Stat. Con.

2nd tranche
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENTVS. NAGA Case #6

Good Law

G.R. No. L-24116-17, August 22, 1968 CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF
NAGA, CEBU, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

In two separate actions, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company sought to test the validity of the distraint and thereafter the
sale at public auction by the principal defendant-appellee, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, of 100,000 bags of cement for the purpose of
satisfying its alleged deficiency in the payment of the municipal license tax for 1960, municipal license tax for 1961 as well as the
penalty, all in the total sum of P204,300.00.The lower court rendered a joint decision sustaining the validity of the action taken by
defendant-appellee Municipality of Naga.The case is now before us on appeal.We affirm.

According to the appealed decision: "From all the evidence, mostly documentary, adduced during the hearing the following facts have
been established.The efforts of the defendant Treasurer to collect from the plaintiff the municipal license tax imposed by Amended
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1959 on cement factories located within the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, have met with rebuff time and
again.The demands made on the taxpayer * * * have not been entirely successful.Finally, the defendant Treasurer decided on June 26,
1961 to avail of the Civil remedies provided for under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code and gave the plaintiff a period
of ten days from receipt thereof within which to settle the account, computed as follows * * *:Deficiency Municipal License Tax for 1960
- P80,250.00; Municipal License Tax for 1961 - P90,000. 00; and 20% Penalty - P34,050.00, stating in exasperation. 'This is our last
recourse as we had exhausted all efforts for an amicable solution of our problem.'"[1]

It was further shown: "On July 6, 1961, at 11:00 A.M., the defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the plaintiff that he was
'distraining 100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of your delinquency in municipal license taxes in the total amount of
P204,300.00' * * *. This notice was received by the acting officer in charge of the plaintiff's plant, Vicente T. Garaygay, according to his
own admission.At first, he was not in accord with the said letter, asking the defendant Treasurer for time to study the same, but in the
afternoon he [acknowledged the] distraint * * *."[2]

As was noted in the decision, the defendant Treasurer in turn "signed the receipt for goods, articles or effects seized under authority of
Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code, certifying that he has constructively distrained on July 6, 1961 from the Cebu
Portland Cement Company at its plant at Tina-an, Naga, Cebu, 100,000 bags of Apo cement in tanks, and that 'the said articles or
goods will be sold at public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, and the proceeds thereof will be utilized in part satisfaction
of the account of the said company in municipal licenses and penalties in the total amount of P204,300.00 due the municipality of
Naga-Province of Cebu' * * *."[3]

The lower court likewise found as a fact, that on the same day, July. 6, 1961, the municipal treasurer posted the notice of sale to the
effect that pursuant to the provisions of Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code, he would sell at public auction for cash to the
highest bidder at the main entrance of the municipal building of the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines on the 27th day
of July, 1961, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the property seized and distrained or levied upon from the Cebu Portland Cement Company
in satisfaction of the municipal license taxes and penalties in the amount of P204,300.00, specifying that what was to be sold was
100,000 bags of Apo cement.[4] No sale, as thus announced, was held on July 27, 1961.It was likewise stated in the appealed decision
that there was stipulation by the parties to this effect: "1. The auction sale took place on January 30, 1962, * * *. "[5]

In this appeal from the above joint decision, plaintiff-appellant Cebu Portland Cement Company upholds the view that the distraintof the
100,000 bags of cement as well as the sale at public auction thereafter made ran counter to the law.As earlier noted, we do not see it
that way.

1.On the validity of the distraintIn the first two errors assigned, plaintiff-appellant submits as illegal the distraint of 100,000 bags of
cement made on July 6, 1961.Its contention is premised on the fact that in the letter of defendant-appellee dated June 26,
1961, requiring plaintiff-appellant to settle its account of P204,300.00, it was given a period of 10 days from receipt within
 which it could pay, failure to do so being the occasion for the distraint of its property.It is now alleged that the 10-day period of
grace was not allowed to lapse, the distraint having taken place on July 6, 1961.

It suffices to answer such a contention by referring to the explicit language of the law.According to the Revised Administrative Code:
"The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows:Upon the failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same,
at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property
subject to the tax Lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to
delinquency, and the expenses of the distraint."[6]

The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt.The municipal treasurer "may seize and distrain any personal
property" of the individual or entity subject to the tax upon failure "to pay the same, at the time required * * *."There was such a failure
on the part of plaintiff-appellant to pay the municipal tax at the time required.The power of the municipal treasurer in accordance with
the above provision therefore came into play.

