Case Title Javier v.

Veridiano II
GR No. G.R. No. L-48050
Date October 10, 1994 307

FACTS:
On January 25, 1963, Petitioner Felicidad Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application from a subdivision. Pending the approval of the sale, sometime in
December 1970, Ben Babol entered a portion adjacent to the land being bought by
Petitioner. Petitioner claims that the occupied land by Babol is part of his land so he
filed a forcible entry case. However, on November 7, 1972, the trial court sustained
the possession of Babol and dismissed the case for forcible entry because the
property occupied by Babol was outside of the property of Javier.

Later on, Babol sold this portion to private Respondent Reino Rosete. In the
meantime or on December 17, 1973, the miscellaneous sale application was
approved and an OCT covering lot 1461 was delivered to Petitioner Javier. This
motivated the Petitioner to demand the land again, now, from Rosete, based on the
issued title and on the basis of ownership. Petitioner Javier filed a complaint for
quieting of title and recovery of possession. Respondent Rosete countered that the
first case on forcible entry constituted res judicata against the second complaint for
quieting of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision on Forcible Entry is considered res judicata on quieting
of title?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that for res judicata to arise, four requisites must
concur (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) the former judgment is
a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second actions
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.

The Supreme Court ruled that since the first three requirements were not
disputed, the issues remaining were the identity of the parties and that of cause of
action.

On the first issue, the High Court ruled that it is evident that private respondent
Reino Rosete is a successor in interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the
commencement and termination of the first action. Hence, there is actual, if not
substantial, identity of parties between the two actions.

However, on the second issue, the SC ruled that there was no identity of the
causes of action because in forcible entry case, the only issue resolved is the issue of
prior possession and not of ownership.

The Supreme Court clarified that accion interdictal, which is the summary
action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the
property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer
(desahucio) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to
be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within
one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for
recovery of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional
trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership
and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial
court. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that a judgment in a forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has
the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

Petition is granted. Javier is the lawful owner of lot 1461 which is being
occupied by Rosete.
Case Title: BUSTOS vs.COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No.: 120784-85
Date: January 24, 2001

FACTS:

Paulino Fajardo died intestate and his four (4) children, namely: Manuela,
Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial executed an extra-judicial partition5 of his estate. After
this, Manuela sold her one fourth (1/4) share which was Lot 284, subdivided into Lots
284-A and 284-B, to Moses, husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. However,
Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to
her brother-in-law, Moses, despite several demands. Thus, Moses filed RTC a
complaint for partition claiming the said share of Manuela which was sold to him.

During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad died and his heirs
executed an extra-judicial partition of his estate. Lucio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B
to spouses Viray. With the case being said, RTC rendered decision in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants.

Then, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Bustos. Along with this, spouses
Viray filed with MCTC an action for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos who
were in actual possession as lessees of the said subject land. MCTC decided the case
in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial court issued writs of execution and
demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with RTC a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. However, RTC dismissed the said case.

Both parties appealed to CA. CA dismissed the cases.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but CA denied the motion.

ISSUE:
The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their
own land.
 HELD:
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners
are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute
the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly
result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the
court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of
the same. "An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of
ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories,
to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner.
Case Title HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and
AQUILINA ABALOS, Respondents.
G.R No. 128177
Date: August 15, 2001

Facts:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of 24,550
square meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, originally owned by
Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, passed on to his heirs who leased the same to
spouses David de Vera and Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years
beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman Soriano, one of the children of Adriano Soriano,
acting as caretaker of the property during the period of the lease. After executing an
extra judicial settlement among themselves, the heirs of Adriano Soriano subsequently
subdivided the property into two (2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No.
60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459
was assigned to Francisca, Librada, Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was
sold by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and
Aquilina Abalos, while, Elocadio, Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares
in Lot No. 8459 also to petitioners.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker and
appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes. Thereafter, Roman
Soriano filed CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation against the
de Vera spouses. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which decision became final
and executory. However, prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered
into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano
to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease in 1982. In an Order dated
December 22, 1972, the post-decisional agreement was approved by the agrarian court.

