 AM
Preface
In such a general and introductory work as this (and this is indeed the
first published monograph devoted entirely to Campbell), the easy and
obvious thing to do would be to write a series of topical chapters, each
devoted to some separate aspect of Campbell’s life and thought: a back-
ground chapter on his Scottish context, a brief survey of his life, then a
chapter each on his rhetoric, treatment of miracles, history, biblical crit-
icism and theology. Foolishly, perhaps, I have not done this. Instead I
have structured this work to reflect my interpretation of the structure of
Campbell’s thought. I have argued that the way in which the various
parts of Campbell’s thought fit together is as important as the individual
parts themselves, and as revealing as a close reading of his texts. Not ev-
eryone will agree with this approach, but I hope at least that my histori-
cal treatment will provoke some new discussion both about Campbell
and his intentions, and about the context of ideas in which Scottish
moderates such as Campbell worked. Most of what has been published
on Campbell has been concerned strictly with his rhetorical theory, and
so I have said little about this aspect of his thought except as it relates to
the larger patterns of his life and work. Nevertheless, I hope that mod-
ern rhetoricians will find something useful here concerning Campbell’s
life and wider interests. Also, since Campbell will be new to most stu-
dents of the Scottish Enlightenment as well as to students of Scottish
church history, I have quoted liberally from both his printed and his
manuscript works to give a sense of his language and style.
I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada for a doctoral fellowship that allowed me to do essential archi-
val research in Scotland, and to the Department of History at the Univer-
sity of Western Ontario for awarding me the Ivie Cornish Memorial
preface.fm Page xiv Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:34 AM
xiv Preface
Fellowship, which gave me time to finish the first drafts. Most of the
manuscript materials used here are housed in the Special Libraries and
Archives at the University of Aberdeen; for extraordinary assistance and
for permission to quote from these materials, I am grateful to the His-
toric Collections, to the Senior Curator, Dr Iain Beavan, and to Captain
C.A. Farquharson of Whitehouse. For assistance in finding additional
materials and for permission to quote from manuscripts in their posses-
sion, I am pleased to acknowledge the Aberdeen City Council, the Na-
tional Archives of Scotland (formerly the Scottish Record Office), The
Trustees of the National Library of Scotland, the British Library, and fi-
nally the Head of Leisure Services of the Sheffield City Council, the Shef-
field Archives, and the Trustees of the Rt Hon Olive Countess
Fitzwilliams Chattels Settlement for Edmund Burke’s Papers. I am grate-
ful for the personal assistance of numerous librarians and archivists, par-
ticularly Colin McLaren, Judith Cripps, Murray Simpson, Patrick Cadell,
Jean Archibald, Christine Johnson, Walter Zimmerman, and David
Murphy.
Many scholars have generously shared ideas, information and timely
encouragements along the way. I would like to thank especially Lloyd
Bitzer, Lewis Ulman, Derek Brookes, Kurtis Kitagawa, Mark Spencer,
and Richard Sher. Earlier versions of this work were read in whole or in
part by Ian Steele, Lorne Falkenstein, Doug Long, Joseph M. Levine,
Paul Wood, and two anonymous readers for the McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press; their suggestions have made this work much stronger than it
could otherwise have been. My deepest thanks go to Professor Fred
Dreyer for providing much-needed inspiration and encouragement,
and to Professor Roger L. Emerson for not only suggesting this project
more than a decade ago but also encouraging and improving it at every
stage of its development. I must also thank my editor, Ruth Pincoe, for
labouring to correct my infelicities without harming my style. Without
the help of these many friends, scholars, and teachers, this work would
be much the poorer, though the opinions and errors remaining are of
course my own.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents and family for their unfail-
ing support, and my wife Heidi for correcting numerous drafts and
demonstrating exemplary patience with my pursuits.
intro.fm Page 1 Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:34 AM
ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Introduction
In him, the polite scholar was eminently joined
with the deep and liberal divine.
William Laurence Brown
Who belonged to the Enlightenment, and to whom did the Enlighten-

ment belong? We know the infidels and the sceptics, the Voltaires,
Humes, Diderots, d’Holbachs, and Gibbons. We know their programs
and pogroms, their wars against religion and the ancien régime, their de-
termination to écraser l’infâme. But did these famous few speak for the
eighteenth century? Did they compel their contemporaries to choose
between enlightenment and orthodoxy? What of the many who cata-
logued nature, joined convivial societies, preached toleration, and un-
covered the anatomy of human nature without ever abandoning church
and traditional social loyalties? There were many such in England,
America, Germany – and France as well. In Scotland, for a time, they
dominated the established church, the universities, and polite society.
But the enlightened and moderate Christians of the eighteenth century
have generally been forgotten in proportion to their numbers.
George Campbell’s modern reputation could hardly be more differ-
ent from the one he enjoyed in his own lifetime. Brown’s funeral ser-
mon, from which the above epigraph is taken, gives only a limited sense
of the esteem in which Campbell was held at the time of his death. To
his contemporaries he was Principal Campbell of Marischal College in
Aberdeen, an influential divinity teacher, a persuasive pulpit orator, an
erudite scholar, a church leader, and a Christian apologist who had si-
lenced the infidel David Hume on the question of miracles. A Disserta-
tion on Miracles (1762) was probably his best-known work in the
eighteenth-century republic of letters, and was reprinted more than
twenty times and translated into several continental languages. Contem-
poraries, however, recognized the “Preliminary Dissertations” to his crit-
ical translation of The Four Gospels (1789) as his scholarly masterpiece.
4 Introduction
As the lead article in the Scots Magazine said at the time of his death, “His
reputation as a writer, is as extensive as the present intercourse of let-
ters; not confined to his own country, but spread through every civilized
nation.”1 John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, the chronicler of eighteenth-
century Scotland, remarked that, “Dr Campbell was long reputed the
most eloquent, if not the most learned, professor of divinity in his
time.”2 Even into the next generation, Campbell was remembered as
“the greatest man of whom [the Church of Scotland] can boast, and the
man who, of all her ministers, has done most by his writings for the
cause of the Christian religion.”3
Today Campbell is known only to a few specialists. Modern rhetori-
cians agree that his Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) pointed the way to the
“new country,” in which the study of human nature would become the
foundation of the oratorical arts. A leading historian of British rheto-
ric has called this work the most important rhetorical text to emerge
from the eighteenth century,4 and a considerable number of disserta-
tions and articles in specialized journals have eked out the details of
Campbell’s contribution to modern rhetorical theory. Beyond the rhe-
torical focus of modern Campbell studies, a few scholars remember
him as the ablest of the many respondents to David Hume’s attack on
miracles, or as a peripheral adherent of the Moderate party in the
Church of Scotland. Otherwise, he is merely one among a myriad of
Scots to come tumbling into the light during the recent renaissance of
eighteenth-century Scottish studies.
How do we account for this disparity between Campbell’s contempo-
rary and modern reputations? How does a man who was once cele-
brated for his defence of Christianity become sidelined to a field of
scholarship that seldom attempts to do more than gauge his progress
from classical to modern conceptions of rhetoric, or trace the influence
of his rules of persuasive discourse on the subsequent generation of
novelists? In his own lifetime, The Philosophy of Rhetoric was among the
lesser-known of Campbell’s works, and it was not even reprinted in En-
glish until the nineteenth century. Interpretive problems must necessar-
1 Scots Magazine 58 (July 1796): 439.

2 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:485.
3 James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: L. Smith, 1841), 323.
4 Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971), 602. The term “new country,” often cited by scholars, is Campbell’s
own (PR, lxxv).
Introduction 5
ily arise when modern scholars assume that this was his only work of
importance. We cannot hope even to understand the place of Camp-
bell’s rhetoric within the context of his work as a whole, or within pre-
vailing eighteenth-century concerns, without a broader appreciation of
his life and thought. One of the best Campbell scholars has expressed
surprise “that Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric failed to treat God’s reve-
lations and designs and failed also to describe the whole territory of
what can be known through natural and supernatural means.”5 If The
Philosophy of Rhetoric failed to do so much, it is only because this secular
work was never meant to stand in isolation from its more obviously pious
siblings. Campbell’s entire body of work, as this study will attempt to
show, was governed by a unified purpose that sought to join the realm of
natural knowledge with that of Christian revelation. The structure of his
thought and the direction of his apology epitomized a widely-accepted
model of Christian argument, one that sought not to divide natural in-
quiry from religious belief, as Bacon had done, but to show how the
realms of sense and of faith ultimately supported one another. The as-
sumptions upon which this model was based, however, diverge signifi-
cantly from those that have become typical of Western thought since the
eighteenth century. The disparity between Campbell’s presuppositions
and those of a later age largely explains the disparity between his con-
temporary and modern reputations. This disparity may also cast light on
the historical decline of some characteristically enlightened ways of
thinking. The two problems are ultimately bound together.
Campbell’s enlightened system of Christian apology is represented in
the structure of the present study, particularly in parts II and III. Like
many religious apologists of his time, he employed both natural evidences
and revealed truths to defend the reasonableness and necessity of the
Christian religion. The order of procedure, though implicit, was easily
recognized by readers familiar with John Locke and Joseph Butler. First
came a theory of knowledge, an empirical model of the workings of the
human mind that described both the powers and the limitations of man’s
natural faculties. This epistemology, reconstructed in chapter 4, paid spe-
cial attention to the natural evidences of God and of revelation, but also
emphasized man’s need of a common sense faculty to ground his moral
nature. Despite this theoretical foundation, for the most part set out in
The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell was a practical philosopher who
scorned system-building. “Valuable knowledge,” he wrote, “… always
5 Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Editor’s Introduction,” in pr, li.

6 Introduction
leads to some practical skill, and is perfected in it.”6 Consequently, his

writings tended to focus on specific problems in the realm of natural
knowledge: the value of testimonial evidences concerning unusual events
such as miracles, the historical nature of the Christian church, and the
proper criticism of ancient texts. These are the subjects of chapter 5.
Upon this solid base of natural knowledge could be constructed an en-
during religious edifice. The results of historical investigation and literary
criticism helped distinguish the essential parts of revelation from the hu-
man innovations, revealing a moderate, pious, practical, and improving
Christianity. Campbell’s theology is the subject of chapter 7, the religious
implications of miracles, church history and scriptural criticism the focus
of chapter 8, and Campbell’s moderatism the subject of chapter 9. But be-
fore we can consider the structure of Campbell’s natural and religious ap-
ologia, we must review his biography in the context of eighteenth-century
Scottish events. Part I offers a narrative reconstruction of his life and
works that is based, wherever possible, on hitherto neglected archival and
primary sources.
Why does a neglected, middleweight figure such as Campbell merit
this attention? The reason must be historical. Despite the broadening of
Enlightenment studies in the last three decades, modern scholarship is
still in danger of equating the Enlightenment with the thought of a few
spectacular and controversial figures such as Voltaire and Hume. Al-
though eighteenth-century Scottish readers were certainly familiar with
Hume’s writings, particularly his essays and historical works, they did not
usually identify with the sceptical undertones of his philosophy. Yet to-
day, Hume’s sceptical, forward-looking philosophy receives a dispropor-
tionate amount of scholarly attention. Less-studied figures such as
Campbell not only wrote popular and convincing books that were read
throughout Europe and America, but also preached every week to the
congregations of Scotland’s cities, ensuring the wide dissemination of
their enlightened, moderate views. This study attempts to reconstruct
the George Campbell that eighteenth-century audiences knew, and to
find what was representative in his thought. It is more concerned to seek
the broad trends and internal consistencies of his apologetic system than
to align his thought with modern conceptions of philosophy, rhetoric or
religion. Campbell’s thought belongs to the eighteenth-century, not to
the modern world. In order to show the distinctness of his thought from
6 PR, lxix.
Introduction 7
modern assumptions, the final sections of chapters 5, 6, and 9 describe

some of the ways in which Campbell’s thought has failed to keep up with
the modern world and why, as a consequence, his reputation has been so
transformed.
Not so long ago, scholars were accustomed to describing a Scottish
Enlightenment that seemed no larger than the city of Edinburgh. Re-
cent scholarship has gone far to redress this geographical bias, but
has not gone nearly far enough in giving the Scottish Enlightenment
its proper religious colouring. A careful study of George Campbell
and his fellow Aberdonians adds much to our understanding of how
the Scottish Enlightenment manifested itself beyond the pale of
Edinburgh. But more importantly, it helps restore religious thought
to its rightful place at the very centre of eighteenth-century Scottish
concern.
a note on terms
It is difficult to find terms adequate to describe Campbell’s kind of

Christianity. Campbell himself sometimes used the term “rational
Christian” to distance himself from those who he thought adhered to
an unreasoning and bigoted faith.7 For the purpose of historical analy-
sis, however, this study will use the terms “moderate Christianity” and
“Christian moderatism” to describe his Christianity – these terms prop-
erly suggest the values of moderation, reasonableness, tolerance, doc-
trinal caution, scholarly precision, and moral earnestness that
Campbell shared with many of his age. These terms should be kept dis-
tinct from the capitalized terms “Moderate party” and “Moderatism” (a
nineteenth-century invention), which describe a faction within the
Scottish church during the second half of the eighteenth century. Al-
though Campbell did indeed have ties with this ecclesiastical party, we
should not assume that this small group of ministers, centred in Edin-
burgh, held a monopoly on eighteenth-century Christian “moderat-
ism.” The term “Popular party” will be used to describe the Scottish
ecclesiastical faction that generally opposed the Moderate party within
the church courts, while the term “High-flyer” will be applied to those
who placed greater emphasis on creeds (that is, the high points of doc-
trine) than did Campbell and his cohorts. The term “Evangelical” will
7 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page.

8 Introduction
be reserved for those who, beginning in the 1730s, paid renewed atten-
tion to the conversion experience, the activity of the Holy Spirit, and
the primacy of missionary activity.8
Campbell’s thought helps to illustrate the unique character of the
“Aberdeen Enlightenment,” which here refers to the thought and ac-
tivities of a small group of professors and professional men (hereafter
referred to as “Aberdonians”) comprising the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society, of which Campbell was a leading spirit. The members of this
group made up nearly the whole of the first generation of Scottish
Common Sense philosophers. Alexander Gerard (whose relationship
to Common Sense is uncertain) was professor of divinity at King’s Col-
lege in Old Aberdeen at the same time that Campbell held the corre-
sponding chair at Marischal College in the New Town. Although
Gerard was Campbell’s chief personal rival, he was at the same time
most like Campbell in overall thought, and therefore provides a useful
point of comparison. Thomas Reid, traditionally considered the father
of Common Sense philosophy, is also useful in judging the degree of
Campbell’s philosophical adherence to the Aberdeen standard. James
Beattie, famed eighteenth-century poet, apologist and professor of
moral philosophy at Marischal, was Campbell’s closest friend in Aber-
deen, and although he claimed to agree with Campbell in all impor-
tant matters, his thought constitutes the most significant obstacle to a
modern reconstruction of the Aberdonian mindset. Despite this diffi-
culty, “Common Sense” (capitalized) will be used to describe the col-
lective, formal philosophy of the Aberdonians, and to distinguish it
from the more common meanings of “common sense,” as well as from
the faculty in human nature that the Common Sense philosophers
believed was responsible for common sense judgments.
8 See D.W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the
1980s (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
chap_1.fm Page 9 Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:35 AM
part i
George Campbell: Life and Works
The Making of a Christian Philosopher

(to 1771)
back groun d a nd educ ation
On 22 January 1765, the Aberdeen Philosophical Society debated a

question posed by George Campbell, “Whether the manner of living of
parents affects the genius or intellectual abilities of the children.”1 Per-
haps Campbell had reason to wonder. His father, Colin Campbell, from
the little we know of him, was quite unlike his son in temperament and
outlook. This is not surprising when one considers Scotland’s turbulent
transition into the eighteenth century.
Colin Campbell was born in 1678, at the height of the government op-
pression of the Covenanters, adherents of the Presbyterian form of
church government. He was the son of George Campbell, Esq., of
Westhall in Aberdeenshire, who, according to Campbell’s first biographer,
“had originally come from Moray, and was a descendant of Campbell of
Moy, and a Cadet of the family of Argyle.”2 We know nothing of the fam-
ily’s religious sympathies before Scotland’s rejection of Episcopal govern-
ment in 1690, nor in the decade or so following. Colin Campbell received
his m.a. from Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1699, and, like many of his
1 The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aber-
deen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 194.
2 George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Camp-
bell” (1800), leh, 1:vi. Westhall is located in the parish of Oyne, approximately 20 miles
northwest of the city of Aberdeen. Westhall was owned by a John Campbell of Moye be-
tween 1654 and 1674; see The Jacobite Cess Roll for the County of Aberdeen in 1715, ed. Alistair
and Henrietta Tayler (Aberdeen: Third Spalding Club, 1932), 83. John Campbell was
probably Colin Campbell’s grandfather. I have not been able to trace Campbell’s lineage
back to the west of Scotland.
12 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century
generation, went to Leiden for theological training.3 Leiden, the leading

university in the Protestant Netherlands and one of the most forward-
looking institutions in Europe, was known for its religious toleration and
liberalism, and was to become a model for Scottish university reform in
the eighteenth century. Colin Campbell would certainly have been ex-
posed to a great many new ideas, borne by religious refugees from France
and dissenters from England, though we do not know the degree to which
he embraced them. We can, however, learn a little more about his reli-
gious mind after his return to Aberdeen, for he began a spiritual journal
at the time of his establishment in the First Charge (St. Nicholas’ West
Church).
“On thursday [the] 29 of April 1703,” the document begins, “poor,
insignificant I was ordained by [the] laying on of hands of the presbtry,
to preach the gospel in this city (Aberdeen).” The journal reveals a man
desperately aware of his own sinful nature and continually cognizant of
a direct and intervening providence. Colin Campbell’s God was both
terrible and merciful, abandoning his servant in the midst of his ser-
mons, but always reminding him of the superior wisdom of divine guid-
ance in every detail of his life. The journal also reveals the considerable
opposition which Colin Campbell encountered from his own parishio-
ners, though it is unclear whether his enemies objected to him person-
ally or to the re-established Presbyterian church that he represented in a
largely Episcopalian part of the country.4 Colin Campbell came to be
known for his peculiar preaching style (though what this was, our
sources do not say), but also for his orthodoxy. He was loyal to the new
Hanoverian government, supporting it during the abortive Jacobite ris-
ing in 1715 when Aberdeen and most of its ministers and professors
favoured the Pretender.5
Scottish Calvinists such as Colin Campbell despised popish rituals and
holidays, and so it is unlikely that he attached much significance to the
3 Peter John Anderson, ed., Fasti Academiae Mariscallanae Aberdonensis, 3 vols (Aberdeen:
New Spalding Club, 1889–98), 2: 272; Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, 7 vols, new ed.
(Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1915–28), 6:38.
4 The single sheet of manuscript, attributed to Colin Campbell, minister of St. Nicho-
las’ Church in Aberdeen, is entitled “Some Memorandu’ms”, and is found in the National
Library of Scotland, MS 1704, fol. 5.
5 Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae, 6:38. After the ‘15, Colin Campbell was one of Ilay’s
chief friends and supporters in Aberdeen politics; see Roger L. Emerson, Professors, Patron-
age and Politics: The Aberdeen Universities in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 1992), 45.
The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 13
fact that his youngest son, George, was born on 25 December, in the
year 1719. Nor did the elder Campbell have long to train his youngest
son in the militant spirituality of his generation, for he died suddenly on
27 August 1728, leaving his family in somewhat difficult circumstances.
Colin Campbell was survived by his wife Margaret Walker (daughter of
Alexander Walker, Esq., a merchant and provost of Aberdeen) and,
according to the estate inventory, five children besides George.6
Colin Campbell departed this world while it was in the midst of mo-
mentous changes. The political union of Scotland with England, though
accomplished two decades before, was only now beginning to bear eco-
nomic fruits. The city of Aberdeen was slowly recovering from a popula-
tion low of about 6,000 at the beginning of the century.7 Its small size
was offset by its importance as the capital of the Northeast, a region with
unique cultural and intellectual traditions and a character that set it
apart from the rest of the Scottish lowlands. The Northeast had long
been the preserve of a liberal Episcopalianism which opposed the cove-
nanting tradition of the Southwest. The distinctness of the Northeast,
however, came to be tempered in the years after the 1715 rebellion by
the influx into Marischal College of a group of young professors and re-
gents with modern ideas of education. This group included the mathe-
matician Colin Maclaurin, the moral philosopher George Turnbull, and
others eager to teach the likes of Shaftesbury and Newton. They re-
flected the trends in education that were simultaneously transforming
the universities in the south of Scotland. This rising generation, of
whom Francis Hutcheson at Glasgow was the most famous and influen-
tial, was concerned more with polite and virtuous learning than with po-
lemical dispute, more with the general providential economy than with
6 sro CC1/6/9, dated 26 September 1728. The children listed are Jean (probably
christened 29 January 1706), Colin (christened 28 January 1711; died September 1763,
sro CC1/6/40), Margaret (christened 30 Sept, 1716), Anna (christened 19 January
1718), George (christened 27 December 1719), and Marjorie (probably christened 7 May
1721); International Genealogical Index. Colin Campbell the younger’s will of 1765 lists sisters
Ann, Marjory, and Margaret (Milne), but no other siblings (sro CC1/6/40). Keith
(“Account of George Campbell,” vi) mentions that Colin Campbell the elder had a small
estate near Aberdeen, though there is no other evidence of this.
7 William Robbie, Aberdeen: Its Traditions and History (Aberdeen: D. Wyllie, 1893), 259.
This figure undoubtedly excludes the Old Town of Aberdeen, which lay outside the city
proper. The combined population reached about 15,000 by mid-century and 25,000 by the
end of the century; see John Sinclair, The Statistical Account of Scotland 1791–1799, ed.
Donald Withrington and Ian R. Grant, 20 vols (East Ardsley, Wakefield: EP Publishing,
1982–83), 14:285–6.
the acts of particular providence. They were well-acquainted with the

Newtonian and Lockean philosophies that Calvinistic scholasticism had
once scorned. George Campbell’s education reflected the liberalizing
trends in Scottish pedagogy that had become entrenched by the 1730s.
Campbell attended the Aberdeen Grammar School from 1729 to
1734, but it is probable that he had already become proficient in read-
ing and writing English at one of the other burgh schools. He studied
under Alexander Malcolm (author of a philosophical work on mathe-
matics) and presumably also under the rector John Milne and the
under-master James Dun (who was later to become both a friend of
Campbell and the father-in-law of James Beattie). The Grammar School
maintained a high reputation for the teaching of Latin, which included
a review of classical logic and rhetoric as well as the standard eighteenth-
century canon of ancient authors. The school also ensured that the boys
were well-versed in The Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647), which con-
tained the basic creed of Scottish Calvinism together with its scriptural
proof-texts. Campbell would have learned by memory that “Man’s chief
end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever,” and that God “hath
fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass.” He would also have discov-
ered that the proper interpretation of the fifth commandment, “Ho-
nour thy father and mother,” was to do the duties of one’s particular
rank and station. Likewise, the eighth commandment, “Thou shalt not
steal,” required “the lawful procuring and furthering the wealth and
outward estate of ourselves and others.”8
In his fifteenth year (1734), Campbell turned his steps towards
Marischal College, the University at the heart of the New Town.
Marischal College, like its sister college in the Old Town, still operated
according to the regenting system, whereby one teacher guided a class
of boys for several years through all of the required subjects, with the
exception of mathematics and of a first year devoted to the classical lan-
guages. The regents were expected to teach a standard curriculum
which included (in order) logic, metaphysics, pneumatology (the phi-
losophy of mind or spirit), ethics, and natural philosophy. The presen-
tation of these subjects may well have been transformed by the fact that
during the 1730s English replaced Latin as the language of instruction.
Campbell learned mathematics from Professor John Stewart, who was
8 The Westminster Shorter Catechism, in The Creeds of Christendom, ed. Philip Schaff and Dav-
id S. Schaff, 3 vols, 6th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1931), 3:676, 677, 690, and
692.
later one of his associates in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.

Stewart taught Newtonianism and the practical applications of mathe-
matics, but he also stressed the moral and mental utility of the disci-
pline.9 Thomas Blackwell the younger, professor of Greek and later
principal, lectured on the history and culture of ancient Greece in his
first-year Greek course. His published works, like his lectures, presented
polite, contextual examinations of classical literary works and lan-
guages, as well as naturalistic explanations of ancient mythologies, un-
doubtedly laying an early foundation for Campbell’s scholarly career.
Unfortunately, Campbell’s regent, William Duff (later a historian of mi-
nor note), was an unpleasant man little interested in teaching his
charges. He spent most of his time away from the college, for which
negligence he was eventually deposed (January 1738). Campbell was
one of the senior boys who gave testimony against Duff. Alexander
Innes, an able but unremarkable man, was appointed regent in Duff’s
place, having already substituted during his many absences. Campbell
may also have come to know Thomas Reid, who was until 1736 the
college’s librarian. Campbell graduated m.a. in 1738.10
As with most young men of his social background, Campbell knew
that his best hope for advancement was through one of the three major
professions. His elder brother Colin being already destined for the min-
istry, Campbell moved to Edinburgh to become apprenticed to George
Turnbull, a writer to the signet. Writers to the signet were not as socially
prestigious as advocates, but they earned good livings by providing com-
mercial services in the area of Scots law, and they were to become even
wealthier over the course of the eighteenth century through the busi-
ness of consolidating and managing Scotland’s landed estates.11 We
know almost nothing of Campbell’s three years as an apprentice, but we
do know that he abandoned a secure albeit dull profession (and an ex-
pensive education) in about 1741 when his interests gravitated towards
theology. It was perhaps during this time that Campbell became friends
with Hugh Blair, then a tutor in Edinburgh, whose preaching Campbell
9 Paul B. Wood, The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1993), 22.
10 Anderson, Fasti Academiae Mariscallanae Aberdonensis, 2:29. For Campbell’s testimony
before the rectorial court, see aul ms M 387/9/2/2/6.
11 John Stuart Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society 1707–1764: Power, Nobles, Law-
yers, Edinburgh Agents and English Influences (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), 32–5; Anand
C. Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 77.
supposedly admired.12 Campbell may also have associated with other fu-
ture Moderates, and almost certainly visited or joined various convivial
societies. In any case, he began attending the divinity lectures of John
Gowdie at Edinburgh University, and was sufficiently fascinated to move
back to Aberdeen (probably late in 1741) to enroll as a full-time divinity
student.
Aberdeen divinity students, whether enrolled at King’s or Marischal,
customarily attended the lectures of both divinity professors. The King’s
professor was John Lumsden, a respected and learned teacher who spe-
cialized in controversial divinity and church history. Lumsden’s reading
list is of particular interest. Despite his supposedly conservative reputa-
tion in matters of doctrine, he recommended such English divines as
Stillingfleet, Chillingworth, Tillotson, Whiston, Clarke, Sherlock, and
Butler, as well as Hugo Grotius and a list of controversialists who wrote
against atheists, Socinians, papists, and Jews.13 The Marischal professor
James Chalmers died in 1744 and was succeeded in 1745 by Robert
Pollock, who was known for his teaching of practical theology, which
included preaching and pastoral care. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre
remarked that Pollock’s expertise lay in Hebrew literature, which he
advised should be read in the original rather than in translation,14 a
suggestion that Campbell certainly took to heart.
Campbell’s theological education was not confined to the classroom.
Student societies had become an important part of a young Scot’s edu-
cation, providing opportunities for public speaking as well as conversa-
tion and debate. Campbell must have retained a strong impression of
the burgeoning club scene in Edinburgh, where well-known societies
such as the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh were merely the most
visible examples of an improving tradition that stretched back to the sev-
enteenth century. It was only natural that in January 1742, not long af-
ter the beginning of the college session in Aberdeen, Campbell formed
12 James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: L. Smith, 1841), 322.
Blair’s life is covered in Robert Morell Schmitz, Hugh Blair (Morningside Heights, N.Y.:
King’s Crown Press, 1948). Blair, who was only licensed to preach in October 1741, was cer-
tainly not yet a minister of the Canongate church, as has been claimed elsewhere. Campbell
may have heard Blair preach in one of the student societies. H. Lewis Ulman states that
Campbell was introduced to Blair by John Farquhar, which suggests a later date (Minutes of
the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 35).
13 G.D. Henderson, Aberdeen Divines: Being a History of the Chair of Divinity in King’s
College, Aberdeen (aul Special Collections typescript, n.d.), 292A.
14 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edin-
burgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:469.
the Theological Club with John Glennie and James McKail. The club
was designed to combine “the pleasures of conversation with the pursuit
of sacred literature.”15 It was, in other words, to be both polite and
Christian. The members of the club created fourteen regulations to pro-
mote individual improvement in all things related to the study of divin-
ity, particularly the practical aspects of the pastoral office. Campbell
later recalled this little club with great fondness, recommending the for-
mation of such societies to his own divinity students as an effectual
means of improvement, a central theme in all of Campbell’s thought.
Moreover, the modern scholar can cite the Theological Club as the
venue in which Campbell first discussed and formulated his rules of
literary composition.16
The early 1740s was an eventful time in Scottish history that left a
profound and lasting impression upon the minds of the young divinity
students who would later form the Moderate party within the Church
of Scotland. Ambitious young men were well aware of the battles be-
tween the Argathelians and Squadrone for control of Scottish politics.
The supremacy of the duke of Argyll, chief of the Campbell clan, was
as yet far from certain. The young Edinburgh Moderates noted the
Scottish church’s excessive dependence on secular political factions
and would eventually seek to make the church independent of such
outside interests. At the same time, the future Moderates could ob-
serve the dangers of popular religious enthusiasm to church order and
discipline. The Cambuslang Revival, known as the “Great Wark,”
began in 1742, and drew crowds of up to thirty thousand to hear pop-
ular preachers such as George Whitefield.17 The young Moderates
generally scorned such events, regarding as mere enthusiasm what
others claimed was the outpouring of divine grace. We do not know
Campbell’s opinion of Cambuslang, though his later strictures on
15 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” viii. Keith’s biography of Campbell appears

to be the only notable source of information concerning this society. Keith received his
information from John Glennie. Later members included Alexander Gerard, James Trail
(later Bishop of Down and Connor and an honourary member of the Aberdeen Philo-
sophical Society), and possibly John Skinner of Linshart (Episcopalian minister, poet and
father of the Episcopal bishop of the same name). Thomas Reid was not a member, as is
sometimes suggested.
16 lstpe, 48 and 349.
17 Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch, The Scottish Church 1688–1843: The Age of
the Moderates (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1973), 55; Richard B. Sher, Church and Uni-
versity in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 31–2.
enthusiasm generally and on Whitefield specifically suggest that it may

have affected him deeply. The year 1745 was even more memorable:
Prince Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender, began a bold at-
tempt to reclaim the throne for his family, an affair which ended un-
happily for him, and tragically for so many Scots. Again, we have no
account of Campbell’s activities during the ‘45, when the Edinburgh
Moderates vigorously defended the Hanoverian government, but he
may well have been involved; Aberdeen was captured by the Highland
force on 25 September, a week after the surrender of Edinburgh, and
Campbell’s divinity examinations appear to have been delayed until
the following year. In any case, his feelings towards a Jacobite revival
were even colder than those of the now rather unsympathetic Aber-
donian gentry. Nor did the Aberdonian elite have reason to regret
their lack of enthusiasm for the Stuarts, for by all accounts Aberdeen
and the whole of Scotland prospered considerably during the expan-
sion of empire that followed the defeat of the last major Jacobite
threat in April 1746.
Campbell received his licence to preach from the Presbytery of
Aberdeen on 11 June 1746, having subscribed the confession of faith
and successfully completed a series of trials before that body, includ-
ing the preparation of a popular sermon on a specified text and a his-
torical discourse on a matter of early church history, the explication
of a text in Greek and Hebrew, and the handling of questions on doc-
trine and history.18 Campbell was a probationary preacher for less
than a year before being called to the ministry at Fordoun, a call
which turned into a contest between the heritors and the heads of
families in the parish. The issue was resolved by the 1747 General As-
sembly in favour of the other candidate, William Forbes, a friend of
Campbell’s from the Theological Club.19 Campbell was more success-
ful on his next call, which came in October 1747 from Robert Burnett
of Leys on behalf of his father, Sir Alexander Burnett, fourth baronet
of Leys, the patron of the parish of Banchory Ternan in Kincar-
dineshire. The call engendered some confusion between George, of
whose reputation the heritors had heard, and his elder brother Colin,
18 Register of the Presbytery of Aberdeen, sro CH2/1/8, pp. 67–70.

19 [Nathaniel Morren, ed.], Annals of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland: From
the Final Succession in 1739, to The Origin of the Relief in 1752, (Edinburgh: John Johnstone,
1838), 99. There was a great increase in the number of such disputes in the Church of
Scotland during the 1740s (Sher, Church and University, 50).
who mistakenly received the initial invitation. The congregation ulti-

mately approved the younger brother, who was ordained on 2 June
1748.20
The genesis of Campbell’s scholarly career can be traced to his nine
years in this quiet country parish. His vigorous program of self-improve-
ment began with a conscientious desire to improve his ability to under-
stand and communicate the plain and simple truths of Scripture, and
eventually culminated in his two greatest works, The Philosophy of Rhetoric
and The Four Gospels. But he also pursued polite interests, composing
among other things a piece called “Of wit, humour, and ridicule,” a wide-
ranging literary essay that would eventually become the second chapter
of The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Of more immediate importance, however,
Campbell began to establish a reputation as a preacher of the first order,
an achievement that did not come easily to him. Campbell later told his
divinity students that at this time he had been too concerned with memo-
rizing his sermons (in accordance with the regulations of the Scottish
Kirk) and not concerned enough with composition, which, he came to
believe, was the real key to effective preaching.21 He also learned the
practical aspects of Scottish church government, and was voted modera-
tor of the October 1751 meeting of the Synod of Aberdeen. As was cus-
tomary, Campbell delivered the opening sermon of the following synod
meeting in April 1752. This sermon, entitled “The Character of a Minis-
ter of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern,” became his first publication.
It reflects the pastoral concerns that occupied his mind in these early
years, being at once a synopsis of his later Lectures on the Pastoral Character
and a summary of his Christian creed. Campbell vigorously upheld the
importance of progress in knowledge, considering this to be the founda-
tion of true philosophy and religion, yet he argued that it was a minister’s
first duty to show that true progress in knowledge must be founded upon
piety and practical virtue. This judicious balance of arguments ensured
Campbell’s first publication a good reception in the Monthly Review.22
20 Register of the Presbytery of Kincairden Oneal [Kincardine O’Neill], sro CH2/

602/3, pp. 25, 29 and 34. John R. McIntosh and H.R. Sefton claim that Campbell was a
leader of the 1749 movement for augmentation of the ministerial stipend until the govern-
ment threatened to take away his royal chaplaincy; see the article on Campbell in the Dic-
tionary of Scottish Church History and Theology, ed. N. Cameron (Downer’s Grove, Ill.:
Intervarsity, 1993), 128. There is no supporting evidence for this unlikely claim, and it is
doubtful that a first-year country minister would have had a royal chaplaincy.
21 lpc, 247.
22 Monthly Review 8 (April 1753): 32.
Campbell’s growing reputation must have impressed the magistrates of

the city of Aberdeen, for he was called home in 1757 and would remain
there for the rest of his life. He returned to Aberdeen not only with a con-
siderable stock of learning, which would become the foundation of a life-
time of scholarship, but with a life companion as well. He married Grace
Farquharson on 26 June 1755 in Glenmuick parish in Aberdeenshire.
The Farquharsons were an old established family of the Northeast, long
known as Episcopalians and Jacobites. Grace’s father, Harry Farquharson
of Whitehouse Mill in the parish of Logie-Coldstone, died in April 1746
at Culloden, leading the Mar men for the Young Pretender. It appears
that the aftermath of the ‘45 left his widow Barbara Gordon and seven
children in some difficulty; Harry Farquharson’s estate was not settled un-
til 1766, and then only with George Campbell’s signature.23 Grace was, by
all accounts, a spirited woman and a fine companion. There is no record
of any children from their union.
principal of marischal college
On 19 January 1757, the Aberdeen Town Council elected George

Campbell to be a minister of the city, whereto he was translated on
23 June 1757.24 The translation was very much a return home, for he
took the Second Charge (St. Nicholas’ East Church) that shared the
ancient cathedral with his father’s former charge, where he had wor-
shipped as a boy. The transition was not entirely smooth, however;
Campbell had inherited the parish of the late John Bisset (1692–
1756), a popular preacher and outspoken foe of church patronage.
This same John Bisset had been responsible for the popular outcry at
23 Hew Scott refers to Harry Farquharson’s wife as “Mary Ross.” James McCosh’s ac-
count of Grace Campbell’s character in The Scottish Philosophy (London: Macmillan,
1875), 244, based on a letter from Campbell to his niece, is actually about Grace’s moth-
er. The settlement of the Farquharson estate can be found in sro CC1/6/40 (30 January
1766). It appears that, because he died in battle, his family estate was not in danger of
forfeit. The Farquharsons were probably one of the many families in the Northeast that
gave up Jacobitism and converted (at least superficially) to Presbyterianism in the years
after the ‘45. The current “Whitehouse” owned by the Farquharsons in Tough near
Alford is a different estate purchased by Campbell’s nephew Peter Farquharson.
24 aca Council Register 62, fol. 156. The minister’s annual salary at the time was
100 pounds sterling plus a chalder of coals; see William Kennedy, Annals of Aberdeen,
2 vols (Aberdeen: A. Brown, 1818), 2:50. Aberdeen ministers were not provided with
manses.
Thomas Reid’s call to New Machar in 1737. Bisset was a “puritan of

the old school” and the instigator of the secession church in
Aberdeen, the first congregation of which was formed from his own
parish after his death – that is, upon Campbell’s arrival. Bisset had ap-
parently advised his parishioners in advance that they were unlikely to
receive a replacement who could minister to their expectations.25 It is
likely that the parish would have been prejudiced against any new can-
didate that had the town’s patronage, rather than against Campbell
personally. Nevertheless, Campbell, if he was not already, was hence-
forth unfriendly to would-be separatists.
Campbell’s move to Aberdeen put him back at the centre of the vi-
brant intellectual life of the Northeast. Within two years he was again
immersed in university affairs, this time as principal of Marischal
College and University. How he got the appointment is not entirely
clear. The office was in the gift of the crown (the estates and patronage
of the earls of Marischal having been forfeited after the ‘15), and was
thus administered by Scotland’s political manager Archibald Campbell,
Lord Ilay, now the third duke of Argyll. Keith states that when Principal
Robert Pollock died, Campbell was initially disinclined to apply for the
post, but was eventually persuaded to write Ilay directly, claiming family
connection. It appears that he had little local support for the position,
whereas the other two candidates – professor of natural philosophy
William Duncan and professor of natural and civil history Francis
Skene – had the support of the magistrates and the local landed inter-
ests respectively. Nevertheless, Campbell was presented to the office in
August 1759. Ilay was undoubtedly impressed by Campbell’s reputation
as an outstanding pulpit lecturer (quite appropriate to a principal’s du-
ties), his legal training, his political reliability, his moderate character,
and perhaps even his scientific and improving interests.26 Principal
25 Scots Magazine 58 (July 1796): 437; James Stark, The Lights of the North (Aberdeen:
D. Wyllie, 1896), 211. Part of Bisset’s congregation seceded after not being allowed to call a
successor, applied to the Burgher-Associate Synod for a pastor, and in 1758 received Alex-
ander Dick; see Robert Wilson, An Historical Account and Delineation of Aberdeen (Aberdeen:
James Johnston, 1822), 140.
26 Ilay, a trained lawyer, an improver, and a botanist, was known for promoting people
like himself; Roger L. Emerson, “The Scottish Scientific and Medical Patronage of Archibald
Campbell, 3d Duke of Argyll 1723–1761” (unpublished typescript, n.d.). I can find no trace
of the letter Campbell supposedly wrote to Ilay, but undoubtedly he stressed his father’s
loyalty to Ilay’s brother, the second duke.
Campbell was soon awarded a doctor of divinity degree, an honour

more respectable for having come from King’s College rather than
Marischal.27
The principal’s duties were important but not onerous. The number
of students in the college was probably approaching 200 at this time.28
The principal administered the college, recruited students, chaired fac-
ulty meetings, conferred degrees, and disciplined the boys. He ad-
dressed the assembled students every Friday, and may also have led daily
chapels. Although the college’s original constitution required the prin-
cipal to do a considerable amount of teaching (including languages and
astronomy), it is likely that most of these requirements had become ob-
solete by the eighteenth century.29 Campbell still had sufficient time to
attend to his pastoral duties, as well as his private studies.
Campbell took the helm of the university soon after it had gone
through some remarkable changes. Marischal, unlike its neighbour
King’s, had abandoned the regenting system in 1753, and entirely re-
ordered its curriculum to match modern and enlightened conceptions
of science, education, and human psychology. Edinburgh, Glasgow, and
St Andrews had made comparable changes earlier in the century. The
Scots Magazine of December 1752 described Marischal’s new order of
teaching. First year students would attend the professor of Greek, as
they always had. Second year students would now take civil and natural
history as well as elementary mathematics. Third year students would
concentrate on natural philosophy and advanced mathematics. Moral
philosophy and logic would be taught only in the fourth and final year.
27 The degree, according to Peter J. Anderson, Officers and Graduates of the University and
King’s College, Aberdeen, 1495–1860 (Aberdeen: New Spalding Club, 1893), 101, was given
on 1 October 1761 (along with one to Alexander Gerard), but in Fasti Academiae Mariscal-
lanae Aberdonensis, 2:29, Anderson gives the year as 1764 (as do most other biographers).
The earlier date is probably correct, since, by November 1761, Campbell was being called
“Dr” in the minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. If this is the case, the recogni-
tion preceded the publication of A Dissertation on Miracles (1762), but followed its delivery
as a synod sermon. Scottish university principals were generally expected to possess or be
awarded doctorates.
28 See Chitnis, Scottish Enlightenment, 134, for student numbers at the Scottish universi-
ties during the Eighteenth Century, and 148, for the costs of education, which were very
low by European standards.
29 See Sinclair, Statistical Account of Scotland, 1:303, for the principal’s duties specified
in Marischal’s founding charter. The principal’s salary, more than 100 pounds sterling per
year, came out of the former bishop of Aberdeen’s rents that had been transferred to the
college.
Alexander Gerard (1728–95), the new professor of moral philosophy

and logic, was chosen by his colleagues to defend the new arrangements
with a publication entitled, Plan of Education in the Marischal College and
University of Aberdeen, with the Reasons of It (1755). The Plan of Education
was a thoroughly enlightened document, reflecting the Baconian view
that “the only basis of Philosophy is now acknowledged to be an accu-
rate and extensive history of nature, exhibiting an exact view of the vari-
ous phænomena for which Philosophy is to account, and on which it is
to found its reasonings.” The new teaching order, argued Gerard, better
accommodated the “gradual openings of the human mind,” and thus
more easily convinced the understanding of the truth of its evidences.
There was also a strong hint of Hume’s empirical approach to human
nature: “The constitution of man, and his several active powers must be
explained, before his business, his duty, and his happiness can be discov-
ered.”30 Faculty appointments during Campbell’s tenure highlighted
the college’s new enthusiasm for mathematics and science: Patrick Cop-
land took the professorship of natural philosophy in 1775 (though he
nominally held the mathematics chair), the civic improver Robert
Hamilton won the professorship of mathematics in 1779 (though he
held the natural philosophy chair), and George French gained the
newly created chair of chemistry in 1793. Also in 1793, William Living-
ston inherited the post of mediciner, and was the first in a long time to
treat the job as something more than a sinecure.31 Copland in particu-
lar pleased the New Town with popular lectures and public works
projects, spearheading the erection of a fine astronomical observatory.
It may safely be assumed that Campbell was a significant player in trans-
forming Scotland’s youngest university into the growing and thriving in-
stitution of the Northeast. So too was the third earl of Bute, Marischal’s
chancellor after the death of his uncle Lord Ilay and an enthusiast of
science and medicine.
The changes within Marischal College reflected an evolving notion of
education, in which human knowledge was increasingly regarded as dy-
namic, contingent, and specialized. Campbell, in keeping with this
trend, placed much more emphasis on the proper method than on the
precise content of learning. In other words, he taught his students to
teach themselves. This pedagogy was appropriate to the flourishing,
30 [Alexander Gerard], Plan of Education in the Marischal College and University of

Aberdeen, with the Reasons of It (Aberdeen: James Chalmers, 1755), 5, 7, 14, and 23.
31 Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 81.
bustling New Town and its college, where specialization and cosmopoli-
tanism had become the prevailing ideological realities. Nevertheless,
the moral welfare of the boys remained one of the chief concerns of
Marischal College’s principal, as evidenced by a letter to the magistrates
of the city in which Campbell recommended that the town council pre-
vent acting companies from staging plays during the college term and
thus tempting students away from their classes.32
Meanwhile, King’s College in the Old Town retained the regenting
system and perhaps also a more traditional conception of education. In
any case, their student numbers remained far behind Marischal’s
throughout the eighteenth century. This disparity, together with more
mundane concerns for property and influence, may explain the misfor-
tunes of the various eighteenth-century proposals for uniting the two
colleges. Most of the Marischal men and a few isolated individuals at
King’s sought to join the two independent institutions in order to pro-
mote more efficient teaching, establish functional professional schools,
and thus raise Aberdeen’s academic reputation. As Alexander Carlyle
noted during a visit to Aberdeen in August 1769, “It is very absurd to
have two Colleges so near one another, so ill endow’d, so ruinous, and
attended by so small a number of Students, when their Union would
rectify all these Evils, and make one very flourishing University.”33 Un-
fortunately, proprietary and legal obstacles were not so easily overcome.
John Chalmers, Campbell’s opposite number at King’s College, along
with most of the King’s professors, consistently blocked the various
union attempts. Their introverted and nepotistic interests would cer-
tainly have been endangered by a union, though it is worth remember-
ing that the educational arguments used to promote union may not
have impressed the King’s men. The first of two union attempts during
Campbell’s tenure came in 1770. A second, more involved attempt,
which occured during the mid 1780s, was especially unpleasant and
generated a significant pamphlet war. A large part of the ill-feeling was
focused on William Ogilvie, the King’s humanist who had repeatedly
alienated his colleagues by calling public attention to their peculations
and to their refusal to reform King’s educational short-comings or rem-
edy its administrative abuses. But the union was probably doomed
32 “Principal and Professors to the Magistrates of Aberdeen” (17 February, 1787), aca
Letterbook 13, 217. See also Wood, Aberdeen Enlightenment, 69.
33 Alexander Carlyle, Journal of a Tour to the North of Scotland, ed. Richard B. Sher (Aber-
deen: Centre for Scottish Studies, 1981), 16. Carlyle recognized that it would take a special
act of parliament to bring about a union, but he did not see the difficulty of arranging this.
regardless, for the sides could not agree on either the location of a
united university or its new faculty arrangements. Campbell contributed
a pamphlet to the debate entitled Defence of the Conduct of Marischal Col-
lege, in Relation to the Present Scheme of Union, Against the Attack Made on It
by the Principal and Six Professors of King’s College. In a Letter to a Friend. By a
Member of Marischal College (October 1786).34 The apologetic title sug-
gests that relations between the two sides had already broken down, and
that the purpose of the work was rather to save face than to argue the
benefits of union. Campbell’s passions were directed primarily against
his chief antagonist in the debate, Alexander Gerard. Their relation-
ship, perhaps born of a friendly rivalry in the early years of Campbell’s
return to Aberdeen, appears to have cooled markedly after Gerard was
translated from Marischal to King’s in the early 1770s.35 This rivalry may
even have played a part in the decline of that most fertile of enlightened
institutions, the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.
the aberdeen philosophical society
The “Wise Club,” as the Society was popularly known, was undoubtedly
the most historically significant influence on Campbell’s intellectual de-
velopment. The Society was formally established in January 1758 and
survived until 1773. Campbell was one of six original members, and was
the only one who belonged to the Society for its entire recorded exist-
ence.36 The Society’s membership was virtually indistinguishable from
the Aberdeen literati. Thomas Reid (1710–96) is generally considered
34 This pamphlet (attributed to Campbell) defended Marischal from accusations made

in the King’s College pamphlet Memorial from the University and King’s College of Aberdeen
(August 1786, attributed to Alexander Gerard and Thomas Gordon), which was itself a
rebuff of William Ogilvie’s Outlines of a Plan for Uniting the King’s and Marischal Universities
(July 1786).
35 There are cryptic references to strained relations between the two in several sources,
particularly in Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s Scotland and Scotsmen, though none provides a time-
frame. Gerard’s hostility to the 1786 union attempt is almost unaccountable, considering
that he had actively backed earlier union proposals while at Marischal (see, for example,
aul ms M 387/16/2, 1–8).
36 See Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society for details of membership and partici-
pation. Table A-2 shows that Campbell attended 195 of 248 meetings; only Gerard and
Thomas Gordon attended more (215 and 209 respectively). In March 1773, the date when
the Society’s records suddenly break off, Campbell was the only surviving original member
still in Aberdeen. It is likely that the Society folded because individual members were
committed to too many other things.
the moving force behind the Society’s inception, because he had be-
longed to a “philosophical club” in Aberdeen in 1736–37, although
Campbell’s experience in Edinburgh and with the Theological Club
may have been just as important. The other original members were the
mediciner John Gregory (1724–73), the gifted physician and naturalist
David Skene (1731–70), the mathematician John Stewart (ca. 1708–
66), and the minister Robert Traill (1720–75). Subsequently elected
members included Alexander Gerard (1728–1795), James Beattie
(1735–1803), William Ogilvie (1736–1819), James Dunbar (1742–98)
and John Farquhar (1732–68).37 This group of literati, like the Moder-
ates in Edinburgh, were or would become firmly established in both
church and university. Many of them were to achieve considerable fame
in the coming decades. Campbell and Gerard were the most faithful
participants in the Society, and may have been responsible for the fact
that such a small club survived as long as it did.
The Aberdeen Philosophical Society was formed in the same year as
the correctly-predicted return of Halley’s comet, an event that dramati-
cally vindicated the powers of Newtonian science and human reason.
But it was perhaps Bacon who gave the Wise Club its purpose, well-
encapsulated in the society’s seventeenth and final rule:
The Subject of the Discourses and Questions shall be Philosophical, all Gram-
matical Historical and [Philological] Discussions being conceived to be forreign
to the Design of this Society. And Philosophical Matters are understood to com-
prehend, Every Principle of Science which may be deduced by Just and Lawfull
Induction from the Phænomena either of the human Mind or of the material
World; All [Observations] & Experiments that may furnish Materials for such In-
duction; The Examination of False Schemes of Philosophy & false Methods of
Philosophizing; The Subserviency of Philosophy to Arts, the Principles they
borrow from it and the Means of carrying them to their Perfection.38
The Society gave considerable attention to experimental science and

methodology, though it was not as purely scientific as the Edinburgh
Philosophical Society. Nor was it as focused on practical economic, so-
cial, and political issues as the Select Society in Edinburgh. The Wise
37 After Farquhar’s death, Campbell and Gerard collected and edited his Sermons on
Various Subjects, published in two volumes in 1772. These were quite popular, especially in
London, and went through several editions. Campbell recommended them to his divinity
students (lstpe, 274).
38 Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, 78.
Club explored a wide range of subjects, from scientific observations and

philosophical issues to problems of education and social reform. The
Society’s constitution allowed its members to work individually (by read-
ing discourses) as well as corporately (by discussing questions recorded
in advance).
The questions that Campbell posed for the Society’s consideration
form a window into his personal interests as well as those of his age.
His first recorded question – “What is the Cause of that Pleasure we
have from Representations or Objects which excite Pity or other pain-
full Feelings?” – was the subject not only of a discussion, but ultimately
of an important chapter in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. The question con-
joined aesthetics with the philosophy of the human mind, both of
which were leading concerns among the members of the Wise Club.
Another question posed by Campbell – “Can the Generation of Worms
in the Bodies of Animals be accounted for on the common Principles
of Generation?” – highlighted an important contemporary scientific
issue which became a matter of particular interest to the naturalist
David Skene.39 Campbell’s third question – “Whether Matter has a
Separate and permanent Existence” – was crossed out in the Society’s
records in favour of a question concerning “The Nature of Contrari-
ety.” It would be of considerable philosophical interest to know why
the Society chose not to debate the original question, which had been
central to Berkeley’s philosophy. Campbell was in turn influenced by
the questions posed by other members. The group’s discussion of
David Skene’s question concerning the nature of enthusiasm and su-
perstition was reflected in one of Campbell’s later sermons, and also
touched on the problem of belief in miracles.40
The Wise Club provided a venue in which Campbell could explore his
scientific interests. Not only did he contribute discussion questions con-
cerning the colour of the heavens and the nature of diseases in animals,
but he also devoted considerable time to the collection and classification
of botanical specimens. A rare letter from this period details Campbell’s
expeditions into a remote corner of Aberdeenshire, where he examined
geological phenomena and identified plant species with more than mere
39 See Skene’s abstract of the discussion (which includes a compelling example of his
bibliographic knowledge of the topic), aul ms 37, fol. 188r–v, and a discourse by him on
the same topic, aul ms 475, fols 284–9.
40 aul ms 37, fols. 186r–7v.
amateurish skill.41 The recipient of the letter, David Skene, was one of
the many correspondents of the Swedish taxonomist Linnaeus; this
linked Campbell, along with thousands of other amateur botanists, into
the most important network of eighteenth-century naturalists. James
Beattie later wrote, “The Principal, who was once a great botanist,
though he has now given over the study, has made him [his son, James
Hay Beattie] a present of a very great collection of dried plants.”42 Sam-
ples from this same collection now constitute the oldest specimens in the
Aberdeen University Herbarium. Campbell’s interest in natural history,
particularly in the systematic classification of nature, suggests that he
shared with Reid and with many thinkers of the Enlightenment a rather
taxonomic view of the whole of creation, including the human mind.
Their notion that human classificatory systems represented a purposeful
organizational scheme built into the natural world by the Creator had
significant religious and apologetic undertones.
The Aberdeen Philosophical Society is most often remembered for
its philosophical publications, notably Reid’s Inquiry into the Human
Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), Beattie’s Essay on the Na-
ture and Immutability of Truth (1770), and Gerard’s Essay on Genius
(1774). Campbell’s own discourses appeared later in The Philosophy of
Rhetoric, a work very much influenced by the members of the Wise
Club. Campbell’s attempt to employ the universal rules of rhetoric to
uncover the principles of human nature may have been encouraged by
the specific subject-rules of the Society. Likewise, the doctrine of evi-
dence in A Dissertation on Miracles was heavily influenced by a philoso-
phy of Common Sense that was, to a large degree, worked out in
Society meetings. This common interest in fundamental problems of
knowledge suggests that the Wise Club, having been created for, among
other things, “the Examination of False Schemes of Philosophy & false
Methods of Philosophizing,” was deeply concerned to meet the scepti-
cal challenges of David Hume. Although the Society’s interest in Hume
is well known, the nature and complexity of its relationship with the
sceptic is not as well understood. This relationship, as we shall see, is
better characterized as a dialogue than as a simple refutation. The Wise
Club members were certainly concerned to vindicate science and reli-
41 Campbell to Skene, 1 August 1770 (ncl MS THO 2, fols 53–4). See aul ms 482,
p. 45, for an example of Campbell’s contributions to Skene’s work in natural history. See
also chapter 6, below.
42 Beattie to Miss Valentine (his niece), 22 May 1787 (aul ms 30/1/266). Campbell
used botanical analogies in several of his published works.
gion from the implications of Hume’s scepticism, but they also consis-
tently used Hume’s philosophy of human nature as a foundation for
their own moral philosophy. Virtually all the members of the Society
took up some part of Hume’s thought, often in print, as in the works of
Campbell, Reid, Beattie, and Gerard, but also within the confines of
the Society, as in a discourse by John Farquhar entitled, “On the nature
[and] operations of the imagination, in which Mr Humes theory of this
faculty is particularly considered.”43
Campbell’s major contribution to the Society’s philosophical dia-
logue with Hume was also his only publication during this period. A Dis-
sertation on Miracles, published in 1762, was based on a synod sermon
preached in October 1760, and was directed against Hume’s famous at-
tack on miracles, found in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Campbell’s Dissertation took issue both with Hume’s philosophical stric-
tures on the possibility of believing testimony concerning miraculous
events, and with his historical considerations of various miracle claims,
ultimately vindicating the Protestant view of miracles. Between the
preaching of the initial sermon and the publication of the first edition,
Campbell entered into a correspondence with Hume himself, mediated
by their mutual friend Hugh Blair, who had shown Campbell’s manu-
script to Hume. In a letter to Blair, probably written in the autumn of
1761, Hume spoke highly of the manuscript, though he objected to its
controversial tone, claiming Campbell was “a little too zealous for a phi-
losopher.”44 Campbell obligingly toned down the personal nature of the
attack, enough that Hume wrote him a friendly letter soon after the
publication of the Dissertation. In this well-known epistle, Hume praised
Campbell’s philosophical abilities, and especially the affable tone in
which Campbell had ultimately conducted the controversy. “I own to
you,” he claimed, “that I never felt so violent an Inclination to defend
myself as at present when I am thus fairly challeng’d by you,” but never-
theless he cited his famous maxim never to answer an adversary in
print.45 Campbell’s reply was equally obliging, praising Hume’s abilities
as a writer and the generosity he had shown in taking notice of his work.
43 aul ms 3107/1/3, pp. 35–7. In this discourse, Farquhar seems more often to
agree than disagree with Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Similar references to Hume’s
philosophy appear in David Skene’s papers as well.
44 The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932),
1:351. There do not seem to be any other surviving portions of this particular exchange of
letters.
45 aul ms 3214/7.
He admitted that Hume’s friendly letter had even forced him to love
and honour a man so different in religious and moral principles.46 Un-
fortunately, there is no evidence that the two ever corresponded again,
though it is quite possible that they met subsequently in Edinburgh.
Campbell’s Dissertation was even better received by the critics. An
anonymous writer in the Critical Review thought Campbell’s reasoning
so acute, “that we may venture to pronounce Mr. Hume, with all his
subtilty, will not be able to elude the force of the critic’s argument.”47
William Rose, writing in the Monthly Review, praised Campbell’s work as
the most regular and methodical treatment of the topic to date.48 A
Dissertation on Miracles went through many English editions, and in
translation became Campbell’s best-known work on the continent. For
a considerable time after its first publication, it was considered to be
the definitive refutation of Hume’s impious attack on the miracles of
the Christian religion. Campbell’s reputation as a writer and Christian
apologist was firmly established.
46 nls ms 23154, n. 11.

47 Critical Review 14 (August 1762): 84.
48 Monthly Review 26 (1762): 499.
The Years of Achievement (1771–1790)
professor of divinity
In an often-repeated story, Marischal College’s professor of divinity

Alexander Gerard supposedly said that his successor George Camp-
bell was indolent, a remark that, when repeated to Campbell, roused
him to a hitherto unknown diligence.1 Though the justness of the
accusation, and perhaps also the anecdote itself, seem doubtful, we
can be certain that the charge of indolence was impossible to sustain
after Campbell added the duties of professor of divinity to his other
activities.
John Lumsden, Campbell’s former divinity professor at King’s, died in
July 1770. Alexander Gerard, who had already held Marischal’s divinity
post for a decade, was translated to the corresponding chair in the Old
Town’s college. Campbell’s candidacy for the Marischal vacancy seems to
have had the support of most of his colleagues, though David Skene,
Campbell’s friend in science and dean of faculty at Marischal, took the
additional precaution of writing to Lord Kames for help in securing the
place for him. The divinity chair, one of two Marischal chairs in the gift
of the Town Council, was voted to Campbell on 26 June 1771, after the
council had satisfied itself as to Campbell’s “Ability piety Literature,
1 G.D. Henderson, Aberdeen Divines: Being a History of the Chair of Divinity in King’s College,
Aberdeen (aul Special Collections typescript, n.d.), 324; James McCosh, The Scottish Philoso-
phy (London: Macmillan, 1875), 239. This unflattering anecdote does not appear in
George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Campbell”
(1800), in leh, l:v–lix.
Christian life and Conversation.”2 The new position was of no great ma-
terial benefit to Campbell, adding only twenty pounds per year to his
principal’s and minister’s salaries. He was, however, translated from
St. Nicholas’ to Greyfriars, a ministerial position in the college chapel
that was traditionally attached to the divinity chair, but carried no fixed
duties beyond a weekly sermon in one of the city’s churches.3 This reduc-
tion in parochial obligations allowed Campbell to focus entirely on
lecturing and publishing.
We are fortunate that many of Campbell’s divinity lectures have been
published. They provide important insights into the structure of Camp-
bell’s thought and the range of his scholarly activities. They also betray
the fact that he and Gerard, his opposite number at King’s, had broken
the long-standing tradition of dividing the teaching duties between the
two chairs. Individual students continued to attend both lecturers, but
they now observed a great deal more overlap and less specialization
than before.4 They probably could not have helped noticing some cold-
ness between the two professors, despite the remarkable similarities of
their religious thought.
The college term in Aberdeen ran from the beginning of Novem-
ber to early April, but the divinity course did not begin until mid or
late December. Campbell increased his own workload by doubling the
number of lectures normally delivered in a term. He lectured on
Tuesdays and Thursdays, while Gerard lectured on Mondays and
2 aca Council Register 63, fol. 183. Skene’s letter to Kames (26 September 1770) is
found in aul ms 38, no.175. G.D. Henderson says Campbell only narrowly won over his
old friend John Glennie (Aberdeen Divines, 324).
3 The twenty pounds sterling salary (from the crown) is cited in the letter from Skene
to Kames. Divinity students in Scotland did not pay class fees. At the time of his retire-
ment in 1795, the divinity chair and Greyfriars (which belonged to the city rather than
the college) were together worth 160 pounds sterling per year; Keith, “Account of George
Campbell,” liii. This gave him a total income of more than 260 pounds sterling per year.
Again, the divinity professor’s salary, primarily made up of his ministerial income, would
have come out of land rents and feu duties, such as the rents of Torie (aul ms M 94,
p. 53), formerly belonging to the bishop or abbot of Greyfriars.
4 Robert Eden Scott attended and preserved notes on the lectures of both professors
during the 1786–87 term. These notes can be found in Aberdeen University Library, ms
M 190 (Campbell’s lectures) and ms K 174 (Gerard’s lectures). See appendix 1 for a list
of the lecture topics from that term. Both professors lectured on aspects of biblical criti-
cism during that school year, confirming the lack of lecture coordination. Each profes-
sor, in effect, had to do the work of a whole divinity faculty, except for the teaching of
Hebrew. The Hebrew classes, which divinity students were strongly urged to attend, were
given twice a day, five days a week, by the professor of oriental languages.
The Years of Achievement (1771–1790) 33
Fridays. Because divinity students did not take degrees, often lived out
of town, and frequently supported themselves by teaching or tutor-
ing, regular attendance at divinity lectures was a perennial concern.
Campbell did his best to regularize his course, and kept attendance
records for each class so that he could provide a fair and accurate re-
port of each student’s diligence for the presbytery at the time of a
prospective minister’s licensing examinations.5 Since prospective
ministers were expected to take at least four years of divinity studies,
Campbell lectured according to a four-year schedule. A student enter-
ing at any stage of the cycle could expect to hear the entire course of
lectures during his four years of study. Campbell further claimed that
each year he would intersperse lectures on theoretical divinity with
lectures on practical pastoral duties.6 Both Campbell and Gerard lec-
tured extensively on biblical criticism, but spent little time on system-
atic theology. Both emphasized the practical duties of the pastoral
office. As Marischal College did not have a chair of ecclesiastical his-
tory, Campbell devoted a considerable portion of his theology course
to this subject. He lectured in English, but expected his students to be
sufficiently proficient in Latin to follow extensive quotations without
translation. In addition to the two weekly lectures, Campbell spent
Saturdays listening to student discourses. Since both Campbell and
Gerard held high reputations as preachers, the populations of Old
and New Aberdeen, along with the matriculated members of these
communities, would have been familiar with the professors’ preach-
ing, and thus with the practical bent of their theologies.
5 aul ms M 191, p. 44. The trials that Campbell used with his students were probably
also preparatory for the licensing examinations (see aul ms M 192, p. 5). According to
John Sinclair’s Statistical Account of Scotland 1791–1799, ed. Donald Withrington and Ian R.
Grant, 20 vols (East Ardsley, Wakefield: EP Publishing, 1982–3), 1:319, the two Aberdeen
divinity professors had sixty to eighty students between them at any one time, though only
a third attended regularly. On Campbell’s teaching style, see Keith, “Account of George
Campbell,” lxxvii. aul ms M 192, p. 5 provides details on the various discourses, homilies,
and sermons that Campbell expected to hear from his students. aul ms K 174, pp. 140,
201, and 333 suggest that Gerard’s student exercises were practical in nature, appropriate
to the pastoral duty lectures he was giving at that time.
6 According to a portion of his introductory lectures not included with the printed Lectures
on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, Campbell devoted the Tuesday lectures to the sci-
ence of theology and the Thursday lectures to the pastoral function (aul ms M 191, p. 40).
However, according to Scott’s lecture notes for 1786–87 (see appendix 1), Campbell lectured
only on biblical criticism that year; Gerard did in fact intersperse lectures on criticism among
his lectures on pastoral duties.
As principal and professor of divinity in one of Scotland’s five universi-

ties, Campbell was an important and influential person within the Church
of Scotland. Although we do not know much about his ecclesiastical poli-
ticking, we do know that he was heavily involved in the various layers of
Scottish church government. He would have regularly attended local kirk-
sessions and the meetings of the presbytery of Aberdeen, as well as the bi-
annual meetings of the provincial Synod of Aberdeen, of which he was
moderator on several occasions. Despite his frequent attendance, Camp-
bell was never moderator of the General Assembly, an odd fact consider-
ing the respect in which he was held by all parties within the church. He
consistently refused to be considered for the moderator’s position, claim-
ing that he did not have the character of a politician and wished only to
convince his fellow assembly members by argument and persuasion.7 In-
deed, the church courts were the major remaining venue for public ora-
tory in Scotland after the Union, and Campbell did not lose these
opportunities to practice his chosen art. According to Thomas Somerville,
There was not any member of the General Assembly who was listened to with
more attention, or who, as a speaker, was more successful in producing conviction
than Principal Campbell of Aberdeen. The closeness, the force, the condensed
precision of his reasoning, exceed the power of description. Not a single superflu-
ous word was used – no weak or doubtful argument introduced. Like a mathemat-
ical demonstration, every topic produced accumulation of proof, and prepared
his audience for the more complete assent to the conclusion drawn from it. His
person and manner indicated such simplicity of character, such indifference ei-
ther to personal consequence or the interests of party, that it was impossible to
deny him as much credit for the purity of his heart as for the transcendent excel-
lence of his understanding. Although he coincided with Dr. Robertson in every
case relative to presentations and the settlement of vacant parishes, yet I remem-
ber that in some questions of considerable moment, he divided with the minority,
which, from the power of his arguments, was, on such occasions, more consider-
able than in most other cases decided by calling the votes of the members.8
7 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” xli.

8 Thomas Somerville, My Own Life and Times 1741–1814 (Edinburgh: Edmonston and
Douglas, 1861), 95–6. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre suggests that Campbell seldom spoke in
the General Assembly and did not enter much into party debates; see Scotland and Scotsmen
in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood,
1888), 1:493. According to Sher, Campbell attended the General Assembly eight times
between 1751 and 1785, while Gerard was there fourteen times in the same period; see
Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Englightenment: the Moderate Literati of
Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 128.
We should not conclude from this that Campbell was entirely free of the
entanglements of church politics. He may have played a small part in
the Moderate party’s victory when the “Drysdale bustle” came before
the 1764 General Assembly.9 But it is as yet too soon in this study to
consider the extent of Campbell’s relations with the Moderate party.
Campbell, by virtue of his offices, was also an important figure in
Aberdeen city life. In 1783, for example, he was elected tenth patron of
the Incorporated Trades of Aberdeen, an honourary lifetime position
that he seems to have held until he resigned his divinity chair in 1795.
The patron, usually one of the ministers of St. Nicholas’, was responsi-
ble for providing continuity at the society’s elections, and presiding at
other official functions.
the spirit of the gospel
Campbell’s literary career would prove to be highly controversial,

though seldom in the ways that he anticipated. His already well-known
Dissertation on Miracles had established him as a significant European fig-
ure in Christian apologetics. Campbell believed that all attacks upon
Christianity took one of two forms, impugning either its character or its
positive evidences.10 A Dissertation on Miracles defended the external evi-
dences of Christianity from the strictures of an infidel. In his next publi-
cation, Campbell attempted to defend the character of Christianity
(that is, its worthiness of God) not only against attacks from outside the
church, but also against the dangers of misguided Christians within.
In April 1771, Campbell preached a sermon before the Synod of
Aberdeen that was published the same year as The Spirit of the Gospel A
Spirit Neither of Superstition Nor of Enthusiasm. Campbell argued, against
the critics of religion, that true Christianity is characterized neither by
fearful superstition nor by intemperate enthusiasm. True Christianity, he
said, breathes the spirit of charity, reforming power, and soundness of
9 See Richard B. Sher, “Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in Mid-Eighteenth-

Century Edinburgh: The Drysdale ‘Bustle’ of the 1760s,” in New Perspectives on the Politics
and Culture of Early Modern Scotland, ed. John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander
Murdoch (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1981), 198. In 1764, the Edinburgh Moderate John
Jardine represented Marischal College at the General Assembly; this probably could not
have happened without the approval of Campbell and Gerard. In his closing speech
Gerard, who was the moderator that year, defended patronage and the rule of law; see
Gerard’s speech in Nathaniel Morren, ed., Annals of the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland 1752–66 (Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1840), 405–9.
10 lstpe, 90; st, 1:307.
mind, rather than the spirit of mystery, ritual, intolerance, and sectarian
zeal. Few in the enlightened eighteenth century could have objected to
this standard theme – that Christianity is intrinsically beautiful and wor-
thy of the God revealed in nature – for it embraced moderatism while re-
jecting irreligion. The Critical Review noted that the sermon “contains the
genuine dictates of a sound mind, and breathes throughout the evangel-
ical spirit which it so accurately and elegantly describes.”11 But others
were less pleased, particularly those adherents of Scottish churches out-
side the Presbyterian fold who thought that Campbell’s sermon chal-
lenged their very legitimacy. Indeed, Campbell’s latitudinarian and anti-
sectarian stance placed more emphasis on the heart of the individual
than on the ceremonies and legalities that High Church dissenters
claimed were necessary to salvation. William Abernethy Drummond, a
minister of the nonjuring Scottish Episcopal Church, answered with a
pamphlet entitled Remarks Upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon (1771), in which
he objected to Campbell’s scant regard for the external observances of
religious worship and for the correct structure of church government,
both of which he felt were essential to salvation.12 But Drummond’s tone
was not hostile, unlike that of Campbell’s other major critic. The second
attack, entitled A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency, Both for Christianity
and Protestancy, of a Sermon, said to be preached before an Assembly of Divines
(1771), appeared under the moniker, “Staurophilus, A Member of the
Aletheian Club.” This pamphlet was in reality the first publication of the
Roman Catholic priest George Hay, who was later to become head of the
Catholic church in Scotland. The author’s identity was apparently un-
known to Campbell, who nevertheless guessed the sectarian adherence
of his opponent. Hay brutally characterized Campbell’s sermon as
“fraught with the grossest calumnies and most unjust misrepresenta-
tions.”13 He dismissed Campbell’s implied charges that the Catholic
church had historically promoted ignorance in its adherents, corrupted
11 Critical Review 32 (November 1771): 396.

12 Other Scottish Episcopalians felt more threatened by Campbell. John Allan wrote to
John Alexander: “I’m informed the Sermon is doing some hurt in the North; & no wonder:
for the Author’s Principles will be readily adopted by this fashionable Age” (2 October
1771, sro CH12/23/1422). See other letters of Scottish Episcopalians, sro CH12/23/
1416–1430, and CH12/24/138 and 140.
13 George Hay, A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency (London: Printed for the Aletheian
Club, 1771), 9. Alexander Geddes, another Scottish Catholic priest, wrote satirical verses
on what must have been Campbell’s sermon; see Reginald C. Fuller, Alexander Geddes 1737–
1802: Pioneer of Biblical Criticism (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1984), 24.
Christian morals, and sacrificed virtue for the advancement of the papal
hierarchy. Campbell was taken aback by the vicious nature of Hay’s at-
tack, no doubt because he had never directly implicated the contempo-
rary Roman Catholic church. Although Campbell did eventually prepare
a rebuttal, it was never printed.14 However, the issues raised in this con-
troversy were to become important themes of his later writings, particu-
larly his divinity lectures. For the present, Campbell had unwittingly
made himself a leading enemy of Scots outside the established church.
the philosophy of rhetoric
In the late spring of 1775, Campbell undertook the long journey to

London to find a publisher for The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a work begun in
a quiet country parish twenty-five years earlier. Clearly Campbell had
high hopes for the manuscript, for he sought help in the best literary cir-
cles. The well-connected critic William Rose wrote to James Beattie that
he was in the process of helping Campbell sell the manuscript to the fa-
mous Scottish-born publisher and King’s Printer William Strahan.15 Be-
attie, who had himself been in London only the week before, recorded
the following entry in his journal: “[Principal Campbell’s] manuscript is
now given to Strachan who has put it in the hands of Adam Smith. I ad-
vise the Principal not to meddle himself in the disposal of it, but to leave
that matter to Mr. Rose and others of his friends, who will probably get
more money for it than he would be inclined to ask … I have again and
again recommended it to Strachan in the strongest terms, yet no more
than it deserves.”16 Strahan did indeed publish the work in the following
year, but we do not know the price or conditions of the manuscript sale.
Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations had just been published, gave
Strahan a mixed opinion: “There is good sense, and learning, and phi-
losophy in Campbells Book: But it is so unfashioned that I am afraid you
14 John Allan, in another letter to John Alexander (20 November 1771), stated that
“Campbel has been insinuating his Intention of making a Reply soon. He is very angry at
the Author of the Detection to whom, I imagine, his Answer will be principally addressed”
(sro CH12/23/1429). In an unpublished manuscript, Campbell mentioned that there
were two other minor attacks on his sermon in addition to these two (aul ms 651, p. 25),
but I have not been able to find them. In a later letter to Bishop John Douglas (30 Decem-
ber 1790), Campbell mentioned three attacks altogether, the third being by “a Scotch
methodist” (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 16).
15 Rose to Beattie, 26 June 1775: aul ms 30/2/232a.
16 Entry for 19 June 1775, quoted in Margaret Forbes, Beattie and His Friends (Westmin-
ster: Archibald Constable, 1904), 123.
will not be a great gainer by it.”17 The critics were kinder, if not always
less confused about the structure of the work. The anonymous reviewer
for the Critical Review had nothing but praise, noting in particular Camp-
bell’s philosophical abilities.18 William Enfield, reviewing for the Monthly
Review, was almost equally lavish, though he seemed to think that addi-
tional volumes would appear so as to complete Campbell’s explicit
plan.19 Indeed, Campbell had named perspicuity, vivacity, elegance, ani-
mation, and music as the “five simple and original qualities of style,” but
had addressed only the first two.20 Eighteenth-century sales did nothing
to contradict Smith’s original assessment.
The two major purposes evident in The Philosophy of Rhetoric both reveal
a man of the Enlightenment. The first purpose was to set out rules of cor-
rect English usage, a matter of common concern to eighteenth-century
English and particularly Scottish authors. Campbell displayed a genuine
talent for systematically exposing the stylistic flaws of English authors, us-
ing the best writers as examples. He did not wish to promote novel stan-
dards of usage, arguing that customary usage is the only rule of correct
style. Nor did he wish to argue any new principles of persuasion. The
rules of effective communication, that is, of raising appropriate emotions
in one’s audience or of persuading by means of argument, had been de-
finitively outlined by the ancients, notably Aristotle, Quintilian, and
Cicero. Nevertheless, the foundation of these universal rhetorical princi-
ples in human nature was only beginning to be explored in Campbell’s
time. Campbell’s second major purpose was to employ the study of rheto-
ric to discover the inner workings and secret springs of the human mind,
17 Smith to Strahan, 6 July 1776: The Correspondence of Adam Smith, ed. E.C. Mossner
and I.S. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 1987), 202–3. Smith was not en-
tirely disinterested, for his own “Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres” was in potential
competition with Campbell’s book.
18 Critical Review 42 (July, August and September 1776): 1–11, 111–18 and 182–7.
19 Monthly Review 55 (October and November 1776): 286–95 and 374–83. For a full
account of the critical reaction to this work see H. Lewis Ulman, “Discerning Readers: Brit-
ish Reviewers’ Responses to Campbell’s Rhetoric and Related Works,” Rhetorica 8 (1990):
65–90.
20 pr, 216. Campbell himself offered no explanation for this apparent incompleteness.
There are no manuscript remains of any additional parts. Perhaps the slow sales of the first
edition prevented Campbell from publishing more. The existing portion includes all of the
discourses delivered to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society; see The Minutes of the Aberdeen
Philosophical Society 1758–1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press,
1990), 26. The structure of The Philosophy of Rhetoric might have looked more conventional
if not for the specific rules of the Wise Club.
and thereby contribute to the burgeoning science of man that had be-
come the particular concern of the Scottish Enlightenment. The practical
art of rhetoric was to lead the philosopher, in inductive or Baconian fash-
ion, to the theoretical science of the mind. Campbell aligned the newly-
explored faculties of the mind with the classical ends of persuasive dis-
course, and found that the ends of speaking could be reduced to the fol-
lowing: “to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to
move the passions, or to influence the will.”21 These faculty-associated
ends were then connected with those qualities of style (notably perspicu-
ity and vivacity) that most effectively encouraged belief and ultimately ac-
tion. Campbell even employed the Scottish notion of “sympathy” to
account for the effectiveness of the communicative arts. He described
sympathy as “the common tie of human souls,” which included a natural
tendency to believe the testimony of others.22 The Philosophy of Rhetoric
contained the most complete (though perhaps not entirely systematic)
expression of Campbell’s philosophy of mind, which grappled with some
of the most fundamental issues of eighteenth-century epistemology, not
the least of which was the sceptical philosophy of David Hume. We can
imagine, then, that Campbell’s book made particularly pleasurable
reading for Hume as he lay on his deathbed.23
t h e wa r w i t h a m e r i c a
The year 1776, which marked the formal outbreak of hostilities be-
tween Britain and most of her American colonies, was also a turning
point for the British people, who seemed utterly surprised and baffled
by an event that prompted a drawn-out crisis of national confidence.
The king proclaimed several national fast-days, which in turn generated
a large number of fast-day sermons, many of which were published.
Campbell’s fast-day sermon, entitled The Nature, Extent, and Importance,
of the Duty of Allegiance, was preached on 12 December 1776, and pub-
lished early in the following year. It argued that rebellion is unreason-
able and without scriptural warrant, and that true liberty can only be
found within the rule of law. The proud and haughty Americans, by
placing their hopes in republicanism and abstract notions of right, had
21 pr, 1.
22 pr, 15 and 96.
23 James Boswell reports that Hume was reading The Philosophy of Rhetoric at the time of
their last meeting; see Boswell in Extremes 1776–1778, ed. Charles McC. Weis and Frederick
A. Pottle (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 11.
made themselves ungovernable, thus imperilling their existing constitu-

tional liberties. Moreover, they were spreading their dangerous and mis-
leading republican notions back to the British Isles. Nevertheless,
Campbell concluded that the Americans ought to be allowed their inde-
pendence if they were determined to delude themselves. He main-
tained this unusual opinion even as the war progressed. In a letter to
Edmund Burke, written 12 June 1779, he declared, “I should have had
no objection to their total independence, if any minister could have
adopted that measure with safety. But such a real independence as they
wanted, along with a nominal subordination, appeared to serve only as a
foundation for eternal quarreling … I am strongly inclined to think
(and it was my opinion from the beginning) that Great Britain might be
much more benefited by an equitable alliance and treaty of commerce
with that people, than even by the connection that heretofor subsisted
between us.”24
Campbell’s moderation, pragmatism, and willingness to give up the
pride of empire set him apart from the two predominant extremes of
Scottish opinion. Though he rejected the republicanism and pro-
Americanism of Popular party adherents such as John Erskine, his con-
fidence in British moral right combined with his conciliatory attitude
towards the mistaken colonists set him apart from most Moderates.
Hugh Blair, Alexander Carlyle, and Adam Ferguson all favoured sup-
pressing the rebels by force. Alexander Gerard’s fast-day sermon of
1778, Liberty the Cloke of Maliciousness, Both in The American Rebellion, and
in The Manners of the Times, saw dire consequences for both Americans
and Britons if they did not begin a moral reformation and repudiate
the sin and licentiousness that had brought war as God’s punishment.
William Robertson, in another fast-day sermon of the same year, re-
mained belligerent in his sense of British moral superiority, reproving
doom-sayers such as Gerard while remaining mindful of the need for
renewed piety and patriotism.25
Campbell’s sermon seems to have been accorded greater respect in
the reviews than most of the myriad of fast-day sermons that ap-
peared at the same time.26 Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, whose
political opinions were much like Campbell’s and who had also alien-
24 sca WWM Bk. 1/1172.

25 Manuscript notes on Robertson’s sermon are preserved in nls 5003, fols 92–3v.
26 In the Monthly Review 56 (April 1777): 315–17, Campbell’s sermon is counted as
number 29 of the fast-day sermons reviewed.
ated himself from popular opinion by advocating that Britain aban-

don her colonies before their anarchical principles endanger the
delicate balance of the British parliamentary system,27 made efforts
to have quantities of Campbell’s sermon sent to America for distribu-
tion. It is not known whether the sermon made the crossing at this
time, though an announcement shortly after the peace of 1783 de-
clared that one thousand copies of the sermon were to be given away,
both to domestic employers and to sea-captains venturing to the re-
maining British colonies in America, as antidotes to unconstitutional
republicanism.28
two sermons
Campbell published two more sermons in the turbulent years following

the outbreak of war with the colonies. The first of these, entitled The Suc-
cess of the First Publishers of the Gospel a Proof of Its Truth (1777), returned
Campbell to familiar territory – the external evidences of the Christian
religion. It was preached before the annual meeting of the Society in
Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, an association particu-
larly concerned with converting Scottish Roman Catholics of the high-
lands and islands. The sermon argued that the situation of the world
during the first era of the Christian church was so inhospitable to the
Gospel message that the church could not have prospered by natural
means alone. The doctrines of Christ must have appeared foolish to that
age, especially when preached by lowly, illiterate Jewish fishermen. The
historical fact of the Gospel’s rapid and unparalleled success, therefore,
can only be explained by supernatural means. In other words, the early
Christian church must necessarily have had the particular blessing of
heaven. Campbell thought it obvious that the Roman Catholic church
had enjoyed no comparable divine favour, a historical-providential argu-
ment common among eighteenth-century moderate Protestants. William
Robertson’s only published sermon, The Situation of the World at the Time of
Christ’s Appearance, and Its Connexion with the Success of His Religion, Consid-
ered (1755), likewise claimed that historical evidences show the early
church to have had the unique support of providence.
27 Tucker’s views on the American situation, which Campbell cited, were published in
Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects (1774). On Tucker’s unique perspective on the
American conflict, see J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 85–6, 119–21, 157–91.
28 See the handwritten version of this announcement, bl Add. MS 33498, fol. 40.
Whereas The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel is typical of Camp-
bell’s calm and measured apologetic tone, the second sermon of this pe-
riod, entitled The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society (1779), seems
strangely out of character. The argument itself was common enough in
the eighteenth century: that Christianity is by its very nature and spirit
beneficial to the interests of civil society, contrary to the claims of “liber-
tines” that religion is a political invention for the purpose of social con-
trol. Campbell argued that religion is necessary for civil order and
happiness because it provides moral sanctions that political laws cannot.
The libertines’ attempt to undermine religion could only lead to the col-
lapse of civil society. But Campbell’s sermon seems to imply further that
arguments favourable to the Christian establishment can be made en-
tirely apart from the historical truth of Christianity’s claims – an unusual
argument from an apologist known for his evidential defence of Christian
belief. Campbell generally argued that Christianity ought to be believed
because of its morally certain evidences, not because of its accidental ben-
efits. The argument that seems to lurk beneath the surface of the Happy
Influence sermon – that civil society should endorse Christianity regardless
of its historical truth – challenged his usual assertion that the factual truth
of a claim ought to stand independently of the supposed benefits of belief
in that claim.29 The civil consequences of Christian belief, however well-
founded, ought to have been superfluous to his argument, for the best
way to ensure those beneficial effects was to defend the evidential justness
of the underlying belief. Although such philosophical ambiguity was un-
usual for Campbell, the argument itself was not uncommon among mod-
erate Christian (and even non-Christian) apologists in the eighteenth
century. In The Influence of Piety on the Public Good (1761), Gerard argued
that irreligion is destructive to civil society because it unleashes the vi-
ciousness of human nature ordinarily kept in check by the prescripts of
religion, true or otherwise. He claimed that, “the mischiefs of irreligion
are incomparably greater, and more destructive to society, than all the
bad effects which can be charged on false religion.”30
29 aul ms 650, section ii. See also st, 2:71, where Campbell (like Hume) claimed that
“a good end will never sanctify bad means,” which for Campbell ought to have included
encouraging known falsehoods.
30 Gerard, The Influence of Piety on the Public Good (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell,
1761), 13 (Gerard’s emphasis). It seems that few in the eighteenth century believed Pierre
Bayle’s claim that a society of atheists was possible. Even in Diderot’s Encyclopedia, the Abbé
Yvon attacked Bayle, arguing that religion is necessary for the survival of civil society; see
the article “Atheists” in Stephen J. Gendzier, ed., The Encyclopedia: Selections (New York:
Harper and Row, 1967), 67–72.
Although the defensive and fearful tone evident in Campbell’s Happy

Influence sermon cannot be easily reconciled with his usual preaching
style, it can perhaps be explained by the turmoil of events that sur-
rounded its composition. The British national mood only worsened with
the progress of the American war, and the situation complicated by
events of 1778–79 that have come to be known as the “No-Popery” affair.
the no-popery affair
Roman Catholics in Scotland continued to cling to their religion

throughout the eighteenth century despite the best efforts of the Re-
formed church. Unlike their English counterparts, however, Scottish
Catholics were poor, few in number, and politically insignificant. Their
civil status had become especially precarious since the Glorious Revolu-
tion, and they continued to suffer popular resentment even though the
laws against them were not strictly enforced. However, the increasingly
tolerant mood of enlightened society caused some in high places to
think that the time had come to begin lifting these civil disabilities. The
need to raise more troops for use in the American war provided a more
immediate political motivation. On 14 May 1778, Henry Dundas, Scot-
land’s Lord Advocate and the rising star of Scottish political manage-
ment, announced that a bill for the relief of Catholics in Scotland would
likely be introduced into the House of Commons following the success-
ful passage of a similar piece of legislation for England and Ireland. The
announcement caused immediate panic among delegates to the Scottish
General Assembly, which happened to meet later that same month, and
provoked intense debate concerning the threat of Catholic relief to Prot-
estant interests in Scotland. Campbell, who attended the 1778 General
Assembly, spoke in favour of the relief act, downplaying the dangers of
Catholic emancipation. But no amount of assuagement could calm the
general hysteria that soon infected the Scottish population, who likely
believed that Catholic relief in a time of providential war was an addi-
tional affront against God. In January and February of 1779, Edinburgh
and Glasgow fell victim to No-Popery riots, which destroyed considerable
Catholic property. William Robertson, a leading voice in favour of relief,
had his house attacked by the Edinburgh mob and received a number of
anonymous death-threats. Scotland’s abashed political managers de-
cided in February to drop the relief effort, a gesture which barely eased
the public tension.
A considerable pamphlet war erupted around the emancipation is-
sue. The first major volley was fired by Campbell’s Episcopalian rival,
William Abernethy Drummond, in a piece called The Lawfulness of Break-

ing Faith with Heretics Proved to be An Established Doctrine of the Church of
Rome, in a Letter to Mr. G.H. (September 1778). Drummond’s pamphlet
was actually a belated response to George Hay’s polemical piece, A De-
tection of the Dangerous Tendency, which was itself an attack on Campbell’s
sermon The Spirit of the Gospel. As an Episcopalian High Churchman,
Drummond was perhaps more threatened by the Romanist Hay than by
Campbell, and thus he defended Campbell’s implied charges concern-
ing the intolerant nature of the Roman Catholic church. As the title of
his pamphlet suggests, Drummond argued that the Catholic church still
upheld the doctrine of the lawfulness of breaking faith with heretics.31
Campbell, however, was less concerned with the likes of Drummond
and Hay than with controversialists within his own church. He was
particularly worried about an inflammatory piece by the advocate John
Dickson (on behalf of the “Friends of the Protestant Interest”) entitled
A Short View of the Statutes at Present in Force in Scotland against Popery
(1778). It claimed that the proposed relief act was really “an act for
promoting the growth of Popery,” and as such was both unconstitu-
tional and a threat to national security.32 Furthermore, argued Dickson,
Catholics were fundamentally anti-Christian, blasphemous, untrustwor-
thy, and intolerant, and therefore unworthy of being tolerated. They
would, if unchecked, take over the property of the whole kingdom.
These claims, as Campbell well knew, were calculated to inflame the
prevailing prejudices of Scottish popular opinion.
Campbell published An Address to the People of Scotland, Upon the Alarms
that Have Been Raised in Regard to Popery in April 1779. It was a masterful
piece of enlightened Christian argument, demonstrating from both
Scripture and reason that persecution in all its forms is both wrong and
ineffective. It demolished Dickson’s claims that Catholics threatened na-
tional security or sought to overrun the kingdom. But the Address’s argu-
ments were perhaps too enlightened to prevail against either popular
opinion or the more learned prejudices of his fellow Protestant minis-
ters, many of whom were still wary of regarding Jesus as (merely) an ex-
ample of moral conduct.33 In fact, Campbell’s was probably the only
31 George Hay responded to Drummond’s attack with An Answer to Mr. W.A.D.’s letter to
G.H. (1778). Drummond answered with A Second Letter to Mr. G.H. (1778).
32 Dickson, A Short View, 2d ed., in Scotland’s Opposition to the Popish Bill (Edinburgh:
David Paterson, 1780), 321. In this second edition, Dickson attacked Campbell personally,
calling him “the apologist of Popery” (335n.).
33 Robert Kent Donovan, No Popery and Radicalism: Opposition to Roman Catholic Relief in
Scotland, 1778–1782 (New York: Garland, 1987), 102.
pamphlet to appear in Scotland in favour of relief. As he later reflected

in a letter to the Anglican bishop John Douglas, the Address aroused “all
the zealous and intolerant protestants of every denomination, episcopa-
lian and presbyterian, juror and nonjuror, seceders, independents
&c.”34 One pamphlet, purportedly “By a Lady,” entitled Observations on
P[rincipal] C[ampbe]ll’s Conduct, with Regard to the R. Catholic Bill (1781),
accused Campbell himself of inciting the contemporary hatred of Cath-
olics with his 1771 sermon The Spirit of the Gospel. Though the anony-
mous author claimed to be Protestant, the pamphlet’s systematic
defence of Catholic doctrine made its sectarian authorship plain, and
thus allowed it to be easily ignored. A more typically Protestant piece,
entitled A Vindication of the Opposition to the Late Intended Bill for the Relief
of Roman Catholics in Scotland (1780), argued that the Church of Rome
was the Antichrist, and that Protestant opposition to the relief measure
was therefore most reasonable, as suppressing dangerous Popish peda-
gogical and political agendas. These sentiments were probably shared
by John Erskine, the leader of the Popular party in the Scottish Church,
and a declared admirer of Campbell. He gently rebuked Campbell for
insinuating that the Scottish clergy was responsible for whipping up
popular hostility against relief. Like the author of the Vindication, he
thought the present disabilities were reasonable because of the danger
Catholics posed to civil society, rather than because of their religion per
se.35 Campbell’s arguments could hardly prevail against long-standing
Calvinist prejudices that seemed on the surface to mirror arguments
found elsewhere in his own writings. In recognition of his efforts on be-
half of Roman Catholics, he was supposedly dubbed “Pope Campbell”
and had his windows smashed by a mob.36
Much of this debate took place long after the relief measure had
been discarded in Westminster and condemned in the May 1779 meet-
ing of the General Assembly. The reaction to the proposed bill came
from the bottom up. Popular agitation inspired the Aberdeen Town
Council to resolve “by every legal and Constitutional Method to En-
deavour to prevent the said Bill from being brought into Parliament,”
34 Campbell to Douglas, 30 December 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 16v).

35 John Erskine, ed., A Narrative of the Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Scot-
land, May 25 1779. Occasioned by Apprehensions of an Intended Repeal of the Penal Statutes against
PAPISTS (Edinburgh: W. Gray, 1780), v.
36 James Bruce, Lives of Eminent Men of Aberdeen (Aberdeen: L. Smith, 1841), 342–3;
James Valentine, “An Aberdeen Principal of Last Century,” The Aberdeen Journal (3 April
1896): 5. Donovan says there was a minor disturbance in Aberdeen in late 1778 (No Popery
and Radicalism, 27n.).
and for that purpose to hire legal counsel in London.37 Likewise, on

1 February 1779, the Presbytery of Aberdeen voted by a margin of
thirty-three to two (Campbell being one of the dissenters) that the pro-
posed relief bill would “be highly prejudicial to the interests of religion,
and perhaps to the civil interests of Society too.”38 But the opponents of
relief were even more active in the Southwest, particularly in the Synod
of Glasgow and Ayr. By the time of the May General Assembly, the for-
merly confident Moderates were on the defensive, and were ultimately
forced to concede that present measures for Catholic relief were inex-
pedient. Campbell, who seems not to have taken part in the 1779 de-
bates in the General Assembly, was nevertheless considered the leader
of the relief forces, evidenced by the fact that Erskine addressed his ac-
count of the debates of that session directly to him.39 Campbell main-
tained a low view of his clerical opponents, as expressed in a letter to
Edmund Burke: “You will be surprized to be informed, but it is a certain
fact, that they are the most unfriendly to true and rational liberty of any
in the country, the most bigoted, the most intolerant, the most fanati-
cal, and in one word, the most like the Bostonians of the last century.
They are the very men who have had a principal hand in raising the
present flame against papists.”40 The loss of this battle was a major de-
feat for the Moderates, and may have encouraged Robertson’s retire-
ment from active church politics. It may also account for Campbell’s
relative quiet in the following years. Despite moderate hopes, the
General Assembly’s resolution had somewhat more finality than James
Beattie realized when he wrote to Forbes: “I am quite out of temper
with our General Assembly, and almost the whole of the Scotch minis-
ters. Dr Campbell is the only man among them, who has had the cour-
age to speak and publish the words of Christianity, which are always the
37 aca Council Register 64, fol. 154 (29 January 1779).

38 sro CH2/1/10, p. 226. Nevertheless, the declaration of the Presbytery of Aberdeen
against Catholic relief, reprinted in Scotland’s Opposition to the Popish Bill, sounds consider-
ably more moderate than declarations printed by groups in the Southwest of Scotland.
39 There is some mystery as to Campbell’s whereabouts at this time. The records of the
1779 General Assembly suggest that he was a delegate, and that he was serving on commit-
tees. Yet his Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society sermon was supposedly preached in
Aberdeen on the Sunday that fell in the midst of the General Assembly meetings. In his ad-
miring review of Campbell’s Address to the People of Scotland, William Rose suggested that this
pamphlet was published because Campbell could not attend the General Assembly; see
Monthly Review 62 (February 1780): 149. Perhaps Campbell decided at the last moment to
stay away because of his close involvement in the affair.
40 Campbell to Burke, 12 June 1779 (sca WWM Bk. 1/1172).
words of truth and soberness. You must have seen his excellent pam-
phlet. As matters now stand, there is a grevious stigma upon the name
of Presbyterian; but I hope a new assembly may wipe it off, as nothing is
more unsteady than the resolution of a popular meeting.”41
the four gospels
Campbell’s public withdrawal after the defeat of the Catholic relief

proposal was not a sign of inactivity. These were the years in which he
completed his scholarly masterpiece, The Four Gospels, Translated from
the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations, and Notes Critical and Explana-
tory. Like The Philosophy of Rhetoric, this work was begun in his earliest
pastoral days. The Greek word studies that form the basis of the trans-
lation are evident throughout his writings. The genesis of the work
may perhaps be discovered in the daily devotions of his childhood,
when he took note of the King James Version’s particular rendering of
certain idiomatic expressions. “I remember,” Campbell wrote, “that
when I first observed this distinction of character in the English Bible,
being then a schoolboy, I asked my elder brother, who had been at
college, the reason of the difference.”42 Obviously unsatisfied with the
explanation he received, Campbell sought to rework the standard
translation using the new critical methods of the Enlightenment.
Campbell was not alone in this attempt; as he himself observed, “there
has been of late, both abroad and at home, a profusion of criticisms
on the sacred text; and many new versions have been attempted, espe-
cially in France and England.”43 The work was the most scholarly of
his career, and particularly required the honing of his language skills.
In addition to Latin and the various Hebrew and Greek dialects with
which he was already familiar, Campbell improved his reading knowl-
edge of French and Italian, and learned German in order to study
Luther’s Bible. He also believed that the work demanded a detailed
examination of the history and culture of the peoples who had pro-
duced the Gospels, and for this purpose enlisted the critical eye of the
judge and antiquarian scholar David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes. The Four
Gospels was intended to be not just a translation, but a model of trans-
lation. The greater part of its 1500 pages was taken up with critical
41 Beattie to Forbes, 12 June 1779 (aul ms 30/1/171).

42 fg, 1:474.
43 fg, 1:486.
dissertations on the problems of translating and interpreting ancient

texts, and with critical notes on the translations themselves.
This immense quantity of work was, however, no guarantee of an easy
publication. The publisher William Creech warned Beattie that a work
even of such high literary merit would have difficulty making money for a
publisher, and reminded him that The Philosophy of Rhetoric had yet to see a
second edition.44 Nevertheless, Campbell, manuscript in hand, travelled
to London in the summer of 1787 to find a publisher. He had the help
not only of his travelling companion James Beattie, by now an important
figure in the English publishing world, but also of the expatriate Scot
John Douglas, bishop of Carlisle (to whom the work was dedicated). Dou-
glas was not optimistic concerning the price they would get for the manu-
script, reminding Campbell that even the most valuable sacred works
were seldom the most popular literature.45 Thomas Cadell agreed to
print a first edition of 750 copies, but declined to purchase the property
of the manuscript outright. Though Campbell would have made little or
nothing by this agreement, he was relieved to have the work in press.
Campbell’s trip was memorable in other ways as well. Through Dou-
glas he was introduced to the king and queen at Windsor, and enjoyed
several audiences with them.46 In London, however, he had less to do.
The ageing Aberdonian was unable to keep up with Beattie’s relentless
social schedule, and it is also possible that he found the heat and op-
pression of the metropolis difficult to manage. Consequently he left
London prematurely, though he seemed to regret his hasty decision –
his subsequent sea-voyage to Berwick was so unpleasant that he would
not consider another trip south thereafter.47
The Four Gospels did not appear in print until early 1789. As Campbell
feared, the price of two guineas for the two substantial quarto volumes
proved prohibitive to popular sales. The critics were suitably impressed,
though more with the critical dissertations in the first volume than with
the actual translations in the second.48 Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s opinion
44 Creech to Beattie, 17 May 1787 (aul ms 30/2/545).

45 Douglas to Campbell, 8 July 1787 (aul ms 3214/17).
46 See Campbell’s letter to his niece Ann Farquharson, 25 July 1787 (aul ms 3214/
14). George III, like Campbell, was both a pious man and an enthusiastic naturalist.
47 Beattie recalls the story to Williamson, Campbell’s London host, some years later
(22 November 1789, aul ms 30/1/302).
48 See the Critical Review 67 (June 1789): 401–9; and 68 (October 1789): 268–76; and
the Monthly Review 2 (June, July, and August 1790): 121–38, 249–65, and 404–12. The best-
know portrait of Campbell, which still hangs in Trinity Hall, shows him holding a copy of
The Four Gospels. (This portrait, painted by Archibald Robertson, has also been reproduced
in stained glass in the Marischal College chapel.)
was perhaps representative: “All the learning and ingenuity of principal

Campbell did not enable him to make a better translation of the gos-
pels; for one hole he mended, like the bakers, he made two or three.”49
Campbell was especially bothered by the criticisms of his translations,
and defended their accuracy and justness, if not their attractiveness to
an English-speaking audience accustomed to the idiom of the King
James Version. It was in fact the inaccuracies in the common version
that had first prompted Campbell to use the critical tools of his age to
produce a better translation. Bishop Douglas assured him that, despite
the reservations of the reviewers, the translation was well-received by his
own peers. Josiah Tucker intimated that the bishop of Gloucester ex-
pected the English Prayer Book would soon be revised with Campbell’s
criticisms in mind. Dr. William Heberden, a physician and respected
classical scholar, was especially impressed with the translation and en-
couraged him to consider undertaking the rest of the New Testament.50
Campbell pleaded age and declined. Nevertheless, his Gospel transla-
tion was used, along with various other translations, in several popular
nineteenth-century editions of the New Testament.51
Campbell’s new publication invited fresh attacks from his old nemesis
William Abernethy Drummond, now a Scottish Episcopal bishop. Drum-
mond renewed his strictures against Campbell’s low-church views in two
pamphlets – A Friendly Address (1789), and Reasons for the Scotch Episcopal
Clergy Submitting to the Royal Family of Hanover (1792). Drummond partic-
ularly objected to Campbell’s claim, in the “Preliminary Dissertations,”
that the early church had used the term “heresy” quite differently from
its modern sectarian signification. But such criticisms were merely
convenient excuses for Drummond to restate his own views on the nec-
essary order and discipline of church government against Campbell’s
49 Letters of John Ramsay of Ochtertyre 1799–1812, ed. Barbara L.H. Horn (Edinburgh:
Scottish History Society, 1966), 5. Ramsay likewise criticized the translations of Alexander
Geddes and Bishop Robert Lowth, the most advanced British biblical critics of the time.
Ramsay elsewhere suggested that Campbell’s Greek scholarship was considered superficial
by many English scholars (Scotland and Scotsmen, 1:495).
50 Campbell to Douglas, 22 Sept. 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fols 12–15); Douglas to
Campbell, 19 June 1789 (aul ms 3214/9); Tucker to Campbell, 24 Oct. 1790 (aul ms
3214/3); Heberden to Campbell, 23 Dec. 1789 (aul ms 3214/1).
51 Campbell’s translation of the Gospels was combined with other translations by Philip
Doddridge and James Macknight under the title The New Testament (1826), and frequently
reprinted. Archibald Alexander, at Princeton Theological Semninary, used Campbell’s
Four Gospels in his divinity teaching; see Lefferts A. Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and
Pietism: Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 155.
supposed latitudinarianism. Moreover, the pamphlets represented at-

tempts to heal the breach that had developed among Episcopalians in
Scotland during the eighteenth century. Campbell was to become
deeply involved with this proposed reconciliation.
the scottish episcopalians
A century after the establishment of the Presbyterian form of govern-

ment in the Church of Scotland, remnants of the old Episcopal order
remained, particularly in the Northeast. The 1712 Act of Toleration
gave legal recognition to Episcopalians who abjured the Stuarts and
took an oath of allegiance to Queen Anne and her Hanoverian succes-
sors. Those who accepted these terms were provided with English-or-
dained Episcopal clergy and followed the English model of worship.
Those who refused (including most of the Episcopal clergy and all of
the bishops) remained Jacobites and faced persecution throughout the
eighteenth century, particularly in the aftermath of the ‘45. These two
Episcopalian bodies, one legal and one not, grew increasingly apart
through the eighteenth century, each fundamentally suspicious of the
other.
The decisive change for the nonjuring Episcopalians came in 1788
when Bonnie Prince Charlie, the last of the exiled Stuart pretenders,
died in Rome. John Skinner (1744–1816), bishop of Aberdeen and pri-
mus of the Scottish Episcopalian church (and the son and namesake of
Campbell’s class-mate), took this opportunity to lead his church back
into favour with the Hanoverian government. He and Bishop William
Abernethy Drummond began making overtures to Westminster for re-
peal of the disabilities against them. They enlisted the help of Campbell,
a personal acquaintance of Skinner, who wrote of the situation to
Bishop John Douglas in London. Douglas passed along Campbell’s en-
couragements and those of other leading Moderates to the Anglican
bishops.52 The only remaining obstacle to the removal of the disabilities
against the Scottish Episcopalians was the presence in Scotland of the
English-ordained Episcopalians, who feared that relief measures would
force their clergy and property under the jurisdiction of the Scottish
bishops. Campbell was familiar with Episcopalians on both sides of this
issue. His wife’s family had been dissenting Episcopalians who had
52 John Skinner (son of the primus), Annals of Scottish Episcopacy (Edinburgh: A. Brown,
1818), 175–6 and 184.
fought for the Young Pretender. His friend James Beattie was intimate
with the English-ordained Episcopalian clergy of the Northeast.53
Campbell knew that their differences, not the least of which was the
extreme High Church stance maintained by the harried dissenting
bishops, engendered fear and mistrust on both sides. Abernethy Drum-
mond’s pamphlets against Campbell were, at bottom, attempts to assert
the right of jurisdiction of Scottish Episcopal bishops over their angli-
cized brethren and to assuage their fears concerning the consequences.
Until the 1790s, the government in Westminster was more inclined to
protect the existing interests of the English-ordained Episcopalians, and
so blocked repeated parliamentary attempts to provide relief for the
dissenters. But the persistent applications of the Scottish Moderates fi-
nally broke their resistance and convinced the Anglican bench of bish-
ops that the Presbyterian Church of Scotland had no particular
objections to relief for dissenting Episcopalians. The bill that was finally
passed in June 1792 required the Scottish Episcopal clergy to assent to
the Thirty-Nine Articles, but placed the English Episcopal clergy in Scot-
land under their jurisdiction. This and the eventual relief of Scottish
Catholics in 1793 were significant victories for Campbell’s enlightened
principles of toleration. His efforts drew a fond regard from his old
adversary William Abernethy Drummond; “Dr Campbell has behaved
like himself: for he is one of the sweetest blooded, & best hearted men
in the world, & the friend of mankind. ‘Tis a great pity that he is so
loose in Church principles, for were He a sincere Episcopalian, he
would be of great use to us as he is now, on account of his learning, a
great ornament to the Presbyterians.”54
53 One such acquaintance had been James Riddoch, an English-ordained minister in

Aberdeen. In 1779 Riddoch’s widow (who was James Boswell’s cousin) approached Beattie
and Campbell to edit her late husband’s sermons, pleading financial difficulty. The two
agreed, not knowing that the huge mass of sermons was not only unprepared for publica-
tion but also almost unreadable in manuscript form. We know from Beattie’s letters that he
went on to transcribe and edit some of the sermons, but it is unclear whether or not Camp-
bell was able to continue with the project. Riddoch’s Sermons were published in two volumes
in 1782, but no credit was given to either Campbell or Beattie. The story can be found in
Beattie’s letters to Sir William Forbes: 10 April 1779 (aul ms 30/1/166); 28 April 1779
(nls Acc 4796, box 94); and 11 April 1780 (aul ms 30/1/180). The last letter makes no
mention of Campbell’s continued involvement.
54 Abernethy Drummond to John Douglas, 27 April 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 7r).
The Height of Reputation (from 1790)
last years
In the midst of his efforts for the relief of Scottish Episcopalians,

Campbell was nearly brought to his own end. The illness struck
quickly in January 1791. A cold became a violent asthma and fever,
and soon those around him were resigned to his imminent death.
Grace Campbell was so distraught at her husband’s suffering that she
thought him better at rest. Campbell even spoke what he thought
were the dying words of a Christian man. Within days, those around
him began the flurry of letters concerning the distribution of his of-
fices after his death. Campbell intimated to Beattie that he hoped he
would succeed him as principal. But this was not to be. By 31 January
Campbell had passed through the worst of his ailment, and the doc-
tors became confident of his recovery. By early March he was again at-
tending to his duties at the college.1 But he no longer enjoyed his
former vigour, and was forced to drop many of his public duties, par-
ticularly those involving the church courts. This loss of robustness
was slight, however, compared to the loss of his wife in February
1 Beattie to Laing, 21 Jan. 1791, to Forbes, 31 Jan. 1791, and to the Duchess of Gordon,
7 March 1791 (nls Acc 4796, box 92); Beattie to Arbuthnot, 24 Jan. 1791 (aul ms 30/
1/317); Beattie to Montagu, 24 Jan. 1791 (aul ms 30/1/318). The Rev. Dr. David
Cruden’s account of what he thought would be his last conversation with Campbell (23 Jan.
1791) is reprinted in George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of
Dr. George Campbell” (1800), in leh, 1:l–li.
The Height of Reputation (from 1790) 53
1793.2 Campbell was thereafter attended by his niece Ann Farquhar-

son, who had lived with the Campbells for many years and had
become as a daughter to them.
Campbell devoted his remaining energies to the preparation of his
final publications. Foremost in his mind were questions concerning the
nature of the true church, which had arisen from his historical re-
searches into the character and structure of the early church. In addi-
tion to preparing his ecclesiastical history lectures for publication, he
began to consider a belated response to some of his earlier critics.
Campbell had never answered the attacks made against his sermon The
Spirit of the Gospel twenty years ago.3 He decided to compose additional
apologetic tracts for a new edition of his Dissertation on Miracles, which
was also to include previously-published sermons in order to help buoy
up sales of The Four Gospels. In a letter to his printer William Creech of
14 September 1793,4 Campbell described four tracts: one on implicit
faith, a second on Christian temperance and self-denial, a third on the
unfavourable effects of superstition on morality, and a fourth on the
difference between the form and power of religion. All four concerned
abuses that Campbell believed had infected the true church and had
become most apparent in Roman Catholicism. All but the fourth tract
survive in some form. The first tract, “Of implicit faith,” was never pub-
lished, but exists in a manuscript version ready for the press.5 It was di-
rected primarily against Bishop George Hay’s Detection of the Dangerous
Tendency, and upheld Campbell’s earlier implicit charge that the Ro-
man church had historically promoted a faith based on ignorance
rather than knowledge. The second and third tracts became essays
2 Though Grace Campbell’s death is usually given as 16 February 1792 (first in Keith,
“Account of George Campbell,” xiii), 1793 seems more likely. In a letter to William Forbes,
dated 23 February 1793, James Beattie noted that Mrs. Campbell had died a few days be-
fore (nls Acc 4796, box 94). Also, Campbell’s will dates Grace’s will (which I have not
found) as 5 February 1793 (sro CC1/6/60). The Aberdeen Magazine states that Grace died
about three years before Campbell; see “Memoirs of the late Dr. Campbell,” (June 1796):
47. The 1793 date makes doubtful the traditional story that Grace’s death was hastened by
her assiduous attention to her husband’s health in 1791.
3 Besides the attacks by Hay and Drummond, Campbell suggested that there had been
two other attacks made against The Spirit of the Gospel, “one probably by a presbyterian, the
other by a Roman Catholic” (aul ms 651, p. 25). Of these I can find no trace.
4 Campbell to Creech, 14 Sept. 1793 (The William Creech letterbooks, Dalguise Mun-
iments, sro W. Reg. House, microfilm RH4/26/1). See also Campbell to Douglas, 30 Dec.
1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 16).
5 aul ms 649.
within a lengthy manuscript entitled, “Defence of the doctrine con-

tained in the foregoing sermon against the attacks made upon it, by
one under the signature of Staurophilus and an anonymous remarker,”
which, as the title suggests, was the very tract intended to defend the re-
published Spirit of the Gospel sermon.6 The “Defence” manuscript con-
tains three essays: “The doctrine of some priests has encouraged
ignorance,” “Of christian temperance and self-denial,” and “Supersti-
tion unfavourable to morality.” A portion of the second essay was pub-
lished at the end of the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History. The “Defence”
manuscript was a substantial piece of controversial writing and, if pub-
lished, would have run to approximately 750 octavo pages – more than
five times the length of the sermon it was intended to vindicate. This
scholarly bulk reflects Campbell’s intention to answer fully Hay’s chal-
lenge to produce evidence that the Roman Catholic church had in fact
followed a policy of breaking faith with heretics. His evidence included
many of the same historical examples that had been used by Protes-
tants for two centuries (such as the case of Jan Huss), but he also cited
eighteenth-century examples to demonstrate the continuing relevance
of Protestant mistrust.
In addition to these strictures on Roman Catholic abuses, Campbell
went after some potentially dangerous abuses within Protestant Chris-
tianity. The unfinished “Strictures on Dodwell’s Paraenesis [in five sec-
tions]”7 attacked the common ecclesiastical tendency of placing too
much authority in human hands. The antagonist in question was Henry
Dodwell the elder (1641–1711), a learned apologist of English nonju-
rors, whose De nupero schismate Anglicano paraenesis (1704) advocated an
extreme High Church view of ecclesiastical authority. Campbell de-
nounced Dodwell’s Episcopal view of ecclesiastical history on the
grounds that it “corrupts the mind from the simplicity that is in Christ.”8
His concern to combat High Church ecclesiology is also evident in
6 aul mss 651–655. It is not clear how the “Defence” manuscript and the “Implicit
faith” manuscript are related to one another. Both are responses to the published attacks
on The Spirit of the Gospel. Both contain prefaces that suggest that they were to answer Hay’s
attack. In addition, it is clear that the “Implicit faith” tract was originally intended to be the
first of a series of tracts. But there do not seem to be any structural or organizational paral-
lels between the two manuscripts, suggesting that one was ultimately meant to supersede
the other.
7 aul ms 650. The unpublished manuscript mysteriously breaks off in the early part of
section iv, suggesting that Campbell may have been working on it at the time of his last
illness.
8 aul ms 650, section iv.
another lengthy attack on Dodwell, found in the published Lectures on

Ecclesiastical History, in a section that Campbell added to the manuscript
in the final years of his life.9 Campbell’s scorn for Dodwell may reflect
an increasing trepidation concerning the authoritarianism apparent in
Protestant churches (and states) in the years following the outbreak of
the French Revolution. He said little about the situation in France itself,
but in a letter to Douglas in 1790, he made a grave allusion to the
unthinking mob of Paris.10
All the while Campbell continued his administrative duties in the uni-
versity, including the management of several student bursaries. A small
scandal erupted in Aberdeen in 1794 over a bursary established by the
will of a John Paterson. Campbell was charged by an Aberdeen shoe-
maker, Alexander Paterson, with failing to observe the terms of the will,
which, Paterson thought, ought to have favoured his own son. Campbell
responded to the charge with a pamphlet entitled Remarks on Dr. Paterson’s
Will (n.d., probably 1794), which, while admitting that the wording of the
bequest led to confusion, argued that he had settled that year’s bursary
correctly. Though Campbell claimed strict compliance with the terms of
the will, it is clear that the rewarding of academic excellence was upper-
most in his mind. The details of the dispute are unimportant, but the dis-
pute itself, which involved a significant branch of the Incorporated Trades
(of which Campbell was patron), occasioned bitter feelings in the town
and may have convinced Campbell that it was time to consider retiring
from formal duties.
Campbell’s wish to retire was tempered by a desire to be succeeded by
a worthy candidate. He made his first overture to the Town Council,
which held the gift of the divinity chair, in October 1794, only weeks be-
fore the beginning of the college term.11 Campbell offered to resign the
divinity chair immediately on the condition that it go to one of three po-
tential candidates: his close friend David Cruden, minister of Nigg;
James Shirrefs, minister of St. Nicholas’ West in Aberdeen; or his future
editor James Fraser of Drumoak. The council, for reasons unknown, de-
clined Campbell’s offer, and he was forced to teach another winter. It
may well have been a difficult term. On 11 June 1795, Campbell wrote
unconditional letters of resignation to both the Presbytery of Aberdeen
9 See aul ms m 193.

10 Campbell to Douglas, 22 Sept. 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fols 12–15).
11 There is a transcription of the letter in aca Council Register 67, fol. 41v. The origi-
nal letter does not appear in the council’s letterbook.
and the Town Council.12 Campbell cited failing health rather than a de-
cline in will to serve Christ. But the choice of successor was no longer at
issue, for by that time one had already been found. The position went to
William Laurence Brown, who, before fleeing from the French army,
had ministered to an English-speaking congregation in the Nether-
lands, and had been professor of moral philosophy and ecclesiastical
history in the University of Utrecht.13 Though the Town Council held
the gift of the divinity chair, it appears that the appointment was ma-
noeuvered by Henry Dundas in London, and may have reflected politi-
cal rather than academic concerns.14 Nevertheless, Campbell seemed
quite pleased with his successor.
In July 1795 Campbell resigned the principalship to Brown as well.
He must have negotiated a retirement from this post some time earlier,
for it seems that he had been promised a pension from the government
no later than spring of 1795.15 The pension, worth 300 pounds sterling
per annum, more or less covered the income from Campbell’s various
offices. Campbell was pleased with the arrangement, though, as he
confessed to the college chancellor, Lord Mansfield, “It is to me a real
self-denial … to be no longer a member of Marischal College.”16
Campbell did not have long to enjoy either his pension or his leisure.
He fell ill at the end of March 1796, “seized with a stroke of palsy,” and
died on April 6.17 Campbell’s final illness was not as memorably pious as
the one of five years earlier; he quickly lost all power of speech and
writing, and was soon reduced to insensibility. His friends preferred to
12 The letter to the Presbytery appears in the Presbytery of Aberdeen court records,
sro CH2/1/11, and is reprinted, though somewhat incorrectly, in Keith, “Account of
George Campbell,” liii–lv; there is a transcription of the letter to the Town Council in aca
Council Register 67, fols 69v–70r.
13 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” liii.
14 Roger L. Emerson, Professors, Patronage and Politics (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University
Press, 1992), 92–3. Campbell’s letter (22 July 1795) to the earl of Mansfield, Marischal’s
chancellor since 1793, suggests that Campbell had agreed to Brown’s appointment before
he resigned the chair (aul ms M 96).
15 A letter to Campbell from John Moore, archbishop of Canterbury, via W.L. Brown,
dated 12 May 1795, was already apologizing for the lateness of the government pension for
the intended resignation of his offices (aul ms 3214/4). A letter from Campbell to John
Spottiswoode (14 January 1796) suggests that he had finally received his pension (nls ms
2618, fols 57–8).
16 Campbell to Lord Mansfield, 22 July 1795 (aul ms M 96).
17 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” lvii. See Keith for details of his last illness.
Beattie provides a few additional details in a letter to Laing, 10 April 1796 (nls Acc 4796,
box 92).
remember Campbell’s last days as those of his earlier illness. Campbell

was buried on April 17 in St Nicholas’ churchyard. William Laurence
Brown preached the funeral sermon.18 Campbell’s will named his
nephew-by-marriage Peter Farquharson, an Aberdeen advocate, as his
executor. Peter’s sister Ann Farquharson, the niece who had lived with
the Campbells for so many years, was the main beneficiary of the estate.
The estate itself was not negligible, for Campbell was able to disperse
monies in the amount of 1550 pounds sterling, mostly to his female rel-
atives. Ann received his English books, which were probably the same
ones listed in A Catalogue of a Valuable Collection of Books (Aberdeen,
1799).19 The only material portions of Campbell’s estate remaining to-
day are to be found at Whitehouse, near Alford, the residence of Peter
Farquharson’s descendants.
On the question of Campbell’s personal character, we are generally
at the mercy of his eulogists, particularly Keith and Brown. Beattie
spoke most highly of his friend’s character, and likely viewed Camp-
bell’s death as the perfect Christian foil to the famous and controver-
sial death scene of the despised arch-infidel David Hume.20 The
limited evidence we have clearly suggests that Campbell was held in
the highest regard as a preacher, orator, and teacher, and that friends
and foes alike spoke of his sweetness, patience, and generosity of
character.
18 The funeral sermon was published as The Death of the Righteous Precious in the Sight of
God: A Sermon Preached in the West Church, Aberdeen, April 17th, 1796. On Occasion of the Death
of the Very Reverend Dr. George Campbell, Late Principal and Professor of Divinity in Marischal Col-
lege (Aberdeen: A. Brown, 1796). Campbell himself did not hold a high opinion of funeral
sermons (lstpe, 498). The inscription on Campbell’s tombstone has become entirely ob-
scured; for the Latin inscription and location of the tomb, see James Valentine, “An Aber-
deen Principal of Last Century,” The Aberdeen Journal (3 April 1896): 5.
19 Campbell’s will is found in the Scottish Record Office, CCI/6/60. Since the auction
catalogue contains the libraries of several others as well, it is impossible to identify accurate-
ly Campbell’s own books.
20 See, for example, Beattie to Laing, 10 April 1796 (nls Acc 4796, box 92), and par-
ticularly Beattie to Forbes, 31 January 1791 (nls Acc 4796, box 92); the latter contains
an implied comparison with Hume. Beattie was almost certainly battling Hume’s posthu-
mous reputation, particularly the account of Hume’s stoical character given by Adam
Smith shortly after the philosopher’s death. Beattie had long despised Hume, and
seemed particularly offended by his death scene, the calmness of which Beattie apparently
thought should be reserved as the ultimate evidence of Christian truth. In a letter to
Elizabeth Montagu, written 7 December 1776, Beattie indicated that he was offended by
Hume’s levity during his last illness, a levity unbecoming one devoid of hope (aul ms
30/1/118).
p os th um ou s p ubl ic atio ns
Campbell’s publications did not cease with his death. The two-volume
edition of A Dissertation on Miracles that appeared in 1797 included all of
Campbell’s previously published sermons (except The Character of a Min-
ister) but not the additional tracts that he had intended to add. More im-
portant – both to Campbell’s reputation and to our understanding of
the structure of his thought – was the posthumous publication of his di-
vinity lectures, first composed in the early 1770s but continually revised
until the 1790s. Lectures on Ecclesiastical History (1800), the first part of
Campbell’s divinity course to be published, was also the most controver-
sial. Campbell intended these particular lectures for the press, no doubt
because they concerned the nature and form of the Christian church –
matters that dominated his thought in the last years of his life. The lec-
tures were published by his literary executors, who also asked George
Skene Keith, a long-time friend of Campbell’s, to contribute the life that
has hitherto been the main source of biographical information about
Campbell. The lectures went to press virtually unedited.21
Campbell’s ecclesiastical history lectures are less a narrative history
of the church than a series of topical arguments designed to illustrate
certain historical tendencies in the development of the church, partic-
ularly the growth and domination of the hierarchical form of ecclesias-
tical government. He traced the means by which a collection of small,
independent, and egalitarian congregations were transformed into a
multi-layered, hierarchical, and elitist government that was ultimately
subjugated to the bishop of Rome. There was nothing particularly new
in Campbell’s analysis, except perhaps his use of psychological explana-
tions and his latitudinarian conclusion. Presbyterian historians had
long argued that Episcopal government was a human corruption, and
much of the theological controversy in Scotland during the seven-
teenth century had covered the same historical territory. A consider-
able number of Campbell’s lectures were devoted to the question of
whether the primitive bishops had been of equal or superior rank to
the presbyters. His conclusion – that early bishops were nothing more
than congregational ministers – implicitly challenged the foundation
of the Scottish Episcopal church. Even more typical of Campbell’s gen-
21 There is little difference between the manuscript and published versions. In a letter
to the Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine 9 (July 1801): 249n, Keith claimed not to be the
editor.
eral thesis, however, was his characterization of the Roman Catholic

church, an organization that he believed was entirely devoted to self-
aggrandizement. This latter theme was augmented by the anti-monastic
“Essay on Christian Temperance and Self-Denial,” which the publishers
extracted from Campbell’s manuscripts and added to the lectures. Pre-
dictably, this essay argued that many Catholic spiritual practices were
superficial and devoid of moral benefit.
The reactions of Campbell’s contemporaries to these lectures provide
insight into the tensions that existed in British society during the last de-
cade of the eighteenth century. Both the Critical Review and the Monthly
Review received Campbell’s arguments favourably, suggesting that much
of the English establishment felt unthreatened by Campbell’s strictures
on the necessity of the Episcopal form of church government. The anony-
mous reviewer in the Tory Critical Review called them, “the most impor-
tant lectures on church history that have ever fallen under our inspection;
in which such is the assemblage of good qualities, that we know not which
most to admire: – the erudition, the labour, the impartiality, the ease, the
skill, the arrangement of the lecturer, are every-where conspicuous, and
every-where correct.”22 Stephen Jones, in the Monthly Review (which by
this time had become a vehicle for radical ideas), also considered Camp-
bell’s account impartial, but warned that some in England would think
Campbell too much a latitudinarian, and too condemning of the contro-
versies within the early church. Jones suggested that the times were not
favourable for an impartial and critical account of such a politically-
charged topic.23 Indeed, Campbell would gain new enemies for treating
so lightly the necessary form of early church government. The lectures
were attacked through six issues of the Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine
from an extreme High Church position. George Gleig, who apparently
wrote this review with help from William Abernethy Drummond, charged
Campbell not only with maligning the original church with false assump-
tions and shoddy scholarship, and with subverting the Christ-authorized
form of the Anglican church, but also with supplying arms to the rabble
to use against the contemporary church.24 Clearly, Campbell’s tolerant
and latitudinarian views of primitive and contemporary Christianity were
not everywhere welcome in an age of revolution.
22 Critical Review 33 (October 1801): 205.

23 Monthly Review 35 (July and August 1801): 262 and 398.
24 Anti-Jacobin 8 (Feb., March, and April 1801), and 9 (May, June, and July 1801).
Drummond refers to Gleig’s authorship in a letter to Bishop Alexander Jolly, 22 Dec. 1801
(sro CH12/30/78/2).
Book-length attacks soon followed. Campbell had long been an irri-

tant to the Scottish Episcopal church, but the Scottish Episcopalians,
having recently received legal recognition with Campbell’s help, now
felt dismayed and even betrayed by the publication of the Lectures on Ec-
clesiastical History.25 Some Episcopalians were simply hostile. Andrew
Macfarlane, the bishop of Ross, who claimed that he had always held
Campbell in contempt, called the lectures “a farrago of impertinent,
petulant rancorous stuff – as must turn a person of taste’s stomach,” and
little wondered that, “the disciples of Campbell should all be loose –
and many of them Infidels.”26 Charles Daubeny, later archdeacon of
Salisbury, agreed with his Scottish brethren, and, in a letter to Bishop
John Skinner, called Campbell’s publication, “the most hostile, the most
illiberal, and the most unsupported attack that has perhaps ever been
made on the Episcopacy of the church of Christ!”27 Daubeny publicly at-
tacked Campbell’s lectures in a lengthy preface to his Eight Discourses on
the Connection between the Old and New Testament Considered as Two Parts of
the Same Divine Revelation (1802). As the title suggests, Daubeny believed
that the Old and New Testaments together constitute a single eternal
revelation, and that the church likewise has only one legitimate and
eternal form, specifically that of the apostolic-sanctioned Episcopal
church.
Daubeny appealed to Skinner to publish a Scottish answer to Campbell.
Skinner obliged with a substantial tome entitled Primitive Truth and Order
Vindicated from Modern Misrepresentation (1803). Skinner’s central argu-
ment was virtually identical to Daubeny’s, stressing the importance of con-
tinuity and legitimacy to proper church order and ultimately to the
salvation of the individual. Skinner added arguments defending the ex-
clusive legitimacy of the Scottish Episcopal church in his native country.
Many of Skinner’s arguments were derived from the review in the Anti-
Jacobin, though they did not exhibit the extreme hostility that character-
ized other responses to Campbell. Skinner treated his adversary with
respect, but implicitly regretted that Campbell’s mistaken views would
prevent them from meeting in glory.
The final two publications of Campbell’s literary career did not gener-
ate any significant controversy, but unlike the Lectures on Ecclesiastical
25 John Skinner (the younger), Annals of Scottish Episcopacy (Edinburgh: A. Brown,

1818), 314.
26 Macfarlane to Bishop Jolly, 2 July 1800 (sro CH12/30/71).
27 Daubeny to Skinner, 19 August 1801; quoted in Skinner, Annals of Scottish Episcopacy,
315.
History, they had not been intended for the press. The first of these, the
Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence (1807), was transcribed
from Campbell’s manuscripts and corrected by his old friend James
Fraser of Drumoak.28 This volume contained four “Introductory Dis-
courses” (described below), six lectures on systematic theology, and
twelve lectures on pulpit eloquence. The “Systematic Theology” lectures
were perhaps misleadingly titled, for Campbell explicitly repudiated
doctrinal systems. They were not a systematic overview of Campbell’s re-
ligious tenets, but were rather a systematic method for studying Scrip-
ture and the evidences of religion, and for forming a system of Christian
morality. Their purpose was in fact to prevent divinity students from too
quickly accepting a fixed view of Christian teaching. The lectures on
pulpit eloquence complemented The Philosophy of Rhetoric by seeking
“only to apply to the pulpit, as far as they are applicable, the general
rules laid down by the ancients.”29 They examined the major types of
pulpit oratory, giving particular attention to the ways in which these
various sermons could be most effectively employed to highlight and
recommend Christian knowledge and practice.
James Fraser received formal credit as the editor of Campbell’s final
posthumous publication, Lectures on the Pastoral Character, which ap-
peared in 1811. The lectures were practical in nature, giving advice to
prospective ministers, especially those in the Church of Scotland, on
particular virtues to cultivate and vices to avoid. These themes re-
turned Campbell to the earliest concerns of his pastoral and publish-
ing career, as exemplified in his 1752 sermon The Character of a
Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern. The lectures also gave re-
newed attention to the controversial opinions of Campbell’s old adver-
sary David Hume – specifically Hume’s disparaging remarks on the
pastoral character.30 Campbell’s defensiveness suggests that Hume
had once again pierced the very heart of Campbell’s world-view, just as
28 Fraser’s name does not appear in the volume, but his editorship is clearly implied in
a letter to Campbell’s niece Ann Farquharson concerning the task of preparing the work
for publication; Fraser to Ann Farquharson, 23 April 1805 (aul ms 3214/12). Unfortu-
nately, we do not have the manuscript of this or the final volume of Campbell’s lectures
against which to check the scope and nature of Fraser’s editing. Fraser may have kept the
manuscripts, but I have not been able to find them.
29 lstpe, 505.
30 lpc, 146–9. Campbell was primarily concerned with Hume’s infamous essay “Of
National Characters,” which suggested that the ministerial office itself corrupted the
character of its occupant.
the sceptic had done long ago with his excoriation of Christian evi-
dences. To the end of his career, Campbell was concerned with the
same issues that had occupied his mind in the earliest days of his
Christian ministry, foremost of which was the defence and practical
realization of the Christian religion.
campbell’s lecturing scheme
Having reviewed all of Campbell’s known publications, we can now

make a preliminary sketch of the place of his individual works within
the context of his thought as a whole. Campbell’s divinity lectures pro-
vide the key to mapping out his intellectual system and to understand-
ing the greater purposes of his body of work. His lecturing scheme
demonstrates not only the scope of his science of divinity, but also the
unity of his publications, including such secular works as The Philosophy
of Rhetoric.
We have several sources from which to reconstruct the original form
of Campbell’s lecturing scheme. The main sources are Campbell’s
printed lectures together with their manuscript originals, and the stu-
dent notes of Robert Eden Scott. Campbell’s explicit lecturing plan
appears in the “Introductory Discourses,” and can be augmented by
Keith’s “General View of Dr. Campbell’s Prelections in Theology.”31
Campbell’s three posthumous publications contain fifty-nine lectures,
listed under five headings: four “Introductory Discourses,” six lectures
on “Systematic Theology,” twelve lectures on “Pulpit Eloquence,”
twenty-eight lectures on “Ecclesiastical History,” and nine lectures on
the “Pastoral Character.” Do these represent Campbell’s entire divinity
course? Campbell supposedly lectured according to a four-year cycle.
The college term ran approximately sixteen weeks each year, from late
December to early April. Since Campbell and Gerard both lectured
twice a week, they would have each delivered approximately thirty-two
lectures per year, giving a total of 128 lectures over a four-year
31 leh, 1:lx–lxxviii. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre claimed that the “Theology” article in
the “Edinburgh Encyclopedia” provides a good overview of Campbell’s manner of teaching
divinity; see Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:486. Ramsay’s meaning is a mystery. The “The-
ology” article in David Brewster’s Edinburgh Encyclopedia (which appeared in 1830, consid-
erably after Ramsay’s death) does not sound like Campbell at all. If Ramsay was referring
to an edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica (it could only be the first or the second), I can
find no evidence that Campbell wrote or was cited in either of these.
course.32 It appears, then, that fewer than half of Campbell’s lectures

were published. There are a number of ways to account for the differ-
ence. James Fraser, the editor of the Lectures on Systematic Theology and
Pulpit Eloquence, indicates that at least one of the pulpit eloquence lec-
tures had been excluded because it was identical to a chapter in The
Philosophy of Rhetoric.33 Campbell himself intimated that he would re-
peat his four “Introductory Discourses” each year for the benefit of in-
coming students. With this, we have enough material (including that
represented in Scott’s student notes) to account for three full years of
Campbell’s divinity course. What then of the remaining year? The an-
swer may lie in Campbell’s own account of his lecturing scheme,
found in the “Introductory Discourses.” Here we discover that much
of Campbell’s divinity teaching can be found in his other publications.
Campbell divided his divinity course into two major parts: the theo-
retical and the practical. “The first regards purely the science of theol-
ogy, the second the application of that science to the purposes of the
christian pastor.”34 The theoretical side encompassed three fields: ec-
clesiastical history, biblical criticism, and systematic or polemical divin-
ity. Systematic divinity was subdivided into two parts: the “Christian
System” and “Theological Controversy.” The practical side of the
course was divided into two major areas: “Instructing” and “Govern-
ing.” Figure 1 correlates this course structure with Campbell’s known
publications.
Campbell subdivided the first major section of the theoretical science
of divinity – ecclesiastical (or sacred) history – into “Ancient History”
and “Church History.” The latter corresponds to the published Lectures
on Ecclesiastical History, which surveys the church from its primitive be-
ginnings to modern times, and fills up exactly one year of instruction.
Campbell also treated aspects of ecclesiastical history in his unpublished
manuscripts, notably his “Strictures on Dodwell” and his “Defence” of
The Spirit of the Gospel sermon. Since “Ancient” or “Jewish History” was
taught by the professor of oriental languages as part of his daily Hebrew
32 This is supported by Robert Eden Scott’s student notes, aul ms M 190 (Campbell’s
lectures) and aul ms K 174 (Gerard’s lectures). Scott attended both professors during the
1786–87 college term, and apparently did not miss any lectures. He records thirty-one lec-
tures for each professor. The topics of Scott’s lecture notes are summarized in appendix 1.
33 pr, book 1, chapter 10 corresponds with the second eloquence lecture (lstpe,
274n.). Fraser also intimated in the Lectures on the Pastoral Character (67n.) that a particular
illustration already found in The Four Gospels was removed from the printed lecture.
34 lstpe, 4.
Figure 1: Campbell’s lecturing scheme (with related publications)
I . THE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY (Theory)

1. Sacred History Lectures on Ecclesiastical History
i. Ancient (Jewish) “Strictures on Dodwell” MS
ii. Ecclesiastical
2. Biblical Criticism “Preliminary Dissertations”
to The Four Gospels
3. Systematic or Polemical Divinity

i. The Christian System Lectures on Systematic Theology
ii. Theological Controversy
a. Against Infidels A Dissertation on Miracles
The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel
The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society
b. Against Misinformed Christians The Spirit of the Gospel

“Defence” MS
“Of implicit faith” MS
An Address to the People of Scotland
II . THE PASTORAL OFFICE (Practice)

1. Instructing
i. By Example (Propriety of The Character of a Minister
Character) Lectures on the Pastoral Character
ii. By Teaching (Christian Eloquence) Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence
The Philosophy of Rhetoric
2. Governing
i. Church Discipline
ii. Ordination
class (which divinity students were expected to attend) Campbell only

provided brief instructions on how to study Jewish antiquities.
Campbell’s lecture notes for the second major area of theoretical di-
vinity, biblical criticism, do not appear to have survived, yet they clearly
formed the basis of the “Preliminary Dissertations” which appeared with
his translation of The Four Gospels. Scott’s lecture notes, recorded during
the 1786–87 term (as Campbell was putting the final touches on his
Four Gospels manuscript), and summarized in appendix 1, correspond
closely to the “Preliminary Dissertations,” suggesting that Campbell was
reading from that very manuscript. Campbell’s lectures on biblical criti-
cism filled up another full year of his divinity course.
Campbell did not care for abstract theological questions or disputes,
which is perhaps why we have only six published lectures on systematic
theology. All of these provide practical instruction on a method of study

rather than on the “Christian System” itself, which Campbell thought di-
vinity students should derive from their own Bible studies (hence the
importance of criticism). No lectures survive on the second aspect of po-
lemical divinity, that concerned with theological controversy. This does
not mean that Campbell had nothing to say on the matter. He subdi-
vided the subject of theological controversy into two parts, each repre-
senting a major danger from which Christianity had to defend itself.
The first part treated the attacks on Christianity made by infidels, while
the second considered the dangers posed by misinformed Christians.
Eighteenth-century writers, particularly British moderates, routinely
defended the necessity of revelation against infidels and deists. As Camp-
bell said to his class, “The first controversy that claims our attention is the
deistical, as this strikes directly at the foundation of all.” He advised his
students to become familiar with infidels’ attacks upon Christianity’s ex-
ternal and internal evidences.35 Campbell’s own published writings re-
flect this apologetic concern. A Dissertation on Miracles is a particularly
good example of the defence of Christianity’s testimonial evidences.
Likewise, The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel highlights Christian-
ity’s historical evidences. The Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society jus-
tifies Christianity’s moral character against the taunts of libertines.
Divinity students in Aberdeen would certainly have been familiar with
Campbell’s apologetic works, as well as those of other eighteenth-century
apologists such as Alexander Gerard, whose The Influence of the Pastoral
Office on the Character (1760) was directed against Hume.
Campbell’s Christian apologia was at least as much concerned with
the dangers posed by misinformed Christians as by infidels. His Spirit of
the Gospel sermon, directed against the twin evils of superstition and en-
thusiasm, ultimately involved him in considerable inter-denominational
controversy. Misguided Christians (in this case Roman Catholics)
loomed large in two unpublished manuscripts: “Of implicit faith” and
the “Defence” of the Spirit of the Gospel sermon. Protestant High Church-
manship was the target of the manuscript “Strictures on Dodwell.” In
addition, Campbell’s Address to the People of Scotland was directed against
the enthusiastic and intolerant members of his own church. We do not
know if Campbell treated all of these subjects in his lecture course, but
it is likely that he at least provided his students with directed readings; it
is also possible, considering the volume of apologetic material that
35 lstpe, 221.
Campbell had to work with, that the subject of “Theological Contro-

versy” filled up all or most of a year of instruction.
Campbell divided the second half of his divinity course – the practical
application of the science of theology to the pastoral office – into “In-
structing” and “Governing.” Because ministers taught their parishioners
both by direct instruction and by example, Campbell subdivided the in-
structing category into “Christian or Pulpit Eloquence” and “Propriety
of Character.” The latter corresponded to the Lectures on the Pastoral
Character, which was itself a reworking of Campbell’s first publication,
The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern.36 The
published Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence obviously addressed the topic of
Christian rhetoric. That eloquence was of long-standing importance to
Campbell’s way of thinking is evidenced by its centrality in the Theolog-
ical Club of his student days. Also, like all classical-Christian schemes of
rhetoric, The Philosophy of Rhetoric considered the pulpit to be a major
medium for the art of public speaking. Preaching was certainly the most
pervasive form of oratory in eighteenth-century Scotland, and was prob-
ably the initial spur to Campbell’s interest in rhetoric. He maintained
that a minister must use every rhetorical device to communicate reli-
gious truth.37 Effective communication, in the pulpit as elsewhere, de-
manded a familiarity not only with the classical rules of discourse, but
also with the powers of the human mind and the types of evidence that
made the classical rules compelling. Thus, even the secular Philosophy of
Rhetoric was closely tied to Campbell’s pedagogically-oriented structure
of thought.
Nearly all of Campbell’s writings were subsumed within his general
scheme of education. The only area of his divinity course that is not re-
flected in either his known lectures or his other published works is the
second part of the practical side of the pastoral office, concerned with
“Governing.” This he divided into “Church Discipline” and “Ordina-
tion.” Campbell himself stated that he would not discourse copiously on
the topics of discipline, ordination, and civil rights.38 Keith, however,
notes that Campbell “delivered several useful lectures on christian duty
36 Gerard also gave considerable attention to the topic of pastoral care; see Scott’s lec-
ture-note topics, summarized in appendix 1, and Gerard’s own posthumously-published The
Pastoral Care, ed. Gilbert Gerard (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies; Aberdeen: A. Brown,
1799).
37 aul ms M 190, p. 288, shows Campbell chastising his students for failing to suit their
discourses to their intended audiences.
38 lstpe, 63–4.
and christian practice, and on the duties which we owe to God, our
neighbour, and ourselves. It does not appear, that he ever wrote any
thing on the conduct of ministers, when attending the Church courts of
the Scotch establishment.”39 Campbell certainly did not lack experience
in this area, but perhaps he believed that experience itself was the only
practical teacher in the political and disciplinary duties of the pastoral
office. In any case we have no indication that this formed a significant
part of his lecturing scheme.
Campbell’s literary career was clearly dominated by pedagogical and
pastoral concerns. Thus a comprehensive view of his lecturing scheme
provides insight into the structure of his thought, and clarifies the direc-
tion of his Christian apology. But it is equally clear that Campbell’s reli-
gious mind was deeply imbued with the values of the Enlightenment.
This can be seen in his emphasis on methodology before doctrine, on
critical inquiry before judgment, and on the practical realization of the
Christian values of tolerance, moderation and improvement. A consid-
erable portion of the clergy of the Scottish Northeast and highlands was
thus inculcated with the values of the enlightened, moderate Christian.
The values of Campbell’s enlightened age did not long outlive him; as
the world changed, so did his reputation. At the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, Campbell was considered one of Scotland’s foremost re-
ligious minds, but this reputation did not survive the evangelical revival
and mid nineteenth-century disruption within the Scottish church. Nei-
ther his biblical criticism nor his historical scholarship could withstand
the nineteenth-century methodological upheavals in those fields. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, Campbell’s religious works were no
longer being reprinted. But The Philosophy of Rhetoric, which was little
read in Campbell’s time, found new life in the nineteenth century; it
was reprinted at least forty-five times, and became a standard textbook
in the field, particularly in the American college curriculum, where only
the rhetorical texts of Hugh Blair and Lord Kames were more fre-
quently read. The Philosophy of Rheforic continues to be reprinted to this
day and is now regarded as one of the most important contributions to
eighteenth-century rhetorical theory. The only other Campbell publica-
tion to survive (marginally) into the twentieth-century is A Dissertation on
Miracles, due primarily to the twentieth-century renaissance in Hume
39 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” lxxv. Gerard dealt briefly with the pastor’s
public duties.
studies. But here again, a work that was thought by eighteenth-century

minds to have refuted Hume’s unreasonable scepticism has now been
eclipsed by modern fascination with the opinions of the sceptic himself.
The fact that Campbell’s modern reputation bears little resemblance
to his eighteenth-century reputation is not an unusual historical phe-
nomenon. To understand this disparity is to understand some of the dif-
ferences between the characteristic thought-patterns of the eighteenth
century and those of our own world. The remainder of this study will at-
tempt to rebuild the structure of George Campbell’s thought in order
to appreciate the significance of his ideas in the context of his age. Such
an attempt may also shed light on the ways in which Western thought
has changed in the last two centuries.
part ii
Natural Knowledge:
The Enlightened Campbell
Philosophy in Theory
the philosophical context
George Campbell was not alone among eighteenth-century philoso-

phers in striving to align his philosophical activities with Christian ends.
But what were these Christian ends, and how were they to be realized?
What kind of Christian was Campbell? John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, that
inveterate observer of eighteenth-century Scottish personalities, charac-
terized Campbell’s theology as perfectly orthodox in the manner of late
seventeenth-century Anglican divines.1 Indeed, Campbell’s defence of
Christian truth bore a striking resemblance to the apologetic works of
those English churchmen who have come to be known as latitudinari-
ans. William Chillingworth, Edward Stillingfleet, and John Tillotson, like
Campbell, all countenanced a basic orthodoxy, avoided doctrinal subtle-
ties, preached Christian morals, and advocated some form of religious
toleration. More importantly, their apologetic works, like Campbell’s,
were the products of an underlying concern to discover the boundaries
of religious knowledge.2
1 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols.
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:486.
2 The Aberdonians had a high regard for these three figures. Campbell recommended
the “excellent Chillingworth” to his students, claiming that his work was an “admirable
specimen of just and acute reasoning” (lstpe, 206). He often used Tillotson as an example
of preaching style (for example lstpe, 305), and, in a footnote to the third edition of A
Dissertation on Miracles, he denied Hume’s claim that Tillotson’s argument against transub-
stantiation was akin to Hume’s argument against miracles (st, 1:60–3n.). In his Pastoral
Care Gerard cited Stillingfleet more often than any other source.
Late seventeenth-century philosophy, as well as the philosophy of

the Enlightenment, was dominated by fundamental questions con-
cerning how the human mind can know or be sure of anything. Crit-
ics of religion such as Hobbes and Spinoza were intent on bringing
these basic epistemological problems into the religious realm as well,
and wondered whether reliable religious knowledge was at all attain-
able. The latitudinarian divines, like the Scottish Moderates of the
next century, were not only apologists but also church leaders deter-
mined to unify the diverse elements within the Anglican community,
while still upholding the vitality of the Christian faith. They wished to
avoid the extremes of Roman dogma on the one side and of radical
scepticism on the other. In pursuit of a middle way, the latitudinarian
divines formulated a theory of probabilistic knowledge wherein belief
was to be proportioned to the available evidence. Absolute certainty,
they argued, was in the mind of God alone and therefore beyond the
scope of religious apology. But the Anglican divines did not draw ei-
ther sceptical or fideistic conclusions from the limitations of human
knowledge. They believed that the human mind was capable of reach-
ing various degrees of probable knowledge, ranging from mere opin-
ion to moral certainty, the highest degree of assurance attainable in
the moral realm. Moral certainty, according to Stillingfleet, was “a suf-
ficient foundation for an undoubted assent,” and was founded on argu-
ments “strong enough to convince an unbiased mind.”3 This degree
of certainty could be reached or nearly reached in the most funda-
mental religious matters, which is to say that the empirical evidences
in favour of the Christian religion were sufficient to convince any im-
partial enquirer. Nevertheless, the human inability to know the mind
of God with absolute certainty necessitated the practice of religious
moderation and toleration. It also allowed room for, and indeed
made necessary, religious faith. “Therefore as God has set some
Things in broad day-light …” said Locke, “So in the greatest part of
our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so
say, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and
Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here; wherein to
check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day’s
Experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liableness
3 Cited in Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-
Century England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 48.
Philosophy in Theory 73
to Error.”4 Although our knowledge can reach only the “neighbour-

hood of Certainty,”5 we need not assume that knowledge and reli-
gious faith must be strictly divided. As a modern student of the
Anglican divines has remarked, “Reason and revelation – the terms
frequently used to discuss the divines’ allegiances – remain distinct,
but they are distinct inside a structure that allows for intercommuni-
cation on common grounds of evidence.”6 The probabilistic ap-
proach to Christian apology, which may be termed “Christian
empiricism,” dominated the British Enlightenment and found its
greatest eighteenth-century champion in Bishop Joseph Butler
(1692–1752).
Butler’s The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution
and Course of Nature (1736) encapsulated the methodological and struc-
tural approach of Christian empiricism. The first part of the work de-
scribed the extent of religious knowledge that could be gained solely by
man’s natural abilities. Using analogical reasoning, Butler argued from
the moral certainty of God’s government in the natural realm to the cor-
responding probability of his government in the moral realm. He es-
sayed to show the overwhelming probability of doctrines such as the
survival of our minds and identities after death and the existence of re-
wards and punishments in the next life. The human capacity for im-
provement was an additional indication that this life was but a
probationary state for the next life. Butler thought it unlikely that God
would act as a moral governor if he had not given us free wills. Our nat-
ural reason, therefore, indicates that our earthly life is merely a part of a
larger providential plan. Natural religion cannot itself discover this
plan, but it can teach us to anticipate the revelation that will complete
God’s communication to men. Having established the overwhelming
probability of the essential doctrines of natural religion, Butler then ar-
gued, in the second part of his Analogy, that the Christian religion most
successfully addresses the religious concerns raised by our natural en-
quiries. Christianity contains all that nature leads us to expect in a true
4 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 652. The religious origins and Christian apologetic pur-
poses of Locke’s Essay have been excellently argued by Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowl-
edge in Locke’s Philosophy,” in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 194–223.
5 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 655.
6 Reedy, The Bible and Reason, 32.
revelation, including an unimpeachable moral character and sufficient

positive evidences (prophecies and miracles) to convince us of its divine
origin. Christianity, in other words, is a reasonable and necessary
religion – it appeals to both our natural moral sense and our critical
understanding.
Butler’s probabilistic approach to problems of religious knowledge
was widely imitated through the eighteenth century and seems to have
been especially compelling to those who came of age in the 1730s. It re-
mained the standard model of Christian apology until the middle of the
nineteenth century. William Paley (1743–1805), the most influential of
the late eighteenth-century Christian apologists, followed this standard
apologetic trend by declaring that the evidences of natural theology
ought to be studied before the positive evidences of the Christian reli-
gion.7 The Scottish moderates were particularly impressed by Butler’s
order of procedure and division of Christian evidences into natural and
revealed components. Thomas Reid, while a young man, took extensive
and detailed notes on The Analogy of Religion.8 Campbell acknowledged
that this work had “shown us how useful [the analogical] mode of rea-
soning may be rendered, by the application he hath so successfully
made of it for refuting the cavils of infidelity.”9 Butler was credited by
his contemporaries with having decisively refuted the early-eighteenth-
century deistical challenge to the latitudinarian defence of the Christian
evidences. Although he, like Locke and the latitudinarians, emphasized
the natural limits of the human understanding, his underlying argu-
ment – that we can hardly get through the ordinary course of our daily
lives without believing in God’s providential governance – proved
congenial to the Aberdonians’ way of thought.10
The Aberdonians were particularly drawn to Butler’s method of argu-
ment. First, they supported the concept and necessity of probabilistic
reasoning. As Campbell said, “provided the facts upon which it is
founded be sufficiently numerous, the conclusion is said to be morally
7 The Works of William Paley, D.D. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1842), 434.
8 These twenty cramped pages of summary notes may be seen in aul ms 3061/10. See
also The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, 2 vols, 7th ed. (Edinburgh:
MacLachlan and Stewartk, 1872), 1:237.
9 pr, 54n. Campbell highly recommended Butler to his students (lstpe, 91–2); for
other favorable comments see, lstpe, 427, and dm, 30 and 276. For Campbell’s borrowing
of the concept of the “analogy of nature,” see fg, 1:6.
10 See Basil Mitchell, “Butler as a Christian Apologist,” in Joseph Butler’s Moral and
Religious Thought, ed. Christopher Cunliffe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 97–116.
certain.”11 Alexander Gerard, in his aptly-titled Dissertations on Subjects

Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (1766), claimed that,
“the evidence of Christianity is of the probable kind; and in every prob-
able argument, the strength of the evidence depends not only on the
strength of each separate probability, but also on the number of proba-
bilities.”12 Thomas Reid likewise argued that the strength of probable
reasoning depends upon the united force of several arguments which,
by themselves, might be unconvincing.13 Second, the Aberdonians sup-
ported the structure and direction of Butler’s reasoning. Concerning
“the order in which our theological enquiries ought to be conducted,”
Campbell instructed his divinity students that, “religion hath been often
and not unaptly divided into natural and revealed.” Natural religion, he
said, subdivided into two parts: “namely what concerns the nature and
providence of God [natural theology], and what concerns the duties
and prospects of man [ethics].” Even Scripture presupposed that “the
knowledge of divine attributes and of human obligations are discover-
able by the light of nature.” These subjects, he continued, do not “fall
within my province as a teacher of christian theology. They are in fact
preliminary studies, and constitute a part of the philosophic course.”14
Campbell assumed that his divinity students, in the fourth year of their
arts degree, had received philosophical instruction concerning the na-
ture and attributes of God, and the consequent moral duties of man.
The theologian, he maintained, must begin as a philosopher.
Late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemological theories
were generally inspired by problems of religious knowledge. This was the
case not only for the latitudinarians, but also for Locke, Berkeley, and But-
ler. It was also true for Campbell and his Aberdeen associates. But the
Aberdonians faced an additional problem not encountered by their
Anglican predecessors, a difficulty that arose directly from the earlier
attempts to establish an empirical epistemology. The problem was David
Hume. Hume highlighted the potential scepticism embedded in the new
empirical theory of knowledge. Butler’s accumulation of evidences was,
for him, an accumulation of uncertainties. The Aberdonians, unlike many
of their contemporaries, recognized the importance of Hume’s challenge,
and devoted considerable energies to saving empirical philosophy and
11 pr, 50. See also aul ms 652, p. 107.

