42 Tuason vs. Tuason

8/24/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 088
[No. L-3404. April 2, 1951]
ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ANTONIO

TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants and
appellees.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY; PARTITION; RESCISSION.—A

contract among land co-owners wherein they agreed to fill their property,
construct roads therein and then subdivide it into small lots for sale, the
proceeds to be later divided among them, and to this end one of them
was to finance the whole development and subdivision, to prepare a
schedule of prices and conditions of sale subject to the approval of the
other two co-owners, to sell the subdivided lots and execute the
corresponding contracts with buyers, and to receive 50 per cent of the
gross selling price of the lots and the rents that may be collected f rom
the property while in the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be
divided in equal portions among the three co-owners,—does not violate
article 400 of the Civil Code. Far from violating the prohibition against a
co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, the contract
precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-
ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held in common
and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-
429
VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 429
Tuason vs. Tuason Jr. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership

until all the lots shall have been sold is a mere incident to the main object of
dissolving the co-ownership.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Peña, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alcuaz & Eiguren for appellant.
Araneta & Araneta for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cc2fed80d5e1232fe003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/20
In 1941 the sisters Angela L Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto

and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an
area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in
Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an undivided 1/3
portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. It
seems that the objection to dividing the property was that it would
lose in value by the proposed partition. The share of Nieves was
offered for sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy
it. The offer was later made to their mother but the old lady also
declined to buy, saying that if the property later increased in value,
she might be suspected of having taken advantage of her daughter.
Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a
domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was
issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same property.
The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into
small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided
among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6)
entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated
June 30, 1941.
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6),
Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorney-in-fact and
lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother
Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same
430
430 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Tuason vs, Tuason Jr. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.
time he was a member of the Board of Directors of the third co-

owner, Araneta, Inc.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated
as follows: The three co-owners agreed to improve the property by
filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then
subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the
whole development and subdivision; it was to prepare a schedule of
prices and conditions of sale, subject to the approval of the two other
co-owners; it was invested with authority to sell the lots into which
the property was to be subdivided, and execute the corresponding
contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to pay the real estate taxes
due on the property or of any portion thereof that remained unsold,
the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising
expenses, salaries of personnel, commissions, office and legal
expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to eject all
tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to
furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason,
copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and
collections made thereon. In return f or all this undertaking and

obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial
burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of the
lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property, while in
the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal
portions among the three co-owners so that each will receive 16.33
per cent of the gross receipts.
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the
contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of reference we are reproducing them
below:
"(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during- all the time
that it may be necessary f or the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully
sell the said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the
purchase prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots
may be rented while there are no purchasers thereof;
431
VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 431

"(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is

hereby given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said
co-owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots
Into which this property might be sub-divided; the powers herein vested to
the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART may not be revoked until the
purposes of this contract have been fulfilled and carried out, and the PARTY
OF THE SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk,
delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers,
employees or to third persons;
"(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall
sell, alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein
without first giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and
acquire the same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by
any other prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the
property subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to
acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be made
subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract;
provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and
Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE
SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled
by the members of the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said
corporation at the time of the signing of this contract and/or their lawful
heirs;"
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers

conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta.
Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta,

Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the
"Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted
to it in the document, she had decided to rescind said contract and
she asked that the property held in common be partitioned. Later, on
November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the
property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including
rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered said
property.
The suit was directed principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's
brother, Antonio Tuason Jr., one of the co-owners evidently did not
agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-
defendant. After hearing and
432

after considering the extensive evidence introduced, oral and

documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Peña in a
long and considered decision dismissed the complaint without
pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff appealed f rom that
decision, and because the property is valued at more than P50,000,
the appeal came directly to this Court.
Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the
memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null and void or rescinded
are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to
understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and
legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract
of subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into
by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D. Tuason, Exhibit "L",
but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed from each
other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more
favorable to the owners therein and less favorable to Araneta Inc.;
that Atty. Antonio Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her
legal adviser as he did because he was one of the officials of Araneta
Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms
of the contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans of
the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in
not introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not
delivering to her her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales.
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the
contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court that in the main
the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both
contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a
broker, and both had every opportunity to go over and compare them
and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage in entering into the
contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty.
433
VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 433

Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member

of the Board of Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit
"6" was executed, he was not the party with which Angela
contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to
the evidence Araneta, Inc. showed to her the plans of the subdivision
and all the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her
share of the proceeds of the sale but that she ref used to receive the
same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta
Inc., had spent about P1 17,000 in improvement and had received as
proceeds on the sale of the lots the respectable sum of
P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the decision
appealed from on these points:
"The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio
Araneta in connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are
above board. He committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary
relationship existing between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio
Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was
executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for said copy contains all
that appears now in exhibit 6.
"Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing
the terms of the contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to
make the necessary improvements on the property as required by paragraphs
1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time
schedule of prices and conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be
sold; and to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a copy of
the monthly statement of the sales and rents of the subdivided lots, and a
statement of the monthly gross collections from the sale of the property.
"The Court finds from the evidence that the defendant Gregorio Araneta,
Incorporated has substantially complied with the obligation imposed by the
contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements alone, it has
disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes,
commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as defined in
the agreement.
"With respect to the charge that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has
failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, list of prices and
the conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly statement
of collections f rom the sale of
434

the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no basis. The evidence shows
that the defendant corporation submitted to the plaintiff periodically all the
data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots,
together with the amount corresponding to her. But without any justifiable
reason, she refused to accept them. With the indifferent attitude adopted by
the plaintiff, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to
continue sending her statement of accounts, checks and other things. She
had shown on various occasions that she did not want to have any further
dealings with the said corporation. So, if the defendant corporation
proceeded with the sale of the subdivided lots without the approval of the
plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct impression that under the
contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is binding upon all
the three. "The Court feels that rescission of the contract exhibit 6 is not in
order. Even granting that the defendant corporation committed minor
violations of the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that 'rescission
will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only
for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the
object of the parties in making the agreement' (Song Fo & Co. vs.
Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821)."
As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the

Japanese occupation from 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc.
although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment
and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the parcel.
As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped
selling the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the
purchase price would be paid in Japanese military notes; and Atty.
Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be thankfull because
otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of the
receipts, which currency later became valueless.
But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh.
6) should be declared null and void because its terms, particularly
paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the
provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the purposes of
reference we quote below:
435
VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 435

"ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the

community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in
common.
"Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified
length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a
new agreement."
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the
Civil Code are not applicable. The contract (Exh.. 6) far from
violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to
remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and
object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by
selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the
sale among the co-owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to
preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall -have been sold, is a
mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-ownership. By
virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and
most expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership,
the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation
shall have been attained.
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps
based on the other agreement or contract (Exh. "L") referred to by
appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into a
partnership, although this object is not expressed in so many words
in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil
Code in -the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very
reason that Art. 400 is not applicable.
Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial
court, we find no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the
appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court
that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held
in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area
remained unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the
great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well
436

Torres vs. Quintos
observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of

being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that
Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties
by agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not
exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600
sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-
year period fixed by Art. 400.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points

raised in the appeal and which counsel for appellant has extensively
and ably discussed, citing numerous authorities. As we have already
said, we have viewed the case from a practical standpoint, brushing
aside technicalities and disregarding any minor violations of the
contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced
that the trial court and this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical
and expeditious way the intentions and the agreement of the parties
contained in the contract (Exh. 6), namely, to dissolve the
community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the
said parties.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Parás, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and

Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Parás, C. J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted to affirm.

Judgment affirmed.
______________
[G. R. No. L-3304. April 5, 1951]
ANTONIO C. TORRES, petitioner and appellant vs. EDUARDO

QUINTOS, respondent and appellee.
1. QUO WARRANTO; PERIOD FOR FILING.—An action against

an officer for his ouster from office must be commenced within one
year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to
hold office, arose.
437
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 437
Torres vs. Quintos
2. ID.; ID.; PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY DOES