On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and
three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, which was later on granted. On August
22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the post-decisional agreement
between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera in CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for
reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the agrarian court a motion for
execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease
the property. The motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of the subject
property, jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Roman's property to
answer for the use and occupation by Soriano of 6/7 share of the property. On October
25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental demanded by
petitioners, which, however, was denied by the agrarian court. The agrarian court
likewise authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by petitioners. Soriano's
motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Soriano to file a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed
with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication Board, a complaint against petitioners
for "Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction"
docketed as DARAB Case No. 528-P-93.
Issue:
Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case can
effectively eject the possessor (SORIANO) thereof, whose security of tenure rights
is still pending determination before the DARAB.
Held:
No. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot
effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights
are still pending determination before the DARAB. There is no dispute that Abalos
spouses' title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality.
However, the declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically
include possession, especially so in the instant case where there is a third party
occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an agricultural
tenant. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the
right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is
established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which
they value as life itself ad deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of
ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. The
Supreme Court decided to refrain from ruling whether petitioners may be
dispossessed of the subject property while petitioner's status as tenant has not yet
been declared by the DARAB.
Case Title Garcia v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 133140
Date August 10, 1999

FACTS:
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land was
registered, sold with the consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their
daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos). The
Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to
secure a loan and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered. On March 9, 1981,
Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead new Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued in the name of the Magpayos.

The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest
bidder bought the land. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired
without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated
in favor of PBCom which cancelled the Magpayo's title and new TCT was issued for
PBCom.

On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land, which was granted. Upon service
of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who was
in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for Intervention.
Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant
suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited
the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired
no right thereover.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner of the land was the Magpayo spouses and thus the mortgage
to PBCom was valid.
HELD:
We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership
exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.8 Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by
way of sale.9 Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose
of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses.
On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of
a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of
an owner and possession of a holder. "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be
the owner himself or one who claims to be so." On the other hand, "one who possesses
as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."

The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner
for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of
Appeals that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor.
Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at
the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer
of ownership.

On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his

mother's share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not
included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court.
This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered owned by
petitioner's parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage
to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate
of title over the property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered
into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership
over a particular property.15 The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery
of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of
ownership.16 All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they
mortgaged the property to PBCom.
Case Title Rodil Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129609
Date: November 29, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Rodil Enterprises, Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca Building
(O’RACCA), owned by the Republic of the Philippines (REPUBLIC). RODIL entered
into a sublease contract with the private respondents Carmen Bondoc, Teresita
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, members of the Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIATION).

On 12 September 1982, BP 233 was enacted. It authorized the sale of “former alien
properties” classified as commercial and industrial, and the O’RACCA building was
classified as commercial property. Pursuant thereto, RODIL offered to buy the
building. While pending for appraisal of market value of the property, the
ASSOCIATION offered to lease the same building through the Department of General
Services and Real Estate Property Management.

Pending action for RODIL’s offer to buy the building, RODIL requested for another
renewal of the lease for 5 years. The Management suspended the request of RODIL
for renewal of lease for 5 years because ASSOCIATION’s offer to lease was more
beneficial to the REPUBLIC. The management issued a temporary occupancy permit
to ASSOCIATION.

A new custodian was then designated to manage the O’RACCA building. Renewal of
lease was entered into by RODIL and the new management for the building for 10
years.

RODIL filed an action of unlawful detainer against the members of ASSOCIATION.

MTC ruled in favor of RODIL, and this was affirmed by the RTC. CA, on appeal,
reversed the decision of the RTC.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the renewal contract between Rodil and the Republic is valid.
HELD:
We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of
disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no
exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus
disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the
leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for
unlawful detainer are present.

Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with
the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was
merely by virtue of acquiescence. The records clearly show this to be the case. The
REPUBLIC merely issued a "temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the
name of the respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of
respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation of respondents was merely
tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter remained
uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately
for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by
virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992.
Case Title CORNELIO M. ISAGUIRRE (petitioner) v. FELICITAS
DE LARA (respondent)
G.R. no. 138053
Date: 31 May 2000

FACTS:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over a parcel of land identified as a portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre,
with an area of 2,342 square meters filed with the Bureau of Lands. Upon his death, he
was succeeded by his wife, Felicitas de Lara. By virtue of a subdivision survey, the area
was reduced to 1,000 square meters on which a two-story residential-commercial
apartment stands, in the name of their sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara.
Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained loans from the Philippine National Bank. Due
to financial difficulties in 1953, she approached Cornelio M. Isaguirre (who was
married to her niece) and executed a document denominated as "Deed of Sale and
Special Cession of Rights and Interests" where she sold a 250 meter portion of Lot 502
with the two-story commercial-residential structure standing thereon, for and in
consideration of the sum of P5,000.00.

On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the property based on the
deed of sale, resulting in the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title (OCT), in his
name. Meanwhile, the sales application of Felicitas over the entire 1,000 square meter
property (including the 250 meter portion claimed by petitoner) was also approved,
and an OCT was issued in her name as well. Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner
filed an action for quieting of title in RTC Davao against Felicitas on May 1990. The trial
court decided in favor of petitioner and declared him as the lawful owner of the
property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding that the
transaction entered into by the parties was an equitable mortgage, not a sale, due to the
inadequacy of the consideration and because the payment thereof was made in several
installments of minimal amounts.

The Supreme Court affirem said such decision declaring the petitioner’s OCT null and
void. Respondent then sought for a writ of possession from the trial court. This was
opposed by petitioner stating that he had the right of retention over the property until
payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had introduced on the
property. RTC Davao granted the motion for writ of possession in favor of respondent.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of the
subject property, because the agreement entered into by the parties was an equitable
mortgage; as such, there is no necessity for petitioner to actually possess the property
because, as the mortgagee, he only has to annotate his claim at the back of the certificate
of title in order to protect his rights against third persons and secure the debt.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to RTC Davao for its failure to
specify the period within which the mortgagor (respondent) must pay the indebtedness
and the total amount thereof with interest, plus necessary expenses incurred by
petitioner over the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner/mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain
possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount of
indebtedness by the respondent/mortgagor as well as the value of the improvements
the former has made on the property before the transaction was declared to be an
equitable mortgage

HELD:
NO. A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a
principal obligation. It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears
with the proper Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage
is nevertheless binding between the parties. 18 Thus, the only right granted by law in
favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document
in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains
possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to
the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does
not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security since the
mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security
it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may
institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially,
whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds
therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.
Apparently, petitioner's contention that "[t]o require [him] . . . to deliver possession of
the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would
be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without basis. Regardless of its
possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in
the event of the debtor's default in the payment of his loan obligation.
Case Title MELCHOR CUSTODIO, petitioner, appellee,
vs.
ROSENDO F. CORRADO, respondent.
G.R. no. G.R. No. 146082
Date: July 30, 2004

FACTS:
On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment case against
petitioner Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil
Case No. 116. It was dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that (1)
it had no jurisdiction as the complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was no barangay
conciliation, and (3) the plaintiff failed to prove his case by preponderance of
evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC of Balayan, Batangas affirmed the appealed decision
docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099.

On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No.
120,7 and which is the core case subject of the present petition.

The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the
registered owner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered
by TCT No. T-21342. He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the
complaint, petitioner Melchor Custodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of
tenancy relationship with respondent’s father, Crisanto Corrado and without his
knowledge and consent, demolished his old residential house on the said lot and
constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his family now reside.

In his Answer, petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold

tenant of Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that
respondent’s father consented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years
ago when the subject lot was still owned by respondent’s father and before it was
transferred to respondent. As affirmative defenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action; (b) the required barangay conciliation under P.D.
15089 was not complied with; and (c) the present complaint is now barred on the
ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on forum shopping.

The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no
identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the
former is an ejectment suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the
date of deprivation of possession while the latter is for recovery of possession, and
not ejectment. It also brushed aside the alleged tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondent, noting that the milling tickets were issued for
respondent’s father as the planter and petitioner as the tenant, but without any
evidence showing that they referred to the subject lot and without any indication that
petitioner was getting his share from the subject lot.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable in this case.
2. Whether the alleged tenancy relationship between petitioner with respondent
and the latter’s father was established by preponderance of evidence.
HELD:
1. No.

We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is

inapplicable because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits
and its cause of action is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession
and ownership.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
(a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action.

In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A
judgment on the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when
there is determination which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default
and without trial. Thus, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an
unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to
the causes of action and the subject matter of the case. In this case, the MTC’s
dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack of jurisdiction and lack of
proof of the date of demand without determining and resolving who has the right of
possession between petitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was not resolved on
the merits but was dismissed on technical points. A judgment dismissing an action
for want of jurisdiction cannot operate as res judicata on the merits.
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120.

2. No.

Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him
and respondent’s father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that
this is a factual issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value
of evidences presented which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
Besides, this issue had already been squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and
we find no impelling reason to set it aside. According to the Court of Appeals, the
milling tickets only showed that they were issued to Crisanto Corrado but did not
show whether such tickets referred to the same lot in question. In petitions for review
on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of
law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on
this Court, which is not a trier of facts.