12 Alexander Gerard, Dissertations on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of
Christianity (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, 1766), 405.
13 Works of Thomas Reid, 1:482.
14 lstpe, 84–6.
religion from the perceived ravages of his scepticism. Hume’s influence

on the Aberdonians’ philosophy was extraordinarily pervasive and
complex. It began with a theory of human nature.
t h e s c i e n c e o f h u m a n n at u r e
Although it is not a formal treatise on epistemology, The Philosophy of

Rhetoric, written over the course of twenty-five years, contains the bulk of
Campbell’s philosophy of human nature and theory of knowledge. Its
purpose, according to Campbell, was to investigate those principles in
human nature which account for the efficacy of the established rules of
rhetoric, for it is “in the human mind that we must investigate the
source of some of the useful arts.”15 The Rhetoric was intended to
present not “a correct map, but a tolerable sketch of the human mind;
and, aided by the lights which the Poet and the Orator so amply furnish,
to disclose its secret movements, tracing its principal channels of per-
ception and action, as near as possible, to their source: and, on the
other hand, from the science of human nature, to ascertain with greater
precision, the radical principles of that art, whose object it is, by the use
of language, to operate on the soul of the hearer, in the way of inform-
ing, convincing, pleasing, moving, or persuading.”16 Clearly the practi-
cal and theoretical aspects of rhetoric were meant to shed light on one
another. “Besides, this study, properly conducted, leads directly to an
acquaintance with ourselves; it not only traces the operations of the
intellect and imagination, but discloses the lurking springs of action in
the heart. In this view it is perhaps the surest and the shortest, as well as
the pleasantest way of arriving at the science of the human mind.”17
Campbell later explained his purpose with a peculiarly Scottish analogy:
The art of the rhetorician, like that of the philosopher, is analytical; the art of
the orator is synthetical. The former acts the part of the skilful anatomist, who,
by removing the teguments, and nicely separating the parts, presents us with
views at once naked, distinct, and hideous, now of the structure of the bones,
now of the muscles and tendons, now of the arteries and veins, now of the bow-
els, now of the brain and nervous system. The latter imitates Nature in the con-
structing of her work, who, with wonderful symmetry, unites the various organs,
15 pr, lxxiii.
16 pr, lxvii.
17 pr, lxxiv.
adapts them to their respective uses, and covers all with a decent veil, the skin.
This, though she hide entirely the more minute and the interior parts, and show
not to equal advantage even the articulations of the limbs, and the adjustment
of the larger members, adds inexpressible beauty, and strength, and energy to
the whole.18
The anatomical analogy is remarkably like that found in the conclusion

of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature and in his famous letter to Francis
Hutcheson, where Hume argued that a moral philosopher can study hu-
man nature either as a painter, highlighting moral excellence, or as an
anatomist, systematically exposing the real workings of the human
mind, though he cannot do both at the same time.19 Campbell may not
have agreed with Hume concerning the impossibility of joining the two
methods of inquiry, but he nevertheless placed his own rhetorical work
on the anatomist side of this analogy. Even to his divinity students
Campbell said, “It is the business of the orator to accommodate himself
to men, such as he sees they are, and not such as he imagines they
should be.”20 Thomas Gordon, the King’s humanist, likewise told his
undergraduates that “the only way prior to revelation, by which we can
discover the proper business or duty of man is to consider what is the
real constitution of his nature; and from what it leads him to, to deduce
what he was designed for.”21 Alexander Gerard’s best-known works simi-
larly employed the phenomena of taste and genius to investigate human
nature. The Aberdonians (with the clear exception of Beattie) emulated
Hume’s anatomical approach to human nature, and claimed to investi-
gate human nature by empirical means. But unlike Hume, they thought
that this approach was the surest means of strengthening virtue and
religion, because it demonstrated their foundation in human nature.
18 pr, 92n.
19 Hume to Hutcheson, 17 September 1739: in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T.
Greig, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1:32–4. The remarkable concluding pas-
sage of David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch,
2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 620–1, has clear rhetorical implications for
Campbell.
20 lstpe, 299.
21 Cited in Paul Wood, “Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aberdeen Enlighten-
ment,” in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1990), 144. Wood’s paper explores the question of how the Aberdonians,
particularly the earlier generation of Turnbull and Fordyce, dealt with the anatomist/
painter distinction. Wood argues that, unlike the Edinburgh professors, they thought they
could join the two methods of inquiry.
Campbell, like most philosophers of the Enlightenment, believed in a

universal human nature. In fact, he thought that a philosophy of rheto-
ric was possible only because the “general principles [of taste] are the
same in every people.” Even figures of speech, “are so far from being
the inventions of art, that, on the contrary, they result from the original
and essential principles of the human mind.”22 The task of the empiri-
cal philosopher of human nature, then, was to explicate these “original
and essential principles.” But this was no easy task, for, “Whatever re-
gards the analysis of the operations of the mind, which is quicker than
lightning in all her energies, must in a great measure be abstruse and
dark.”23 Campbell freely borrowed epistemological concepts from his
contemporaries, which helps us to understand these concepts in the
context of his time but at the same time obscures his own particular un-
derstanding of them. Eighteenth-century philosophers generally as-
sumed that the contents (or “clear and distinct” ideas) of the human
mind are in plain view, and that human motivations are transparent to
the unbiased philosopher. “The properties of our clear and adequate
ideas,” said Campbell, “can be no other than what the mind clearly per-
ceives them to be.”24 Like Locke and the ideal philosophers after him
(but in surprising contrast to Reid), Campbell held that “the mind is
passive. It does not act, but is acted upon.”25 The mind cannot generate
its own simple ideas, though it can combine simple ideas into novel
combinations. Campbell assumed that all of our ideas are particular,
thus following the atomistic conception of mental contents current in
the eighteenth century, but he also argued that we have the inborn abil-
ity to abstract general or universal truths from particular facts by recog-
nizing that the words or signs of individual things may represent “an
infinity of others, resembling in one circumstance, though totally
dissimilar in every other.”26 Thus we come not only to communicate by
arbitrary signs but to think by them as well.
Campbell’s epistemology was framed as his rhetorical philosophy re-
quired. He said frustratingly little about the particular contents of the
mind, and what he did say is not always easy to reconcile with a consistent
22 pr, 411 and 316.

23 pr, 265.
24 pr, 36. Cf. Hume: “The essence and composition of external bodies are … obscure
… [but] the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known” (Treatise of Human Nature, 366).
In a similar vein, Locke argued that there is no thought without consciousness (Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, 109).
25 aul ms 655, un-numbered page. See also pr, 49.
26 pr, 260.
theory of the mind. “Perception,” he explained early in The Philosophy of

Rhetoric, “is employed alike to denote every immediate object of thought,
or whatever is apprehended by the mind, our sensations themselves, and
those qualities in body suggested by our sensations, the ideas of these
upon reflection, whether remembered or imagined, together with those
called general notions, or abstract ideas. It is only the last of these kinds
which are considered as peculiarly the object of the understanding, and
which, therefore, require to be distinguished by a peculiar name.”27
Campbell applied the term “intellection” to this latter ability of the mind
to handle general or abstract notions, simultaneously chastising Locke
for promiscuously using the term “idea” to indicate such different things
as perceptions of the senses, traces of memory, creations of the imagina-
tion, and conceptions of the intellect.28 Here Campbell seemed intent
on keeping the operations of the senses and of the understanding strictly
apart. Sense perceptions ought never to be confused with ideas proper.
Although Campbell, contrary to Reid, sometimes suggested that the
mind is only a passive receiver of whatever objects happen to come be-
fore it, he joined Reid in criticizing the ideal philosophers for confusing
the distinct actions or powers of the mind. Should Campbell, then, be
classed among the Common Sense realists as an opponent of the ideal
system or “way of ideas” that followed upon John Locke’s revolutionary
epistemology? This is perhaps the most difficult question in Campbell
studies. Campbell scholars have variously attributed the inspiration of his
underlying epistemology to John Locke, Thomas Reid, and David
Hume.29 The eminent Campbell scholar Lloyd F. Bitzer has undertaken
the most rigorous comparison of epistemological concepts, arguing that
27 pr, 35–6n.
28 pr, 261–3.
29 Campbell’s indebtedness to Locke was suggested more than fifty years ago by Clar-
ence W. Edney, “George Campbell’s Theory of Logical Truth,” Speech Monographs 15
(1948): 19–32. In 1962, Lloyd F. Bitzer defended a dissertation that argued in detail not
only that Campbell’s greatest intellectual debt was to Hume, but also that Campbell’s phi-
losophy was nearly identical to Hume’s, even in its use of scepticism; see “The Lively Idea:
A Study of Hume’s Influence on George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric” (Ph.D. diss., State
University of Iowa, 1962). Bitzer has defended this position in “Hume’s Philosophy in
George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 3, no. 2 (Summer 1969):
139–66, and in the introduction to his standard edition of Campbell’s The Philosophy of Rhet-
oric. Despite his textual support for this thesis, Bitzer’s claim has not been accepted without
question. Dennis R. Bormann, for example, found the argument of Campbell’s likeness to
Hume prima facie unbelievable; see “Some ‘Common Sense’ about Campbell, Hume, and
Reid: The Extrinsic Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 71, 4 (1985): 395–421. See also
the bibliographical essay below, pp. 276–7.
Campbell’s greatest intellectual debts are to Hume, at the expense of

Locke and Reid. And indeed, Campbell seemed to distance himself from
Reid in many significant ways, particularly in his extensive borrowing of
Hume’s principles of association, which Hume himself thought was his
most original contribution to philosophy.30
Hume had argued that the ideas and impressions in our minds do not
assemble or follow one another randomly, but adhere to certain univer-
sal principles of association, analogous to the universal principles of mo-
tion and of attraction that Newton had discovered inductively in the
natural world. According to Hume, we know the laws of nature only by
observing their universal effects, or more properly the associations that
consistently occur in our minds, rather than by perceiving directly their
ultimate causes. The most important of Hume’s associating principles
were resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and especially cause and
effect. Campbell (as well as Gerard) also gave considerable attention to
“the tendency of the mind to associate ideas under the notion of causes,
effects, or adjuncts.”31 In fact, Campbell argued that experience owes its
very existence to the habitual association of like ideas retained in mem-
ory and generalized. “There is a variety of relations to be found in
things,” he said, “by which they are connected. Such are, among several
others, resemblance, identity, equality, contrariety, cause and effect,
concomitancy, vicinity in time or place. These we become acquainted
with by experience; and they prove, by means of association, the source
of various combinations of ideas.”32 In our use of language too, we “con-
tract a habit of associating the sign with the thing signified, insomuch
that either, being presented to the mind, frequently introduces or occa-
sions the apprehension of the other,” so that by custom we come to asso-
ciate certain arbitrary sounds with the ideas of particular things.33
Campbell even reminded his divinity students to pay due regard to “the
laws of association in our ideas” when considering the problems of ser-
mon composition.34 Nevertheless, he seemed more willing than Hume
to believe that the relations between things themselves exist objectively
in the external world, and are learned and imitated by the mind. If so,
this differentiated his associational psychology from that of Hume, who
30 This at least is the view of the young Hume in the Abstract (1740); see Treatise of
Human Nature, 661.
31 pr, 50.
32 pr, 258.
33 pr, 258.
34 lstpe, 399–400.
could make no claims concerning the reality represented by habitual

mental constructs. Although this may at first seem a minor quibble (in
that it still allows them both to be “associationists”), it will prove to be a
difference of considerable philosophic import.
Hume’s principles of association are undeniably important in
Campbell’s theory of the mind, but they cannot account for the whole
of Campbell’s explanation of human nature, as they must in Hume’s
philosophy. The principles of association help to explain the confu-
sion and strife over words that complicate the art of rhetoric, but they
cannot justify the pervasive human belief in the reality of the external
world and of the existence of objective truth. For this, Campbell in-
voked the innate powers of the mind – called faculties – a significant
non-Humean concept. The mental faculties were important for
Campbell not only in explaining the efficacy of the classical rules of
rhetoric, but also in justifying our confident ability to judge evidence
and truth, including the truth of the Christian religion. But here we
must be cautious. To invoke the faculties of the mind does not neces-
sarily make one a faculty psychologist in Reid’s sense – that is, a be-
liever in the fundamental and irreducible powers of the mind which
form a bulwark of Common Sense philosophy. Seventeenth– and
eighteenth–century philosophers routinely invoked the “faculties” or
“powers” of the mind, often as no more than a convenient literary fic-
tion, and sometimes merely to distinguish men from brute animals.
This seems to be the case with Locke’s use of the faculties, and it may
also explain Hume’s occasional use of such concepts. But did Camp-
bell employ the faculties of the mind in a similarly loose manner? Pro-
fessor Bitzer argues that Campbell’s “implied view of distinct mental
faculties breaks down” towards the end of the first book of The Philoso-
phy of Rhetoric.35 Indeed, Bitzer may be correct that Campbell’s con-
ception of the scope of the faculties is not consistently held, even in
regard to purely rhetorical matters. But before we can decide the is-
sue, we must take a closer look at Campbell’s account of the powers of
the human mind.
35 pr, xxi. Campbell’s view of the faculties may not have been consistent over time. By
Campbell’s own account, the first chapter of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, which introduces the
concept of the four faculties, was written in 1750, while he was minister in the isolated
country parish of Banchory Ternan. Most of the other chapters of book I seem to have been
written while he was in Aberdeen, and read before the Aberdeen Philosophical Society,
whose Common Sense members would have taken an interest in his views on the powers of
the mind.
the faculties of the mind
Although Hume, like most eighteenth-century philosophers, sometimes

invoked the mental faculties, they were fundamentally foreign to his epis-
temology. His insistence that the only demonstrable difference between
sensations, memories and imaginings is their relative degree of vivacity
made the concept of distinct faculties redundant. Reid, in contrast, con-
structed his entire epistemology on the premise that there are distinct,
original, though inexplicable faculties or powers in the human mind. His
list of the mind’s constitutional powers included perception (which en-
compasses sensation), consciousness, memory, conception (which in-
cludes imagination), abstraction, judgment, reasoning and taste.36 These
irreducible powers supported his notion of an active and self-willing
mind, while Hume’s associational principles were consistent with his no-
tion of a passive mind whose basic operating principles are beyond the
influence of the will. Campbell’s own position was more ambiguous.
Sometimes, like Hume, he seems to have differentiated the mental pow-
ers only by their degree of vivacity: “A passion is most strongly excited by
sensation … Next to the influence of sense is that of memory, the effect
of which upon passion, if the fact be recent, and remembered distinctly
and circumstantially, is almost equal. Next to the influence of memory is
that of imagination; by which is here solely meant the faculty of appre-
hending what is neither perceived by the senses, nor remembered.”37
Campbell agreed with Hume that, “sense invariably makes a stronger im-
pression than memory, and memory a stronger than imagination.”38 Yet
he seemed unwilling to make vivacity the sole means of distinguishing
between the mental powers. Campbell explicitly repudiated Hume’s no-
tion that belief is nothing more than a lively idea.39 Moreover his rhetor-
36 Nearly every essay in Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man accounted for a dif-
ferent irreducible power or faculty of the human mind. Reid defined the faculties as “those
powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make a part of the constitu-
tion of the mind” (Works of Thomas Reid, 1:221). Though Reid’s “train of thought” (1:379–
88) bore some resemblance to the theory of the association of ideas, he insisted on seeing
even this as the product of an active, rather than of a passive, mind (see 1:388).
37 pr, 81.
38 pr, 137.
39 pr, 73. Campbell here cited Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of
Common Sense (1764). The Aberdonians consistently denied Hume’s equation of belief with
vivacity; see, for example, Works of Thomas Reid, 1:183. Within the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society, John Farquhar chastised Hume for not seeing the fundamental differences be-
tween such mental activities as sense perception, memory, and imagination (aul ms 3107/
1/3, pp. 35–7).
ical philosophy appealed to the different faculties of the mind to explain

the efficacy of the various types of classical discourse.40 There are “princi-
ples in our nature,” said Campbell, before discussing each of the facul-
ties in turn, “which, when properly addressed and managed, give no
inconsiderable aid to reason in promoting belief.”41 This has obvious sig-
nificance for the orator, but, on a more fundamental level, it suggests
that Campbell’s notion of belief was closely linked with his notion of the
constitutional powers of the mind.
How many mental faculties did Campbell identify? The Philosophy of
Rhetoric begins with the declaration that “All the ends of speaking are re-
ducible to four; every speech being intended to enlighten the under-
standing, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence
the will.”42 This enumeration of the faculties was made with purely rhe-
torical ends in mind and need not be taken as complete, for it obviously
excluded memory, which Campbell regarded as a subordinate faculty in
the realm of persuasion. Yet later in book I of The Philosophy of Rhetoric,
Campbell dealt extensively with four faculties: memory, imagination, the
understanding, and the passions. Here memory takes the place of the
will, but since the will (or the “heart”) is the final arbiter of action, and as
such is influenced by the other faculties, it need not be a major topic of
rhetorical concern in itself. In addition, Campbell seems to have consid-
ered the senses (external and internal) to be original faculties, and there
are occasional hints that he regarded taste as an original power of the
mind.43
The imagination (known also as the “fancy” or the “creative faculty”)
received the most attention in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. According to
Campbell, the imagination has virtually unlimited powers to combine
and shape ideas from sense or memory, and is most effectively influ-
enced by the principle of vivacity – that is, “by exhibiting to it a lively
40 pr, 1, and lxxiii. See also pr, book 1, chapter vii, and lstpe, 374. Gerard also ar-
gued that the purpose of oratory is to convince the understanding, please the imagination,
move the passions, and persuade the will (aul ms k 174, p. 181).
41 pr, 71.
42 pr, 1. Bacon’s standard account of the faculties (taken over, for example, in
Diderot’s Encyclopedia) cited memory, reason, and imagination, which he associated with
history, philosophy and poesy respectively.
43 pr, 356 and 411. Campbell includes “admiration” as one of “those original feelings
of the mind, which are denominated by some the reflex senses, being of the same class with
a taste for beauty, an ear for music, or our moral sentiments” (pr, 3). It is difficult to know
what to make of this, or of his singular references to the “moral powers of the mind” (pr,
80) or the “power of speech” as a “useful faculty” (pr, lxxiii).
and beautiful representation of a suitable object.”44 Although its rhetor-

ical end is pleasure, it can also enliven arguments addressed to the un-
derstanding, thus maintaining the attention of the audience. Campbell
believed that strong and lively ideas are essential to Christian persua-
sion, for, like Hume, he was convinced that ideas alone are ineffective
when not directed to the appropriate passions. “If it is the fancy,” said
Campbell, “which bestows brilliancy on our ideas, if it is memory which
gives them stability, passion doth more, it animates them.”45 The pas-
sions, then, like the fancy, should not fall beneath the notice even of
the Christian orator. “When persuasion is the end,” said Campbell,
“passion also must be engaged.”46 Pride, hope, self-love, patriotism, and
compassion are among those passions that most effectively moved an
audience to action. But though the passions are indispensable tools of
pastoral influence, Campbell knew that they are capable of great mis-
chief if not properly guided. The orator has to take care to satisfy his au-
dience “that there is a connexion between the action to which he would
persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he
excites.”47 Campbell, like his contemporaries, was profoundly inter-
ested in working out the proper relationship between the passions and
the understanding, or what was commonly called reason.
Campbell did not always clearly distinguish the understanding from
reason and judgment. Reid defined judgment as a simple power of rec-
ognizing self-evident premises, thereby making it equivalent to com-
mon sense perception. Reasoning, he said, is the ability to “draw
conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are.”48 Campbell
likewise tended to assume that reason works only from established pre-
mises or foundations, and that its primary task is to consider the weight
and validity of evidence. The Aberdonians generally applied the term
“understanding” to all of these powers together – that is, to the whole
power of thinking – and indeed to all of the mental powers besides
sense, memory, imagination, passion and the will. For Campbell then,
the understanding was the same as the power of intellection, which
handled all abstract ideas and general notions. Nevertheless, he some-
times used the term “reason” to signify this comprehensive sense,
rather than confining it to its properly narrow sphere.
44 pr, 3.
45 pr, 77.
46 pr, 77.
47 pr, 77–8.
48 Works of Thomas Reid, 1:423 and 425.
Reason (in the broad sense) had traditionally been sovereign of the
mental realm, though eighteenth-century empiricists tended to reduce
the relative importance of reason in most human activities, and to cir-
cumscribe its meaning. Hume placed severe limits on the ability of rea-
son (in any sense) to discover knowledge and moral values. Campbell,
as an anatomist of the human mind, was likewise aware that reason, in
either its broad or its narrow sense, was not itself a source of knowledge.
He declared that “the far greater part of the natural knowledge with
which a man of science is acquainted, he neither did derive, nor by any
exertion whatever could derive, from his mental powers; but that he has
gotten it by information from without; and that the only legitimate ap-
plication of the intellectual faculty was, to enable him to apprehend the
facts, and canvass the evidence.”49 He contrasted this empirical account
of reason with that of the so-called rationalists: “With them, reason is
held the standard of truth; whereas it is, primarily, no more than the test
or the touchstone of evidence, and in a secondary sense only the stan-
dard of truth. Now the difference between these two, however little it
may appear on a superficial view, is very great.”50 Here Campbell was be-
ginning to use reason in its narrower signification. He denied that rea-
son, even in its broadest sense, can be an adequate source of knowledge.
He also denied that reason can or even ought to determine the ends of
action. Like Hume, he argued that a strong passion can be overcome
only by another strong passion, or by the destruction of the belief that
originally excited the passion.51 Hume might have summed up his views
on reason and the passions thus: “passion is the mover to action, reason
is the guide.” The words, in fact, are Campbell’s.52 As he explained to
his divinity students, “To make me believe, it is enough to shew me that
things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to shew that the action will
answer some end. That can never be an end to me, which gratifies no
passion or affection in my nature. In order to persuade, it is always nec-
essary to move the passions. Passion is the mover to action, reason is the
guide. Good is the object of the will, truth is the object of the under-
standing. It is only through the passions, affections and sentiments of
the heart, that the will is to be reached.”53 The philosopher of human
49 st, 1:343.
50 fg, 1:2–3. Campbell immediately went on to say that reason is necessary to appre-
hend the evidence provided by God to prove his revelation.
51 dm, 249; pr, 93.
52 pr, 78.
53 lstpe, 530–1. Most of this passage is lifted from The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 77–8.
nature must recognize that “mens [sic] conduct is influenced more by

passion than by cool reflection,” and that “the bulk of mankind are
more influenced by their passions, in forming their opinions, than by
reason.”54 But Campbell, unlike Hume, did not have to depend exclu-
sively on a narrowly-defined reason to stand against the desires of the
passions. His broader conception of the understanding (which Hume
did not seem to share) included a power of judging the validity of
fundamental moral and metaphysical propositions.
Despite the limitations that he placed on the narrowly-defined power
of reason, Campbell believed that the understanding (which includes
reason as one of its components) is the chief safeguard against the dan-
gerous influences of the passions. He warned his readers that “the un-
derstanding is too generally the dupe of the passions.”55 Virtue, he
thought, is too important to be considered a mere passion, and must be
subject to the superior decisions of the understanding. “This preroga-
tive the intellect has above all the other faculties, that whether it be or
be not immediately addressed by the speaker, it must be regarded by
him either ultimately or subordinately; ultimately, when the direct pur-
pose of the discourse is information or conviction; subordinately, when
the end is pleasure, emotion, or persuasion.”56 Belief, upon which pas-
sions themselves are often founded, is primarily swayed by information
and argument, which belong to the realm of the understanding. Under-
standing, to bring about conviction, must be enlivened by imagination,
memory and the passions, but, “these are not the supplanters of reason
[in the broader sense], or even rivals in her sway; they are her hand-
maids, by whose ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart,
and procure it there a favourable reception.”57 This passage may have
been meant to stand in opposition to Hume’s famous dictum that “rea-
son is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pre-
tend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”58 Campbell
agreed with Hume that the passions are absolutely necessary to motivate
the will, and that the intellect is powerless to direct activity towards
desirable ends without their aid. Nevertheless, he had considerably
more faith than did Hume in the ability of the intellect to discover desir-
able ends and reveal them to the passions. The passions are not to be
54 st, 2:292 and 314.

55 st, 1:392.
56 pr, 216.
57 pr, 72.
58 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 415.
conquered, but rather directed to higher purposes by the God-given in-

tellectual faculty. The passions and the understanding (known also as
“the head”) combine to influence the will (or “the heart”); the object of
the understanding is truth, and that of the will is the good. Thus is civili-
zation born of the triumph of reason over the passions.59
Memory, at first glance, seems to play only a minor role in Campbell’s
account of the faculties. The ultimate end of speaking, he says, “may be
at one time to inform or convince the understanding, at another to de-
light the imagination, at a third to agitate the passions, and at a fourth
to determine the will. But it is never the ultimate end of speaking to be
remembered, when what is spoken tends neither to instruct, to please,
to move, nor to persuade.”60 In a purely rhetorical context, memory
must be subordinate to the other faculties. Campbell often reminded
his readers that memory is fallible, and that some memories are so faint
or lacking in vivacity as to be no better than opinions.61 But if we look
beyond these seeming slights, and indeed beyond the purely rhetorical
context, we discover that memory receives an inordinate amount of at-
tention over the course of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, and is almost invari-
ably tied to Campbell’s dealings with his friendly adversary, David
Hume.
In the same years that he was composing the bulk of the chapters that
would become the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell was
also attempting to distance himself from Hume on the matters of expe-
rience, testimony and memory. Early in A Dissertation on Miracles he ar-
gued that Hume had misrepresented the vital role played by testimony
in our acquisition of knowledge, and that our faith in the representa-
tions of others is original, unaccountable, and founded in our very
nature. He then challenged Hume
to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest informations of his mem-
ory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt, or to explain. Indeed
memory bears nearly the same relation to experience, that testimony does. Cer-
tain it is that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected
by experience. Yet should any person hence infer, that memory derives all its ev-
idence from experience, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. On the con-
trary, experience derives its origin solely from memory, and is nothing else but
59 pr, 80 and 77; aul ms 653, part iii, unnumbered page.

60 pr, 76.
61 pr, 41, 54, 58, 60.
the general maxims or conclusions, we have form’d, from the comparison of

particular facts remember’d. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to
memory, we had never been able to acquire experience.62
Only memory can address the defects of memory, which is to say that
the more lively representations of memory will correct the more con-
fused and indistinct ones. But in no case can experience claim an au-
thority above, or even exist apart from, the unaccountable and original
authority of memory.
This passage in the Dissertation on Miracles helps explain Campbell’s
rather odd treatment of memory in The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Although
he counts memory as a subordinate faculty in the rhetorical context, he
does not regard it as in any way inferior in the logical context – that is,
in the handling of evidence and in the search for truth. Memory shows
up in many unexpected places in the first book of the Rhetoric. At the be-
ginning of a section entitled “The nature and origin of Experience,”
Campbell considers the two “sources in our nature which give being to
experience,” namely sense and memory. The senses are the “original in-
lets of perception” but they operate only in the present moment, where-
upon memory “becomes the sole repository of the knowledge received
from sense; knowledge which, without this repository, would be as in-
stantaneously lost as it is gotten.” Memory is therefore “the only original
voucher extant of those past realities for which we had once the evi-
dence of sense.”63 A few pages later, Campbell returns to the problem of
testimony, and again links its authority to that of memory: “But that tes-
timony, antecedently to experience, hath a natural influence on belief,
is undeniable. In this it resembles memory; for though the defects and
misrepresentations of memory are corrected by experience, yet that this
faculty hath an innate evidence of its own we know from this, that if we
had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been
able to acquire experience.”64 And again, in a section entitled, “The su-
periority of Scientific Evidence re-examined,” Campbell seems strangely
concerned to highlight the uncertain reliability of this faculty; “It was
observed of memory, that as it instantly succeeds sensation, it is the re-
pository of all the stores from which our experience is collected, and
that without an implicit faith in the clear representations of that faculty,
62 dm, 17–18.
63 pr, 47.
64 pr, 54.
we could not advance a step in the acquisition of experimental knowl-

edge. Yet we know that memory is not infallible: nor can we pretend that
in any case there is not a physical possibility of her making a false report.
Here, it may be said, is an irremediable imbecility in the very foundation
of moral reasoning.”65 But Campbell makes no attempt to resolve the
dilemma. Instead, he asks whether mathematical reasoning has any bet-
ter foundation in certainty? The answer is firmly negative. Even mathe-
matical reasoning, which seems to be incontrovertible, depends upon a
gradual series of proofs held in memory. We do not see an entire mathe-
matical demonstration at once, but have only the strong impressions of
memory to vouch for the validity of each part, so that ultimately “the
whole evidence is reduced to the testimony of memory.” “In spite of the
pride of mathesis,” he continues in rather Humean language, “no dem-
onstration whatever can produce, or reasonably ought to produce, a
higher degree of certainty than that which results from the vivid repre-
sentations of memory, on which the other is obliged to lean.”66 But
Campbell has no interest in drawing sceptical conclusions from this un-
promising state of affairs. He merely insists on the absolute dependence
of all knowledge upon the indefensible and unaccountable authority of
memory. Even the geometrician, who comes closest to absolute cer-
tainty, will find it impossible, “by any efforts, to shake off his depen-
dence on the accuracy of his attention and fidelity of his memory.”67
Thus, throughout the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell
repeatedly gives memory a place where one does not expect to find it,
and an importance far out of proportion to its role in public address.
Campbell’s incessant concern for memory might be unaccountable
if his concerns were simply rhetorical. But it was no coincidence that
the spectre of Hume haunted these pages as it had the Dissertation on
Miracles. In both works Campbell was concerned to establish the
proper epistemological foundation of belief, for which the faculty of
memory was the cornerstone. Hume had treated memory as different
from sense perception and imagination in nothing but degree – that
is, in the liveliness of the experience. Belief was likewise no more than
the vivacity with which we perceive an object. Hume declared that “we
must not be contented with saying, that the vividness of the idea pro-
duces the belief: We must maintain that they are individually the
65 pr, 58.
66 pr, 59.
67 pr, 59.
same.”68 In Hume’s system, belief could not be philosophically differ-

entiated from mere feeling. Campbell, like the other Aberdonians,
took exception to this, not because he thought that the veracity of
memory or of belief could be rationally demonstrated, but because he
understood that moral reasoning and its conclusions depend entirely
upon the irreducible authority of our mental powers. Could such an
important edifice as moral and scientific knowledge rest securely upon
a mere degree of vivacity? In Campbell’s view Hume had not done
nearly enough to safeguard memory as the foundation of our empiri-
cal knowledge, and ultimately of our belief. Experience without mem-
ory is meaningless. So too is belief that cannot be distinguished from
feeling. “I will not say with a late subtle metaphysician,” declared
Campbell, “that ‘Belief consisteth in the liveliness of our ideas.’ That
this doctrine is erroneous, it would be quite foreign to my purpose to
attempt here to evince.”69 Since Reid had successfully refuted this doc-
trine, Campbell was content to agree with Hume “that belief com-
monly enlivens our ideas; and that lively ideas have a stronger
influence than faint ideas to induce belief. But so far are these two
from being coincident, that even this connexion between them,
though common, is not necessary. Vivacity of ideas is not always ac-
companied with faith, nor is faith always able to produce vivacity.”70
Belief, then, was influenced by vivacity, but it was not the same as vivac-
ity. And so Campbell set himself apart from Hume to stand with his
Common Sense associates, to whom these chapters of The Philosophy of
Rhetoric were originally read. Like Reid, he thought that the impor-
tance of memory transcended the ability of moral philosophers to
prove that it is well founded. Memory is compelling by its own unac-
countable and irresistible authority, and is therefore to be accounted
an irreducible faculty of the human mind.

69 pr, 73. See similar statements in James Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of
Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1776), 58, and
Works of Thomas Reid, 1:107 and 358.
70 pr, 73. Bitzer’s claim that vivacity was the main component of Campbell’s concep-
tion of belief is at best misleading; see “Hume’s Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philoso-
phy of Rhetoric,” 150. Though Campbell did borrow some of Hume’s language of vivacity,
his account of memory (about which Hume had little to say) and of belief was ultimately
closer to Reid’s view. For a clear, concise summary of Reid’s account of memory (which he
too invariably linked with belief) see Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London: Routledge,
1989), 118–24.
Campbell’s treatment of memory in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, far out

of proportion to his strictly rhetorical concerns, suggests that he re-
garded this faculty as much more than a convenient fiction. Moreover,
he seemed to introduce the topic whenever he was answering Hume on
such matters as testimony and experience, suggesting that Campbell
thought he was correcting a fundamental shortcoming in the sceptic’s
account of human knowledge. There is certainly nothing in Hume
equivalent to Campbell’s triple insistence that memory is fundamental
to all knowledge, absolutely unaccountable in its reliability, and yet un-
questionable in its authority.71 Though no other power of the mind re-
ceived a similarly compulsive treatment, Campbell’s review of the
faculties in chapter VII of The Philosophy of Rhetoric suggests that he re-
garded the imagination, the understanding, and the passions as co-
equal in authority with memory. In the later “Defence” manuscript, he
named memory, judgment and imagination as mental faculties that, like
one’s opinions, can never be forfeited or alienated.72 Campbell thus fol-
lowed Reid in regarding the faculties as real constitutional powers of the
mind, and as important original sources of evidence and belief.
Campbell thought that Hume had misunderstood the psychology of
belief. Hume had underestimated the crucial role played by the irreduc-
ible powers of the human mind in establishing belief and influencing the
will. Although the passions are the primary movers of the will, they are
directionless and therefore impotent without the investigating power of
the understanding, the enlivening ability of the imagination, and the ver-
ifying authority of the memory. The Aberdonians were certainly not the
first to appeal to the faculties of the mind – they had been standard lin-
guistic tools in English philosophy since Bacon – but they were perhaps
the first to give a consistent authority to the faculties in vouching for the
reliability of human knowledge. Unlike Hume, Campbell was a faculty
psychologist. He certainly argued (not unlike Hume) that we cannot
rationally control our belief or lack of belief in abstract propositions such
71 In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume gives little attention to memory (which may
help to account for Campbell’s own detailed though scattered treatment), and he never
distinguishes memory from a degree of vivacity or a feeling (for example, 85, 153). Unlike
Campbell, Hume seems to think that memory is the source of personal identity (261). In
his dissertation (“The Lively Idea”), Bitzer appears to argue that Campbell was no different
from Hume on the matter of memory, but in Bitzer’s earlier essay, “A Re-evaluation of
Campbell’s Doctrine of Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 46 (1960): 135–40, there are
hints of how important memory was to Campbell.
72 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page.
as religious doctrines,73 which is to say that we cannot will our belief. In

this sense, belief is indeed a feeling and beyond the control of reason,
and as such demands toleration from other minds. But Campbell also ar-
gued that we have considerable freedom to decide, by means of our rea-
soning powers, what information to gather and present at the bar of
belief. Reason, though it cannot act as a judge, has all the powers of an
advocate. It can properly be said, therefore, that “probability results from
evidence, and begets belief. Belief invigorates our ideas. Belief raised to
the highest becomes certainty. Certainty flows … from the force of the
evidence, real or apparent, that is produced.”74 Inasmuch as belief falls
within the realm of reason, so also is it a problem of evidence.
campbell’s theory of evidence
The Aberdonians were all deeply interested in problems of evidence.

John Stewart, the Marischal professor of mathematics, devoted most of
his Wise Club discourses to exploring the nature and types of evidence.
Thomas Reid said, “To believe without evidence is a weakness which ev-
ery man is concerned to avoid … Nor is it in a man’s power to believe
anything longer than he thinks he has evidence.”75 Campbell devoted a
considerable chapter of the first book of The Philosophy of Rhetoric to de-
tailing the nature, types, and sources of evidence. He believed that in or-
der to move an audience, a rhetorician must appreciate the relationship
between evidence and human nature. Thus he was determined to heal
the classical breach between logic and rhetoric. He also treated the prob-
lem of evidence in his apologetic works, most notably in A Dissertation on
Miracles. Although his delineation of the types of evidence was not strik-
ingly original (except, as we shall see, in the matter of testimony), it
nicely encapsulated a typically eighteenth-century understanding of the
subject. This encapsulation is schematically represented in figure 2.
Campbell divided evidence into two major types, intuitive and deduc-
tive, which he distinguished by the following criteria: “Logical truth con-
sisteth in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the
nature of things. This conformity is perceived by the mind, either imme-
diately on a bare attention to the ideas under review, or mediately by a
comparison of these with other related ideas. Evidence of the former
73 Campbell addressed this problem most fully in the last part of his “Defence” manu-
script, aul ms 655.
74 pr, 81.
Figure 2: Campbell’s Theory of Evidence
I . INTUITIVE EVIDENCE natural, original and unaccountable

immediately perceived
not subject to reasoning
1. Pure Intellection concerns “metaphysical” truths
mathematical axioms and definitions
2. Consciousness concerns “physical” truths
present feelings and sensations
knowledge of self-existence
3. Common Sense concerns self-evident “moral” truths
foundation of moral reasoning
(including the veracity of memory)
II . DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE mediately perceived by a comparison of ideas

subject to reasoning
1. Demonstrative (Scientific) invariable relations of general ideas
simple and absolute proofs (no contrary proofs possible)
2. Moral contingent relations of particular facts
complex and probable evidences (contrary proofs
likely)
province of rhetoric
i. Experience customary/habitual associations of ideas
probability related to uniformity of experience
ii. Analogy indirect experience
weakens in proportion to remoteness of resemblance
iii. Testimony often antecedent to personal experience
primary source of particular/historical facts
iv. Calculation of Chances mixture of demonstrative (mathematical) and moral
evidence
kind is called intuitive; of the latter, deductive.”76 Intuitive evidence is

convincing by its mere appearance. Its effect on the mind’s power of
judgment is “natural, original, and unaccountable,” which is to say that
76 pr, 35. Campbell’s division is akin to Reid’s distinction between “intuitive judgments”
(i.e., common sense judgments) and “discursive judgments,” the second of which divides into
demonstrative and probable reasoning (Works of Thomas Reid, 1:475–6). Locke also divides
knowledge between intuitive and demonstrative (Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
531). In section iv of his first Enquiry, Hume divides “the objects of human reason” into “re-
lations of ideas” and “matters of fact”, the second of which corresponds to Campbell’s moral
evidence, and the first of which corresponds largely to Campbell’s demonstrative evidence,
but seems also to include some elements of intuitive evidence; see David Hume, Enquiries Con-
cerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge
and P.H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 25.
no additional evidences of any kind can make it any more compelling.

Campbell subdivided intuitive evidence according to its three sources:
intellection, consciousness, and common sense. These three irreducible
sources of evidence are responsible for our apprehension of metaphysi-
cal, physical, and moral truths respectively.77 Pure intellection allows us
immediately to recognize the necessary and universal relations that exist
among abstract ideas, by which Campbell meant such fundamental
mathematical axioms and definitions as “one and four make five” and
“the whole is greater than a part.”78 Evidence from consciousness,
which includes our present feelings, sensations and passions, allows us
to have sure knowledge of our existence and of the operations of our
own minds. This source of evidence appears to have some correspon-
dence with the faculty of judgment, the task of which is to judge the re-
semblance or disparity between various objects that come before the
mind. It is also the seat of our intuitive pronouncements concerning
“beauty or deformity, harmony or discord, the elegant or the ridicu-
lous.”79 Finally, evidence from common sense assures us of the reliabil-
ity of such fundamental moral principles as causation, the continuity of
nature, and the reliability of memory. These principles allow us to make
sense of the variable and uncertain experiences of our everyday lives.
“All reasoning,” said Campbell, “necessarily supposes that there are cer-
tain principles in which we must acquiesce, and beyond which we can-
not go – principles clearly discernible by their own light, which can
derive no additional evidence from any thing besides.”80 These com-
mon sense axioms “are as essential to moral reasoning, to all deductions
concerning life and existence, as those of the first kind are to the sci-
ences of arithmetic and geometry. Perhaps it will appear afterwards that,
without the aid of some of them, these sciences themselves would be ut-
terly inaccessible to us.”81 Denial of such “primary truths” does not, as
with the evidence from intellection, imply a manifest contradiction,
only insanity.82
Deductive evidence, unlike intuitive evidence, cannot be immediately
perceived, but must be demonstrated either logically or factually. Such
77 pr, 42.
78 pr, 35–6.
79 pr, 38. Here Campbell sounds not only like Reid, but also like the Moral Sense
philosopher, Francis Hutcheson.
80 pr, 42.
81 pr, 42.
82 pr, 41–2. Campbell is here quoting from the French philosopher Claude Buffier.
evidence falls within the realm of reason because it is not concerned

with fundamental premises – convincing instead by a comparison of
ideas. “All rational or deductive evidence,” said Campbell, “is derived
from one or other of these two sources: from the invariable properties
or relations of general ideas; or from the actual, though perhaps vari-
able connexions subsisting among things.”83 Campbell called the first of
these subtypes demonstrative and the second moral. Demonstrative evi-
dence concerns the abstract and invariable relations of ideas. It “is built
on pure intellection, and consisteth in an uninterrupted series of axi-
oms,” and is therefore capable of absolute proof in that the opposite of
such a proof is inconceivable. It “is solely conversant about number and
extension, and about those other qualities which are measurable by
these. Such are duration, velocity, and weight.”84 Although the conclu-
sions of demonstrative evidence are absolute, its authority is limited to
mathematical and geometrical demonstrations.
Moral evidence (which Reid called probable evidence) is concerned
only with matters of fact – that is, with the actual but contingent relations
among things. Moral reasoning is “founded on the principles we have
from consciousness and common sense, improved by experience; and as
it proceeds on this general presumption or moral axiom, that the course
of nature in time to come will be similar to what it hath been hitherto, it
decides, in regard to particulars, concerning the future from the past, and
concerning things unknown from things familiar to us.”85 Like his latitu-
dinarian predecessors, Campbell understood that even in the highest
reaches of moral certainty there always remains the physical possibility
that the conclusion drawn may be false. Moral reasoning, therefore, con-
cerns things that are probably but not necessarily true, things whose op-
posites are conceivable. Yet the importance of moral evidence is not
thereby diminished, for though “all the truths which constitute science,
which give exercise to reason, and are discovered by philosophy, are gen-
eral; all our ideas, in the strictest sense of the word, are particular. All the
particular truths about which we are conversant, are properly historical,
and compose the furniture of memory.”86 Campbell illustrated the nature
of moral evidence with such examples as ‹Cæsar overcame Pompey›
and ‹The sun will rise to-morrow›;87 both statements are accepted
83 pr, 43.
84 pr, 43.
85 pr, 43.
86 pr, 260.
87 pr, 44.
among the best-attested kinds of evidence, but neither is so absolutely cer-

tain as to exclude all other possibilities. These examples are remarkably
similar to ones employed by Locke88 and by Hume in his Enquiry Concern-
ing Human Understanding. Hume had divided human knowledge into two
kinds – “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” – the first being demon-
stratively certain mathematical relations and the second being exempli-
fied by the following: “That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less
intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the af-
firmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demon-
strate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a
contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.”89
Clearly Campbell’s “moral evidence” corresponded closely to Hume’s
“matters of fact,” which both philosophers considered to be, despite infe-
rior certainty, more important than demonstrative evidence in the realm
of everyday life.90 Hume would certainly have agreed with Campbell that
“the proper province of rhetoric is the second, or moral evidence; for to
the second belong all decisions concerning fact, and things without us.”91
Although Hume gave little formal attention to the category of intuitive ev-
idence, he broadly agreed with Campbell concerning the structure and
purpose of deductive evidence. And though they also agreed that moral
evidence is only highly probable at best, Campbell was much less willing
than Hume to draw sceptical conclusions, particularly concerning the his-
torical matters of fact upon which the truths of Christianity are founded.
“In moral reasoning,” he said, “we ascend from possibility, by an insensi-
ble gradation, to probability, and thence, in the same manner, to the sum-
mit of moral certainty. On this summit, or on any of the steps leading to it,
the conclusion of the argument may rest.”92 Moral evidence was therefore
not only the most important part of Campbell’s evidential theory, but also
the most laden with difficulties. Whereas demonstrative evidence allows
no contrary proofs and no degrees of probability, “the case is far other-
wise with moral evidence, which is of a complex nature, which admits
88 “That there is such a City in Italy as Rome: That about 1700 years ago, there lived in
it a Man, called Julius Cæsar; that he was a General, and that he won a Battel against another
called Pompey,” are particular facts related by historians of credit which must therefore be
believed (Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 662).
89 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 25–6.
90 pr, 46.
91 pr, 43.
92 pr, 44. Campbell criticizes syllogistic logic for being unable to deal with the degrees
of probability inherent in this fundamental source of evidence (pr, 62).
degrees, which is almost always combated by opposite proofs, and these,

though perhaps lower in degree, as truly of the nature of proof and evi-
dence as those whereby they are opposed. The probability, on the whole
… lies in the proportion which the contrary proofs, upon comparison,
bear to one another; a proportion which, in complicated cases, it is often
difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to ascertain. The speakers,
therefore, on the opposite sides have each real evidence to insist on.”93
Campbell was not naïve concerning the problems endemic to moral evi-
dence, upon which his world view and apologetic system rested. That is
why, in his practical philosophy, he both agreed with Hume that the em-
pirical apologist will encounter considerable obstacles, but also denied
that these obstacles are rationally insurmountable.
Campbell divided moral evidence into three major types, according
to the sources from which it is derived – experience, analogy, and testi-
mony – plus a derivative category called the calculation of chances.94
Experience, the first category of moral evidence, “is the foundation of
philosophy; which consists in a collection of general truths, systemati-
cally digested.”95 Like Hume, Campbell equated experience with the
observed uniformity of cause and effect in nature, and, like Hume, he
described it as equivalent to the habitual associations of ideas in the
mind.96 The highest moral certainty is equivalent to the most uniform
experience. Campbell considered experience to be, “if not the foun-
dation, at least the criterion of all moral reasoning whatever,” includ-
ing natural history, natural theology and psychology.97 Even in the
matter of interpreting Scripture, he claimed, we must keep it as a rule,
that “in every question relating to fact, where experience may be had,
our safest recourse is to experience.”98 But unlike Hume, Campbell
gave special emphasis to the role of memory in vouching for the
authority of experience.
Analogy, the second source of moral evidence, is a weaker form of ex-
perience, and constitutes the human habit of reasoning from that
93 pr, 276.
94 Campbell considered the calculation of chances, which includes such things as mor-
tality tables and the rolling of dice, to be an application of demonstrative or mathematical
evidence to problems of moral evidence.
95 pr, 54.
96 pr, 50–1. Campbell also noted that in this operation, the mind is entirely passive
(pr, 49).
97 pr, 52.
98 fg, 1:22. See also st, 1:343.
which is known to that which is unknown. Campbell was careful in ar-

guing that the evidence from analogy is reliable only in proportion to
the likeness between the two things being compared, though this reli-
ability is greatly strengthened by the number of similarities observed.99
Although he was clearly mindful of the abuses to which this form of
evidence had too often been subjected, he was equally unwilling to
dismiss such an important form of moral argument, as is evidenced by
his praise of Bishop Butler’s analogical defence of the truths of the
Christian revelation.
Testimony, the third source of moral evidence, was of even greater im-
portance to Campbell’s apologetic system, and may justly be considered
his most original contribution to the standard eighteenth-century concep-
tion of evidence. In A Dissertation on Miracles, Campbell declared that
Hume’s whole argument against the testimony of miracles was “built
upon a false hypothesis. That the evidence of testimony is derived solely
from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not
so incontestable a truth, as he supposes it; that, on the contrary, testimony
hath a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience,
will, I imagine, easily be evinced.”100 Contrary to Hume, Campbell argued
that faith in testimony is part of human nature and antecedent to all per-
sonal experience, rather than the consequence of experience. He
claimed that his disagreement with Hume on this point “is by no means
so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may appear. According to his phi-
losophy, the presumption lies against the testimony, or (which amounts to
the same thing) there is not the smallest presumption in its favour, till
properly supported by experience. According to [Campbell’s theory] …
there lies the strongest presumption in favour of the testimony, till prop-
erly refuted by experience.”101 Campbell carried this argument over into
The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Testimony, which he defined as “a serious intima-
tion from another, of any fact or observation, as being what he remem-
bers to have seen or heard or experienced,”102 is a necessary supplement
to and even foundation of the general truths derived from our personal
experience, for testimony gives us information concerning any number of
particular facts which we ourselves have not experienced. He further de-
fied Hume by giving testimony a special status compared to experience.
99 pr, 53. Compare this to Reid’s similar description of analogy (Works of Thomas Reid,
1:236–8).
100 dm, 14.
101 dm, 15–16.
102 pr, 55.
He argued that a single reliable piece of testimony (such as a miracle

claim) can overturn even a uniform body of experience to the contrary,
and carries greater weight concerning any particular fact than the general
conclusions of experience, which “may serve in confutation, but can
never serve in proof of particular or historical facts. Sufficient testimony,
and that only, will answer here.”103 Thus, “when experience is applied to
the discovery of the truth in a particular incident, we call the evidence
presumptive; ample testimony is accounted a positive proof of the
fact.”104 But Campbell was implicitly arguing something more, with which
Hume could not readily agree: that the natural influence of testimony on
belief is a consequence of the Creator’s benevolent design. To this source
of knowledge, “when we have no positive reasons of mistrust or doubt, we
are, by an original principle of our nature (analogous to that which com-
pels our faith in memory), led to give an unlimited assent. As on memory
alone is founded the merely personal experience of the individual, so on
testimony in concurrence with memory is founded the much more exten-
sive experience which is not originally our own, but derived from oth-
ers.”105 Campbell was arguing from human nature, in which he saw both
a natural inclination to tell the truth and a principle of sympathy which
supported the natural reliability of testimony. Perhaps Campbell thought
that, in this particular instance, Hume had overlooked the empirically-
observed operation of sympathy in human relations, which had neverthe-
less found a place in his moral theory. Hume had also failed to appreciate
the sheer inadequacy of personal experience uninformed by the enlarged
103 pr, 84; see also 55.

104 pr, 55. Campbell conceded that there is some value to Hume’s sceptical argument,
but said, “the utmost in regard to [it] … that can be affirmed with truth, is that the evidence
of testimony is to be considered as strictly logical, no further than human veracity in gen-
eral, or the veracity of witnesses of such a character, and in such circumstances in particu-
lar, is supported, or perhaps more properly, hath not been refuted, by experience. But that
testimony, antecedently to experience, hath a natural influence on belief, is undeniable”
(pr, 54). A little further down, Campbell added the standard Lockean reservations: “we are
taught to consider many attendant circumstances, which serve either to corroborate or to
invalidate its evidence. The reputation of the attester, his manner of address, the nature of
the fact attested, the occasion of giving the testimony, the possible or probable design in
giving it, the disposition of the hearers to whom it was given, and several other circumstanc-
es, have all considerable influence in fixing the degree of credibility” (pr, 55). In The Four
Gospels, Campbell noted that a man’s known prejudices will either detract from or add to
the reliability of his testimony depending on whether they are favourable or unfavourable
to the claim under consideration (fg, 1:507). None of these considerations, however,
invalidate the essential believability of human testimony.
105 pr, 55.
views of testimony, for much of what Hume classified as experience was

actually based not on personal observation but on the attested observa-
tions of others.106 We can no more reject the testimony of reliable wit-
nesses concerning particular facts than we can the myriad individual
testimonies that have combined to establish the laws of nature in the first
place. Campbell surely believed that he had defeated Hume at his own
game, by suggesting that a single positive testimonial claim is inherently
more believable than the universal laws of nature themselves, which,
according to the sceptic, are merely constructions of the human mind.
Campbell assumed that reliable testimony, like memory, is fundamental
to human knowledge, but is nevertheless beyond the scope of empirical
demonstration. He held that human nature is designed implicitly to be-
lieve testimony, and that it learns to doubt only with time and experience.
This is not merely the observed condition of the human species, but also
the beneficent design of providence. Hume’s scepticism concerning the
believability of any testimony regarding miracles had reversed the natural
order of belief, and had thus imperilled all historical testimony and all
moral reasoning. To avoid the unacceptable consequences of Hume’s
scepticism, Campbell was obliged to posit a mechanism in human nature
capable of equating our natural propensity to believe testimony with our
need for metaphysical and moral truth. Humanity, he implicitly argued, is
obliged to believe that the Creator does not deceive his creatures con-
cerning their fundamental sources of knowledge.107 His theory of knowl-
edge and of evidence repeatedly highlighted the mechanisms in human
psychology that compel people to trust their experience, their memory,
and the testimony of others. The reliability of these mechanisms cannot
be guaranteed by experience, for they are the very sources of experience.
How then did Campbell propose to guarantee their veracity? His solution,
which brought him closer to his Aberdeen colleagues as it distanced him
from Hume, was the philosophy of Common Sense.
campbell’s common sense philosophy
“George Campbell would count as a member of Reid’s school,” opined

S.A. Grave in 1960, “if his concern with the philosophy of Common
Sense had been less marginal.”108 This pronouncement by an influential
106 dm, 37–46; pr, 56.

107 See st, 1:371–2, where Campbell argues that God would never use false means to
achieve his ends, for “God cannot contradict himself.”
108 S.A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 5.
modern scholar has perhaps prevented others from carefully examining

Campbell’s relationship to Common Sense philosophy. Yet the Aber-
donians themselves valued Campbell’s contribution to their stand
against the abuses of empirical philosophy. Beattie prefaced the 1776
edition of his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to
Sophistry and Scepticism with this acknowledgment: “It is with great plea-
sure I take this opportunity to declare, that the best Theory of Evidence I
have ever seen, is delivered by my excellent Friend Dr Campbell, in that
most ingenious and learned performance, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. His
principles and mine, though they differ somewhat in the arrangement,
(in which I am inclined to think that his have the advantage), will not be
found to differ in any thing material.”109 In his Aberdeen logic class of
1763, Reid taught a theory of testimony almost identical to that used by
Campbell in A Dissertation on Miracles. The same account of testimony
appears again in Reid’s Intellectual Powers (1785), though the brevity of
his remarks suggests that he deferred to Campbell’s treatment in The
Philosophy of Rhetoric.110 Campbell’s theory of evidence was thus closely
tied to the larger Aberdeen project, casting doubt on the notion that
Campbell’s contribution to Common Sense philosophy was marginal.
Campbell in turn defended the Common Sense philosophy of his as-
sociates. In The Philosophy of Rhetoric he attacked Joseph Priestley’s at-
tempted refutation of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald,111 which surely
indicates that he thought his own position implicitly threatened by
Priestley’s criticisms of Common Sense. Campbell made deferential ref-
erences to his “learned and ingenious friend Dr. Reid,”112 and declared
that the doctrine of common sense “hath lately, in our own country,
been set in the clearest light, and supported by invincible force of argu-
ment, by two very able writers in the science of man, Dr. Reid … and
109 Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, x.

110 eul ms Dk.3.2, pp. 47–8; Works of Thomas Reid, 1:482. Reid acknowledged the sim-
ilarity of Campbell’s thought to his own, but declined to specify any intellectual debts
(1:468). Gerard also believed that Campbell was the last word on the subject of testimony;
See An Essay on Genius, ed. Bernhard Fabian (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1966), 297–8.
111 Joseph Priestley’s An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind on the
Principles of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and
Dr. Oswald’s Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (London: J. Johnson, 1774), was not
a defence of Hume, but rather a defence of the Lockean experimental philosophy tradition
that he thought was most successfully carried forward by David Hartley. Priestley accused
the Common Sense philosophers of advocating ignorance by multiplying tautological
“original principles,” of being dissatisfied with reasonable degrees of evidence, and of
reducing philosophical inquiry to subjective feeling.
112 pr, 81n.
Dr. Beattie … I beg leave to remark in this place, that, though for dis-
tinction’s sake, I use the term common sense in a more limited significa-
tion than either of the authors last mentioned, there appears to be no
real difference in our sentiments of the thing itself.”113 This declaration
warrants a brief review of the works of Aberdeen’s leading Common
Sense philosophers, Reid and Beattie, in order to identify those tenets
which Campbell claimed to support.
Thomas Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common
Sense (1764), was published just before he left King’s College to occupy
Adam Smith’s vacated moral philosophy chair at Glasgow. It immedi-
ately set itself against the “ideal system” or “theory of ideas,” which Reid
claimed had come to prominence in Descartes and Locke, but had only
displayed its full sceptical potential in the works of Berkeley and Hume.
Reid believed that philosophy had strayed onto an inevitably sceptical
path when it assumed that “ideas” stand between external objects and
the human understanding. In the first stage of his defence of epistemo-
logical realism, Reid argued that we perceive things in themselves, and
not by means of mediatory ideas. His Common Sense theory of percep-
tion denied Locke’s and Hume’s assumption that the mind is merely a
passive receiver of sense impressions. He argued that an “idea” is prop-
erly an act rather than an object, which means that the perception of an
external body is substantially more than a mere sensation or feeling in
the mind. In the second stage of his apology, Reid countered Hume’s
extreme metaphysical scepticism by giving a special status to those fun-
damental beliefs that we necessarily hold despite a lack of rational war-
rant: “If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the
constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a
necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without
being able to give a reason for them – these are what we call the princi-
ples of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what
we call absurd.”114 Reid argued that the axioms of common sense are
universal principles of human nature, which give us the ability intu-
itively and actively to recognize necessary metaphysical truths, in the
same way that Moral Sense philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson had
claimed we recognize moral and aesthetic absolutes. Reid agreed with
113 pr, 38n. Campbell also acknowledged his debt to the French philosopher Claude
Buffier, whose own version of “Common Sense” in his Traité des premières vérités (1714)
evidenced an “uncommon degree of acuteness in matters of abstraction” (PR, 38n) and
predated that of the Aberdonians.
Hume that reason is powerless to justify even the most fundamental and
necessary metaphysical beliefs, such as the objective reality of the self,
other minds, the material and spiritual worlds, and causation.115 He ar-
gued, therefore, that philosophers must give up the attempt to ground
everything on reason, and admit that even reason itself is founded on
self-evident and unprovable principles. “The evidence of sense,” he said,
“the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of
things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded
on our constitution: none of them depends upon, or can be resolved
into another. To reason against any of these kinds of evidence, is absurd;
nay, to reason for them is absurd. They are first principles; and such fall
not within the province of reason, but of common sense.”116 Likewise
belief, “which accompanies sensation and memory, is a simple act of the
mind, which cannot be defined.”117 Our nature compels us to pass judg-
ments, including the inexplicable judgment of belief, on the things we
perceive.
Such original and natural judgments are … a part of that furniture which Na-
ture hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Al-
mighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct
us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in
the dark. They are a part of our constitution; and all the discoveries of our rea-
son are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of
mankind; and, what is manifestly contrary to any of these first principles, is what
we call absurd. The strength of them is good sense, which is often found in those
who are not acute in reasoning.118
Reid’s assertions ultimately rested on an assumption of providential de-

sign that Hume was unwilling to accept. “Common Sense and Reason
have both one author,” said Reid; “that Almighty Author in all whose
other works we observe a consistency, uniformity, and beauty which
charm and delight the understanding: there must, therefore, be some
order and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts
of his workmanship.”119 Despite such providential assumptions, Reid’s
115 See Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), essay vi, chapters v and vi,
for a list of his first principles of common sense.
117 Ibid., 1:108.
118 Ibid., 1:209.
119 Ibid., 1:127.
philosophy of Common Sense was grounded on a rigorous theory of

perception that has retained the critical admiration of modern schol-
ars. The absence of a similar careful and philosophic foundation has
prevented James Beattie’s version of Common Sense from finding a
modern audience.
Beattie intended his philosophy of Common Sense to have greater
popular appeal than Reid’s academic treatment. Whereas Reid criti-
cized a philosophical tradition and largely spared the personal reputa-
tion of Hume, Beattie’s Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth
(1770) attacked Hume’s very character. Beattie’s Common Sense phi-
losophy was more concerned to defend moral and metaphysical abso-
lutes than a theory of perceptual realism, and was therefore more
polemical than Reid’s. “I account That to be truth,” said Beattie, “which
the constitution of our nature determines us to believe, and That to be
falsehood which the constitution of our nature determines us to disbe-
lieve.”120 Common sense is simply “that power of the mind which per-
ceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but
by an instantaneous and instinctive impulse; derived neither from edu-
cation nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our
will, whenever its object is presented, according to an established law,
and therefore not improperly called Sense; and acting in a similar man-
ner upon all mankind, and therefore properly called Common Sense.”121
Our common sense assures us of the existence of the soul, the self, God,
and human free will. These truths are not subject to the test of reason
because “all just reasoning does ultimately terminate in the principles of
common sense; that is, in principles which must be admitted as certain,
or as probable, upon their own authority, without evidence, or at least
without proof.”122 Finally, Beattie assumed “that truth is something
fixed and determinate, depending not upon man, but upon the Author
of nature.”123 Beattie’s audience was delighted, both with his undis-
guised hatred of Hume’s sceptical dilemmas and with the bold and un-
apologetic manner in which he stated the utterly simple truths in which
they had always believed.
George Campbell wrote no systematic work on Common Sense
philosophy. Even his use of the term “common sense” was usually less
120 Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 19.

121 Ibid., 26–7.
122 Ibid., 239.
123 Ibid., 89.
formal than that of his associates, often signifying nothing more than
“reasonableness” or “common wisdom,” and sometimes standing in
place of reason itself. Such loose employments of the term are not
philosophically precise, but neither do they contradict the Aber-
donians’ more formal understanding of the concept. In whatever sense
he used the term elsewhere, “common sense” remained an important
subsection of Campbell’s category of intuitive evidence, and thus an im-
plicit rejection or correction of Hume’s extreme empiricism. In his
treatment of evidence in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell defined
common sense as “an original source of knowledge common to all man-
kind.”124 Common sense differs from other forms of intuitive evidence
in that it gives us sure knowledge of the existence of persons and sub-
stances beyond our own minds. By it we are assured of the truth of such
fundamental propositions as these: ‹Whatever has a beginning has a
cause’ – ‘When there is in the effect a manifest adjustment of the several
parts to a certain end, there is intelligence in the cause.’ ‘The course of
nature will be the same to-morrow that it is to-day; or, the future will re-
semble the past’ – ‘There is such a thing as body; or, there are material
substances independent of the mind’s conceptions’ – ‘There are other
intelligent beings in the universe besides me’ – ‘The clear representa-
tions of my memory, in regard to past events, are indubitably true.›125
These truths, “and a great many more of the same kind,” cannot be
known by reason, yet “it is equally impossible, without a full conviction
of them, to advance a single step in the acquisition of knowledge.”126
Campbell thought it sufficient proof against Hume’s scepticism that it is
impossible “for a rational creature to withhold his assent” from such
fundamental and universally acknowledged premises.127 Even experi-
ence is impossible without antecedent guiding principles. Campbell rec-
ognized that common sense truths are not of the kind whose denial
would imply a contradiction, which is to say that it is conceivable that
124 pr, 38–9.

125 pr, 40. This list does not include an assurance of our own existence, which Camp-
bell included under the evidence of consciousness (pr, 37), and which he considered to
precede even the evidence of common sense. Reid’s list of the first principles of common
sense includes the six mentioned by Campbell, plus many more. Campbell’s claim that his
was but a partial list suggests that he may have agreed with Reid’s other first principles. It
is difficult to say how far Campbell followed Reid on the first principles of free will, taste,
and morals. He did refer to the “reflex senses” which included a taste for beauty and for
moral sentiments (pr, 3).
126 pr, 40.
127 pr, 40.
they might be false, and suggested that they be called instinctive rather
than intuitive. But he was not much concerned with the possibility of
these truths being proved wrong, for “such instincts are no other than
the oracles of eternal wisdom.”128 Reason itself can hardly pretend to
undermine such fundamental notions as that of causation, which “is
from the very frame of our nature, suggested, necessarily suggested, and
often instantaneously suggested; but still it is suggested and not per-
ceived.”129 Campbell thus agreed with Hume that belief in causation
cannot be rationally justified. Yet we are not without a reason for believ-
ing that the future will resemble the past: “By reason we often mean, not
an argument, or medium of proving, but a ground in human nature on
which a particular judgment is founded. Nay further, as no progress in
reasoning can be made where there is no foundation, (and first princi-
ples are here the sole foundation,) I should readily admit, that the man
who does not believe such propositions, if it were possible to find such a
man, is perfectly irrational, and consequently not to be argued with.”130
In the brief section on “common sense” in The Philosophy of Rhetoric,
Campbell again gave particular emphasis to the problem of memory; in
fact, he gave it considerably more attention than the other five axioms
listed. He argued that our faith in memory is considerably different
from our faith in our present feelings (subsumed under evidence from
consciousness), for “there is a reference in the ideas of memory to
former sensible impressions, to which there is nothing analogous in
sensation.”131 Our faith in memory is not derived from consciousness,
and therefore cannot depend upon the mere vivacity of our feelings.
“Some may imagine,” said Campbell, “that it is from experience we
come to know what faith in every case is due to memory. But it will ap-
128 pr, 42.

129 pr, 366. The power of causation “is conceived by the understanding, and not perceived
by the senses, as the causes and the effects themselves often are” (pr, 367). Elsewhere, Camp-
bell argued that reason cannot take an infinite number of steps to prove something, and must
therefore terminate in self-evident axioms (aul ms 654, un-numbered page).
130 pr, 71n. For example, Campbell objected to the scholastic form of syllogistic dis-
putation because it allowed its adherents to “defend any position whatsoever, how con-
tradictory soever to common sense, and to the clearest discoveries of reason and
experience” (pr, 271). He chastised the philosophic pride it had engendered, “which
will not permit us to think that we believe any thing, even a self-evident principle, without
a previous reason or argument” (pr, 70). In the footnote following, Campbell cited
Hume’s Treatise as an example of the futility of trying to prove what is self-evident, which
was no doubt a contemporary form of syllogism.
131 pr, 41.
pear more fully afterwards, that unless we had implicitly relied on the
distinct and vivid informations of that faculty, we could not have moved
a step towards the acquisition of experience.”132 If Campbell was speak-
ing to Hume, as he almost certainly was, he was suggesting that even
the sceptic himself had not been sufficiently sceptical of memory as a
source of knowledge. If memory is not in fact a fainter copy of a sense
impression (as Hume claimed it was), then it must be a mental phe-
nomenon sufficiently different to constitute an irreducible faculty of its
own. As such it requires its own mechanism for bringing about belief.
This mechanism assures us not only that we remember a specific thing
happening but that what we remember really did happen. We neither
perceive nor understand this mechanism, yet we cannot deny its opera-
tion. In his repeated claim that the reliability of memory must be sub-
sumed under the authority of common sense,133 Campbell, it seems,
was determined that his notion of memory should not be confused with
Hume’s.
Besides the six common sense axioms listed above, Campbell sug-
gested that there are “a great many more of the same kind,”134 but de-
clined to list them. Nevertheless, we have indications as to what they
might be. In an early passage from the Dissertation on Miracles, Camp-
bell distanced himself from Hume by giving testimony equal standing
with memory as a fundamental source of knowledge. Here the reliabil-
ity of memory and of testimony were put on the same level with such
fundamental metaphysical propositions as “similar causes always produce
similar effects” and “the course of nature will be the same to-morrow, that it was
yesterday, and is today.”135 Neither experience nor reason can guarantee
the general reliability of testimony, yet we are unable to disbelieve
such an important source of knowledge. Without it there is neither
history nor science. Our faith in testimony, and thus our faith in all
knowledge beyond the range of our personal experience, must be
grounded elsewhere. We believe it by virtue of our common sense. In
132 pr, 41.

133 pr, 61.
134 pr, 40. Lloyd F. Bitzer, in his introduction to The Philosophy of Rhetoric (xxxvii) and
elsewhere, seems curiously unwilling to give much credence to Campbell’s claim that there
are more common sense axioms besides these six. Nevertheless, Campbell’s specific state-
ment that there are “many more” such truths, together with his general deference to Reid
on the subject of common sense, suggest that he was much closer to the other Common
Sense philosophers than Bitzer will allow.
135 dm, 16.
light of this, it is not difficult to understand why Campbell’s treatment

of testimony was taken as definitive by the other Aberdonian Common
Sense philosophers.
There are indications from elsewhere in his writings that Campbell’s
common sense axioms, like Reid’s, included moral and religious impera-
tives. Campbell assumed, as did most eighteenth-century philosophers,
that God can neither mislead us nor contradict himself.136 This assump-
tion allowed him to give divine sanction to the pleadings of conscience:
“The laws which prohibit murder, adultery, theft, false testimony have the
manifest stamp of divine authority; there is no difference of opinion about
their meaning; the light of nature, or, if you please to call it common sense is
sufficient to satisfy all who are neither fools nor mad that they are binding
on all human beings.”137 In his religious writings, Campbell often linked
“the dictates of conscience” with “the common sense of mankind.”138 He
assured his divinity students that, in matters of conduct, God does not
leave our most important duties to be discovered by reason, “but has in
our consciences given such clear intimations of what is right and amiable
in conduct, that where there have been no prejudices to occupy the mind,
and pervert the natural sense of things, it commands an immediate and in-
stinctive approbation.”139 Thus the obligation of promises is fundamental
to our nature, and not derived from laws.140 And even when conscience
must make a difficult choice, it is “a principle of common sense, that a less
evil should be born to prevent a greater.”141 Campbell confidently as-
sumed that religion cannot contradict common sense, for the latter, like
conscience, always coincides with the purest spirit of the Gospel.142 Com-
mon sense may in fact be used to judge when religion has strayed from its
true path. Liturgies written in a language other than that of the common
people are obviously repugnant to common sense.143 Campbell thought it
a self-evident axiom, as clear as the axioms of geometry, that belief cannot
be compelled, and that common sense demands religious toleration.144
136 st, 1:371–2.

