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ART 19- Breach of Promise to Marry

WASSMER vs VELEZ FACTS APPLICATION OF LAW


 Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer following  A mere breach of promise to pay is not an
their mutual love decided to get married on actionable wrong.
September 4, 1954  To formally set a wedding, go through necessary
 September 2, 1954, Francisco left a note for procedures, only to walk out of it when the
Beatriz to postpone their mother because his matrimony is about to solemnize is palpable and
mother opposes it. Velez did not appear nor justifiable to good customs which holds liability
was he heard again. in accordance with Art, 21 of the NCC
 Records show that Wassmer and Velez applied If Expenses Are Actually Incurred
for a marriage license and had already incurred  In this case, every necessary procedure in
costs for their supposed wedding having a wedding is already done, meaning they
 Beatriz sued Velez and Velez failed to answer already incurred costs. Velez running from the
and was declared default by the court. wedding gives Wassmer the right to recover
money or property advanced by her upon the
faith of such promise to marry.
ART. 22-23 UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CASE FACTS APPLICATION OF LAW
GONZALO v TARNATE  After DPWH awarded the contract of Pari Delicto
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay-Section -According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the
of the Mt. Province Road on July 22, 1997 to the
petitioner Gonzalo, the petitioner entered into a guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from
subcontract with respondent Tarnate (JNT one another and are not entitled to an affirmative relief
Aggregates) to supply materials and labor for because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault.
the project.
The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that
 Their agreement stipulated that Tarnate would
pay Gonzalo 8% and 4% of the contract price. holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an
 April 6, 1999 Gonzalo executed a deed of illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific
assignment, assigning Tarnate 10% retention
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be
fee for Tarante’s equipment that has been
utilized in the project. Also included in the deed sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
is the authorization of Gonzalo for Tarnate to damages for its violation; and where the parties
use his company’s receipt in processing the
are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will
documents relative to the collection of the 10%
retention fee and encashing the check to be be given to one against the other.
issued by the DPWH Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari
 During the processing of the documents,
delicto is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises
Tarnate learned that Gonzalo unilaterally
rescinded the deed by means of affidavit of when its application contravenes well-established
cancellation (04/19/1999) public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been
 The disbursement voucher for the retention fee defined as “that principle of the law which holds that no
of 10% was issued in the name of Gonzalo and
the retention fee was released to him subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
 Tarnate demanded the payment of retention tendency to be injurious to the public or against the
fee from Gonzalo, but to no avail. public good.”
The subcontract and Deed of Assignment between
Gonzalo and Tarnate are void being contrary to law.  Tarnate was allowed by the court to recover his
retention fee as an exemption due to unjust
enrichment.
 Contract is void
- Every contractor is prohibited from
subcontracting with or assigning to another
person any contract or project that he has with
DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary approved of
such contract.

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