At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-
trial stage where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of
respondent and that petitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and
respondent are bound by such stipulations which are deemed settled and need not be
proven during the trial. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit
the basic issues between the parties. It thus paves the way for a less cluttered trial and
resolution of the case. Its main objective is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the
trial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it is a basic legal precept that
the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during the pre-trial
Case Title PACENCIO ABEJARON v. FELIX NABASA
G.R. no. G.R. No. 84831
Date: June 20, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a
118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway General
Santos City. Petitioner Abejaron and his family occupied the 118-square meterland.
At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built
thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. Petitioner later improved
their abode to become a two-storey house. This house, which stands to this day,
occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same
Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioners' daughter, Conchita. The small store was eventually
destroyed and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron built another store. He later planted
five coconut trees on the property. Knowing that the disputed land was public in
character, petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation
purposes.

The last two declarations state that petitioners' house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5.
Petitioner stated that respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter
portion of Lot1. Nabasa built his house about 4 meters away from petitioner
Abejaron's house. Employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron did
not apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it
was government property. Without his knowledge and consent, Nabasa applied for
and caused the titling in his name the entire Lot 1, including petitioner Abejaron's
118-square meter portion. Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate of Title pursuant
to a Free Patent covering Lot 1. As the title included petitioner Abejaron’s portion of
the lot, he filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and
application. The protest was dismissed for failure of the petitioner to attend the
hearings.

Petitioner Abejaron then filed an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent Nabasa before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner in its
reconveyance case declaring the possession and occupancy of Abejaron over 118
square meters of lot in good faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of said portion
in the OCT issued in the name of Nabasa erroneous.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for
reconveyance is actual fraud which in this case was failed to be substantiated by
Abejaron. Without proof of irregularity neither in the issuance of title nor in the
proceedings incident thereto nor a claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of the
title, the title would become indefeasible. The petitioner hence resorts to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land.
HELD:
No.
As petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is not the
proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of
the land to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the government,
who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion.

An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose

property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one
year from the date of the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding
and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who
secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof.
Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to
prosper, it is essential for the party seeking reconveyance to prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.

As admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation
purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by other
effective proof. Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not
bolster his case as the earliest of these was dated 1950. Petitioner's evidence does not
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through
possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as
required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic
presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence
of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." As petitioner Abejaron has not
adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial
confirmation of title, or homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action
for reconveyance.
Case Title Homer Javier v. Susan Lumontad
G.R. no. GR No. 203760
Date: December 3, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner Homer Javier alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier
(Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land in Taytay,
Rizal.

Since his birth, petitioner's family has lived in the residential house erected thereon.
Upon Vicente's death, petitioner, together with his mother, continued their possession
over the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into the subject land and
started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion
thereof, despite petitioner's vigorous objections and protests. The dispute was
submitted to barangay conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between
the parties. Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent the instant
forcible entry complaint, averring, in addition to the foregoing, that reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the above-said portion may be fixed at
P5,000.00 per month. Respondent claimed gthat she is the owner of the portion where
the building was being constructed.

The MTC dismissed the complained and found that Vicente actually subdivided the
subject land into two lots: the first lot, with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to
petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject
building was erected, was given to one Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of
Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was eventually acquired by respondent
from the latter through sale.

RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and accordingly ordered respondent to
vacate the disputed portion and surrender possession thereof to petitioner. Likewise,
it ordered respondent to pay.

CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to the latter court for trial on the
merits. It concluded that respondent had the subject building constructed in the
concept of being the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable for forcible entry
HELD:
No. In forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical
possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In other words, the plaintiff
must allege that he, prior to the defendant's act of dispossession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the
property.

Notwithstanding petitioner's proper classification of his action, his forcible entry

complaint, nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed
to justify his right to the de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the
disputed premises.

As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from
which petitioner hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only
covers his house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to show
that he has the right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on
the contrary, appears to be consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in
view of TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 covering the same property as registered in her
name. Thus, with no evidence in support of petitioner's stance, and the counter-
evidence showing respondent's right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m.
portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must necessarily fail.
Case Title Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v Ando
G.R. no. 195669
Date: May 30, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer and damages before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Mandaue City against herein respondents in their capacities as members of the
Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church (MBC), and the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI).