137 aul ms 650, section iii. Common sense also provides exceptions to the above laws,
such as the right to kill in self-defence (aul ms 652, part ii).
138 fg, 1:89.
139 lstpe, 182.
141 st, 2:146.
142 st, 2:203.
143 leh, 2:242.
144 aul ms 654, un-numbered page.
Our common sense may even oblige us to defy laws that seek to compel
belief and promote intolerance, for “by the common sense of mankind,
undebauched by superstition, fanaticism, or party-spirit, virtue is acknowl-
edged to be on the side of disobedience, and the meritorious character is
he who in defiance of all its terrors dares to transgress an iniquitous stat-
ute.”145 Campbell’s strictures on certain religious practices, particularly
those of the Roman Catholic church, suggest that common sense and cus-
tom do not always coincide. Bad customs often develop slowly and insensi-
bly in the context of ignorance and superstition, and undermine the
dictates of common sense.146 Nevertheless, nature has given us rational
powers to correct these abuses.
It seems then that Campbell’s catalogue of common sense truths was
considerably more extensive than the tidy six-item list that appears in The
Philosophy of Rhetoric, and that it included moral as well as metaphysical
axioms. These truths pervaded his philosophy and underpinned the en-
tire structure of his apologetic system. “That miracles are capable of
proof from testimony,” he said at the end of the Dissertation on Miracles,
“and that there is a full proof of this kind, for those said to have been
wrought in support of Christianity; that whoever is moved, by Mr Hume’s
ingenious argument, to assert, that no testimony can give sufficient evi-
dence of miracles, admits, tho’ perhaps unconscious, in place of reason, a
mere subtilty, which subverts the evidence of testimony, of history, and
even of experience itself, giving him a determination to deny, what the
common sense of mankind, founded in the primary principles of the un-
derstanding, would lead him to believe.”147 Though this sense of com-
mon sense may be considerably less rigorous than traditional readings of
Campbell’s philosophy would prefer, it also brings Campbell closer to
the intentions of his Aberdeen associates, particularly their concern to
defeat the implications of Hume’s scepticism for all classes of knowledge,
whether scientific, historical, or religious. Campbell usually upheld the
epistemological realism of Common Sense philosophy – that is, the be-
lief in our irreducible knowledge of the objective existence of bodies,
minds, and metaphysical and moral truths. His occasional references to
145 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. In the same manuscript, Campbell argued
that the civil penalties against Irish Catholics were without moral validity. He claimed that
certain moral and social obligations (such as the obligation to honour promises) antedate
all civil contracts, powers and obligations; civil laws, therefore, cannot suspend these natu-
ral obligations.
146 aul ms 652, p. 87.
147 dm, 288.
the “regular and analogical make” of all languages148 even suggest that
he agreed with Reid’s notion that the universal constants in the structure
of human languages are founded in human nature itself.
Nevertheless, there are notable differences between Campbell’s Com-
mon Sense philosophy and the philosophies of Reid and Beattie. First of
all, Campbell’s list of common sense axioms was somewhat more cau-
tious and carefully circumscribed than theirs. Despite some tantalizing
hints, we simply do not know how extensive Campbell’s list of common
sense axioms would have been had he chosen to treat the topic in a sys-
tematic manner. That he did not do so suggests either that he trusted
Reid’s enumeration or that, in Newtonian fashion, he wished to claim
no more of common sense than was necessary for his immediate episte-
mological and religious needs. It may even indicate that he gave more
weight to Hume’s sceptical reservations than did Reid. Secondly, Camp-
bell seems to have held a notion of perception that was occasionally at
odds with the perceptual theory that Reid made fundamental to his own
notion of Common Sense. Campbell tended to agree with Hume (and
Locke) that the human mind is a passive receiver of sensory data. In his
discussion of religious faith and persecution, he argued that “belief … is
the necessary, not the voluntary consequence of the evidence; and
strictly speaking, there is no more merit in the faith consequent upon
the clear manifestation of the truth to the understanding … than there
would be in the sight of a visible object set in broad daylight before a
man who has the perfect use of his eyes. The reason is the same in both.
The mind is passive. It does not act, but is acted upon.”149 Reid, of
course, objected to the ideal system’s tendency to view the mind as pas-
sive. He argued that “the mind is, from its very nature, a living and ac-
tive being.”150 Campbell was much less willing than Reid to see any
influence of the will upon perception and belief.151 Nevertheless, with-
out more textual evidence it is difficult to determine how different
Campbell and Reid were on this matter. Neither Beattie nor Campbell
were as concerned with perceptual theory as was Reid, so it is not clear
whether Campbell’s views on the passivity of the mind constitute a
significant departure from the more commonly-accepted version of
Common Sense.
148 pr, 259.

Finally, and most perplexing, is Campbell’s relationship to Common

Sense philosophy’s most popular champion, James Beattie. Beattie
claimed that he and Campbell thought alike on all important matters.152
Yet Beattie’s belligerent misunderstanding of Hume’s philosophy (a phi-
losophy for which Campbell had a deep understanding and sympathy)
makes this claim problematic. Campbell read and corrected the manu-
scripts of all of Beattie’s philosophical publications, yet allowed Beattie’s
misreadings and personal abuse of Hume to go to press. While Campbell
may have believed that Beattie’s “masterly pen”153 and polemical liber-
ties were suited to a popular audience, it is difficult to judge his relative
sympathy for Hume’s philosophy as opposed to Beattie’s virulent anti-
scepticism. Neither Reid nor Campbell allowed themselves to indulge in
Beattie’s type of ad hominem argument against Hume, nor would they dis-
miss the useful parts of Hume’s sceptical philosophy for fear of their
moral implications, as Beattie was prone to do.154 Perhaps Campbell’s
love for Beattie as a friend and his admiration for him as a moral teacher
allowed the elder principal to forgive or overlook his younger associate’s
shortcomings as a philosopher.
Campbell’s purpose in writing was quite removed from that of his
better-known Common Sense associates. Unlike Reid, he did not at-
tempt to explicate the philosophy of Common Sense in a comprehen-
sive manner. And unlike Beattie, he did not try to influence or reassure a
popular audience. But there can be little question that Campbell was in-
debted to the Common Sense philosophy of his associates, particularly
Reid with whom he was in close contact for seven crucial years. The simi-
larity of their Common Sense philosophies indicates common origins.
But this merely begs the question of who influenced whom. It seems
likely that the currents of influence flowed in more than one direction,
and involved all active members of the Wise Club.155 Campbell’s theory
152 See Beattie to William Creech, 28 October 1789 (aul ms 30/1/299). Campbell’s
support of Beattie’s work can also be seen in fg, 1:429n. and 452.
153 fg, 1:453n.
154 For more on the Beattie problem, particularly Beattie’s distinctness from the other
Aberdonians, see Paul B. Wood’s “Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aberdeen
Enlightenment.”
155 Reid, for example, took notes on “An Argument to prove that the Identity of a per-
son does not consist in Consciousness against Mr Locke by Mr[r] G Campbel [sic],” an ar-
gument which later appeared in his own writings as the story of the brave officer who, as a
boy, had robbed an orchard (cited in Charles Stewart-Robertson, “Thomas Reid and Pneu-
matology: The Text of the Old, The Tradition of the New,” in The Philosophy of Thomas Reid,
ed. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989], 397; the manuscript
of persuasion and evidence constituted an important bridge between

Common Sense philosophy and the philosophy of the Wise Club’s
friendly adversary, David Hume. In fact, Campbell’s good-natured attack
on Hume’s theory of testimony in A Dissertation on Miracles (1762) may
have been the first printed expression of Aberdonian Common Sense. It
reinforces the notion that the Aberdonians’ weapons against scepticism
were often borrowed from the sceptic’s own forge.
Of course, a case could be made that Hume himself drew Common
Sense conclusions long before the Aberdonians did. In a sentiment al-
most perfectly reproduced later in Reid, Hume argued that “nature, by
an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as
well as to breathe and feel.”156 Furthermore, “’Tis happy … that nature
breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from
having any considerable influence on the understanding,” for, “the
sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho’ he asserts, that he
cannot defend his reason by reason.”157 And, as if to confute his future
opponents, Hume declared that “Whoever has taken the pains to refute
the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antago-
nist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature
has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render’d unavoidable.”158
Nevertheless, Hume and the Aberdonians drew very different conclu-
sions concerning the philosophical authority of our natural beliefs. Al-
though Hume recognized that nature has imposed certain beliefs upon
us, he held that we can claim nothing more of cause and effect than
what custom teaches, and certainly nothing concerning ultimate causes
or objective reality. Custom leads us to infer necessary connections in
the world, but, “upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in
the mind, not in objects.”159 He doggedly maintained “that there is no
absolute nor metaphysical necessity, that every beginning of existence
notes are found in aul 6/3/5, fol. 3). Lloyd Bitzer counts citations in The Philosophy of Rhet-
oric to prove that Hume had a greater influence on Campbell than did Reid; see “Hume’s
Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” 161. It is unclear what this quanti-
tative argument can actually prove, for it does not say enough about how Campbell used
Hume (Campbell often brought up Hume merely to disagree with him), and it does not
take into account the personal (and thus largely undocumented) relationship between
Campbell and Reid.
157 Ibid., 187.
158 Ibid., 183.
159 Ibid., 165.
shou’d be attended with [a cause].”160 Hume ultimately refused to ac-

quiesce in the vulgar view of the world, though he understood that na-
ture prevents us from being able to disown it. “’Tis impossible upon any
system to defend either our understanding or senses … Carelessness
and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy.”161 Hume recognized
the practical necessity of giving in to the demands of common sense in
matters of moral philosophy, but he refused to do so in his speculative
philosophy. The Aberdonians, in contrast, demanded a complete sur-
render to common sense both in moral and in metaphysical matters.162
The major difference, then, between Hume and the Aberdonians was
their respective attitudes towards the possibility of recognizing meta-
physical truth. Beattie’s zealous concern for the triumph of truth over
doubt may seem extreme to modern readers, but it also endeared him
to Campbell. Campbell claimed that “the sole and ultimate end of logic
is the eviction of truth,” and that “logical truth consisteth in the confor-
mity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the nature of things.”163
His rhetorical theory may have been grounded in human nature, but its
purpose was directed towards something higher, for “as the soul is of
heavenly extraction and the body of earthly, so the sense of the dis-
course ought to have its source in the invariable nature of truth and
right, whereas the expression can derive its energy only from the arbi-
trary conventions of men, sources as unlike, or rather as widely differ-
ent, as the breath of the Almighty and the dust of the earth.”164
Campbell clearly believed that there is such a thing as “universal truth,”
and that we can discover it. This truth cannot be relative, for “the way of
truth is one, the ways of error are infinite.”165 The Aberdonians further
held that the propositions that nature obliges us to believe are not only
binding upon us, but true as well. Hume would acknowledge only that
they are binding. The Aberdonians, unlike Hume, were willing to make
truth claims about ultimate causes – that is, about God. Not any kind of
160 Ibid., 172.

161 Ibid., 218.
162 David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 201. See also M.A. Stewart’s account of
the differences between Hume and the Common Sense philosophers in “The Scottish
Enlightenment,” in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, ed. Stuart Brown
(London: Routledge, 1996), 289.
163 pr, 33 and 35.
164 pr, 34.
165 pr, 271; see also lstpe, 229.
God would do, however. The Aberdonians required a God with certain
qualities, for it was not the mere existence of God that guaranteed the
reliability of common sense dictates, but the moral qualities that they
believed God must necessarily possess. A benevolent providence was as
fundamental to their philosophy as it was to their religion. The Com-
mon Sense philosophers, like the Anglican divines before them, as-
sumed that God does not deceive us in our natural beliefs, and that as a
consequence we can have morally certain knowledge of God’s existence
and moral nature through our natural lights. Hume, of course, would
have viewed these assumptions as hopelessly circular. The Aberdonian
common sense position, in contrast to Hume’s, was founded on the
premises of natural religion.
natu ral r elig ion
“Reason is natural Revelation,” said Locke, “whereby the eternal Father of

Light, and Fountain of all Knowledge communicates to Mankind that
portion of Truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural Fac-
ulties.”166 This view held sway throughout the eighteenth century.
Campbell’s assumptions about the being and attributes of God and
about man’s ability to know God were shared by most eighteenth-
century British moderates. Natural religion did not belong to the deists
alone, but was considered fundamental to Christianity itself. As Gerard
said to his divinity students, “Natural religion is the foundation of re-
vealed; its principles & the doctrines of morality are all advanced illus-
trated & improved in the Christian system.”167 Campbell taught his
divinity students that
As it is the same God (for there is no other) who is the author of nature and the
author of revelation, who speaks to us in the one by his works, and in the other
by his spirit, it becomes his creatures reverently to hearken to his voice, in what-
ever manner he is pleased to address them. Now the philosopher is by profes-
sion the interpreter of nature, that is of the language of God’s works, as the
christian divine is the interpreter of scripture, that is of the language of God’s
spirit. Nor do I mean to signify, that there is not in many things a coincidence in
the discoveries made in these two different ways. The conclusions may be the
same, though deduced, and justly deduced, from different premises. The result
166 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 698.

167 aul ms k 174, p. 317.
may be one, when the methods of investigation are widely different. There is
even a considerable utility in pursuing both methods, as what is clear in the one
may serve to enlighten what is obscure in the other.168
What methods of investigation are appropriate to the philosopher of

natural religion? “He argues from the effect to the cause, the only way
in which we can argue intelligibly concerning the divine attributes.”169
Campbell was concerned, as ever, with the proper method of studying
the being and works of God. This method had been learned from the
natural philosopher, for “Spirit, which here comprises only the Su-
preme Being and the human soul, is surely as much included under the
notion of natural object as body is, and is knowable to the philosopher
purely in the same way, by observation and experience.”170 Such a
method is appropriate because “the natural evidences of true theism are
among the simplest, and at the same time the clearest deductions from
the effect to the cause.”171 Eighteenth-century scientists and religious
apologists, like their latitudinarian predecessors, believed that natural
philosophy and religion were bound together by a common providen-
tial purpose. The great Newton himself had encouraged his followers to
apply the methods of natural philosophy to the study of moral philoso-
phy, “For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first
Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from
him, so far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another,
will appear to us by the Light of Nature.”172 Natural knowledge and re-
vealed knowledge were commonly held to be two parts of the same di-
vine communication. Campbell likewise viewed natural religion and
natural philosophy as aspects of the same providential economy.
Campbell and his contemporaries agreed that God, by his very na-
ture, provides human beings with sufficient knowledge about himself
for their well-being. But eighteenth-century polemicists could not agree
whether natural knowledge of God was by itself sufficient for human
needs. Deists claimed that it was, whereas Christians (including moder-
ate ones) maintained that a more specific revelation was required to
supplement the general declarations of nature. The deists were cer-
tainly in the minority, but they had provoked a great many apologists,
168 lstpe, 86–7.

169 pr, 378.
170 pr, 53.
171 lstpe, 88–9.
172 Isaac Newton, Opticks (New York: Dover, 1952, 1979), 405.
such as Bishop Butler, to seek detailed evidences of the foundations of

Christianity in nature. The Aberdonians, like the Anglican divines be-
fore them, argued that the natural world itself proclaims the need for a
saving revelation and that it provides hints as to what this revelation
must contain in order to be authentic.
Campbell maintained that nature reveals much about the character
of God. The sublime majesty and wonder of the created world tells us
that we ought to reverence and fear God.173 It also confirms that God is
economical in his works, neither contradicting nor repeating himself
unnecessarily.174 The good order of the natural world is reflected even
in our moral nature, that is, in our constitutional common sense, which
shows us our duties towards God, ourselves, and others, for “the cause of
God can be no other than the cause of piety and virtue.”175 The law of
nature, which is “engraven on the tables of the human heart by the fin-
ger of the Creator,”176 allows us to recognize that the teachings of Christ
corroborate and strengthen the obligations of natural religion, a clear
mark of their authenticity as revelation. Campbell argued, however, that
no revelation can give us more information about our natural rights
than nature itself does, nor can revelation oppose those natural
rights.177 The moral obligations described by Cicero, for example, take
precedence before all other human conventions and governments,
though they are ultimately the same as those espoused by Scripture.178
Most of Campbell’s remarks on natural religion are derived from his
discussion of our natural moral duties, particularly those concerning re-
ligious toleration. But we should not conclude from his lack of system-
atic treatment that natural religion was otherwise unimportant to him.
Natural theology simply did not fall within the scope of his publications
or lectures. Campbell explained to his divinity students that natural reli-
gion was properly the subject of their moral philosophy course, which
they had taken in the final year of their arts degree. He assumed that his
students were sufficiently grounded in moral philosophy that his own
173 st, 1:324.

174 st, 1:372. Eighteenth-century natural philosophers generally held to the principle
of “least action” – that God’s creation is always as efficient as possible; see Thomas L.
Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 30.
175 aul ms 652, part i, un-numbered page.
177 aul ms 654, part iv, un-numbered page.
teaching could presuppose the premises of natural religion without

having to make them continually explicit. How then can we reconstruct
this important part of Campbell’s thought without direct textual evi-
dence? We can turn to the texts of his professorial associates, who
taught natural religion to Scottish undergraduates.
James Beattie, one of Campbell’s closest friends, lectured on natural
religion as part of his moral philosophy course at Marischal. His lectures
were published in the early 1790s as the Elements of Moral Science. Beattie
taught his students that the Christian revelation rests on the proofs of
natural religion, for “we do not prove from Scripture, that God exists.”179
Only after we have determined, by means of rational proofs, the being
and attributes of God, can we judge the truth or falsehood of any pur-
ported revelation. The proofs of the existence of God, said Beattie, are
not difficult to discover. He recommended a combination of a priori and
a posteriori arguments that, upon examination, would easily recommend
themselves to common sense. The proofs of God’s existence also suggest
some of his necessary attributes, including his spiritual nature, self-exist-
ence, oneness, omnipotence, unchangingness, infinite wisdom, good-
ness, and justice.180 Beattie warned his students of the dangers of
forgetting these truths, because “atheism is utterly subversive of morality,
and consequently of happiness.”181
Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, also delivered to undergrad-
uates, painted a similar picture. Like Beattie and Campbell, he argued
that much of our knowledge of God is derived analogically from our un-
derstanding of the human mind.182 He stressed the importance of this
kind of knowledge, for “there can be no rational piety without just no-
tions of the perfections and providence of God. It is no doubt true that
Revelation exhibits all the truths of Natural Religion, but it is no less true
that reason must be employed to judge of that revelation; whether it
comes from God.”183 “That Man is surely best prepared for the study of
revealed Religion,” he maintained, “who has just and Rational Sentiments
179 James Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 2 vols, 3d ed. (Edinburgh: Archibald
Constable and John Fairbairn, 1817), 1:279.
180 Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 1:292–8. Beattie also maintained that Scripture is
necessary to correct and improve our views concerning God’s nature (1:293).
181 Ibid., 1:278–82 and 292–8.
182 Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, ed. Elmer H. Duncan (Washington:
University Press of America, 1981), 2.
183 Reid, Natural Theology, 1.
of natural Religion.”184 Reid argued that the existence of God is pro-

claimed by heaven and earth, as well as by the structure of our minds, and
therefore requires no additional proofs, though he nevertheless provided
a series of a priori and a posteriori arguments. He divided God’s naturally-
known attributes into two categories: natural and moral. Thus we can
have certain knowledge of God’s necessary existence, eternity, immensity,
unlimited powers, perfect knowledge and wisdom, spirituality, unity, and
immutable happiness. In addition, we can be sure of his moral veracity,
love of virtue, and justice. Reid argued that without natural and rational
religion, Revelation would degenerate into one or the other of the eigh-
teenth century’s leading evils, that is, superstition or wild enthusiasm. Nat-
ural religion is also essential for meeting basic human needs, for without
religion mankind would be plunged into anarchy and despair.185
The natural religion of Reid and Beattie was entirely compatible with
prevailing eighteenth-century views. And since their lectures were the very
ones that Campbell recommended to his divinity students as foundations
of their Christian studies,186 we may safely infer that Campbell’s view of
natural religion would have been very much the same. Natural religion
provided a necessary foundation for the Aberdonians’ Common Sense
philosophy. Although the axioms of common sense are known by instinct
rather than by reason, they are not arbitrary, for they have been im-
planted by the benevolent Creator. The fact that these principles of com-
mon sense can be empirically verified – that is, observed a posteriori to exist
in human nature – suggests that they provide us with an eternal moral
standard without obstructing our free will. In the eyes of Campbell, these
natural dictates agreed with the purest teachings of the Gospel. Like But-
ler, the Aberdonians were convinced that they could reasonably demon-
strate the truth of Christianity by showing its conformity with what natural
religion leads us to expect from an authentic revelation.
Campbell’s thought fit very well into the eighteenth century. He strug-
gled with the same problems of knowledge, particularly of religious
184 Thomas Reid, Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self-
Government, Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 109.
185 Reid, Natural Theology, 2, 8, 10–16, 63–89.
186 lstpe, 84–7. “Now the philosopher is by profession the interpreter of nature, that
is of the language of God’s works, as the christian divine is the interpreter of scripture, that
is of the language of God’s spirit … The result may be one, when the methods of investi-
gation are widely different” (87).
knowledge, that had motivated seventeenth-century Anglican divines

(as well as John Locke) to develop an empirical approach to natural and
religious evidences. Campbell’s solutions were much like theirs. His phi-
losophies of human nature, of evidence, of Common Sense, and of nat-
ural religion were all consistent with the central concerns of the
Enlightenment. But the same problems of knowledge that had encour-
aged the latitudinarian divines to develop their probabilistic theory of
evidence had also encouraged the deists to challenge the Christian evi-
dences and wage war over miracles. Campbell was still fighting that war
nearly a century later, and his greatest adversary, David Hume, was as
much an heir of the late seventeenth-century debate concerning the
limits of human knowledge as was Campbell.
Campbell’s relationship to Hume was remarkably complex. He was
completely familiar with all of Hume’s writings, and frequently cited
them as authoritative sources, even on matters of religion.187 Although
he called Hume’s treatment of miracles “one of the most dangerous at-
tacks that have been made on our religion,” he wrote, “The piece itself,
like every other work of Mr Hume, is ingenious; but its merit is more of
the oratorical kind than of the philosophical. The merit of the author, I
acknowledge, is great. The many useful volumes he hath published of
history, and on criticism, politics, and trade, have justly procur’d him, with
all persons of taste and discernment, the highest reputation as a writer.
What pity it is, that this reputation should have been sullied by at-
tempts to undermine the foundations both of natural religion, and of re-
veal’d!”188 Still, Campbell had a good sense of his personal debt to
Hume: “For my own part, I think it a piece of justice in me, to acknowl-
edge the obligations I owe the author, before I enter on the propos’d
examination. I have not only been much entertain’d and instructed by
his works; but, if I am possess’d of any talent in abstract reasoning, I
am not a little indebted to what he hath written on human nature, for
the improvement of that talent. If therefore, in this tract, I have re-
futed Mr Hume’s Essay, the greater share of the merit is perhaps to be
ascrib’d to Mr Hume himself.”189 Campbell certainly believed that it
187 See, for example, st, 1:325, where Campbell used Hume’s Natural History of Reli-
gion approvingly. Campbell cited virtually all of Hume’s works in the course of his writings.
188 dm, v–vi.
189 dm, vi–vii. Campbell expressed similar sentiments in his only known letter to Hume
(25 June 1762), where he not only demonstrated a very intimate knowledge of Hume’s
works but admitted he had the highest opinion of his adversary and had even been forced
to admire Hume’s character despite their very different principles (nls ms 23154, n. 11).
was necessary to oppose the moral and religious implications of

Hume’s scepticism, but this does not mean that he was fundamentally
hostile to Hume. It does not even mean that he was hostile to Hume’s
scepticism – just the degree of it. In Campbell’s eyes, Hume’s failing
was his refusal to see the natural limits of scepticism in light of the dic-
tates of common sense and the probabilistic evidences available in the
moral realm. Hume’s scepticism was otherwise a very useful instru-
ment, and Hume a skillful wielder of it. Campbell paid tribute to his
philosophical master by sometimes turning that scepticism against the
sceptic himself, as in the matters of memory and testimony.190
Campbell and his Aberdeen associates (with the exception of Beattie)
were at once deeply influenced by Hume’s philosophy and yet opposed
to its extreme consequences. Campbell regarded Hume’s philosophy as
dangerous precisely because it was, in so many ways, like his own.
Hume’s genius and the profound competence of his methodology
made his departures from the true path all the more seductive. The
Aberdeen Philosophical Society’s intense interest in Hume suggests that
he effectively challenged their most deeply-held assumptions con-
cerning the nature of the knowable. At the same time he provided a
methodology and analysis of human nature that, because of its compre-
hensiveness, insightfulness, and cleverness, they (apart from Beattie)
could not do without.191 Hume was simply too important to ignore. This
was to become painfully apparent when Hume applied his metaphysical
scepticism to the practical evidences of the Christian religion.
190 Some of this tension is also evident in the mind of Alexander Gerard, the man
who most resembled Campbell. In one of his sermons, Gerard used Hume’s premise, that
“all arguments concerning matter of fact are ultimately founded on experience,” to re-
ject Hume’s historical characterization of the pastoral office; see Sermons, 2 vols (London:
Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 2:344. Gerard added that Hume’s “infidelity will probably rob
him of some part of the attention and regard, which his philosophical genius and taste
would have otherwise commanded from the curious and intelligent” (2:438).
191 Lewis Ulman comes to similar conclusions concerning the ambiguity of the Wise
Club’s attitude towards Hume; see The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–
1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 51.
Philosophy in Practice
George Campbell intended his philosophy to be practical rather than

theoretical. He dealt with problems that were very much in the
eighteenth-century mainstream, such as the nature of effective commu-
nication, the possibility of belief in testimony concerning miracles, the
standards of historical proofs and explanations, and the uses of biblical
criticism. But as we have seen, all of these practical problems were
grounded in a well-reasoned, though not fully explicated, theory of hu-
man nature and of evidence. Testimony was of particular philosophic
concern for Campbell, because “to this species of evidence … we are
first immediately indebted for all the branches of philology, such as, his-
tory, civil, ecclesiastic, and literary; grammar, languages, jurisprudence,
and criticism; to which I may add revealed religion, as far as it is to be
considered as a subject of historical and critical inquiry, and so discover-
able by natural means.”1 Campbell believed that critical philosophy was
the beginning of Christian wisdom. He and his moderate Christian asso-
ciates held that, in an age of enlightenment and of growing infidelity,
religious belief was obliged to answer its critics by grounding itself in
evidences and empirical probabilities. Natural knowledge had to pre-
cede revealed knowledge, in order of time if not of importance. “Testi-
mony,” said James Beattie in summary, “is the grand external evidence
of Christianity.”2
David Hume’s strictures on the Christian evidences pierced the very
heart of the Aberdonians’ Christian apology, and could not be safely
1 pr, 56.
2 James Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and
Scepticism (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1776), 84–5.
ignored. Alexander Gerard argued that “there is a credulous, and

there is a sceptical temper; they are founded in opposite turns of un-
derstanding: but these opposite turns generally imply the same intel-
lectual weakness, an incapacity of perceiving the force of evidence
quickly and precisely.”3 The natural proofs of Christianity, he contin-
ued, are as clear as a Euclidian demonstration. He therefore placed
the burden of disproving Christianity’s obvious evidences upon unbe-
lievers: “all men are obliged, before they can reasonably disbelieve the
gospel, to go through an inquiry which will put it in their power to de-
cide with understanding, concerning the fact upon which our present
argument depends.”4 Consequent failure to be impressed by Chris-
tianity’s ample evidences implied a weakness of philosophical under-
standing, or perhaps of ordinary common sense. The Aberdonian
philosophers, with the exception of Beattie, recognized Hume’s un-
common philosophical abilities. Hume’s attacks on the Christian evi-
dences were, therefore, all the more unaccountable. His failure to
believe seemed to challenge the Aberdonians’ claim that our inborn
common sense provides a universal standard for judging evidence.
How then did the Aberdonians deal with Hume? They sought to dem-
onstrate that the evidences in favour of Christianity are of the same
kind as the evidences for any historical claim. “Now as the miracles,”
said Campbell, “which were wrought in support of our religion, with
us stand on the evidence of testimony conveyed in history, and as the
fulfilment of most of the prophecies urged in support of the same
cause, are vouched to us in the same manner, the argument with
regard to miracles is entirely, and with regard to prophecy is in a great
measure of the historical kind … Whereas therefore with regard to the
performance of such a miracle, there can be only one question, and a
mere question of fact.”5 Campbell accounted for Hume’s unac-
countable unbelief by claiming that he was mistaken, first and fore-
most, in matters of fact. This was a compelling strategy as far as most
eighteenth-century minds were concerned, though, as we shall see, it
did not entirely penetrate to the heart of their differences.
3 Alexander Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 1:226.

5 lstpe, 93–4.
Philosophy in Practice 123
the problem of believing miracles
Miracles were the cornerstone of the empirical structure of eighteenth-

century Christian apology. They were the basis of scriptural authority
(that is, of Revelation) and as such constituted perhaps the most impor-
tant battleground in the Enlightenment’s war over religion. Christian
moderates responded to the taunts of their deistical and sceptical con-
temporaries by arguing that the miracles upon which the Christian reli-
gion was originally founded were not merely objects of faith, but also
unimpeachable historical facts.
The triumph of Newtonian science at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury made respectable the notion that most events in the world happen
according to fixed and uniform natural laws. Rather than account for
the particular intentions of God, natural philosophers preferred to elu-
cidate the general expressions of God’s will embodied in the natural
universe. This, however, created new problems for the majority of natu-
ral philosophers who remained convinced Christians. Miracles and
other acts of particular providence had always been important supports
of Christian belief, and had even provided causal explanations of the in-
explicable events of everyday life. But now that acts of particular provi-
dence had been removed from ordinary life,6 what was to be their status
in the realm of Christian belief? Christian philosophers such as John
Locke took upon themselves the apologetic task of reintegrating biblical
miracles into their mechanistic world-view, an effort which helped to ig-
nite the eighteenth-century deistical war over miracles. The miracles
controversy brought together the major philosophical issues of the day:
problems concerning the nature of knowledge, evidence and belief, the
religious implications of the scientific world-view, and the proper
boundaries between general and particular providence. The probabilis-
tic approach to natural and religious evidences, which had been devel-
oped by seventeenth-century Anglican divines, was severely tested on
this eighteenth-century battleground.
By the middle of the eighteenth century the miracles debate had al-
ready passed its zenith, though controversial pamphlets continued to be
published in great numbers. Virtually every major enlightened figure, and
6 For Protestants, the exclusion of miracles from everyday life included the denial of
transubstantiation (as in Tillotson’s famous discourse) and the erection of lightning rods
against what many still considered to be acts of particular providence.
a host of minor ones, had something to say on the matter. When David
Hume belatedly entered the lists against belief in miracles, it was not
because he had discovered some new argument against miracles them-
selves, but because he realized that his novel theories concerning our
knowledge of cause and effect and of the laws of nature had undermined
the foundation of the moderate Christians’ evidential belief in miracles.
Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” appeared as a two-part section in his En-
quiry Concerning Human Understanding, which was originally published in
1748 under the title Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understand-
ing. In his only known letter to Campbell, Hume explained the origin of
the essay’s central argument:
I was walking in the Cloysters of the Jesuites College of La Fleche (a Town in

which I pass’d two Years of my Youth) and was engag’d in conversation with a
Jesuit of some Parts & Learning, who was relating to me & urging some nonsen-
sical Miracle perform’d lately in their Convent; when I was tempted to dispute
against him, and as my Head was full of the Topics of my Treatise of Human Na-
ture, which I was at that time composing, this Argument immediately occur’d to
me, and I thought it very much gravell’d my Companion. But at last he observ’d
to me, that it was impossible for that Argument to have any Solidity because it
operated equally against the Gospel as the catholic Miracles: Which Observation
I thought proper to admit as a sufficient Answer.7
“This Argument,” concerning the balancing of experience against the

claims of testimony, developed out of the larger argument of the Enquiry,
which was itself a popular reworking of the more detailed Treatise of Hu-
man Nature (1739–40). Hume’s main contention in these works was that
our understanding of the world – that is, our understanding of such no-
tions as cause and effect – is the product not of reason or of intuition but
of personal experience. Having observed the constant conjunction of
two ideas in the past, we form a habit of expecting them to be so con-
joined in the future. “All reasonings concerning matter of fact,” said
Hume, “seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means
of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and
senses.”8 Thus our belief in any matter of fact, even concerning an event
7 aul ms 3214/7.
8 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975),
26.
beyond the range of our personal experience, must depend upon its
conformity with our customary expectations of the course of nature.
“Though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory
and senses, and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most
distant places and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be
present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in
drawing these conclusions.”9 We believe a particular testimonial claim
only in proportion to its conformity with our experience of the world. A
purported event which contradicts our experience is properly held in
suspicion, which is to say that it does not become an object of belief,
since “a wise man … proportions his belief to the evidence.”10
The question of miracles, as with all testimonial claims, is merely a
question of probability, of balancing our general experience of nature
against the likelihood of the testimony being credible. Hume implicitly
argued that the reality of miracles is not at issue, for we cannot perceive
ultimate causes. At issue is the believability of purported events that con-
tradict our experience of nature. A miracle, according to Hume, is an
event that necessarily violates this uniform experience, and is therefore
as unbelievable an event as can be imagined.11 The body of experience
that has established the laws of nature is the only measure by which we
can judge the believability of particular testimonial claims, including
those which seek to contradict this uniform experience.12 Hume main-
tained, as a maxim of good philosophy, that we must always reject the
less probable of two opposing evidences, for “a weaker evidence can
never destroy a stronger.”13 In the case of miracles, we must believe ei-
ther that the testimony is true or that the claimant is deceived or lying.
Such a contest between our experience of nature and our experience of
the reliability of witnesses is not of long duration, for “no testimony is
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind,
that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it en-
deavours to establish.”14 Every miracle claim is necessarily “opposed by
an infinite number of witnesses,”15 which overwhelm the probability of
the individual claim. The ontological possibility of miracles aside, Hume
9 Ibid., 45.
10 Ibid., 110.
11 Ibid., 114.
12 Ibid., 127.
13 Ibid., 109.
14 Ibid., 115–16.
15 Ibid., 121.
asserted that there never has been sufficient evidence for believing any
miracle.16 The remainder of Hume’s essay sought to justify this claim
with historical and satirical arguments.
Campbell’s objections to Hume’s miracles argument mirrored his ob-
jections to Hume’s epistemology. Like the Common Sense realists,
Campbell claimed that the relations between ideas in our understand-
ing reflect the real relations that subsist between external things. In
other words, cause and effect relationships are real and independent of
the mind that perceives them. Campbell rejected Hume’s peculiar no-
tion of experience. In his haste to dethrone reason in favour of experi-
ence, Hume had forgotten that even personal experience depends
upon the veracity of memory, the reliability of which has no guarantor
but our common sense. Thus even Hume’s argument from experience
must be meaningless without the authority of common sense. Hume
had altogether misjudged the source from which we gain our under-
standing of the uniform course of nature. He had supposed that this un-
derstanding derives from our personal experience, when in fact our
individual acquaintance with the course of nature is extremely limited.
We depend upon the testimony of others for our understanding of the
world long before we have experienced even the smallest part of its op-
erations for ourselves.17 Our experience of the uniform course of na-
ture, therefore, depends upon a source whose veracity, like that of
memory, cannot be empirically demonstrated.
Campbell thought that Hume had fundamentally misunderstood the
psychology of belief. The sceptic had assumed that testimony must be
disbelieved until the weight of probability tips in its favour. In sceptical
(or perhaps legal) fashion, Hume had suggested that the burden of
proof must always rest upon those who testify in favour of such an
unlikely event as a miracle. Campbell reversed this premise, arguing
that one must always presume the truth of testimony, including testi-
mony for miracles, unless one can find sufficient cause for doubt.18 He
claimed that this presumption is founded in human nature itself, since
the Aberdonians considered faith in testimony to be a necessary precon-
dition of all human knowledge. Hume had supposed that human minds
begin their quest for knowledge by being sceptical of the testimony of
16 Ibid., 116.
17 dm, 39.
18 dm, 15–16. We may recall that both Hume and Campbell received some legal
training.
others, and only gradually come to believe testimonial claims as they

gain experience of the world. Campbell argued that Hume had got
things the wrong way round. Human beings are in fact naturally credu-
lous. Children believe whatever they are told, and only learn to doubt
certain testimonial claims as they gain experience. Hume’s assumptions
about the nature of belief contradicted not only the observed facts of
human nature, but also the benevolent design evident in God’s
creation.
Campbell’s summary of Hume’s “Of Miracles” argument early in A
Dissertation on Miracles suggests that he objected particularly to
Hume’s notion that belief is determined by subtracting one kind of
experience from an opposing one – that is, by deducting the testi-
mony concerning a particular event from our general experience of
nature and proportioning our belief to the remainder. This arithmet-
ical notion of evidence was repugnant not only to the Common Sense
notion of testimony, but to the moderate Christian conception of
moral argument, which placed great weight on the character and dis-
interestedness of individual witnesses. Campbell argued that a few
credible witnesses are worth more than a multitude of doubtful or
prejudiced ones.19 He thought Hume’s balance of probabilities argu-
ment led him to be unfairly hard on testimony regarding miracles, for
he made demands of such testimony that he would not make of testi-
mony concerning events, however rare, that fall within the scope of
human experience. Campbell denied Hume’s notion that testimony
and experience are directly opposing forms of evidence and that one
could be neatly subtracted from the other. On the contrary, “A gen-
eral conclusion from experience is … but presumptive and indirect;
sufficient testimony for a particular fact is direct and positive evi-
dence.”20 “In what regards single facts,” said Campbell in summary,
“testimony is more adequate evidence than any conclusions from
experience.”21
19 fg, 1:454.
20 dm, 46; cf. pr, 82 and 84. Hume was unconvinced. In a letter to Edward Gibbon of
18 March 1776, he wrote, “Where a Supposition is so contrary to common Sense, any pos-
itive Evidence of it ought never to be regarded” (The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig,
2 vols [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932], 2:310–11).
21 pr, 54; see also dm, 35–6. Hume seems to have anticipated this. He argued that in-
credible testimony actually destroys itself. Our usual belief in testimony causes us to reject
the incredible testimony that would imperil the ordinary testimony upon which our
knowledge depends (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 121).
Hume and Campbell agreed that the problem of miracles was really a
problem of evidence, an attitude that tied them both to the major con-
cerns of the Enlightenment. They further agreed that the issue must
take into account certain epistemological – or perhaps psychological –
considerations, such as the observed nature of human belief. Why then
did they disagree as to the reasonable possibility of belief in miracles?
Obviously, the question of miracles was for them considerably more
than an abstract problem – miracles symbolized their deep-seated reli-
gious differences. But without looking this far ahead, we may also ob-
serve that they were not arguing about precisely the same thing.
Although each disputant put forward compelling arguments and found
weaknesses in the other, they did not establish a common definition of
the object in dispute. Hume claimed (and Campbell agreed) that, “the
chief obstacle … to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sci-
ences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms.”22 Yet
neither contestant really addressed the problem of semantics, even
though their central arguments depended on definition. We must,
therefore, consider their distinct conceptions of miracles in order to
understand why they failed to agree.
the problem of defining miracles
The meaning of the term “miracle” was as ambiguous in the eighteenth

century as it is today. In modern popular usage, “miracle” often signifies
no more than a wonderful or remarkable event. The eighteenth-century
understanding of the term had considerably wider signification, but it
also had to bear the weight of new scientific and probabilistic concep-
tions of natural providence. In order to provide a context for the eigh-
teenth-century miracles debate, we must consider the normative
eighteenth-century meaning of the term before we examine Hume’s
and Campbell’s particular concepts.
Nathan Bailey’s early eighteenth-century Dictionarium Britannicum
(1730) defined miracles as “works effected in a manner unusual or
different from the common and regular method of the Almighty Provi-
dence, by the Interposition either of himself, or of some intelligent
Agent, superior to Man, for the Evidence and proving of some particu-
lar Doctrine, or in Attestation to the Authority of some particular
22 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 61.

Person or Persons,”23 a definition lifted almost verbatim from Samuel

Clarke’s enormously influential Boyle Lecture of 1705. Samuel Johnson
considered a miracle to be “a wonder; something above human power;”
or “an effect above human or natural power, performed in attestation of
some truth.”24 Eighteenth-century miracle definitions included three
common but distinct elements: (1) reference to an event contrary to
the ordinary course of nature, and (2) ascription of agency to some su-
pernatural power, (3) for the purpose of proving a divine truth or
favour. Most eighteenth-century men of letters would have agreed to a
definition of miracles that included some combination of these three
elements.
Nevertheless, eighteenth-century treatments of miracles differed
from one another according to the weight that the disputants chose to
put on the various components of the definition. The Newtonian em-
phasis on the uniformity of general providence made the first element
of the definition much more compelling than it had traditionally been,
but also raised the standard of proof. Even moderate Christian apolo-
gists agreed that acts of particular providence were the rarest of events,
done only for the greatest of purposes. The second element of the defi-
nition was probably the oldest, and certainly remained current in the
eighteenth century, though eighteenth-century Christian apologists
tended not to accept a supernatural claim unless it was accompanied
with compelling evidence that the ordinary course of nature had in fact
been interrupted. The significant exception were Evangelicals (called
“enthusiasts” by the moderates), who claimed inner or private miracles
and revelations that were not subject to verification, and were thus held
in suspicion by most moderate Christians.25 The third element of the
definition – that miracles must attest some significant point of religion
– was given particular emphasis by moderate Christians who believed
that it would minimize the violations of general providence, and pre-
serve the evidential character of miracles from the violence done by
enthusiasts to objective truth.
23 Nathan Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1969). The def-
inition given in the first edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, 3:251, closely followed
Bailey’s definition.
24 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London: W. Strahan, 1755).
25 See, for example, the abstract of a Wise Club discussion in which the members debat-
ed whether belief in the interruption of the fixed course of nature by the deity, especially for
the purpose of a personal revelation, makes one an enthusiast; AUL MS 37, fol. 186.
Hume placed the burden upon the first element of the definition –
that a purported miracle, to be worthy of regard, must clearly violate the
ordinary course of providence. This, according to his philosophical pre-
mises, was the only aspect of the definition of miracles that could possi-
bly fall within the realm of human observation. However, he was not
content to follow Samuel Clarke and other eighteenth-century apolo-
gists in defining a miracle as an event that was merely unusual or differ-
ent from ordinary providence. Hume defined a miracle as “a violation
of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has es-
tablished these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of
the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be
imagined.”26 Hume in effect argued that the very definition of a miracle
(assuming the definition hinges on an extreme interpretation of the
first element) is the best proof against a miracle claim. If an event falls
within the ordinary scope of human experience, it cannot be a miracle,
for, “nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common
course of nature.”27 Again, “there must … be a uniform experience
against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit
that appellation.”28 The second and third elements of the definition of
a miracle are therefore irrelevant unless the first is clearly established,
and the first element virtually negates the possibility of rational belief in
miracles. Even supposing that the fact of a miracle were established, it
would be a singular effect with which the mind would be unable to
associate a cause. In any case, the sceptical enquirer could proceed no
further.
This was enough to satisfy Hume the epistemologist that miracle
claims are inherently unworthy of critical consideration, but it was not
enough to satisfy the philosopher of human nature concerning the psy-
chological or sociological significance of miracle claims. Hume was not
oblivious to the religious importance of the other components of the
definition. “A miracle,” he said, “may be accurately defined, a transgres-
sion of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition
of some invisible agent.”29 He completed the definition as follows: “Every
miracle … pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions
26 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 114. For the significance of Clar-
ke’s definition of miracles, see Ezio Vailati, Leibniz & Clarke: A Study of Their Correspondence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 140ff.
28 Ibid., 115.
29 Ibid., 115n.
(and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish

the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force,
though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system.”30 The latter
part of this statement highlights another common eighteenth-century
assumption: that evidence for one religion simultaneously constitutes
evidence against all other religions. “If a miracle,” said Hume, “proves a
doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can
never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as
incompatible as the doctrines.”31 Hume was as aware as his Christian op-
ponents of the significance of miracles to exclusive religious claims. But
more than the moderate Christians, he also saw the significance of mira-
cles to the philosophy of human nature. Miracles highlight certain
aspects of human psychology, such as the compelling human need to
assign causes even to events that have not occurred with sufficient
frequency for the associative principles of the mind to create their own
causal connections. “It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have
recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause
of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be
accounted for from the common powers of nature.”32 Only philoso-
phers understand that the ultimate causes of such prodigies are as
unknowable as the ultimate causes of everyday events.
However serious Hume’s intentions may have been, he used a great
deal of his characteristically subtle humour to achieve his purpose. He
often used the term “miracle” in an intentionally loose manner: for
example, “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the
testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miracu-
lous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.”33 Undoubtedly,
Hume’s loose employment of the term was meant to parody the very
notion of miracles. Campbell was fully aware of Hume’s devices, and
took him gently to task: “The style, we find, is figurative, and the au-
thor is all the while amusing both his readers and himself with an un-
usual application of a familiar term.”34 Campbell criticized Hume for
sometimes using the term “miraculous” as a synonym for “improba-
ble,” so as to always reject the more improbable event. But if miracles
30 Ibid., 121.
31 Letters of David Hume, 1:350–1. In the same letter, Hume stated, “I never read of a
miracle in my life, that was not meant to establish some new point of religion” (350).
33 Ibid., 115–16.
34 dm, 101.
are merely improbable events, Campbell suggested, then miracles

must happen all the time, for history is full of improbabilities.35
Campbell’s conception of miracles was, in point of emphasis, very
different from Hume’s. Whereas Hume focused his attention primarily
on the first element of the definition, Campbell (like other moderate
Christians) gave considerable attention to the second and particularly
the third elements. As we have seen, Campbell did not consider the
first element of the definition to be an insurmountable barrier to be-
lief. He objected to Hume’s arbitrary distinction between what is con-
trary to experience and what is merely not conformable to it (that is, what
has not been observed or recorded before). He suggested that, as far as
experience goes, there is no meaningful difference between the terms,
and that as a consequence there is no inherently greater presumption
against believing testimony concerning the miraculous than believing
testimony concerning the merely extraordinary or unfamiliar.36 Camp-
bell was reluctant to agree with Hume that miracles were really viola-
tions of the laws of nature, rather than instances of the over-riding of
ordinary laws by hitherto unknown natural laws.37 But the difference
between Hume and Campbell on this point was more than a matter of
terminology. Hume believed that we cannot observe the laws of nature
directly; we can observe only constant conjunctions. We habitually
come to expect the same conjunctions in the future, and thus construct
the laws of nature in our minds. Any knowledge we have of God as a
causal principle must come from the uniform effects of nature.38 Any
break in the constant conjunctions merely destroys the mental con-
struct. Thus a miracle, even if demonstrated, could reveal nothing
about God. Campbell, in contrast, believed that we have sure knowl-
edge of external causal relationships by means of our common sense,
that they exist independently of our minds, and that they are in no dan-
ger of collapse if occasionally suspended for higher providential pur-
poses. Though we discover universal laws by experience, we also
35 dm, 99–101.
36 dm, 47–52. On Campbell’s objection to Hume’s argument that a miracle is contrary
to experience, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The ‘Indian Prince’ in Miracle Arguments of Hume and
His Predecessors and Early Critics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 31, no. 3 (1998), 212–18.
37 aul ms 651, pp. 10–11. In a note to the third edition of A Dissertation on Miracles,
Campbell suggested that the spiritual world is governed by laws with which we are not
familiar, laws which might account for occasional suspensions of the inferior laws of the
material universe (st, 1:86n.).
intuitively recognize that the laws of nature stand whether or not they
are in every case observed. Campbell did not believe that purposeful
departures from the otherwise uniform laws of nature detracted from
the dignity or reliability of those laws.
Campbell and other moderates did what Hume found philosophically
unacceptable – they fell back on a conception of God that assumed his
mastery over both general and particular providences. They assumed,
like Locke, that the believability of miracles is tied to the great purposes
for which they are supposedly wrought. In fact, Campbell objected to
Hume’s central argument – that the greater of two miracles ought always
to be rejected – on the grounds that a greater miracle is a clearer indica-
tion of a great and noble purpose, and therefore of an event worthy of
God.39 Hume, who could have no reliable knowledge of the nature or
perhaps even the existence of God, could never prefer a supernatural ex-
planation to a natural one. The merely improbable still falls within the
realm of experience, whereas belief in the miraculous would seem to re-
quire knowledge or faith from without the realm of experience. Camp-
bell, in contrast, believed that we can know much about the nature and
intentions of God by means of natural knowledge in conjunction with
common sense. Like the seventeenth-century latitudinarians, Campbell
and the moderates expected to find limited examples of particular provi-
dence in support of a necessary revelation.40 Campbell’s definition of a
miracle was thus necessarily pointed at a supernatural element. A mira-
cle, he said, “implies the interposal of an invisible agent, which is not im-
plied in [a merely extraordinary event].”41 We may already observe a
significant lapse in parity between Hume’s and Campbell’s definitions,
for Hume would not even allow such an implication. Hume’s theory of
knowledge does not permit speculation concerning the cause of a
unique event. A contradiction of the ordinary course of nature can imply
no more than the forfeiture of a natural law. Campbell was more predis-
posed to consider the divine meaning of an event, “for if the interposal
of the Deity be the proper solution of the phenomenon, why recur to
natural causes?”42 Unlike Hume, he could not think of a miracle without
39 dm, 95.
40 Locke, for example, argued that the third element of the definition of a miracle
actually makes the existence of miracles more believable, because it leads us to anticipate
them; see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), 667.
41 dm, 51.
42 dm, 60n.
considering all three elements of the definition. Campbell’s natural reli-

gion demonstrated that natural knowledge about God is insufficient for
human purposes. He therefore expected that God would reveal his di-
vine purpose for humanity in a great and unmistakable historical event.
This assumption made the second and third elements of the miracle def-
inition indispensable, and the first part a considerably less formidable
obstacle to belief.
According to moderate Christians, the first element of the defini-
tion can be vindicated by natural (that is, historical) evidences, while
the second element is virtually self-evident. It is the third element of
the definition – that a miracle is meant to support a divine communi-
cation – that requires the most careful attention. This is apparent from
the epigraph that Campbell placed on the title-page of his Dissertation,
which quotes John 10:25: “The works that I do in my Father’s name,
they bear witness of me.” In Campbell’s mind, belief in a miracle, once
gained, must necessarily carry with it belief in a corresponding super-
natural communication. Campbell’s natural theology assumed that
God never interrupts the course of nature in vain – that is, without at-
testing some divine truth that could not be communicated in any
other manner. He also agreed with Hume that a new religion would be
difficult, if not impossible, to accept without such a divine mark of
favour.
Campbell assumed that since God must reveal his will to mankind
with the support of appropriate miracles, a critical philosopher’s
chief task is to decide which among the historical miracle-claims is
most believable. Once the authenticity of a miracle, or set of miracles,
has been verified, one can and must accept the revelation that accom-
panies the miracle. Christianity, argued Campbell, is most probable in
its evidences and most conformable in character to the expectations
of nature as determined by experience and common sense. It is the
only religion in human history (having superseded the Hebrew reli-
gion) whose claims have been founded on well-attested miracles.43 It
stands in stark contrast to the obviously false claims of Mahomet and
the Roman Catholic church. Christianity, therefore, ought to be fol-
lowed in its simplest and purest form without unreasonable expecta-
tion of further divine signs or proofs, for once a revelation has been
well-founded, ordinary providence is sufficient for daily life.
43 dm, 124 and 159.

Hume and Campbell’s debate over miracles was about much more
than just miracles. They were contesting the nature of religious belief
itself. Hume was implicitly willing to abandon revealed religion if satis-
factory evidences could not be found. Campbell assumed that a satis-
factory answer is necessarily within the grasp of the rational mind. It is
hardly surprising, therefore, that Hume placed the burden of proving
a miracle on the believer, while Campbell placed the burden of dis-
proving Christian miracles on the unbeliever. Campbell went so far as
to declare that his greatest advantage over Hume was being on the
side of truth, while Hume’s only advantage was his native ingenuity.44
His fundamental premise was that “God has neither in natural nor re-
veal’d religion, left himself without a witness; but has in both given moral
and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence
the gainsayer, and to render the atheist and the unbeliever without ex-
cuse. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to exam-
ine.”45 Campbell assumed that the Christian evidences demand
investigation, while Hume, working from the premise that miracles
are inherently unbelievable, felt no compulsion to examine every (or
any) miracle claim. In defiance of Hume, Campbell confidently de-
clared that testing Christianity’s claims in the stark light of reason
only demonstrates their strength and consistency.46 He was certainly
right in assuming that the vast majority of his readers would be sympa-
thetic to his own presuppositions and to his manner of defining mira-
cles. Hume, on the other hand, had to do all the work of convincing
Christian readers to disregard their native prejudices concerning the
possibility of believing miracles.
Hume not only rejected the moderates’ assumptions concerning nat-
ural religion, but wondered what a proven contradiction of the ob-
served laws of nature could possibly signify. The moderates, using
epistemological and empirical criteria less rigid than Hume’s, believed
that the fact of a miracle can be known with moral certainty, and solely
by means of natural knowledge. The significance of such an event, how-
ever, can only be understood with knowledge from outside of nature.
We must, therefore, leave consideration of the religious significance of
miracles to the final part of this study.
44 dm, 6. It is unclear what motives Campbell was implicitly attributing to Hume.

45 dm, 3–4.
46 dm, 284.
the philosophical historian
The historical evidences concerning the miracles of Jesus and of the

Apostles not only constituted a cornerstone of the moderates’ religious
belief, but also revealed a great deal about the original constitution of
the Christian church. “A considerable portion of the Christian faith,”
said Campbell, “consists in points of an historic nature.”47 Historical evi-
dences were useful in discriminating among the various and conflicting
claims within Christianity. Eighteenth-century Scots of competing de-
nominations agreed that the form, structure, and beliefs of the early
church would determine which among the contemporary claims of
Christianity were authentic and which were merely the illegitimate
offspring of human invention. Campbell therefore taught his divinity
students the critical uses of history.
The leading British historians of the eighteenth century, most notably
David Hume and Edward Gibbon, re-invented their discipline by bring-
ing the concerns of the critical philosopher to a field of study that had
traditionally been dominated by dull annalists or politically and reli-
giously motivated polemicists. The philosophical historians rejected tra-
ditional party debates, displayed a philosophical concern for method,
applied critical and probabilistic reasoning to historical sources and
questions of human motivation, employed an enlightened and empirical
theory of human nature, and, most importantly, focused their critical
attention on natural and causal explanations.48
Campbell was a philosophical historian of this kind, despite the fact
that he was mainly concerned with the history of the Christian church.
His historical interests are evident not only in his ecclesiastical history
lectures, but also in A Dissertation on Miracles, The Four Gospels, and some
of his sermons. His unpublished manuscripts show that historical dis-
putes were the chief preoccupation of his later years, while his system-
atic treatment of evidence suggests that history and its proofs had
always been fundamental to his system of thought. Campbell and other
eighteenth-century thinkers were as much concerned with the uses of
the past as were nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers, though
their theory of human nature prevented them from using history in
47 leh, 1:3.
48 David Wootton has provided the best short summary of this new philosophical ap-
proach to history in “Narrative, Irony, and Faith in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall,” History and
Theory 33 (1994): 77–105.
ways to which we have become accustomed. It is important, therefore,

to reconstruct Campbell’s general view of history before examining his
treatment of specific historical problems.
The enlightened historians’ concern for impartiality and their criti-
cal attitude towards sources allowed them both to reject partisan histor-
ical claims and to be tolerant of the differentness of past cultures. They
were, by turns, systematically judgmental and surprisingly sympathetic
in their historical pronouncements. “Wonderful are the differences in
manners and opinions,” said Campbell, “which prevail in different
countries, and even in the same country, at different periods.”49 He rec-
ognized the difficulties of entering into the sentiments of the early
Christian age, and argued that one cannot understand a past language
without understanding the character of the people who spoke it. Even
more remarkable in light of common eighteenth-century prejudices, he
often restrained himself from lumping all Roman Catholics into cate-
gorical judgments.50 However, Campbell’s attempts at historical sensi-
tivity are not always convincing, especially when they are followed by
harsh, judgmental comments on the views of literary opponents. He
considered it a matter of historical fact that the Roman Catholic church
had always been concerned more with power than with doctrine. His
account of the successes of the early church betrays his enlightened in-
clination to assign universal motives to the actions of past peoples:
“Now the nature of things, my brethren, was the same then that it is at
present, and means which we perceive now to be perfectly inadequate
must have been always so.”51 These hard judgments become more com-
prehensible in light of the purpose for which philosophical historians
studied the past.
Like their humanist predecessors, enlightened historians viewed the
study of history as a moral enterprise. History was meant to be didactic,
not merely in the narrow sense of communicating moral lessons or
teaching by example, but also in the broader sense of providing an un-
derstanding of human nature itself. Campbell intended his divinity lec-
tures “to convey some notion of the nature and origin and essential
parts of this species of history, to trace as briefly as possible the latent
springs of the principle changes, with which the ecclesiastical history in
particular presents us; and … to offer suitable advices to the student,

50 st, 2:21 and 2:308–10; fg 1:54.
51 st, 2:31.
first as to the order in which he ought to proceed in the acquisition of

this necessary branch of knowledge; secondly as to the books and assis-
tances which he ought to use.”52 Two things are here evident. The first is
that Campbell intended to teach a method of historical study so that his
students could embark on a lifetime of competent self-instruction. He
continually made this philosophy of education plain to his students:
So far from allowing yourselves to lose any thing of what ye have already ac-
quired, ye ought to be daily improving your stock of knowledge. Of some
branches of study, young men, after finishing their philosophical course, often
have the acquisition to begin. Of this sort is civil history, which, especially the an-
cient oriental, as well as Greek and Roman histories, are of considerable impor-
tance here, inasmuch as they have a pretty close connection and are in some
particulars closely interwoven with the scriptural and ecclesiastic histories; and
these ye know make a principal branch of your subject. Sacred history and pro-
fane serve reciprocally to throw light on each other. I may add that historical
knowledge is of immense use in criticism, from the acquaintance to which it
introduces us, with ancient manners, laws, rites and idioms.53
The second point that Campbell wished to convey is that the study of
history ought to be concerned primarily with moral causes – that is, with
the hidden springs or motives of human nature. As he explained in The
Philosophy of Rhetoric, a minister must know human nature in order to
communicate effectively with his parishioners. History, as a branch of
moral philosophy, was meant to uncover the real causes of historical
events and thus effectively to display the motives and consequences of
moral action and ultimately the universal nature of man.
Campbell’s enlightened interest in uncovering human nature as man-
ifested in the history of the Christian church allowed him to treat reli-
gious conflicts and controversies as failings of human character rather
than as shortcomings of theological knowledge. His historical explana-
tions often cited the universal weaknesses of human nature, such as a
tendency to be irrationally swayed by wealth and splendour, names and
titles, and a veneration for antiquity. Campbell took it for historical
truth that, “exorbitant wealth annexed to offices may be said universally
to produce two effects … arrogance and laziness.”54 He explained the
52 lstpe, 54–5.
53 lstpe, 78.
54 leh, 2:218. See also fg, 1:229; leh, 2:110, 2:149, and 1:405.
continued veneration of Latin in the church thus: “though it arise in

them all from a silly prejudice, which manifestly shows, that the form of
religion has supplanted the power; yet I can easily, without recurring to
authority or foreign influence, especially in the decline of all literature
and science, account for it from the weakness incident to human na-
ture.”55 Like Hume, Campbell believed that any customary observance,
however unofficial, always comes in time to be considered a positive
right. “Custom rules the world,” said Campbell, “and is the principle
foundation of obedience in all the governments that are, and ever were,
upon the earth.”56 Here he intended the term “custom” to signify some-
thing more than its ordinary meaning, and indeed to suggest a larger
philosophical or conjectural view of the course of history.
Conjectural history was one of the most remarkable products of the
Scottish Enlightenment’s concern to understand the past in a philo-
sophical manner. Conjectural historians tended to explain history in its
broadest terms, by drawing upon a probabilistic theory of human nature
and motivation. They wrote the history of institutions and movements
rather than of individuals – thus Lord Kames explained the origins of
British law, while Adam Smith traced the history of the sciences, and
Hume examined the cycles of religious belief.57 Campbell did the same
for the Christian church. The Lectures on Ecclesiastical History may be read
as a psychological reconstruction of church history that combines tradi-
tional historical evidences with an enlightened understanding of the
universal principles of human nature. Campbell’s declared goal “in
these discourses, is not to give a narrative of facts, but from known facts,
with their attendant circumstances, by comparing one with another, to
deduce principles and causes.”58 He sought the “springs of action” that
were not immediately apparent to the historical reader. “As some of the
largest and loftiest trees spring from very small seeds, so the most exten-
sive and wonderful effects sometimes arise from very inconsiderable
causes.”59 Campbell paid little attention to individual historical actors,
except insofar as they illustrated general trends. His historical analyses,
like those of other conjectural historians, focused on the unintended
55 leh, 2:254.
56 leh, 2:53. Like Hume, Campbell argued that custom can eventually reconcile men
to any historical development (pr, 402).
57 These themes are covered in Kames’ Historical Law-Tracts, Smith’s “History of
Astronomy” and its companion pieces, and Hume’s Natural History of Religion.
58 leh, 2:108.
59 leh, 2:143.
consequences of a great number of uncoordinated individual actions.

The development of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, for example, was as
much the unplanned product of certain human tendencies as it was the
explicit policy of church leaders. Christian persecution grew without de-
liberate planning over a long period of time. The conspiracy of the
priesthood, apparent in the writings of Campbell and of most Enlight-
enment figures, was likewise an undesigned conspiracy. Campbell’s ex-
planations may not have paid much regard to the intentions of
individual historical actors, but they appealed to a few causal principles
and thus had philosophical coherence, in keeping with the expectations
of his enlightened audience. The novelty of Campbell’s approach to
church history (an intensely-cultivated historical field) was his concern
for broad philosophical explanations rather than minute controversial
details.
Enlightened historians sought the most broadly-applicable explana-
tions of historical events and trends, and consequently viewed the past
in its broadest terms. This helps account for the readiness with which
they judged the past. Campbell, like his contemporaries, held a low
opinion of the “middle ages” between antiquity and his own reformed
and enlightened age. The end of these “dark ages” was signified by “a
second dawn of reason, and the return of thought, after a long night of
barbarity and ignorance.”60 Like Hume and Robertson, Campbell
chronicled the decline of literature, arts, and learning that accompa-
nied the medieval rise of superstition and priestcraft, which was itself a
secondary cause in Satan’s historical plan.61 The decline of the Roman
Empire and the rise of ecclesiastical dominion was a matter of wonder
to the modern reader, “when the sun of science was now set, and the
night of ignorance, superstition and barbarism, was fast advancing; that
out of the ruins of every thing great and venerable, there should spring
a new species of despotism, never heard of, or imagined before, whose
means of conquest and defence were neither swords nor spears, fortifi-
cations nor warlike engines, but definitions and canons, sophisms and
imprecations; and that by such weapons, as by a kind of magic, there
should actually be reared a second universal monarchy, the most formi-
60 leh, 2:265.
61 leh, 2:50–2. Similar views are found in William Robertson’s The History of the Reign
of the Emperor Charles V, 2 vols, new ed. (Dublin: J. Stockdale, 1804), 1: 56; cf. Hume’s The
History of England, foreword by William B. Todd, 6 vols (Indianapolis: LibertyFund, 1983),
1:4 and 2:518–19.
dable the world ever knew.”62 Despite his disagreement with Hume over
the evidential possibility of miracles, Campbell, like Hume, had no diffi-
culty attributing the age’s myriad of false miracles to a gross and igno-
rant people. He accused the medieval pope Gregory I of using his office
purely for political gain, of being interested more in converts than in
good Christians, and of pursuing a form of zeal that was hostile to true
Christian tolerance. “That Gregory had, through the misfortune and er-
ror of the times, thoroughly imbibed … these principles, will never be
doubted by any person, who, with judgment and impartiality, reads his
history.”63 Even while defending Roman Catholics against popular Prot-
estant hostility in his Address to the People of Scotland, Campbell equated
modern Catholic irrationality with the church’s rise to power in dark
and ignorant ages. His characterization of the Middle Ages as an ex-
tended moral lapse in the history of human nature was little removed
from the opinions of Hume or Voltaire. His description of “priestcraft”
could easily be attributed to either of these authors. Campbell even
cited Voltaire approvingly in his divinity lectures.64 The historical source
for his discussion of the Council of Trent was Paolo Sarpi, whose antipa-
thy to Rome was famous. Campbell clearly believed that one did not
have to be a Protestant historian to see that historical scholarship was
demonstrably unfavourable to the claims of Rome.65
Campbell’s view of the rise of the modern era and of the Protestant
Reformation also corresponded to the views of his compatriots, with
the exception of Hume. Although Campbell, Robertson, and Hume
agreed that the modern age broke like morning light over the dark ru-
ins of corrupted civilization, Hume implicitly denied a connection be-
tween the reformed religion and the new learning. Campbell agreed
with Hume that the invention of printing played a significant role in
the triumph of modern learning, but like Robertson, he also high-
lighted the key role played by the learned Martin Luther.66 It is not dif-
ficult to see how these historical judgments concerning the nature of
62 leh, 2:19.
63 leh, 2:75.
64 leh, 2:135 and 313–14. Campbell quoted from what is probably the Essai sur les
moeurs, and, very interestingly, from the Dictionnaire philosophique.
65 leh, 2:94; lstpe, 206.
66 Compare leh, lecture 28, with Robertson, who emphasizes the classical learning of
the reformers (Charles V, 1:422); compare also leh, 2:265 and 330–2 with Hume, History
of England, 3:140 and Robertson, Charles V, 1:421.
the medieval church and the character of the Reformation became in-
extricably intertwined with the eighteenth-century British view of the
contemporary Roman Catholic church.
Such a sweeping view of human history was easily translated into a the-
ory of progress. Campbell argued that the changes evident in mankind
over the last three thousand years were no less than the transformation
of a child into an adult.67 The most dramatic change had been in the arts
and sciences; as Thomas Reid wrote, “Nature intended man to improve
in Knowledge and the usefull arts.”68 Campbell saw progress in knowl-
edge reflected in the development of language: “Things sensible first
had names in every language: The names were afterward extended to
things conceivable and intellectual. This is according to the natural
progress of knowledge.”69 Campbell seems to have believed that recent
advances in general learning had made it virtually impossible for dark-
ness and ignorance to again triumph as they had in the Middle Ages. His
theory of toleration was based partly on the historical supposition that
“the progressive state of all human knowledge and art, will ever be un-
friendly to the adoption of any measure which seems to fix a barrier
against improvement.”70 The most interesting expression of Campbell’s
view of progress, however, is found in a letter to Bishop John Douglas.
Here Campbell argued that humanity is advancing towards a state of per-
fection predicted in Isaiah’s prophecy, “they shall beat their swords into
plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks.” “I am strongly of opin-
ion,” wrote Campbell, “that this prophecy will be one day literally accom-
plished: tho’ we are many centuries too early here to see it. The
advancement of knowledge is the sure foundation of improvement of ev-
ery kind, both in morals and in civil policy.”71 This enlightened and opti-
mistic view of progress is made all the more fascinating by its complete
lack of secular intent, as if the triumph of the Enlightenment itself was
the fulfillment of God’s plan for man on earth. It further suggests that
Campbell’s view of the structure of history was firmly providential, and
his view of the future eschatological.
67 dm, 251.
68 Thomas Reid’s Lectures on Natural Theology, ed. Elmer H. Duncan (Washington: Uni-
versity Press of America, 1981), 46.
69 fg, 1:206.
70 fg, 1:29.
71 Campbell to Douglas, 22 July 1790 (BL Egerton MS 2186, fols 10v–11r). The scrip-
tural reference is to Isaiah 2:4.
t h e n at u r e o f t h e e a r ly c h u r c h
Campbell’s historiography was unquestionably enlightened, though it

partook of older traditions as well, as when he appealed to Genesis to ac-
count for the necessarily miraculous origin of the world.72 But Camp-
bell tended to focus his historical energies on the early Christian
church. Like most of his contemporaries, he believed that the model of
the early church was the proper standard by which to measure all subse-
quent manifestations of the church. The prescriptive authority of the
early church was a religious concern, and as such will be considered
later. The historical nature of the early church, however, remained a
problem of natural knowledge, since the post-apostolic church was left
“to force its way in the world by its own intrinsic and external
evidence.”73
The controversial details of ecclesiastical history came to dominate
Campbell’s attention only in his last years, as evidenced in his unpub-
lished manuscripts. The “Strictures on Dodwell” employed a wide
range of historical sources to demonstrate that the apostolic succes-
sion was neither a fact nor a doctrine of the early church. Like Presby-
terian historians since the Reformation, Campbell argued that
historical evidences contradicted the doctrine of the primitive rule of
bishops. Dodwell’s shoddy scholarship, he suggested, bred a false and
dangerous ecclesiology. Campbell was even harder on his anonymous
antagonist “Staurophilus” (the Roman Catholic bishop George Hay),
whose confessional adherence he easily identified. In the lengthy “De-
fence” of his Spirit of the Gospel sermon, Campbell surveyed the fright-
ening legacy of Catholic church policies, from the early days of
institutionalized Christian intolerance, to the betrayal of Jan Huss, and
finally to the claims of papal infallibility still being made in the eigh-
teenth century. Campbell cited such unnatural moral practices as mo-
nasticism and the breaking of faith with heretics to demonstrate that
the corruption of the church was a matter of historical fact. His
sources were eclectic, including such pre-Christian authorities as
Cicero, Horace, and Caesar, as well as his own contemporaries Vol-
taire, Helvétius, Montesquieu, and Gibbon. He appealed to Protestant
churchmen and historians (such as Mosheim), but mostly to the
72 dm, part II, section VI.

