1.Cayetano vs.

Monsod court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.
201 SCRA 210 September 1991
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman,
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. 2.Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Topics:
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. “A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.”—Canon 3, Code of
Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of
Professional Responsibility
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
“A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
qualifications for legal services.”—Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf Facts of the Case:
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
to Nogales, was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
afford the services of big law firms.
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been which states undignified phrases like-- “Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7th Floor Victoria
Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.” It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an
article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star because it is composed
of specialists that can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it
is, especially on marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.
Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be
allowed based on this American Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing
wrong with making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has to offer.
Issue:
Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.
Court Ruling:
The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond
the domain of the paralegals. As stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law
is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to paralegals. As
with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his
goods. The Legal Clinic promotes divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages
which are undoubtedly contrary to law.
The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in
a reputable law list, (2.) An ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing
without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
3.RODOLFO M. BERNARDO v ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA Adm. Case No. 2984. August
31, 2007
FACTS:
Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of several
administrative offenses such as misappropriating and converting to his personal
use the money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s
property; falsification of documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed
of Sale and Deed of Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he was
without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the
amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also
to be insufficiently funded. The Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per
Curiam which found the respondent Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against
him and imposed on him the penalty of Disbarment. Respondent files a Petition
praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law however, the
Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition for reinstatement. The respondent filed
again this present petition for review of his Administrative case with a plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his
indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for
forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long
repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to
leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due
to his disbarment.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.
HELD:
The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has passed since he was
punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not
lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact
that Mejia is already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Thus, while
the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows
how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to
correct offenders. However, the petitioner is reminded that practice of law is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance
with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying
the privilege to practice law.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
4.December 20, 2017 VENTEREZ V. COSME
Elisa Venterez, Genero de Vera, Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V.
Palma and Ramon De Vera, Complainants, v. Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme , Respondent
A.C. No. 7421, 10 October 2007
Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The
court ruled against the complainants. They wanted to file a motion of
reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, the
complainants were constrained to contact another lawyer to prepare the motion
for reconsideration.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that the
complainants were withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) engaged
another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme further explained that he even
turned over the records of the case to the son, ceased to be counsel of the
complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of the Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Held:
The Supreme Court find the respondent guilty of violating Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of
the CPR for abandoning the complainant’s case without a good cause. An attorney
may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney
should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.
For failing to protect the interests of the complainants, the respondent violated
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
The Supreme Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for a
period of three months.
5.MARY JANE D. VELASCO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CHARLIE DOROIN AND
ATTY. HECTOR CENTENO, RESPONDENTS.
[ A. C. No. 5033, July 28, 2008]
THE case: a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco on March 31,
1999, against respondent lawyers for forgery and falsification constitutive of
malpractice.
Facts: Atty. Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City, knowing that
complainant's father was already dead as of 21 January 1996, made it appear in
disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane D. Velasco on March 31, 1999, against
the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that... complainant's father appeared before him in
respondent lawyers for forgery and falsification constitutive of malpractice.
Quezon City on 17 January 1997.
Complainant alleged that she was appointed as Administratrix in Special
A case for Falsification of Public Document was filed against respondent
Proceedings"In the matter of the Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo
Atty. Hector Centeno before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39,
Doroin, Monina E. Doroin, petitioner." Eduardo Doroin, died on 21 January 1996, in
docketed as Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12
Papua New Guinea. In this Special Proceedings case, respondents were
September 2001 and pleaded "not... guilty." After the arraignment, Atty. Centeno
collaborating counsels for Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
did not anymore appeared [sic] in court and jumped bail.
Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful means into making her sign
The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum
of Professional Responsibility when they caused "extreme and great damage to the
of P1,216,078.00 giving the paramour of complainant's father, Josephine
complainant."
Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and also allotting complainant's two (2)
alleged illegitimate brothers and an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of The Commissioner recommended that the respondent lawyers be disbarred.
P1,216,075.00 each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law. But no
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
share was assigned to complainant's mother, who was the legal... wife of Dr.
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline...
Eduardo Doroin.
that respondent lawyers be suspended indefinitelyIssues:
To partially satisfy complainant's share of Php 1,216,078.00, Atty. Doroin
The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector Centeno are
required complainant to sign a paper which was an alleged Confirmation of
guilty of violating their lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Authority to Sell the property of complainant's father located at Kingspoint
Professional Responsibility which would merit their disbarment
subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City
Ruling:
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint Subdivision
sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed thereon, but when she We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP, but modify the
visited it again on January 1999, there was already a four-door townhouse penalty to be imposed on respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.
constructed.The owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. the property... was
In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of
sold by Atty. Doroin... to Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura [sic], by forging the signature
sale and forced her to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her
of complainant's late father.
that it was "in accordance with law."
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant
violation of the lawyer's oath to uphold the law and the basic tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct.
Elementary it is in succession law that... compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse
shall have a share in the estate by way of legitimes[23] and no extrajudicial
settlement can deprive the spouse of said right except if she gives it up for lawful
consideration, but never when the spouse is not a... party to the said
settlement.[24] And the Civil Code reminds us, that we must "give every man his
due."... we agree with the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the more appropriate penalty
on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector
Centeno who, aside from committing a... dishonest act by depriving a person of
her rightful inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he falsified a
public document and thereafter absconded from the criminal proceeding against
him after having posted bail.Principles:
6.OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ (DISBARMENT)567 SCRA 118
FACTS:
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of
law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct.
The complainant alleges that despite receipt of legal fees in compliance with a
Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations
under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant's requests for a
report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for
return of the money paid to him. Torben B. Overgaard, a Dutch national, entered
into a Retainer Agreement1 with the respondent, Atty. Godwin R. Valdez. For the
amount of PhP900,000.00, the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent to represent him as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two
cases filed against him. The Agreement stipulated that fees would cover
acceptance and attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, other legal incidental
expenses, and appearance fees. The complainant alleges that the respondent did
not do a single thing with respect to the cases covered under the Retainer
Agreement. Not only did the respondent fail to enter his appearance in the
criminal cases filed against the complainant, he also neglected to file an entry of
appearance in the civil case for Mandamus, Injunction and Damages that the
complainant filed. The respondent also did not file a Comment on the complaint
for Illegal Possession of Firearms which was dismissed and under review at the
Department of Justice.15
Due to the above lapses of the respondent, on November 27, 2006, the
complainant wrote the respondent and demanded the return of the documents
which were turned over to him, as well as the PhP900,000.00 that was paid in
consideration of the cases he was supposed to handle for the complainant.16
However, complainant was unable to get any word from the respondent despite
repeated and continuous efforts to get in touch with him.
Torben Overgaard was constrained to file an administrative complaint against Atty.
Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that the
respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. that
the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, and to be ordered to return
the amount of PhP900,000.00.
iSSUE: Whether Atty. Valdez violated the code of professional responsibility of
lawyers?
