Case Title Alolino vs Flores

G.R. no. 198774

Date: April 04, 2016

FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially
constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor
to the structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property.
There are terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall:
three (3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed
their house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining
the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. Since they were constructing on a municipal
road, the respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only about
two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five
windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light
and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the
municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Respondent spouses alleged that they had occupied their lot where they constructed
their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further
alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to
the very boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they
emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's
alleged easement of light and view because it has no window.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent’s property where the spouses built their house/sari-sari store was
validly reclassified from a municipal/barrio road to a residential lot by the Sanggunian?

HELD:
No.

There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari-sari store on government

property. Properties of LGUs are classified as either property for public use or
patrimonial property. Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two
classifications:
 Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino’s house is property of public
dominion devoted to public use.

We find no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local Government of Taguig
had already withdrawn the subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a
residential lot. In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely
passed a resolution. The difference between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in
jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment
or opinion of the legislative body.

Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate
the use of these properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case
with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with the
conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian's
failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the barrio
road.

As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective
citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable
or disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription; (4) it
cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it is not subject to
attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements.

Petition is granted.