73 leh, 1:4.
church fathers and to modern Roman Catholic historians (in particu-

lar Claude Fleury’s massive Histoire ecclésiastique) so as to make his case
all the more convincing to his antagonists.
Campbell’s most comprehensive and philosophical treatment of
church history, however, is found in his divinity lectures. The Lectures on
Ecclesiastical History may be described as a history of the corruption of
the Christian church. Campbell believed that the New Testament did
not prescribe any specific ecclesiastical polity, but rather provided only
examples of Christian love and community.74 This primitive equality of
Christians was transformed, with the progress of time and the addition
of vast numbers of adherents, into an increasingly hierarchical and sac-
erdotal institution. The Roman papacy was merely the last logical stage
of a spiritual despotism built from layer upon layer of authoritarian
claims, and solidified by the slow but irresistible force of custom. The
first and most significant step in this process, argued Campbell, was the
transformation of bishops from congregational ministers into spiritual
and administrative authorities. The bishops, who had originally been
equal in rank and office to the presbyters (an old Protestant argument),
began to arbitrate disputes among other pastors and lay Christians, a
practice which soon became a customary right. This process was en-
trenched by the Christianization of the Roman Empire, when the au-
thority of bishops was confirmed by law and extended to great numbers
of new adherents. Here, the novelty of Campbell’s philosophical ap-
proach to the history of the church becomes most apparent. He ex-
plained these historical processes with reference to the universal
propensities of human nature, arguing that time and custom always
transform duties into privileges, and spiritual claims into material ambi-
tions. But though this process was natural and inevitable, it was still a
corruption of the pastoral office. Human nature merely accounted for
the ease with which spiritual mandates were forgotten when mixed with
magisterial powers.
Campbell was well aware that the primitive rights of bishops had been
a fundamental matter of debate in the Scottish church since the Refor-
mation. He therefore devoted a substantial number of his history lec-
tures to describing and accounting for this first significant corruption.
Subsequent lectures detailed the inevitable development of metropoli-
tans, patriarchs, and church courts. The rise of the Roman See was the
last stage of the transformation of the Christian church into a worldly
74 leh, 1:99.
hierarchy. Campbell devoted the bulk of his remaining lectures to this

great symbol of human corruption, whose sole objective was the perfec-
tion of its worldly power. He argued that Rome acquired its right of doc-
trinal arbitration by consistently deciding claims in favour of appellants,
thereby encouraging more appeals.75 Rome confirmed its power by its
acquisition of dazzling wealth and by its skillful and opportunistic ma-
nipulation of events to suit its authoritarian policies. But Rome’s good
fortune could not last. Campbell implicitly believed that the recovery of
learning was inevitable and necessarily fatal to Roman claims. The Ref-
ormation was the direct result of Rome’s inability to keep its charges in
perpetual ignorance.
Campbell believed that his historical claims were grounded in objec-
tive fact, rather than merely the required declarations of a Presbyterian
churchman and teacher. He even found support for these claims in
Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Camp-
bell read the first volume (that is, the first sixteen chapters) of The
Decline and Fall soon after its publication in 1776, and immediately
wrote a letter to their mutual publisher William Strahan, of which the
following extract, dated 26 June 1776, survives:
I have lately read over one of your last winter’s publications, with very great plea-
sure and I hope some instruction. My expectations were indeed high when I be-
gan it, but I assure you the entertainment I received greatly exceeded them.
What made me fall to it with the greater avidity, was, that it had in part a pretty
close connection with a subject I had occasion to treat sometimes in my Theo-
logical lectures; to wit the rise and progress of the Hierarchy. And you will be-
lieve I was not the less pleased to discover in an Historian of so much learning
and penetration so great a coincidence with my own sentiments in relation to
some obscure points in the Christian Antiquities. I suppose I need not inform
you that the book I mean is Gibbon’s History of the fall of the Roman Empire;
which in respect of the style and manner as well as the matter is a most masterly
performance.76
This extract suggests that the main argument of Campbell’s ecclesiastical

history lectures was well established by 1776. It further suggests that Camp-
bell did not at this time notice any irreligious tendencies in Gibbon’s work.
75 leh, 2:41.
76 bl Add. MS 34886, fol. 78. These are Gibbon papers, which suggests that this extract
was copied by Strahan for Gibbon.
His subsequent citations of Gibbon continued to be favourable. The

printed Lectures on Ecclesiastical History contain a lengthy quotation from
chapter forty-six of The Decline and Fall, indicating that Campbell kept up
with the various volumes of Gibbon’s work as they were published.77
Like Campbell, Gibbon argued that the early Christian church did
not establish a definitive form of ecclesiastical government, for “the
apostles declined the office of legislation, and rather chose to endure
some partial scandals and divisions than to exclude the Christians of a
future age from the liberty of varying their forms of ecclesiastical gov-
ernment according to the changes of times and circumstances.”78
Gibbon also claimed that the offices of bishop and of presbyter were
originally the same, and that the term “bishop” only later came to be ap-
plied to the presidents of the presbyterian assemblies. A primitive
bishop, in other words, was originally no more than a first among
equals. Only gradually did the growth of the church lead to the forma-
tion of a hierarchy, as bishops began to assume ascendancy over their
fellow presbyters, and metropolitan prelates subsequently claimed
rights over bishops.79 Gibbon thus reproduced the leading arguments
of Campbell’s lectures, against which Campbell’s Episcopalian oppo-
nents took such exception. At the end of his infamous chapter fifteen,
Gibbon remarked that the humble status of the early Christians ought
to increase our regard for the successes of the primitive church.80 This
sentiment, though without the possibility of ironic intent, was at the
heart of Campbell’s 1777 sermon, The Success of the First Publishers of the
Gospel a Proof of Its Truth. Gibbon appealed to the universal principles of
human nature to account for the rise of monasticism, claiming that the
particular value system of the early church allowed its adherents to easily
confuse resistance to ordinary pleasures with spiritual merit, which in
turn allowed pride of spirit to triumph over physical comfort.81 This
kind of explanation would undoubtedly have appealed to Campbell.
77 This chapter on Gregory i appeared in the fourth volume of the work, first published
in 1788. See also fg, 1:506n., where Campbell, in a long footnote, considered a historical
question posed by Gibbon. Campbell eventually became aware of Gibbon’s infidelity, prob-
ably through Hailes, and called him “that able but prejudiced author”; see Campbell to
Hailes, 1 March 1783 (NLS MS 25303, fols 177–8).
78 Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J.B. Bury,
7 vols, 2d ed. (London: Methuen, 1909–14), 2:43.
79 Ibid., 2:43–8.
80 Ibid., 2:72.
81 Ibid., 2:37–40. Compare Gibbon’s explanation to Campbell’s “Essay on Christian
Temperance and Self-Denial,” in his Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.
Campbell’s philosophical treatment of the early church was, at least

superficially, very much like Gibbon’s. Gibbon argued that impartial his-
torians must appeal exclusively to natural and human explanations, yet
the sceptical direction of his own narrative suggests that he was neither
as pious nor as impartial as he claimed. He declared that ancient peo-
ples would have embraced any pagan superstition “if, in the decisive mo-
ment, the wisdom of Providence had not interposed a genuine
revelation.”82 This passage can suggest entirely contradictory interpreta-
tions depending upon one’s view of Gibbon’s literary intentions. But all
this must be read into Gibbon’s style, for his infidelity is not apparent at
the literal level. It is nevertheless remarkable that Gibbon’s explicit his-
torical arguments were largely compatible with the enlightened Re-
formed tradition. It is also noteworthy that Gibbon and Campbell,
working independently, but with many of the same philosophical inten-
tions, came to virtually the same conclusions about controversial matters
of church history. We must, however, defer consideration of the reli-
gious implications of these historical conclusions to another chapter
and perspective.
the critical uses of the gospel
Campbell’s philosophical history was closely tied to another field of

practical scholarship that occupied much of his attention: biblical crit-
icism. His great scholarly achievement was the 1789 publication of The
Four Gospels, Translated from the Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations, and
Notes Critical and Explanatory. The translation of the four canonical
Gospels was a practical working out of the philosophical and rhetorical
principles found in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, though the addition of
twelve substantial dissertations, as well as extensive notes on the trans-
lations, made it an original work of critical philosophy in itself. The
“Preliminary Dissertations” examined, among other things, the lan-
guage, style, and idiom of the New Testament writers, the historical or-
igins of their particular style, the proper signification of certain terms
and titles, and the critical rules for examining and translating Scrip-
ture. Campbell’s contemporaries were particularly impressed by his re-
marks on the original meaning and subsequent corruption of such
terms as “mystery,” “blasphemy,” “schism,” and “heresy.”83 The misuse
82 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, 2:59.

83 fg, dissertation ix.
of these terms had had profoundly negative effects on the develop-

ment and perceived mandate of the Christian church. Campbell be-
lieved that practical criticism was vitally important for modern
Christians. As he explained to his students in an introductory lecture
to his divinity course: “To lay down … proper canons of sacred criti-
cism, to arrange them according to their comparative merit, so that we
may readily apprehend the way in which they are to be applied, must
be a very useful labour to all in general, but of particular consequence
to the young student. It is the more so, because could we once arrive at
being adepts in the critical science, the help of the commentator
would be much more rarely needed; we should serve as commentators
to ourselves.”84
Two major purposes are evident in The Four Gospels. First and fore-
most, Campbell meant his scholarship to be useful to ordinary Chris-
tians – that is, to provide them with an accurate and unambiguous
translation for the purposes of practical devotion. To Lord Hailes he
wrote “It is not the business of the teacher of religion to make men lin-
guists, or critics, or antiquaries, but to make them good Christians … In
short, as I write to the people of the eighteenth century, I choose to
speak the language of the eighteenth century, and not that of the fif-
teenth or sixteenth.”85 To this end, he argued, a translation must be free
of darkness, obscurity, and unfamiliar or obsolete words, and it must
faithfully reproduce any colloquial usage in the original. The sense of
the original passage is everything in a translation, and that sense must
therefore be reflected in the standard usage of the translator’s own day.
As in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell argued that a living language is
subject to change over time, and that meanings must be accurately con-
veyed by contemporary usage. In the employment of a word, utility al-
ways takes precedence over pedigree. Campbell had no qualms about
criticizing the standard King James Version of the Bible, despite the ven-
eration in which it was commonly held, because a translation is only as
good as its ability to capture the sense of the original.86
The second major purpose of The Four Gospels was critical. Campbell
wished to establish comprehensive rules of translation, and to demon-
strate in notes how these rules were to be applied to the actual problems
84 lstpe, 57.
85 Campbell to Hailes, 24 June 1789 (NLS MS 25305, fols 13–14).
86 fg, 1:409–10; Campbell to Hailes, 23 Nov. 1789 (NLS MS 25305, fols 16–22);
Campbell to Hailes [Autumn 1789?], (NLS MS 25305, fols. 27–30). The majority of criti-
cisms of The Four Gospels concerned the colloquial nature of the translation.
of Gospel translation. Consequently, his claims to accuracy were made

on rational rather than inspirational grounds, and appealed to a critical
tradition of biblical scholarship stretching back to Erasmus’ ground-
breaking edition of the Greek New Testament in 1516. From the early
sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, following in the wake of the
more dramatic events of the Reformation, there was a long, quiet revolu-
tion in biblical criticism. Campbell’s work was very much a part of this
tradition. The first quarter of the sixteenth century witnessed a scholarly
rediscovery of the ancient languages in which the original texts of the Bi-
ble had been written. The uncovering of ancient Hebrew, Greek, and
Latin manuscripts allowed Christian humanists to develop a new confi-
dence in their ability not only to understand the intentions of ancient
authors but also to bring about a spiritual renewal in the Church by
rescuing the historical and literal meanings of the scriptural texts from
the technical and allegorical accretions of medieval scholarship.
Throughout the sixteenth century linguists and grammarians painstak-
ingly collated the ancient manuscripts upon which the new breed of
scholar-printers based their critical editions. The humanists also estab-
lished trilingual colleges in order to train new generations of competent
biblical scholars. Philologists cleared away medieval additions to the
Latin language, while Greek specialists learned to distinguish the
Semitic idioms that underlay New Testament Greek from the Greek of
the secular classics, and Hebrew scholars strove to overcome their preju-
dices against Judaism to master this very foreign and difficult language.
Vernacular translations began to appear in unprecedented numbers,
from Luther’s German Bible to the English Geneva Bible of 1560. How-
ever, the hoped-for renewal in biblical studies was largely sidelined by
the dogmatic preoccupations of the Reformed and Tridentine
Churches.87 But the steady accumulation of linguistic and critical com-
petencies continued throughout the seventeenth century with little of
obviously revolutionary implication until the work of the French Orato-
rian priest, Richard Simon (1638–1712). Simon’s supremely competent
and detailed critical researches into the origin and authorship of the
Mosaic books threatened traditional Protestant assumptions concerning
the plain and simple authority of Scripture. Campbell’s latitudinarian
87 The preceding is largely based on Basil Hall, “Biblical Scholarship: Editions and
Commentaries,” in The Cambridge History of the Bible: [Volume 3] The West from the Reforma-
tion to the Present Day, ed. S.L. Greenslade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1963), 38–93.
predecessors (as well as many orthodox Catholics) labored to deny a

priori that Simon’s brilliant speculations about the compilation of the
Pentateuch from earlier sources could be correct, but they largely
overlooked the French priest’s potentially revolutionary methodology.88
Campbell was keenly aware of this long progress of textual scholar-
ship. In the tenth and eleventh dissertations of The Four Gospels, he pro-
vided a history and commentary of the various editions and translations
of the Bible since the sixteenth century. He shared with his predeces-
sors an implicit confidence that the major problems of biblical criti-
cism and translation had been solved, and that the work of three
centuries of steady linguistic and critical development was nearing its
completion. Campbell’s own translation was based on the Greek texts
of John Mills and the Dutch Remonstrant J.J. Wettstein; since both of
these included scholarly apparatus and variant readings, Campbell was
able to concentrate on the practical task of rendering the Gospels into
contemporary English without having to worry about the authority of
the Greek originals. Bishop Brian Walton’s weighty Biblia Sacra Poly-
glotta (1655–57), known as the “London Polyglot”, was an additional
source that made accessible a century of critical developments and gave
English scholars a sense of confidence that they possessed an authentic
and reliable version of the Word of God.89 Campbell was also familiar
with the leading edge of contemporary biblical scholarship, including
the works of J.D. Michaelis and Alexander Geddes, who were generat-
ing novel mythical interpretations of the literary intentions of biblical
authors. He knew and even applauded (with certain reservations) the
critical work of Richard Simon, returning to it again and again in the
“Preliminary Dissertations” as an example of the beneficial effects of
free enquiry, without ever viewing it as a threat to his Protestant belief
in the fundamental authority and reliability of Scripture.90 Though he
knew that no single translation was or could be perfect, Campbell nev-
ertheless shared with three centuries of critical scholars a firm belief
that free enquiry, public debate, and critical methodology were to-
gether capable of solving all important questions concerning the inten-
tions and reliability of the scriptural authors. He was confident that just
88 See Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985), chapter 5.
89 Reedy, The Bible and Reason, 8.
90 fg, 1:121. Campbell’s extensive comments on Simon can be found in fg, disserta-
tions iii and xi, part i, and leh, 1:30–3. He thought that Simon was extremely sensible
when not blinded by confessional attachment, and recommended him to his students.
as the Reformation had sprung inevitably from the revival of learning,

so too would the continued refinement of biblical criticism complete
the work of the Reformation.
Campbell believed that his two major objectives – popular utility and
critical rigour – were compatible and even complementary. His desire to
unite these two enlightened ends into a single work was exceptionally
optimistic, and suggests that The Four Gospels, more than any other work,
reflected his lifelong ambition to unite the ideals of the Enlightenment
with the purposes of Christianity. But this marriage of popular transla-
tion and scholarly criticism (in two massive volumes) did not produce
the hoped-for offspring. Campbell’s scholarly audience appreciated his
critical apparatus much more than his translation, while his popular au-
dience embraced the translation only when it was divorced from the
massive scholarship that had created and supported it. His pedagogical
ambition to make a work of enlightened scholarship available to ordi-
nary Christians was hardly realized.
Campbell’s faith in the ability of critical scholarship to vindicate
cherished beliefs was not uncommon in eighteenth-century Scotland.
Campbell’s friend, the moderate minister Hugh Blair, had similarly
championed the authenticity of the “rediscovered” Ossianic poems,
which painted a heroic image of Scotland’s past while conveniently
vindicating the projections of Scottish conjectural historians. The
Scottish public embraced the epic poems, considering them to be,
like the Bible, a national treasure.91 Later critics, who were able to
show that these poems had been largely fabricated by their “discov-
erer” James Macpherson, wondered why Ossian’s scholarly supporters
failed to suspect the poems’ too-convenient likeness with their own vi-
sion of the past. In Blair’s mind, the historical integrity of Ossian, like
Campbell’s Jesus, depended upon the literal veracity of supposedly
ancient texts, and on the assumption that literary criticism would vin-
dicate common-sense interpretations of ancient motives. The same
theory of universal human nature that allowed Scottish philosophical
historians to confidently organize and judge the past likewise allowed
Christian moderates such as Blair and Campbell to judge the reliabil-
ity and intentions of ancient texts and authors. Earlier in the century,
ancients and moderns had fought the “Battle of the Books” over the
91 James Macpherson’s “Ossianic” Fingal (1762) and Temora (1763) were hailed at the
time as authentic ancient Scottish epics on a level with the Homeric epics. But not only
Scots were captivated by the forgery; see, for example, Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther.
legitimacy of new methods of textual criticism, which sometimes chal-

lenged the canon of classical authors. Like the Scots, William Temple
had been confident of his ability to judge the authenticity of classical
works by his general experience of human affairs.92 But by the second
half of the eighteenth century, classical texts had irrevocably become
the objects of philological analysis and even literary dissection. Could
the moderates imagine the same process overwhelming biblical stud-
ies? Campbell certainly believed that the critical and historical prob-
lems affecting ancient secular texts also applied to ancient Christian
documents. His confidence, however, that the grammatical and criti-
cal arts had been largely perfected and that critical analysis would
only augment the authority of Scripture, shows the degree to which
his conception of biblical criticism differs from our own. Literary crit-
icism was in fact still a young discipline. Eighteenth-century scholars
did not yet have the quantitative body of comparative manuscripts
that would allow later generations of scholars to fundamentally rein-
terpret ancient literary intentions and to challenge popular concep-
tions of the meaning and uses of ancient texts. The invention of
higher criticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
was to a significant degree responsible for the decline of Campbell’s
posthumous reputation.
the road to higher criticism?
Campbell belonged to a critical tradition firmly embedded in the early

modern period. But his own textual work, coming at the very end of the
Enlightenment, has been eclipsed by the nineteenth-century revolution
in critical studies that has come to be known as higher criticism. Al-
though higher criticism had its roots in the Enlightenment, it belonged
to a post-Enlightenment world. It is clearly unfair to judge Campbell’s
work by scholarly developments since his time. Nevertheless, a compari-
son of his biblical criticism with that of the following age highlights the
magnitude of post-Enlightenment changes in scholarly assumptions and
values, and as such merits historical attention. Enlightenment scholars
were not less learned or able than later scholars, but they did lack many
of the texts used by later critics. More importantly, however, Enlighten-
92 Joseph M. Levine, Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 163.
ment scholars made certain assumptions concerning human psychology

and motivation that prevented them from drawing conclusions that
modern minds have taken as natural and obvious.
Textual or lower criticism is concerned with the recovery, verification,
and establishment of reliable texts. It attempts to resolve differences be-
tween manuscripts in order to determine the best possible version of a
text. Literary or higher criticism is concerned with the authorship, style,
origins, structure, and literary history of a particular text. It employs a his-
torical and empirical methodology to uncover the human origins and
meaning of a text, without concern for its exegetical application. Thus
lower criticism tries to establish what the Gospel texts actually said about
Jesus, while higher criticism seeks to uncover what the Gospel writers
meant by these claims, and, possibly, what these claims tell us about the
historical Jesus. Techniques of literary criticism had been applied to classi-
cal literature since the late seventeenth century, most successfully in the
work of Richard Bentley. By the eighteenth century, classicists had begun
to employ “mythical” interpretations to explain the literary intentions of
their ancient secular authors. These critics considered ancient myths to
be not deliberate fictions but rather poetical and philosophical explana-
tions of semi-historical events. Campbell’s teacher Thomas Blackwell
claimed that ancient mythologies were neither literal relations of fact nor
devoid of religious meaning, but were rather the natural first expressions
of philosophy and religion.93 It was perhaps inevitable that scholars would
come to apply such explanations first to the Hebrew and then to the early
Christian documents. In mid eighteenth-century France, the royal physi-
cian and Catholic scholar Jean Astruc helped to lay the foundation of
modern higher criticism by highlighting stylistic variations in Genesis that
suggested this book was a combination of several distinct, older docu-
ments. In England, Bishop Robert Lowth made the rather novel proposal
that the Old Testament prophets were speaking to their own people
rather than to modern Christians.94 Campbell’s Roman Catholic friend
Alexander Geddes, who was also working on a new Scripture translation
with explanatory notes, compared the Hebrew historians of the Old Testa-
ment to Homer and Herodotus, and suggested mythical interpretations
93 Thomas Blackwell, Letters concerning Mythology (London: n.p., 1748), 10. Blackwell
seems to have implied that some of these mythical interpretations could be applied to
Scripture as well (286).
94 W. Neil, “The Criticism and Theological Use of the Bible, 1700–1950,” in The
Cambridge History of the Bible, 270–2.
of the Garden of Eden and Noah’s deluge. The creation stories were to be
taken not as literally true but as philosophical poems designed to pro-
mote faith.95 Like Richard Simon before him, Geddes succeeded only in
offending Protestant and Catholic orthodoxy alike. The German philoso-
pher J.G. Hamann went much further, describing the Bible as God’s po-
etry, where religious truth is found in the language itself rather than in
some universal truth merely represented by language.96
Campbell was fully aware of these early experiments in literary criti-
cism. But was he likewise inclined to a mythical interpretation of the
New Testament texts, comparable to Geddes’ and Lowth’s treatment of
the ancient Hebrew texts, or to D.F. Strauss’ revolutionary handling of
the Gospels less than half a century later? There is some evidence that
Campbell was able to conceive of Scripture as simply a collection of liter-
ary texts. He knew that his understanding of ancient documents was im-
proved by familiarity with the particular historical customs and contexts
in which they were written. He argued that, “it is of real consequence to
scriptural criticism, not to confound the language of the sacred penmen
with that of the writers of the fourth, or any subsequent century.”97 He
knew that the original authors had very distinctive styles that were usu-
ally masked in translation.98 His word-studies often demonstrate the
kind of critical thinking that would become common in the nineteenth
century, such as his disassociation of the word “devil” from “Satan,” or
his history of the development of the term “Christ.”99 It is also clear
from the sheer scale of The Four Gospels that his conception of translation
involved more than just language skills. Accurate translation requires a
historical appreciation of subtle changes in language and thought over
time. Furthermore, Campbell considered some comparative problems
between the Gospel texts. He noted that “the evangelists have been
thought, by many, so much to coincide in their narratives, as to give
scope for suspecting that some of those who wrote more lately copied
those who wrote before them. Though it must be owned that there is of-
ten a coincidence, both in matter and in expression, it will not be found
95 Reginald C. Fuller, Alexander Geddes 1737–1802: Pioneer of Biblical Criticism (Sheffield:

Almond Press, 1984), 6, 46, and 92.
96 Terence J. German, Hamann on Language and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 66 and 107. Hamann’s views of religious dogma as changeable and non-
objective clearly went against Common Sense notions of language and eternal truth.
97 fg, 1:364.
98 fg, 1:48–9.
99 fg, 1:152–68 and 143–51.
so great in the original, nor so frequent, as perhaps in all translations an-

cient and modern.”100 Higher critics of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries pursued this same question at greater length and with many
more sources, arriving at very different conclusions concerning the non-
literary origins of the received Gospel texts. This suggests that the differ-
ences between eighteenth-century critical scholarship and higher criti-
cism can be partially explained by the sheer bulk of comparative data
that has accumulated since the eighteenth century.101 Campbell was, at
the very least, beginning to ask the questions that would characterize the
work of the higher critics. In his divinity lectures, he noted the great vari-
ety of writings within the Bible, posed historical questions concerning
the origins of its books, and wondered about the many other biographi-
cal accounts of Christ that must have existed.102 In a preliminary disser-
tation entitled “Observations on the right Method of proceeding in the
critical Examination of the Books of the New Testament,” Campbell rec-
ommended careful consideration of the individual styles and back-
grounds of the various New Testament authors, the purpose and design
of each of the works, and the changing uses of literary devices such as
metaphors. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, who was generally critical of the
liberality with which Campbell taught raw divinity students, stated that,
“He directed them to read the Bible in the order in which the books
were written – only as a history of ancient facts and opinions – in order
to discover what it treated of, without giving themselves the trouble to
ascertain its truth or falsehood, or even its precise meaning.”103
Yet despite this critical open-mindedness, it is clear that Campbell was
not moving in the direction of nineteenth-century higher criticism.
100 fg, 1:422. It is evident that Campbell was able to look at the individual Gospels as
discrete texts: “It would be absurd to suppose, that the pronouns and relatives in one Gos-
pel refer to antecedents in another. Every one of the Gospels does, indeed, give additional
information; and, in various ways, serves to throw light upon the rest. But every Gospel must
be a consistent history by itself; otherwise an attempt at explanation would be in vain” (fg,
2:215). Nevertheless, he does not seem to have considered that each Gospel itself might be
a collection of distinct fragments.
101 Joseph M. Levine uses this argument (rather than a revolution in methodology) to
account for the increased competence with which nineteenth-century classical scholars
were able to solve problems that had plagued their eighteenth-century predecessors; See
Dr. Woodward’s Shield: History, Science, and Satire in Augustan England, paperback ed. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1977, 1991), 291–2.
102 leh, 1:23–8.
103 Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Alexander Allardyce, 2 vols (Edin-
burgh: William Blackwood, 1888), 1:486–7.
Though he occasionally treated scriptural texts as if they were like other

ancient texts, his continual use of terms such as “holy writ” and “divine
oracles” suggests clear limits to his willingness to do so. His biblical criti-
cism was applied less to the original writings of the “sacred penmen”
than to the ways in which men have subsequently treated or interpreted
the fixed body of Scripture.104 So far from viewing the Old Testament as
a product of Jewish history and culture, Campbell asserted that the very
incongruity between the “barbarous” ancient Hebrews and their won-
drous Scriptures is the best evidence that the latter could not have been
of mere human origin.105 Despite this low view of the ancient Hebrew
people, Campbell assumed that their writings constituted the only reli-
able history of ancient events, and that pagan histories can be sum-
marily dismissed.106 At no time did he consider applying a mythical
interpretation to the Gospel narratives, but always assumed that they
were literal relations of fact. He deduced, from the apparent simplicity
of the narratives, that the Gospel writers recorded only what they wit-
nessed and heard and never intruded with personal commentary,107 a
claim entirely at odds with the trends of modern biblical scholarship.
He assumed that ancient Christians were pure in their beliefs and unen-
cumbered by dogma, an assumption which today’s higher critics cannot
afford to make. Campbell declared that “the grand question, to adopt
the scripture idiom, is no other than this, Is the doctrine which Jesus
Christ preached, from heaven, or of men? That it is from heaven, is the
avowed belief of all his disciples; that it is of men, is on the contrary the
declared opinion of Jews and pagans.108 Campbell’s assumption that the
statements attributed to Jesus are faithful records of his actual words is
in keeping with his Common Sense views concerning the inherent be-
lievability of testimonial evidence. Moreover, he believed that he could
104 fg, 1:469.

105 dm, 263–6. He argued that in all other aspects of learning, the Hebrews were as
children, but that in their religious notions they were entirely mature. In all non-religious
matters, Campbell thought that the Pentateuch suited the style of an ancient barbarous
people.
106 leh, 1:2 and 18.
107 fg, 1:90 and 477. Despite a suggestion that the Gospel of John reflected the cur-
rents of opinion of the times in which it was written (aul ms M 190, p. 352), Campbell
claimed that the “artless simplicity” evident in this Gospel is the best evidence of its trust-
worthiness (fg, 2:409–10). Modern scholars, in contrast, tend to see John’s Gospel as the
one most influenced by doctrinal innovations in the early church.
108 lstpe, 89.
derive from the whole of Scripture a single, unified, and historically

accurate character-sketch of Jesus. The only remaining question for crit-
ics, then, was whether to accept or reject the entirety of the Gospels’
claims concerning the Messianic nature of Christ. Unlike modern crit-
ics, Campbell did not consider that the Gospels may be collections of
earlier fragments, some of which were more likely than others to be the
actual teachings of the historical Jesus. In other words, he assumed that
the Gospel accounts of Jesus must be all of one kind – literally true or an
utter fabrication.109
Campbell was either unwilling or unable to do what modern higher
critics believe is essential to their task, that is, give up or at least suspend
the assumptions that Scripture is fundamentally different from other
ancient writings and that it is necessarily of one piece, single and inviola-
ble. Higher critics have implicitly abandoned the notion that the various
texts which make up the Bible were the products of one mind working
for a single explicit end, and that these texts are therefore necessarily
free of internal contradiction.110 Higher critics have given up the idea
that the devotional and religious value of Scripture is directly depen-
dent upon its historical accuracy. Eighteenth-century empirical Chris-
tians could do no such thing. They believed that Scripture is a
uniformly-inspired body of writings, that its authority is founded on the
veracity of the miracles with which it was historically associated, and that
the only matter of controversy concerns the nature of the universal
truths it represents. Campbell implicitly assumed that failure to under-
stand Scripture is the fault of modern readers, and not the consequence
of ambiguities in the literary sources themselves. He was aware that the
Gospel stories may not have followed precise chronological order, but
he argued that this was no more than the effect of a memorial style of
109 Campbell was extremely critical of the non-canonical accounts of Jesus and the ear-
ly church, considering them to be easily-identifiable forgeries and calling them the “basest
frauds” (aul ms 652, pp. 98 and 100–1).
110 See fg, 2:408–9, for Campbell’s explanation of how the singularity of John’s ac-
count of the raising of Lazarus actually makes the story more believable than if other Gos-
pel writers had recorded it too. Modern critics tend to argue that the last twelve verses of
the Gospel of Mark were added by later Christians to bring that Gospel into line with later
stories of Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances. Campbell was aware that some manuscript
versions of Mark did not contain the last twelve verses, but argued that these verses were
authentic because he could think of no plausible reason why they would be added if they
were not there originally (fg, 2:237). Clearly, Campbell did not consider that the doctrines
of the early church could have evolved over time.
writing, and had no impact on the literal veracity of Gospel claims.111

Higher critics, in contrast, tend to view ancient documents as like the
peoples and cultures that created them – subject to change over time.
The Gospels represent not a single-minded declaration of doctrine but
the evolving needs, hopes, and beliefs of the early Christian community.
Consequently, higher critics recognize that there may not even be a sin-
gle “correct” version of a scriptural text. Eighteenth-century critics, on
the other hand, assumed that sufficient scholarly attention can deter-
mine the correct interpretation of any textual problem. As has been sug-
gested, they did not yet have the critical mass of comparative texts with
which to develop theories characteristic of higher criticism. But what
most effectively cut off eighteenth-century scholars from higher criti-
cism was the want of a psychology able to account for the non-rational
human needs that, even in the case of seemingly sophisticated early
Christians, produce “mythical” texts. The limits of Campbell’s biblical
criticism were the limits of the Enlightenment.
111 fg, 1:511. Although Campbell did have a relatively dynamic view of linguistic
change, he does not seem to have held a dynamic view of the mental constructs that lan-
guages represent. Truths remain eternal, even as languages change.
The Limits of Enlightenment
the enlightened man
In the eyes of Christian moderates, the Enlightenment was a powerful

ally of truth. Campbell employed an enlightened theory of evidence to
defeat Hume’s sceptical attacks on testimony concerning miracles. He
opened The Four Gospels with a thoroughly enlightened declaration of in-
tellectual independence: “I have always laid it down as a rule in my re-
searches, to divest myself as much as possible of an excessive deference
to the judgment of men.”1 He believed that the extreme claims of the
papacy were being checked not because his age was unusually honest
but because his age possessed more historical knowledge: “This is one
great victory which knowledge has already gained over the triple alli-
ance of ignorance, superstition and priestcraft.”2 Campbell’s hostility to
superstition was no less than that of any Enlightenment figure. Al-
though he criticized the irreligious tendencies of his day, he suggested
that even more enlightenment was needed to defeat irreligion and
libertinism.3
Campbell believed that the Enlightenment belonged to Christian
moderates like himself. But how representative was his thought of the
age? Does he deserve to be called an Enlightened man of letters, along
with such luminaries as Montesquieu, Voltaire, d’Alembert, Helvétius,
1 fg, 1:2.
3 cmg, 61. Campbell assumed that critical thinking can only unmask false religion; see
leh, 2:266.
Hume, and Gibbon?4 Or was he merely a traditional divine masquerad-

ing as a secular philosopher? Such questions demand that we consider
the fundamental values and concerns of the Enlightenment itself. I will
suggest that it is the breadth of Campbell’s interests, united by an ency-
clopedic theory of knowledge, that marks him as a man of the Enlight-
enment. This breadth of concern is apparent not only in his major areas
of specialization – epistemology, rhetoric, history and criticism – but in a
host of other areas as well.
Campbell and his moderate Christian associates held views of religion
that often seem little removed from those of the “pagan” Enlighten-
ment. Hume and Voltaire tended to portray the clergy as duplicitous,
self-interested power-seekers, whose ministrations constituted a conspir-
acy for control of the ignorant masses. In his essay “Of National Charac-
ters,” Hume attacked what he took to be the universal character of the
priest by contrasting it with the “candid, honest, and undesigning” char-
acter of the soldier.5 He suggested that clergymen typically feign more
piety than they possess, advance their own interests by promoting igno-
rance and superstition in their charges, and protect their priestly society
with persecution and revenge. It is hardly surprising that Scottish minis-
ters took offence at this characterization, though only as it applied to
the clergy of their own church. With regard to Roman Catholic priests,
the Scottish moderates were quite willing to uphold Hume’s strictures.
Campbell consistently portrayed the Roman Catholic hierarchy as the
product of a deliberate quest for power. “That the great enemy which
superstition has to overcome is knowledge,” said Campbell of the Roman
See, “was early perceived by those, who found their account in support-
ing her throne. Nor were they slack in taking measures for stifling this
dangerous foe.”6 Spiritual tyrannies always depend upon ignorance and
credulity. To this end, “Superstition, especially when formed into a poli-
tic system, like the Romish, is never deficient in expedients for conjur-
ing down that terror, and rendering it subservient to the invariable aim,
priestly dominion.”7 Campbell’s manuscript “Of implicit faith” accused
the Roman church of deliberately promoting ignorance in its adher-
ents. His “Defence” manuscript catalogued the criminal history of the
4 All of these figures were cited in Campbell’s religious writings, and almost always as
respectable authorities.
5 David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller, rev. ed. (India-
napolis: LibertyFund, 1985, 1987), 199.
6 leh, 2:239.
7 leh, 2:238.
The Limits of Enlightenment 161
Roman hierarchy. That the degeneration of the true Christian religion

happened over many ages and with unintended design does not seem to
have lessened Rome’s culpability in Campbell’s eyes. “Does any one
claim or exercise a dominion over the faith of others?” he asked. “That
man is a priest in the most odious sense the word bears.”8 “Priestcraft”
was alike repugnant to “common sense, morality, and all rational reli-
gion, natural and revealed.”9 William Robertson’s History of the Reign of
the Emperor Charles V likewise attributed uniformly base motives to the
clerics of the Roman faith. Enlightened unbelievers merely extended
these strictures to all clerics, whether pagan, Roman, or Reformed. Like
Voltaire and Hume, Protestant writers had difficulty believing that Ro-
man Catholic prelates could possess a genuine concern for the spiritual
welfare of their charges while they advanced the worldly policies of
Rome. The Enlightenment’s belief in a conspiracy of the priesthood
may have been comforting to eighteenth-century minds. It helped ac-
count for the almost inevitable corruption that enlightened moderates
could not overlook in their ideal institution, the Christian church. It
also helped to explain why so many in an age of enlightenment failed to
be convinced by the clear and rational evidences of true religion.
Despite the evils of false religion, Christian moderates assumed that re-
ligion itself was essential to the security and well-being of society, just as
Voltaire thought that belief in an avenging deity was necessary to prevent
his servants from cutting his throat.10 Campbell’s sermon, The Happy In-
fluence of Religion on Civil Society, hinted that false religion might be prefer-
able to no religion for the sake of social stability, though its stated
purpose was to deny the claims of libertines that religion is merely a po-
litical invention for the purpose of social control. This denial sits uneasily
with Campbell’s underlying belief in a conspiracy of the priesthood, but
it says much about his assumptions concerning human motivations. The
sermon seems to assume that religious adherence and civil obedience
are the consequences of prudent calculations concerning reward and
punishment. On the one hand, this parallels Campbell’s enlightened
belief that the mental processes driving human action are plain and
open to inspection. On the other hand, it implies that human nature is
naturally inclined to evil unless checked by clear penalties. This latter
8 st, 1:429.
10 Arthur M. Wilson, Diderot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 1972), 101. See
also James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Louisville: West-
minster John Knox Press, 1997), 121.
implication seems to conflict with the Common Sense view that human
beings have a natural “propensity to speak truth.”11 Yet Campbell
seemed genuinely concerned that society would crumble but for the sup-
port of convincing Christian evidences. This apparent inconsistency in
Campbell’s view of human nature will be addressed again as a religious
problem in the next chapter, but the underlying question of human
motivation is a matter of Enlightenment psychology which concerns
enlightened infidels and Christians alike. Here, the common eighteenth-
century belief in transparent psychological motives may be enough to ex-
plain the widespread theory of a priestly conspiracy, for only a clear and
powerful motive, such as personal aggrandizement, could account for
the deliberate actions of Roman Catholic prelates that ran counter to the
obvious evidences and obligations of natural religion.
Perhaps the Enlightenment’s uncertainty about human motivations
also helps to explain its pervasive demand for religious toleration. Locke
and the latitudinarian divines had agreed that toleration is the necessary
consequence of the extremely limited human capacity to attain certain
knowledge. Campbell’s unyielding demand for religious toleration was
likewise grounded in his epistemological theory. He claimed that “a man’s
right to his opinions may be truly said to be both natural and unalienable.
As they depend not on his will, it is not in his power to alter them. And no
law is obligatory which commands a man to lie. Religious toleration there-
fore may justly be considered as a natural right.”12 Campbell’s views on tol-
eration were little removed from Hume’s. According to Campbell, all men
believe that their opinions conform to nature and to reason. All men
think that their apprehension of truth is stronger than that of others. But
natural reason also shows us that we are not capable of uncovering the se-
cret springs of another person’s heart. We can judge only the actions, not
the opinions, of others.13 Wrong-thinking is at worst a misfortune, but
never a crime. Persecution does not destroy false beliefs but only morality,
for the object of all persecuting laws, “without exception, is to produce
and to reward the guilt of lying, cowardice, and hypocrisy, to destroy and
to punish the virtues of veracity, fortitude and integrity.”14 Thus Campbell
11 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, 2 vols, 7th ed. (Edin-
burgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872), 1:196. “Lying,” continued Reid, “… is doing vio-
lence to our nature.”
12 st, 2:144.
13 leh, 2:288–9; aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page.
14 aul ms 653, part ii, un-numbered page. Diderot uses virtually the same argument
in his article on “Intolerance” in the Encyclopédie.
could argue, against prevailing British opinion, that disabilities against

Irish Catholics were inhuman and devoid of moral authority. Campbell
went well beyond Locke by suggesting that freedom of religion should be
extended even to the adversaries of religion.15 Intolerance, however well-
meant for the security of society, breeds only party-spirit, thus destroying
the natural bonds of sympathy and producing a prejudice which “even the
divinest eloquence will not surmount.”16 And as a final incentive, Camp-
bell reminded his audience that toleration is the glory of the British
nation.17
That Campbell should appeal to the Glorious Revolution as the foun-
dation of religious tolerance is not surprising, since his politics, like the
politics of most British moderates, was committed to the spirit of com-
promise that followed the 1688 revolution. The re-establishment of
Presbyterian government in the Scottish church had happily combined
Protestant freedoms with a disciplined kirk, leaving behind the cove-
nanting spirit that had made the seventeenth-century Scottish church
intolerant and ungovernable. Since the moderates were deeply commit-
ted to the contemporary political and religious settlement, their politics,
though open to reform within the existing constitution, tended to resist
any trend or movement that threatened to upset the delicate constitu-
tional balance established in the wake of the Glorious Revolution.18
For Campbell, the leading threat to enlightened political stability was
the “wild schemes of our political visionaries,” chiefly those of the Amer-
ican republicans and their British supporters, such as the dissenting
minister and radical Whig Richard Price.19 In his sermon on The Duty of
Allegiance, Campbell considered the colonial rebellion to be a civil war
that threatened not only the colonies but also the British nation itself.
He cautioned his fellow Scots, many of whom he knew were sympathetic
to the Americans, that the rebels’ “loose and republican principles”20
15 dm, 284. Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration had stopped short of tolerating Roman
Catholics (enemies of the state) and atheists (enemies of natural religion).
16 pr, 97.
17 aul ms 649, p. 8.
18 William Robertson’s unpublished centenary sermon of 1788 praises the Glorious
Revolution for establishing political liberties and religious rights, setting Britain apart from
all other nations; see nls ms 3979, fols 11–27. See also Richard B. Sher, Church and Uni-
versity in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 327.
19 st, 2:124. Campbell identifies Dr. Price as one of his targets in his letter to Burke of
12 June 1779; sca WWM Bk. 1/1172.
20 st, 2:123.
struck not only at the British Parliament but at the very foundation of
government itself, undermining the basic principles of authority and
obedience. The “ringleaders” in the American Congress21 had confused
republicanism with liberty, and so mistook their own groundless rebel-
lion for a just resistance to despotic government. Campbell did not
mean to advocate a slavish obedience to established government, but
rather a principled obedience based on the realization that the “igno-
rant and credulous” multitude was as capable of tyranny as powerful
men.22 He argued that there could be no such thing as perfect freedom
in a civil society. The only true freedom was freedom within the law,
which demanded the sacrifice of some personal liberty for protection
and security. Campbell had little sympathy for Locke’s political philoso-
phy, calling the original compact “one of the hackneyed topics of writers
on politics.”23 Like Hume, Campbell believed that government is really
founded on opinion.24 Since right is established not in abstract princi-
ple but in immemorial custom, the Americans could not justly claim the
right to be taxed only by their direct representatives, because few British
citizens in England and Scotland enjoyed that privilege.25 Campbell was
in favour of allowing the colonies some seats in the House of Commons
and of taxing Britons at a proportionately higher rate than Americans.26
But the colonists’ refusal to consider any of these solutions only
confirmed their pride and ungovernableness.
Campbell’s political views were certainly hostile to republicanism and
indeed to any fundamental shift in the political balance established
after the Glorious Revolution. But few eighteenth-century minds saw
any necessary connection between love of liberty and republicanism.27
Most enlightened thinkers seemed content to leave republicanism
where they had found it, in the classical texts of their youth. Campbell
was certainly with the majority of his countrymen in opposing American
innovations in the ancient constitution. Though his unspoken fears con-
21 st, 2:206.
22 st, 2:180.
23 st, 2:153.
24 leh, 2:234.
25 st, 2:208–9.
26 st, 2:211.
27 Hume, for example, rejected republican arguments even as he supported American
independence; see Donald W. Livingston, “Hume, English Barbarism and American Inde-
pendence,” in Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment, ed. Richard B. Sher and
Jeffrey R. Smitten (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 133–47.
cerning republican anarchy did not come to pass in America, they cer-
tainly seemed to be realized in the France of the 1790s, as Campbell
lived out his last days. He was also undoubtedly justified in criticizing
American slave-holding, as well as the revolutionary leaders’ refusal to
grant women the same freedoms that they had demanded for them-
selves. By the Americans’ own principles, argued Campbell, women
would have to be considered slaves if not represented in the American
legislative system.28 Like the majority of his contemporaries, Campbell
also believed that his conservative political principles were consistent
with Scripture, which commanded men to fear “the LORD and the
king: and meddle not with them that are given to change.”29 The Gospel
does not inhibit regular and constitutional change, he contended, but it
does forbid us to remove “the ancient landmarks of the constitution.”30
The addition of such scriptural imperatives in support of the British
constitution would hardly have detracted from their enlightened
authority in the eyes of most of Campbell’s countrymen.31
Campbell’s guarded and typically enlightened pessimism concerning
man’s ability to manage his political affairs by abstract principle alone
was balanced by his enlightened optimism concerning man’s ability to
uncover nature. The study of nature was the duty and the joy of enlight-
ened men, whether Christian or not, and most were motivated by a gen-
uine desire to uncover the general providence of the Creator,
particularly through the study of natural history.32 In their investigation
of the book of creation, the practitioners of Enlightenment were all the
children of Francis Bacon, who was the guiding spirit of the Royal Soci-
ety and of the many scientific societies to follow. Bacon’s system of
knowledge played no small part in shaping the greatest of Enlighten-
ment accomplishments – Diderot’s Encyclopedia – as is evidenced by
28 st, 2:177n.
29 This is Proverbs 24:21, the proof-text of Campbell’s Duty of Allegiance sermon.
30 st, 2:134 and 204.
31 Cf. J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), chapters 4 and 9.
32 See Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1985), 115–17. E.C. Spary explains the eighteenth-century mania for classify-
ing nature as a mark of personal enlightenment: “One made the transition from natural
(the brute) to social (member of polite society) by recapitulating the Adamic process of
generating order from an initial perceptual chaos” (“The ‘Nature’ of Enlightenment,” in
The Sciences in Enlightened Europe, ed. William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999], 295). This explanation nicely combines
enlightened motives and Christian motives for the study of nature.
d’Alembert’s laudatory notice of the English philosopher in the “Pre-

liminary Discourse.” Campbell, like Reid, Hume, and most eighteenth-
century Scots, was also profoundly indebted to Bacon; Campbell de-
scribed him as “perhaps the most comprehensive genius in philosophy
that has appeared in modern times.”33 The Latin epigraph that appears
on the title-page of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, taken from Bacon’s De
Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), may be translated as “Let men
be assured that the solid and true arts of invention grow and increase as
inventions themselves increase.”34
In this context, Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric was a work of “inven-
tion” or discovery – that is, an attempt to realize the Baconian dictum
that “All art is founded in science, and the science is of little value which
does not serve as a foundation to some beneficial art.”35 “Valuable
knowledge,” continued Campbell, “always leads to some practical skill,
and is perfected in it.”36 This search for useful knowledge applied to
phenomena not only of the external world but also of the internal
world, for “it is also in the human mind that we must investigate the
source of some of the useful arts.”37 By the proper application of these
arts, which are founded on experiment and observation, we “rise from
the individual to the species, from the species to the genus, and thence
to the most extensive orders and classes,” and finally arrive at general
truths.38 This is the “New Country,” the study of rhetoric turned into a
science of man, where the investigator may survey the most extensive
principles of human knowledge after carefully gathering his observa-
tions of human behavior, classifying them, and thereby establishing the
rules of rhetorical efficacy.39 Thus even Campbell’s most original contri-
bution to rhetorical theory, his attempt to align the classical ends of
speaking with the recently-explored faculties of the mind, derived from
Bacon’s attempt to survey the whole structure and purpose of knowl-
edge. The introduction to The Philosophy of Rhetoric, which includes all of
these Baconian phrases as well as a rather Baconian overview of the en-
tirety of knowledge, was probably written in the mid 1770s, just prior to
33 pr, lxxiii.
34 Quoted in Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 596, which uses Spedding’s edition of Bacon’s works.
35 pr, lxix.
36 pr, lxix.
37 pr, lxxiii.
38 pr, lxx.
39 pr, lxxiv-lxxv.
publication. It reflects not only the Baconian ideal of the practical ends
of knowledge, which suffused the entire Enlightenment, but also the
ideal of cooperative scientific investigation that had given rise to the
Wise Club.
The influence of “Lord Bacon”40 is evident throughout the produc-
tions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, beginning with the found-
ing rule that the subjects of the Society’s researches would include
“Every Principle of Science which may be deduced by Just and Lawfull
Induction from the Phænomena either of the human Mind or of the
material World.” This method would encompass observations and ex-
periments, as well as the examination of “False Schemes of Philosophy,”
and would uphold “The Subserviency of Philosophy to Arts.”41 Bacon’s
influence is also apparent in the taxonomic nature of the society’s inter-
ests, particularly in David Skene’s defence of classificatory schemes as
necessary for bringing the profusion of nature within manageable
bounds. Skene upheld the legitimacy and usefulness of Linnaeus’ clas-
sificatory system against critics such as Buffon, and enlisted Campbell’s
help in gathering field samples for inclusion within the Linnaean sys-
tem. In 1765, Skene made a list of plants he had received from Camp-
bell which were gathered on Mount Morven, an 870 meter peak located
in the southwest corner of Aberdeenshire, not far from Grace Farqu-
harson’s childhood home.42 In August 1770, Campbell was still doing
field-work for Skene around Mount Morven, describing in some techni-
cal detail what he considered to be new or rare plant specimens, and
taking notes on the geographical and mineralogical features of the
area.43 Skene’s premature death at the end of that year must have been
a severe blow to Campbell and to the Wise Club; Skene was the pre-
eminent naturalist among them, and his classificatory expertise was im-
mensely useful to the Aberdonians’ science of man. Skene believed that
systematic classification was applicable not only to the animal, vegeta-
ble, and mineral kingdoms, but also to the structure and faculties of the
human mind. The subjects of his discourses indicate that he considered
the study of the natural world and the study of the human mind to be
parts of the same natural history. Thus it is no accident that Campbell
40 This is Thomas Gordon’s phrase from his discourse “Of the Philosophy of Language
& Grammar” (aul ms 3107/3/4, p. 399), cited in The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society 1758–1773, ed. H. Lewis Ulman (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 48.
42 aul ms 482, p. 45.
43 Campbell to Skene; ncl THO 2, fols 53–4.
frequently employed horticultural and taxonomic analogies in The Phi-

losophy of Rhetoric.44 Nor were classificatory schemes regarded as merely
human constructions imposed upon nature; according to Thomas
Reid, the classes, genera, and species that we discover in the natural
world by means of our innate mental faculties reflect the real and pur-
poseful order of God’s benevolent creation.45 The division of knowl-
edge derived from Bacon was ultimately a representation of the unity of
knowledge.
Science and the application of scientific method to moral subjects
pervaded the work of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. This is evi-
dent not only in Reid’s report on the transit of Venus in 1761, and in
the society’s frequent discussion of such topics as optics, agriculture,
chemistry, and mathematics, but also in Campbell’s question, “How far
human laws can justly make alterations in what seems to be founded on
the principles of the law of nature?”46 This, together with Gerard’s ques-
tion, “Whether national characters depend upon physical or moral
causes, or whether they are influenced by both?”47 suggests that the
Wise Club was very much interested in the attempts of innovative think-
ers such as Montesquieu to apply scientific and classificatory schemes to
human society. Unfortunately we know too little about the Wise Club’s
debates on these questions, but it is nevertheless interesting that, in the
middle of the eighteenth century, the application of Bacon’s inductive
methodology to such moral topics as ethics, natural religion, social
structures, manners, population, language, justice, and education still
44 For example, see pr, lxix, 51 and 53, where Campbell uses botanical details to make
rhetorical points. Throughout The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell mixes scientific and lit-
erary analogies without embarrassment, suggesting that this may have been common in the
meetings of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.
45 This paragraph is indebted to Paul B. Wood, “Buffon’s Reception in Scotland: The
Aberdeen Connection,” Annals of Science 44 (1987): 169–90. See also Bernhard Fabian’s cat-
alogue of David Skene’s Wise Club papers in “David Skene and the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society,” The Bibliotheck 5 (1968): 81–99. On eighteenth-century classificatory schemes as re-
flections of general providence, see Hankins, Science and the Enlightenment, 115–17; James L.
Larson, Interpreting Nature: The Science of Living Form from Linnaeus to Kant (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 28–9; and Richard Drayton, “Knowledge and Empire,” in
The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume II: The Eighteenth Century, ed. P.J. Marshall
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 231–52, which wonderfully describes the long
eighteenth-century “tradition of missionary and vicarage naturalism” (234).
47 Ibid., 198.
had an air of novelty. These diverse topics of enlightened interest were

subject to the same spirit of scientific or critical inquiry, and all were
bound together within the same providential scheme of creation. In the
world of the Christian moderates, all knowledge was ultimately about
God, his creation, and his intentions for humankind. This is evident
even in the titles of the most popular and influential works of natural
history of the British Enlightenment, such as John Ray’s The Wisdom of
God Manifested in the Works of the Creation and William Derham’s Physico-
Theology, or a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God from His Works
of Creation. As a recent historian of the Aberdeen Enlightenment has
justly concluded, “scientific knowledge was presented within a natural
theological framework, and, while its practical applications were by no
means overlooked, science was chiefly valued as a resource for the
defence of religious orthodoxy.”48
The Enlightenment was perhaps the last age in which a man like
Campbell could competently participate in such a wide range of intel-
lectual activities and dare to survey the whole expanse of human knowl-
edge. But the Enlightenment’s very ability to collect, organize, and
classify information may have been the cause of its own demise. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, scholarly fields such as history, philol-
ogy, criticism, botany, and even philosophy and the social sciences had
become so specialized and so rich in comparative information that few
could hope to become masters of even one branch of knowledge.
Campbell’s passing marked the end of an age in which a polite scholar
could maintain a wide competence in the republic of letters and a poly-
mathic view of the whole range of human knowledge. The loss of this
breadth of inquiry and of the Baconian unity of knowledge49 heralded
the breakdown of the psychological premises upon which Campbell’s
world-view was constructed. The rise of new forms of psychological, bio-
logical, and historical explanation help to account for the precipitous
decline of Campbell’s reputation within fifty years of his death. As we
shall see, the transformation of Campbell’s posthumous reputation is
not only an interesting historical problem in itself, but a microcosm of
the fate of the Enlightenment.
48 Paul B. Wood, “Science and the Aberdeen Enlightenment,” in Philosophy and Science
in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988), 49.
49 On the economy and unity of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment, see espe-
cially section viii of Roger L. Emerson’s important paper, “Science and the Origins and
Concerns of the Scottish Enlightenment,” History Of Science 26 (1988): 333–66.
the limits of the enlightened mind
Campbell’s conception of evidence and belief, and therefore his view of

all natural knowledge, was based on a cluster of assumptions concerning
human psychology. He generally assumed that the operations of the
mind are open to easy inspection. He assumed that human beings act ac-
cording to clear and obvious motives. He assumed that reliable testifiers
are always fully aware of the operations of their own minds. Finally, he as-
sumed that these aspects of human nature remain constant throughout
history, and that standards of evidence and belief are therefore universal
and unchanging. These assumptions dominated the British Enlighten-
ment’s empirical notion of defensible religious belief. The philosophy of
Common Sense was merely the most determined statement of the en-
lightened consensus concerning a universal human nature. Common
Sense philosophy claimed that all human minds are so constituted as to
perceive and judge evidence (such as testimony) in a uniform manner,
and that God is of such a nature that he places necessary and saving
truths within reach of human minds.
These standard Enlightenment assumptions concerning human psy-
chology and its application to religious evidences, already apparent in
Locke and in the work of the seventeenth-century latitudinarian divines,
are nowhere more clearly and systematically expressed than in William
Paley’s View of the Evidences of Christianity (1794). Like the Common
Sense philosophers before him, Paley was motivated by Hume’s chal-
lenges to rational Christian belief. Paley openly assumed that the claims
of the first Christians must have been either deliberate forgeries or lit-
eral relations of historical fact. Since the early Christians demonstrably
suffered for their claims, and for no other apparent reason than their
belief in the literal truth of those claims, they must have been telling the
truth. Paley had no means of explaining why sane men and women
would suffer and die for the sake of religious claims that they did not be-
lieve in an absolutely literal and historical manner. He assumed that the
early Christians observed the miracles and weighed the claims of Jesus
in the manner of an eighteenth-century empirical philosopher, and
consequently arrived at morally certain conclusions.
Campbell likewise assumed that Christianity must be either “a divine
communication to mankind, or a mere human figment.”50 He thought
it impossible that the first Christians could have sanely preached the
50 lstpe, 105.
Gospel story unless it was a historical relation of facts that they them-
selves had witnessed.51 Why, he wondered in a sermon preached be-
fore a Scottish missionary society, would these daring witnesses risk
their lives for something they did not believe to be literally true?52 He
argued that the writers of the Gospels were clearly too calm to be fa-
natics or imposters, and that their literary style made their testimony
prima facie believable.53 History demonstrates that the Apostles were
virtuous and trustworthy men. Moreover, any explanation of the Chris-
tian claims as a conspiracy presents insurmountable difficulties,
whereas “the Christian’s hypothesis, that they spoke the truth, and
were under the influence of the divine Spirit, removes at once all diffi-
culties, and in my judgment, (for I have long and often revolved the
subject), is the only hypothesis which ever will, or ever can remove
them.”54 Early Christians had no earthly motive for clinging to belief
in the face of persecution, “indeed no motive whatever but faith and a
good conscience. If they had these, their conduct was perfectly ratio-
nal; their counterpoise to all worldly considerations was more than
sufficient. Whereas, if they were liars in the profession which they
made, and had not the internal supports of faith and the testimony of
conscience, I will take the liberty to say that their conduct was, on all
principles of persuasion, utterly inexplicable.”55 Furthermore, we can
trust the historical veracity of the Gospel-writers because they were in
the best position to know the truth of what they related, and because
they had “no conceivable temptation to misrepresent.”56 Campbell
here followed his own Common Sense maxim that we are obliged to
believe testimony unless we have a compelling reason not to. The Ab-
erdonians generally ignored the possibility of inexplicable motives. Al-
exander Gerard assumed that a deceitful persona and an honest one
are equally transparent. He could thereby detect the deliberate lies of
Mahomet.57 Campbell likewise thought it plain that the Koran was the
51 st, 2:62.
52 st, 2:31–2.
53 dm, 110.
54 fg, 1:96–7.
56 fg, 2:241.
57 Alexander Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 1:365. So too
could he determine that Jesus’ methods were not the methods of an imposter, for Jesus was
obviously concerned with providing clear evidences of his claims; see Gerard, Dissertations
on Subjects Relating to the Genius and the Evidences of Christianity (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and
J. Bell, 1766), 77.
work of men whereas the Bible’s teachings were superior to human

sentiments.58 Beattie defended the New Testament writers with the
presumption that they either believed or disbelieved what they wrote,
and, therefore, that their accounts must be taken as literally true or as
gross forgeries. He then essayed to show that they were men of virtue
who could not possibly have disbelieved what they claimed, and that
their claims must therefore be accepted as true.59 Campbell’s Roman
Catholic opponent George Hay likewise assumed that we must believe
the testimony of others if they believe it themselves and relate it hon-
estly. He explicitly declared what Campbell implicitly believed, that to
doubt honestly-related testimony would undermine all history and all
religion, and bring about universal scepticism.60 Even Hume, the scep-
tic in question, generally assumed that human motives are open to
conscious inspection. Campbell suggested, quite rightly, that critics of
religion had difficulty explaining the faith of martyrs, for what possi-
ble motive could there be for defending a lie in the face of death?61 Ei-
ther they were correct in their beliefs or pitiably self-deceived.
Campbell agreed with his non-Christian opponents that, in either
case, their beliefs deserved toleration. But though he was determined
to tolerate adherents of different faiths, he felt no obligation to con-
cede to them any measure of truth whatsoever, for “what things in na-
ture are more contrary, than one religion is to another religion? They
are just as contrary as light and darkness, truth and error.”62 Thus the
best witnesses of religious truth are those who were initially hostile to a
new faith, but who thereafter converted upon witnessing miracles.63
Campbell believed he had found many such witnesses in the early
church. His deistical and sceptical opponents, who had no use for a su-
pernatural revelation based on miracles and prophecies, were obliged
to discredit such witnesses. Nevertheless, Campbell and his opponents
tended to agree that the Gospel must be either a truthful relation of
58 st, 1:152–7n.
59 James Beattie, Evidences of the Christian Religion; Briefly and Plainly Stated, new ed.
(Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1787), 53–75.
60 George Hay, The Scripture Doctrine of Miracles Displayed, ed. Bishop Strain, 2 vols
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1873), 2:10 and 90.
62 dm, 84.
63 dm, 86–7.
literal fact or “a villanous imposition on the world.”64 The eighteenth-

century war between Christian moderatism and deism was waged from
opposite poles of the same assumption.
Eighteenth-century writers tended to explain human motivation in an
“either this or that” manner. They were very confident of the universal-
ity of human nature and in their ability to uncover fundamental human
motivations. This helps to account for the ease with which Enlighten-
ment historians judged the past. Campbell assumed that different reli-
gious faiths are fundamentally opposed to one another, that what is true
in one necessarily demonstrates the falsity of the other. Thus, it was obvi-
ous to Campbell that the Old Testament related history while ancient
pagan texts retailed myths.65 Nineteenth- and twentieth-century propo-
nents of historicism have often charged their enlightened predecessors
with having little sympathy for the differentness of other times and cul-
tures, and with judging the past by the standards of their present. Al-
though these charges have sometimes been exaggerated to make the
eighteenth century appear fundamentally ahistorical, they correctly sug-
gest that enlightened historians believed that they could understand any
past or foreign culture if they could only uncover the universal princi-
ples of human nature that determine its cultural expressions. Enlight-
ened minds tended to assume that the diversity apparent in the moral
universe masks a hidden uniformity, just as the natural world appeared
chaotic until its universal laws were uncovered by the great Newton. The
Enlightenment’s notion of “truth” was universal, and so, therefore, were
its standards of judgment. And truth, for enlightened minds, was invari-
ably bound to the literal veracity of historical claims.
The Enlightenment’s notions of historical truth were undercut by
nineteenth-century philosophical developments in the German-speaking
parts of Europe. Whereas the eighteenth century tended to see both nat-
ural and moral evidences as subject to similar laws of probability, the
nineteenth century abandoned this attempt to apply quantitative or
mathematical notions of evidence to moral subjects.66 Butler’s and
64 dm, 118. Like the English deists, German critics such as Reimarus came to the con-
clusion that the Christian religion was a fraud perpetrated after Jesus’ death by his disci-
ples; see Henry E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1966), 48–9.
65 leh, 1:2.
66 Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1988), 369.
Paley’s empiricism, which focused on the weight and quantity of evi-

dence, was a casualty of the nineteenth-century rejection of moral prob-
abilism. The Enlightenment viewed human nature as constant,
impervious to the changes of history, and thus subject to general laws.
The nineteenth century tended to see human nature as part of history
and as inseparable from the specific cultures in which it manifested itself,
just as the emerging science of biology tended to see the natural order it-
self as subject to change over time.67 Herder rejected the Enlighten-
ment’s belief that one can understand another culture by discovering the
common ties of human nature. Nineteenth-century relativism and na-
tionalism displaced the enlightened values of universalism and cosmo-
politanism. The Hegelians rejected the Enlightenment’s “either this or
that” conception of competing religious or cultural claims with a more
flexible “both this and that” conception of cultural mores. New notions
of psychological explanation evolved to match these relativistic values.
Whereas Lockean psychology tended to consider only readily-observable
mental processes, the nineteenth century discovered the unconscious
and applied it to problems of human motivation, until Freud was em-
boldened to remove the last barriers separating formal religious beliefs
from individual neuroses.68 Just as the neurotic Viennese were among
the most civilized people in the world, so too were seemingly rational cul-
tures capable of inventing religious belief for reasons not apparent to the
empirical philosopher. All of these trends were hostile to Common Sense
conceptions of human nature, and all conspired to make Campbell’s
theory of testimony unworkable, especially as applied to foreign cultures.
Nineteenth-century innovations in human psychology were felt in
many areas of scholarship, particularly in the new field of higher criti-
cism. David Friedrich Strauss’s influential The Life Of Jesus Critically Exam-
ined (1835) was one of the first applications of Hegelian history and
myth to New Testament documents. Herder had argued that myths are
the ultimate expression of the spirit of a people. Strauss likewise ex-
plained the writings and doctrines of the early Christian church as mani-
festations of a myth-making process – that is, as products of the Christian
community’s unconscious hopes and beliefs. The Gospel of Jesus was his-
torically conditioned, developing through many generations of the
67 See James L. Larson, Interpreting Nature, chapter iv, for an account of the eighteenth-
century static view of nature and of species, in which Campbell’s botanical pursuits were
perfectly at home.
68 See, for example, Freud’s “Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices” (1907) and
Totem and Taboo (1913).
Church. Strauss did not employ this myth-making concept in a negative

manner, as eighteenth-century empirical Christians would have, but in-
stead viewed myths as indispensable components of all storytelling, his-
torical or otherwise. Too often, he said, myths “are confounded with
fables, premeditated fictions, and wilful falsehoods, instead of being rec-
ognised as the necessary vehicle of expression for the first efforts of the
human mind.”69 Strauss granted that it is difficult for modern minds to
conceive of a time when the imagination was so powerful that its cre-
ations were as literally believed as historical facts, but such was the differ-
entness of primitive thought.70 Strauss’s historical Jesus was ultimately an
ambiguous figure – neither the literal Son of God nor an impostor. The
significance of Jesus, however, is found in the “universal idea” that his life
represents. Strauss firmly separated philosophical and religious truth
from historical fact. The dogmatic (or rather dialectical) significance of
Jesus’ life remains unaffected by the mythical nature of the Gospel ac-
counts.71 In fact, the eternal truths of the Gospels can only be discovered
and preserved if they are rigidly excised from the mass of absurd and
contradictory historical claims that surround them.72
Campbell would have found Strauss’s account of the Gospels incon-
ceivable. He could not have imagined a Christianity divorced from its lit-
eral and historical evidences, and removed from objective proofs such
as historically-verifiable miracles. Nor could he conceive the religious
value of the Gospel texts apart from their literal and factual claims.
Nevertheless, Strauss’s kind of thinking has permeated modern inter-
pretations of Scripture. William Robertson Smith, a late nineteenth-
century Aberdonian biblical critic, shocked the Scottish religious
community by introducing the findings of German higher criticism to
English-speaking audiences. Like Strauss and Kierkegaard, Smith sepa-
rated his personal faith from the consequences of biblical criticism. By
the end of the nineteenth century, most British scholars had done the
same, so that virtually all the assumptions underlying Campbell’s great
69 Strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. George Eliot
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 52.
70 Strauss, Life of Jesus, 83.
71 Strauss, Life of Jesus, lii.
72 John Edward Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805–1841
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 165–75, and 255–87. Toews emphasizes
that for Strauss, historical fact could never be sufficient to support a saving religion (262).
Only through the “Hegelian rehabilitation” of Christianity, by means of a “negative
moment” of uninhibited criticism, could its eternal philosophical truths be recovered (258).
work, The Four Gospels, were quietly discarded. At the end of the eigh-
teenth century virtually all Christian denominations assumed that the
Bible contained timeless propositions directly inspired by the Holy
Spirit, that all parts of the Bible were equally inspired and therefore
equally relevant, and that the Bible spoke directly to modern Christians;
by the end of the nineteenth century only a few sects that were unaware
of developments in the historical understanding of the origins of Scrip-
ture could facilely accept these notions.73 Campbell’s lifetime of biblical
scholarship was rendered obsolete. A recent historian has plausibly sug-
gested that the nineteenth-century surrender of the notions of scrip-
tural infallibility and of the objective verifiability of Christian evidences
was nothing short of a major paradigm shift in Christian thought.74
Nineteenth-century developments in historiography paralleled these
changes in psychology and biblical criticism. By eighteenth-century stan-
dards, Campbell had a good sense of historical change. “It happens in a
tract of ages,” he said, “through the gradual alterations which take place
in laws, manners, rites and customs, that words come, as it were, along
with these, by imperceptible degrees, to vary considerably from their prim-
itive signification.”75 Nevertheless, the Dissertation on Miracles assumed that
contemporaries of the early Church treated miracles and other religious
claims with a critical eye, in the same manner as eighteenth-century phi-
losophers.76 Nineteenth-century historicism demanded a more flexible ac-
count of historical evidence than that allowed by the enlightened static
view of history, demonstrating that even the most fundamental Christian
doctrines had been historically conditioned.77 Just as eighteenth-century
critical historiography had begun to expose the Whiggish myths support-
ing the contemporary British identity,78 so also did subsequent scholars at-
tack historical claims supporting cherished notions of the Christian past.
73 Alan Richardson, “The Rise of Modern Biblical Scholarship and Recent Discussion
of the Authority of the Bible,” in The Cambridge History of the Bible: [Volume 3] The West from
the Reformation to the Present Day, ed. S.L. Greenslade (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1963), 294–338.
74 Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defense of Infallibilism in
19th Century Britain (Lewiston and Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), 4 and 226.
75 fg, 1:216.
76 dm, 106.
77 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1989), 307.
78 See Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an
Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
This undermined the moderate Christian assumption that the essential

truths of Christianity, like the essential features of human nature, were
beyond the reach of temporal change.
The end of the Enlightenment corresponded to the collapse of this
uniform conception of history and of human nature in favour of a more
flexible and dynamic world view, but one which could not be grasped in
its entirety by a single human mind. Modern scholars must appreciate
the premises that both shaped and limited Campbell’s thought, and rec-
ognize that if Campbell did not do higher criticism it was only because it
was not for him a conceptual possibility. Like the seventeenth-century
Anglican divines, he had come to defend his religious beliefs with a prob-
abilist theory of evidence. Eighteenth-century minds, whether orthodox
or deist, assumed that the disproving of Christianity’s historical claims
must necessarily lead to disbelief in the Christian religion. Nineteenth-
and twentieth-century critics have silently abandoned this imperative.
Campbell’s “either this or that” conception of religious proof reveals not
so much the limits of his religious mind as the limits of his enlightened
mind. It was the Enlightenment that seemed unable to deal with the
complexities, irrationalities, and hidden motives of human behaviour.
We cannot hope to understand eighteenth-century thought, or the
thought of one of its more typical figures, without appreciating the psy-
chological distance that separates us. This distance helps to explain the
considerable disparity between Campbell’s eighteenth-century reputa-
tion and his modern one. His scholarship appears unimpressive to a
modern mind accustomed to scholarly standards that, while not necessar-
ily better than Campbell’s, are based on a wider range of comparative
sources as well as a very different conception of evidence and of human
motivation. Just as Victorian churchmen were forced to abandon Butler’s
probabilistic Analogy of Religion while retaining his epistemological ser-
mons, so we have forgotten the apologetic works that made Campbell fa-
mous in his time in favor of a secular rhetoric and epistemology that was
all but unread in the eighteenth century.
George Campbell’s conception of Christian apology was ultimately
dependent upon a unity of natural and religious knowledge that was
made unworkable by subsequent scholarly innovations. The nineteenth-
century abandonment of scriptural infallibility broke the connection be-
tween critical scholarship and religious faith. Faith was henceforth to be
a subjective and internal matter – as it was for William Robertson Smith
and Albert Schweitzer. But in Campbell’s world, the bridge from natural
knowledge to faith stood firm. We have reached the borders of the

realm of eighteenth-century natural enquiry, and though this realm has
yielded a great deal of knowledge concerning God and his intentions
for humanity, this knowledge is not in itself sufficient to show human
beings the way from this life to the next. The very findings of natural
enquiry point towards the realm of grace.
part iii
Revealed Knowledge:
The Religious Campbell
Campbell’s Theology
mystery and faith
Christianity, declared Campbell, cannot convince by rational argument

alone. “No arguments unaccompanied by the influences of the Holy
Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God.”1 The human mind is inca-
pable of discovering all the necessary principles of true religion solely by
its natural abilities. Natural religion is the basis but not the sum of the
Christian religion. Natural religion carries within itself the evidence of
its own insufficiency. It also indicates that the God of nature will provide
for his creatures’ needs with a particular revelation. This revelation, by
its very nature, must contain information that cannot be anticipated or
grasped by limited human understanding. It must, in other words,
contain mysteries.
Natural knowledge gives way to revealed knowledge at the point
where natural evidences prove that Christian claims are morally certain.
But natural evidences are only highly probable at best, and natural be-
lief must correspond to the strength of those evidences. Religious faith,
on the other hand, is not based upon degrees of probability. It must be
whole and complete, without reservation. Faith, said Locke, “which …
absolutely determines our Minds, and … perfectly excludes all wavering
… leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation.”2 Campbell
1 dm, 1.
2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 667. Locke argued that faith has its foundation in good rea-
son (687), but also that faith is ultimately different from reason; our assent to a proposition
of faith is based upon our reasoned assurance that it comes from God (689 and 698). On
Locke’s various uses of the concepts of faith, knowledge, and opinion, see the excellent
argued that true faith, as opposed to implicit or ignorant faith, is

founded upon knowledge, both of the propositions of Christian belief
and of their evidences.3 But the certainty of Christian faith, like the cer-
tainty of our belief in the metaphysical truths of common sense, must ul-
timately transcend the limits of the natural evidences upon which
Christian belief is rationally established, and it must embrace the whole
of Revelation.4 Unlike Hume, the Scottish moderates believed that al-
though the natural evidences of Christianity are not absolutely certain,
one must make an absolute commitment of faith, a faith that will be rec-
ognized and strengthened by God. The efficacy of Christian faith is itself
a mystery, a sure sign of the inner working of the Spirit of God.
Campbell gave little public attention to the mysteries of the Christian
faith. He found scant virtue in dwelling on those things that are by their
nature unknowable.5 Those who advertise their unusual acquaintance
with the mysteries of religion only demonstrate their ignorance.6 Camp-
bell believed, as did his deistical contemporaries, that too much atten-
tion to mystery promotes superstition and spiritual tyranny. The
absurdities found in some translations of Scripture, he said, have proved
“a fund of materials to the visionary, out of which his imagination
frames a thousand mysteries.”7 He thought it ridiculous to retain ob-
scure and ambiguous phrases in a translation, even though they had be-
come sanctified by tradition. He cautioned his divinity students not to
treat the Christian mysteries as sacred rituals. The term “mystery” origi-
nally signified only something “not yet discovered.”8 The relationship
between God’s omniscience and human free will has never been under-
stood by the rational mind, continued Campbell, and yet it is a mystery
central even to natural religion. He implicitly suggested that such a nec-
essay by Richard Ashcraft, “Faith and Knowledge in Locke’s Philosophy,” in John Locke: Prob-
lems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969),
194–223.
3 aul ms 649, pp. 22–3. Here Campbell was arguing against what he took to be the
Catholic view of faith – that one can be saved by a proxy faith based on the spiritual author-
ity of other men.
4 fg, 1:6.
5 In The Four Gospels, however, Campbell noted that the original scriptural meaning of
“mystery” was not “unknowable” but “unknown,” though many parts of Revelation still
surpass human comprehension (fg, 1:282 and 285).
6 st, 1:364.
7 fg, 1:336.
8 aul ms M 190, p. 246.
Campbell’s Theology 183
essary mystery must be accepted, but not ruminated upon with an atten-
tion unbecoming to the present state of human knowledge. Hugh Blair,
in a sermon entitled “On our Imperfect Knowledge of a Future State,”
argued that our current condition fits us for concentrating on this life,
rather than speculating on the next.9 Campbell and the moderates be-
lieved, as Calvinists always had, that it is not the business of Christians to
know the mind of God. It is their business only to believe and to obey
the clear dictates of Christian revelation.
Eighteenth-century Christian moderates accepted the necessity of
mystery without allowing it to dominate their public ministry. They
agreed that belief in Christianity entails belief in certain doctrines be-
yond the reach of natural knowledge. Yet they would also have agreed
with the late eighteenth-century moderate divine George Hill that faith
is primarily, though not exclusively, an exercise of the understanding.10
Revelation posed no overwhelming conceptual problem to these en-
lightened minds. Its authenticity and importance could be confirmed by
natural means. Campbell said, “the christian scheme … will be found, it
is hoped, exactly conformable to the purest dictates of the unprejudiced
mind.”11 Or, as Campbell’s colleague Alexander Gerard said, “Christian-
ity includes all the principles of natural religion, and superadds the rev-
elation of a stupendous dispensation of Providence, for the redemption
and reformation of an apostate world, by Jesus Christ.”12 James Beattie,
who taught natural religion to undergraduates, summed up the implica-
tions of this notion: “When we have, from the purity of its doctrine, and
the external evidence of miracles, prophecy, and human testimony, sat-
isfied ourselves of the truth of the Christian revelation, it becomes us to
believe even such parts of it as could never have been found out by
human reason.”13
How then is Christianity (including its mysteries) to be believed, how
are its essential doctrines to be discovered, and how are these doctrines
to be put into practice? These questions constituted the essence of
Campbell’s intellectual journey. We have seen, in the structure of his
9 Hugh Blair, Sermons, 4 vols, 19th ed. (London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1794),
1:85–114.
10 Donald P. McCallum, “George Hill, D.D.: Moderate or Evangelical Erastian?” (M.A.
thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1989), 46–8.
11 lstpe, 182.
12 Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 2:388.
13 Beattie, Elements of Moral Science, 2 vols, 3d ed. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and
John Fairbairn, 1817), 1:279.
lecturing scheme, that virtually all the parts of his scholarly and peda-
gogical work were connected, and even bound together for a common
end – which was the practical realization of the Christian religion.
Campbell taught Scotland’s future ministers that practical religion
ought to inform every aspect of the Christian’s earthly journey. “On the
most sublime of all sciences, theology and ethics,” said Campbell, “is built
the most important of all arts, the art of living.”14 Politeness and true reli-
gion seek the same end, for impiety “does not more clearly betray a total
want of religion, than a total want of good manners.”15 “I would have, in
the minister of religion,” said Campbell to his divinity students, “the po-
liteness of the gentleman grafted on the virtue of the Christian.”16 He
cautioned his charges that religion is a powerful tool, with the capacity
to bring out the worst as well as the best in human nature. “Remember,”
he said, “that the whole of our business and duty in life may be said to
consist in the right application of our talents, by the proper use of our
opportunities.”17 Utility and piety ought ideally to be joined in the life
of the enlightened Christian.
Campbell’s practical religion, like his practical philosophy, required a
theoretical base. But his formal religious doctrine, like his theoretical
philosophy, is not easy to uncover. He chose not to express this part of
his thought systematically. Systematization always conjured up the spec-
tre of “orthodoxy.” “Now to know the truths of religion,” he said, “which
you call orthodox, is the very end of my enquiries, and am I to begin
these enquiries on the presumption, that without any enquiry I know it
already?”18 Campbell thought the term “orthodoxy” was too often used
by priests as a weapon to intimidate the unthinking. Orthodoxy should
not be considered a starting principle, for then it would already hold
universal approbation and require no proof. Orthodoxy, if it meant any-
thing to Campbell, was not a standard but a goal – that is, the end of
much questioning and uncertainty. It was this Calvinistic spirit of en-
quiry and striving that Campbell wished to implant in the minds of his
students.
The nature of Campbell’s writings also makes it difficult to uncover
his doctrinal beliefs. The divinity lectures were purposefully kept free of
doctrine, so as to allow his students to discover scriptural doctrine for
14 pr, lxix.
15 lpc, 25.
16 lpc, 118–19.
17 lpc, 257.
18 lstpe, 113.
themselves. Campbell’s surviving sermons were occasional pieces,

meant to address specific issues or themes, and cannot be taken as typi-
cal of Campbell’s weekly sermons in either content or style. Only the
first of Campbell’s published sermons – The Character of a Minister – con-
tains an explicit creed. The typical sermons that Campbell delivered
each week from Aberdeen’s pulpits have not survived, and indeed may
never have been written out in full. He was famous in his time as an ex-
positor of Scripture, and he was recognized particularly for his ability to
explicate difficult passages in the Pauline epistles and the major pro-
phetic books of the Old Testament, as well as for his concern to draw
practical lessons from his textual commentary.19 We must keep in mind
that we have only a partial record of Campbell’s religious doctrine when
we compare his sermons to the somewhat more typical collections left
behind by such contemporaries as Alexander Gerard and Hugh Blair.
In re-creating Campbell’s doctrine, therefore, we are limited to the
topics that can be found in his writings. This means that some topics of
great interest to eighteenth-century Scots – the nature of Christ’s atone-
ment, for example – cannot be included simply because they do not fall
within the scope of Campbell’s surviving works. Other more practical
questions – such as the nature of Christ’s moral example – can be exam-
ined at length. Although the following review will allow us to better un-
derstand Campbell’s religious mind, it will not allow us to judge the
completeness or incompleteness of his doctrine. There is simply not
enough evidence to make a systematic theologian out of Campbell. But
we must begin somewhere. We may start, then, with the creed that
Campbell endorsed at the time of his ordination.
the westminster confession

and the scottish church
The official standard of Christian doctrine for ministers of the Church

of Scotland was the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647). While this
confession was the required test of orthodoxy, it could not, by its own
standards, be taken as the very word of God. Its central premise was that
Scripture alone constitutes God’s revelation to humanity, a claim sup-
ported by its frequent citations of the Bible. The Westminster Confes-
sion acknowledged the importance of human reason and betrayed a
19 See George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George
Campbell” (1800), in leh, 1:xii and xxxv; and The Aberdeen Magazine (June 1796): 49–50.
distinct distaste for mystery, yet recognized the necessity of mystery as a

consequence of the unsearchableness of God’s nature and the limits of
human reason. It allowed a limited place for natural theology, arguing
that the light of nature demonstrates the benevolence and omnipo-
tence of God, but quickly added that the light of nature also exposes
our sinful state. Only Revelation can exhibit the means of our salvation
and the proper manner of worshipping God. Theologically, the West-
minster Confession focused on the majesty and sovereignty of God. It ar-
gued the absolute determination of all things by God and the absolute
dependence of man on divine mercy. That man is also free and respon-
sible for his condition was an acknowledged mystery of the Christian
faith. The confession held that man, in contrast to God, is utterly de-
praved and powerless, and cannot be saved even by his own faith, for the
justifying faith of righteousness is itself given by God. Apart from divine
grace, the works of a degenerate man, no matter how admirable or use-
ful, are of no value and count only as additional sin. The confession ar-
gued that the body of chosen saints, known as the universal church, is
invisible and distinct from the visible church. It nevertheless maintained
the necessity of adhering to the discipline and sacraments of the
correctly-established visible church. Finally, the confession stressed the
endless striving of the Christian elect.20
The Westminster Confession and its attendant catechisms were
adopted as the official creed of the Church of Scotland upon the re-
establishment of the Presbyterian form of church government in 1690.
As we have seen, Campbell was early trained in the Westminster Shorter
Catechism, and was of course completely familiar with the Westminster
Confession itself. He was required to subscribe to the latter in order to
be ordained in the established church, though we know neither his
opinion of the creed nor if he held any mental reservations upon sub-
scribing. We also do not know if Campbell noticed that the Westminster
Confession gave relatively little emphasis to the doctrine of Christ or to
the mysteries of the Trinity. The moderates themselves would later be
criticized for their lack of attention to these same matters. Campbell
did refer to the Westminster Confession in his divinity course, though
not often, and we do not know if he reviewed it systematically with his
20 The Humble Advice of the Assembly of Divines (hereafter, Westminster Confession), in