Whatever might have been set forth in the letter of the municipal treasurer could not change or amend the law.It has to be enforced as
written.That was what the lower court did.What was done then cannot be rightfully looked upon as a failure to abide by what the
statutory provision requires.Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.There is only room for application.That was that occurred in this case.[7]

2.On the validity of the auction sale The validity of the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 is challenged in the next two errors
assigned as allegedly committed by the lower court.Plaintiff-appellant's argument is predicated on the fact that it was not until
January 16, 1962 that it was notified that the public auction sale was to take place on January 29, 1962.It is its view that
under the Revised Administrative Code[8] the sale of the distrained property cannot take place "less than twenty days after
notice to the owner or possessor of the property [distrained] * * * and the publication or posting of such notice."

Why such a contention could not prosper is explained clearly by the lower court in the appealed decision.Thus: "With respect to the
claim that the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was null and void for being contrary to law because not
more than twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice, it is believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal
Treasurer of Naga have substantially complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative
Code.From the time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30, 1962,
certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed.If the sale did not take place, as advertised, on July 27, 1961, but only on January 30,
1962, it was due to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax, and
the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax
collector was already well publicized for many months."[9] The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be
disputed.Under the circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries conviction.

The point is further made that the auction sale took place not on January 29, 1962, as stated in the notice of sale, but on the next day,
January 30, 1962.According to plaintiff-appellant: "On this score alone, the sale * * *, was illegal as it was not made on the time stated
in the notice."[10]

There is no basis to sustain such a plea as the finding of the lower court is otherwise.Thus: "On January 16, 1962, the defendant
Treasurer informed Garaygay that he would cause the readvertisement for sale at public auction of the 100,000 bags of Apo cement
which were under constructive distraint * * *.On January 19, 1962, the said defendant issued the corresponding notice of sale, which
fixed January 30, 1962, at 10:00 AM., as the date of sale, posting the said notice in public places and delivering copies thereof to the
interested parties in the previous notice, * * *.Ultimately, the bidding was conducted on that day, January 30, 1962, with the
representatives of the Provincial Auditor and Provincial Treasurer present.Only two bidders submitted sealed bids.After the bidding, the
defendant-Treasurer informed the plaintiff that an award was given to the winning bidder, * * *.[11]

This being a direct appeal to us, plaintiff-appellant must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive what the lower court found as
established by the evidence, only questions of law being brought to us for review.It is the established rule that when a party appeals
directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any finding of fact made by the court below.[12]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated July 23, 1964, is affirmed in toto.With costs against plaintiff-appellant.
FEDERATION VS. EISMA Stat. Con. 2nd tranche
Not Cited Recently Case #9

EN BANC G.R. No. L-61236, January 31, 1984 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR AND ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES
UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB
CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, AND ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for
damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma[1] then of the
Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to
dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of Labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was
such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required
that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary Injunction should not
be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their
behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of
its property and the free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its
road right-of-way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is
issued by this Court."[2]

The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of
the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumayao, Zamboanga
City.[3] Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of
monthly living allowances.[4] Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging
illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and
"employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit.[5] It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of
the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no."[6] The strike began on May
23, 1982.[7] On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members
of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary Injunction and/or restraining order."[8] It
was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and
suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises.[9] Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of
the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts
complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive
jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.[10] There was, as noted
earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.

Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary
Injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982.[11] After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing
respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of Injunction dated July
20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the case effective as of [that] date and continuing
until otherwise ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: (e) No person engaged
in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' "[12]

On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of respondent Judge and
maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza,[13] on the other hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met
squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He concluded that "the instant
petition has merit and should be given due course."
He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this Court after each of such
changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction.[14] So it was applied by this Court
in Garcia v. Martinez[15] and in Bengzon v. Inciong.[16] On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending
Article 217, and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and other
forms of damages."[17] The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal
dismissal of employees.[18] That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential
Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending. Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling then to
decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation,
separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly
excluded by this Code."[19] An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional trial
court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2,
paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment"[20] this is
to be compared with the former phraseology: "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment."[21] It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations.

Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. Certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge
being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.

1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It
means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of
the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a Strike. That
was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this
Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico,[22] a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call
for obedience. Thus: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."[23] It is so even after the lapse of
sixty years.[24]

2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost
fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide
a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez,[25] the issue was set forth in the opening
paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question
often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for
recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages--the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National
Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?"[26] It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the
case."[27] Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in
words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue before Us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in Presidential Decree
1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: * * * Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. - (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: * * * 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except
claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5.
All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code."[28] That same month, two other
cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman[29] and Aguda v. Vallejos.[30]

3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was not followed by private respondent when
it filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later.[31] On this point, reference may be made to our decision
in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment,[32] promulgated on September 15, 1983. In
that case, the question involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking
petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations
Commission the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264(g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in
the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would not comply
with such order considering that request for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the
labor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket line and start returning to work on August
20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which
reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor Code, as amended, specifically Article 264(g), mandates
that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall immediately return
to work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike."'[33] No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry
of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as
set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter.

4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and
original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit,
history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc.
v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc.[34] as "the rather thorny
question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn"[35] between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that
unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." [36] Certainly, the present Labor
Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition
of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that
may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside.
The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this
case is assigned, is enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The
temporary restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.
 Stat. Con. 2nd tranche
Case #10
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondent appellee.

Gregorio E. Fajardo for appellant.

Gregorio Baroque for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court, petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying on what it
considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the Republic Act No. 2023, more specifically the first two paragraphs thereof: "... (1) A
member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operative
authorizing his employer to deduct from the salary or wages payable to him by the employer such amount as may be specified in the
agreement and to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative in satisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the member
to the co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if so required by the co-operative by a request in
writing and so long as such debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid, make the claimant and remit forth with the amount
so deducted to the co-operative."1

To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, as quoted in the brief for petitioner-appellant, stated the following: "Then petitioner
contends that under the above provisions of Rep. Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the
payroll collection from the respondent's employees' wages and salaries. As can be clearly seen, there is nothing in the provision of
Rep. Act 2023 hereinabove quoted which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and salaries. The only effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer to deduct
from the salaries or wages payable to members of the employees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts to the union and to
pay the same to the credit union. In other words, if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted, the employer could not be compelled to act as the
collecting agent of the employees' credit union for the employees' debt to his credit union but to contend that the debt of a member of
the employees cooperative credit union as having first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does
not appear. In other words, the mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the
employees' debt from the latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory character does not convert
the credit union's credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent in enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to
give first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the law would have so
expressly declared. Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on
preference of credits. 2

Such an interpretation, as could be expected, found favor with the respondent-appellee, which, in its brief, succinctly pointed out "that
there is nothing in said provision from which it could be implied that it gives top priority to obligations of the nature of that payable to
petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company, in issuing the documents known as Exhibit "3" and Exhibit "P", which establish the
order of priority of payment out of the salaries of the employees of respondent-appellee, did not violate the above-quoted Section 62 of
Republic Act 2023. In promulgating Exhibit "3", [and] Exhibit "P" respondent, in effect, implemented the said provision of law. 3

This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no favorable
action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.

1. The applicable provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so
applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter
the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals: 4 "It has been repeated time and time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is
nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our
decisions have consistently born to that effect. 5.

2. Clearly, then, mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would
base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a a suit of
this character. In J.R.S. Business Corporation v. Montesa, 6 this Court held. "Man-damus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that
there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act, which specifically the law enjoins as a duty or an unlawful
exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled. 7 The opinion continued in this wise:"According to
former Chief Justice Moran," only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights are
of the petitioner are not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. In support of the above view, Viuda e Hijos de
Crispulo Zamora v. Wright was cited. As was there categorically stated: "This court has held that it is fundamental that the duties to be
enforced by mandamus must be those which are clear and enjoined by law or by reason of official station, and that petitioner must
have a clear, legal right to the thing and that it must be the legal duty of the defendant to perform the required act.' As expressed by the
then Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion: "It is well establish that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the
right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful." To the same
effect is the formulation of such doctrine by former Justice Barrera: "Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already
imposed." 8 So it has been since then. 9 The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 10 this court
speaking through Justice Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has also been held that it is essential to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative
duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. 11

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.