NOT SUSPEND PERIOD FOR FILING.—The pendency of an
administrative remedy does not suspend the period within which a
petition for quo warranto should be filed. While it may be desirable
that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is
compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are
prerequisite to, nor bar, the institution of quo warranto proceedings,
it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office
allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the

courts, should file the proper judicial action within the
reglementary period. Public interest requires that the right to a
public office should be determined as speedily as practicable.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Martinez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roman A. Cruz for appellant.
Quijano & Alidio for appellee.
PARÁS, C. J.:
The petitioner-appellant held the position of chief of police of the

City of Manila from March 3, 1936, until the coming of the
American liberation forces when Col. Marcus E. Jones, U. S. A.,
assumed the functions of the office on orders of Gen. Douglas
MacArthur upon request of President Osmeña. The petitioner served
as assistant to Col. Jones until March 15, 1945, when he left the post
at his own request. Col. Jones was relieved by Col. J. W. Holland, U.
S. A., who remained as Manila chief of police until March 1, 1946,
when Lt. Col. Angel Tuason, P. A., was appointed acting chief of
police by the President of the Philippines. In the meantime, on
March 18, 1945, the petitioner was taken into custody by C. I. C.
and subsequently indicted for treason in the People's Court which,
however, acquitted him on January 16, 1948. During the pendency
of the criminal case against the petitioner, Col. Lamberto T. Javalera
was appointed chief of police of Manila in place of Col. Tuason;
Col. Manuel de la Fuente replaced Col. Javalera; and the
respondent-appellee, who was in turn appointed in place of Col. De
la
438

Torres vs. Quintos
Fuente, qualified for the position on January 12, 1948, and has
remained in said office. The appointments of Col. Javalera and the
respondent were both confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
After his acquittal, or on February 6, 1948, the petitioner
addressed a letter to the Mayor of Manila inquiring about his official
status and impliedly asserting his right to be reinstated as chief of
police, which claim was turned down. The petitioner, on July 7,
1948, sent a letter to the President of the Philippines reiterating his
claim to the position. On January 17, 1949, the petitioner was
advised by the Secretary of Justice to bring his case before the courts
of justice. On January 26, 1949, the petitioner filed in the Supreme

Court a petition f or quo warranto against the respondent, but the
same was dismissed on January 28, 1949, without prejudice to its
filing in the Court of First Instance. The present quo warranto
petition was instituted In the Court of First Instance of Manila on
February 1, 1949. After hearing, judgment was rendered dismissing
the petition on the ground that the same was not commenced within
one year after the cause of the respondent's ouster or the petitioner's
right to hold office arose, in accordance with section 16, Rule 68, of
the Rules of Court. From this judgment the petitioner has appealed,
pressing the contention made in the lower court that the
reglementary period of one year was suspended during the pendency
of petitioner's request for reinstatement addressed, first, to the Mayor
of Manila and, secondly, to the President of the Philippines. Reliance
is replaced on the decision in Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, (48 Phil., 676).
There is every ground to hold that the petitioner's right to hold
the disputed office, if at all, arose in May, 1945, when he was
replaced by Col. Jones and when he was arrested by the CIC and
thereafter prosecuted for treason in the People's Court. As a matter
of fact? the petitioner admits, in his brief, that he had been deprived
439
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 439

Torres vs. Quintos
of said office "first by the arbitrary action of the Intelligence Corps

of the United States Arm and, on, during the pendency of the treason
m the People's Court by his own sense of propriety." it is noteworthy
that in Casin vs. Caluag (80 Phil., 758; 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 9, p.
379), we have held that a civil action f or quo warranto may be tried
and decided independently of a pending criminal case for treason.
Hence, sively more than one year had elapsed before the proper quo
warranto petition was commenced. Assuming, however, that the
petitioner's cause of action arose only 011 January 12, 1948, when
the respondent qualified for the position of the Manila chief of
police, or on 16, 1948, when the petitioner was acquitted by the
People's Court, the petition for quo warranto filed in the Court on
January 28, 1949, is still beyond the period prescribed in section 16
of Rule 68.
In Abeto vs. Rodas, (82 Phil., 59; 46 Off. Gaz., 930), we applied
section 16 of Rule 68 and held that the period fixed therein is a
condition precedent to the existence of the of action, "with the result
that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper
although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss."
In case, the petitioner (Abeto) filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration In which, invoking the case of Agcaoili vs.
Suguitan, it was contended that the reglementary period of one year

was suspended by the order of the President exonerating him from
certain administrative charges, because the petitioner (Abeto) "was
justified in waiting for the President of the Philippines to reappoint
him as the logical and legal consequence of his exoneration," "only
after considerable delay, when his hopes failed, did petitioner
institute the present proceedings." We denied said supplemental
action in a minute resolution, the effect of which is of course to
reject the theory the pendency of an administrative remedy the
period within which a petition for quo warranto be lien,
440