The Creeds of Christendom, ed. Philip Schaff and David S. Schaff, 3 vols, 6th ed. (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1931), 3:598–673.
students. Considering both his dislike for systems and his emphasis on
individual discovery of Christian theology through self-directed Bible
study, it is probable that he did not.
Campbell was well aware that the recent history of his own church was
shaped by controversies concerning the degree of strictness with which
the official creed was to be imposed upon its ministers and teachers. In
the first half of the eighteenth century the term “heresy” was frequently
used, precisely because the church now had a clear standard of ortho-
doxy.21 Several professors of divinity were charged in the General As-
sembly with teaching heretical opinions to Scotland’s future ministers.
John Simson (1668–1740), professor of divinity at Glasgow, came be-
fore the Scottish church’s highest court on two separate occasions –
charged first with promoting Arminianism and later with teaching Ari-
anism. Whether or not Simson actually held these doctrines, he cer-
tainly taught his students natural theology and the art of critical
thinking. His implicit suggestion that Christian knowledge is capable of
improvement by the employment of human reason was anathema to the
creedalists of his time, but nevertheless, Simson paved the way for a
more enlightened standard of teaching in the next generation.22 The
orthodoxy of Archibald Campbell (1691–1756), a St Andrews professor
of divinity, was also seriously questioned in the General Assembly. His
The Apostles No Enthusiasts made the Apostles into rational believers of
Christ, which, according to his opponents, gave too much credit to cor-
rupted human faculties. The fact that Archibald Campbell was not con-
victed suggests either that secular politicians were conspiring to mitigate
the enthusiasms of strict creedalists, or that the forces of creedalism
were declining within the established church.23 We do not know George
Campbell’s opinion of these highly-publicized trials of Scotland’s divin-
ity teachers, but we may surmise that they encouraged him to guard his
own expressions in the divinity hall and to question the justness of rep-
resenting the spirit of Christianity in terms of strict adherence to
abstract propositions.
21 Gordon Donaldson, The Faith of the Scots (London: B.T. Batsford, 1990), 103.
22 The Simson case has finally been examined in scholarly detail by Anne Skoczylas,
Mr Simson’s Knotty Case: Divinity, Politics, and Due Process in Early Eighteenth-Century Scotland
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001).
23 James K. Cameron, “Theological Controversy: A Factor in the Origins of the Scottish
Enlightenment,” in The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. R.H. Campbell
and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), 128.
Increasingly, Scottish Presbyterians who were dissatisfied with the es-

tablished church’s commitment to creedal orthodoxy chose secession,
beginning with Ebenezer Erskine’s formation of the Associate Presby-
tery in 1733. Thereafter the number of seceding congregations grew
rapidly; in 1750, there were forty-five, and by the end of the century
there were more than three hundred,24 though many of these congrega-
tions had little interest in strict intellectual creedalism. The Evangelical
revivalism that arose in the 1730s on both sides of the Atlantic encour-
aged many Scots to seek a religion of the heart rather than of the head.
Evangelicals were unfriendly to both the exclusivity of the seceding
creedalists and the conservatism and rational empiricism of the rising
moderates; instead they supported popular revivals such as those at
Cambuslang in the 1740s. Some Evangelicals who remained within the
established church, such as John Erskine, became leaders of the Popu-
lar party, which opposed the Moderate party in the Scottish church
courts. William Robertson’s Moderates, who first gained influence in
the 1750s and had Campbell’s general support, thrived because of their
high degree of organization and the patronage they received from so-
cial elites. They clashed with the Popular party over such issues as lay pa-
tronage and the morality of stage plays (also an Enlightenment debate),
though these issues may have masked more fundamental differences in
Christian values. Campbell was highly sensitive to these developments
within the eighteenth-century Scottish church, but he was most con-
cerned with the rise of party spirit itself. Party attachment, the bane of
enlightened historians, was for Campbell a symptom of the disunity and
decline that inevitably infected and corrupted the Christian church in
all of its manifestations.
The controversies that both shaped the eighteenth-century Scottish
church and troubled the mind of George Campbell revolved around a
few characteristic issues: the necessity of strict adherence to established
creeds; the merits of doctrinal purity as opposed to ecclesiastical unity;
the relative value of a religion of the head as opposed to one of the
heart; and finally, the source of Christian knowledge itself, that is, the
degree to which the human understanding is capable of searching out
Christian truth. This last issue was the starting point of Campbell’s own
religious doctrine.
24 Richard B. Sher and Alexander Murdoch, “Patronage and Party in the Church of
Scotland, 1750–1800,” in Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408–1929, ed. Norman
Macdougall (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983), 201.
campbell’s theory of religious knowledge
“Knowledge,” said Campbell early in his career, “is truly the ground-work of
every moral and spiritual attainment.”25 Knowledge was a powerful in-
strument, susceptible to abuse by the wicked, though more likely to pro-
mote the good. Campbell’s theory of Christian knowledge was not far
removed from his secular epistemology. Like his seventeenth-century
Anglican predecessors, he developed a theory of knowledge equally
suited to religious and secular applications. He saw little discontinuity
between the two realms, since the law of nature, which was the law of
God, was inscribed on human hearts.26 It is therefore no surprise that
Campbell’s theory of religious knowledge was an extension of his natu-
ral epistemology.
Campbell’s religious epistemology, like its secular counterpart, de-
voted considerable attention to methodology. Revealed knowledge, like
natural knowledge, is gained by experience rather than by means of an
innate reasoning power. The light which informs our reason in spiritual
matters comes “from without, and consists chiefly in testimony, human
or divine.”27 Thus Campbell’s theory of evidence applies equally to re-
vealed religion, “as far as it is to be considered as a subject of historical
and critical inquiry, and so discoverable by natural means.”28 The most
important tool of the experimental theologian is a critical attitude, for
“when we have no principles of critical knowledge, we have no rule by
which to chuse.”29 Therefore Campbell taught his divinity students the
enlightened doctrine that they must think and judge for themselves.
Campbell was optimistic concerning the ability of critical methodol-
ogy to solve religious problems. Knowledge, he held, is the bane of spir-
itual despotism, and allows true virtue and piety to throw off the fetters
of harmful superstition. The sixteenth-century revival of learning had
25 cmg, 7.
26 aul MS 653, part II, un-numbered page. Lloyd F. Bitzer has, mistakenly I think,
found a substantial break between Campbell’s secular theory of knowledge and his reli-
gious epistemology, arguing that “the empiricism announced in the Rhetoric cannot be suc-
cessfully sustained; Campbell abandons his classical empiricism when he makes provision
for revealed truths”; PR, li. This is a very twentieth-century view. Campbell, like most of his
moderate contemporaries, believed that his faith in revelation was founded on and justified
by historical, testimonial, and critical evidences. He scorned the kind of radical division
between knowledge and faith that Bitzer seems to be implying.
27 fg, 1:4.
28 pr, 56.
29 lstpe, 121.
prepared men’s minds to receive a true reform of religion. But, he cau-

tioned, modern Christians must not depend on the immediate inspira-
tion of the Holy Spirit, for the age of miracles and of direct inspiration
has passed.30 God expects Christians to prosper by natural means. True
revelation can never contradict the findings of natural reason because
both come from the same divine source.31 Our intellectual powers tell
us, for example, that authentic revelation must be morally unassailable.
The neglect of our natural powers can bring on only “the terrors of su-
perstition, or the arrogance of fanaticism.”32 The accumulation of em-
pirical knowledge, therefore, is the best means of solving difficulties of
scriptural interpretation, for “in every question relating to fact, where
experience may be had, our safest recourse is to experience.”33 A minis-
ter’s task is to progress in his understanding of the Christian evidences,
and to communicate these evidences to his parishioners with the aid of
the rhetorical arts.
Campbell thus gave considerably more credit than did the Westmin-
ster Confession to man’s natural ability to know God, but this enlight-
ened empiricism did not lessen his commitment to the core doctrines
of Protestantism. In fact, his emphatic support of the authority of
Scripture was based on a rational appreciation of its singular divine
character. “Now,” said Campbell, “for supporting and enforcing the
suggestions of reason and conscience, I know no auxiliary so powerful
as the precepts of the gospel, which are the result of the most enlarged
views of human nature, and which breathe the most liberal benevo-
lence to the whole creation of God.”34 Although our natural reason
can successfully answer the “grand question … Is the doctrine which
Jesus Christ preached, from heaven, or of men?”35 it can say little
more about the particular intentions of God. So having recognized
with moral certainty the true heaven-born revelation, we must submit
ourselves to its teaching. Campbell instructed his divinity students that
30 leh, 2:236–7 and 265–6; lstpe, 263–6.

31 lstpe, 86–7. “God, in the economy of grace, as in the economy of nature, supplies
man with all the materials necessary for his support and well being, but at the same time
requires the exercise of those faculties with which he hath endowed him, for turning those
materials to the best account” (lstpe, 110).
32 st, 1:341–2; see also cmg, 11, leh, 1:101, fg, 1:7.
33 fg, 1:22.
34 aul MS 653, part III, un-numbered page. Campbell argued that Jesus’ teaching was
authoritative because he was able to convince his hearers that his teachings conformed to
nature, conscience, and common sense (fg, 1:89).
35 lstpe, 89.
while they may include arguments from nature and from history in
their sermons, they must argue primarily from Scripture.36
Scripture is clearly the primary source of Christian knowledge, but
the meaning of Scripture is not always unambiguous or impervious to
misunderstanding. Christians must approach Scripture in the proper
spirit. First, said Campbell, they must seek the simple meaning of a text
rather than an obscure or difficult one, for revealed truths must be ac-
cessible to all believers.37 The transparency of Christ’s character de-
mands a corresponding belief in the simplicity of his teaching. This
assumption allowed Campbell to think of the Christian Scriptures as a
unified body of doctrine with a simple, central message. Thus, “Scrip-
ture will ever be found its own best interpreter.”38 Natural reason, how-
ever, suggests that not every part of Scripture is of equal doctrinal
importance. In the hierarchy of Christian knowledge, Campbell gave
particular emphasis to the record of Christ’s exemplary life as found in
the Gospels. The Four Gospels was a thoroughly Protestant attempt to
provide ordinary Christians with an accurate and accessible translation
of the very heart of God’s revelation to humanity.
Campbell was not alone among moderates in his commitment to the
necessary simplicity and unity of Christian knowledge. He heartily rec-
ommended to his readers a sermon by his colleague Alexander Gerard
entitled “The Nature of Sound Doctrine,” which argued that true
scriptural doctrine, as opposed to the divisive complexity of human
systems, is known by its clarity and simplicity. Sound doctrine always
has a moral tendency, and is concerned with practical conduct rather
than with the subtleties of correct thinking. “Let us attend to the great
end of all Christian doctrine,” concluded Gerard, “namely, holiness of
heart and life, our purification from vice, and our improvement in vir-
tue.”39 Gerard and Campbell agreed that the term “heretic” properly
denotes one who prefers divisiveness to the simple truth of Gospel mo-
rality. Campbell worried that, even among Protestants, the sufficiency
of Scripture had been subverted by the monopolistic interpretive
claims of parties and factions.40 Thus his regard for Scripture explains
his antipathy to both ecclesiastical party conflict and the tyranny of
creeds.
36 lstpe, 481.
37 leh, 1:101.
38 fg, 1:358. See also lstpe, 57.
39 Gerard, Sermons, 2:163.
40 lstpe, 242.
Campbell’s theory of religious knowledge, in sum, united the values

of the Enlightenment with traditional Protestant orthodoxy. Scripture
provided the Christian with all the knowledge necessary for salvation,
but its authenticity was discovered by natural means. Christians had to
depend upon themselves to read and interpret Scripture, and had to be-
ware of putting too much faith in teachers. The liberty given by Christ to
all believers – a liberty too often usurped by priests – was the foundation
of enlightenment in this world and of salvation in the next. The moder-
ates tended to view the Reformation and the Enlightenment as aspects
of a single historical development. Like Robertson, Campbell suggested
that the modern age began “when the light of the reformation broke
forth, and people awoke out of that lethargy into which ignorance and
sacerdotal tyranny had lulled them, when they began to be sensible that
God had not more certainly given men eyes to see with, and ears to hear
with, and feet to walk with, than he had given them reason to assist in
the discovery of truth, and conscience to indicate the path of duty.”41
campbell’s doctrine
Campbell’s pedagogical strategy of teaching a method of religious en-

quiry rather than Christian doctrine itself may have been profitable to
his students, but it makes more difficult the modern historian’s task of
uncovering his personal doctrinal beliefs. Nevertheless, it is time to at-
tempt a reconstruction of what Campbell called, in his own brief creed,
“the genuine uncorrupted truths of christianity.”42
Campbell’s secular epistemology, as we have seen, was closely related
to his philosophy of human nature. Similarly, his religious epistemology
was tied to his doctrine of man. Traditional Calvinists had viewed hu-
man beings as utterly depraved and worthless, incapable of contributing
anything to their own redemption, and presumably unable to discover
saving truth for themselves. Campbell acknowledged the “universal dep-
ravation” into which man had fallen as a consequence of sin, and al-
lowed that man had “become obnoxious to perdition.”43 He seems to
have upheld a more or less traditional Calvinist conception of the four
stages of human corruption and salvation, claiming that the science of
religion teaches “the origin of man, his primitive dignity, the source of
41 aul MS 649, p. 43.

42 cmg, 16. This short creed is reprinted in appendix 2, pp. 267.
43 cmg, 26 and 16.
his degeneracy, the means of his recovery, the eternal happiness that
awaits the good, and the future misery of the impenitent.”44 He ac-
counted for the inevitable corruption of the church with the observa-
tion that “what God makes upright, man always corrupts by his
inventions.”45 Divisions within the church “are universally admitted to
be evils, though unavoidable in the present lapsed condition of human
nature.”46 These scattered excerpts suggest that Campbell believed in
the fallenness of human nature, but his writings contain little other
direct evidence on the matter.
Indirect evidence, however, suggests that Campbell did not subscribe
to the full measure of the Calvinist view of human depravity. His belief
in the progressive nature of religious knowledge would have been un-
tenable if man’s natural faculties had become entirely corrupted by the
fall. He held that “none of the appetites or affections belonging to hu-
man nature are evil in themselves.”47 If they were intrinsically evil, what
faith could the Aberdonians have placed in the natural instincts or com-
mon sense of humankind? Thomas Boston, whose Human Nature in its
Fourfold State (1720) represents a more traditional Scottish Calvinist
theology, asserted that the fall had corrupted our natural faculties to
the degree that we had become hostile to goodness itself, and had ac-
quired “a natural proneness to lies and falsehood.”48 Such a view seems
incompatible with the Common Sense account of human nature, which
was quite consistent with the general trends of the Enlightenment.49
Reid claimed that human beings are naturally inclined to tell the
truth.50 John Farquhar preached that despite our fallen condition, we
have a natural abhorrence of evil and an inborn sympathy for the
sufferings of others.51 The Aberdonians were thus ambiguous on the
44 pr, 105.
45 leh, 1:46.
46 leh, 1:48.
47 st, 1:321.
48 Select Works of the Late Rev. Thomas Boston, ed. Alexander S. Patterson (Edinburgh: A.
Fullarton, 1844), 34.
49 Ernst Cassirer argued, “The concept of original sin is the common opponent against
which all the different trends of the philosophy of the Enlightenment join forces”; see The
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James Pettegrove (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951), 141.
50 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton. 2 vols, 7th ed.
(Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872), 1:196.
51 John Farquhar, Sermons on Various Subjects, ed. George Campbell and Alexander
Gerard, 2 vols, 3d ed. (London: T. Cadell, 1778), 1:59.
effects of original sin. Campbell suggested that man is sufficiently cor-

rupted to make it impracticable for him to discover true religion by nat-
ural means.52 “The weakness and the corruption of our nature,” agreed
Gerard, “render the assistance of God absolutely necessary for our prac-
ticing holiness.”53 Nevertheless, the moderates’ focus on moral preach-
ing and reformation (as opposed to states of grace) suggests that
human beings have some capacity to understand good and to act for
their own betterment. Campbell and his fellows seem to have believed
that human nature falls somewhere between natural goodness and sin-
ful corruption. Human beings are not sufficiently fallen to lose all hope
of desiring and seeking the will of God and of improving themselves.
Yet they are not sufficiently pure to avoid the necessity of seeking God’s
revealed plan of salvation. It is difficult to say whether this ambiguity
represents the moderates’ sincere position or rather a convenient sop
to the surviving creedalists in their church. In any case, this crucial
equivocation paves the way for the more important parts of the moder-
ates’ theology. As Campbell said, concerning the purpose of man’s ex-
istence, “The light of nature, as well as revelation, points to this great
end, the perfecting of his nature by effecting a conformity to the will of
God, the highest felicity of which a man is susceptible.”54
The traditional Calvinistic focus on the absolute depravity of human
nature was meant to contradistinguish and highlight the absolute
power, goodness, and otherness of God. By the same measure, the eigh-
teenth-century moderates’ more positive reading of human nature al-
lowed them to mitigate the extreme Calvinistic emphasis on the
absoluteness of God’s will. The Christian moderates wished to attribute
to man an effective freedom of choice compatible with a benevolent di-
vine providence. After all, God had created the natural world for man’s
benefit and improvement. Campbell argued that the proper method of
discovering God’s nature is to reason from the effects evident in cre-
ation to their cause,55 a position which implicitly credited man with a
considerable power of discovering God’s nature for himself.
Campbell therefore sought a God who reveals himself. “God has not,
in respect of revealed, any more than in respect of natural religion, left
himself without a witness. Sufficient evidence has been and will be
52 cmg, 10.
54 leh, 2:372.
55 pr, 378.
always given.”56 Campbell’s brief creed described God in terms recog-

nizable to a natural philosopher: “there is one only GOD, a spirit, eternal
and omnipresent, infinitely powerful, wise and good, the maker and the ruler
of the world.”57 This description is conspicuously devoid of reference to
God’s vengefulness and absolute intolerance of sin, for only in a super-
stitious religion does “the divine being [appear] to the worshippers as a
capricious and tyrannical master to his wretched slaves.”58 Campbell as-
sumed that an authentic religion must resemble its author: “Whatever
therefore tends to exhibit our religion as amiable, is, in fact, an intrinsic
evidence of its truth.”59 Campbell’s God is a God of love and mercy, un-
derstanding of human failures, and desirous of man’s improvement by
both natural and spiritual means. The whole of nature declares that
God has not abandoned his creatures to misery, but has provided them
with the means and the evidences to desire and know God’s benevolent
plan for humanity. By removing some of the distance between God’s ab-
solute holiness and man’s absolute corruption, Campbell managed to
avoid the unanswerable question that had plagued Scottish Calvinists
for generations – the question of how an omnipotent, infallible, and just
God can permit sin without being responsible for it.
The gulf between the holiness of God and the fallenness of man had
traditionally been filled by the person of Jesus Christ, the saving media-
tor who partook fully of both the human and the divine natures. If the
moderates indeed held a mitigated view of the corruption of human na-
ture, it seems to follow that their christology would focus less on the
atoning nature of Christ’s sacrifice and more on the moral example of
Jesus’ life. This is certainly the sense of their extant sermons. But this
does not necessarily mean that they dismissed the traditional doctrine of
Christ. Christology is the touchstone of orthodoxy. The doctrine of the
Trinity, for example, is so closely tied to the doctrine of Christ, that to
clarify the one will largely clarify the other. But in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, the orthodox doctrines of Christ and of the Trin-
ity, which had formerly been agreed upon by Catholics and Protestants
alike, came under intense critical scrutiny from biblical scholars and
church historians. They increasingly found these doctrines to be depen-
dent not upon Scripture but upon historical developments in the early
56 st, 2:63.
57 cmg, 16.
58 st, 1:331.
59 st, 1:308.
church.60 Modern scholars have usually assumed that eighteenth-

century Scottish moderatism was part of this critical trend and have
therefore equated it with Socinianism – the belief that Christ was not
truly or fully divine.61 This has merely exacerbated the judgment of
nineteenth-century churchmen that the moderates ignored the saving
work of Christ and were therefore heterodox. By the standards of strict
creedalists, Campbell indeed failed to give sufficient public attention to
the nature of Christ and of his atonement. But before we judge Camp-
bell on what he did not say, we should be clear on what he did say.
Campbell’s view of Christ was constructed with care from textual and
historical evidences. Dissertation vii of The Four Gospels, for example,
considers the historical signification of the term “Messiah.” Campbell
argued that the ancient meaning of the term was quite different from
the modern meaning. In Jesus’ time, not even the few who believed that
he was the Messiah thought of him as more than human. The title
“lord” was meant only as a mark of respect to a superior. Nevertheless,
Campbell did not draw heterodox conclusions from this claim. “It was
plainly our Saviour’s intention to insinuate, that there was in this charac-
ter, as delineated by the Prophets and suggested by the royal Psalmist,
something superior to human, which they were not aware of. And
though he does not, in express words, give the solution, he leaves no
person who reflects at a loss to infer it.”62 Campbell argued that the con-
fusion over these terms is a good example of the tendency of modern
readers to impose their own meanings on ancient words, and he ac-
cused contemporary paraphrasers of making the Gospel Jesus into their
own party man.63 This helps to explain Campbell’s reluctance to discuss
the nature of Christ in his own writings. He thought that the true Christ
is to be found in the Gospels rather than in modern commentaries. The
Christ of the Gospels is the very opposite of a party man.
Nevertheless, there are enough scattered clues in Campbell’s writings
to suggest that his view of Christ was largely orthodox. In his “Defence”
manuscript, Campbell advocated the simple creed that had been
sity of Chicago Press, 1989), 88–101 and 193–4.
61 Socinianism actually had more than one meaning to its enemies, and could signify,
besides the denial of Christ’s divinity, a methodology that put too much emphasis on human
reason; see Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Reason (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985), 119–20.
62 fg, 1:237.
63 fg, 1:236–42; pr, 351.
enough for the early Christians: “I believe Jesus is the messiah the son of
God.”64 Like Locke, he added that “we must possess the love as well as
the belief of the truth, if we would be saved by it.”65 He asserted that
Christ is the Son of God, was born of a virgin, lived a perfect life, rose
from the dead, and purchased eternal happiness for those who repent
and obey the Gospel. These claims, in fact, take up the bulk of his for-
mal creed.66 He taught his divinity students that their study of scriptural
doctrine must include consideration of the Messiah’s “pre-existence and
divinity, his state of suffering including his incarnation, his character, his
ministry on earth, his death and burial, and … his succeeding state of
glory, including his resurrection, ascension, exaltation, and second
coming, together with the purposes which the several particulars were
intended to answer.”67 This suggests that Campbell guarded his doctri-
nal expressions merely to prevent his students from neglecting their
own researches. But he explicitly rejected Unitarianism (perhaps the
natural consequence of Socinianism) in a friendly letter to the Unitar-
ian sympathizer Alexander Christie.68 A more complete christology ap-
pears near the end of the “Defence” manuscript: “no created excellency
is worthy to be compared with that of the only begotten son of God, the
brightness of the father’s glory and the express image of his person; we
are certain that no human virtue, however splendid, will bear to be com-
pared with his in whom dwelt all the fulness of the godhead bodily, who
did no sin, and in whose mouth no guile was ever found; whose whole
life and death and doctrine are incontestable evidences of the insupera-
ble zeal whereby he was actuated for the advancement of the honour of
God and the felicity of men.”69 Though this passage would not satisfy a
strict creedalist, there is enough material here to uphold a more or less
traditional christology. Campbell declared that Christ was the Son of
God, in whom resided the completeness of God, that he was fully
human and perfect, and that he died for the salvation of men.
A similar christology can be found in the writings of other moderates,
though the references are infrequent. Alexander Gerard’s series of ser-
mons “The First Promise of the Redeemer,” describes the miraculous
conception of Christ and the role of Christ as the primary instrument of

65 st, 1:309.
66 cmg, 17.
67 lstpe, 158.
68 Campbell to Christie, 20 May 1790 (NLS MS 3703, fols 65v–70).
mankind’s salvation.70 John Farquhar saw Jesus not only as “the greatest
person that ever trod the earth,” but as a deity, the eternal Son of God.71
Hugh Blair’s sermons clearly proclaim the death and resurrection of
Christ for the sake of man’s salvation, and the present role of Christ as
the Great High Priest. Moreover, his equation of Christ with God is so
strongly implied as to be unmistakable, though the equality of Christ
with the Father is less clear.72 George Hill, the most systematic of the
eighteenth-century Scottish moderates, held a doctrine of Christ that
was unimpeachable by any orthodox standard.73
If the moderates’ view of Christ was largely orthodox, why did they
not preach it more frequently or distinctly in their surviving sermons? It
is probable that they viewed the atoning nature of Christ’s mission as a
mystery, a doctrine to be believed rather than understood. An overzeal-
ous desire to dwell on the details of such mysteries leads to enthusiasm
and to strife within the church, which are, in Campbell’s eyes, contrary
to the spirit of the Gospel. Within Campbell’s lifetime, such controver-
sies had rent the unity of the Church of Scotland. Like other moderates,
Campbell believed that Christians ought to concentrate on matters
within their grasp. Thus he chose to highlight the reforming power of
the exemplary moral life of Jesus rather than the inscrutable ontological
status of Christ. This he considered no abrogation of his ministerial
duty, for to divide the church over abstract questions (as invariably hap-
pens) was to violate the very core of Christ’s teaching. As George Skene
Keith wrote, “though satisfied, in his own mind, of the truth of the es-
sential doctrines of Christianity, he also disapproved of certain abstruse
questions concerning the trinity, the nature of Christ’s satisfaction, and
such like controversies.”74 Campbell did occasionally advertise his or-
thodoxy, as in a reference to the “Holy Ghost, the third of the sacred
Three in whose name we are by baptism initiated into the Christian
communion.”75 But his orthodoxy usually manifested itself in a subtler
form, particularly in his tendency to read into the nature of the divine
what he found characteristic in the life of Jesus. This may have been his
way of demonstrating the unity of Christ with the being of God.
70 Gerard, Sermons, 1:119 and 139.

71 Farquhar, Sermons on Various Subjects, 2:243, 194 and 198.
72 Blair, Sermons, 1:48–9, 116–7, 121, 197 and 153.
73 McCallum, “George Hill,” 40–4.
74 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” xliii–xliv.
75 st, 1:314. This may be his only substantial reference to the place of the Holy Spirit
within the Trinity.
Campbell’s doctrine of salvation corresponded to his christology,

which is to say that he made no firm commitment to either side of the
long-standing Scottish debate over the relative value of faith and works
in the economy of salvation. Sometimes Campbell seemed to uphold
the traditional Calvinist doctrine that man has been corrupted to such
a degree that he cannot even will to believe in saving grace. The doc-
trine of unmerited grace he called an “important evangelical truth.”76
In illustrating a particular preaching style, he used the doctrine of re-
demption by unmerited grace through the mediation of Christ and
the operation of the Spirit.77 But Campbell’s views sometimes took
him far afield of traditional Calvinism. The text for his sermon The
Happy Influence of Religion on Civil Society, Proverbs 14:34, reads, “Righ-
teousness exalteth a nation: but sin is a reproach to any people.”
Campbell interpreted “righteousness” in this passage to mean “true
and practical religion,”78 an interpretation which placed considerably
more emphasis on the moral practice of Christians than on the
unmerited grace of God.
Campbell’s doctrine of salvation can be better understood in relation
to one that it opposed. He attacked the elder Dodwell for taking the keys
of salvation from Christ and giving them exclusively to bishops. In con-
trast to this rather arbitrary means of salvation, Campbell preferred a
more traditional notion: “as we are repeatedly assured in the New Testa-
ment, the purpose, rule or law of the Almighty, when he should come at
last to judgment, was to render to every man according to his deeds.”79 Camp-
bell clearly subscribed to a doctrine of works, in defiance of Calvinist tra-
dition. He credited human beings with a considerable capacity for
achieving their own redemption. Moreover, he thought that people who
reform themselves inspire others to seek their own salvation.80 Gerard
similarly argued that “genuine religion is wholly practical: grace is but
the principle of virtue and good works. Your religion can be of no value,
I should rather say, you have no real religion, if it do not enter into life
with you, if it do not pervade and animate all your actions.”81 Gerard
76 lstpe, 453.
77 lstpe, 447–8.
78 st, 2:82.
79 aul ms 650, section ii. Campbell cited Revelation 22: 12, “And, behold, I come
quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be.”
81 Gerard, Sermons, 1:11. Gerard further suggested that the diligent practice of one’s
calling promotes one’s salvation (1:342).
went so far as to tell his students that, “every person must work out his
own salvation & depend only upon his own labours for it,” thus prefer-
ring to emphasize the process of regeneration over the various states of
grace.82
Although Campbell and the moderates preached the value of works,
even in regard to salvation, they did not believe that man has the capac-
ity to seek his own salvation apart from divine grace. But should the
moderates nevertheless be labelled Arminians? Did they reject Calvinist
predestination by claiming that Jesus died for all willing to receive him?
On the one hand, the Common Sense philosophers (especially Reid)
insisted that our will must be free in some effective sense, and that we
must be able to determine our own will. Though this was directed pri-
marily against Hume’s naturalistic kind of determinism, it may also
have been implicitly directed against the determinism inherent in ex-
treme Calvinism. On the other hand, the moderates seem to have up-
held a more traditional Scottish notion of providential determinism.
Reid taught his students that “the firm perswasion that nothing befalls
us but by the appointment or permission of our Father in Heaven, is the
truest Source of Consolation to a pious Mind.”83 Campbell’s own posi-
tion conforms neither to predestinarianism nor to Arminianism. He
said that “God does not force the wills of his creatures; but he makes
both their errors and their vices conduce to effect his wise and gracious
purposes.”84 Divine foreknowledge does not appear to be deterministic
in the Calvinist sense. Yet Campbell, like Locke and Diderot, based his
toleration argument on the premise that human beings cannot will
their own belief. Belief in abstract propositions is rather the irresistible
consequence of viewing the available evidence.85 It seems, therefore,
that Campbell believed there are natural limits to human free will,
quite apart from theological arguments. It appears that he was less com-
mitted to free will than were his Common Sense associates. Campbell
had reason to be circumspect on the matter, for he was clearly hostile to
the antinomian tendencies of his own church. He argued that no spiri-
tual attainment can free us from our natural duties and obligations,
since God is the author of nature as well as of revelation.86 Although
82 aul ms K 174, p. 7.
83 Thomas Reid, Practical Ethics, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990), 120.
84 fg, 1:440.
85 See aul ms 655.
86 aul ms 654, part IV, un-numbered page.
Campbell’s thought does closely resemble the thought of seventeenth-

century Dutch Remonstrants or Arminians,87 the label of “Arminian” is
neither helpful nor accurate by itself. It does not convey either the com-
plexity or the ambiguity of his position. Campbell certainly believed
that Christ’s atonement is indispensable to human salvation, and that
the grace of God is necessary to discover it. But he also claimed that
“the grace of the HOLY SPIRIT of God is tender’d to every one, who
sincerely and assiduously seeks it.”88 This ambiguity is further evident in
his assertion that neither reason nor faith is by itself sufficient for the
Christian.89 If pressed, Campbell would surely have argued that salva-
tion is the business of God, whereas the fulfillment of God’s natural and
revealed commands is the business of men, and their only legitimate
concern. Thus he held fast to the traditional Calvinist idea that this life
is one of endless striving. But he also believed that our striving need not
be blind to our fate. Ultimately, reason and grace are cooperative
partners in the work of salvation.
What then are men fated for? Campbell was much less willing than
previous generations to speculate on the nature of the next life. He sup-
ported the minimal view that “the wicked shall go into everlasting punish-
ment, and the righteous into life eternal.”90 But his treatment of the term
“hell”, both in The Four Gospels and in the lecture hall, discarded much
of the popular fire-and-brimstone understanding of the concept. The
New Testament writers, in their accounts of the state of the soul after
death, were inclined to use a range of common, contemporary meta-
phors which cannot be unambiguously rendered by a single modern,
theologically-weighted term such as “hell.”91 Campbell even seems to
have upset James Boswell’s supper by suggesting that annihilation would
not be such an undesirable fate.92
87 See Rosalie L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge Platonists and the
Dutch Arminians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Colie demonstrates both
the likeness and the direct ties between the Dutch Remonstrants (who rejected extreme
Calvinism) and the English Platonists as well as the latitudinarian divines.
88 cmg, 17.
89 fg, 1:3–4.
90 cmg, 17.
91 fg, Dissertation vi, part ii.
92 See Boswell’s brief journal entry for 7 June 1777; Boswell in Extremes 1776–1778, ed.
Charles McC. Weis and Frederick A. Pottle (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 129. Boswell
had probably been describing to Campbell his last interview with Hume (at which time
Hume had been reading Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric), and Campbell had likely opined
that Hume’s notion of annihilation after death was not inherently repugnant.
Campbell and the moderates did not consider the institutional

church to be necessary for the salvation of the individual. Campbell’s
page-long creed includes no mention of the church in any form. He de-
clared that Christ has no temporal kingdom.93 He would have agreed
with Calvin that the Church Triumphant is invisible, though he would
have disagreed with the extreme Calvinists’ sectarian conception of the
visible church. Nevertheless, he upheld the traditional belief that the
true church is “the spouse of Jesus Christ, for the love of whom he
died.”94 Campbell emphasized Christ’s role as sole mediator between
man and God in the Christian economy. A minister, therefore, can only
claim the role of mediator or priest in a loose sense.95 Campbell’s hostil-
ity to the human usurpation of Christ’s priesthood runs as a theme
throughout the Lectures on Ecclesiastical History. His unmistakable antipa-
thy to the Roman Catholic hierarchy derived from his general dislike of
any clerical superiority within the church. He believed that emphasis on
rites and ceremonies is positively harmful to the Christian life if it dis-
tracts from simple Gospel truths.96 He even considered the rite of bap-
tism useless in itself, suggesting the relative unimportance of the
sacraments to salvation.
Campbell was largely indifferent to the form of ecclesiastical order. The
probabilist theory of knowledge that he inherited from the seventeenth-
century latitudinarians encouraged him to favour an inclusive view of the
visible church. His explicit ecclesiological claims were largely negative. He
worried primarily about the dangers posed to personal religion by partic-
ular forms of the church, and consequently highlighted the alarming his-
torical consequences of sectarian claims. It is not surprising that he
viewed the visible church as a voluntary society, united by common princi-
ples of belief. In the “Defence” manuscript, the main target of which was
the Roman Catholic notion of hierarchical authority, Campbell described
the ideal church as a “society” whose “members” had come together by
means of an “original compact”97 – terms all borrowed from contempo-
rary political theory. Campbell’s concern for ecclesiological abuses natu-
93 st, 1:397.
95 leh, 1:310–11.
96 cmg, 11.
97 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page; also leh, 1:4. Robertson’s political Mod-
erates used the notion of a voluntary church to support their call for greater discipline with-
in their own church. See Robertson’s “Reasons of dissent” (often called the “Manifesto of
the Moderate Party”), reproduced in The Scots Magazine 14 (April 1752): 191–7.
rally led him to insist on the separation of church and state powers. He
argued that the purpose of the Christian religion is to influence the heart,
not to establish a temporal kingdom.98
Campbell applied the same concerns to his own church. He advo-
cated neither its disestablishment nor a return to the covenanting tradi-
tion of the past. He was rather ambivalent as to whether the Scottish
people would be held accountable for their collective degree of faithful-
ness to God. His sermon The Nature, Extent, and Importance, of the Duty of
Allegiance strongly implied that the American war was a divine punish-
ment for national sin. In every war, said Campbell, there is “some immo-
rality or guilt which is the direct cause. The superintendency of
Providence is doubtless to be acknowledged in this, as in every other
event.”99 Nevertheless, his use of the passive voice throughout this pas-
sage suggests that he could not be sure of God’s intentions. He was
more sure, however, of the appropriate human response to acts of prov-
idence: “affliction of every kind ought to excite us to self-examination,
prayer, and repentance.”100 Campbell’s hesitancy concerning the possi-
bility of a Scottish or British jeremiad may be contrasted with the cer-
tainty evident in Gerard’s own fast-day sermon: “[we must] humble
ourselves in sincere repentance for those sins by which we have pro-
voked God to visit us with this calamity, and which, persisted in, may
justly provoke him to prolong it, or to blast our success and our national
prosperity.”101 The Americans, continued Gerard, “have stirred up war:
and war is one of the fiercest fiends which the Almighty turneth loose
for the punishment of nations by whom he hath been long pro-
voked.”102 But neither Campbell nor Gerard adhered to a view of divine
visitation comparable to that held by John Bisset, Campbell’s High-fly-
ing predecessor in Aberdeen’s Second Charge. Bisset’s sermon on the
Lisbon earthquake of 1755 argued that “national sins, without national
repentance, will certainly bring on national judgments.”103 The Lisbon
98 leh, 1:40–1.
99 st, 2:127.
100 st, 2:128.
101 Alexander Gerard, Liberty the Cloke of Maliciousness (Aberdeen: J. Chalmers, 1778), 3.
102 Ibid., 13.
103 John Bisset, Discourses on Several Important Subjects (Edinburgh: John Bruce, 1763),
55. On the context of eighteenth-century Scottish jeremiads, see Richard B. Sher, “Wither-
spoon’s Dominion of Providence and the Scottish Jeremiad Tradition,” in Scotland and America
in the Age of the Enlightenment, ed. Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten (Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press, 1990), 46–64.
earthquake was a divine call for the repentance of the Scottish people,
lest they receive a similar visitation. Clearly, Bisset, like most traditional
Calvinists, held a very immediate sense of providence, which was funda-
mentally incompatible with Campbell’s probabilist theory of knowledge
and of Christian evidences. Campbell believed in divine rewards and
punishments for virtues and crimes, but seems to have been unwilling to
make claims about how these were manifested in the present life.
Although the moderates’ conception of providence appears to have
included an element of divine visitation, they agreed that God generally
accomplishes his designs through natural means. But in keeping with
their more traditional Christian heritage, they tended to interpret hu-
man history according to a Christian model. Campbell argued, in A Dis-
sertation on Miracles, that the origins of the world would be inexplicable
without reference to particular acts of providence (miracles), and that
the beginning of history would be unknowable without Revelation.104
Sometimes, however, the moderates’ views of historical providence were
not entirely complementary. William Robertson’s sermon, The Situation
of the World at the Time of Christ’s Appearance, and Its Connexion with the Suc-
cess of His Religion, argued that the success of the early church can be ex-
plained entirely in terms of God’s general providence, which is to say
that the church could not have prospered outside of the particular his-
torical context that God prepared for it by natural means. However, in
The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel a Proof of Its Truth, Campbell
asserted that the early church could not possibly have prospered by nat-
ural means in the hostile situation of the time, and therefore must have
had the miraculous assistance of particular providence. Although these
arguments seem to contradict one another, their incompatibility, if no-
ticed at the time, would have appeared merely as additional proofs that,
one way or another, the early church enjoyed the patronage of heaven.
campbell’s christianity
This overview of Campbell’s theology demonstrates that he was not no-

tably heterodox. His departures from traditional Scottish Calvinism are
best explained by the tempering effects of eighteenth-century natural
religion. In other words, Campbell was a mitigated Calvinist, and was
perhaps influenced by the more tolerant Episcopalian traditions of the
Northeast. But to judge Campbell’s theology merely by the standards of
104 dm, part ii, section vi.

the Calvinist past or the Evangelical future is to miss the originality of

his Christianity. Furthermore, such judgments tend to perpetuate the
mistaken notion that the moderates’ commitment to Christianity was
limp and superficial. We ought, therefore, to consider Campbell’s Chris-
tianity in its own terms.
Campbell’s Christianity was centred on the concept of a personal and
practical reformation of life and character. His notion of reformation en-
compassed improvement in both knowledge and morals. “As in reli-
gion,” said Campbell, “the ultimate end both of knowledge and faith is
practice, or, in other words, the real improvement of the heart and life,
so every doctrine whatever is of use, either as a direction in the perfor-
mance of duty, or as a motive to it. And the knowledge and belief of hear-
ers are no farther salutary to them, than this great end is reached. On the
contrary, where it is not reached, where the heart is not bettered and the
life reformed, they prove only the means of aggravating their guilt and
heightening their condemnation.”105 Campbell’s reluctance to proclaim
a comprehensive and dogmatic theology does not indicate indifference
to Christian truth, but rather highlights his sincere pedagogical belief
that every Christian must discover God’s revelation for himself. Although
Campbell believed that “religion is a thing purely personal,”106 he was no
fideist. He assumed that the strongest Christian faith is built on the bed-
rock of empirical investigation.107 Faith based on ignorance is worthy
only of scorn. But Campbell also believed that mere acknowledgement of
the moral certainty of Christianity’s claims is insufficient. Belief must give
way to the transforming certainty of faith. Christians convicted by the
Spirit of God must not merely repent but ceaselessly reform their lives
and characters. Campbell believed that moral reform is that “to which ev-
ery other [part] in this [Christian] economy points, as to its ultimate
end.”108 “The reformation of mankind,” he taught his students, “is the
great and ultimate end of the whole ministerial function.”109 Or as his
friend John Farquhar said, “the great design of religion is to make us bet-
ter men.”110 Gerard likewise declared that the end of the pastoral office
105 lstpe, 466–7.

107 st, 2:42.
108 lstpe, 169.
109 lstpe, 355. “The primary intention of preaching is the reformation of mankind,”
though it is of all the purposes of persuasion the most difficult to achieve (pr, 107).
110 Farquhar, Sermons on Various Subjects, 1:239.
is “the improvement and salvation of mankind.”111 The Aberdonians’

notion of the Christian life and system, therefore, is best summarized as a
work of reformation.
This reformation, thought Campbell, should be founded upon the
“spirit of the Gospel.” He used this phrase to capture the character
and style of Christ’s ministry, which was always benevolent, moral, and
practical. Christ was not only a saviour, but “the very pattern in the
conduct of providence presented for our imitation.”112 A profession
of Christianity is worthless without a striving to become like Christ.
The spirit of the Gospel, said Campbell, is the “internal signature of
genuine Christianity.”113 He contrasted this spirit of Christ to the
blind zeal of dogmatism. Dogmatic disputes, he told his students, al-
ways lead away from the charity and virtue that constitute the true
heart of religion. The authentic fruit of Christianity is moral reforma-
tion rather than vain disputation.114 Protestantism’s most character-
istic failing is its tendency to become overly concerned with
metaphysical reasoning, which leads only to dogmatism and conse-
quently disharmony. Campbell approved Gerard’s argument that con-
troversy and division within the church is the very opposite of “sound
doctrine,” which, in its proper scriptural signification, means health-
fulness and healing. Sound doctrine necessarily excludes any teaching
without a practical, moral tendency.115 Campbell thought it better to
accept a measure of doctrinal uncertainty than to live apart from the
spirit of the Gospel, whose only absolute requirement is benevolent
unity. William Laurence Brown’s posthumous summary of Campbell’s
teaching was strikingly apt:
He placed the essence of religion, where our Saviour himself placed it, in the
unfeigned love of God, and of mankind, and actions were, in his opinion, virtu-
ous only as far as they flowed from one or other of these sources, or tended to
establish or enlarge these principles in the hearts of men. To him it appeared
highly detrimental to pure and vital christianity to make it consist wholly in cer-
tain external modes of worship, in the maintenance of certain systems of specu-
lation, or in any of those little peculiarities by which sects and parties are
111 Alexander Gerard, The Pastoral Care, ed. Gilbert Gerard (London: T. Cadell and
W. Davies, 1799), 403.
113 st, 1:317.
114 cmg, 15–16.
commonly distinguished … Bigotry he regarded as having a fatal tendency to

sour the temper, and to harden the heart. Laxity of principle he considered as
cutting the sinews of christianity. Lukewarmness was, in his opinion, incompati-
ble with conviction of the truth of religion; fanaticism was subversive of all its
blessed effects.116
Practical piety was, for Campbell, the very end and purpose of the
Christian life. Piety he defined as the respectful recognition of God’s be-
nevolent mastery in the universe.117 Practical religion is the self-conscious
pursuit of virtue in the present life. Campbell’s improving religion was
never far removed from the practical spirit of the Enlightenment, just as
his piety owed much to the Enlightenment’s conception of natural
religion. The moderatism of Campbell and of his associates is best under-
stood in this light. But before turning to a final examination of
Campbell’s moderatism, we must examine some of the practical and
controversial implications of his Christianity.
116 William Laurence Brown, The Death of the Righteous Precious in the Sight of God (Aber-
deen: A. Brown, 1796), 26–7.
117 See lpc, 24. Campbell here equated impiety with treason against God’s supreme
authority.
Religious Problems and Controversies
George Campbell’s religion, like his philosophy, was meant to be practi-

cal. The religious problems that occupied his attention were hotly-
debated issues in his day, and their solution required the use of both
natural and revealed sources of knowledge. Campbell believed that
there are certain things we can know about the nature of miracles,
Scripture, and the Christian church by means of our natural under-
standing alone. Thus he could argue with Hume concerning the philo-
sophical possibility and merit of miraculous claims without invoking
revelation or divine inspiration. So too could he invoke the authority of
the Roman Catholic critic Richard Simon concerning the reliability of
scriptural texts. Finally, he could engage in historical debate over the
nature of the early church with such diverse figures as the High Church
apologist Henry Dodwell or the infidel Edward Gibbon. In all of these
cases Campbell the philosopher was confident that he could arrive at
highly probable empirical conclusions, allowing him to believe the
veracity of Christian claims with moral certainty.
Probabilistic conclusions, however compelling to the rational mind,
were not in themselves teleologically satisfying to the believer. True and
practical Christianity demanded a faith that was oblivious to degrees of
moral evidence. A believer must ponder the religious implications of
the Christian evidences, and realize the consequences of belief with
practical commitment. Even natural religion proclaims the need to
move beyond natural knowledge. Campbell thought it clear that the
successes of the early church could not be explained by natural means
alone, as is evident in his sermon The Success of the First Publishers of the
Gospel a Proof of Its Truth. Our natural researches, therefore, compel us to
consider the significance of the religious claims of a small band of be-
Religious Problems and Controversies 209
lievers who clearly enjoyed the favour of God’s particular providence.

The empirical certainty of miracles in the early church constitutes an
unmistakable sign of the revelation of God’s particular will to mankind.
th e r e l i g i o u s i m p l i c at i o n s o f m i r ac l e s
Campbell employed an enlightened theory of knowledge to defend the

historical veracity of miracles against the Enlightenment’s greatest scep-
tic. His reason for defending miracles, however, cannot be explained by
a secular teleology. “My primary intention in undertaking an answer to
[Hume’s “Miracles”] … hath invariably been, to contribute all in my
power, to the defence of a religion, which I esteem the greatest blessing
conferred by Heaven on the sons of men.”1 When we left the subject of
miracles, Campbell had established, by natural arguments, not only that
miracles are possible, but also that they are the expected consequence
of God’s moral nature. Furthermore, he had demonstrated that the his-
torical claims in favour of the miracles of the early church were not only
highly probable but morally certain. This means, according to the third
element of our earlier definition, that the doctrine that accompanies
these miracles must constitute a special revelation from God. The most
obvious religious implication of this is that anyone who can successfully
prove the fact of a miracle can also claim a corresponding point of doc-
trine. Campbell thought it historically plain that the only believable
miracles are those recorded in Scripture for the purpose of authenticat-
ing scriptural doctrine. After the initial verification of the Christian
claims, “it pleased heaven to withdraw those supernatural aids,” so that
modern Christians “have no ground to look for miraculous assistance.”2
Miracles form the bridge between God’s natural providence and his re-
vealed will. Having crossed that bridge, Campbell’s argument concern-
ing miracles shifted away from Hume and toward Christian rivals such
as the Roman Catholic apologist George Hay, who had an interest in
finding miracles in every age since the early church. The remaining dis-
cussion of miracles, therefore, must consider the significance rather
than the ontological possibility of miracles.
Campbell was not, however, entirely done with Hume. Even the scep-
tic had recognized that the question of miracles was interesting prima-
rily because of its religious implications. “If the spirit of religion join
1 dm, 5.
2 leh, 1:4; st, 2:349.
itself to the love of wonder,” said Hume, “there is an end of common

sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all preten-
sions to authority.”3 Hume understood that most people neither believe
nor disbelieve miracle claims for philosophical reasons, but that their
belief in miracles generally follows their religious commitments. Ac-
cording to his Natural History of Religion, religious belief can be ade-
quately explained by a secular philosophy of human nature without
reference to metaphysical arguments. The superstitious tendency evi-
dent in human nature, along with the love of wonder, easily accounts for
popular belief in miracles. Thus a particularly superstitious religion,
such as Roman Catholicism, naturally has a corresponding legion of
miracle claims. In the second half of his “Miracles” essay, Hume derived
devious pleasure from pointing out the multitude of witnesses attesting
to modern Catholic miracles. He implicitly suggested that their testi-
mony was as good as, if not better than, the testimony of the witnesses
for early Christian miracles.
Hume may simply have intended to perplex conscientious Protestant
readers, who necessarily believed the Gospel miracles without accepting
Roman Catholic ones. He concluded his “Miracles” essay with an ironic
shot aimed directly at the empirical Christian apologists of his age. His
strategy, he claimed, was to
confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Christian Religion,

who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most
holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of expos-
ing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure … upon the
whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended
with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person
without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And who-
ever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his
own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him
a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.4
If Hume’s purpose was to bait moderate Scottish divines, then he ac-

complished his end with particular success. Perhaps nothing better
3 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975),
117.
4 Ibid., 129–31.
identifies Campbell as an eighteenth-century empirical Christian than

his compulsion to answer Hume’s ironic charge. Campbell took great
pains to discount the testimonies that Hume playfully asserted in favour
of contemporary Roman Catholic miracles. In fact, his attempt to di-
rectly answer the historical details of Hume’s ironic argument most
clearly betrays his empirical mindset.
Campbell argued that Christianity was first established in an environ-
ment inherently hostile to its message. Its first witnesses, therefore,
could not have been predisposed to believe its miracle claims. The testi-
mony supporting the Gospel miracles could have survived only if the
miracles were true and therefore unassailable by Christianity’s many en-
emies. Thus the rapid growth of the early church constitutes a conclu-
sive demonstration that the Gospel miracles were believed even by those
who were originally hostile to the Christian message. Roman Catholic
miracle claims, in contrast, are advanced by those who are predisposed
to believe them, in an environment that encourages such claims.5 All
eighteenth-century philosophers and historians knew that the testimony
of interested parties is inherently suspect. Thus the myriad Catholic mir-
acle claims can be dismissed on purely natural grounds. Despite his
Common Sense defence of testimony, Campbell had no difficulty disbe-
lieving testimony concerning Catholic prodigies. He advanced the typi-
cal eighteenth-century Protestant belief that Popery is a “fruitful source
of lying wonders,” and predictably concluded that the reliability of Cath-
olic witnesses is in no way equal to that of the Gospel testifiers.6 Catholic
miracles, unlike the Gospel miracles, cannot be rationally believed.
Campbell’s rejection of Roman Catholic miracles required the use of
detailed historical arguments even apart from Hume’s taunts. The Cath-
olic apologist Bishop George Hay agreed that Hume’s impieties could
be easily dismissed, but he allowed no such treatment of his own claims.
His arguments were perhaps even more dangerous to Campbell’s apolo-
getic system than were Hume’s. Though the number of Catholics in
Scotland was small, Catholicism still held considerably more sway than
did scepticism. Hay, like Campbell, considered miracles to be the
“highly-prized prerogative of revelation.”7 Miracles were to be regarded
5 dm, 86–7 and 221.

6 dm, 211 and 244. In “The Success of the First Publishers of the Gospel,” Campbell
even suggests that the Roman hierarchy knows its miracles are poorly founded, but used
them anyhow to buttress its shaky claims to spiritual authority (st, 2:45).
7 George Hay, The Scripture Doctrine of Miracles Displayed, ed. Bishop Strain, 2 vols
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1873), 1:vii.
as absolute proofs of a divine communication. In fact, argued Hay, the

Protestant Reformation could be rejected on the grounds that it
wrought no miracles to prove the legitimacy of its innovations. God
would never sanction such a departure from tradition without incontro-
vertible evidence.8 Though Hay’s Scripture Doctrine of Miracles Displayed
(1775) was published some time after Campbell’s Dissertation on Mira-
cles, it nevertheless represents an important category among Campbell’s
ideological opponents.
Hay’s argument concerning miracles proceeded in an entirely differ-
ent direction than Campbell’s. Although Hay discussed the historical
evidences of miracles, he did so only in the second volume of his work,
thus assuming the reality of miracles from the outset. He did not even
attempt to engage Hume directly, because the philosophical aspects of
belief in miracles were of no interest to him. Hay claimed that “since
revelation assures us of the fact, it is most unphilosophical to pretend
from reason to argue against it.”9 Hay made no attempt to persuade in-
fidels or deists that miracles are possible or historically demonstrable.
His arguments were directed at Protestant moderates who already be-
lieved in the possibility as well as the fact of miracles. He argued that if
any Christian miracles are worthy of belief then Roman Catholic mira-
cles must be among them, for why should the establishment of the orig-
inal Gospel be the only legitimate function of miracles?10 Hay claimed,
undoubtedly with Campbell in mind, that the Common Sense pre-
sumption of the veracity of testifiers must apply as well to Catholic wit-
nesses as to any other. Catholic testimony is no more self-interested
than Protestant claims, for does not Protestantism predispose its adher-
ents to limit miracles to the first Christian age?11 Hay had only to dem-
onstrate that there is no good reason to believe that the age of miracles
had ended to accomplish his main purpose, which was, he said, to de-
cide the whole issue between Catholicism and Protestantism.12 If he
could merely show that the age of miracles had not in fact ended, then
Campbell would have to acknowledge the continuity and authority of
the Roman Catholic church.
Campbell, of course, would admit none of this. Although he did not
engage Hay directly on this matter, he implicitly disagreed with him
8 Ibid., 1:286.
9 Ibid., 1:31.
10 Ibid., 1:65.
11 Ibid., 2:85 and 2:48.
12 Ibid., 2:87.
concerning the premises of their debate. Campbell started from the

common eighteenth-century assumption that God accomplishes his
purposes in the most efficient manner possible – that is, with the fewest
interruptions of the natural course of providence. Critical philosophers
must seek not only the most believable miracles but also the most eco-
nomical set of miracle claims. Biblical miracles are the best-attested in
human history, and for that reason Christianity (which has superseded
Judaism) is the only well-founded religion. Christian revelation was con-
vincingly and completely established in its first age, requiring no fur-
ther examples of particular providence to support it.13 Roman Catholic
miracles are simply superfluous. Campbell consistently assumed that
Christianity ought to be followed in its simplest and purest form, with-
out unreasonable expectation of further signs and proofs. In fact, he
suggested that miracle claims are illegitimate if unaccompanied by a
corresponding doctrinal claim.14 After God had communicated the full-
ness of his saving plan to humanity, he intended natural providence to
suffice for daily life. The Protestant Reformation required no miracles
because it merely re-established the spirit and doctrine of the early
church. Campbell further rejected Roman Catholicism for advancing
its way by force rather than by testimony and persuasion, a historical
fact that gave it the character of Mahomet rather than of Christ.15
Campbell’s Protestant stance was not without its difficulties. He ac-
knowledged that “the intrusion of mistakes into the [scriptural] manu-
scripts, and thence into printed editions, was, without a chain of
miracles, absolutely unavoidable.”16 Since he wished to avoid any mirac-
ulous claims concerning the historical transmission of Scripture, his
Protestantism was forced to rely upon the merits of textual criticism,
one of the natural means by which God intends modern Christians to
prosper. He knew that similar conclusions, mixed with a little more
scepticism, had permitted Richard Simon to reject the Protestant princi-
ple of sola scriptura as inherently unreliable. But Campbell was optimistic
concerning the critical powers given by God to man. In the end, he
13 Campbell’s argument is undoubtedly a bit circular. He argued, a priori, that since

Gospel revelation is sufficient for human needs, miracles must have ended in the early
church, and that subsequent claims can be automatically discounted. But he also argued, a
posteriori, that since the age of miracles has in fact ended, God must have deemed primitive
Christianity sufficiently evidenced to convince Christians of all subsequent ages (leh, 1:4).
14 lpc, 135.
15 st, 2:42–3.
16 fg, 1:447.
treated Roman Catholic miracles as Hume had treated all miracles, as-
suming a priori that they were unreliable, without feeling an obligation
to consider the individual pieces of testimony. He boldly concluded that
not even a miracle could justify false or immoral methods of advance-
ment. “There are doctrines,” he said in his Spirit of the Gospel sermon,
“which, though an apostle of Christ, or an angel from heaven, should
preach to us, we ought not to receive.”17 Campbell assumed, in other
words, that authentic doctrine must not only be supported by miracles,
but must also be inherently consistent with reason and natural virtue.
His opponents undoubtedly objected to this elevation of human reason
above the explicit commands of God. They might also have complained
that Campbell could use this criterion against virtually any doctrine he
pleased, and that he had the Roman Catholic church in mind when he
established it. Hay, who had a particular dislike for this sermon, would
not have failed to notice this.
Apart from his disagreement with Hume, Campbell applied most of
his efforts to minimizing the place of miracles within the Christian econ-
omy. He argued that one ought not to call a miracle that which can be
explained by ordinary providence or by natural or human causes. Scrip-
tural prophecies, for example, can be fulfilled by secondary causes with-
out the assistance of miracles.18 Campbell’s position on particular
providence – situated somewhere between Hume’s rigid agnosticism and
Hay’s Catholic fideism – highlights the inherent difficulties of Christian
moderatism. Campbell was forced to make certain assumptions about
what constitutes a reliable witness, though he could convince neither
Hume that there are reliable witnesses for any miracles, nor Hay that the
Gospel testifiers are more reliable than Catholic ones. He also needed to
convince his various opponents that the successes of the early church
constitute proof of God’s particular favour, while the apparent successes
of the Roman Catholic church do not. Campbell undoubtedly believed
that his hostility to Roman claims was based on historical evidence rather
than on prejudice – an assumption that found more sympathy in the
eighteenth-century world than it does in the modern world.
Campbell’s miracles argument may ultimately have proved more ef-
fective against Hume than against Hay. If Hay’s argument formed part
of a larger providential view of the world, then he may have been
17 st, 1:375.
18 Campbell to Hailes, 24 June 1789 (nls ms 25305, fols 10–16).
closer than Campbell to Calvinist High-flyers such as Bisset or Evangel-

icals such as Wesley, who believed in the direct hand of God in con-
temporary history. Campbell’s attempt to navigate between Hume’s
empirically-founded scepticism and Hay’s or Wesley’s practical nega-
tion of the distinction between general and particular providence put
him in an extremely vulnerable position. The moderates held a very
specific and narrow view of what constituted reliable evidence. Both
Hume and Hay, from very different perspectives, rejected the moder-
ate criteria. Yet the moderate position nevertheless remained more
typical of the Enlightenment.
the inter pretation o f sc riptur e
The authority of the Gospel revelation, as Campbell well knew, was

founded upon the authenticity of the miracles recorded in it. He saw no
problem in the notion that Scripture is fundamentally self-authenticating.
But Scripture, once received as the word of God, presented its own
unique problems. Campbell specifically rejected the notion that the integ-
rity of Scripture had been maintained through the ages by miraculous
supports. Yet he also rejected the Roman Catholic position that the
church could guarantee the continuity of true doctrine. Campbell upheld
the Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura, but grounded this belief in the
competency of the critical arts which he himself practised. He was com-
mitted to the authority of Scripture, but not to any indiscriminate use of
Scripture. He knew that sectarians routinely abuse Scripture in order to
find their favourite doctrines. But God had provided an antidote. He had
given us critical powers so that we can know something of the nature and
attributes of God, more about the nature of man, and a great deal about
the historical and critical uses of scriptural texts. We therefore have a ra-
tional and empirical basis for interpreting Scripture and understanding
the divine truths that are not found in nature. Campbell’s Protestant faith
was not set in opposition to reason, but was built upon the accomplish-
ments of rational enquiry. “Every thing … here,” he said, “is subjected to
the test of Scripture and sound criticism.”19
Campbell believed that one of the most important tasks of critical
reason is to mitigate the potentially dangerous effects of popular and
sectarian interpretations of Scripture. He told his divinity students
19 fg, 1:31.
never to believe a tenet “in opposition to reason and to common

sense.”20 Scripture ought not to be followed in a slavishly literal man-
ner. Though it enjoins us to obey our rulers, there are times when resis-
tance to government or parents is lawful, and when killing is
necessary.21 Therefore, “It is by common use, and not by scholastic
quibbles, that the language of the sacred writers ought to be inter-
preted.”22 The enemy of true understanding is party spirit. Campbell
encapsulated the sectarian philosophy thus: “You are to try our doctrine
by the Scripture only: But then you are to be very careful that you ex-
plain the Scripture solely by our doctrine.”23 He believed that the legiti-
mate purpose of scriptural study is to formulate doctrine rather than to
reinforce pre-formed doctrines. As Alexander Gerard said, “New means
of elucidating scripture are every day discovered and employed: there is
a very general disposition among protestants to examine with impartial-
ity what it really teaches.”24 Campbell even seemed to believe that solv-
ing the linguistic problems of Scripture by means of historical
scholarship and textual criticism had the potential to eliminate most
controversy and confusion from the church. “In these matters we ought
all to be determined by the impartial principles of sound criticism, and
not by our own prepossessions.”25 The health and unity of the church,
he suggested, is directly dependent upon the practical progress of natu-
ral knowledge. Campbell’s intentions for his textual criticism are best
understood in light of this Christian teleology.
But Campbell must have known that reason had not always defini-
tively clarified doctrinal disputes and had sometimes created new ones.
John Locke had intended to elucidate the fundamental principles of
Christianity by means of “an attentive and unbiased search” of the Scrip-
tures alone,26 but was surprised to find himself charged with undermin-
ing the faith by giving too little regard to the orthodox doctrine of the
Trinity. Indeed, one of the most notorious casualties of biblical criticism
between the time of Erasmus and the time of Richard Bentley was the
20 lstpe, 148.
21 st, 2:135–7.
22 fg, 1:340.
23 fg, 1:106.
24 Alexander Gerard, The Corruptions of Christianity Considered as Affecting Its Truth (Ed-
inburgh: Mundell and Son, 1792), 41.
25 fg, 1:278.
26 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. George W. Ewing (Washington:
Regnery Gateway, 1965), xxvii.
Protestant certainty that Trinitarian orthodoxy could rest safely on the

authority of Scripture rather than on the authority of Church tradition.
Nor could critical scrutiny of Scripture resolve the old Reformation de-
bate concerning what actually happened during the sacrament of the
Lord’s Supper. By the eighteenth century, doctrinal tradition was
increasingly coming into conflict with rational and especially historical
inquiry.27
Campbell himself was little inclined to worry about such abstract
theological disputes. He considered his translation of the Gospels to be
not an exercise in scholastic pedantry, but rather a means of promoting
the practical improvement of Christian knowledge. “The worst conse-
quences,” he said, “which the blunders of transcribers have occasioned,
are their hurting sometimes the perspicuity, sometimes the credibility of
holy writ, affording a handle to the objections of infidels, and thereby
weakening the evidences of religion.”28 Campbell nevertheless argued
that a multiplicity of critical translations actually affirms rather than ob-
scures the most important truths of Scripture, and secures the reputa-
tion of Christ against the infidels.29 This seemed to him the best
argument for freedom of enquiry and publication in religious matters.
Unlike Richard Simon, Campbell believed that the critical method of
scriptural enquiry is sufficient for Christian needs, and considerably
more reliable than Simon’s conception of church tradition.
What then were the practical consequences of Campbell’s biblical
criticism? How did he actually apply his principles to the problems of
translation and interpretation? Campbell took seriously his own injunc-
tion in The Philosophy of Rhetoric that usage and custom is of primary im-
portance in communication. In his translation of the Gospels, he
generally adopted the King James Version (the standard English transla-
tion) as his base text, recognizing that the language of this particular
translation had become the standard medium of religious expression in
the English-speaking world. His own translation was, for the most part, a
correction of the common text rather than an original production, and
he admitted in the translation notes that he often chose to retain the
sity of Chicago Press, 1989), 6; on the problem of Scripture and the doctrine of the Trinity,
see 91–2. On the problem of the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, see Pelikan’s earlier
volume, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984), 202–3.
28 fg, 1:455.
29 fg, 1:18–20.
common reading rather than to make a linguistic innovation. “It is a

good rule in translating,” he said, “always to prefer the usual significa-
tion, unless it would imply something absurd, or at least unsuitable to
the scope of the place.”30 This further supports the notion, advanced in
a previous chapter, that Campbell’s biblical criticism was inherently
conservative.
Campbell did not, however, always retain the familiar flavour of a pas-
sage. His translation of a particularly controversial text – Matthew
16:18–19 – may have shocked many of his Protestant readers. The King
James Version reads:
And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my
church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.
And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever
thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt
loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.
Campbell’s version is considerably more abrupt:
I tell thee likewise, Thou art named Rock; and on this rock I will build my
church, over which the gates of hades shall not prevail. Moreover, I will give thee
the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatever thou shalt bind upon the earth,
shall be bound in heaven; and whatever thou shalt loose upon the earth, shall
be loosed in heaven.31
Apart from its inelegance, Campbell’s choice of “Rock” in place of

“Peter” may have bothered many Protestants who preferred to keep the
Apostle Peter distinct from the foundation of the church. But in his
notes Campbell argued that Jesus specifically intended to associate the
name of Peter with the rock of the church’s establishment and, further-
more, that the keys of the kingdom were in this instance given specifi-
cally to Peter.32 As if to remove all ambiguity, Campbell elsewhere
confirmed that the powers of binding and loosing were at this time
given to Peter alone, and only later given to the rest of the disciples.
Peter was therefore to be considered as the first among equals in the
30 fg, 2:80.
31 fg, 1:536.
32 fg, 2:95 and 100.
apostolic circle. But Campbell quickly added – so as not to give satisfac-

tion to Roman Catholic pretensions – that Peter’s position, though spe-
cial, was not hereditary, and that this singular status died with him.33 He
emphasized that, although his critical reading of the passage contradicts
the traditional Protestant interpretation, the same critical insight dem-
onstrates that Peter himself never claimed the powers that the Roman
church eventually ascribed to him. Campbell supplemented his inter-
pretation with a psychological or conjectural reconstruction of how the
Roman church came, step by step and century by century, to mistake
Peter’s unique office for a position of supremacy and ultimately of
despotism over the church.34 Campbell therefore used his critical tal-
ents both to disabuse the Roman church of its illusions concerning the
status of Peter, and to correct the mistaken Protestant reading of the
same passage.
Campbell claimed that the right use of reason can prevent dangerous
interpretative errors, as in the case of the “parable of the supper” (Luke
14:23). His translation, which is similar to the King James Version, reads:
“The master answered, ‘Go out into the highways, and along the hedges,
and compel people to come, that my house may be filled.›35 This pas-
sage had often been interpreted as a divine command to force unbeliev-
ers into the church – that is, as a warrant for persecution. Campbell,
however, argued that “usages such as this, of expressing great urgency of
solicitation by terms which, in strictness, imply force and compulsion, are
common in every tongue.”36 In other words, the term “compel” is merely
a figure of speech, and “doth not authorize persecution or force in mat-
ters of religion.”37 The passage does, however, provide a useful example
for ministers that there is sometimes an apparent inconsistency between
the literal meaning of a text and “the principles of right reason.”38 The
inconsistency can be resolved only by means of critical and historical
study that places the usage in its appropriate context.
The same rule applies to other frequently misunderstood scriptural
terms. What was often translated as “devil” or “Satan” in the King
James Version – and hence taken to be a proper name – carried no
33 leh, 1:161–6 and 369–70.