The MTCC ordered the petitioner to show cause why its complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement on certification against forum-
shopping. The petitioner, allegedly, failed to mention in its certification against non-
forum-shopping a complete statement about the status of another case filed against it
by MBC and UCCPI concerning the recovery of parcels of land. Said case involved the
same parcel of land subject of the unlawful detainer case. The MTCC dismissed the
case on the ground of BUCCI’s failure to comply with the requirement of certification
against forum-shopping. Petitioner appealed with both the RTC, and CA; however,
both courts denied said appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping for filing the case for unlawful
detainer during the pendency of the action for recovery of ownership, and for failing
to disclose the status of said action in the certification of non-forum-shopping

HELD:
NO. The rule on non-forum-shopping requires a two-fold compliance: a) the non-
commission of forum-shopping; and b) the submission of the certification against
forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity
with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.

In this case, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful
detainer, and the land ownership recovery case. The issues raised are not identical in
the two aforementioned cases.

With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the institution
of a subsequent action: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and [over] the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of
cause of action. In the petitioner’s certification against non-forum-shopping, it
mentioned that the decision in the land ownership case was still pending appeal before
the CA. As such, the said judgment is not yet final. Also, as mentioned, the issue in the
two cases are not identical. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is
entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or physical possession of the disputed
parcel of land; whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party
has the right to be recognized as lawful owner of the disputed parcels of land.

The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of

ownership case would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful
detainer case, such that the court handling the latter case would be bound thereby and
could not render a contrary ruling in the issue of physical or material possession."

It is important to note that BUCCI has alleged that although the RTC dismissed the
complaint against it in the ownership recovery case, it still filed the unlawful detainer
case because there was never a ruling in the former case as to who between the parties
had the better right to the material or physical possession of the subject property.
Petitioner also asserted that although it had previously allowed the lawful occupation
of the disputed property by respondent MBC, it nonetheless had to put an end to such
forbearance, because all possible avenues for compromise between the parties in this
case had already been closed. Thus, a favorable ruling for BUCCI in the action for
recovery of ownership would not at all compel or constrain the MTCC to also
obligatorily rule in the summary action of ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to the
material or physical possession of the disputed lot because even if it be proved that it
has the lawful title to, or the ownership of, the disputed lots, there is still the need to
resolve in the summary action of unlawful detainer whether there are valid or
unexpired agreements between the parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by
the actual occupants of the disputed property.
Case Title German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
et. al.
G.R. no. 76216
Date: September 14, 1989

FACTS:
Cynthia Jose and Manuel Jose, residents of Philadelphia, U.S.A executed a special
power of attorney authorizing the German Management & Services, Inc. to develop
their land in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal into a residential subdivision.
Subsequently, the petitioner obtained Development Permit no. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission.

However, the petitioners found that the respondents and twenty other persons are
currently occupying the said land and so they advised them to vacate but to no avail,
thus they proceeded to work. Due to this, the respondents filed an action of forcible
entry before the Municipal Trial Court alleging that they have been occupying and
cultivating the lands for twelve to fifteen years already and on the first week of August
1983, the petitioner under a permit was authorized to improve a nearby road subject to
the condition that it shall secure the right of way from the owners of the lot to be
affected and lastly, they claim that the petitioners deprived them of due process of law
by removing their improvements to the land, destroying their crops and through force
or intimidation, have tried to unlawfully eject them from their farmholdings.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of Municipal and Regional Trial Court
and favored the respondents.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it
reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the
opportunity to file its answer.
2. Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case
against petitioners.
HELD:
The comment filed by the petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed
the petition for review by the respondents; in addition, the Court of Appeals have
already heard the petitioners on its motion for reconsideration, thus negating the
possibility of any violation of due process.
 Secondly, it must be observed that the respondents are the actual and current
possessors of the land. The issue is not about the ownership; forcible entry never
determines the validity of a title. Admittedly, the petitioners may validly claim
ownership based on the title they are holding, nevertheless, the party in a peaceful
possession shall not be turned out by violence or intimidation.

On the contrary of claims of the petitioner, Article 429 of Civil Code should not
apply. The Doctrine of Self-Help only occurs when there is an actual or threatened
dispossession. When possession is actually lost, the owners must resort to judicial
process for the recovery and not through their initiative efforts, this is in accordance
with Article 536 which states that “In no case may possession be acquired through force
or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that
he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”
Case Title FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES AND FEDERICO
VILLADELREY, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. no. L-28716
Date: November 18, 1970

FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of
lot known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico in Sitio Bote-bote, Nasugbu, Batangas. The
said parcel of land used to be tenanted by the deceased father of Cabalag. The overseer
the hacienda is Felix Caisip and the owner of the same is Roxas y Cia. The latter
acquired a court ruling against spouses Cabalag and Guevarra for forcible entry.
Spouses Cabalag and Guevarra received the writ of execution on June 6, 1959, ordering
them to leave the premises within 20 days. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen by
Caisip weeding in the portion of Lot 105-A. Caisip bade her to leave but she refused to
do so. Caisip asked for help of police sergeant Ignacio Rojales and police corporal
Federico Villadelrey, both previously assigned by the Chief of Police to Sitio Bote-bote
as requested by Antonio Chiudan, the hacienda administrator, due to the tenacious
attitude of Cabalag to remain in the premises. Still refusing to leave, the two police
officers forcibly dragged her towards a forested area, where there was a banana
plantation – as Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.

A case was filed against the petitioners for grave coercion. One of their defenses was
Art. 429. They were found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense.
HELD:
Art. 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. Spouses Cabalag and Guevarra were given
20 days from June 6, 1959 to vacate the premises. On June 17, 1959, Spouses Cabalag
and Guevarra did not invade nor usurp said premises. They had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor.

*Article 429 of the Civil Code states that “the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has
the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property”.
Case Title People v. Pletcha, Jr.
G.R. no. 19029 - CR
Date: June 27, 1977

FACTS:

Facts of the case state that herein appellant, Tito Pletcha, Jr., was the owner of a lot
allegedly leased by Radeco Corporation from a certain Lopinco. In the morning of June
10, 1973, appellant found eight (8) men from Radeco Corporation constructing a fence
made of bamboo poles and wires on the land stated. Despite request of desistance from
the appellant pending resurvey he proposed upon the land, the men totally ignored
him and continued working. Enraged, appellant then went back with a bolo without
any chance, however, to actually use it or threaten them due to the reaction of the group
of running away upon seeing him. The men subsequently filed and action for grave
coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant then invoked “self-
help” under Article 429 of the Civil Code, giving him as the owner the right to use
reasonable force to exclude any person threatening his peaceful ownership, in defense
of the land he owns for 19 years. As a result of such action, the MTC of Murcia, Negros
Occidental convicted him for grave coercion. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court erred in its decision.

HELD:
Yes, the court erred in convicting herein appellant for grave coercion. Under Article
429 of the Civil Code:

“The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may
be reasonable necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.”

The quoted provision clearly confirms the right of the appellant, as an owner and
lawful possessor of the land, to use such reasonable force to repel and invasion or
usurpation, actual, threatened or physical, of his property. The principle of self-defense
and the protective measures related thereto covers not only his life but extends also to
his property and liberty.

With this, the ruling of the MTC was reversed and the appellant was acquitted.
CASE TITLE DIAMOND FARMS, INC.,vs.DIAMOND FARM
WORKERS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
G.R. NO. G. R. No. 192999
DATE H. July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the commercial farming of bananas. A
portion of the land it owns was placed under CARP coverage. Thus, its
certificate of title over the portions of the land under CARP were cancelled,
and new TCT’s were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Subsequently, beneficiaries were identified, most of whom were members of
respondent cooperative. Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful occupation
against respondents, alleging that it was the lawful owner of two parcels of
land within the portions covered by the CLOA and that the said CLOAs had
yet to attain finality owing to appeals filled by petitioner. Thus, while the
beneficiaries had yet to be designated with finality, respondents refused to
do work for petitioner, and forcibly entered the land subject to the dispute
and occupied the same.
Respondents argued the indeed, petitioner had the TCT’s of the parcel of
land subject to the dispute, but these were put under the name of the
Republic upon subjecting it to CARP. Thus, despite the award of the CLOAs
to respondents, petitioner continued to manage the land while paying them
wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation?
RULING
NO. The CA found that petitioner has never sought the nullification of the
Republic’s TCTs. Further, the CA found no credible evidence relating to
proceedings for payment of just compensation. The CA held that the
issuance of the Republic’s TCTs and CLOAs in favor of the 278 CARP
beneficiaries implies the deposit in cash or LBP bonds of the amount initially
determined as compensation for petitioner’s land or the actual payment of
just compensation due to petitioner. Thus, upon it already lost possession
and ownership over the land when the payment of just compensation was
fulfilled.

It is beyond doubt that petitioner is the farm operator and manager while
respondents are the farm workers. Both parties enjoyed possession of the
land. Together, they worked thereon. Before CARP, petitioner was the
landowner, farm operator and manager. Respondents are its farm workers.
After the deferment period, CARP finally dawned. Petitioner lost its status as
landowner, but not as farm operator and manager. Respondents remained as
petitioner’s farm workers and received wages from petitioner.
ART. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property.

Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means to
protect their possession, respondents were not guilty of unlawful
occupation.
Case Title Spouses Fuentes v Roca
G.R. no. 178902
Date: April 21, 2010

FACTS:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his
mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners
Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents
and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and
Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be
paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the
consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata
went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at
Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed,
Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over
the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to
annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since
the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere
forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to
annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor
of the Fuentes spouses. CA reversed this ruling stating that the action has not
prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the
sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the
action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and
the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Rosario's signature on the document of consent had been forged
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed
3. Whether or not only Rosario could bring the action to annul that sale
HELD:
1. Yes. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of
Rosario in the document giving consent and another document executed at the same
time period. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as
proof of Rosario's consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic
consent.
2. No. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without
their mother's (his wife's) written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right
to bring such an action. (See Art. 1410 of the Civil Code)

3. No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed
on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners,
the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person
from its enjoyment and disposal.

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Case Title Marcelo Sunday v People of the Philippines

G.R. no. 215305

Date: April 3, 2018

FACTS:

On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force
Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao
City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to
remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry
of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small,
gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the
bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male
passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as
petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag.
Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus
conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back.
SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner
obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber
carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3)
one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked
petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to
show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA
Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for
Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7 May 2009,5 the latter found probable cause to
charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under PD l 866.
During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura
(Tabura), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine
National Police, and SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5
November 20097 attesting that petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any
kind and caliber per verification from records." Meanwhile, SCAA Buco identified
petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and testified on the details of the routine
inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA
Buco further elaborated on the search conducted.

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct
examination, petitioner denied ownership of the bag. However, he also admitted to
answering SCAA Buco when asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco to open
it after the latter sought for his permission.

On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor

when the latter was asked who owned the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never
disclosed he was with his brother when he boarded the bus.

The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to
present rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the trial court, the parties submitted their
respective memoranda.

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him
to be in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or
license. Consequently, in the dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September
2011, petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866. On 12 October 2011, petitioner
timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged

misappreciation of evidence by the trial court and the supposed illegality of the search.
13 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the
warrantless search was valid being a consented search, and that the factual findings of
the trial court can no longer be disturbed.
In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of
petitioner and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification that:

(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition, he is
imposed an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to seven (7) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition to the
fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00); and

(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 to which the OSG filed its
Comment. 17 In its Resolution dated 15 October 2014, 18 the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed a
Petition before the SC for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seized articles from the petitioner are inadmissible as evidence on
the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

HELD:

No. The Court opined that the Section 2, Article III of the Constitution was patterned
after the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. Moreover the Court stressed that
such is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches
and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article HI of
the Constitution does not apply.The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure
ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes
into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the
Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an
expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the
alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the
case. Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private
property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the
same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the
State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter
those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security measures by an
owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under
Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power
for the promotion of public safety. Necessad1y, a person's expectation of privacy is
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the
public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a
military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro
Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual
and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and
physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may
further be required to open their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness
of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application,
thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the
Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099
are AFFIRMED.
Case Title Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette
G.R. no. 74761
Date: November 6, 1990

FACTS:
1. Spouses Andamo(petitioners) are the owners of a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite
which is adjacent to that of the Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette(respondents), Inc., a religious corporation.
2. Within the land of the respondent, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damaged the petitioner’s crops
and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
3. Petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of the
Corporation, for destruction by means of indundation under Art. 324 pf the RPC.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed another action against the respondent, this time
a civil case for damages, with prayer of issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
4. RTC dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which
was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. (Rule III of RoC
provides that “criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action.

ISSUE:
WON the corporation which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and indundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Article 2176 and 2177 of the NCC on quasi-delicts such that
the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

HELD:
Yes. IAC decision reversed and set aside. TC ordered to proceed with the civil case
independently of the criminal case
1. The civil action is one under Art. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
 delicts.
a. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
i. Damages suffered by the plaintiff,
ii. Fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts must respond; and
iii. The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
In the present case, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.