Torres vs. Quintos
The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative

remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so;
and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the
institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who
claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another
and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the proper
judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in
Bautista vs. Fajardo,
*
(38 Phil., 62), and Tumulak vs. Egay (46 Off.
Gaz., 3683), public interest requires that the right of public office
should be determined as speedily as practicable.
This makes it unnecessary to take up the other contentions made
as well by the petitioner as by the respondent.
The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against the
petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., with whom concur Feria, Tuason and

Reyes, J., dissenting:
The transition which our country has undergone resulting from the
last global war has cast doubt and uncertainty on the tenure of office
of persons who were formerly holding positions in our government.
Some, apprehensive of the future, yielded meekly to the avowed
policy that to hold on to their former positions there is need of a
previous reappointment. Others, more courageous and more
persevering, dared to challenge the official bidding even if to do so
they have to undergo a cumbersome judicial process prompted by
their earnest desire to vindicate their rights under the Constitution.
To the latter group belongs the petitioner who instituted the present
action.
The facts of this case, which are undisputed, show in bold relief
the travails undergone by the petitioner in an effort to regain his
former position as Chief of Police of the City of Manila, which he

claims he never surrendered nor abandoned, yet brushing aside the
efforts made
_______________
* 82 Phil., 828.
441
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 441

Torres vs. Quintos
the majority opinion determined that the petitioner has already

forfeited his claim to the position because of his failure to assert his
right within the period enjoined by law. From this opinion I regret to
dissent.
The facts of this case are well stated in the majority opinion as
follows:
"The petitioner-appellant held the position of chief of police of the City of

Manila from March 3, 1936, until the coming of the American liberation
forces when Col. Marcus E. Jones, U. S. A., assumed the functions of the
office on orders of Gen. Douglas MacArthur upon request of President
Osmeña. The petitioner served as assistant to Col. Jones until March 15,
1945, when he left the post at his own request, Col. Jones was relieved by
Col. J. W. Holland, U. S. A., who remained as Manila chief of police until
March 1, 1946, when Lt. Col. Angel Tuason, P.A., was appointed acting
chief of police by the President of the Philippines. In the meantime, on
March 18, 1945, the petitioner was taken into custody by C. I. C. and
subsequently indicted for treason in the People's Court which, however,
acquitted him on January 16, 1948. During the pendency of the criminal
case against the petitioner, Col. Lamberto T. Javalera was appointed chief of
police of Manila in place of Col. Tuason; Col. Manuel de la Fuente replaced
Col. Javalera; and the respondentappellee, who was in turn appointed in
place of Col. De la Fuente, qualified for the position on January 12, 1948,
and has remained in said office. The appointments of Col. Javalera and the
respondent were both confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
After his acquittal, or on February 6, 1948, the petitioner addressed a letter
to the Mayor of Manila inquiring about his official status and impliedly
asserting his right to be reinstated as chief of police, which claim was turned
down. The petitioner, on July 7, 1948, sent a letter to the President of the
Philippines reiterating his claim to the position. On January 17, 1949, the
petitioner was advised by the Secretary of Justice to bring his case before
the courts of Justice. On January 26, 1949, the petitioner filed in the
Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against the respondent, but the
same was dismissed on January 28, 1949, without prejudice to its filing in
the Court of First Instance. The present quo warranto petition was instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Manila on February 1, 1949. After hearing,

judgment was rendered dismissing the petition on the ground that the same
was not commenced within one year after the cause of the respondent's
ouster or the petitioner's right to hold office arose, in accordance with
section 16, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court."
442

Torres vs. Quintos
It should be noted that the petitioner held the position of Chief of

Police of the City of Manila from March 3, 1936, until the coming
of the American Forces of Liberation, when Colonel Marcus E.
Jones, U, S. A., assumed the functions of the office on orders of
Gen. Douglas MacArthur upon request of President Osmeña. The
petitioner served as assistant to Col. Jones until March 15, 1945,
when he left the position at his own request. It is a well known fact
that the conditions of peace and order months after the liberation of
Manila were not yet normal so much so that even after the
reestablishment of the Commonwealth Government on February 27,
1945, (41 Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 86) the American Forces of Liberation
had virtual control of important sections of the city of Manila. In
fact, the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit, (PCAU), an agency of the U.
S. Army, has opened many posts in different sections of Manila, not
to say of the Philippines, charged with the function of giving aid and
relief to the sufferers and other victims of the war. It is undoubtedly
for this reason that President Osmeña recommended Col. Jones to
assume the functions of Chief of Police of the City of Manila and
caused the designation of petitioner to assist him in the difficult task
of restoring normalcy to our people. The petitioner, conscious of his
civic duty, could not but accede to President Osmeña's bidding
without for a moment surrendering his claim to the position. And he
evinced this attitude when days after his designation as Assistant
Chief of Police, he left his post, not before sending to Col. Jones a
letter of the following tenor:
"March 18, 1945

"Colonel N. E. Jones
"Chief of Police
"Manila
"Sir:
"In connection with our conversation yesterday afternoon, I beg

to request that I be relieved of my duties as Assistant Chief of
Police of Manila pursuant to the designation you have given me
443
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 443

Torres vs. Quintos
about a couple of weeks ago upon the transfer of the Manila

Police Department from the control of the city government to
that of the Provost Marshal General. You will notice that I am
not tendering my resignation for the reason that first, I was
appointed by the President of the Commonwealth as Chief of
Police of Manila and, second, because under the present set-up
you were the authority who gave me the designation of
Assistant Chief of Police.
"To clear that point of my assignment under you, permit me
to explain that if I had offered my services to you without any
hesitation under any capacity it was because the highest
representative of the Commonwealth Government then present
in Malacañang during the last days of 1941 instructed me and
my organization to remain in post for the interest of peace and
order and protection of life and property of the residents of this
city and not because we volunteered our services to the
Japanese, and if we continued that service during the last three
years it was because there was no other alternative, either we
have to be incarcerated or executed.
"Trusting that I have made myself clear in this delicate
matter, please allow me to express to you my sincere
appreciation for the courtesies you and your colleagues have
extended to me during the short time that I have been working
under you and if you believe that I can still be of service to you
and the U. S. Army in any other capacity I will be very willing
to render it.
"Yours very sincerely,
"ANTONIO C. TORRES"
Note that the above letter was submitted to Col. Jones on March 13,
1945, wherein he particularly stressed the fact that he was not
resigning from his position but merely asking that he be relieved of
his duties as Assistant Chief of Police because he believed then that
he was still the Chief of Police by virtue of an appointment extended
to him by the President of the Commonwealth, and that if he
acceded to serve under him it was merely because "the highest
representative of the Commonwealth Government then present in
Malacañang during the last days of 1941 instructed me and my
organization to remain in post for the interest of peace and order and
protection of life and property of the residents of this city." Note
444

Torres vs. Quintos
also that on March 18, 1945, the petitioner was taken into custody
by C. I. C. and was subsequently indicted for treason in the People's
Court.
The failure of the petitioner to avail of his right when he was
replaced in his former position by Col. Jones, and was arrested by
the C. I. C. and prosecuted before the People's Court is very
understandable. A becoming sense of decency and propriety would
counsel anyone to refrain from taking any coercive measure when
the finger of suspicion is pointed to him with his fate hanging in the
balance. A charge for treason is a very serious crime which carries
with it capital punishment. It also carries with it expulsion from the
service and deprivation of civil and political rights. It is the worst
crime that a citizen may commit against his government and people,
such that the policy of the government has always been not to
reappoint a person indicted of this crime, or to suspend from office
one who is tainted with this stigma. Common sense and prudence
dictate that under the circumstances the proper attitude to pursue is
to wait for the termination of the case. Surely. There is no point to
start an action for quo warranto before knowing the outcome of the
treason case, since its nature and eff ect may make such action
unnecessary. I am aware that a case of quo warranto may proceed
independently of a criminal action for treason (Casin vs. Caluag, 45
Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 9, p. 379), but this is no justification for
holding one guilty of laches or of abandonment for following a
different course of action.
After the petitioner was acquitted on January 16, 1948, which
vindicated his name and reaffirmed his loyalty to the Government he
had faithfully served, he renewed his efforts to regain his position.
Thus, on February 6, 1948, he addressed a letter to the Mayor of
Manila inquiring about his official status and impliedly asserting his
right to be reinstated as Chief of Police. This claim was turned
down. On July 7, 1948. he sent a letter to the President
445
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 445