34 leh, 2:95–101.
35 fg, 2:276.
36 fg, 2:401.
37 lstpe, 388.
38 lstpe, 386.
such signification in the original Greek. For example, in the King

James Version, Matthew 16:23 reads:
But he turned, and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an of-
fence unto me: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that
be of man.
The same passage was rendered thus by Campbell:
But he turning, said to Peter, Get thee hence, adversary, thou art an obstacle in my
way; for thou relishest not the things of God, but the things of men.39
The significance of Campbell’s changes is obvious. He based his interpre-

tation partly on the linguistic conventions of the Gospel writers, but also
on his understanding of the character of Jesus, who he assumed had spo-
ken the original words. Jesus, he argued, would not have used such a harsh
appellation as “Satan” when he meant no more than “adversary” or “obsta-
cle,” for “this would be but ill adapted to the patience, the meekness, and
the humility of his character.”40 The same applies to John 6:70, the
passage concerning Judas Iscariot, which in the King James Version reads:
Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?
Campbell translated the same passage, as:
Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve? yet one of you is a spy.41
Campbell claimed that distinguishing character descriptions from

proper names requires an appreciation of such minute matters as the
use or omission of an article in the original Hebrew-inflected Greek.42
Campbell admitted that some passages of Scripture cannot be defini-
tively clarified. For example in the King James Version Matthew 26:29
39 fg, 1:536.
40 fg, 1:155. Campbell clearly believed that he could interpret Scripture according to
what he believed Jesus must have been like. These beliefs were based on further assump-
tions concerning the unity of intent and historical literalness of the various Gospel texts. In
other words, the character of Jesus was based on an interpretation of Scripture while at the
same time, the interpretation of Scripture was based on the character of Jesus.
41 fg, 2:421.
42 fg, 1:154.
reads: “But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the
vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s king-
dom.” This passage, said Campbell, has caused much speculation as to
the nature of heaven, and specifically whether the immortal require sus-
tenance. He made no attempt to answer the question, but merely used
the passage to show that such a possibility exists. The common assump-
tion that the immortal saints will need no sustenance is without scrip-
tural support. The lesson to be learned is that “difficulties in Scripture
arise often from a contradiction neither to reason nor to experience;
but to the presumptions we have rashly taken up, in matters whereof we
have no knowledge.”43 Campbell held that the critical arts are useful in
uprooting notions that have no necessary place in Christian belief, and
in demonstrating that Christians need not have dogmatic assurance
about every speculative point of doctrine.
The best interpreter of Scripture, Campbell consistently argued, is
Scripture itself. This old Protestant maxim had some important impli-
cations, as demonstrated in one of the most interesting passages in
Campbell’s “Preliminary Dissertations.” Referring to Ephesians 5:32,
which compares the union of Christ and his church to the institution
of marriage, Campbell remarked, “the apostle alluded not to any fic-
tion, but to an historical fact, the formation of Eve out of the body of
Adam her husband. For, though there is no necessity that the story
which supplies us with the body of the parable or allegory (if I may so
express myself) be literally true, there is, on the other hand, no neces-
sity that it be false. Passages of true history are sometimes allegorized
by the sacred penmen. Witness the story of Abraham and his two sons,
Isaac by his wife Sarah and Ishmael by his bond-woman Hagar, of
which the apostle has made an allegory for representing the compara-
tive natures of the Mosaic dispensation and the Christian.”44 Camp-
bell’s point was that a general familiarity with Scripture often makes
clear the literary intentions of particular scriptural authors. But he
also seems to have implied that the divine truth of Scripture might
conceivably stand apart from the literal truth of the biblical stories.
Though he certainly did not mean by this what D.F. Strauss would
mean a half-century later, it is interesting to note that long exposure
to ancient literary genres had perhaps planted the seed of higher
criticism in Campbell’s mind.
43 fg, 2:133.
44 fg, 1:287.
For the most part, however, Campbell adhered to the assumption that
Scripture is a single entity rather than a collection of literary texts. He
assumed that Scripture was the product of one mind rather than of
many.45 As the final point of his scriptural inquiry, he asked the ques-
tions that modern critics tend to ask at the beginning, namely, “first
what is scripture, secondly, what is its authority.”46 He claimed in The Four
Gospels that critics cannot take the same liberties with a scriptural text
that they can with a secular one, thereby assuming a qualitative differ-
ence between the two. He argued that a critic ought not to court novelty
in translation, even though he elsewhere warned against searching
Scripture merely to find pre-formed interpretations.47 Despite his criti-
cal innovations, and despite his use of the tools of the Enlightenment,
Campbell never strayed far from his orthodox Protestant roots.
Campbell believed that there are no ideal solutions to the problems
inherent in textual work. Nevertheless, he maintained that critical schol-
arship can discover adequate solutions. His rational optimism suggests
that he was able to reconcile, to his own satisfaction, the Protestant tra-
dition of sola scriptura with the enlightened ideal of progress in knowl-
edge. Campbell’s critical scholarship assured him that, apart from a few
localized problems, God’s message to humanity is clearly evident in the
grand unity of Revelation: “And whatever in any degree corroborates
our faith, contributes in the same degree to strengthen our hope, to en-
hance our love, and to give additional weight to all the motives with
which our religion supplies us, to a pious and virtuous life.”48
t h e n at u r e o f t h e c h u r c h
Campbell’s historical scholarship helped him decide difficult questions

concerning the interpretation of scriptural texts and the validity of mir-
acle claims. Likewise, his researches into ecclesiastical history influ-
enced his views on the structure, order, and authority of the church.
Campbell and his ecclesiological opponents agreed that contemporary
45 fg, 1:42. At one point, Campbell addressed this problem by asking, “How is this di-
versity in the diction of the sacred penmen reconcilable with the idea of inspiration?” (fg,
1:50). The terms he used suggest his answer. They imply that it is the words rather than the
sentiments of Scripture that are open to criticism (fg, 1:52). The truth of Scripture is
found in its ideas rather than in its expressions.
46 lstpe, 159.
47 fg, 1:455, 1:11, and 1:71.
48 fg, 1:86.
controversies over church order depend directly upon the historical

nature of the early church. “The practice of the apostolic age,” said
Campbell, “which has the best title to the denomination of primitive, is
the surest commentary on this precept of our Lord.”49 Since the funda-
mental issue in the Scottish church since the Reformation had been the
legitimacy of the Episcopal as opposed to the Presbyterian form of
church government, Scottish historians had long and vigorously de-
bated whether Christianity had ever prospered in Scotland without the
guidance of bishops, and whether the rule of bishops was of earthly or
of heavenly origin.50 As a professor of church history, Campbell could
hardly avoid such historical disputes, however divisive he thought they
were. He therefore taught his students “the utility of the study of church
history, when entered on (as is too rarely the case) by a mind free from
prejudices, and superior to the injustice which is almost invariably
consequent on all party-attractions whatsoever.”51
Campbell and his antagonists, however, derived very different lessons
from their historical studies. First of all, they disagreed over the necessity
of a specific church order for the salvation of the individual Christian.
Campbell’s historical investigations convinced him that the form of ec-
clesiastical order had not been of particular importance in the early
church. He further undercut his Episcopal opponents by declaring that
“the early belief of a particular tenet is not a sufficient proof of its truth,
and that the early adoption of a particular custom is not a full vindica-
tion of its rectitude.”52 Campbell believed that the primitive church had
been a free, voluntary, and humble body which respected the laws and
independence of the civil magistrate. The apostolic church had even tol-
erated diverse views and sentiments in order to avoid dispute.53 The
term “church,” said Campbell, had originally denoted either a single
congregation or the whole body of believing Christians, but never a de-
nomination or political entity.54 Campbell warned his students to keep
in mind the corruptive powers of “time, the greatest of all innovators,
49 leh, 1:55. Protestants and Catholics had always agreed that there can be no devel-
opment of doctrine, and that true doctrine is continuous with apostolic revelation; see
Pelikan, Reformation, 334–5.
50 David Allan, Virtue, Learning and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1993), 47–8.
51 aul ms 650, section iii, un-numbered page.
52 aul ms 650, section iii, un-numbered page.
53 leh, 1:41–5; aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page.
though, when it operates by slow degrees, the least observable.”55 The

true apostolic church was of very short duration, and the corruptions of
the following ages cannot be taken as authoritative models.
Campbell believed that a proper historical reading of the post-apostolic
church demonstrates how quickly it had lost sight of its original mandate.
If Christ’s kingdom was a spiritual kingdom, as it surely was, then the
church’s worldly successes after its official establishment by Constantine
were really hindrances to its true mission, rather than signs of divine
favour.56 Critical inquiry shows that the bulk of church history has been
little more than strife over words. Campbell believed that examples of ec-
clesiastical tyranny are not confined to the past, and that spiritual despo-
tism remains a constant threat to the spirit of Christ. Like many of his
contemporaries, he assumed that Roman Catholic countries such as
Spain were merely puppets of a foreign ecclesiastical power.57
Campbell’s historical belief in the corruption of the church was sup-
ported by his critical work with early Christian texts. His discussions of
the terms “schism” and “heresy” in the “Preliminary Dissertations”
nicely summarize his conception of the original and ideal character of
the church, as opposed to its subsequent manifestations. “Schism,” he
argued, originally meant “an alienation of the heart,” while “heretic”
properly signified a person of sectarian or factious temperament.58 The
real evil implied by these concepts is alienation not from God or truth
but from one’s Christian brethren, “for it is in the union of affection
among Christians, that the spirit, the life, and the power of religion, are
principally placed.”59 Dogma, suggested Campbell, is unimportant com-
pared to Christian unity in its primitive sense. “We are to remember,” he
said, “that ‘as the kingdom of God is not meat and drink,’ so neither is it
logical acuteness in distinction, or grammatical accuracy of expres-
sion.”60 These studies convinced Campbell that true Christianity ought
to be primarily concerned with achieving a disposition of heart appro-
priate to the spirit that Christ brought into the world. The visible
55 leh, 1:59. Gerard also argued that all religions, authentic or not, become corrupted
with the passage of time; see his Corruptions of Christianity, 32.
56 fg, 2:219–20.
57 leh, 2:319.
58 fg, 1:306, 310 and 317. Alexander Gerard likewise argued that a heretic is properly
one who disputes with his brethren; see his Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–
82), 2:149.
59 fg, 1:306.
60 fg, 1:307.
church, therefore, is not a saving institution, but rather the context in

which the spirit of Christ is to be exercised to transform lives and hearts.
Outward church forms have a legitimate function, but are no more valu-
able than their ability to facilitate the reformation of Christian lives by
the spirit of the Gospel. “Heresy” and “schism” signify not heterodox
thought but the disunity of spirit which almost inevitably divides and
corrupts the body of Christ’s people. Clearly then, an “orthodox”
church is as liable to these evils as any sect. Campbell’s hostility to cer-
tain ecclesiastical doctrines was derived from his conviction that visible
forms of church order had too often interrupted the true work of the
Gospel.
Campbell’s reading of church history, together with his understand-
ing of the spirit of the Gospel, rendered it impossible for him to support
the exclusive claims of any contemporary church institution, even his
own. Scottish Calvinists had traditionally been inclined to see the imme-
diate hand of God in history, and were quick to interpret particular
events within a providential and indeed deterministic framework.61 But
Campbell, despite his belief in the wisdom of providence, was deter-
mined to resist the militant implications of extreme Calvinist ecclesiol-
ogy, which held that God communicates to the elect only within the
context of an exclusive covenant.62 The great error in the history of the
church, he claimed, “has been an attempt to render it in effect a tempo-
ral kingdom, and to support and extend it by earthly means.”63 In The
Spirit of the Gospel, Campbell plainly declared that Christ has no temporal
kingdom. He even said that the apostles themselves were “Latitudinar-
ian” since they did not separate from the synagogue.64 Established reli-
gious forms were largely irrelevant to Christianity’s legitimate concerns.
Despite these claims, or rather because of them, Campbell’s ecclesiology
became the subject of heated controversy, though he did not live to see
the final stages of this controversy. His only purposeful contributions to
this debate, besides The Spirit of the Gospel, were his unpublished manu-
scripts, particularly the “Strictures on Dodwell” and the “Defence.”
Campbell’s latitudinarian tendencies, evident particularly in his ser-
mon The Spirit of the Gospel, outraged his opponents in Scotland’s non-
juring churches. The Roman Catholic bishop George Hay, writing
61 See Allan, Virtue, Learning, particularly 119–25.

62 Pelikan, Reformation, 367.
63 fg, 1:30.
64 st, 1:397 and 412. “Latitudinarian” is Campbell’s term.
under the pseudonym “Staurophilus,” claimed that “the sacramental

rites are the infallible means, on the part of God, for bringing the grace
of justification, as well as the actual grace by which we are enabled to
persevere, to the soul of the worthy receiver.”65 This was no more than
the traditional Catholic position that saving grace is communicated
through the correctly-administered sacraments by a properly-ordained
priest. Campbell’s objections to this position were based on his histori-
cal understanding of the Roman Catholic church, whose atrocities filled
up scores of pages of the unpublished “Defence.” His lack of agreement
with Hay on the church’s role in the scheme of salvation may indicate a
more fundamental disagreement concerning the proper perspective
from which to view ecclesiastical history. Is the Christian past, they im-
plicitly debated, to be interpreted by the dictates of Catholic church
tradition or by the spirit of critical historical inquiry?
Campbell’s more significant ecclesiological adversary, at least in the
context of recent Scottish history, was William Abernethy Drummond,
bishop in the Scottish Episcopal church. Drummond followed Camp-
bell’s career like a critical shadow. In 1771 he chided Campbell for sug-
gesting that external observances are of no value, arguing that one who
willfully spurns Christ’s ordinances cannot hope for salvation.66 Later
he objected to Campbell’s definition of “schism” in The Four Gospels,
agreeing that the term indicated an alienation of heart, but contending
that it more significantly suggested a contempt for lawful authority.
“Heresy,” likewise, could indeed refer to erroneous doctrine, since unity
of belief is essential in the true church.67 Even after Campbell’s death,
Drummond helped write a lengthy attack on the Lectures on Ecclesiastical
History in the Anti-Jacobin Review. He and George Gleig argued that
Campbell had prejudiced the question of legitimate church order by as-
suming the inevitable corruption of the post-apostolic church. They fur-
ther charged Campbell with supporting a notion of popular church
government which, because of its contempt for legitimately-established
hierarchies, could lead only to anarchy.68
65 George Hay, A Detection of the Dangerous Tendency (London: Printed for the Aletheian
Club, 1771), 92.
66 William Abernethy Drummond, Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon (Edinburgh:
John Wilson, 1771), 12.
67 William Abernethy Drummond, A Friendly Address (Edinburgh: n.p., 1789), 13
and 16.
68 Anti-Jacobin 8 (March 1801), 279; 9 (June 1801), 127; and (July 1801), 241–2
and 250.
Campbell’s church history lectures also provoked more considered and

systematic replies that cannot be dismissed merely as the rhetorical ex-
tremes of a revolutionary age. Bishop John Skinner, primus of the Scot-
tish Episcopal church, argued from the premise of God’s unchanging
nature that there can be only one legitimate ecclesiastical order for all
time. The Old Testament Hebrew synagogue and the subsequent Chris-
tian church are expressions of a single divinely-sanctioned model of eccle-
siastical government. Legitimacy, argued Skinner, is indispensable to
salvation, and is found only in those bishops ordained in the tradition of
the apostolic succession. Thus Campbell’s ecclesiastical history must nec-
essarily be wrong, even apart from factual arguments, for there is but one
saving church, which in Scotland is the Episcopal. On matters as
important as salvation, concluded Skinner, the true church cannot be too
intolerant of schism.69 Campbell was forced to disagree, for despite his
loathing of schism, he thought intolerance was worse – the cause rather
than the effect of schism. He had no particular desire to unseat Skinner,
challenging only the necessity rather than the legitimacy of the Episcopal
order. To Skinner and his brethren it was all the same. They believed the
greatest contemporary threat to Christianity was church leaders, like
Campbell, who held liberal and generous views of distinctions among
sects.70
Campbell’s ecclesiological opponents maintained a rigid and legalistic
conception of salvation, considering it unattainable without adherence to
certain technical requirements. Drummond assumed that there could be
no true church without spiritual jurisdiction based on lawful apostolic or-
dination. Where there is no true visible church, there is no salvation, for
legitimacy simply does not reside in the heart. “Since there is in Scotland
a regular Episcopacy,” concluded Drummond, “you must either be mem-
bers of the Church of Scotland, or of no church.”71 Campbell’s moderat-
ism rejected such ultimatums as contrary to the true spirit of the Gospel.
But the Episcopalians also believed that their arguments had historical
justification, and that the apostolic succession was empirically verifiable.
Unsurprisingly, Campbell held that it was impossible to verify a perfect
69 John Skinner, Primitive Truth and Order Vindicated from Modern Misrepresentation, 1st Amer-
ican ed. (New York: T. and J. Swords, 1808). Despite his gratitude to Campbell for his help in
legalizing the Scottish Episcopal church, Skinner must have realized that he could not have
done the same for Campbell if their positions had been reversed.
70 Charles Daubeny, Eight Discourses on the Connection Between the Old and New Testament
Considered as Two Parts of the Same Divine Revelation (London: J. Hatchard, 1802), 457–8.
71 Drummond, Friendly Address, 20; see also his Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon, 46.
lineal descent of ordination from the Apostles.72 In the “Strictures on

Dodwell” manuscript, he argued that the office of apostle was limited to
the first generation of the church. The Apostles’ powers of binding and
loosing did not descend to later generations. By attributing to the early
bishops God’s own power of judging the souls of men, Dodwell the elder
had given more power to priests than the Roman Catholic church ever
had. Dodwell had in fact so misread church history as to propose a spiri-
tual despotism, and thus the most miserable form of slavery imaginable.
“I have never heard of a scheme,” said Campbell, “which combines so
closely all the evils of atheism and despotism with those of superstition
and idolatry.”73 History shows not only that such extreme High Church
arguments are in error, but that virtually all Christian sects and denomi-
nations become tainted with time. Drummond pointed out that Camp-
bell’s arguments implicitly gave up the divine right of the Presbyterian
form of church government.74 Campbell agreed, and there was nothing
left to argue.
What then were the implications of Campbell’s historical and biblical
studies for his contemporary situation? On the one hand, Campbell
firmly adhered to the necessity of a separation of church and state powers.
As the spiritual realm is entirely removed from the civil, so also must the
church be kept free of the powers of physical or legal coercion. The weap-
ons of the magistrate are inappropriate to the work of the minister, whose
only legitimate power is persuasion.75 On the other hand, Campbell did
not oppose an official state church. He thought the present Church of
Scotland was well-adapted to the needs of its members, for the civil magis-
trate could not interfere with the ecclesiastical courts, nor could the
church use excommunication as a political weapon. The church’s inabil-
ity to impose civil penalties made its rulings cautious and respectable.76
The appropriate function of the church, said Campbell, is the discipline
of its own members, particularly its ministers – a discipline which he
believed was too relaxed in the Scotland of his day.77 Campbell had no
72 leh, 1:104.
73 aul ms 650, section ii, un-numbered page.
74 Drummond, Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon, 31.
75 aul MS 654, part IV, un-numbered page.
76 leh, 1:74–5. This sentiment was meaningful in a country where it was relatively easy
to leave the established church for another one of similar beliefs.
77 lpc, 235. In this matter, he was very much in agreement with the political Moderates
of his day. He thought that the Church of England, whose ecclesiastical laws were more lax,
was particularly prone to ministerial sloth (lpc, 230).
absolute objections to the Episcopal model of church government; his

close friend James Beattie actually preferred it. But Campbell’s ecclesiol-
ogy focused on the practical needs of Christians rather than on the uncer-
tain issue of legitimacy. Church order mattered most to the fringe groups,
such as the Scottish Episcopalians, whose very existence (they thought)
depended upon the exclusivity of their ecclesiological claims.
superstition and enthusiasm
Campbell’s concern for church order was less governed by regard for
the next life than by regard for the present life. The business of the vis-
ible church was not to save souls but to provide leadership and stability
in matters of religious doctrine, worship, and discipline. Campbell’s
intense commitment to freedom of thought and expression did not
permit him to interfere with the worship of other Christian bodies. His
concern for the good order of society, however, caused him to worry
about two typically eighteenth-century religious problems. Supersti-
tion and enthusiasm, as embodied in Roman Catholicism and Evangel-
icalism respectively, were to eighteenth-century moderates the chief
obstacles to religious enlightenment.
Campbell was deeply mistrustful of the Roman Catholic church, de-
spite his pleas for Catholic emancipation. Like many of his age, he as-
sumed that the Roman priesthood conspired to keep its charges in
perpetual ignorance and dependence. “Certain it is,” said Campbell,
“that [the Romish religion] … succedes [sic] best where ignorance and
barbarity with their inseparable attendant superstition most abound.”78
Priestcraft, he argued, is the inevitable consequence of joining the of-
fices of cleric and magistrate. All religious sects are guilty to some de-
gree of superstition, but the Roman Catholic church is the veritable
embodiment of this unfortunate tendency of human nature.79
Campbell’s hostility to the Roman Catholic church was partly de-
rived from his Presbyterian heritage. Nothing had united Scottish Prot-
estants of the previous two centuries more than their common hatred
of papists. The Westminster Confession was packed with anti-papal sen-
timents, and explicitly identified the pope with antichrist. Robert
Wodrow’s History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland implicitly
bound Presbyterianism, Hanoverian loyalty, and civil liberty together
78 aul ms 649, p. 41.

79 aul ms 654, part iv, un-numbered page; aul ms 652, pp. 93–4.
with antipathy to Romish tyranny and persecution. William Dunlop, a

professor of ecclesiastical history at Edinburgh, demonstrated the
unity of Protestant belief by contrasting it with Catholic superstition.80
Even seventeenth-century Anglican divines developed their probabilist
theory of knowledge against the absolutist claims of their Roman Cath-
olic opponents. Thomas Reid similarly argued that the papal claim of
infallibility is the greatest obstacle to the advancement of religious
knowledge.81 Alexander Gerard, who took great offence at Hume’s un-
generous characterization of the ministerial character, was quite will-
ing to uphold Hume’s charges against the Roman clergy.82 Campbell’s
own hostility to the Catholic church had much in common with this
heritage, yet it was also more nuanced and carefully reasoned than the
common Protestant prejudice. He directed his energies against the
documented claims of Roman Catholic apologists.
Bishop George Hay, the vicar apostolic of the Scottish Catholic com-
munity, maintained an ecclesiology similar to that of his Episcopalian ri-
vals. Like them, he held that salvation is unattainable outside of the one
true visible church. The true church, said Hay, “is always Holy, always
Catholic, always a visible body … always one, always apostolical, always
infallible in what she teaches.”83 It follows, then, that “the Church of
Christ is the only road to salvation,” though Hay of course denied true
church status to the Church of England or to any other non-Roman
Episcopal church.84 Hay directed “An Inquiry, Whether Salvation Can
Be Had Without True Faith, and Out of the Communion of the Church
of Christ” against Campbell and other latitudinarians. Hay explicitly re-
jected the liberal view – prevalent, he thought, in the contemporary
world – that a man can be saved in any religion provided that he live a
moral life according to his own conscience.85 Whether Campbell actu-
ally held such a view is questionable, but it is noteworthy that Hay char-
acterized his moderate opponents in the same way that Presbyterian
High-flyers did.
80 William Dunlop, A Preface to an Addition to the Westminster Confession, (London: T.

Cox, 1720), 42.
81 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, 2 vols, 7th ed.
(Edinburgh: MacLachlan and Stewart, 1872), 1:268.
83 George Hay, The Sincere Christian, in Works of the Right Rev. Bishop Hay of Edinburgh, ed.
Bishop Strain, 5 vols (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1871), 1:175.
84 Hay, Works, 1:195 and 1:211–14.
85 Hay, Works, 2:262.
Campbell’s objections to the Roman Catholic church were derived

partly from his notion of the true spirit of the Gospel, which he thought
opposed the extreme claims of apologists such as Hay, and partly from
his enlightened scholarship. His work on the Gospels showed him that
the Roman church’s “secret reason, both for preserving the consecrated
terms and for translating only from the Vulgate, is no other than to
avoid, as much as possible, whatever might suggest to the people that
the Spirit says one thing and the church another.”86 Familiarity with
church history demonstrated that the spirit of the modern Catholic
church was antithetical to the spirit of the primitive church. Campbell’s
“Defence” manuscript supported this claim with a catalogue of Catholic
crimes and abuses throughout the ages. The actions of prelates and
popes in the “advancement of sacerdotal despotism” had illustrated
their disregard both for God’s natural law and for his revealed com-
mands. Though the breaking of faith with heretics was never an estab-
lished doctrine, it was sufficiently practised to warrant Protestant
mistrust of Catholic promises. Most of all, Campbell objected to
“priestly dominion, the summum bonum in Rome’s theology.”87 He did
not believe that the majority of modern Roman Catholic adherents was
corrupt. In fact, most Roman Catholics detested the inquisition. Yet,
How they should have the inconsistency, notwithstanding this, to acknowledge a

power as from God, which has found it necessary to recur to expedients so man-
ifestly from hell, so subversive of every principle of sound morality and religion,
can be regarded only as one of those contradictions, for which human charac-
ters, both in individuals and in nations, are often so remarkable. That the policy
of Rome bears the marks, not of the wisdom which is from above, which is first
pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and of
good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy; but of that which flows
from a very different source, and is earthly, sensual, devilish, is so manifest, that
the person who needs to be convinced of it, seems to be beyond the power of
argument and reason.88
Campbell had himself clearly passed the bounds of reasonable dis-

course, but his passion on the matter is telling. As much as he objected
to the Roman Catholic church’s legacy of intolerance and tyranny, he
86 fg, 1:401.
88 leh, 2:320–1.
objected even more to its subversion of the true spirit of the Gospel.
Roman claims of spiritual superiority and infallibility were the chief ob-
stacles to the flourishing of a charitable and voluntary Christian soci-
ety.89 Christian unity ought to be not the product of ignorance and fear
in its adherents, but rather the spontaneous consequence of the gather-
ing of like-minded individuals who have discovered Christian truth by
means of personal Scripture-reading. Campbell’s treatment of the Ro-
man church was subtle in that his notion of Christian charity allowed
him to simultaneously condemn the spirit of Popery and tolerate the
practice of the Catholic religion. He believed that he was being consis-
tent, though it is not difficult to understand why he confused many of
his fellow Presbyterians – particularly those who clung to a traditional
covenanting and militant view of their confession.
Campbell’s presuppositions concerning the true spirit of the Gospel
were fundamentally incompatible with the claims of Roman Catholics
such as George Hay. Both Catholic and Episcopalian High Churchmen
assumed that there can be only one divinely-sanctioned church order,
though they disagreed over the identity of the true apostolic church.
Campbell, who believed that church order is largely irrelevant to the
question of salvation, was concerned only to discover which form of
church government best supported the practice of the Christian life.
His historical studies had convinced him that none of the contemporary
churches corresponded exactly to the apostolic model, and that perhaps
it was not essential that they do so. In fact, he conceded that different
forms of church government might be suitable to different climates and
conditions, as was the case with civil government.90 The enlightened
pedigree of this idea is unmistakable.
Campbell opposed any form of church government that placed its
own good above that of the individual Christian. Coercion had no place
in matters of the heart. The authoritarian nature of the Roman hierar-
chy was therefore incompatible with the true Gospel. Did this mean that
there was no place for church discipline? Was the heart the only author-
ity for the individual Christian? Eighteenth-century moderates were
forced to address this issue by those who elevated individual Christian
experience above all temporal authority – those whom we historically la-
bel “Evangelicals.” Eighteenth-century Evangelicals, whether Calvinist
or Arminian, gave priority to the activity of the Holy Spirit and to the
89 lstpe, 127.
90 leh, 1:92.
internal evidences of the Christian religion – that is, to the vivid and per-
sonal experience of saving grace. Eighteenth-century empirical
Christians like Campbell tended to call these people “enthusiasts.”91
Nevertheless, the Aberdonians were friendlier to the travelling Method-
ists than were many Scots in the southern lowlands. John Wesley and
George Whitefield visited the capital of the Northeast more than a
dozen times each, and were cordially received into its established
churches – even into the chapel of Marischal College.
Evangelicalism horrified those who gave priority to church order.
William Abernethy Drummond, answering Campbell’s The Spirit of the
Gospel in 1771, categorically denied the legitimacy of the inward call.92
Bishop Skinner argued that “enthusiasm” (by which he clearly meant
Evangelicalism) was the logical consequence of rejecting the apostolic
succession.93 Campbell and other moderates tended to have somewhat
different reasons for objecting to the Evangelical spirit. They agreed with
the High Churchmen that popular religious activities promoted disorder
within the church. Gerard advised his divinity students that lay fellowship
meetings at the parochial level were not necessarily bad, but were usually
so ill-managed that they promoted more enthusiasm, superstition, and
hypocrisy than genuine piety. For that reason, they had to be carefully
monitored and controlled.94 But eighteenth-century Christian moderates
usually objected to Evangelicalism because it implicitly rejected the no-
tion of objective and demonstrable truth in religious matters. Campbell
believed that religious truth, to be of any value, must not only be discover-
able by the individual mind but also empirically verifiable – that is, sub-
ject to scrutiny by other minds. The empirical conception of defensible
religious belief underlay the whole structure of Campbell’s apologetic sys-
tem, from his secular notion of evidence and his philosophy of suasive
discourse, to his detailed examination of the natural evidences of the
Christian religion. Campbell believed that Christianity can answer infidel-
ity and deism only on its own terms – that is, on the basis of the historical
verifiability of Christian claims. Evangelicalism merely abandoned the ev-
idential field to Christianity’s most dangerous opponents. Campbell ob-
jected to the Evangelical emphasis on Christian feeling and passion for
91 Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (London: W. Strahan, 1755) defined an enthusiast as,

“One who vainly imagines a private revelation; one who has a vain confidence of his inter-
course with God.”
92 Drummond, Remarks upon Dr. Campbell’s Sermon, 34.
93 Skinner, Primitive Truth, 18.
94 aul ms K 174, pp. 193–5.
much the same reason that he objected to Hume’s under-appreciation of

the natural and Christian evidences. Hume and the Evangelicals each
failed to appreciate the Creator’s gift of critical faculties capable of
uncovering the natural evidences of divine truth.
Campbell’s objection to enthusiasm (which could mean creedalists as
well as Evangelicals) was rooted in his notion of the true spirit of Gospel
charity. “The fanatic,” he said, “considers himself as Heaven’s favourite;
and believes this to be either his peculiar prerogative, or, at least, a priv-
ilege he enjoys in common with a few.”95 He noted that “in some popu-
lar systems of religion, the zeal of the people is principally exerted in
support of certain favourite phrases, and a kind of technical and idiom-
atical dialect to which their ears have been long inured, and which they
consequently imagine they understand, but in which often there is noth-
ing to be understood.”96 Such errors, characteristic of certain parties
within the Church of Scotland, are difficult to detect when the subject is
abstract. Campbell cautioned his students to avoid “superstitious or en-
thusiastical notions in regard to religion.”97 The spirit of false religion
takes different forms in different individuals; “In the apprehensive and
timorous, the effect is Superstition; in the arrogant and daring, it is Enthu-
siasm. Ignorance is the mother of both by different fathers.”98 Campbell
thought that his own church was subject more to the latter abuse. Vio-
lence is the natural consequence of an enthusiast’s conviction that he
has found special favour in the sight of God.99 In The Philosophy of Rheto-
ric Campbell pointed out the evils of fanaticism resulting from the mis-
use of rhetoric. Popular hatred, he warned, is easily inflamed, but only
the sensitive rhetorician can move an audience to love.100 Thus the
study of rhetoric must be an essential component of the training of an
effective minister.
Campbell gave particular attention to the dangers of enthusiasm in-
herent in the Presbyterian church. In his divinity lectures, he wondered
aloud why some enthusiastic Scottish preachers criticized their brethren
for preaching a “dry and heathen morality” when they themselves
95 st, 1:337.
96 pr, 270.
97 lpc, 162. Superstition he defined as that “which instigates only to a blind tenacious-
ness of absurdities in theory, and the most contemptible mummeries in practice, as a full
compensation for every defect in virtue, and an atonement for every vice” (lpc, 162).
98 st, 1:334.
99 st, 1:337.
100 pr, 108–9.
courted popularity by attacking the sins of the wealthy.101 He inveighed

against popular preachers who noisily attacked the shortcomings of
their fellow ministers but succeeded only in promoting the very schisms
and “methodisms” that had rent the Scottish church.102 He objected
not to pious zeal, but to sectarian zeal. Ultimately, said Campbell to his
divinity students, there must be order and discipline even within a vol-
untary body such as the church because it contains as many opinions as
it does adherents.103 Opinions are not worth dividing the body of
Christ’s believers, for division itself is the great enemy of the Gospel.
Campbell’s rejection of salvation by external observances or visible insti-
tutions meant that the true cost of salvation is borne inwardly, by means
of self-discipline and personal reformation. Enthusiasm is the outward
sign that an individual has not grasped this central Christian truth.
Campbell had no particular quarrel with contemporary Evangelicals
(who were not sectarian), and certainly not with warmth in the cause of
religion. He feared only the dangers to which the enthusiastic mindset
exposed the practical realization of the authentic spirit of the Gospel.
True religion is of the heart, though only the head can decide if the
heart has not deceived itself. “That we may reflect light on others,”
Campbell told his Christian audience, “we must ourselves be previously
enlightened.” To this end we must have experienced the spirit of the
Gospel in our own hearts.104 Those who impose their private experi-
ences and imagined revelations upon others have not experienced the
true Gospel. Those who indulge in the excesses of enthusiasm have
forgotten their God-given reason.
It has long been assumed that the Evangelical spirit was the particu-
lar enemy of the Moderate party within the eighteenth-century
Church of Scotland. Campbell, like his Moderate brethren, did in-
deed advocate order and discipline within the Scottish church. But
the point of this discipline was not to crush Christian zeal or self-
determination, nor to promote authoritarian power in the church
(which Campbell feared more than enthusiasm), but to prevent the
needless divisions that destroyed Christian charity. It is time now to
undertake a final examination of Campbell’s moderatism and of his
relationship with the much-maligned Moderates.
101 lpc, 192–3.

102 lpc, 211. Campbell here meant not Methodists but seceders and sectarians.
103 lpc, 207.
104 st, 1:312.
The Limits of Moderatism
m o d e r at i s m a n d t h e m o d e r at e pa rt y
“In all great questions,” said George Skene Keith of Campbell, “he be-
longed to what is called the moderate party in the church; and generally
supported the laws of the state with respect to patronage.”1 Campbell
was acknowledged by his contemporaries to be a Moderate in the nar-
row, political sense of the term. From what we have already seen, he was
certainly a moderate in the broader sense of the term. He was politically
conservative, though he defended the Glorious Revolution settlement
and advocated freedom of religion and expression. He was a latitudinar-
ian, though he preferred the Presbyterian discipline of his own volun-
tary church. He was rational and empirical in his treatment of Christian
evidences, though he allowed for the usual Christian mysteries. He
trained his divinity students to cultivate politeness and critical thinking,
but not at the expense of piety. He valued natural religion, but empha-
sized that it was merely the first step towards discovering the saving
truths of revealed religion.
These values were largely shared by those who formed the Moderate
party within the eighteenth-century Church of Scotland. This well-
organized group of ministers and laymen should, however, be kept dis-
tinct from the broader climate of values and beliefs that constituted en-
lightened moderatism. The Moderate party first rose to prominence
under William Robertson’s leadership in the early 1750s. It advocated
order and discipline according to the law and to the Presbyterian
1 George Skene Keith, “Some Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. George Camp-
bell” (1800), in leh, 1:xl–xli.
The Limits of Modernism 237
model of church government, and employed skillful ecclesiastical man-

agement to bring enlightened values into the Scottish church. Camp-
bell generally supported the goals and strategies of the Moderate party,
though his ideological aversion to party spirit, not to mention his dis-
tance from Edinburgh, prevented him from being one of its leading
political figures. His only surviving letter to Alexander Carlyle demon-
strates that he was intimate with the Moderate party leadership but at
the same time hostile to the personal attachments that were evidently
taking priority over the merits of particular policies and cases in the
General Assembly.2 Campbell’s co-leadership with Robertson during
the time of the No-Popery affair (1778–79) marked the height of his
political involvement with the Moderate party.
The reputations of Scottish moderatism and of the Moderate party
have suffered greatly since the rise of the latter in the 1750s. Moderates
were first made the subject of popular abuse in John Witherspoon’s sa-
tirical Ecclesiastical Characteristics (1753). He cleverly accused “the mod-
erate man” of neglecting Scripture, courting heresy, despising religious
learning, and favouring social accomplishments and politeness above
pastoral duties. Witherspoon’s characterization was taken at face value
by later critics and has remained popular among churchmen and po-
lemicists for two centuries. Many twentieth-century secular scholars have
continued to assume that the Scottish moderates valued polite morality
above scriptural doctrine, placed worldly values before religious ones,
and bowed to the dictates of secular politics and fashionable society.
Recent scholarship has begun to revive the reputation of the Scottish
moderates by demonstrating that they were genuinely concerned for
the welfare of the Scottish church and for the spiritual lives of its peo-
ple, and that they were not as doctrinally distinct from their “orthodox”
opponents as has been supposed. Nevertheless, this same scholarship
continues to pay meagre respect to the religious and pious aspects of
moderate Christian thought.3 We have already observed that, although
he downplayed the necessity of dogmatic certainty on speculative points
of doctrine, Campbell was not notably heterodox. We have seen that la-
bels such as “Arminianism” and “rationalism” cannot account for the
subtlety of his religious thought. Furthermore, we have noted that he
placed the highest value on Christian reformation and practical piety. It
is absurd, therefore, to charge Campbell with maintaining a shallow,
2 Campbell to Carlyle, 19 November 1785: eul Dc.4.41/116.

3 See the paragraph on the moderates in the bibliographical essay pp. 285–6.
unsophisticated, or insincere form of Christianity. His religious body of

thought provides a valuable means of re-examining the ideological te-
nets, real or imagined, of eighteenth-century Scottish moderatism. It
gives substance to the Christian temperament of an overlooked group
of social and religious philosophers.
t he mod erate ideol ogy
“Let your moderation be known unto all men,” said the Apostle.4 Mod-
eration was the pre-eminent value of eighteenth-century moderatism,
combining the foregoing scriptural imperative with contemporary no-
tions of politeness. Gerard maintained that “every excellence is a mid-
dle between two extremes.”5 Campbell likewise told his divinity
students that “truth is most commonly to be found in the middle be-
tween … two extremes.”6 In his first published sermon, he advised his
fellow ministers to be examples of moderation and temperateness in all
things.7 Moderation sought the happy median between too much re-
gard for doctrine and too little, between extreme legalism and too little
respect for lawful authority, and between solemnity and levity in wor-
ship. Moderation meant avoiding the extremes of superstition and en-
thusiasm, both of which corrupted the true spirit of the Gospel.
Authentic Christianity was by its very nature moderate, avoiding both
ignorant faith and overzealous action. Moderation also meant avoiding
the extremes of self-indulgence and self-denial. Campbell argued that
there is no Christian virtue in suffering for the sake of suffering. Self-
denial in the name of Christianity, particularly in the form of monasti-
cism, is a corruption of legitimate self-discipline.8 Finally, moderation
meant tempering religious passion with reason. A religious faith in-
formed only by passion is the enemy of moderation, as demonstrated
by the lawless mob.9 Religious truth, said Campbell, can never be dis-
covered while passions hold sway in the mind, a notion supported as
much by his secular theory of human nature as by his Christian ideals.10
4 Philippians 4:5.
5 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste, 3d ed. (Edinburgh: J. Bell and W. Creech;
London: T. Cadell, 1780), 122.
6 lpc, 137–8.
7 cmg, 59.
8 leh, 2:379.
9 st, 2:341–4.
Campbell’s notion of moderation rejected traditional conceptions of

religious controversy. Though he realized that “by this moderation, I
gain nobody,”11 he believed that seeking adherents is itself contrary to
the spirit of the Gospel. “In the search of truth,” he said, “… I disclaim
all party or sect.”12 A central tenet of his moderatism, then, was the re-
jection of the sectarian or partisan spirit, as well as those things that en-
gender this spirit, notably controversy over abstract doctrine. Campbell
argued that “nothing blinds the understanding more effectually than
the spirit of party, and no kind of party-spirit more than bigotry, under
the assumed character of religious zeal.”13 Perhaps with his own church
in mind, he noted that “the more insignificant, the more inconceivable,
nay the more nonsensical the question is, the greater will be the heat,
the more unrelenting the zeal, and the less flexible the dogmatism with
which it is agitated.”14 Campbell counted as evil any controversy that dis-
tracts the Christian from his charitable duty. “Have our polemic divines,
by their abstruse researches and metaphysical refinements, contributed
to the advancement of charity, love to God, and love to man? Yet this is,
in religion, the great end of all; for charity is the end of the command-
ment, and the bond of perfectness.”15 Campbell taught that proper
Christian zeal, as opposed to sectarian zeal, is concerned only with
purity of heart, and is guided by knowledge and charity.
The Scottish moderates had a high regard for ecclesiastical order,
which for them included respect for social subordination. Campbell
may have rejected party spirit in matters of doctrine, but he nevertheless
supported the Moderate party in matters of church order and disci-
pline. In the eighteenth-century Scottish church, this meant the en-
forcement of lay patronage – the legal right of traditional landed
patrons and town councils (rather than a slightly broader group of heri-
tors and church elders) to select their parochial ministers.16 The Mod-
erate party has been frequently disparaged for its conservative views of
social order, although recent scholarship has demonstrated that the

13 fg, 1:101.
15 fg, 1:482.
16 See Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate
Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24 and 47–8. The ene-
mies of lay patronage argued that the 1712 patronage law contravened the 1707 Treaty of
Union.
eighteenth-century opponents of the Moderate party seldom advocated

democratic notions of church government.17 The Moderates may have
believed that patronage was the necessary price for keeping great land-
owners friendly to the Presbyterian form of church government. Robert-
son’s Moderate party was created explicitly to promote order and
discipline within the Church of Scotland. Its policy paper – published in
1752 and since dubbed the “Manifesto of the Moderate Party” – argued
that discipline and subordination are necessary for the survival of any
society, particularly a voluntary society such as the Church of Scotland.18
This meant that the issue of lay patronage was of secondary importance
to the more central problem of law and order. Campbell’s views were
fully in line with those of the Moderate party. “All government,” he said,
“all subordination, all order, is overturned at once, if every man shall
think himself entitled to rail and clamour, whenever he disapproves, or
is dissatisfied.”19 Although Campbell did argue that Christians are obli-
gated to the dictates of their own consciences – that is, to the laws of
God before those of men20 – it is likely that he meant only private mat-
ters of belief, and not the right of a congregation to choose its minister.
This does not mean that he was simply a reactionary conservative, for
“neither length of time, nor extent of territory, nor number of suffrages
can invest error with the prerogatives of truth, or make evil good, and
good evil.”21 We have seen that Campbell associated the history of the
church with the almost inevitable and insensible rise of abuses over
time, which suggests that he supported the Moderate party because it
promoted the practical interests of Christianity in Scotland rather than
because it was simply conservative. The unusual respect that he com-
manded in the General Assembly suggests that he was often successful
17 Richard Sher and Alexander Murdoch argue that the Popular party was not “popu-
lar” at all. Most opponents of lay patronage wanted to place control of ministerial appoint-
ments into the hands of lesser heritors or of ministers themselves, rather than into the
hands of the people; see “Patronage and Party in the Church of Scotland, 1750–1800,” in
Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408–1929, ed. Norman Macdougall (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1983), 197–220.
18 “Reasons of dissent from the judgment and resolution of the commission,” reprint-
ed in The Scots Magazine 14 (April 1752): 191–7. The Moderates were perfectly aware that
Scottish Presbyterians could and did leave the established church for other Presbyterian
churches more to their liking. In fact, the Moderates may have wished to force these
extreme elements out of the established church.
19 lpc, 206.
21 aul ms 652, p. 85.
in his attempts to convince his fellow ministers to consider each ecclesi-

astical issue according to its individual merits, rather than according to
a predetermined party line. His commitment to social order in no way
implies disdain or insensitivity towards his common parishioners. In any
case, the social conservatism generally evident in the Moderate party (as
well as in the Popular party of the time) was more typical of the age than
any democratic notion of popular rights.
Moderates have most often been accused of a thinly-disguised secular-
ism and of a disdain for religious truth and piety. This is a much more seri-
ous charge than that of social conservatism. The fact that the Moderates’
religion sometimes appears secular indicates that they wished to bring reli-
gion into the realm of daily life. As Gerard said, “The shop, the exchange,
the occupations of active life, form the only theatre on which the virtues of
justice, fidelity, and honesty can be practised; and without constantly prac-
tising these, you can have no religion.”22 This attitude was rooted in the
traditional Christian notion that the present life is “a state of discipline for
eternity.”23 Campbell characterized the religious fanatic as one who valued
“what tended only to make men resigned to Heaven, and useless to man-
kind; what tended but to promote rational piety, temperance, justice, and
beneficence, was in no estimation at all.”24 “That doctrine is the soundest,”
he contrarily suggested, “which has the happiest influence on the temper
and lives of those who receive it; which operates most powerfully by love to
God, and love to man.”25 Although moderate preachers such as Hugh
Blair implicitly identified the interests of Christianity with those of polite-
ness, they also maintained that the triumph of true Christianity was respon-
sible for the contemporary revolution in manners.26 Robertson claimed
that the mildness and humanity of modern European manners, as well as
Europe’s superiority in the arts and sciences, were largely the consequence
of the Protestant Reformation.27 Thus the moderates assumed that polite
culture was the consequence of Christian reform, rather than the catalyst
of a secularized religion as their critics have suggested. They saw politeness
as part of God’s plan for the Christian enlightenment of humanity.
22 Alexander Gerard, Sermons, 2 vols (London: Charles Dilly, 1780–82), 1:18.

24 st, 1:365–6.
25 st, 1:442.
26 Hugh Blair, Sermons, 4 vols, 19th ed. (London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1794),
vol. 1, sermon vi, “Of Gentleness.”
27 William Robertson, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ’s Appearance, in The
Works of William Robertson, 12 vols (Edinburgh: Stirling and Slade, 1822), 1:cxxx–cxxxii.
The Scottish moderates naturally translated their notions of Chris-

tian politeness into their sermons. Their critics have misinterpreted
this as the preaching of mere secular morality. There can be little
doubt that the moderates preached morals in preference to doctrine.
That their sermons nevertheless contained orthodox doctrine was not
enough to satisfy the traditional sensibilities of their High-flying oppo-
nents, who believed that every sermon ought to proclaim the high
points of Christian doctrine, including the depravity of human nature,
the omnipotence of God, the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, and the
irresistible gift of grace given to the elect. The fact that formal theol-
ogy constitutes but a small portion of the Scottish moderates’ surviving
discourse does not necessarily indicate an ignorance or distaste of the-
ology. Campbell was perfectly familiar with the creeds of his church,
and expected his divinity students to preach the traditional Calvinist
doctrines.28 Why then did he not continually reinforce these doctrines
as previous generations had? The answer lies partly in the method-
ological emphasis of his educational philosophy. Campbell wished to
teach his students and parishioners to be their own teachers. His style
cannot be understood apart from the pedagogical purpose that per-
vades his work. And as Jesus himself had said, a teacher is to be judged
by his practical fruits – that is, by his moral example.29 Other leading
Scottish moderates, many of whom were university professors, were
likely motivated by similar pedagogical concerns.
To understand the Scottish moderates’ moral preaching style, we
must consider their own explicit claims. Gerard thought that moral
preaching best reflects the heart of the Gospel message: “A very great
part of that conduct by which your eternal happiness may be promoted,
consists in transacting your ordinary business in a proper and virtuous
manner.”30 A Christian faith that does not give priority to moral duties,
he said, is nothing more than superstitious veneration of forms and ob-
servances.31 The moderates tended to equate virtue itself with true reli-
gion. In Gerard’s mind there was no difference between wickedness and
contempt for religion. The denial of one’s moral duty must lead inevita-
bly to denial of the religious truth that commands virtue. Thus Gerard
confidently excluded from sound doctrine anything that did not have a
28 See pr, 105.

31 Ibid., 1:310.
practical, moral tendency.32 Campbell likewise taught his divinity stu-

dents that to preach the whole Christian system in every sermon is to ac-
complish nothing at all, for such a strategy allows no time to inculcate
the practical and useful Christian duties.33 The moderates did not ig-
nore doctrine in their moral preaching, but instead applied it in the
only way they thought proper. They believed that any doctrine devoid of
practical application could lead only to superstition and popery. A here-
tic is one who disrupts the unity of the church by overturning this
Gospel priority of conduct before doctrine.
The moderates intended their preaching to be practical and moral, but
no less Christian for all that. Campbell believed that Jesus’ Sermon on the
Mount was the very heart of Christian ethics.34 Hugh Blair argued that our
concern for the next life ought to inspire our efforts to moral improve-
ment in this life, for, “in this conflict, the souls of good men are tried, im-
proved, and strengthened.”35 The pursuit of virtue in the present life is the
surest means of benefiting our eternal souls, for there can be no other
means of gaining divine favour. Moral improvement, insisted Campbell, is
the only absolutely indispensable part of the Christian life. No special dis-
pensation of grace can alter this divine imperative.36 The preaching of
moral improvement was the practical consequence of Campbell’s empha-
sis on Christian reformation and the spirit of the Gospel. For some moder-
ates, personal reformation was also linked with a more traditional
covenanting notion of national reformation. As Gerard said, “It is only the
reformation of each particular person, that can reform the nation.”37
The Scottish moderates’ emphasis on moral reformation sheds light
on the nature of their theology. Their christology, for example, focused
on the character and actions of Jesus, rather than on the ontological sta-
tus of Christ. The moderates thought that undue attention to the mys-
teries of the Christian faith could only pervert the simple and
unmistakable moral imperatives of the Gospel. The true spirit of the
Gospel is found in the life and teachings of Christ and the Apostles
rather than in the doctrinal systems of later interpreters.38 Campbell’s
32 Ibid., 2:3, 82, and 142.

33 lstpe, 444.
34 cmg, 4.
35 Blair, Sermons, 1:98.
37 Alexander Gerard, National Blessings an Argument for Reformation (Aberdeen:
J. Chalmers, 1759), 25.
38 st, 1:330.
decision to translate only the Gospels highlights his belief that knowl-
edge of Christ’s actions and teachings is more relevant to the life of the
Christian than knowledge of his divine status. The moderates undoubt-
edly questioned the value of proclaiming human sinfulness if it did not
lead to practical moral improvement. Their moral preaching further
suggests that their doctrine of God was strongly influenced by contem-
porary developments in natural philosophy and natural religion. Their
emphasis on the virtue of benevolence, for example, indicates that they
had discovered in nature a benevolent deity. Moral preaching, there-
fore, was the natural consequence of an enlightened generation’s dis-
covery of God’s love for his creatures reflected in the natural and moral
order of the universe. This divine love for humanity included the gift of
a capacity for self-improvement. Alexander Gerard imagined a future
time when Christianity would again become, “as it truly is in the New
Testament, not a system of nice speculations and contentious subtleties,
but a series of plain principles, evidently founded in scripture, unmixt
with the arbitrary explications, and precarious conclusions of fallible
men, all naturally touching the heart, commanding congruous affec-
tions, and, by their joint force, directly inculcating piety and virtue, and
promoting the reformation and happiness of mankind.”39
t he mo derate pro gra m
The practical bent of Scottish moderate theology had several important

implications. The moderates meant to reform not only the lives of indi-
vidual Christians but also the world in which they lived. To this end they
promoted religious toleration and improved pastoral care. These goals
are particularly evident in Campbell’s life and writings.
We have already seen that Campbell devoted a considerable portion
of his works and public ministry to the characteristically enlightened
cause of religious toleration. But most of his arguments for toleration
were grounded in his conception of Christianity. He declared that “reli-
gion and coercion of any kind are utterly incompatible.”40 “True reli-
gion,” he believed, “is of too delicate a nature to be compelled … by the
coarse implements of human authority and worldly sanctions.”41
40 fg, 1:27.
41 leh, 1:73.
Religious coercion is not only ineffectual, but contrary to the ideal spirit
of the ministerial office. Toleration, in contrast, is found both in the
Gospels and in the practice of the apostolic church. In fact, any evi-
dence that the Gospel advocated punishment for wrong-thinking would
only disprove its divine origin.42 Campbell claimed that to destroy free-
dom of conscience by means of coercion is to destroy religion itself, for
true Christianity is more concerned with purity of heart than correct-
ness of opinion.43 At best, compulsion turns a man of mistaken judg-
ment into a hypocrite. Campbell argued that no claims of truth can
justify religious persecution, for “the true definition of persecution is to
distress men, or harass them with penalties of any kind, on account of
an avowed difference in opinion or religious profession.”44 This defini-
tion suggests that a man cannot be justly persecuted for spreading his
views either. In fact, Campbell wished to defend “freedom of opinion in
its utmost extent. This, in my judgment, gives a much fairer chance for
the discovery of truth, as well as for promoting the interests of humanity
and equity in mens [sic] treatment of one another, than all the artifices
which have been devised by a crooked policy, for either bribing or
frightening the mind into a decision which is not founded in cool reflec-
tion. I am so little a partisan in regard to any of the sects concerned in
this question, that, tho’ I am myself a firm protestant, I would make no
distinction here between protestant and catholic.”45 He further chal-
lenged the prevailing assumptions of most of his contemporaries, in-
cluding some in the Moderate party, by insisting that persecution
cannot be justified even for the protection of the community.46 Camp-
bell’s strong opinions were derived from his belief that religious truth is
most often subverted by the imposition of arbitrary bounds of inquiry.
Scripture, he claimed, is not meant to make men omniscient in matters
of religion. Still, the critical arts and a wealth of translations have actu-
ally brought Christians closer to scriptural truth.47 “The due consider-
ation of the progressive state of all human knowledge and art,” he

43 Campbell to Hailes, 24 June 1789 (nls ms 25305, fols. 10–16); aul ms 653,
part iii, un-numbered page. Gerard made virtually the same argument at the close of his
Dissertations.
44 st, 2:249; aul ms 654, part iv.
45 Campbell to Douglas, 11 March 1790: (bl Egerton ms 2186, fol. 5v).
47 st, 1:361; fg, 1:19.
asserted, “will ever be unfriendly to the adoption of any measure which

seems to fix a barrier against improvement.”48
Toleration was not only right, argued Campbell, but practical as well.
He believed that the tempers of the Scottish Episcopalians had been
soured by their exclusion from national life. Their extreme High Church
stance was merely a natural reaction against the perceived threat to their
existence. Consequently, legal toleration would almost certainly moderate
their temperaments, so that “their sentiments will breath [sic] more of
humanity, and more of common sense.”49 Campbell suggested that to
treat the Scottish dissenters as friends instead of enemies would eventually
make them so.50 His attitude may have reflected the situation in the
Northeast of Scotland, where Episcopalians and Presbyterians, as well as
Jacobites and Hanoverians, had coexisted more readily than had similar
groups in the south of Scotland. Campbell’s marriage into a prominent
Episcopalian and Jacobite family certainly demonstrated the practical
benefits of friendly understanding. His firm but extremely unpopular
stance during the No-Popery affair likewise reflected his belief that his
own church was often less than an ideal model of the true spirit of Chris-
tianity. He chastised his countrymen for their intolerance toward Catho-
lics, arguing that their illiberal spirit was no different than that which
made the spirit of popery itself so reprehensible.51 Intolerance, he sug-
gested, indicates only a lack of faith in the effectiveness of providential
protection.52
Campbell’s theory of toleration was as advanced as that of any non-
Christian philosopher of his time, and may have reached an audience
that was unfamiliar with the works of Locke and Voltaire. He advocated
full freedom of inquiry and expression, and argued the corresponding
necessity of removing powers of civil coercion from ecclesiastical offices.
To combine the offices of magistrate and minister, he said, “is to attempt
to form a hideous monster at the best … The weapons of [the minis-
ter’s] warfare are not carnal: he forbears threatening, and does not em-
ploy the arm of flesh: his weapons are the soft powers of persuasion,
48 fg, 1:29.
49 Campbell to Douglas, 4 July 1789 (bl Egerton ms 2185, fol. 192r).
50 Campbell to Douglas, 22 July 1790 (bl Egerton ms 2186, fols 10–11). Campbell
argued in a direction opposite to most of his countrymen. They claimed that Catholics and
Episcopalians could not be tolerated because they were dangerous to civil society. Campbell
argued that they were dangerous to civil society because they were not tolerated.
51 st, 2:240 and 261.
52 cmg, 58.
animated by tenderness and love. In vain it is pretended, that the [coer-

cive] ecclesiastical jurisdiction … is not of the nature of dominion, like
the secular. Where is the difference that can be called material?”53
Campbell taught his young charges that a minister must not form a poor
opinion of those who think differently than they do,54 for he was well
aware that a large share of contemporary intolerance could be traced to
the example of ministers. One of his major pedagogical aims, therefore,
was to instill a spirit of toleration into the future moral and spiritual
leaders of the Scottish community. In fact, he devoted an entire
discourse near the end of his history lectures to defending the benefits
of toleration – an appropriate end to a course whose theme was the
gradual corruption of the church.
Campbell’s concern to instill in his divinity students a sense of the
true spirit of Christian charity helps to dispel the common notion that
the Scottish moderates were unconcerned with the duties of the pasto-
ral office. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that moderates such as
Alexander Carlyle and William Robertson were deeply concerned with
pastoral duties. Gerard’s divinity lectures devoted considerable space to
the daily obligations of the parochial minister. He described to his stu-
dents the aims and requirements of the pastoral office: “The spirit of
your profession is a warm ambition to accomplish the salvation & im-
provement of men; an active & ardent love of God & of Christ; benevo-
lence towards men; a love of truth & of religion.”55 He told them that
the ministerial office requires a full-time commitment, and is incompat-
ible with absenteeism and secular occupations.56 Although we know lit-
tle about Campbell’s actual performance as a minister, it is clear from
his writings that he was deeply concerned with the office itself. From the
beginning of his career, Campbell equated the ministerial office with
enlightenment – that is, with improvement in both understanding and
virtue. His first published sermon, The Character of a Minister of the Gospel,
criticized “these enlightened days” for their growing unconcern with
the duties of religion.57 Campbell was critical not of the Enlightenment
itself, but of its abuses. He thought it contradictory to pursue virtue and
yet neglect religion. More enlightenment, not less, was the antidote for
the ills of his age. Rhetoric was just one of the enlightened arts that
53 leh, 1:67.
54 lstpe, 18.
55 aul ms K 174, p. 65. See appendix 1 for a list of Gerard’s lecture topics.
56 aul ms K 174, pp. 197–9.
57 cmg, 61.
could be effectively employed to battle popular errors.58 The Philosophy

of Rhetoric itself was begun at the time of Campbell’s first pastoral place-
ment at Banchory Ternan. Along with The Four Gospels, it was meant to
address his early concerns about the best means of interpreting and
communicating Gospel truths to God’s people. In other words, the pur-
poses of these works were conceived within the context of Campbell’s
larger pastoral and pedagogical concerns.
Campbell’s Lectures on the Pastoral Character outline his views of the
ideal nature of the ministerial office. He contrasted the characteristic
virtues of the minister – meekness, fortitude, and temperance – with the
particular vices to which a minister is most susceptible – namely hypoc-
risy, love of popularity, schism, and sloth. In his earlier work, The Charac-
ter of a Minister of the Gospel, he cautioned his fellow ministers against
intemperance and impiety. Campbell argued that worship ought to be
solemn, and that gravity is most becoming in the ministerial character.59
His first biographer suggests that he was quite sincere in his recommen-
dations, practising a style of public prayer that was simple and humble,
and that avoided pompous and controversial expressions.60 Campbell
believed that the administration of the sacraments and other external
observances are only a small part of the minister’s duties: “To inculcate
the truths and duties of religion, to give seasonable advice and consola-
tion, make also a part of that important charge: if I should even say, the
principal part, I should not speak without warrant.”61 Only the perver-
sions of priestcraft, he thought, put rites and observances in place of
true moral piety.
the limits of the mod erate min d
The moderatism of Campbell and of his associates was a more carefully-

constructed and complex system of thought than has been generally re-
alized. It was also more earnestly and sincerely Christian than has been
commonly assumed. Too many critics have confused moderatism’s
methodological care and aversion to dogmatism with coolness towards
Christian truth. Campbell’s system of thought was truly a system in that
its components could not be isolated from one another. Each individual
58 cmg, 49.
59 cmg, 39–45; pr, 26.
60 Keith, “Account of George Campbell” xxxix–xl.
part of that system depended on the viability of the other parts, and on
the structure of the whole. Campbell’s position on miracles, for exam-
ple, was inseparable from both his larger Christian apology and his the-
ory of evidence. Likewise, his rhetorical philosophy was inseparable
from the religious purposes of his larger work. The structural unity of
his thought depended upon acceptance of certain notions of human
psychology, as well as agreement concerning the nature and uses of evi-
dence. Thus the enlightened parts of his thought were bound together
with the religious parts.
There were certain advantages to such a unity of thought. Campbell’s
expertise in ecclesiastical history, for example, lent authority to both his
treatment of miracles and his defence of religious toleration. Eighteenth-
century minds craved the kind of detailed historical examples that
Campbell brought to his examination of the early church. Campbell’s
familiarity with epistemological theory contributed to his triumph over
Hume in contemporary opinion. His theory of evidence made his Chris-
tian apologia all the more convincing to an empirical age. His biblical
criticism allowed his Protestant emphasis on the sole authority of Scrip-
ture to appear more secure. But if Campbell’s Christian system worked
so well in the context of the Enlightenment, what became of it thereaf-
ter? Why did the moderate ideology and program not survive into the
modern world?
The fate of Campbell’s apologetic system is typical of the fate of any
system of thought that is rooted in a very specific historical context.
Campbell’s arguments were compelling so long as his audience ac-
cepted the premises from which he argued. Eighteenth-century audi-
ences were drawn to his style of argument and particularly to the
evidential and psychological premises from which he worked. But subse-
quent generations have silently abandoned many of the key premises
that formed the foundation of his argument. Without this solid founda-
tion, the remaining structure of his thought verges towards collapse.62 A
Dissertation on Miracles, for example, argues the nature of testimony and
of belief rather than the nature of miracles themselves. If one rethinks
the nature of historical and testimonial evidences – as nineteenth-
century historians did – then Campbell’s position on miracles becomes
62 Gerard Reedy finds something similar in the structure of the thought of his late seven-
teenth-century Anglican divines. Their rational faith was founded upon an “interdependent
unity of arguments,” scriptural and natural arguments each assuming the truth of the other,
so that the whole system stands or falls together; see The Bible and Reason (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 62.
considerably less tenable. If one begins to handle Christian texts in a

radically new manner – as the higher critics did – then the use of the
Gospels as simple historical narratives becomes problematic. If the evi-
dences of Christian miracles and revelation are re-evaluted, then so
must the conclusions of empirical Christian belief. Moderate Christian-
ity depended upon the critical historiography and textual scholarship
developed during the age of Enlightenment. Just as the Enlightenment
sowed the seeds of its own demise by creating the critical tools and un-
covering the wealth of information that later generations would use to
question the Enlightenment’s underlying views of human nature and of
universal truth, so also did the demise of the Enlightenment entail the
demise of a form of Christianity that was dependent upon enlightened
proofs.
Campbell, like his age, believed in the existence of objective truth –
that is, the notion that truth is “either this or that.” Yet his theory of tol-
eration was based on the epistemological premise that the human mind
is incapable of attaining certain knowledge. Indeed, the most bigoted
and ignorant sectarians are generally the most sure of their grasp of
truth, and are thus the most intolerant. Campbell saw no contradiction
between his belief in objective truth and his support of a toleration pol-
icy that was based on the relativity of human knowledge of truth. This
may represent a religious version of Newton’s rules of philosophical rea-
soning, which held that we do not perceive the universal laws of nature
directly, but that our belief in the truth of such laws is contingent upon
future experience of phenomena conformable to them.63 The journey
towards truth can never be completed in this world. Seventeenth-
century Anglican divines had similarly believed that truth is absolute
even though our knowledge of it is not. Upon this premise they con-
structed their probabilist theory of knowledge, which Campbell remade
into his own. Campbell believed that religious and moral knowledge is
based upon experience, the cumulative effect of which amounts to
moral certainty. Moral certainties, according to Campbell’s philosophy
of evidence, can be as reliable as mathematical certainties, even though
their “truth” depends upon the continued support of verifiably similar
experiences. Eighteenth-century moderatism was friendly neither to
Hume’s unreasonable scepticism nor to the Evangelical fondness for pri-
vate religious experiences and revelations. It was also unfriendly to the
63 See especially rule iv of Newton’s “Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy” at the beginning

of book iii of the Principia.
dogmatic and exclusive religious claims made by extreme Episcopalians

and Roman Catholics, as well as by some Presbyterian sects. The moder-
ates could live comfortably with the limitations inherent in the notion of
probabilist knowledge, including a degree of uncertainty about religion
and Scripture. They could do so with the confidence that their method
of inquiry was most likely to lead them closest to the truth. This confi-
dence allowed them to believe that their Christian faith, which de-
manded a commitment oblivious to degrees of probability, was well-
founded. But the moderates’ enlightened views concerning the empiri-
cal nature of the human understanding also made necessary the practice
of philosophical and religious toleration.
The moderates’ philosophical caution may have been reasonable in
its time, but it was much too subtle to be popular, which helps to explain
the demise of moderatism in the early nineteenth century. The moder-
ates’ emphasis on balance between extremes meant a balance between
ignorant belief on the one hand and unreasonable scepticism on the
other, between religious certainty and methodological caution, between
evidence and faith, and between orthodoxy and freedom of enquiry.
Campbell and the other moderates had continuously to maintain a
middling position between the opposing pulls of fideism and scepti-
cism, ecclesiastical authoritarianism and spiritual enthusiasm, religious
conservatism and radicalism. They were challenged on the one side by
legalistic sects, such as Scottish Episcopalians and Roman Catholics, who
made exclusive claims about salvation based on their understanding of
history and tradition. On the opposite side, they were challenged by
Evangelicals who based their religious claims on private experiences
rather than on historical evidences. Moderate Christians had to weigh
their desire to challenge these claims with critical arguments against
their desire to maintain a vital and charitable Christianity. They also had
to prevent their own religious scepticism from becoming as unreason-
able as the scepticism of Hume and Gibbon. Moderate Christian schol-
ars who adopted the critical tools of their age bore the novel burden of
defending not only their own sectarian claims but the validity of
religious belief itself.64 The Scottish Moderates had to do all this while
sustaining their political viability.
Maintaining such a reasonable, middling position is difficult enough
in times of political, social, and ideological stability. It is impossible
64 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1989), 108.
when external pressures become as unbearable as they did in Britain

and Europe after the 1780s. By the early nineteenth century, the moder-
ates’ position was being pulled apart from every side. The political and
intellectual atmosphere in Britain during the wars with revolutionary
France became particularly unfriendly to those considered liberal in
their thought.65 The British establishment feared a social conflagration,
and demanded firmer allegiance to orthodox and conservative values.
The ultra-conservative journal that was founded during this time, the
Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine, was decidedly unfriendly to Campbell’s
latitudinarianism. The Moderate party in the Church of Scotland be-
came more conservative and reactionary, implicitly abandoning some of
its moderatism. These pressures made it virtually impossible to maintain
the kind of ideological balance and cautious intellectual optimism that
eighteenth-century moderates desired. By attempting to maintain an
intellectual position reasonable to all, the moderates’ position became
acceptable to none.
The climate of the nineteenth century was as unsuited to the social
and intellectual values of moderatism as it was to the values of the En-
lightenment. Just as the nineteenth century swept away many of the en-
lightened premises upon which Campbell’s thought was constructed, so
also did it sweep away many of the premises of Christian moderatism.
Eighteenth-century moderates defended their formal beliefs with what
they took to be objective historical facts. Higher critics of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, however, tended to divorce their religious faith
from both traditional orthodoxy and historical enquiry. They cultivated
a Christian faith that was well removed from the evidences (which they
themselves had gathered) that cast doubt on the literal veracity of tradi-
tional claims about Jesus. The moderates were traditional enough to
consider it absurd to believe in one who did not historically do all that
was claimed of him – that is, one who did not assert that he was the
divine Son of God and who did not perform miracles to prove that he
was. The moderates also adhered to enlightened views of human na-
ture. They assumed (along with some notable infidels of their time) that
65 For an account of how Reid’s reputation was manipulated during this period be-
cause of political considerations, see Paul B. Wood, “Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher: A
Study of Science and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Leeds, 1984). Roy Porter sees the social stability and values of the Enlightenment in
England being repudiated from many sides during the time of the French Revolution; see
“The Enlightenment in England,” in The Enlightenment in National Context, ed. Roy Porter
and Mikulás Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 16–17.
society would crumble without the support of religious moral sanctions.

Nineteenth and twentieth-century innovations in psychology and sociol-
ogy have discarded such assumptions and eroded their emotional im-
pact. The limits of the moderate mind were intimately related to the
limits of the enlightened mind. The fall of the Enlightenment entailed
the fall of Christian moderatism.
Campbell, of course, foresaw no such limits to his system of thought.
His was not an age of crisis. He saw no incompatibility between the reli-
gious mind and the enlightened mind. He thought that his world was
progressively – if fitfully – advancing towards a state of perfection. In the
coming age, he argued, swords will be beaten into plowshares, as fore-
told in Scripture: “I am strongly of opinion that this prophecy will be
one day literally accomplished: tho’ we are many centuries too early
here to see it.” In Campbell’s imagination, the ideals of an enlightened
utopia merged with those of primitive Christianity. But he did not think
that his own age had yet come close to realizing such ideals. “To me it is
not improbable,” he said late in his life, “that we shall be deemed little
better than savages, by our Successors, two centuries hence.”66
66 Campbell to Douglas, 22 July 1790 (bl Egerton MS 2186, fols 10v–11r). Campbell
was here speaking of the folly of the slave trade, which the Aberdonians hoped to abolish.
concl.fm Page 254 Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:39 AM
Conclusion
For what concerns natural religion, to the light of
nature, and the light of conscience which
Solomon justly calls the candle of the Lord; and for
what concerns revealed religion, to the light of
God’s word, interpreted by the best application I
can make of the understanding which God has
given me to be employed in his service, I will
assiduously and attentively look for direction. In
this exercise I have ground to think that I shall
not prove unsuccessful. I am persuaded that to
them who use aright what they have, more shall
be given: whatever is necessary, God will not
withhold. If we seek the truth, in the love of
truth, we shall find it.
George Campbell1
“That we may reflect light on others,” said Campbell to his fellow minis-
ters, “we must ourselves be previously enlightened.”2 George Campbell
was thoroughly a man of the Enlightenment. This is not to say that he
was enlightened because, like David Hume, he developed a systematic
theory of evidence and grounded the rhetorical arts in the study of hu-
man nature. Nor is it to say that he was enlightened because he pro-
duced a critical history of the Christian church that looked much like
Edward Gibbon’s, or exposed the conspiracy of the priesthood in the
manner of Voltaire. Campbell needs no comparison to the great infidels
of the age to earn his enlightened credentials. The eighteenth century
had many more enlightened Christians like Campbell, moderate and
practical, than it had enlightened pagans. These enlightened Christians
did not flee the critical assaults of their sceptical counterparts, but in-
stead attempted to answer the critics of religion on their own terms.