HELD:
Respondent Valdez had indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded
of members of the bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer is required to keep the client informed of the status of his case and to
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
A lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received for and
from the client.
Respondent Valdez did exactly the opposite.
The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of
responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his duties
as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the respondent,
betray not only the trust of their client, but also public trust. For the practice of
law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to
those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.41 Those who are
unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of
the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law. We must protect the
administration of justice by requiring those who exercise this function to be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly
repose confidence in them.
In this case, we find that suspension for three years recommended by the IBP is
not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent.
The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the bar. We could not find any mitigating
circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. For violating elementary principles
of professional ethics and failing to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and
good faith, the respondent has proven himself unworthy of membership in this
noble profession.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and
his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to
immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial
demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%),
shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision
until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers
and documents received from the complainant.
Copies of this Decision shall be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
 7.EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
PETITIONER
Facts:
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law
until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On
that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice.
Issue:
Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine
bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
Ruling:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This
is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated
his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions
“(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.
8.Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc
dated March 9, 2010 "B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court). - The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments
to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5. Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for
admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before
being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully
completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its
equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the
Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government:
civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the
bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications
showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or
its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the
proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor
of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine
Government.
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present
a certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the
study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized
and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree
or its equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a
separate bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to
CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the country."
9.In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death
of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On
February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed
an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on
June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less
than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed
and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath
and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had
been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10
months.The court ordered Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may
now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen
(15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the
eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted
to the practice of law
HELD: Yes
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to
take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of
Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
• The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. • Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various general public and proper administration of justice is concerned.
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
• All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
duties and public service.
those seeking admission to the Bar.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the
• Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
expected from members of the general public.
uncalculating.
• Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
possessed of good moral character.
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be • Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to take the bar
examinations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to the
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position
to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
 10.IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied
PETITIONER. (DIGEST) B.M. No. 2540 for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying
that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
September 24, 2013
Roll of Attorneys.
TOPIC:
ISSUE:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Attorneys

FACTS:
RULING:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he
took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and
Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had misplaced the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing
through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in
upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most
the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just
serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.
an attendance record.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys
himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he
was not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar; and that
subsequently forgotten.
he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his various positions at different firms and companies.
roll number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
presumed to know the law and its consequences.
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by
characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he
belief and an honest error of judgment. thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake
of fact as a valid justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not
a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that
would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s
duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. However, the
Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made
to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not
allowed to engage in the practice of law.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by
Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law
(UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of
the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer.
Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing
because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On
December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring
Mr. Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In
compliance with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a
Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of the
Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under
Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand,
UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of
allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising
lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having made at
least one supervised appearance." 2

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing
11.BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997 before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY
SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730). Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court
Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings,
under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a
motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed the by
member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11
entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Bacoor, Cavite.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical
presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with
the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence
or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of
professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on
their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to
protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable
action by their law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed
to practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications,
particularly a license, as required by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied
by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The
rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct
control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public
policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess
tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v.
Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or
the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party
litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S.
vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts,
the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who
cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of
justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts
is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the
presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is
properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court,
where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial
Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and
supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited
by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer in all his appearance.
12.FERDINAND A. CRUZ v ALBERTO MINA
 G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007 no. 730, providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts
(MTC’s).
FACTS
ISSUE
Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a
formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner agent or friend of a party litigant
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
HELD
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
school.
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for
continuation of trial. However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is
different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
the Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138
the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the
provides:
rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. —In the court of a justice of the peace, a
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
supervision of a member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that
party without the supervision of a member of the bar. There is really no problem
the court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to heed to the
as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
clear mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission
to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-
A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that
appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor
under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
13.SC Adopts Revisions to the Law Student Practice Rule
July 16, 2019
The Supreme Court en banc, on June 25, 2019, adopted and promulgated A.M. No.
19-03-24-SC Rule 138-A Law Student Practice, otherwise known as the Revised Law
Student Practice Rule (Revised Rule). The Revised Rule is an amendment to the
existing provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. A salient feature of the
Revised Rule is that a law student must now be certified to be able to engage in
the limited practice of law.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the
Supreme Court used its power to adopt and promulgate rules concerning legal
assistance to the underprivileged through the amendment of the provisions of
Rule 138-A. This amendment ensures access to justice of the marginalized sectors,
enhances learning opportunities of law students by instilling in them the value of
legal professional social responsibility, and to prepare them for the practice of law.
The Supreme Court also addressed the need to institutionalize clinical legal
education program in all law schools in order to enhance, improve, and streamline
law student practice, and regulate their limited practice of law. The Revised Rule is
now more comprehensive with 14 sections and shall take effect at the start of the
Academic Year 2020-2021 following its publication in two newspapers of general
circulation.
Under Section 3 of the Revised Rule, a law student shall apply for and secure a
Level 1 or 2 Certification, as the case may be, in order to be permitted to engage in
any of the activities under the Clinical Legal Education Program of a law school.
The basic distinction between the two levels involve the minimum academic
requirement the law student has successfully completed: for Level 1 Certification –
first-year law courses, while for Level 2 Certification – third-year law courses.
Section 4 enumerates the practice areas for law student practitioners for both
Level 1 and 2 Certifications. Section 5 itemizes the certification application
requirements, which include a duly-accomplished application form under oath in
three copies accompanied by proof of payment of the necessary legal and filing
fees. It also distinguishes where each level certification is valid. Level 1 is valid
before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies within the judicial region
where the law school is located, whereas Level 2 is valid before all courts, quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies.
Once the law student is certified, the certificate number must be used in signing
briefs, pleadings, letters, and other similar documents produced under the
direction of a supervising lawyer. (Section 7) The law student shall also take the
Law Student Practitioner’s Oath, a modified lawyer’s oath, under Section 8 before
engaging in the limited practice of law.
The duties of law student practitioners, law schools, and supervising lawyers are
also enumerated in Sections 6, 9, and 11 respectively.
The Revised Rule also enumerates in Section 13 acts considered as unauthorized
practice of lawas well as the corresponding sanctions, without prejudice to existing
laws, rules, regulations, and circulars. It stresses that “unauthorized practice of law
shall be a ground for revocation of the law student practitioner’s certification
and/or disqualification for a law student from taking the bar examinations for a
period to be determined by the Supreme Court.”
A.C. No. 5161
14.RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S.
TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. ROLANDO S. TORRES …
Petitioner
Promulgated: July 11, 2017
For resolution is the Petition1 dated March 10, 2017 filed by Rolando S. Torres
(Torres) who seeks judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Records show that in a Resolution2 dated April 14, 2004 in Ting-Dumali v. Torres,3
the Court meted the supreme penalty of disbarment on Torres for “presentation of
false testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the
forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement;
and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such
forgery,”4 thereby committing gross misconduct and violating Canons 1 and 10 the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres
guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1
and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately.
x x x5
Aggrieved, Torres twice moved for reconsideration,6 both of which were denied
with finality by the Court,7 which then stated that “[n]o further pleadings will be
entertained.”8 This notwithstanding, Torres: (a) filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift
Disbarment9 dated January 26, 2006 begging for compassion, mercy, and
understanding;10 and (b) wrote letters to former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban11 and former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga12 reiterating his pleas
for compassion and mercy. However, these were ordered expunged through the
Court’s Resolutions dated June 13, 200613 and September 5, 2006,14 considering
the previous directive that no further pleadings will be further entertained in this
case. Still undaunted, Torres continued to file numerous submissions either
seeking his reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of
disbarment to suspension,16 all of which were either expunged from the
records17 or denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, Torres filed a Petition19 dated June
11, 2015 seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys.20 In a Resolution21 dated August 25, 2015 (August 25, 2015
Resolution), the Court denied the petition, holding that Torres had failed to
provide substantial proof that he had reformed himself, especially considering the
absence of showing that he had reconciled or attempted to reconcile with his
sister-in-law, the original complainant in the disbarment case against him; nor was
it demonstrated that he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he had
committed against her.22
Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again seeking judicial
clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that
judicial clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court
will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise are indispensable.23 In Re: The Matter of the
Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a member of the Philippine
Bar,24 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judge’s associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent
finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.25
In support of the instant petition for reinstatement, Torres merely rehashed all the
several testimonials and endorsements which he had already attached to his
previous petitions, in addition to another endorsement, this time coming from the
incumbent Secretary of Justice, stating that Torres “is a person of good moral
character and a law abiding citizen.”26 However, these testimonials and
endorsements do not prove whatsoever that Torres had already successfully
reformed himself subsequent to his disbarment. Neither do they exhibit remorse
towards the actions which caused his delisting from the Roll of Attorneys, i.e., the
fraudulent acts he committed against his sister-in-law. In this regard, it is
noteworthy to point out that since the promulgation of the Court’s August 25,
2015 Resolution, there was still no showing that Torres had reconciled or even
attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law so as to show remorse for his
previous faults.
Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence to demonstrate his potential
for public service or that he - now being 70 years of age27- still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
In sum, Torres failed to comply with the guidelines for the grant of judicial
clemency; hence, the instant petition must necessarily be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
15.A.C. No. 7054 - CONRADO QUE, complainant v. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA,
JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
This is an Appeal/Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
(Atty. Revilla), praying that the decision dated December 4, 2009 of the Court
disbarring him from the practice of law be reconsidered on the ground of equity,
as the penalty of disbarment is severe, harsh and excessive and not commensurate
to the infraction he committed in good faith. He also pleads leniency and
compassion, considering that he is the sole breadwinner of his family with a sick
and bedridden mother and a sick sister to support; a financial benefactor of Our
Lady of Mt. Carmel, Lucena City; and an indigent patient at the Heart Center.
We resolve to deny the motion.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[1] Hence,
the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it.[2]
It is not amiss to note that as early as the first administrative case of Atty. Revilla
before us, Plus Builders, Inc., et.al v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr., the Court has
punished Atty. Revilla, among others, "for committing a willful and intentional
falsehood before the court and misusing court procedure and processes to delay
the execution of a judgment." In the 2006 decision in Plus Builders, the Court
imposed upon Atty. Revilla a suspension for two (2) years. On his motion for
reconsideration, which was based on arguments similar to the ones that are now
presently raised, the Court exercised judicial leniency and reduced the penalty of
suspension to six (6) months. In both instances, Atty. Revilla was sufficiently
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
From the established infractions committed by Atty. Revilla in the case at bar, it is
clear that he did not heed the Court's warning. Additionally, and as Atty, Revilla
admitted, we take note that another disbarment case has been filed against him
by Atty. Cesar Uy (counsel of the complainant), which case is now pending before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
With these considerations in mind, the Court can no longer accept the plea for
equity, leniency and compassion Atty. Revilla now submits. He must now be held
fully accountable to the consequences of his professional misconduct. As we
stated in the decision, he did not learn any lesson from his past experiences and
has since then exhibited traits of incorrigibility, aptly demonstrated by his failure
to heed the Court's warning in Plus Builders. His undesirable traits have no place in
the legal profession and in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.'s
Appeal/Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, the Court, in deciding whether or not to
reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The
Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant
contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings;
and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart
and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other
transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove
that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document
in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court
considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the
numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the
judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after
his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found
guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of
law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review
by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature
and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to
consider the respondent’s reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also
failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement
was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
16.FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and
GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian,
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant, v. ATTY. EDMUNDO L.
MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that respondent deceived her into
marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
The complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he
representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the
first on December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on
December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16,
1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his
previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with
one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their
children without providing them any regular support up to the present time,
leaving them in precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting
instead that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen
Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will to a “sham wedding” to protect
her and her family’s reputation since she was then three-months pregnant. He
submitted in evidence that in the civil case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J.
Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to
the trial court’s findings on the basis of his evidence which was not controverted,
that the marriage was indeed “a sham and make believe” one, “vitiated by fraud,
deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal
impediment” and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised the
additional defenses that the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to
complainant is res judicata upon the present administrative case; that complainant
is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in her
letter to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always been the victim in
his marital relations, respondent invoked the final and executory August 21, 1998
in the case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,” declaring his first
marriage void on the ground of his wife’s psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for
three months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of
the profession. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by
final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He
and complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his
first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first
marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is
inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the continued right
to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even assuming that respondent
was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the
following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day,
respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her.
Thus, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is
hereby disbarred from the practice of law.
17.Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000
Petitioner: Leslie Ui
Respondent: Atty. Iris Bonifacio
Facts of the case:
Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on
grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children.
According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between
them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop
their illicit affair but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is a
victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be
a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in
Amoy, China. Moreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing
their relationship. When respondent knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she
stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and Carlos Ui never
lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept
the situation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her
marriage contract.
Issue:
Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves
to be barred from the practice of law?
Held:
NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It
is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is
a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good
moral character is also requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However,
the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered as an immoral.
For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and to opinion of good and respectable member of the community.
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. constitute gross immoral conduct. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. Additionally, even
A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
punishment therefor. Henceforth, the Court hereby dismissed the instant petition
standards.
and herein respondent should be allowed to take his lawyer’s oath.
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering
Antecedent Facts:
his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
profession. admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, complainant filed the instant petition
18.[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997.]
averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, Complainant, v. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., Respondent. wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her. that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
Jose Remi S. Maranon for Private Respondent. allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only
P10.00 for the child on the latter’s birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship
SYNOPSIS
ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in 1971, Hence, this petition.
against respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar candidate in the 1970 Bar
Issue: whether or not Simeon Barranco be denied to take his lawyers oath?
examination, praying thereto that herein respondent be denied admission to the
legal profession. In her petition, complainant averred that respondent and she had
been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
Held:
respondent failed to fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Hence, complainant charged him of gross immorality. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent
The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims
warranting permanent exclusion of herein respondent from the legal profession.
His engaging in premarital sexual relations with the complainant and promises to
that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman
examinations. scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent
suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
other indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful, Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of fees.
respectable members of the community. We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang
SO ORDERED.
8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of
whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of
such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were

evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that she had been
forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s
girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those
years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced
to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily
and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who
could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the
partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should
be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
19.A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
The Case: Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was
forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
Facts:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in
Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job
as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G.
Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with
respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his
wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave
Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado
and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would,
however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and
continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987,
complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer
living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent
Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken
his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress
hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to
take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her
custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with
Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his
legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,
stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cordova be suspended from the practice of law?
Held:
we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most
recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to
be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of
the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him
as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for
admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of
good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as
a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that
"the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for
the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground
for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we
here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social
institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed
and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited
with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son
and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had
himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a
member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He
was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who
consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an
adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he,
rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of
"reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting
with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and
its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting
his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the
Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of
his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that
he has clung to.
20.EN BANC [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
[SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON.
TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
-Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have
violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
“Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.”
-Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the
legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada
v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice
and due process.
-According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11
June 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their
bias and partiality against his client.
-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p.
13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even
before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking
in open court that to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and
disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the Sandiganbayan
justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.
-The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of
Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
‘a) going to EDSA 2;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President
on the ground of ‘permanent disability’ even without proof of
compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g.,
written declaration by either the President or majority of his
cabinet; and
‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of
permanent disability.
-In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum
shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.
-Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse
to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
-In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain
of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions
to this Court or to its Members.
-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to
persist on end. In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia
wrote to say -
“What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s right to due process of
law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The
rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that
when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had
already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting
to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be
expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?”
Issue: WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
-Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction
can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto,
82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his
client’s case within the judicial forum. Indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both
broadcast and print media.
 “Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar
from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.”
-It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political activities,” in its statutory context, relates
to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath
of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is
a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices
of the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official
functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of
the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not countenance any wrongdoing
nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have
been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on
similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning
the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful
of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has
chosen not to at all take heed.
-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
21.Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case
pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his
position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed
him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec
requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the
petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?
Holding:
No, Ledesma’s withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty
rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the
bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of
service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de
oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
Ratio:
“The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges,
or other officials or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor
General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as
counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-
appellant’s counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was
substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the
defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28,
1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban)
Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel
is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing
with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and
given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with
a counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the
accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muñoz Palma, L-15325, August 31,
1930)
22.IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29- Malpractice
FACTS:
The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela,
admits that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:
“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD MEMBER,
Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for
the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents
of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your
homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you
collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against
you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a
lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads
as follow:
“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people
are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and
that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary
public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague, I would
request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of
your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live
and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in
court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.”
HELD:
Application is given to sec. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act
NO. 2828, providing “ The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brockets, constitutes malpractice, “
and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of
the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a business. The
solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension.
Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The worthiest and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character
and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards,
being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is
not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or
by personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters(one who seeks customers,as for an inn,a public
conveyance,shops,etc.an obtrusive candidate for office.)
of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to
secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved,
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the
traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It
is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out
those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action
in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence
the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or
prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to
the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having
knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to
inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between
individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this
offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to
reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the
instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason
behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and
not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53
Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L.,
1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of
solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession.
It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and
those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the
action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom
joined the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the
case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action
should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of
offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar.
But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first,
his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his
youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar
mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of
the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the
relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as
indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by
disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the
respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an
attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
23.KHAN V. SIMBILLO DIGEST
FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which
reads:“Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of
the Supreme Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered.
She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar
advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was filed which
was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to
suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did
not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but
argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute
prohibition against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in
any way by the prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.
HELD:
Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary
duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration
while duty to public service and administration of justice should be primary.
Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as
an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an
institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise
disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not
altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the dignity
of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears
must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly
publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar.
24.ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
 vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized
to practice law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers,
asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, 25.SAMONT E v GATDULA
Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
February 26, 1999
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
FACTS
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the A suit was filed by Julieta Samonte against Gatdula charging the latter with grave
letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the misconduct consisting in the alleged engagement in the private practice law, which
instant complaint. is in conflict with his official functions as a branch clerk of court. Samonte is the
authorized representative of her sister, Flor de Leon, in a case where there is a
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
typographical error in the complaint in an ejectment suit. The petition to have it
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in
corrected was granted and a motion for execution was issued. However, a
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
temporary restraining order (TRO) was subsequently issued by Judge Castillo of
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
RTC of Quezon City where Gatdula is the clerk. Flor alleges that she went to inquire
about the TRO but Gatdula brushed her off and said “Wow, bad lawyer you have”
and told her to change counsel and even handed her a calling card of “Baligod,
Gatula, Tacardon, Tacardon, Dimailig & Cellera” law firm.
Respondent countered and said that Samonte was just very mad about the TRO
that’s why she filed a case against him. He further alleged that he was not
connected with the law firm. He was invited to be part of it, but he wanted to
remain in the judiciary.
The investigating judge found that the complainant failed to substantiate her
allegations due to failure to appear in court despite several notices for hearing.
However, he that the calling card attached in the complaint, certainly included
respondent’s name
ISSUE
WON the inclusion of Gatdula’s name in the calling card of the law firm in subject
is a violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees
HELD/RATIO
Yes. The Court found that respondent is guilty of an infraction, for not having
denied that his name appears on the calling card which admittedly came into the
hands of the complainant. It is a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of
legal services, and is therefore a clear manifestation of him being engaged in the
private practice of law. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional
card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates the "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for
a public official or employee to, among others:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with official functions. Inclusion of his name gives the impression that he is
connected with the firm, which is not permissible of an officer charged with the
dispensation of justice.
26.CRUZ vs SALVA
105 Phil 1151
FACTS:
A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus,
Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and
Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned
people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new
confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the
results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and
confessions. Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed
Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new
affidavits and confessions. Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee
and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation because the case was pending
appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow him
to appear at the investigation. SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the
prelim investigation.
ISSUES
 Whether or not Salva conducted the investigation property?
RULING:
No. the members of the Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor
judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and
good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and the Court, in the interest of justice, is
constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its
repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the
one liable. Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for
the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and
allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be
contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same
would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
27. PEOPLE V PINEDA 20 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Defendants are charged with five criminal cases of murder by the City Fiscal.
However, two of the defendants moved to consolidate the five criminal cases into
one and disregard the other four. Their plea is that said cases arose out of the
same incident and motivated by one impulse. The respondent Judge approved the
motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file
one single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought
reconsideration thereof. . The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider.
Hence, City Fiscal, in behalf of the People, moved this case for certiorari.
ISSUE
WON the certiorari should be granted
RULING
yes. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigating Fiscal. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash
of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation.
It should not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be
blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly
administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the
statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "
3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be
substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in
court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have
to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to
reason than to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not
investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he
cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying
that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in
equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law
where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to
avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional
or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the
present case fits into any of the situations just recited.1äwphï1.ñët
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we
are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing
separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the
provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for
multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion
should not be controlled.Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed
for is hereby granted
Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should
prosper
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be
decided in an administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the
Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be
dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed,
but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not
only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated
but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is
a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a
member of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and
misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for
membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable
profession who does not even take care that hishonor remains unsullied.
29.A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,

28.Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)
vs.
Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s
Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit
him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance
as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided FERNANDO, J.:
by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and
a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the
legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of
Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua,
owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There
was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of
the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it
would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could
very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by
him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the
bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome
of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its
requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for
malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being
dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly
any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having
appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC
while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he
contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a
government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for
the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having
conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in
order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his
separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to
members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office
set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the
complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975.
At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances,
the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the
complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called
for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to
appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy
"preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he
was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his
complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in an
outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the
unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly
good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice
of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not
embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the
grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's
appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent
police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National
Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact,
separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by
the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission." As for the
charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead
complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal
protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan
recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence. is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be
spread on his record.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot
prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise:
"The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The 30.VITRIOLO v. DASIG A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003
presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has
Facts: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S.
performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The
Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge
Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the
there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his dignity and reputation of the CHED. Almost all complainants in the instant case are
profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this
That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could
She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel
be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a
Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P5,000.00 for the
public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office
Affairs Service, CHED. she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the
held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly
amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She
alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future
demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation
actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such
of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him
Service, CHED. She demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable
but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an
amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of
honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains
unsullied
P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name
then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED.
Issue: Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Held: Yes, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. Respondent’s attempts to extort
money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are
violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits
members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code
which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests.
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of
the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from
one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than
her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of
Canon 120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three
years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name
shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.
31.PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN 455 SCRA 526 (2005)
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawing’s on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors
and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s
assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that
Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et.
al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and
the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond
doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in
the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had
nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also
did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the
liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks.
Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable
meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of
a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought
to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not
act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing
abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but
as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A
lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should
not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which
he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain
reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
32.33.A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo
A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor
General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report
recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao)
had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion
of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits
the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third
year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification
Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma,
and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's
failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper
school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second
charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A.
graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title
from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified,
due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion"
was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained
A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April,
1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949)
six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not
have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the
study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-
legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it,
luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having
been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that
he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not
the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses
of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of
Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within
thirty days. So ordered.
33.A.C. No. 4921 March 6, 2003
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty.
Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to
marry her while representing himself to be single.2 Soon they had an intimate relationship
that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.3 During their affair, respondent was
preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a
member of the Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her
office and confronted her about her relationship with respondent. 5 On September 10, 1997,
respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. 6 On December 9,
1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa.7 By this time however, respondent
had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. 8
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them
was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was
known in the NBI that he was already married and with children; 9 complainant is almost 10
years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; 10 the child borne by
complainant it not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were
having an affair.11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know
at the time that complainant was seeing other men.12
After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
"CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
Immoral conduct has been defined as:" that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency."13
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he
declared explicitly:
"1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
"2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;
"3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my
own;
"4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal
and medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for
living, which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she
becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her own;
"5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is
my child; however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and
acknowledgement already done herein;
"6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a
lawyer, I have full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and
recognition."14
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging,
Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.
"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise
fix amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than
P500 but not more than P1,000."15
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated
that:
". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of
conduct demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a
woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards." 16
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer.17
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on
his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount
to self-stultification.18
This Court has repeatedly held:
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."19
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks
understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," 20 and that
what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire." 21 The Court is not
convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo
that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it
does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is
respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or
not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held
in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto
because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts." 22
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the
bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for
admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral
character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar.23 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the
profession;24 it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law25 and therefore admission to
the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because
his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.
The Court held:
"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law
only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to
be heard."26
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required
for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law."27
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now
refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to
support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment
could be given.28Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed
his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the
Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondent's effort to mend his ways or
that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the
Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should
be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is
able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in himself a firm
conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the
profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.29
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
34.PAULINO VALENCIA vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING 1991
FACTS: In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia and his wife allegedly bought a
parcel of land, where they built their house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an
heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the
sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names. A conference was held in
the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia
and the Valencia spouses. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed
of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed
covered a different property. Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting,
filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The
Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised
them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in
Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay
the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor. A "Compraventa
Definitiva" as a result thereof.
The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, rendered a decision in favor of Serapia.
Paulino filed a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction before the CA.
While the petition was pending, the TC issued an order of execution stating that
"the decision in this case has already become final and executory".
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty.
Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting
the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel. The appellate court
dismissed the petition of Paulino.
Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, also filed a disbarment proceeding
against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery and its
subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo
Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in
violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of
allegedly rigging the case against her parents. the judge. Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may
either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes
ISSUES:
under Article 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the
(issue 1 lang ang connected pero iapil nlng nako ang uban basig pangutaon) trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly,
violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
this malpractice is a ground for suspension. The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
falsifying notarial documents. between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part
as her counsel. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging the case against
adverted to.
spouses Valencia.
II
HELD:
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code: The following persons cannot acquire by
P200.00 in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva".
purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or through the
This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative
mediation of another: (5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony. When an individual's
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges
which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator
their profession. Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary
and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity
relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer
which at all time is expected of him. There is a clear preponderant evidence that
upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its subsequent
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice
introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as
and is a ground for suspension. Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel
an officer of the court.
concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
III
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the
lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A
thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these
administrative cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva"
and rigged the case against spouses Valencia.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the
roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED; and 3. Admin case against
Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos DISMISSED
Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994 FACTS:
Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell
L. Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the US government as a
widow of a US pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the same shall be
irrevocable until her loan is fully paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of
attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the post office. About
three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed the post office that
she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B.
Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for Cerina. Cerina and Yap filed a joint
motion, which does not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to allow the Yap to
withdraw the pension checks. They likewise entered into a compromise agreement
without the participation of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they agreed
that the amount would be paid in monthly installments. Cerina filed a complaint
for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented from seeking
assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by
Atty. Lim that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the
pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be
incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was
assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents Foisted
upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything. She alleged
that she was prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception
and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently
or without authority, assumed to represent complainant and connived in her
defeat. Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her and it was upon
her request that he made the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first
instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had
abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees. The compromise
agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerina‘s debt to Yap and the terms
contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for
violating Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, constituting
malpractice and grave misconduct. RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from
informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint.
There is no showing that Atty.
Lim even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither
is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the alleged
abandonment of Cerina by her counsel.Instead, even assuming that she was really
abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the
situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise agreement which is
grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Lim's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Code of
Professional Responsibility states: Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice
and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
36.EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s
oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel
for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It
is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a
full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys
38.A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
133, Makati City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the
Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885,
entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.1 While
respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator,
dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to
respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal
case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the
matter to respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had
appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out
that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to
handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the
services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a
member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin.
Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not
prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage
of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave
applications approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request
for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court
Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for
violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on
the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood
cousins" who belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of
Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms.
Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a
mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought
respondent's help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885
for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only
purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He
explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's
husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga.
During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3)
children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification
charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in
their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel
since she doesn’t have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer.
Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government
service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary,
he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this
particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping
hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for "humanitarian
purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since
the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the
hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave
applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and
referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following
findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-
885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is
also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the
respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on
official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan
was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself
positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her.
Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed
to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled
a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for
free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding
Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during
all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his
integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel
for his cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and considering
that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not
for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that
any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found
under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said
section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee
of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically
the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated
court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term
"private practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as
counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not
constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a
private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the
head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors.9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous
occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as
borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a
prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the
court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is
hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
39.A.C. No. 5379 : May 9, 2003
WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO
NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint
for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino
and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and
violating the lawyers oath.1cräläwvirtualibräry
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr., pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents
Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion
for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority. As such, he is now under detention.2 Upon personal verification with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly
surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14,
2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M.
Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27,
calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity
and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private
complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the
Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as Annex 1.
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13,
2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they
filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they
immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to
voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at
2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the
accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither
unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has
voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice
of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled
to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies
of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion
on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of
Court.3cräläwvirtualibräry
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court
when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila
A. Pea, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on
December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However,
the presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion subject to the
presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion
of the Motion in the courts calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the
presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of
his ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the instant case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or
decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
submitted her report and recommendation as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be
suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for
a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin
Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of
merit.5cräläwvirtualibräry
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondent’s commission of deliberate
falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.6cräläwvirtualibräry
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate
falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that
he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.8 He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion.9 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10 While a
lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display
the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth.11cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected
from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be
denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such
artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to
injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when
they resorted to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accuseds detention was merely a
statement of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the
hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already
under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not
exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the
custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police
authorities on the same date tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the
application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and
immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability
considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for
bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask
such specific affirmative relief from the court.13cräläwvirtualibräry
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice
of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be
asked for his recommendation.14cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion
for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on
short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-
observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.15cräläwvirtualibräry
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent
clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion
in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the
presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions,
although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the
prompt and sound administration of justice.16 Thus, he should not hesitate to
inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which
are contrary to the established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas,
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate
falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar
G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
40.ADEZ REALTY INC. V. CA 215 SCRA 301 1992
Facts:
ALTERATION OF FACTUAL FINDINGS: DISBARRED
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he
appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to
obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the
practice of law.
He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of
Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court
and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the
petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he
was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council
to the President for appointment as regional trial judge.
Held:
3 YEARS- ENOUGH TO REDEEM HIMSELF AND PROOF HIS WORTH IN PRACTICE
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite
apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to
practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His
admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that
he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession
demands from its practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of
Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly warned that —
THE WARNING: ADHERENCE TO RIGID STANDARDS

MOTION TO LIFT DISBARMENT: LEARNED HIS LESSON WELL [T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already 62 years
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions
old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to
privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession,
the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion
has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its
certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar,
members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect
Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector,
and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .
San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center
for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law
College of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, is LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment
Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon of the required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.
City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D.
Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City
41.RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.
Issue: Should the disbarment be lifted?
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005
 obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates. Thus, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of
Facts: Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his
court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross
frustrations of the outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. The letter
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
contained derogatory and malignant remarks which are highly insulting. The Court
accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of appearing before the court, 42.IN RE: SOTTO, 82 PHIL 595(1949)
he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as the first one. The court was thus
Facts:
offended with his remarks.
♦Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the decision of
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the
this
remarks he has made in his letters addressed to the court.
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and
Held: Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the
other daily newspapers of the locality. The court required Atty. Sotto to show
court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment
cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court.
serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of
court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a ♦ Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court, under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme
Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this be procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the
and with greater reasons in the case of the country’s highest court, the Supreme citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by
Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the
Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his
administration of justice, to which his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal,
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor
who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked,
can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the
or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set
legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. Hence,
forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes
Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational
Ratio:
♦ Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt
of court an act which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent
powers of the court to punish for contempt
♦ That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior
statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of
last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our
Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
♦ Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to
the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision.
♦ Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo
case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven
to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to 2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No.
53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a
local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge
the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members,
In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during
these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of
the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy.
It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme
Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.his
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice.
♦ As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the
court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication
to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys
as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he
should not be disbarred.
43.Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)
Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent
Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision
for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had
been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for
decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint
and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
44.[G.R. No. 35252. October 21, 1932.]
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UY TENG PIAO,
Defendant-Appellee.
1. RELEASE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO REDEEM; CONSIDERATION. — The trial court
absolved the defendant on the ground that he had waived his right to redeem the
property in question in consideration of an understanding between him and an
employee of the bank that the latter would not collect from the defendant the
remainder of a prior judgment. Held: That even conceding that there was such
agreement, it was not shown that said employee was authorized to make it, and
that only the board of directors or the persons empowered by it could bind the
bank.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — The evidence shows that the defendant waived his right to
redeem the land in question because a friend of his wished to purchase it, and the
bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of the sale.
3. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY AS WITNESS. — Although the law does not
forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and
that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm:
Legal Ethics, p. 148.)
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila absolving the defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to
costs.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
"The trial court erred:
"1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to
condone the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and
in favor of the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. "2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in
certificate of title No. 11274 situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano
Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged
promise of condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.
"3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of
the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
"4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such
promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.
"5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng
Piao for the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year
1930 is ’una señal inequivoca y una prueba evidente’ of the condonation of the
balance of the said judgment.
"6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of
P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid
even discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for
the said property.
"7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and
D-1, reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a
case with the appellant bank.
"8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the
amount claimed in the complaint with costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 9, 1924 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment
in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No.
26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June
1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney’s fees and costs. The
court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court
within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do
so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos.
7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the
proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the
City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine
National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a
waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for
P8,600.
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently
resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited
with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the
full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of
P11,574.38, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived
his right to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in
consideration of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would
not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the
trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part
of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged
agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the
pertinent part of whose testimony on direct examination was as follows:
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the
execution of defendant’s waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered
that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the
defendant replied that he did not remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his
right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of
the defendant was interested in buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was
not residing in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank’s attorney, we should like to observe
that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same
time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a
witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active
management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of
Legal Ethics reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such
as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the
trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a
lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Defendant’s testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no
mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1
relates only to the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement
as the defendant claims, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have required
the defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the
defendant, a Chinese business man, would have insisted upon some evidence of
the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right to
redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it
and was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the
defendant with the full amount of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between
Pecson and the defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was
authorized to make any such agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors
or the persons empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such
an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank accepted
the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged agreement. The fact
that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the instance of
the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the
resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant’s waiver of his
right to redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest
thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of
both instances.
45.MERCADO V. VITRIOLO
A.C. No. 5108, May 26, 2005
Facts: Complainant’s husband filed Civil Case for annulment of their marriage with
the RTC which had been dismissed by the trial court, and became final and
executory. Respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel for the
complainant. Respondent filed a criminal action against complainant for violation
of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal
Code. Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates
of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically,
complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married
to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April
11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their
marriage took place on April 11, 1978. Complainant alleged that said criminal
complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts and
information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent
as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent
is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship,
and should be disbarred.
Issue: Whether the Respondent violated the complainant’s attorney-client
privilege by filing a criminal case against the latter.
Held: No, the court held that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainant’s allegations. The court note that complainant did not even specify
the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims
were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a
criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the
criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then
handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will
determine the merit of her complaint.
The court cited the factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
46.A.C. No. 6174 November 16, 2011
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-1961 of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint2 for
disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services
of respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila
City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the
respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the
checks.3Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period
indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.
On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila.4
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation5 filed by
respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the
latter’s daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003,
respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Comment,6 respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that
he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in
deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional
engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any professional
fee for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that
complainant would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that
complainant, based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A.
Año.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant
against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the
demand letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Año.
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the
criminal cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are
likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are "comares" for more than 30 years
since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba.7 Respondent claimed that it is
in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughter’s request that they be
represented by him in the cases filed against them by complainant and
complainant’s daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for Consolidation
which is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his
appearance in the joint proceedings should only be construed as an effort on his
part to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the parties.
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the
parties achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported
that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant
the amount of ₱50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No.
03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the
other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This
allegedly led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant administrative
case for conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
and approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his daring
audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 8
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner,9 as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant
regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by
respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S.
No. 03G-19582-84 entitled "Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba". Respondent stated
that the movants in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants are
likewise mother and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same
transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of
evidence and witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal
favor to complainant who is a close friend.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the
close friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was
established the moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent
regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further
affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the
criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by
complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by
the Investigating Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as "my client" in
the demand letter sent to the defaulting debtor10, respondent admitted the existence
of the lawyer-client relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from
claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from
complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The
prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established
and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship. 11 We held in
Burbe v. Atty. Magulta12 that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised
or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought.13
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." Respondent was therefore bound to refrain
from representing parties with conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so,
without showing any proof that he had obtained the written consent of the conflicting
parties, respondent should be sanctioned.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste.14 In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns of the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree.15
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.16
The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat17 is instructive on this concept, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties.1awp++i1 The test is ‘whether or not in behalf of one client, it
is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client.’18 This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used.19 Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection.20 Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.21
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Año who was
eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a client’s
cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to
represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a
violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.
Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, the disbarment sought in the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors
of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is
directed to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as member of the
Bar.
47.G.R. No. L-23183 December 29, 1924
FILOMENA ONA, applicant.
PATRICIA ISLAS, ET AL. (opponents), petitioners, vs. SERVILIANO PLATON, Judge of
First Instance of Tayabas, and FILOMENA ONA, Respondents.
Tiburcio Ind. Villacorte for petitioners.
Zoleta and Trinidad for respondents.OSTRAND, J.:
It appears from the record that in December, 1920, the herein petitioners filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act
for the review of a decree in a land registration case. On March 23, 1921, the court
denied the petition for review without permitting the petitioners to present their
evidence. Upon appeal to this court the order denying the petition was reversed and
the record remanded to the court below for the reception of evidence. The evidence
having been received, the Court of First Instance on April 16, 1924, again denied
the petition for a review and on May 5, 1924, the petitioners herein filed a motion for
a new trial. The motion was heard and denied on the 17th of the same month and
two days later due notice of the denial was sent to the attorney for the petitioners at
his office address in Manila. The letter containing the notification was returned to
the clerk of the Court of First Instance the latter part of June, 1924, marked
"unclaimed." On August 26, 1924, the petitioners presented their exception to the
order of May 17th denying the petition for a new trial and announced their intention
to appeal to this court. A bill of exception was filed on August 29, 1924, but the trial
court refused to approve and certify it on the ground that the time for presenting it
had then expired.
On September 2, 1924, an order was entered declaring the decision in the land
registration case final, and on the 24th of the same month a writ of possession was
issued directing the sheriff of the province to place the applicant for registration, the
herein respondent, Filomena Ona, in possession of the land. The petitioners
thereupon brought the present action for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance to approve and certify the bill of
exceptions filed on August 29, 1924. Counsel for the petitioners argues that under
section 26 of Act No. 2347 an appellant in a land registration case has thirty days
from the date upon which he receives a copy of the decision within which to present
his bill of exceptions; that the order from which his clients desire to appeal must be
considered a "decision" within the meaning of said section; that as he never
received a copy of the order, the thirty days period had not begun to run at the time
the bill of exceptions here in question was presented. It may well be doubted
whether section 26 of Act No. 2347 is applicable to appeals from orders relating to
petitions for review, but assuming that such is the case, the respondent judge was
nevertheless, in our opinion, fully justified in declining to certify the bill of exceptions
in the present case. The bill was not presented until over three months after the
notice of the order from which the petitioners desire to appeal should have reached
their counsel in the ordinary course of the mails. The notice was duly sent by
registered letter to counsel at his address in the City of Manila and it is not intimated
that the address was erroneous. There is nothing in the record to show that the
postal authorities did not properly perform their duty and we must presume that the
usual notice of the arrival of the letter at the Manila post office was delivered at the
office of said counsel. He failed to claim the letter and it was returned to the Court of
First Instance marked "unclaimed ." His failure to receive a copy of the order in
question was therefore entirely due to his own negligence of which he cannot now
be allowed to take advantage. As a practicing lawyer it was his duty to so arrange
matters that official communications sent by mail would reach him promptly. Having
failed to do so, he and his clients must suffer the consequences of his negligence.
That he may have been absent from his office at the time the notification here in
question arrived is no excuse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied with the costs against the petitioners.
So ordered
48.A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
vs.ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not
tawdry, from the usual. As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for.
Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary
sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the
misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal
(respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting versions
of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000
when she was looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"),
the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former classmate who
was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings
with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein
he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus
no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for
her congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started
having a sexual relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after
respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her
behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he
had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the
accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial
security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these
advances, assured by respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as
his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an
Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was
denoted as the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not
the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she
claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing,
necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter
medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that
despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future
because the Affidavit is not a public document. Because she completely trusted him
at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave
him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for
the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her,
respondent handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and
promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However,
sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her
the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then
running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of
Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that
respondent kept part of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his
promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against Aquino and
referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for
child abuse as well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was
dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise
agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the
import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally
prepared the Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to
her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her problems would be solved,
aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled,
respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking
advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour,
her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able
to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She
argues that respondent's aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a
lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"), particularly Rule
1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant
needed a lawyer who would file the aforementioned action for support.
Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also
his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter
to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and
Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's
infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things
the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would
execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then
advised her to study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also
explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she
requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than
P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the
amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four
postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed.
Aquino then proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a
total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit
that respondent prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies
forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not
know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he
gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant
is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and understands
English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to
her the sum of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could
keep the remaining P38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint.
Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with
complainant. He, however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises.
According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic)
adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into
believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes
considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married
when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high
school classmate of hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence
where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently, complainant called his
residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing
to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was
the Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the
Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial
Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for
complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that she lived no
more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in
his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was
being worked out, complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because
a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and
the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the
money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started
to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition for
Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised
her "to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial
assistance. He also informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as
he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He, however, referred her
to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still
he agreed to give her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months.
Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated only through an
emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the
assistance until June when her alleged fiancé from the United States would have
arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance
for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating
to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of
respondent. She told him that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she
was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent. According
to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent
that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her
request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.On 21 July 2004, the case
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report
and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers
and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report
and Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties'
conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that
of complainant and concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting
in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting
in good moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of
the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers
to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been
compendiously described as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice
complainant to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent
kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid
while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals
the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took
advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of
P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005,
finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the
lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will
merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to
complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for
Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a
Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006
with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more
detailed account of the events that transpired between him and complainant.
Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what
she wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare
allegations that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence, he posits the
case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to determine who
between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground
that it has no more jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been
endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the
IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is whether
this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who
was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal
desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances
due to his promises of financial security and because of her need for legal
assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to conclude that
complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated
woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in
her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job
and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness
and/or helplessness on her part.29 Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls
to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At best, it
proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which
the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her
P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as
she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital
status inspire belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was
impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She herself
admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales
who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his
residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member
in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and
talked to his wife on several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she
helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have
known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with
Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just
plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a
short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to
change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her
aforementioned allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant
evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are left with the most logical
conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral
relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and
moral control over her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit
without letting her read it and without explaining to her its repercussions. While
acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial
support from Aquino especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart
ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent who she
had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by
signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case
she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a
single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the
contents of the Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that
respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the
money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said
Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she
was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim
for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show
that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not
deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The
Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a
layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and
without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit,
a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the
negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement
with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the
amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might
otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure
that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be
proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of
heart. Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted
as Aquino's counsel in the settlement of the case. Again, we only have
complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no
matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will
prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money
given by Aquino to her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he
allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and
pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as
her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered
respondent to return the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a
discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in
settlement of complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that
complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists
that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting
to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially
agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00
more – and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his
attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there
existed two postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On
the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00
but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his
presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy
of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was
only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes
that complainant requested for it as she did not want to travel all the way to
Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a
finding in favor of either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on
mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the parties,
apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the
question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more
in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial
evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for
further reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable
for the cost of her child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds
exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's
fees. Suffice it to state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis,
one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the
Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed
the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public
from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
reliable men and women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As
such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievance.38
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.39Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of
cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground
of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40
abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married
woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a
womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing
cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was found to have sired a child with
another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from
the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship
was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral
attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge
Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there
was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00
for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the
pendency of the case.We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein
respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion and had in fact ended the
brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character
of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in
his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of
P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the
aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of
immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this Decision.Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record
of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
49.A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint
charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the
complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not
constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the
former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation,
report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman
Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented
evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel,
cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He
denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June
1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel
register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging
respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent
Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the
complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant
that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to
the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first
floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that they
go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married;
that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and
the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they
entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant
inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself;
that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted,
telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that
'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon
respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed
himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when
respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but
to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from
3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and
proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on
June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant
refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after their said
sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family
way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of
marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant
gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant
through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to
the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the
highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must
be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he
answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to
the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in
having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June,
1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when
they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to
practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing
additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the
hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the
case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the
respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present
additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such
evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence
produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an
opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be
considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the
complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a
number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on
June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register
of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno"
arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the
latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for
Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling
him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another
one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she
requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to
Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him
to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and
complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant
sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the
complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the
respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and
Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate
issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission
of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical
records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant
was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked
from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the
complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that
he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the
respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that
he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that
they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of
Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter
to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own
testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of
respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule
138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,
1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that
he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her
on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that
date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking
for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does
not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he
fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest
of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort
seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist
him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the
charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a
settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can
not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104,
January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December
28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of
the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a
grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics
of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned
profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest
standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the
dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of
justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence,
his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent
Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred
respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino
while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted
gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross
immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise
ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
and to this Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular
support of his two children by complainant.
Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion
and Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1,
2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For
Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially
treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly,
denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On
December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of
the Vice President7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the
substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should
not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding
of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to
a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character.10
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition
meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion
in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his
children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as
shown by the herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his
disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted
his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in
2008.12 In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations
Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to
serve to date.13 Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan
Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent
likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and
friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of
Candida P. Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of
Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government
Office;18 (5) Certification by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer,
Social Welfare Development Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer of
Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8)
Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the
Office of the Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the
Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the
Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter.25 The Office of the
Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary accountabilities
in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human Resource Management
Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case.27 He is not known to
be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent
of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28 Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the SO ORDERED.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and
present colleagues.30 His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified
that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic
Church.31 He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.32 Records further
reveal that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles,33 as in
fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support34 to his children in compliance with the Court’s directive in the
Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent
was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu
National High School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government
service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service
Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice.36 From the attestations and certifications presented, the
Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 5837
years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly
contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society.
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant
officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have
reformed their ways,38 as in this case.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of

law.1âwphi1 He is, however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with
conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness,
and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.39
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

CASE DIGEST

Prof. Atty. KG B. Balanag

Student: Sambu Vina L.

Course: Juris Doctor III

DMMSU- COLLEGE OF LAW