Torres vs. Quintos
of the Philippines reiterating the same claim to the position. On

January 17, 1949, he was advised by the Secretary of Justice to bring
his case before the courts of justice, and following this advice, on
January 26, 1949, he filed with the Supreme Court a petition for quo
warranto against the respondent, which was dismissed on January
28, 1949, without prejudice to its filing in the Court of First
Instance; and the present petition for quo warranto was accordingly
instituted on February 1, 1949. These steps proved conclusively his
ever consuming desire to regain his position by exhausting every

administrative remedy available to him under the circumstances
before going through the vicissitudes of a cumbersome judicial
process. And, again, I find this interlude understandable, for if the
authorities concerned would consider his case favorably, and he is
reinstated by an executive fiat, there is no point to take the matter to
court. This attitude finds support in the leading case of Agcaoili vs.
Suguitan, (48 Phil. 676), the facts of which, for purposes of
comparison, will presently be discussed. I will attempt to show that
the latter case is applicable here contrary to the opinion of the
majority.
Julio Agcaoili was appointed Justice of the Peace of Laoag,
Ilocos Norte by Governor Harrison on March 25, 1916, to hold
office during good behavior. On March 17, 1923, Act No. 3107 was
approved providing, among other things, that Justices of the Peace
shall serve until they reach the age of 65 years. On April 9, 1923, the
Undersecretary of Justice advised Agcaoili to cease as Justice of the
Peace upon receipt of notice. Agcaoili received the letter on April
26, 1923. On April 28, he sent a letter of protest contending that the
new Act was not applicable to him and evinced his desire to
continue in office. The Undersecretary of Justice instructed the
Provincial Fiscal to prosecute him for having disobeyed his order.
Thereupon, on July 7, 1923, upon being advised of this instruction,
Agcaoili turned over his office to the Auxiliary Justice of
446

Torres vs. Quintos
the Peace. In the meantime Agcaoili waited f or the decision of the

Secretary of Justice on his protest, and as no reply was forthcoming,
he filed a petition for a writ of quo warranto on April 23, 1925, or
nearly two years after surrendering his office to the Auxiliary Justice
of the Peace. One of the questions raised was whether the petition
was filed within the period of one year prescribed by law. The court
answered the question in the affirmative saying. on this point as
follows:
"It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was
ousted from his office as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag.
Not only did he surrender his office on that date under protest, but also on
the 28th day of April, 1923, when he was notified by the Secretary of Justice
that he cease to be a justice of the peace of his municipality, he then
protested and gave a long and lucid argument in support of his protest. In all
justice to him, did he not have a right, without any legal action to protect his
right, to await the solution of his protest of the 28th day of April, 1923? He
had a right to believe that grounds upon which his protest was based would
be convincing to the Secretary of Justice and that he would not be removed.

Until this very hour the record contains no reply from the Secretary of
Justice and no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by the
appellant upon his right to continue as justice of the peace and not to be
ousted."
"In our opinion, even granting that section 216 is applicable to the
appellant, the period of prescription had not begun to run at the time of the
commencement of the present action. He was justified in delaying the
commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had been made.
He had a right to wait the answer to his protest, in the confident belief that it
would be resolved in his favor and that action would not be unnecessary."
(Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, 48 Phil., 696-697.)
We have taken notice of the fact that the above ruling was penned by
Justice Johnson and concurred in by Justices Villamor, Romualdez
and Villa-Real. Justice Johns concurred in the result. Justice
Malcolm concurred and dissented, while Justices Street, Avanceña
and Ostrand dissented. Apparently, the Agcaoili case was decided by
a divided court. It appears, however, that the individual opinions
merely differed on matters collateral to the main
447
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 447