2 st, 1:312. Campbell may also be reflecting the more traditional Calvinist notion that
“in regeneration the mind is savingly enlightened”; see Select Works of the Late Rev. Thomas
Boston, ed. Alexander S. Patterson (Edinburgh: A. Fullarton, 1844), 88.
Conclusion 255
Their appeal to natural evidences was part of the culture of thought

shared by all enlightened minds, whether Christian or pagan. Campbell
believed that the Enlightenment was the ally of a moderate, rational,
and practical Christianity, rather than a threat to his Christian heritage.
His body of work encapsulates the major concerns of enlightened Brit-
ish divines throughout the eighteenth century, and highlights the direc-
tion of their apology, which proceeded methodically from natural
evidences to Christian faith.
This is not to say that Campbell’s personal faith was built workman-
like from a series of natural evidences and probabilist conclusions. He
did not advise his divinity students to suspend their Christian faith until
they had worked through its natural evidences with care and impartial-
ity. In fact, he recommended that his students become thoroughly famil-
iar with “sacred writ and sacred history” before examining the works of
the deistical controversy, so as to avoid being “misled and imposed on.”3
He advised them that inquiring into the authority of Scripture ought to
be the last point of their study of “the revealed word.”4 In other words,
he assumed the truth and goodness of the Christian revelation from the
beginning of his course, and only later provided natural evidences to
support it. He believed that the truth of Christianity had been suffi-
ciently vindicated that it could be taught with absolute confidence. But
in matters of formal apology, Campbell depended upon a structure of
argument that gave order and coherence to virtually everything that he
taught and wrote. “Let it be observed,” said Campbell to his divinity
students,
that all the articles of our faith may be divided into three classes. Some may not
improperly be denominated philosophical, some historical, and some propheti-
cal. Of the first kind, the philosophical, are those which concern the divine na-
ture and perfections; those also which concern human nature, its capacities and
duties: of the second kind, the historical, are those which relate to the creation,
the fall, the deluge, the Mosaic dispensation, the promises, the incarnation of
the Messiah, his life, his death, his resurrection, his ascension, the descent of the
Holy Spirit, the mission of the apostles, and the several purposes which, by these
means, it pleased the divine Providence to effectuate: of the third, or the pro-
phetical kind, are those which regard events yet future, such as the second com-
ing of our Lord Jesus Christ, the resurrection of the human race, the general
3 lstpe, 221–2.
4 lstpe, 159.
judgment, eternity, heaven and hell. As therefore a considerable portion of the

Christian faith consists in points of an historic nature, it must be of consequence
for elucidating these, to be acquainted with those collateral events, if I may so
express myself, which happen to be connected with any of them by the circum-
stances of time and place.5
What is notable here is that the saving truths of the Christian religion
are blended almost seamlessly with the kinds of natural and historical
evidences that formed the foundation of Campbell’s philosophy. In
Campbell’s mind, there was no evident break in the structure and unity
of knowledge. His faith required enlightened evidences to be complete,
and his enlightened thought required faith to give it purpose. No part
of this study, then, has been unrelated to Campbell’s religious mind.
Nevertheless, it is all too easy for moderns to misunderstand the na-
ture of Campbell’s career. Both George Campbell and Alexander Ger-
ard began their literary professions with indisputably secular works on
such typically enlightened topics as rhetoric, taste, and genius – works
born of enlightened societies and founded in the larger Scottish project
of delineating human nature by exploring its various manifestations.
Both Campbell and Gerard, however, increasingly devoted the energies
of their mature years to more obviously Christian concerns. They
trained Scotland’s future ministers, delivered popular sermons, and in-
fluenced the direction of the Scottish church through their participa-
tion in the General Assembly and the Synod and Presbytery of
Aberdeen. But despite this apparent trend from secular to religious con-
cerns, their careers demonstrate a remarkable continuity of thought
and purpose. They were as concerned with the practical realization of
the Christian religion at the beginning of their careers as they were at
the end. Though their methodology was enlightened, their teleology
was unmistakably Christian. Everything that they did pointed towards
the practical and the pious. Nevertheless, modern scholars and students
have concentrated on their secular writings to the exclusion of their reli-
gious works. Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric and Gerard’s Essay on Taste
and Essay on Genius are reprinted and read today while the sermons and
religious dissertations are systematically ignored. The disparity between
Campbell’s eighteenth-century reputation and his modern one is the di-
rect consequence of this arbitrary division. If we wish to gain a more his-
5 leh, 1:2–3.
Conclusion 257
torically-nuanced understanding of Campbell’s intentions, and of the

thought of the age which his work represents, we must repair this
violent breach.
We may begin by recognizing that Campbell was not a divided person.
The same man who wrote The Philosophy of Rhetoric over the course of
twenty-five years also laboured for forty years to produce a translation of
the Gospels for the purpose of Christian edification. The scholarly tools
and critical attitudes that he employed in these works were largely the
same. Can the purposes, then, that guided these works be kept strictly
apart? Was the man who sought the principles of rhetoric in human na-
ture not the same man who searched out the intentions of God in the
natural world? These different activities were bound together by a com-
mon Baconian purpose. When the Aberdonians battled Hume, they did
so to save not only their religion from scepticism, but their science as
well.6 The Wise Club’s study of natural history and natural philosophy,
like that of most eighteenth-century philosophers, was highly teleologi-
cal. Philosophers and theologians alike deduced the existence and na-
ture of God from the apparent design of his universe, which included
the constitution of human nature that gave meaning to the principles of
rhetoric. The more examples of design they found – that is, the greater
their scientific understanding of human nature and of the natural order
– the more they knew of God and of his intentions. William Paley’s Natu-
ral Theology overwhelmed its readers with quantity of detail from the nat-
ural world in order to demonstrate the nature and intentions of God.
Campbell’s arguments concerning the historical nature of the early
church and the superior validity of the apostolic over the Roman Catho-
lic miracles were of the same kind. In disregarding this sheer quantity of
argument, Hume was out of step with his age, both in his treatment of
miracles and in his disdain of the natural evidences employed by Chris-
tian moderates and deists alike to illustrate the beneficent design of the
universe. And being out of step with his age, Hume appears to us as a
prophet of modern philosophy.
Campbell’s mind was not ahead of its time. His thought was suffi-
ciently representative of the eighteenth century that his reputation
could not easily survive the demise of the values and assumptions of his
age. He did not push the frontiers of Western thought towards their
6 Paul B. Wood, The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth Century
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1993), 163.
typically modern forms. Despite even the continuing popularity of his

rhetorical philosophy, Campbell’s thought does not belong to the mod-
ern world. Perhaps, then, his system of thought deserves to fall into ne-
glect, to succumb to the natural selection of historical memory. But the
historian might also argue that Campbell better represents the thought
of his age than one whose philosophy appeals to our own time. Al-
though we recognize in retrospect that David Hume offered important
challenges to eighteenth-century thought – challenges which Campbell
and Reid took seriously – we must also recognize that most eighteenth-
century minds found Hume’s premises, arguments, and conclusions un-
convincing. If we choose to dismiss eighteenth-century Christian moder-
ates for not fully appreciating the philosophy of one who has found
such favour in the modern world, we deliberately misunderstand the
more characteristic thought-patterns of Hume’s world.
Modern students of the eighteenth century have nevertheless chosen
to concentrate on unrepresentative figures such as Hume. As a conse-
quence, we have come to interpret the Enlightenment as we have usu-
ally interpreted Hume – that is, as fundamentally hostile to religion.
Peter Gay, perhaps the most influential of modern interpreters of the
Enlightenment, recognized that some eighteenth-century Christian
scholars had attempted to construct a bridge between religion and phi-
losophy. He nevertheless concluded that the image of the bridge “fails
to evoke the essential hostility between eighteenth-century religion and
eighteenth-century secularism: the philosophes rudely treated the
Christian past rather as Voltaire treated the plays of Shakespeare – as a
dunghill strewn with diamonds.”7 Gay invariably termed the men of the
Enlightenment philosophes, and philosophes, as everyone knows, were fun-
damentally critical of all the manifestations of revealed religion. Thus
the Enlightenment too must have been hostile to religion. But eigh-
teenth-century Scots, with the exception of Hume, will not bear to be
called philosophes. The Aberdeen Enlightenment, of which Campbell was
a leading figure, cannot be interpreted as pagan. Can it therefore prop-
erly be called an Enlightenment? The Aberdonians were certainly
learned scholars, thoughtful philosophers, and respected writers within
the international republic of letters, but they used their learning to
7 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. [Volume I:] The Rise of Modern Paganism
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1966), 322–3. “Christianity made a substantial contribution to
the philosophes’ education,” continues Gay, “but of the definition of the Enlightenment it
forms no part.”
Conclusion 259
uphold a more or less orthodox Christianity. In fact, the Aberdeen mod-

erates, and probably their Edinburgh brethren, were more earnestly
Christian than even their sympathetic modern biographers would sug-
gest. So what do we do with them? The structure and details of Camp-
bell’s apologetic system suggest how one eighteenth-century Scot
managed, at least to his own satisfaction, to reconcile the interests of
religion with those of the Enlightenment.
If we wish to maintain some kind of unified Enlightenment, then we
must think of the eighteenth-century culture of thought as neither reli-
gious nor secular in itself, but as something employed by both Christians
and “modern pagans” for their own purposes. The Enlightenment may
have been an age of secularization, but it was not yet a secular age. It was
united by a common set of concerns and critical attitudes rather than by a
common creed. In the context of the Scottish Enlightenment Hume was
exceptional, both in his attempt to use the critical tools of the Enlighten-
ment against Christianity and in the appeal of his thought to a later age. It
might be argued, however, that Hume’s critical tools were as much a Cal-
vinistic legacy as those employed by George Campbell, John Witherspoon,
or Jonathan Edwards. The fact that scepticism would ultimately be used to
undermine Christianity itself (and not just other versions of it) does not
lessen the Christian intentions of its typical users. Just as classical scholar-
ship had, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, undermined the
popular veneration of classical authors (much against the intentions of the
classicists),8 so also did the critical tools of Christian apology contain the
potential to overturn traditional, historically-based ideas of Christian truth.
Only in hindsight can we perceive the natural progression from textual
criticism to higher criticism, and the ultimate divorce of faith from history.
Campbell’s career was a microcosm of the Christian Enlightenment’s at-
tempt to use all available tools to defend Christian belief, and to navigate
between the extremes of Catholic mystery and Calvinistic scepticism. Chris-
tian moderates asserted the value and necessity of natural knowledge,
though they carefully contained the uses of this knowledge within the
framework of revealed religion. Perhaps the Enlightenment was the last
age to keep the warfare between reason and revelation within manageable
bounds. But the notion of a war between science and religion is the
creation of historians. It is the kind of mental construct or fiction that
Campbell and Hume laboured to expose. Reconciling the enlightened
Campbell with the religious Campbell is our problem, not his.
8 Joseph M. Levine, The Battle of the Books (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2 and 46.
appen_1.fm Page 261 Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:40 AM
Appendices
Appendix 1:
Schedule of Divinity Lectures Given
by George Campbell and Alexander Gerard
during the 1786–87 Term
Descriptions of Campbell’s and Gerard’s lecture courses for the 1786–87 term
come from the student notebooks of Robert Eden Scott.1 Campbell lectured on
Tuesdays and Thursdays, while Gerard lectured on Mondays and Fridays, so that
Aberdeen divinity students could attend both professors. It appears that Scott
missed no classes for the year. Campbell’s lecture for March 29 was cancelled
due to the graduation ceremonies at King’s College.
Campbell Gerard
(1) Dec 19 1st introductory lecture2

(2) Dec 21 2nd introductory lecture
(1) Dec 25 Nature of the pastoral office
(pc, introduction)3
(3) Dec 26 3rd introductory lecture
(4) Dec 29 4th introductory lecture (2) Dec 29 Scriptural criticism
(3) Jan 1 Proper idea of pastoral office
(pc, I:i, 1–3)
1 The manuscripts, both located in the Aberdeen University Library’s special collec-
tions, are numbered M 190 and K 174 respectively.
2 Campbell’s four introductory lectures correspond to the first four introductory dis-
courses found in his Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence or in his manuscript
aul MS M 191 and 192.
3 The abbreviation pc indicates Gerard’s The Pastoral Care, ed. Gilbert Gerard (London:
T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1799). The Roman numerals following indicate the part and chap-
ter. The Arabic numerals indicate the section and (where applicable), the article.
264 Appendices
Campbell Gerard
(5) Jan 2 Language and idiom of Scrip-

ture (fg, I:i)4
(6) Jan 4 Varieties of style in Scripture
(fg, I:ii)
(4) Jan 5 Scriptural criticism: the
Hebrew idiom
(5) Jan 8 Dignity of the pastoral office
(pc, I:i, 4)
(7) Jan 9 Difficulties of translation
(fg, II:ii and iii)
(8) Jan 11 Perspicuity of Scripture (fg: III)
(6) Jan 12 Scriptural criticism: phrases
and clauses
(7) Jan 15 Difficulty of the pastoral office
(pc, I:ii, 1–2)
(9) Jan 16 Simplicity of design in Scrip-
ture (fg: III)
(10) Jan 18 Method of examining Scrip-
ture (fg, IV)
(8) Jan 19 Scriptural criticism:
punctuation
(9) Jan 22 Spirit of the pastoral office
(pc, I:ii, 3)
(11) Jan 23 Difficulties of etymology
(fg, IV)
(12) Jan 25 Word meanings in New Testa-
ment (fg, V:i, ii)
(10) Jan 26 Scriptural criticism:
grammatical figures
(11) Jan 29 Pastoral duties: private duties
(pc, II:i)
(13) Jan 30 Word meanings in New Testa-
ment (fg, V:iii, iv)
(14) Feb 1 Commonly mistranslated
terms: “devil” (fg, VI:i)
4 The abbreviation fg indicates Campbell’s The Four Gospels, which match the lectures
quite closely. The first Roman numeral refers to the dissertation number; the second, lower
case numeral (where applicable) refers to the part number.
Divinity Lectures Given by Campbell and Gerard 265
Campbell Gerard
(12) Feb 2 Scriptural criticism:

grammatical figures
(13) Feb 5 Pastoral duties: private
instruction (pc, II:i, 2)
(15) Feb 6 Mistranslated terms: “hell”
(fg, VI:ii)
(16) Feb 8 Mistranslated terms: “hell” and
“heaven” (fg, VI:ii)
(14) Feb 9 Scriptural criticism:
grammatical figures
(15) Feb 12 Pastoral duties: exhortation
(pc, II:i, 3)
(17) Feb 13 Mistranslated terms: “to
repent” (fg, VI:iii)
(18) Feb 15 Mistranslated terms: “holy”
and “saint” (fg, VI:iv)
(16) Feb 16 Scriptural criticism: rhetorical
figures
(17) Feb 19 Pastoral duties: visiting the
sick (pc, II:i, 5)
(19) Feb 20 Translating titles of honour
(fg, VII)
(20) Feb 22 Translating titles of honour
(fg, VII)
(18) Feb 23 Scriptural criticism: rhetorical
figures
(19) Feb 26 Pastoral duties: reproving and
rebuking, reconciling, care of the
poor (pc, II:i, 6–9)
(21) Feb 27 Terms not directly translat-
able (fg, VIII)
(22) Mar 1 Terms not directly translatable
(fg, VIII)
(20) Mar 2 Pastoral duties: preaching
(pc, II:iii, 1)
(21) Mar 5 Pastoral duties: visitation of
families, catechizing, marriage
(pc, II:ii)
(23) Mar 6 Problem terms: “mystery”
(fg, IX:i)
266 Appendices
Campbell Gerard
(24) Mar 8 Problem terms: “blasphemy”

(fg, IX:ii)
(22) Mar 9 Preaching: explanatory
discourse (pc, II:iii, 1, [1])
(23) Mar 12 Preaching: explanatory
discourse (pc, ibid.)
(25) Mar 13 Problem terms: “schism” and
“heresy” (fg, IX:iii, iv)
(26) Mar 15 Problem terms: “sect” and
“heresy” (fg, IX:iv)
(24) Mar 16 Preaching: probatory
discourse (pc, II:iii, 1, [2])
(25) Mar 19 Preaching: suasory discourse
(pc, II:iii, 1, [4])
(27) Mar 20 Methods of the various trans-
lators (fg, X:i)
(28) Mar 22 The Vulgate; Castalio
(fg, X:iii, iv)
(26) Mar 23 Preaching: invention
(pc, II:iii, 1, [5])
(27) Mar 26 Preaching: disposition,
elocution, memory, pronunciation,
occasional sermons (pc, II:iii, 1,
[6–9])
(29) Mar 27 Beza (fg, X:v)
(28) Mar 30 Pastoral duties: other public
duties (pc, II:iii, 2)
(29) Apr 2 Pastoral duties: public
discipline (pc, II:iv)
(30) Apr 3 The Gospel authors: Matthew5
(31) Apr 5 Mark, Luke, and John
(30) Apr 6 Qualifications for the pastoral
office (pc, III:i)
(31) Apr 9 Preparations for the pastoral
office (pc, III:ii)
5 Each of the translated Gospels is individually prefaced in The Four Gospels.

Appendix 2:
Campbell’s Creed
Such, to wit plain and practical, the genuine uncorrupted truths of christianity …
are in reality neither many nor complicated … Thence we learn, ‘That there is one
only GOD, a spirit, eternal and omnipresent, infinitely powerful, wise and good, the
maker and the ruler of the world: – That man having apostatiz’d from him, and so
become obnoxious to perdition, it pleas’d the universal Lord, for our recovery, to
send into the world his ONLY SON: – That this glorious personage assum’d our
nature, was born of a virgin, and so usher’d into these terrestrial abodes in a way
suitable to the dignity of his source: – That he reveal’d the will of heaven to man,
was by profession a preacher of righteousness, of which in his life he exhibited a
perfect pattern: – That under the form of civil justice, he suffered a most unjust, cruel
and ignominious death: – That he rose again the third day, an irrefragable evi-
dence of his mission: – That he afterwards ascended into heaven: – That by the
merit of his obedience and suffering, he purchased for his people eternal felicity: –
That this purchase is ascertained to all who repent and obey the gospel, and offer’d
on these terms: – That to assist in performing this condition, the grace of the HOLY
SPIRIT of God is tender’d to every one, who sincerely and assiduously seeks it: –
That there is an appointed time of general resurrection, when all the dead where-
soever scatter’d, shall arise: – That thereafter comes the final judgment, when ev-
ery individual shall be judged by Jesus the Son of God, according to the actions
done in the body, whether good or bad: – That finally in consequence of the irre-
vocable sentence, which will be then pronounced, the wicked shall go into everlast-
ing punishment, and the righteous into life eternal, the two last states of retribution
(The Character of a Minister of the Gospel, 16–17).
Appendix 3:
A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence
The following list includes eighty-three letters: sixty-nine written by Campbell,

and fourteen addressed to Campbell. Only extant letters are listed; known but
lost letters have been excluded. Correspondence about Campbell has also been
excluded.
Date Correspondent MS Location
21 Feb. 1761 to the Lord Provost of Aberdeen aca Letterbook 12, 119.
11 Jan. 1762 to Aberdeen Town Council aca Letterbook 12, 209.
7 June 1762 from David Hume aul 3214/7.
25 June 1762 to David Hume nls 23154, n. 11.
30 Sept. 1762 to [John Stuart], third earl of Bute aul M 370.
22 Feb. 1770 to [David Steuart Erskine], eul La. II, 588.
eleventh earl of Buchan
1 Aug. 1770 to David Skene ncl THO 2, fols 53–4.
11 May 1771 to Alexander Kincaid sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.6
22 May 1771 to Alexander Kincaid sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
30 May 1771 to Alexander Kincaid sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
[4 Sept. 1771] to James Beattie aul 30/2/62.7
5 Aug. 1773 from James Beattie MS?8
6 The William Creech letterbooks are part of the Dalguise Muniments, copied on mi-
crofilm at West Register House in Edinburgh, RH4/26/1.
7 This note from Campbell to Beattie is copied into a letter from James Dun to Beattie.
The date is taken from the Dun letter, not from Campbell’s original note.
8 The source used is James Beattie’s Day-Book 1773–1798, ed. Ralph S. Walker (Aber-
deen: Third Spalding Club, 1948). I cannot find the original manuscript of the letter.
A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence 269
13 Apr. 1776 to William Strahan nls 2618, fol. 55.

2 May 1776 to Ann Farquharson aul 3214/5.
26 June 1776 to William Strahan bl Add. 34886, fol. 78.9
27 June 1776 to Ann Farquharson aul 3214/6 [and 3214/8?].
3 Dec. 1776 to Ann Farquharson aul 3214/16.
15 May 1779 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
18 May 1779 to Edmund Burke sca WWM Bk. 1/240.10
12 June 1779 to Edmund Burke sca WWM Bk. 1/1172.
[25 June 1779] to James Beattie aul 30/1/173.11
2 July 1779 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
24 May 1780 from John Erskine [No MS.]12
31 Aug. 1781 to James Beattie aul 30/2/361.
30 Mar 1782 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
5 June 1782 to [William Petty] second earl of Clements Library, Shelburne
Shelburne MSS., v. 115, pp. 215–16.
10 Oct. 1782 to James Beattie aul 30/2/386.
16 Nov. 1782 to Lord Hailes nls 25303, fol. 161.
18 Dec. 1782 to James Beattie aul 30/2/393.
[1 Mar. 1783?] to Lord Hailes nls 25303, fols 177–8.
24 Mar. 1783 to Lord Hailes nls 25303. fol. 179.
7 July 1783 to James Beattie aul 30/2/417.
27 Mar. 1784 to Lord Hailes nls 25304, fols 1–2.
22 May 1784 to James Beattie aul 30/2/454.
4 June [1784?] to James Beattie aul 30/2/478.
25 Sept. 1784 to Lord Hailes nls 25304, fol. 3.
[Summer 1785?] to Lord Bute aul M 387/16/4/7.
19 Nov. 1785 to Alexander Carlyle eul Dc.4.41/116.
9 This is an extract of a letter to the publisher William Strahan, found among the
Gibbon papers.
10 This letter was misdated by Campbell as 1769, an error repeated in the Sheffield
archives.
11 This is an extract from a letter to Beattie that was copied by Beattie into a letter to
Elizabeth Montagu. I cannot find Campbell’s original letter. The date given is that of the
Beattie letter, not of the original Campbell letter.
12 This open letter appears as a preface to John Erskine’s A Narrative of the Debate in the
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh: W. Gray, 1780).
270 Appendices
29 Dec. 1785 to James Beattie aul 30/2/494.

6 May 1786 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
17 June 1786 to Lord Hailes nls 25304, fols 54–5.
12 July 1786 to Lord Buchan [Source of MS?]
17 July 1786 to [Anthony Fletcher], fifth earl aul 2954.
of Kintore
6 Sept. 1786 to Henry Dundas aul U 557.
17 Feb. 1787 to the Aberdeen Magistrates aca Letterbook 13, 217.
8 July 1787 from Bishop John Douglas aul 3214/17.
25 July 1787 to Ann Farquharson aul 3214/14.
16 Apr. 1788 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
5 May [1788?] to Lord Hailes nls 25305, fols 22–3.
10 June 1788 to James Beattie aul 30/2/568.
1 Oct. 1788 from Bishop John Douglas aul 3214/11.
7 May 1789 to Thomas Brydson eul La.II.110.13
19 June 1789 from Bishop John Douglas aul 3214/9.
24 June 1789 to Lord Hailes nls 25305, fols 10–16.
4 July 1789 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2185, fols 191–2.
26 Sept. 1789 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2185, fols 194–5.
[Autumn 1789?] to Lord Hailes nls 25305, fols 27–30.
23 Nov. 1789 to Lord Hailes nls 25305, fols 16–22.
23 Dec. 1789 from William Heberden aul 3214/1.
11 Mar. 1790 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2186, fols 5–6.
20 May 1790 to Alexander Christie nls 3703, fols 66–7.
[24?] May 1790 from Alexander Christie nls 3703, fols 68–70.
22 July 1790 to G.J. Thorkelin eul La.III.379/146.
22 July 1790 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2186, fols 10–11.
22 Sept. 1790 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2186, fols 12–15.
24 Oct. [1790?] from Josiah Tucker aul 3214/3.
13 This letter also includes notes from James Beattie and Patrick Copland to Brydson.
A Checklist of Campbell’s Correspondence 271
9 Nov. 1790 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.

30 Dec. 1790 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2186, fol. 16.
1 Apr. 1791 to Bishop John Douglas bl Egerton 2186, fol. 27.
14 Sept. 1793 to William Creech sro Wm. Creech letterbooks.
4 July 1794 to James Beattie aul 30/2/719.
10 Oct. 1794 to John Abercrombie (Lord aca Council Register 67,
Provost of Aberdeen) fol. 41v.14
12 May 1795 from [John Moore], archbishop aul 3214/4.15
of Canterbury
11 June 1795 to the moderator of the Presbytery sro CH2/1/11, pp. 53–4.
of Aberdeen
11 June 1795 to the Lord Provost of Aberdeen aca Council Register 67,
fols 69v-70r.
22 July 1795 to [David Murray], second earl of aul M 96.
Mansfield
14 Jan. 1796 to John Spottiswoode nls 2618, fols. 57–8.
12 March [yr?] from James Beattie aul 3214/15.
n.d. from [William Heberden?] aul 3214/13.16
14 This is a transcription; the original does not appear in the Council’s letterbook.
15 The message from the archbishop is in William Laurence Brown’s hand.
16 This contains unsigned but friendly comments on Campbell’s Four Gospels; thus the
date is no earlier than 1789. The attribution of authorship to Heberden is my own best
guess based on Campbell’s other correspondence of that time.
biblio.fm Page 273 Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:41 AM
George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century:

A Bibliographical Essay
manuscripts and archives
The life of Campbell presented here has been pieced together primarily
from manuscript sources, many of them previously unnoticed. The most
important Campbell holdings are found in the Aberdeen University Li-
brary (aul), Department of Special Collections and Archives at King’s
College, which contains virtually all of his unpublished manuscripts
(mss 649–655) and lectures (mss m 191–201). R.E. Scott’s notes on
Campbell’s and Gerard’s lectures are located under ms m 190 and ms k
174 respectively. Many of Reid’s and Beattie’s papers and letters are also
found here, as are the manuscripts of the Aberdeen Philosophical Soci-
ety (particularly mss 37, 539 and 3107), a crucial source for the Aber-
deen Enlightenment and for Enlightenment studies at large. The
archives also hold transcriptions (ms 3214) of seventeen letters that are
in the possession of Captain Farquharson of Whitehouse. The Aberdeen
City Archives (aca) has scattered material on Campbell’s appointments
in its registers and letterbooks.
The Edinburgh University Library (eul) has several Campbell letters
as well as a bound proof-copy of the first edition of The Philosophy of Rheto-
ric (Dh5. 150–151). The New College Library (ncl) in Edinburgh has
Campbell’s botanical letter to David Skene (ms tho 2, fols. 53–4). The
National Library of Scotland (nls) has ten letters from Campbell to
Lord Hailes on The Four Gospels (mss 25303–25305, New Hailes collec-
tion), and Campbell’s only known letter to Hume (ms 23154, no. 11).
The Fettercairn papers (mss Acc. 4796) contain the uncut originals of
Beattie’s letters to Sir William Forbes of Pitsligo included in Forbes’ life
of Beattie, with many references to Campbell. The nls also holds Colin
274 A Biographical Essay
Campbell’s “Some Memorandu’ms” (ms 1704, fol. 5). The Scottish

Record Office (sro, now the National Archives of Scotland) has a copy
of Campbell’s will (cc1/6/60) and, at West Register House, microfilm
copies of Campbell’s letters to the booksellers Alexander Kincaid and
William Creech (rh4/26/1). The sro also has a wealth of church
records: ch1 covers the General Assembly, ch2 contains the registers of
the Presbytery and Synod of Aberdeen, and ch12 has some fascinating
material concerning the Scottish Episcopal Church. The Scottish Catho-
lic Archives in Edinburgh has a great deal of material relevant to the
moderates’ relations with Catholic church leaders that is waiting to be
explored. The British Library (bl) has letters from Campbell (and other
moderates) to Bishop John Douglas (Egerton mss 2185 and 2186) and
an extract from a letter from Campbell to Strahan concerning Gibbon’s
Decline and Fall (Add. ms 34886, fols 78–9). The Sheffield City Archives
(sca) has two important letters from Campbell to Edmund Burke (ms
wwm Bk. 1/240 and 1172). The William L. Clements Library at the Uni-
versity of Michigan has one letter from Campbell to the second earl of
Shelburne (Shelburne mss, v. 115, pp. 215–16).
printed primary sources
In addition to the manuscript sources listed above, there are a number

of contemporary and modern printed sources that have proved invalu-
able to this study. H. Lewis Ulman’s edition of The Minutes of the Aber-
deen Philosophical Society 1758–1773 (Aberdeen University Press, 1990)
is essential to any study of the Aberdonians, and contains an extensive
and valuable introduction. The eighteenth-century Scots Magazine con-
tains many articles on contemporary institutions such as the universi-
ties of Edinburgh and Aberdeen, and running accounts of the debates
in the General Assembly that are not found in official church records.
John Sinclair’s Statistical Account of Scotland 1791–1799, nicely re-
printed and edited by Donald J. Withrington and Ian R. Grant in
20 vols (EP Publishing, 1982–3), has much helpful information on par-
ishes and local institutions. Alexander Carlyle’s Anecdotes and Characters
of the Times, ed. James Kingsley (Oxford University Press, 1973), pro-
vides a good sense of how the Edinburgh Moderates came to be in the
context of the 1730s to 1750s. Other contemporary memoirs of impor-
tance are John Ramsay of Ochtertyre’s Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eigh-
teenth Century, and Thomas Somerville’s My Own Life and Times 1741–
1814. The printed sermons of the Aberdonians, though hard to find,
A Biographical Essay 275
are too easily neglected. They provide a good sense of how sincerely
Christian the moderates were; see, in particular, Alexander Gerard’s
Sermons (2 vols) and John Farquhar’s Sermons on Various Subjects (2 vols),
the latter posthumously edited by Campbell and Gerard.
The printing history of Campbell’s works highlights the varying for-
tunes of his posthumous reputation. A Dissertation on Miracles, for exam-
ple, was reprinted at least twenty-three times between 1762 and 1841
(including several translations), but then fell out of print until 1983,
when the first edition was reproduced as part of Garland’s series of
works relating to David Hume. The Four Gospels was reprinted or
abridged at least twenty-two times up to 1848, when its publishing life
ended abruptly. Campbell’s other religious works, particularly the lec-
tures, were occasionally reprinted during the first part of the nineteenth
century, but not after the 1840s.
The Philosophy of Rhetoric appeared only once in the eighteenth cen-
tury, apart from a German translation in 1791, but was reprinted with
increasing frequency throughout the nineteenth century, expanding its
reputation precisely as the religious works were falling into neglect.
Harper and Brothers (now Harper and Row) of New York alone re-
printed the work at least twenty-two times between 1841 and 1887 (see
Lloyd Bitzer’s list of editions, PR, liii–lv). After this it was reprinted only
infrequently in a condensed or abridged form, together with other
works on effective speaking (that is, without the philosophical compo-
nents). The Philosophy of Rhetoric has recently appeared in several schol-
arly facsimiles – most notably Bitzer’s edition in the Landmarks in
Rhetoric and Public Address series published by the Southern Illinois
University Press – and has become a standard text in every history of
modern rhetoric.
secondary sources
c a m p b e l l ’ s r h e t o r i c a n d p h i l o s o p h y Almost all of the

modern secondary material on George Campbell is concerned with his
rhetoric – and less with his rhetoric in the context of the eighteenth
century than with his rhetorical theory in the context of modern rhe-
torical concerns. As this body of literature is far removed from my own
purposes (and largely incomprehensible to non-specialists), I will not
attempt to engage it as a whole. Howard Lewis Ulman has reviewed the
rhetorical literature in “Thought and Language in George Campbell’s
The Philosophy of Rhetoric,” (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University,
1985). Ulman has also nicely summarized the contents of The Philoso-
phy of Rhetoric in chapter 3 of Things, Thoughts, Words, and Actions: The
Problem of Language in Late Eighteenth-Century British Rhetorical Theory
(Southern Illinois University Press, 1994). One recent but not easily ac-
cessible article that attempts to tie Campbell’s rhetoric to the larger in-
tellectual concerns of the eighteenth century is Lloyd F. Bitzer,
“Religious and Scientific Foundations of 18th-Century Theories of
Rhetoric,” (The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication 11 May 1995,
published by Northwestern University, 1996).
Douglas Ehninger was one of the first scholars to recognize the philo-
sophical implications of Campbell’s rhetorical theory in an article that
helped ignite modern Campbell studies: “George Campbell and the
Revolution in Inventional Theory,” Southern Speech Journal 15 (May
1950): 270–6. A number of scholars have tried to get at the philosophi-
cal roots of Campbell’s rhetoric. Clarence W. Edney early suggested the
importance of Locke’s influence (“George Campbell’s Theory of Logi-
cal Truth,” Speech Monographs 15 [1948]: 19–32), which is convincing as
far as it goes, but hardly sets Campbell apart from the majority of his
countrymen or shows the extent to which many of Locke’s rationalistic
assumptions were being silently discarded during the eighteenth cen-
tury. Vincent M. Bevilacqua focused on the Baconian influence (“Philo-
sophical Origins of George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” Speech
Monographs 32 [March 1965]: 1–12), as did Wilbur Samuel Howell in an
impressive survey, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton
University Press, 1971). Again, the comparison is important, but we
should not conclude that this Baconian influence sets Campbell apart
from his British or even his French contemporaries.
Lloyd F. Bitzer has more provocatively pointed towards Hume, using
extensive textual comparisons between The Philosophy of Rhetoric and
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature to show that Campbell borrowed much
of his associational psychology – and consequenty his rhetorical innova-
tions – directly from the sceptic; see “The Lively Idea: A Study of
Hume’s Influence on George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” (Ph.D.
diss., State University of Iowa, 1962), and “Hume’s Philosophy in
George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 3, no. 2
(Summer 1969): 139–66. To my mind, Bitzer significantly overworks
Campbell’s likeness to Hume, and underestimates Campbell’s impor-
tant criticisms of and departures from Hume’s philosophy (particularly
on the matters of memory, testimony, and belief). Nevertheless, Bitzer’s
fundamental comparison remains compelling, though it has provoked
much controversy. Karen Rasmussen appears to accept Bitzer’s argu-

ment, but maintains that Campbell was thereby forced to hold an unten-
able position between Hume’s rigid empiricism and Reid’s intuitive
recognition of Common Sense truths (“Inconsistency in Campbell’s
Rhetoric: Explanation and Implications,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 60
[1974]: 190–200). I suspect that Rasmussen’s argument is really with
Common Sense in general and perhaps with the larger trends of
eighteenth-century philosophy, and that she has undervalued Camp-
bell’s own awareness and solution of this problem. Dennis R. Bormann
has prima facie rejected Bitzer’s considerable body of textual evidence
(apparently without even reading his dissertation) and has argued, with
very little evidence, that because of his Common Sense commitments
Campbell simply could not have been influenced by Hume (“Some
‘Common Sense’ about Campbell, Hume, and Reid: The Extrinsic Evi-
dence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 [1985]: 395–421). Bormann has
failed to consider the possibility that Campbell could have borrowed
from Hume even while he disagreed with him on fundamental matters,
and has dismissed Campbell’s own claims of Hume’s influence. Bor-
mann’s conclusions are profoundly misguided and misleading, though
they do highlight the difficulty of establishing Beattie’s place in Aber-
donian thought. Bormann is not alone, however; the influential but of-
ten-wrong Hugh Trevor-Roper has likewise suggested that Hume and
Common Sense could not belong to the same Enlightenment (“The
Scottish Enlightenment,” Blackwood’s Magazine 322 [1977]: 371–88).
Little has been published on Campbell’s general life and works apart
from this specialized body of literature. The most important life has tra-
ditionally been George Skene Keith’s “Some Account of the Life and
Writings of Dr. George Campbell” (1800), which prefaces the Lectures
on Ecclesiastical History but is not otherwise available to modern readers.
A few later remembrances, such as those found in James Bruce, Lives of
Eminent Men of Aberdeen (1841), and James Valentine, “An Aberdeen
Principal of Last Century,” The Aberdeen Journal (3 April 1896), provide
some interesting biographical details not found (or supported) in
other sources. The six or seven pages of James McCosh’s The Scottish
Philosophy (1875) devoted to Campbell contain a number of factual er-
rors, some of which have been reproduced in the potted biographies
available in general reference works. The best modern account to date
is Lloyd F. Bitzer’s scholarly preface to his reprint edition of Campbell’s
Philosophy of Rhetoric, revised ed. (Southern Illinois University Press,
1988).
e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s c o t l a n d For social and economic

background on Scotland during the eighteenth century, see Rosalind
Mitchison, Lordship to Patronage: Scotland 1603–1745 (Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 1983), and Bruce Lenman, Integration, Enlightenment, and
Industrialization: Scotland 1746–1832 (University of Toronto Press,
1981). There are few if any modern histories of Aberdeen – one must
turn to older works such as William Robbie, Aberdeen: Its Traditions and
History (1893). Eighteenth-century Scots were well aware of the distinc-
tiveness of the Northeast, of which Aberdeen is the capital. James
McCosh gave some account of this in The Scottish Philosophy. Modern
scholars have recently begun to appreciate the particular intellectual fla-
vour of the region, as in Roger L. Emerson, “The Enlightenment and
Social Structures,” in City and Society in the 18th Century, ed. Paul Fritz
and David Williams, (Hakkert, 1973). Stephen A. Conrad, in Citizenship
and Common Sense: The Problem of Authority in the Social Background and So-
cial Philosophy of the Wise Club of Aberdeen (Garland, 1987), gives a good
account of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society’s social discourse,
though it is questionable whether this is what made Aberdeen distinc-
tive. The most important recent work on Aberdeen is Paul Wood’s won-
derful The Aberdeen Enlightenment: The Arts Curriculum in the Eighteenth
Century (Aberdeen University Press, 1993), which describes the college
curricula but also says much about the broader concerns of the Aber-
deen Enlightenment. Roger Emerson’s Professors, Patronage and Politics:
The Aberdeen Universities in the Eighteenth Century (Aberdeen University
Press, 1992) maps out the political context of college business in the
tightly-bred little world of the Northeast. See also the hit-and-miss col-
lection of essays, Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, ed. Jennifer J. Carter and
Joan H. Pittock (Aberdeen University Press, 1987). On Aberdeen pri-
mary education see H.F. Morland Simpson, ed., Bon Record: Records and
Reminiscences of Aberdeen Grammar School from the Earliest Times by Many
Writers (1906). On the divinity course see G.D. Henderson’s unpub-
lished typescript Aberdeen Divines (2 vols, n.d.) in the Aberdeen Univer-
sity Library Special Collections. On the major eighteenth-century
attempt to unite the Aberdeen universities, see the helpful but politi-
cally incomplete account by Walter Robson Humphries, William Ogilvie
and the Projected Union of the Colleges 1786–1787 (Aberdeen University
Press, 1940).
On the Scottish club scene, start with Davis D. McElroy, Scotland’s Age
of Improvement: A Survey of Eighteenth-Century Literary Clubs and Societies
(Washington State University Press, 1969). Further reading should
include Roger L. Emerson, “The Social Composition of Enlightened

Scotland: The Select Society of Edinburgh, 1754–1764,” Studies On Vol-
taire and the Eighteenth Century 114 (1973): 291–329, as well as a series of
papers by Emerson on the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh in The
British Journal for the History of Science (1979, 1981, and 1985). Besides
Ulman’s essential edition of The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Soci-
ety and Conrad’s Citizenship and Common Sense, see Bernhard Fabian,
“David Skene and the Aberdeen Philosophical Society,” The Bibliotheck 5
(1968): 81–99, and Walter Robson Humphries, “The First Aberdeen
Philosophical Society,” Transactions of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 5
(1931–38): 203–38. On the philosophical and religious significance of
the society’s taxonomic activities, see Paul B. Wood, “Buffon’s Reception
in Scotland: The Aberdeen Connection,” Annals of Science 44 (1987):
169–90. See also Wood’s “Science and the Pursuit of Virtue in the Aber-
deen Enlightenment,” in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford University Press, 1990). On eighteenth-
century taxonomic schemes in general (unfortunately, with little British
content) see James L. Larson, Interpreting Nature: The Science of Living
Form from Linnaeus to Kant (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). Alice
H. Sommerville provides a little information on Campbell’s botanical
specimens in “Aberdeen University Herbarium,” Aberdeen University
Review (Autumn, 1979): 200–203. For a sense of the Enlightenment’s
pervasive use of science to construct a natural theology, see the collec-
tion of essays edited by William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer,
The Sciences in Enlightened Europe (University of Chicago Press, 1999),
particularly the afterword by Lorraine Daston.
In the last decade or two eighteenth-century British Jacobitism has be-
come a significant field of scholarship, recently reviewed by Murray
G.H. Pittock, Jacobitism (St. Martin’s Press, 1998). Pittock demonstrates
that Jacobitism was more than just a dynastic struggle – it was the symbol
of Scotland’s widespread opposition to the Union. For what happened
to Jacobitism after the ’45, see Colin Kidd, “The Rehabilitation of Scot-
tish Jacobitism,” Scottish Historical Review 77 (April 1998): 58–76. Con-
text for Campbell’s views on the war with America can be found in
Dalphy I. Fogerstrom, “Scottish Opinion and the American Revolution,”
William and Mary Quarterly 11 (1954): 252–75, and Andrew Hook, Scot-
land and America: A Study of Cultural Relations 1750–1835 (Blackie,
1975). The excellent collection of essays edited by Richard B. Sher and
Jeffrey R. Smitten, Scotland and America in the Age of the Enlightenment
(Edinburgh University Press, 1990) gives a cross-Atlantic context for
many of Campbell’s religious and political views. On the “No-Popery” af-

fair, see Robert Kent Donovan’s essay in the foregoing collection, as well
as his excellent No Popery and Radicalism: Opposition to Roman Catholic Re-
lief in Scotland, 1778–1782 (Garland, 1987), and his condensed “Voices
of Distrust: The Expression of Anti-Catholic Feeling in Scotland, 1778–
1781,” Innes Review 30 (1979): 62–76. For the Catholic side, see Mark
Goldie, “The Scottish Catholic Enlightenment,” Journal of British Studies
30 (January 1991): 20–62. For contemporary accounts of the argu-
ments in the General Assembly, see volume 41 of the Scots Magazine
(May through September, 1779).
t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t The context for Camp-

bell’s epistemology (which, for eighteenth-century minds, was the foun-
dation of philosophy) is the same as for all eighteenth-century British
figures, so no special account of Campbell’s rhetorical concerns need
be taken here. Most eighteenth-century figures were well aware of the
importance of rhetoric in the economy of ideas. Unfortunately, it is
nearly impossible to find a good general treatment of the common set
of problems and concerns faced by all eighteenth-century British episte-
mologists, though individual philosophers (such as the venerable trio of
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) are well served. Late seventeenth-century
English latitudinarianism demonstrates striking parallels with the
thought of the Aberdonians; for comparison, see John Redwood,
Reason, Ridicule and Religion: The Age of Enlightenment in England 1660–
1750 (Thames and Hudson, 1976); Henning Graf Reventlow, The Au-
thority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World, trans. John Bowden
(Fortress Press, 1984); and especially Gerard Reedy, The Bible and Rea-
son: Anglicans and Scripture in Late Seventeenth-Century England (University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). The religious significance of Locke’s epis-
temology has been deftly argued by John W. Yolton in John Locke and the
Way of Ideas (Oxford University Press, 1956). The development of the
seventeenth-century probabilistic theory of knowledge is described in
several excellent studies: Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty
in English Thought 1630–1690 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1963); and Barbara
J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Prince-
ton University Press, 1983). Lorraine Daston convincingly demonstrates
how the Enlightenment’s theory of knowledge and quantifiable notion
of evidence was overthrown by the 1840s (Classical Probability in the
Enlightenment [Princeton University Press, 1988]), precisely when Camp-
bell’s apologetic works ceased to be printed. On Bishop Butler, see the
collection edited by Christopher Cunliffe, Joseph Butler’s Moral and

Religious Thought (Oxford University Press, 1992), particularly the essay
by Basil Mitchell. For Campbell’s unsurprising likeness to Paley, see
D.L. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Paley (University of Nebraska Press,
1976).
The theory of the association of ideas was a relatively new concept in
the eighteenth century (having been dismissed by Locke as an obstacle
to sound reasoning), but has received little treatment from modern
scholars, apart from its use by individual thinkers such as Hume,
Gerard, or in a different vein, Hartley and Priestley. For a general but
limited treatment, see Martin Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical
Theory in Eighteenth-Century England (Mouton, 1970). See also chapter
15 of John H. Randall’s, The Career of Philosophy from the Middle Ages to the
Enlightenment (Columbia University Press, 1962). Campbell’s theory of
evidence was crucial to the collective Aberdonian philosophy, and has
received insufficient attention in that context. C.A.J. Coady has credited
Reid with a theory of testimony that properly belongs, at least in order
of priority, to Campbell (“Reid on Testimony,” in The Philosophy of
Thomas Reid, ed. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews [Kluwer, 1989]).
c o m m o n s e n s e S.A. Grave has written the standard work on Aber-

donian Common Sense Philosophy – The Scottish Philosophy of Common
Sense (Oxford University Press, 1960) – though he has taken a strictly
philosophical and textual view, and overlooked Campbell’s essential
contributions. David Fate Norton has argued that Reid’s Common Sense
and Hutcheson’s theory of Moral Sense were parts of a larger movement
that he has called “Scottish realism”; see “From Moral Sense to Common
Sense: An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common Sense Philos-
ophy, 1700–1765” (Ph.D. diss, University of California, San Diego,
1966). These arguments have been developed in Norton’s rewarding
David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton
University Press, 1982). Reid studies have flourished of late, and a new
critical edition of his works is beginning to appear. One remarkable
volume – Knud Haakonssen’s edition of Reid’s Practical Ethics: Being Lec-
tures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self-Government, Natural Jurisprudence,
and the Law of Nations (Princeton University Press, 1990) – contains an
extensive introduction and an exhaustive commentary on Reid’s moral
philosophy and natural religion. On Campbell and Priestley, see Vincent
M. Bevilacqua, “Campbell, Priestley, and the Controversy concerning
Common Sense,” Southern Speech Journal 30 (1964): 79–98.
m i r a c l e s For a modern assessment of the long eighteenth-century

controversy over miracles, see Robert M. Burns, The Great Debate on Mira-
cles (Bucknell University Press, 1981), which shows that most of the
arguments, with the dramatic exception of Hume’s, had been ex-
hausted by the 1730s. For an account of Hume’s argument in the con-
text of late seventeenth-century debates over probability and testimony,
see M.A. Stewart, “Hume’s Historical View of Miracles,” in Hume and
Hume’s Connexions, ed. M.A. Stewart and John P. Wright (Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1994). For a review of one aspect of the miracles
debate, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The ‘Indian Prince’ in Miracle Arguments
of Hume and His Predecessors and Early Critics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric
31, 3 (1998): 175–230. Still very much worth reading on this subject, as
well as on the whole deistical controversy, is Leslie Stephen’s classic His-
tory of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols, 3d ed. (reprinted
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962); it wonderfully highlights the reli-
gious premises and implications of the innumerable eighteenth-century
disputants, and has influenced many of my own views on eighteenth-
century religious thought. Similar debates were going on at the same
time in France. R.R. Palmer, in Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth
Century France (1939), demonstrates that French Jesuits grappled with
many of the same concerns as their moderate Presbyterian counterparts
in Scotland – including the problems of reconciling reason with faith in
the matter of miracles, and sincere religion with temporal authority, not
least in their battles with the more enthusiastic and Calvinistic
Jansenists.
eighteenth-century views of history and criticism

Modern scholars must be wary of the common nineteenth- and twenti-
eth-century claim that the Enlightenment was fundamentally ahistori-
cal. The eighteenth-century’s particular (and sometimes obsessive)
concern with the past was different but no less sincere than ours. Con-
cerning eighteenth-century conceptions of critical history, see Joseph
M. Levine, Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography
(Cornell University Press, 1987), and an important article by David
Wootton, “Narrative, Irony, and Faith in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall,” His-
tory and Theory 33 (1994): 77–105. Wootton argues that critical history
in its modern cast was invented by David Hume and developed by Ed-
ward Gibbon. Gibbon’s philosophical history and veiled irony is nicely
described in David Womersley’s The Transformation of The Decline and Fall
of the Roman Empire (Cambridge University Press, 1988), which makes
many other important arguments beyond the range of the present

study. On the historical theory of “unintended consequences,” which
was so popular with eighteenth-century Scots, see Ronald Hamowy,
“The Scottish Enlightenment and the Theory of Spontaneous Order,”
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Monograph Series (1987). On the idea
of progress in all its many contexts, religious and secular, see David
Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1990). David Allan has described two centuries of the Scottish
debate over the historical nature of the church in Virtue, Learning and
the Scottish Enlightenment: Ideas of Scholarship in Early Modern History
(Edinburgh University Press, 1993). Campbell did not defend Presbyte-
rianism with appeals to ancient Scottish history, as did many of his pre-
decessors; for a stimulating account of the subversion of this and many
other cherished Scottish historical myths (including the Ossianic), see
Colin Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the
Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, 1689–c.1830 (Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
On the Scottish context of the Ossianic controversy, which has some
parallels to Campbell’s textual criticism, see Richard B. Sher, ‹Those
Scotch Imposters and Their Cabal’: Ossian and the Scottish Enlighten-
ment,” in Proceedings of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 1
(1982): 55–63. See also the collection edited by Howard Gaskill, Ossian
Revisited (Edinburgh University Press, 1991), particularly the introduc-
tory essay, which puts the debate into a sensible perspective. On earlier
English controversies over ancient texts, see the wonderfully readable
Joseph M. Levine, The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the
Augustan Age (Cornell University Press, 1991). On contemporary theo-
ries of ancient texts and myth-making, see: J.W. Rogerson, Myth in Old
Testament Interpretation (Walter de Gruyter, 1974); John Drury, ed. Critics
of the Bible 1724–1873 (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Reginald
C. Fuller’s excellent Alexander Geddes 1737–1802: Pioneer of Biblical Criti-
cism (Almond Press, 1984); and Nigel M. de S. Cameron’s thought-
provoking Biblical Higher Criticism and the Defense of Infallibilism in
19th Century Britain (Edwin Mellen, 1987). See also the collection of
studies edited by S.L. Greenslade in the older but still very useful Cam-
bridge History of the Bible: [vol. 3] The West from the Reformation to the Present
Day (Cambridge University Press, 1963). On nineteenth-century devel-
opments in history and higher criticism, see: Christopher J. Berry,
Hume, Hegel and Human Nature (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); John Edward
Toews, Hegelianism: The Path toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805–1841
(Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Jaroslav Pelikan, Christian

Doctrine and Modern Culture (since 1700) (University of Chicago Press,
1989).
t h e c h u r c h a n d r e l i g i o u s t h o u g h t The only substan-

tial treatment of Campbell’s religious thought to date is a dissertation by
Arthur Raymond McKay, “George Campbell (1719–1796), His Life and
Thought” (Ph.D. diss., Edinburgh University, 1951). McKay’s assess-
ment of Campbell’s orthodoxy from a modern evangelical perspective,
together with his failure to discover the relevant Campbell manuscripts
in Aberdeen, largely explains why he found Campbell’s theology want-
ing. Douglas A. Sonheim’s more recent examination of Campbell’s pul-
pit rhetoric, “George Campbell’s Theory of Pulpit Discourse” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Missouri, Columbia, 1993) does not move beyond
the rhetorical texts or a strictly rhetorical interpretation of Campbell’s
religious intentions. Modern treatments of the religious thought of
other Scottish moderates tend to be superficial and unconvincing. I
think it is rather dismissive, though all too tempting, to summarize their
religious beliefs with such facile labels as “Arminianism,” as in Jeffrey
Smitten, “The Shaping of Moderatism: William Robertson and Armini-
anism,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 22 (1992): 281–300, and
Nicholas J. Griffin, “Possible Theological Perspectives in Thomas Reid’s
Common Sense Philosophy,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 41 (1990):
425–42. Some moderates (including Campbell) may indeed have been
Arminians on the narrow question of salvation, but this does not say
nearly enough about their subtle and earnest theology.
There are no satisfactory general treatments of the eighteenth-
century Scottish Church. Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch’s
The Scottish Church 1688–1843: The Age of the Moderates (Saint Andrew
Press, 1973), is patchy in its research and unreliable in its judgments.
Gordon Donaldson, The Faith of the Scots (B.T. Batsford, 1990), is better
but rather thin. In an older but influential work, The Theology and Theolo-
gians of Scotland Chiefly of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 2nd ed.
(1888), James Walker argued (mistakenly, I think) that the notion of a
personal Jesus had always been central to covenanting theology – an
evangelical assumption that makes it easy to dismiss the moderates’
christology. See also James K. Cameron, “Theological Controversy: A
Factor in the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment,” in The Origins and
Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S.
Skinner (John Donald, 1982), 116–30. There is also a very good but
brief treatment of the Scottish Church (among other things) in M.A.
Stewart, “The Scottish Enlightenment,” in British Philosophy and the Age of
Enlightenment, ed. Stuart Brown (Routledge, 1996). On the long history
of controversy within the Calvinistic churches at large, see John T.
McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism (Oxford University Press,
1954). The eighteenth-century Church of England, like the Church of
Scotland, has usually been dismissed as arid and unconcerned with its
parochial duties, despite Norman Sykes’ Church and State in England in
the XVIIIth Century (1934). On the rise of Evangelicalism in the eigh-
teenth century and its distinctiveness from the established churches, see
D.W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain (Unwin Hyman,
1989), and the very sensible and balanced life of Wesley by Henry D.
Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast: John Wesley and the Rise of Methodism (Trinity
Press International, 1989).
t h e s c o t t i s h m o d e r a t e s Eighteenth-century Scottish moder-

ates have been unsympathetically treated for more than two centuries.
Critics, evangelical and otherwise, have been content to take Wither-
spoon’s satirical attack on his political opponents at face value. Even
into the twentieth century, churchmen such as John Macleod have swal-
lowed Witherspoon’s characterization in its entirety, accusing the mod-
erates of Pelagianism, Socinianism, hostility to the Gospel, and
friendliness to the deistical and worldly fashions of the day; see
Macleod’s Scottish Theology in Relation to Church History Since the Reforma-
tion 2nd ed. (Knox Press, 1946). Even the historian Hugh Trevor-Roper
(see p. 277 above) has not troubled himself to see them as anything
more than closet Socinians. Ian D.L. Clark was the first not only to write
sympathetically about the moderates but also to distinguish “moderat-
ism” as a widespread eighteenth-century mood or attitude apart from
the Moderate party in the Church of Scotland, which did not come into
being until the 1750s; see his “Moderatism and the Moderate Party in
the Church of Scotland 1752–1805” (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University,
1963). Clark took a generous view of moderate preaching, and denied
that moderates ignored either the person or the work of Christ. His out-
standing and regrettably unpublished dissertation was epitomized in
“From Protest to Reaction: The Moderate Regime in the Church of
Scotland, 1752–1805,” in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, ed. Nicholas
T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitcheson (Edinburgh University Press,
1970). Unfortunately, even modern scholars who defend the literature

and politics of the moderates often show little concern for their reli-
gion. In John Dwyer’s Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late
Eighteenth-Century Scotland (John Donald, 1987), the Edinburgh moder-
ates are hardly removed from deists. Dwyer has argued that the proper
context for these divines is polite rather than religious, as if the two are
incompatible; see “The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Mod-
erate Divines,” in New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern
Scotland, ed. John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander Murdoch
(John Donald, 1981). Richard B. Sher’s exemplary study of the Edin-
burgh Moderates, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The
Moderate Literati of Edinburgh (Princeton University Press, 1985), is much
more convincing and well-rounded; Sher describes the collective experi-
ences of Robertson, Blair, Carlyle, Ferguson, and John Home, but never-
theless provides few details concerning their religious commitments. He
summarizes the values of Moderatism under six heads: “Presbyterian-
ism, Scottish nationalism, Stoicism, civic humanism, conservatism, and
enlightenment” (324). It is telling of modern interests that five of these
six heads are explicitly secular. Sher has partly made up for this imbal-
ance in his very useful essay about eighteenth-century notions of Provi-
dence, “Witherspoon’s Dominion of Providence and the Scottish Jeremiad
Tradition,” in the above-noted Scotland and America in the Age of Enlighten-
ment. On the related problem of reconciling the religious and the secu-
lar in one world view, see Ned Landsman’s “Witherspoon and the
Problem of Provincial Identity in Scottish Evangelical Culture,” in the
same collection.
t h e e n l i g h t e n m e n t The debate over the nature of moderatism

cannot be separated from the larger debate concerning the fundamen-
tal nature of the Enlightenment. One’s characterization of the Enlight-
enment largely depends upon whom one takes to be most
representative of the Enlightenment. Twentieth-century interpreters
have generally focused on the anti-religious elements of enlightened
thought. Perhaps more than any other general interpreter, the madden-
ingly prolific Peter Gay has swayed the last and present generation of
scholars with his militantly secular view, particularly in his still-standard
textbook, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols (Alfred A Knopf:
1966 and 1969). Gay has elegantly captured the Enlightenment’s sense
of self-confidence and optimism, but has determined to see it as a single
movement, unified in its opposition to Christian tradition. He has con-

sistently labeled the men of the Enlightenment as “philosophes,” thus
cunningly excluding the many who do not fit the uniform of the soldier
in the war against religion. Consequently, Gay’s Enlightenment be-
longed to Voltaire and Hume. Since the 1960s, Enlightenment scholar-
ship has tended to focus on national, regional, and popular versions of
the Enlightenment, and has shown the Enlightenment to be neither as
pagan nor as unified as Gay supposed. The collection of essays edited by
Roy Porter and Mikulás Teich, The Enlightenment in National Context
(Cambridge University Press, 1981), is a prime example of how differ-
ent kinds of Enlightenment could emerge in different contexts – some,
like the English, with few religious axes to grind. Henry F. May, by
choosing to give more weight to minor works and unpublished letters
than to formal discourses, has discovered several distinct and somewhat
incompatible enlightenments in Europe and America, and has implied
that the Enlightenment in America went hand in hand with develop-
ments in Protestant thought (The Enlightenment in America [Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1976]). Robert Darnton has led the way in offering
surprising glimpses into what ordinary eighteenth-century readers were
actually reading: mainly crude and sometimes scandalous populariza-
tions of Enlightenment thought by hack-writers whose names we have
never heard before; see particularly Darnton’s Literary Underground of the
Old Regime (Harvard University Press, 1982). A few scholars have begun
to take a general look at religiosity in the Enlightenment. For example,
James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant
(Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), points out the Enlightenment’s
diversity and internal conflicts. Roy Porter highlights both the diversity
and the religiosity of the Enlightenment, and he poses a series of excel-
lent historiographical questions in The Enlightenment (Humanities Press
International, 1990); his little book nevertheless demonstrates how dif-
ficult it has become to write a textbook on the Enlightenment that is
both comprehensive and accessible to beginning students. Gay’s version
of the Enlightenment has survived in undergraduate courses because it
is readable and because there is little to oppose it. The field of Enlight-
enment studies has fragmented so much in recent decades that, al-
though scholars have successfully challenged the details of Gay’s
arguments, no one has been able to produce a textbook to rival the
boldness and scope of his grand interpretation. It is time for a major
new interpretation that considers not only the wits and the iconoclasts,
but also the many less spectacular manifestations of the Enlightenment.

It must include both the great names and the forgotten ones, the mag-
nificent folio volumes and the illegal chapbooks, the great political trea-
tises and the weekly journals, the revolutionaries as well as the ordinary
members of the scientific societies, most of whom were content to bal-
ance the new ideas with a more traditional faith in the God of Scripture
and of Nature.
index.fm Page 289 Wednesday, July 25, 2001 11:41 AM
Index
Aberdeen, 13, 18 Bacon, Francis, 5, 23, 26, Burnett, Sir Alexander,

Aberdeen, Presbytery of, 46, 83n, 165–8 fourth baronet of Leys,
55 Banchory Ternan (Kincar- 18
Aberdeen, Synod of, 19, 34 dineshire), 18–19 Burnett, Robert, of Leys, 18
Aberdeen Enlightenment, baptism, See sacraments Bute, John Stuart, third earl
8, 169, 258–9 Beattie, James, 8, 37, 46–7, of, 23
Aberdeen Grammar School, 48, 51, 52, 57, 172, 229; Butler, Joseph, 16, 73–4, 98,
14 and the Aberdeen Philo- 116, 177
Aberdeen Philosophical So- sophical Society, 26, 28;
ciety, 8, 11, 25–9, 81n, “Beattie problem,” 8, 77, Cadell, Thomas, 48
167–9, 257 111; and common sense, calculation of chances, 97
Aberdeen Town Council, 101–2, 104, 110–11, 113; Cambuslang revival, 17, 188
20, 24, 31, 45–6, 55–6 and natural religion, 117, Campbell, (Professor)
Aberdonians, 8, 74–6, 77, 183; and testimony, 121 Archibald, 187
84, 92, 112–14, 120, Beattie, James Hay, 28 Campbell, Colin (father),
193–4, 206, 257 belief, 82–3, 86, 89–92, 11–13
abstract ideas, 78, 79 126–7 Campbell, Colin (brother),
d’Alembert, Jean le Rond, Bentley, Richard, 153, 216 13n, 18–19
159 Berkeley, George, 27 Campbell, George: Address
America, war with (Ameri- biblical criticism, 47–9, 64, to the People of Scotland,
can Revolution), 39–41, 147–58, 215–22, 245–6 44–5, 46n, 141; apolo-
43, 163–5 Bisset, John, 20–1, 203–4, getic system, 35, 65,
analogy, 97–8 215 177–8, 233, 248–51,
Anglican divines, See latitu- Bitzer, Lloyd F., 5, 79–80, 81 255–6, 259; character,
dinarian divines Blackwell, Thomas, the 51, 57; Character of a Min-
Anti-Jacobin Review and Mag- younger, 15, 153 ister, 19, 61, 185, 247–8;
azine, 59, 60, 226, 252 Blair, Hugh, 15–16, 29, 40, “Defence of the Con-
Argyll, Archibald Camp- 67, 151, 198 duct of Marischal Col-
bell, first earl of Ilay, third Boston, Thomas, 193 lege,” 25; “Defence” MS,
duke of, 17, 21, 23 Boswell, James, 201 54, 65, 143–4, 202; Dis-
Arminianism, 200–1, 237 Brown, William Laurence, sertation on Miracles, 3,
association of ideas, 80–1 3, 56, 57, 206–7 28–30, 35, 53, 65, 67,
Astruc, Jean, 153 Burke, Edmund, 40, 46 87–8, 112, 127, 134,
290 Index
149–50; Duty of Alle- Cicero, 38, 116 Enfield, William, 38

giance, 39–41, 163–5, Clarke, Samuel, 16, 129 English Episcopalians (in
203; Four Gospels, 3, 19, Common Sense: evidence Scotland), 50–1
47–9, 53, 147–8, 150–1, from, 93–4, 105–6; phi- Enlightenment, 6, 192,
217–18; Happy Influence losophy of, 8, 100–14, 247–8, 250, 252, 253,
of Religion, 42–3, 46n, 65, 170, 193, 200 254–5, 258–9; Aberdeen
161, 199; “Implicit conjectural history, 139–40 Enlightenment, 8, 169,
Faith” MS, 53, 65; Lec- consciousness, evidence 258–9
tures on Ecclesiastical His- from, 93–4 enthusiasm, 129, 229, 232–
tory, 58–60, 144–5, 202; conspiracy of the priest- 5
Lectures on Systematic The- hood, 140, 160–2, 229, episcopalianism, 50–1, 54–
ology and Pulpit Eloquence, 231, 248 5, 58, 60, 223–4, 226–9,
61, 66; Lectures on the Pas- Copland, Patrick, 23 232
toral Character, 19, 61, 66, Creech, William, 48, 53 epistemology, 72–3, 78–81,
248; lecturing scheme, Cruden, David, 55 189–92
32–3, 62–7; “Of wit, hu- Erasmus, Desiderius, 149,
mour, and ridicule,” 19; Daubeny, Charles, 60 216
pedagogical theory, 23– deductive evidence, 92–3, Erskine, Ebenezer, 188
4, 55, 66–7, 242; Philoso- 94–100 Erskine, John, 40, 45, 188
phy of Rhetoric, 19, 28, deism, 65, 114, 115, 119, Evangelicals, 7–8, 129, 188,
37–9, 66, 67, 76, 81n, 172–3, 233 229, 232–5
83, 87–9, 166, 248; polit- demonstrative evidence, 93, evidence, theory of, 92–
ical thought, 39–41, 42, 95 100, 121–2, 250
163–5; Spirit of the Gospel, Derham, William, 169 experience, 87–90, 97, 98–
35–7, 53, 65, 214; “Stric- Dickson, John, 44 100, 189
tures on Dodwell’s Diderot, Denis, 165, 200
Parænesis” MS, 54, 65, Dodwell, Henry, the elder, faculties of the mind, 39,
143, 228; Success of the 54–5, 143, 199, 228 81–92
First Publishers of the Gos- Douglas, John, 48–9, 50 faith, 181–3, 186, 251, 256
pel, 41–2, 65, 204, 208 Drummond, William Farquhar, John, 26, 29, 193,
Campbell, George, of West- Abernethy, 36, 43–4, 49– 198, 205
hall, 11 51, 59, 226, 227, 228, Farquharson, Ann, 53, 57
Campbell, Grace, See Farqu- 233 Farquharson, Grace, 20,
harson, Grace “Drysdale bustle,” 35 52–3
Carlyle, Alexander, 24, 40, Duff, William, 15 Farquharson, Harry, of
237, 247 Dun, James, 14 Whitehouse, 20
Chalmers, James, 16 Dunbar, James, 26 Farquharson, Peter, 57
Chalmers, John, 24 Duncan, William, 21 Ferguson, Adam, 40
Chillingworth, William, 16, Dundas, Henry, 43, 56 ‘15, the (Jacobite upris-
71 Dunlop, William, 230 ing), 12
Christ, doctrine of, 186, Fleury, Claude, 144
195–8, 243–4 ecclesiastical history, 53–5, Forbes, William, 18
Christian empiricism, 73 58–9, 63–4, 143–7, 224, ‘45, the (Jacobite upris-
Christian moderatism, 7 232 ing), 18, 50
Church, doctrine of the, Edinburgh, 7, 43 Fraser, James, of Drumoak,
186, 202–3, 222–9 Edinburgh Philosophical 55, 61, 63
Church, history of the, See Society, 26 free will, 182, 186, 200
ecclesiastical history Edwards, Jonathan, 259 French, George, 23
Index 291
French Revolution, 55, 165, Hailes, Sir David Dalrymple, 6; and scepticism, 75–6,
252 Lord, 47, 146n 102, 104, 234; on testi-
Freud, Sigmund, 174 Hamann, J.G., 154 mony, 98–100, 109
Hamilton, Robert, 23 Huss, Jan, 54, 143
Gay, Peter, 258 Hay, George, 36–7, 44, 53– Hutcheson, Francis, 13, 77,
Geddes, Alexander, 150, 4, 209, 210–15, 225–6, 102
153–4 230
General Assembly (of the Heberden, William, 49 ideal system, 102, 110
Church of Scotland), 34– hell, doctrine of, 201 imagination, 83–4
5, 43, 46, 240–1 Herder, Johann Gottfried Incorporated Trades of Ab-
George iii (king of En- von, 174 erdeen, 35, 55
gland), 48 heresy, 187, 191, 224–5 Innes, Alexander, 15
Gerard, Alexander, 8, 17n, High Church doctrine, See intellection: evidence from,
256; and the Aberdeen episcopalianism 93–4; as a faculty (equiva-
Philosophical Society, 25, higher criticism, 152–8, lent to understanding),
26, 28; anatomist of hu- 174–6, 221, 252 79, 84; See also under-
man nature, 77, 171; and High-flyers, 7, 215, 230, standing, faculty of
Campbell, 25, 31, 32; 242 intuitive evidence, 92–4
christology, 197–8; and Hill, George, 198
the Church of Scotland, history, philosophy of, 136– Jacobites, 12, 18, 50
34n, 35n; and Hume, 65, 42, 173, 176–7 jeremiads, 203
120n, 122; moral preach- Hobbes, Thomas, 72 Johnson, Samuel, 129,
ing, 241, 242–4; on natu- Holy Spirit, 181, 190, 198, 233n
ral religion, 114, 183; 201 Jones, Stephen, 59
pastoral theory, 66n; ped- human nature: doctrine of, judgment, 84, 94
agogy, 23, 33, 247; politi- 186, 192–4, 242; theory
cal thought, 40, 42; on of, 29, 76–8, 81, 136–9, Kames, Henry Home, Lord,
probable reasoning, 75; 151, 161–2, 170, 174, 31, 67, 139
on providence, 203; on 177, 252, 257 Keith, George Skene, 58,
Roman Catholicism, 230; Hume, David, 6, 23, 39, 57; 66–7
on salvation, 199–200; on and the Aberdeen Philo- King’s College, Aberdeen,
sound doctrine, 191, 206 sophical Society, 28–9, 14, 22; proposals for
Gibbon, Edward, 136, 119–20, 121–2; anato- union with Marischal
145–7 mist of human nature, 24–5
Glasgow, 43, 46 77; on the association of
Gleig, George, 59, 226 ideas, 80–1; and common latitudinarian divines, 71–3,
Glennie, John, 17 sense, 112–14; and the 119, 250
Glorious Revolution, 163, Enlightenment, 257–9; lay patronage, 239–41
164, 236 on evidence, 96–7, 215; Leiden, 12
God, doctrine of, 113–14, on the faculties, 82; on Linnaeus, Carolus (Carl von
115–17, 186, 194–5, 244 history, 136, 139; on Linné), 28
Gordon, Barbara, 20 memory and belief, 87, Livingston, William, 23
Gordon, Thomas, 36n, 77 89, 90–1, 107; on mira- Locke, John: on biblical
Gowdie, John, 16 cles, 29–30, 67–8, 100, criticism, 216; episte-
Grave, S.A., 100–1 119, 124–8, 130–5, 209– mology, 72–3, 79, 96,
Gregory, John, 26 11, 214; on the pastoral 102; on faith, 181, 197;
Gregory i, Pope, 141 office, 61–2, 160; on rea- on miracles, 123, 133;
Greyfriars chapel, 32 son and the passions, 85– on natural religion, 114;
292 Index
political philosophy, Northeast (of Scotland), 13, probable reasoning, 75;

164; on toleration 50–1, 246 on Roman Catholicism,
162–3 230
Lord’s Supper, See sacra- Ogilvie, William, 24, 26 religious knowledge,
ments orthodoxy, 184, 225, 242 189–92
Lowth, Robert, 153 Ossian, 151 republicanism, 39–41, 163–5
Lumsden, John, 16, 31 rhetoric, 82–3, 92, 96, 166–
Luther, Martin, 47, 141 Paley, William, 74, 170, 257 7, 234, 247–8
party-spirit, 188, 216, 239 Riddoch, James, 51n
Macfarlane, Andrew, 60 passions, 84–7 Robertson, William: on his-
McKail, James, 17 pastoral office, 17, 61–2, tory, 140, 141, 241; and
Maclaurin, Colin, 13 66, 247–8 the Moderate party, 236–
Macpherson, James, 151 Paterson bursary, 55 7; and the No-Popery af-
Malcolm, Alexander, 14 perception, 79, 110 fair, 43, 46; on the pasto-
Mansfield, David Murray, Peter (apostle), 218–19 ral office, 247; on
second earl of, 56 politeness, 184, 241–2 providence, 41, 204; on
Marischal College, Aber- Pollock, Robert, 16, 21 the war with America, 40
deen, 14–15, 21–5; popery, See Roman Catholi- Roman Catholicism, 43–5,
proposals for union with cism 53–4, 58–9, 109, 140–1,
King’s, 24–5 Popular party, 7, 188, 241 143–5, 160–1, 210–14,
memory, 87–91, 97, 106–7 Price, Richard, 163 219, 229–32
Michaelis, J.D., 150 Priestley, Joseph, 101 Rose, William, 30, 37
Middle Ages, 140–1 probable knowledge, 72–5,
Mills, John, 150 173–4, 208, 249–50, 257 sacraments, 202, 217, 248
Milne, John, 14 progress, 142, 253 salvation, doctrine of, 199–
miracles, 29–30, 100, 122– providence, 99–100, 115, 201
36, 209–15, 249–50 123, 203–4 Sarpi, Paolo, 141
Moderate party, 7, 17, 34–5, Scotland, Church of, 34–5,
188, 235, 236–8, 239–41, Ramsay, John, of Ochter- 187–8, 203, 225, 228,
252 tyre, 4, 48–9, 62n, 71, 229–30, 234–5, 236–7,
moderatism, 7, 238–53 155 239–41
monasticism, 238 Ray, John, 169 Scott, Robert Eden, 32n, 62
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis reason, 84–7, 106 Scottish Episcopal Church,
de Secondat, baron de, “reformation of life and 50–1, 60, 246; See also
159, 168 character,” 205–7 episcopalianism
moral certainty, 72, 95–6 Reid, Thomas, 8, 15, 17n, Select Society, 26
moral evidence, 95–100 21, 142, 168; and the Ab- Shirrefs, James, 55
Morven, Mount, 167 erdeen Philosophical So- Simon, Richard, 149–50,
mystery, 181–3, 186 ciety, 25–6, 28; and 213, 217
Butler, 74; and Campbell, Simson, John, 187
natural history, 165–9 78, 80, 110–11; and com- Skene, David, 26, 27, 31,
natural religion, 73, 75, mon sense, 90, 101, 102– 167
114–18, 181 4, 110–12, 193; episte- Skene, Francis, 21
“new country,” 4, 166 mology, 79, 84; on evi- Skinner, John, 50, 60, 227,
Newton, Isaac, 80, 115, 173, dence, 92, 95; on the 233
250 faculties, 81, 82, 84; on slavery, 165, 253n
No-Popery affair, 43–7, 237, free will, 200; on natural Smith, Adam, 37–8, 57n,
246 religion, 117–18; on 139, 175
Index 293
Smith, William Robertson, Temple, William, 152 vivacity of ideas, 82, 89–90
175 testimony, 87, 88, 98–100, Voltaire (François-Marie
Socinianism, 196 107–8, 125–7 Arouet), 6, 141, 159, 161
Somerville, Thomas, 34 Theological Club, 16–17,
Spinoza, Baruch, 72 26, 66 Walker, Alexander, 13
“spirit of the Gospel,” 35–6, Tillotson, John, 16, 71 Walker, Margaret, 13
198, 206–7, 231–2, 235, toleration, 50–1, 108–9, Walton, Brian, 150
238, 243 162–3, 219, 228, 244–7 Wesley, John, 215, 233
Stewart, John, 14–15, 26, 92 Traill, Robert, 26 Westminster Confession of
Stillingfleet, Edward, 16, Trinity, doctrine of the, 186, Faith, 18, 185–6, 229
71, 72 195, 198, 216–17 Westminster Shorter Cate-
Strahan, William, 37, 145 Tucker, Josiah, 40–1, 49 chism, 14, 186
Strauss, David Friedrich, Turnbull, George (moral Wettstein, J.J., 150
154, 174–5, 221 philosopher), 13 Whitefield, George, 17, 233
Stuart, Charles Edward Turnbull, George (writer to will, faculty of the, 83, 87
(“Bonnie Prince Char- the signet), 15 Wise Club, See Aberdeen
lie”), 18, 50 Philosophical Society
superstition, 182, 229–32, understanding, faculty of, Witherspoon, John, 237,
234 79, 84–7; See also intellec- 259
sympathy, 39, 99, 193 tion Wodrow, Robert, 229–30
Union of 1707, 13
taste, 83 Unitarianism, 197
taxonomy, 28, 166–9

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ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

McGill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Ideas

1 Problems of Cartesianism 9 The Jena System, 1804–5:

5 John Case and Aristotelianism 12 Paine and Cobbett

6 Beyond Liberty and Property 13 Descartes and the

16 Form and Transformation 24 Kierkegaard as Theologian

31 Mr Simson’s Knotty Case 32 Orthodoxy and

McGill-Queen’s University Press

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001

Legal deposit third quarter 2001

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper

This book has been published with the help of a grant

McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the

National Library of Canada

Suderman, Jeffrey M. (Jeffrey Mark), 1965–

This book was typeset by Dynagram Inc.

part 1 george campbell: life and works 9

part iii revealed knowledge: the religious campbell 179

Abbreviations Used in the Notes

archives and libraries

aca Aberdeen City Archives

writings by george campbell

cmg The Character of a Minister of the Gospel as a Teacher and Pattern

ORTHODOXY AND ENLIGHTENMENT

Who belonged to the Enlightenment, and to whom did the Enlighten-

1 Scots Magazine 58 (July 1796): 439.

5 Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Editor’s Introduction,” in pr, li.

leads to some practical skill, and is perfected in it.”6 Consequently, his

modern assumptions, the final sections of chapters 5, 6, and 9 describe

It is difficult to find terms adequate to describe Campbell’s kind of

7 aul ms 653, part iii, un-numbered page.

The Making of a Christian Philosopher

back groun d a nd educ ation

On 22 January 1765, the Aberdeen Philosophical Society debated a

12 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

generation, went to Leiden for theological training.3 Leiden, the leading

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 13

14 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

the acts of particular providence. They were well-acquainted with the

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 15

later one of his associates in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.

16 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 17

15 Keith, “Account of George Campbell,” viii. Keith’s biography of Campbell appears

18 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

enthusiasm generally and on Whitefield specifically suggest that it may

18 Register of the Presbytery of Aberdeen, sro CH2/1/8, pp. 67–70.

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 19

who mistakenly received the initial invitation. The congregation ulti-

20 Register of the Presbytery of Kincairden Oneal [Kincardine O’Neill], sro CH2/

20 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

Campbell’s growing reputation must have impressed the magistrates of

principal of marischal college

On 19 January 1757, the Aberdeen Town Council elected George

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 21

Thomas Reid’s call to New Machar in 1737. Bisset was a “puritan of

22 George Campbell in the Eighteenth Century

Campbell was soon awarded a doctor of divinity degree, an honour

The Making of a Christian Philosopher (to 1771) 23

Alexander Gerard (1728–95), the new professor of moral philosophy

30 [Alexander Gerard], Plan of Education in the Marischal College and University of