Cooling off Period ARTICLE 58 FC

SOMOSA-RAMOS v. VAMENTA

FACTS: (June 18 1971) Lucy Somosa-Ramos (petitioner) filed an action for Legal Separation, on
concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise
sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed
to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of
respondent Clemente Ramos.

There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on Article 103 of the
Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking
for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would
become even more dim.

Then, the petitioner received an Order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos
to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.

This this Order suspending the hearing of the WPI is in question

ISSUE: whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code (NOW ARTICLE 58 of the FAMILY CODE) prohibiting
the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the
petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit.

HELD: No. Not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of
the six-month period.

It is understandable why there should be a period during which the court is precluded from acting.
Ordinarily of course, no such delay is permissible. Justice to parties would not thereby be served. The
sooner the dispute is resolved, the better for all concerned. A suit for legal separation, however, is
something else again. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best reasons would attach the
quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not
of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the
spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss affection on the part of one or both may be discernible.
Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow
them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal
union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the
part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against the life
of the other, it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit for legal separation
lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The
healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways,
and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period
before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties
alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view
of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be
acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal
provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to
assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of
the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and
manage their respective property.

The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it
proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the
same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital
except in accordance with the orders of the court."

There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from
which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile
be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this
response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and
an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this

Court in Araneta v. Concepcion,3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months
fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only
fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give
them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out
legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of
the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The
law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If
these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused."4 At any rate,
from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months
certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion
of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.