Torres vs. Quintos
issue, the fact being that there was unanimity on the question that
the right of action of the petitioner has not yet prescribed. In other
words, the Court, acting upon a motion for reconsideration filed by
the respondent, resolved unanimously that the def ense of
prescription does not apply to the petitioner under the particular
facts of the case. (Supra p. 707).
The parallelism between the facts of the two cases is very
apparent. In one case, Agcaoili was advised by the Undersecretary
of Justice to cease as Justice of the Peace on April 26, 1923. He
protested on April 28, stating his reason why he should not cease in
office, but surrendered his position on July 17, 1923, when
threatened with criminal prosecution. He filed his petition for quo
warranto only on April 23, 1925 when he saw that the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice was not forthcoming. He therefore waited
for nearly two years before presenting his action in court. No
plausible reason was advanced for his passive attitude during the
interregnum other than his desire to wait for the official resolution.
He should have taken a more militant attitude by making sporadic
inquiries on the matter but he preferred to be silent until after the
expiration of the statutory period. Yet the Supreme Court held that
Agcaoili was justified and has not forfeited his right to the position.
A similar attitude was adopted by the petitioner herein with the
particularity that he was more aggressive and more militant, and

when he was advised to bring the matter to court he lost no time in
taking the corresponding action. In the Abeto case, relied upon by
the majority in disregarding the Agcaoili case, this Court decided the
contrary because Abeto did not file any protest nor a petition for his
reinstatement and merely waited for the President of the Philippines
to reappoint him as the logical and legal consequence of his
exoneration. Abeto is clearly guilty of inaction if not of
abandonment of his former office. No plausible reason, therefore, is
seen why this case cannot be decided in the light of the doctrine laid
down in the Agcaoili case.
448

Torres vs. Quintos
The stand I have taken on this matter also finds justification from a
consideration of the origin and scope of the statute we are called
upon to apply. As was said by this Court, originally there was no
limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto for
the reason that it was an action by the government, and prescription
can not be pleaded as a defense to an action by the government.
Even at the present time in many of the civilized countries of the
world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no
limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general
principle it might be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil
or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceedings brought
to enforce a public right. (McPhail vs. People ex rel. Lambert, 160
111., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 806; People ex rel. Moloney vs. Pullman's
Palace Car Co., 175 111., 125; 64 L. R. A. 366, cited in Agcaoili vs.
Suguitan, 48 Phil., pp. 676, 692.)
There are, however, some States which have adopted some
statutes of limitation regarding institution of quo warranto
proceedings, one of them being Ohio, from the statute of which,
section 16 of Rule 68 of our Rules of Court has been derived. But
these States are few and no decisive precedent can be cited that may
be used as guidance in the determination of the present case.
However, actions for quo warranto abound where the defense of
laches or abandonment had been set up and wherein illuminating
decisions had been rendered. In our quest for precedents we found
one which, because of the similarity of the facts involved, may be
considered of persuasive force and effect in this case. I refer to the
case of People vs. Bailey, decided by the District Court of Appeal of
California (158 Pac. Rep., pp. 1036-1041).
The facts of this case are: J. N. Black was appointed in 1902 a
member of the police force of the City of San Jose. He was later
made captain of police. On July 22, 1908, the Chief of Police of said
city filed charges against
449
VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 449

Torres vs. Quintos
him alleging that he had violated certain provisions of the Charter

