CONFLICTS MIDTERM

1. Distinguish “residence” from “domicile”. Explain the meaning of “residence” within the context of
our election law and in the context of international law.

Answer: It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more
stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term
"residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."[22] When parsed, therefore, the term
"residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or
physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court
elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law."[23]

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it
is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."[24]

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had
his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in
another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the
term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

2 . On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo who is a duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at
Manila married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena (a Filipina) and after seven years of martial
life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately each other. On
May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part says that each one is free to look for a rightful
partner.

On June 15, 1935, the Rodolfo without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the
civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted
another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal,
and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila.

Questions: (1) Is the divorce obtained by Rodolfo valid in the Philippines? (2) Can the two complaints
against him, one for bigamy and another for concubinage prosper in the Philippines? (3)Rodolfo
contends that he is immune from suit as he is a consul of Uruguay, is he correct? (4) Based on your
readings, is Rodolfo liable for bigamy and concubinage? Explain your answer.

Answer: (a)The divorce obtained by Rodolfo is not valid in the Philippines. There is no divorce law in the
Philippines. (b)The complaint for bigamy is proper since he obtained two marriages. THE concubinage
charge however must be dismissed for the reason that there is already condonation when they agreed
to part ways based on the executed document. (c) A consul does not enjoy immunity,hence he is not
immune from suit. (4) Rodolfo is made liable for bigamy only.(Sheneckenburger case)

3. What is the effect of a foreign judgment in our Philippine courts?

Answer: SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

4. Is their an obligatory rule from treaties and conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
foreign judgments? Or allow for the enforcement thereof? Explain.

Answer: There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form
part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of
law requiring it.

5. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court),
District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos
Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human
rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces
during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's
jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international
law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly
situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs
and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had
disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class
consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was
impracticable.

The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US
District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary
execution and disappearance victims.Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an
award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February
1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment
was eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17
December 1996.

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati
(Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the
plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the
Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become
final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to
Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-
payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary
amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The
Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment
of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.

Questions: As judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? Explain your answer.

6. Petitioner Alice is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent Richard filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered
to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Is the ruling of the Court correct? Explain your answer.

7. Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born
on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th
Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole
custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the
joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court)
to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised
sole custody over Stephanie.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of
the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its
order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void
for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.

Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
the case.

In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case
of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Question: Is the ruling of the Court correct? Explain your answer.

Answer: The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary
to law.

In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the
minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.12
Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning."13
For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law
serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1)
Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the
mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception
not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the
mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when
spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under
the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code
on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a
mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed
compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213.22

It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial
custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert
a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of
age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores the
legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age."24

It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other
(father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of
custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these are
objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air
and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness
or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the
regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1

Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration,
lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law
gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from
entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement
by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back to ambit
of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
respondent sole custody of Stephanie.

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28
There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis
supplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by
the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because
he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural
rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the
alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of
who obtained the divorce.

8. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

Question: Is the contention of Rodolfo San Luis correct? Explain.

9. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."

Question: Is the RTC correct in its ruling? Explain.

10. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April, 1982.

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". The city fiscal approved a resolution
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.

Question: Will the adultery case against Imelda prosper? Explain your answer.

NO. When the foreign spouse obtained divorce, he is no longer considered as a proper person to file the
case for adultery, as strictly speaking he can no longer be considered as the spouse of the Filipina.