Technical Awareness

Newsletter
First Quarter, 2015

Chemical Engineering Progress

Ethics – Examining Your Engineering Responsibility
Grubbe, Deborah L. P.E., “Ethics - Examining Your Engineering Responsibility”, Chemical Engineering
Progress, February 2015 pgs 21-29.

Engineering ethics frequently has nothing to do with technology and everything to do with
communication, thought and decision-making patterns, and conflicts around time and money. The
underlying issues often involve conflicts that arise in the execution of engineering work; money and time
are often at the root of the conflict. Serious incidents are frequently the result of ignoring common
sense. Case studies are provided in this article with the intent to help readers become better prepared
since engineers often practice in situations where the rules are not always clearly laid out and issues
around ethics can be double-sided. The case studies included several well-known incidents, the collapse
of suspended skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Kansas City, the space shuttle Challenger and Columbia
disasters and the BP Texas City refinery explosion, with a focus on the incidents’ non-technical causes.

Lessons Learned from Recent Process Safety Incidents

Ness, Albert, CCPS, “Lessons Learned from Recent Process Safety Incidents”, Chemical Engineering
Progress, March 2015 pgs 23-29.

This article discussed key lesson learned from five incidents that have occurred over the past 25 years
that are less well-known. Major disasters like the one that occurred in Bhopal have a low likelihood of
occurring again. The five incidents included in this article demonstrate that even small mistakes can
have disastrous consequences. It is imperative that engineers learn from previous incidents to reduce
their likelihood of recurring. These five incidents include ARCO Channelview explosion (1990) that killed
17 people because proper MOC procedures were not followed, Terra Industries ammonia nitrate
explosion (1994) that killed 4 people and injured 18 because operating procedures did not cover all
phases of operation, Partridge-Raleigh oilfield explosion (2006) that killed 3 and injured 1 because
procedure for hot work permit was not in place, Formosa Plastics vinyl chloride release (2004) that killed
5 and injured 2 because operating procedures were not followed, and Hoeganaes combustible dust flash
fires and hydrogen explosion (2011) that killed a total of 5 and injured 3 because personnel did not fully
understand the hazards and risks of combustible dusts and company did not learn from a similar
incident occurred in 1992.

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Process Safety Progress
Simplified Methods of Using Probit Analysis in Consequence Analysis
James, Michael, “Simplified Methods of Using Probit Analysis in Consequence Analysis”, Process Safety
Progress, Vol. 34 No. 1, March 2015, pgs 58-63.

Ensuring personnel can safely shelter during a chemical release is critical. The probit function is useful in
determining maximum safe sheltering time. Probits provide a link between probability of expected
response and the exposure of a population to a specific event. Probit analysis can provide an estimate of
the percentage of sheltered occupants with potential for adverse response to a chemical release.
Probits can be used to estimate duration of exposure for probability of nuisance-level response, loss of
consciousness, or fatal exposures. Dispersion modeling tools provide data on predicted effects in
response to long-term exposure (typically 1 h). However, these tools do not define the maximum
allowable exposure time for building occupants before loss of consciousness or fatalities are seen. This
article provides methodology for estimating critical exposure duration. This article provides a
methodology with existing MS Excel formulas in measuring probits to arrive at probability of response to
a toxic release. While data on probit values for some chemicals is readily available, there is minimal
guidance in the open literature on developing estimates of probit constants where they do not currently
exist or are not published. This article presents a methodology for estimating probit constants based on
toxicological data.

The paper provides a good overview of what probit is (the probability that a specific exposure will result
in a specific outcome such as death), why it is important and how it can be calculated. The paper
presents probit in terms of a toxic gas release, but notes that the same approach can be applied to other
situations such as radiant heat exposure.

US Chemical Safety Board

Chevron Refinery Fire - Final Report Issued
US Chemical Safety Board No. 2012-03-I-CA

The final report for the explosion and fire that occurred at the Chevron Refinery on April 6, 2012 in
Richmond, CA was released on January 28, 2015. The root cause of the incident was the catastrophic
rupture of a 8” line in the Crude Unit containing hot light gas oil, which partially vaporized on release
forming a flammable gas cloud that ignited 2 minutes after the initial rupture. The explosion resulted in
significant damage to the unit and 6 employees receiving medical treatment for minor injuries.

The final report identified 15 findings that are outlined in the report, the most significant being that
sulfadition corrosion resulted in thin pipe walls within the segment of piping that ruptured. Many of the
recommendations deal with Chevron’s handling of mechanical integrity within the process.

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