and asked that he be removed from office. Upon filing the charges,
the Board of Police suspended him and at the same time appointed
one Bailey to his place. Thereafter, on July 22, 1908, Black filed a
suit against said Board to obtain a judgment prohibiting said Board
from trying him upon the charges preferred against him. A
temporary order restraining said Board was entered, but later, upon
trial, judgment was rendered permanently prohibiting the Board
from trying the petitioner. After the appointment of Bailey, Black
began mandamus proceedings against said Board to collect his
salary on the theory that he had not been legally removed from
office. Judgment was rendered in his favor by the trial court, but
upon appeal, the decision was reversed. On March 23, 1912, an
information in the nature of quo warranto was filed in behalf of
Black alleging that he is the duly appointed captain of police of the
City of San Jose, and that he was illegally removed from office by
the Board and it was requested that he be reinstated to said office. In
resolving the case, the court held:
"The case does not show laches on the part of the state or on the part of the
relator barring relief. * * *.
* * * * * * * *
"Nothing appears in the conduct of the relator since August, 1908, that
savors at all of laches as above defined. No delay is shown in asserting his
rights, and the lapse of time between his attempted ouster and the bringing
of this proceeding is fully and satisfactorily explained and excused. In
addition to the prohibition suit above referred to he began mandamus
proceedings to collect his salary. This proceedings was finally decided
against him on the ground distinctly stated, that before a judgment could be
rendered in his favor for his salary it would be necessary to determine his
right to the office; that could not be done in a mandamus proceeding while
another was occupying the office, performing its duties, and claiming the
right so to do. The present action was begun within 90 days after the final
disposition of the mandamus proceeding. The record shows that relator has
at all times been actively asserting his right to the office, and, while it was
finally
450

Halili vs. Balane
decided that he had mistaken his remedy, it may not be said that his conduct
shows "passive assent" to the conduct of the board or city or defendant and
negatives all idea of unexcused delay." (People vs. Bailey 158 Pac., pp.
1036, 1038-1039).
As may be seen, the court did not find the relator Black guilty of
laches in spite of the lapse of time between the attempted ouster and
the bringing of the proceedings for quo warranto. He was f ound to
have at all times proceeded diligently to have the title to his office
determined and all the steps taken by him were found to have been
done in good faith under the belief that he was adopting the correct
procedure to protect his right. While the case was decided on the
principle of laches and not on that of prescription, the case acquires
importance here in view of the considerations made on the steps,
erroneously or otherwise, taken by the relator in protecting his right
which were found to be satisfactory and justifiable. The element of
time is of the essence in the defense of laches as well as in the
defense of prescription. In my opinion, the Bailey case is also of
persuasive force and effect in the case under consideration.
For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the herein
petitioner has not yet lost his right to have his title to office
determined by this Court, and that, therefore, he should have been
given the benefit of a judgment on the merits. This is what this Court
should have done: to decide the case on the merits. For these
reasons, I dissent.
Judgment affirmed.
___________
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8/24/2019 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 088

[No. L-3404. April 2, 1951]

ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ANTONIO

COMMUNITY PROPERTY; PARTITION; RESCISSION.—A

VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 429

Tuason vs. Tuason Jr. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc.

owners. The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

In 1941 the sisters Angela L Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto

430 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

time he was a member of the Board of Directors of the third co-

collections made thereon. In return f or all this undertaking and

VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 431

"(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is

On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers

Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notiﬁed Araneta,

432 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

after considering the extensive evidence introduced, oral and

VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 433

Antonio Araneta was an ofﬁcial of the Araneta Inc.; being a member

434 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the

VOL. 88, APRIL 2, 1951 435

"ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the

436 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of

We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points

Parás, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and

I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted to afﬁrm.

[G. R. No. L-3304. April 5, 1951]

ANTONIO C. TORRES, petitioner and appellant vs. EDUARDO

1. QUO WARRANTO; PERIOD FOR FILING.—An action against

VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 437

Torres vs. Quintos

2. ID.; ID.; PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY DOES

allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The petitioner-appellant held the position of chief of police of the

438 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

of justice. On January 26, 1949, the petitioner ﬁled in the Supreme

VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 439

of said ofﬁce "ﬁrst by the arbitrary action of the Intelligence Corps

Suguitan, it was contended that the reglementary period of one year

440 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., with whom concur Feria, Tuason and

former position as Chief of Police of the City of Manila, which he

VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 441

the majority opinion determined that the petitioner has already

"The petitioner-appellant held the position of chief of police of the City of

in the Court of First Instance of Manila on February 1, 1949. After hearing,

442 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

It should be noted that the petitioner held the position of Chief of

"March 18, 1945

"In connection with our conversation yesterday afternoon, I beg

VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 443

about a couple of weeks ago upon the transfer of the Manila

444 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Torres vs. Quintos

VOL. 88, APRIL 5, 1951 445

of the Philippines reiterating the same claim to the position. On

ever consuming desire to regain his position by exhausting every

446 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED