N RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons,

Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR,
NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004Ponente: Ynares-Santiago,
J.CRIME INVOLVED: Qualified RapeFACTS: At about 10 in the morning, 12-year old Aileen Mendoza woke
up to find De Villa on topof her. She was unable to call for help because De Villa covered her mouth
with a pillow andthreatened to kill her. He then proceeded to rape her – and eventually Aileen became
pregnant.Her mother noticed the pregnancy and confronted her about it, and Aileen eventually
admittedthat she was raped by De Villa. A criminal complaint was then filed against the petitioner
byAileen’s parents. Aileen was examined by Dr. Cosidon, who confirmed her pregnancy (she wasalready
8 months pregnant at that time), and found healed lacerations in her hymen. During thetrial, De Villa
pleaded not guilty because at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67years old, and was
incapable of an erection. He also interposed an alibi that he was not in thescene of the crime at the
time of the rape. De Villa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubtby the trial court for the rape of
Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity, and was sentenced tosuffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as well as the payment of civil indemnity, moraldamages, costs of the suit, and
support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza – the putative child bornof the rape. Three years after the
decision, June (the son of Reynaldo) alleged that during thetrial of the case, he was unaware that there
was a scientific test that could determine whetherReynaldo was Leahlyn’s father. They sought for DNA
testing to resolve the issue of paternity,but the same was denied. At the petitioner’s insistence, they
gathered samples from Leahlyn,from the grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from Reynaldo himself and was
submitted to the DNALaboratory. The DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report showing that
there was nomatch between the DNA samples.ISSUE: Was the DNA result a valid basis for habeas
corpus, new trial, and acquittal?RULING: NO TO ALL COUNTS. (1) As to Habeas Corpus: The most basic
criterion for theissuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived ofhis freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's
libertyis restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent caseof
Feria v. Court of Appeals, the court ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed ina petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such aswhen, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of aconstitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction toimpose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is voidas to such excess. This Court stated
the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writof error, and should not be thus used.As to
new trial: A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted onlyif the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that saidevidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise ofreasonable diligence; (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;and (d) that the evidence is of
such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change thejudgment. Petitioner-relator's claim that
he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing untilthe trial was concluded carries no weight with
this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence ofDNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of
petitioner, or on the part of petitioner'scounsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding
upon petitioner. As to acquittal: Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence
presented bypetitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outrightacquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven
thatReynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, stillstand,
with Aileen Mendoza’s testimony and positive identification as its bases. The SolicitorGeneral reiterates,
and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an elementof the crime of rape.
Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Courtthat Reynaldo de Villa should
be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction wasbased solely on a finding of paternity of
the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. The court’sconviction was based on the clear and convincing
testimonial evidence of the victim, which,given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal