II. Arrests
(5a)
Rule 113 - Arrest
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody
in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
(1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The
person arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary
for his detention. (2a)
Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. — It shall be the duty of the officer
executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest
police station or jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)
Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom the
warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be
executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the
expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution
shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure
to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Section 6. Time of making arrest. — An arrest may be made on any day and
at any time of the day or night. (6)
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making
an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be
arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested
so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)
Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an
arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of
his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in
the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission,
has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to
inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)
Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a
private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest
him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or
has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest
has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. (9a)
Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. — An officer making a lawful
arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist
him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall
assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without
detriment to himself. (10a)
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. — An officer,
in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant
as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the
person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused
admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)
Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. — Whenever an
officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the
preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate
himself. (12a)
Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. — If a person lawfully arrested
escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him
without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13)
Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. — Any
member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or
of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with
such person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or
night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can
also exercise the same right. (14a)
A. Warrant of Arrest
R.A. 9372 - Human Security Act of 2007 (Terrorism)
> SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any
of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the
Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear
Waste Control Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of
1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law
of 1974); and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on
Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall
suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of
parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
> Sec 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary
notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been
duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of
a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for
delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities,
deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority
within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or
suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken
into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That
the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and
examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining
the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any
judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest
took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge,
among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement
personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented
before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the
person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or
not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological
torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of
what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the
proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days
from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law
enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice
shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding
paragraph.
Sec 1(e) & 1(g), Rule 116, Rules of Court
(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall
be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the
case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the
information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten
(10) days from the date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of
his case shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment. (n)

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme

Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a
bill of particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the
arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period. (sec. 2, cir.
38-98)

SC Circular 38-98 - Speedy Trial Act of 1998

SEARCH AND SEIZURES – RULE 126 - Section 1. Search warrant
defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant
may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge
is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is
based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. —
The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search
after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained
therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in
presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any
other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of
the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct
that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that
the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall
be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it shall be void.
(9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing
property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the
same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the
search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant,
must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the
place in which he found the seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court;
return and proceedings thereon. — (a) The officer must forthwith
deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the
issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if
none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued
and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return
has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of
this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by
the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter
therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the
judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant. (12a)

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress

evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant
and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted.
If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in
and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However,
if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by
the latter court. (n)
G.R. No. 118151 August 22, 1996
WASHINGTON DISTILLERS, INC., MANUEL CO KEHYENG,
CHONGKING KEHYENG, QUIRINO KEHYENG, JASMIN KEHYENG
and PURITA KEHYENG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS,
INC., respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision,1 promulgated on June 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32752, reversing the order dated August 31, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XXVIII, Manila,2 which quashed the search warrant issued against petitioners, and the appellate court's
resolution dated December 1, 1994 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Washington Distillers, Inc., which is owned and operated by
petitioners Manuel Co Chongking, Quirino, Jasmin and Purita, all
surnamed Kehyeng, is a domestic corporation with principal office and
business address at Sta. Lucia, San Fernando, Pampanga. It is engaged
in the manufacture of liquor products, under the labels Gin Seven,
Washington Gin 65, Luzon and Anisado, using as containers 350cc
round white flint bottles with blown-in marks of La Tondeña, Inc. and
Ginebra San Miguel.
On the basis of Search Warrant No. 93-64 issued by Hen. Rosalio G. de
la Rosa, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation seized on May 26-
27, 1993 from the premises of petitioners in San Fernando, Pampanga,
314,289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles, for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700.3 The
bottles were seized upon complaint of private respondent La Tondeña
Distillers, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacture and sale of wines and liquors. Among private respondent's
products is a gin popularly known as Ginebra San Miguel, which is
bottled and sold in 350cc round white flint bottles especially ordered by
private respondent for its exclusive use, with blown-in marks La Tondeña,
Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel. The trademarks are registered with the
Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology Transfer under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 623. 4
In a letter dated May 20, 1993 to the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, private respondent requested assistance in prosecuting
alleged illegal users, buyers, sellers or traffickers of its registered
bottles.5 In response to private respondent's request, NBI agents
Florencio Corpuz and Dante Jacinto, accompanied by Atty. Jaime de la
Cruz, private respondent's legal counsel, conducted surveillance
operations at the premises of petitioner Washington Distillers in Sta.
Lucia, San Fernando, Pampanga. In his affidavit given in support of the
application for a search warrant, Atty. De la Cruz stated that by
pretending to be dealers in second hand bottles, he and the NBI agents
were able to enter the warehouse of Washington Distillers and
discovered that petitioner Washington Distillers had been buying the
empty bottles from junk dealers at a price higher than that offered by
private respondent for retrieving its bottles.6 NBI Agent Florencio Corpuz,
on the other hand, said in his affidavit that inside the warehouse they saw
empty bottles, estimated to be in the thousands, placed in sacks and
cartons, which they examined and found to be La Tondeña's registered
350cc round white flint bottles.7 Based on these affidavits, Atty. Dante C.
Jacinto, Senior Agent of the NBI, filed with Branch XXVIII of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila an application for a warrant to search the premises
of Washington Distillers and to seize empty and filled 350cc round white
flint bottles with blown-in marks of Ginebra San Miguel and La Tondeña,
Inc.
On May 25, 1993, Executive Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa issued a
search warrant, pursuant to which agents of the NBI seized from the
premises of petitioners 314,289 pieces of 350cc round white flint
bottles,8 of which 3,708 were filled and 310,581 were empty.9 The seized
bottles were deposited in the warehouse of private respondent La
Tondeña Distillers, Inc. in Velasquez, Tondo, Manila on the ground that
there was no space for storage in the court or in the NBI compound. 10
On June 9, 1993, petitioners filed a motion to quash the search warrant
on the ground that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction
to issue a search warrant to be executed in San Fernando, Pampanga. In
addition, they claimed that there was no probable cause for issuing the
search warrant because R.A. No. 623 does not cover registered bottles
of liquor manufacturers and that even assuming that it does, under §5 of
the law, no action could be instituted against petitioners because the
bottles had lawfully been sold to
them. 11 Petitioners charged that the private respondent was guilty of
forum-shopping because twice it had applied for a search warrant over
the same subject to the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Indeed, it appears that the first search warrant (Search
Warrant No. 6) was issued on August 19, 1991, and the second (Search Petitioners contend that:
Warrant No. 11) was issued on December 2, 1992 but it was later
quashed for lack of probable cause. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY OR
the order of the trial court was set aside. 12 CAPACITY TO FILE THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS
On August 31, 1993, Hon. Antonio L. Descallar, who had been BECAUSE IT IS NOT A PARTY TO THE SEARCH
designated assisting judge of Branch XXVIII, granted petitioners' motion WARRANT PROCEEDINGS, SEARCH WARRANT 93-64
to quash. He found private respondent guilty of forum-shopping and ruled HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE
that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no authority to issue a search PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES UPON THE
warrant effective outside its territorial jurisdiction. 13 He, therefore, directed APPLICATION OF THE NBI. THEREFORE, THE COURT
the private respondent La Tondeña to return the bottles to petitioners OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
within 48 hours from receipt of his order. PETITION OUTRIGHT.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to
suspend the execution of the order for the return of the bottles. Both
motions were denied by the court in its order dated November 26, 1993,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration and the
motion to suspend the implementation of the order of
execution are hereby DENIED. The Branch Deputy
Sheriff of this Court is hereby directed to serve a copy of
this order upon counsel for La Tondeña Distillers, Inc.
(LTDI) and to immediately carry out the order of August
31, 1993 for the return of 314,298 filled and unfilled
bottles seized from the respondents pursuant to the
invalid Search Warrant No. 93-64.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appaels,
contending that Assisting Judge Antonio Descallar had no jurisdiction to
quash a search warrant issued by another judge because a motion to
quash should be filed with the same court which issued the search
warrant, especially so in this case because Judge De la Rosa allegedly
issued Search Warrant No. 93-64 in his capacity as executive judge.
On June 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals set aside the orders of the
Regional Trial Court and held that, following the ruling of this Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 14 a search warrant may be enforced
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In
addition, it was held that, as assisting judge, the Hon. Descallar did not
have authority to quash the search warrant issued by Judge De la Rosa
in his capacity as executive judge. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied on June 1, 1994. Hence this appeal.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
DECIDED THE PETITION ON AN ISSUE NO LONGER
DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES. THE FINDING OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT JUDGE DE LA ROSA HAD NO
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT
OUTSIDE OF HIS COURT'S TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION AND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
WAS GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING SHOULD,
THEREFORE, NO LONGER BE DISTURBED IN
THE CERTIORARIPROCEEDING.
C. THE ONLY REMAINING POINT OF CONTENTION IN
THIS CASE IS JUDGE DESCALLAR'S AUTHORITY AS
ASSISTING JUDGE TO QUASH THE WARRANT
ISSUED BY JUDGE DE LA ROSA.
First. Petitioners argue that private respondent had no personality to
bring the action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals because the
proceedings for a search warrant were brought by the NBI in behalf of the
People and private respondent La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. cannot
represent the People. As thus put, the contention disregards rulings of
this Court in several cases, 15 recognizing the right of parties at whose
instance search warrants are applied for to question orders quashing the
search warrants. However, there is a sense in which petitioners'
contention is correct. In those cases in which private parties were allowed
to bring suits, the parties were the complainants or offended parties in
pending criminal prosecutions 16 or in cases where at least preparatory
steps had been taken to commence criminal prosecution 17 and the
search warrant was issued in those cases either as an incident of the
pending action or in anticipation thereof. But, in the case at bar, there has
been not even an attempt to prosecute for violation of R.A. No. 623,
pursuant to which the application for search warrant was ostensibly
made. The NBI, which applied for the search warrant in 1993, did not file
any case against petitioners. When petitioners filed a motion to quash the
search warrant, the NBI did not oppose the motion. Only private
respondent La Tondeña did.
Indeed, what is noticeable about this case is that possession of the
bottles was transferred to private respondent through the expediency of a
search warrant, so that instead of merely being an ancillary writ issued
either as an incident of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such
proceedings, the proceedings for a search warrant have become, for all
intents and purposes, the main proceedings by which private respondent
have been able to obtain possession of what it claims to be its property.
Unlike in an ordinary action, however, there was neither complaint by
which petitioners could have been informed of the charge against them
nor answer by which they could have been heard in their defense, before
property claimed by them was taken from them and given to private
respondent.
Contrary to the requirement of Rule 126, §11 that property seized by
virtue of a search warrant must be deposited in custodia legis, the NBI
delivered the bottles to the private respondent La Tondeña. It is claimed
that this was done because there was no place for storage either at the
NBI compound or in the premises of the RTC. This is not a good excuse.
Someplace could have been found or rented for the purpose, but the
delivery of the bottles to private respondent cannot be made without
giving the impression that private respondent has been given possession
of bottles claimed by petitioners to have been lawfully acquired by them.
Indeed, it would seem that private respondent La Tondeña later brought
the certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals mainly in order to keep
the bottles in its possession and not really as legal custodian, in
anticipation of a criminal proceeding. Private respondent had been
frustrated not only in applying for a search warrant to the RTC at San
Fernando, Pampanga. As private respondent La Tondeña admitted in its
opposition to petitioners' motion to quash:
True, that LTDI (La Tondeña Distillers, Inc.) had been
previously granted by the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga search warrants. However, to apply
for a search warrant in respondents' home base for the
third time would be an act in futility. 18
Private respondent filed a replevin case against petitioners in
1987, but again it lost, and it had to bring an appeal which, up to
the time it applied for a search warrant to the Manila RTC, was
still pending in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 36971). 19
Private respondent's desire to maintain the search warrant would be
understandable if there was a criminal action. But there was none. To
make matters worse, when the deputy sheriff, Benjamin Garrido, tried to
recover the seized bottles from La Tondeña's warehouse where they had
been deposited, in view of the quashal of the search warrant, the bottles
could not be found. 20
Private respondent alleges:
12. While it is true that search warrants is (sic) in the
name of the "People of the Philippines," Respondent
LTDI owns the subject property in Search Warrant No.
93-64, pursuant to RA 623, as amended by RA 5700. A
reading of the law will reveal that unauthorized use by
Petitioners of LTDI bottles with marks "Ginebra San
Miguel" and "La Tondeña, Inc." is illegal. Hence, having
been deprived of its property, Respondent LTDI, with the
assistance of the agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation applied for a search warrant, in order to
recover its own bottles, only to find out later that the said
search warrant was quashed without giving LTDI the
opportunity to submit evidence in support of its opposition
to quash search warrant. (Emphasis added) 21
But private respondent's bare claim of ownership does not entitle
it to an award of the possession of the seized bottles through the
expediency of search warrant proceedings. The title to and
possession of the bottles are very much disputed, petitioners
having asserted ownership of the same property by lawful
acquisition for value, 22 in addition invoking §5 of R.A. No. 623 as
a defense. These considerations preclude private respondent's
possession of the property under the search warrant.
Indeed in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 23 we
held, through then Justice Narvasa, that if no criminal case is instituted
after the seizure made pursuant to a search warrant, the property seized
should be delivered "to its rightful owner, or at least to the person from
whom it had been seized." The property "could not be permitted to stay in
a perpetual state of custodia legis. 24 To sustain the challenged decision
of the Court of Appeals in this case would be to keep the seized bottles in
a "perpetual state of custodia legis," if not to give their custody to private
respondent for an indefinite period of time, the effect of which would be
the summary adjudication of the possession of the bottles in favor of
private respondent without the benefit of a proper action for that purpose.
This certainly cannot be countenanced under any regime.
A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, much less a civil
action. 25 It is a special criminal process, the order of issuance of which
cannot and does not adjudicate the permanent status or character of the
seized
property. 26 It cannot therefore be resorted to, as was done here by
private respondent, as a means of acquiring property or of settling a
dispute over the same. The proper remedy is for private respondent or for
the Government itself, assuming the role of a stakeholder, to bring the
appropriate action. 27
Second. Petitioners contend that, contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, Judge Descallar had authority to quash the search warrant
previously issued by Judge De la Rosa. This contention is well taken. It is
settled that a judge may revoke the orders of another judge in a litigation
subsequently assigned to him. In this case, the fact that Judge De la
Rosa was the executive judge is not material, because jurisdiction is
vested in the court, not in him qua executive judge. 28 Applications for
search warrant are made to the executive judge only for administrative
purposes. 29 Judge Descallar, as assisting judge, was competent to
resolve the motion seeking to quash the search warrant.
Nor is there basis for private respondent's claim that Judge Descallar did
not conduct a personal examination of complainant before he issued his
order. The requirement of personal examination refers to the
determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a search
warrant, 30 not to resolve a motion to quash such warrant.
Third. The Court of Appeals, citing the ruling in Malaloan v. Court* of
Appeals, 31 held that the RTC of Manila had authority to issue a warrant
effective outside its territorial jurisdiction. This issue was not raised by the
private respondent in their petition for certiorari. Although this is a
question about jurisdiction it is not a matter which could be raised in
a certiorari proceeding. The RTC may have erred in holding that the
warrant issued by Judge De la Rosa could not be enforced outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila but this is not a jurisdictional
error correctible by certiorari. The fact is that Judge Descallar did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. It cannot be said that, in ruling that the search warrant could
not be enforced in San Fernando, Pampanga, Judge Descallar acted with
grave abuse of discretion by disregarding a decision of this Court. For
Judge Descallar issued his order on August 31, 1993, whereas our
decision in Malaloan came down only on May 6, 1994. What is more, as
this Court said, the question was ''primae impressionis." In fact there may
be a serious problem of retroactivity in applying the new ruling in this
case. 32 But for now it is enough to say that the error sought to be
corrected by certiorari by private respondent La Tondeña was not an
error of jurisdiction but, if at all, only an error of judgment.
Fourth. Petitioners finally contend that Judge Descallar's order quashing
the search warrant should have been upheld because the warrant was
obtained by forum-shopping. Judge Descallar based his order not only on
the theory that a search warrant cannot be enforced outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court which issued it but also upon his finding that
private respondent was guilty of forum-shopping. "There is forum-
shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in
another. 33 This is exactly what private respondent did in seeking the
issuance of a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court, after
failing to obtain warrants from the Pampanga courts. It is noteworthy that
the ruling of Judge Descallar on this point was not assailed in
the certiorari proceeding before the Court of Appeals. Hence, even
though his ruling on the territorial reach of the warrant issued by Judge
De la Rosa was erroneous in light of the subsequent ruling in Malaloan,
the Court of Appeals should have sustained Judge Descallar's order
quashing the warrant on the ground that private respondent La Tondeña
was guilty of forum-shopping.
It cannot be contended that the rule against forum-shopping applies only
to actions, but not to a search warrant because the latter is simply "a
process" incidental to a criminal action. Circular No. 28-91 requires
parties to certify under oath that they have not "theretofore commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency" and that to
the best of their knowledge "no such action or proceeding is pending" in
said courts or agencies.
Indeed, the policy against multiple court proceedings clearly applies to
applications for search warrants. If an application for search warrant can
be filed even where there are other applications pending or denied in
other courts, the situation would become intolerable. Our ruling
in Malaloan recognized this problem and implied that forum-shopping is
prohibited even in search warrant proceedings. 34 Therefore, although
Judge Descallar's ruling limiting the search warrant issued by the Manila
court to its territorial jurisdiction is erroneous, it should nevertheless have
been sustained on the ground of forum-shopping.

To summarize, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed

because:

(1) The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as a
result of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution and the
bottles seized from them should be returned to petitioners in the absence
of any civil action for their recovery.

(2) Respondent Judge Descallar, as assisting judge of Branch XXVIII of

the RTC of Manila, had authority to quash the search warrant issued by
the regular judge, Hon. De la Rosa.

(3) Although respondent Judge Descallar's ruling that the second warrant
could not be enforced in San Fernando, Pampanga is erroneous in view
of our later ruling in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, his ruling should have
been sustained on the other ground on which it is based, i.e., violation by
private respondent La Tondeña of the rule against forum-shopping in
obtaining the search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated June 27, 1994 and the resolution
dated December 1, 1994 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the orders dated August 31, 1993 and November 26,
1993 of Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Manila are hereby
REINSTATED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188794, September 02, 2015
HONESTO OGAYON Y DIAZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
March 31, 2009, and the Resolution3 dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154. The appealed decision affirmed the
joint judgment4 dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Ligao City, Albay, which convicted petitioner Honesto Ogayon of
violating Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.5
The Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed against Ogayon for the
crimes allegedly committed as follows: cralawlaw lib rary
I. Criminal Case No. 4738: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
That at about 5:20 o'clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at
Barangay Iraya, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control four (4) pcs. of
small aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. of disposable lighter in different
colors, one (1) blade trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll aluminum
foil, instruments used or intended to be used for smoking or
consuming shabu, without authority of law, to the damage and
prejudice of the public interest and welfare.6
II. Criminal Case No. 4739: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
That at about 5:20 o'clock (sic) in the morning of October 2, 2003 at
Barangay Iraya, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the law, and
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.040 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with full knowledge that in
his possession and control is a dangerous drug, to the damage and
prejudice of the public interest and welfare.7
chanrobles law
During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739 on January 21,
2004, and March 17, 2004, respectively, Ogayon denied both charges and
pleaded "not guilty." The joint pre-trial held on May 5, 2004 yielded only one
factual admission on the identity of the accused.8 A joint trial on the merits
ensued.
The Prosecution Version
On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera,
together with the other members of the Albay Provincial Police Office,
proceeded to Ogayon's house in Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce
Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003.9 The warrant was for the seizure of shabu
and drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the premises of
Ogayon's house. Barangay Tanod Jose Lagana (Tanod Lagana) and Kagawad
Lauro Tampocao assisted the police team in conducting the search.10
Upon reaching Ogayon's house, the police team noticed several persons inside
a nipa hut located nearby. Suspecting that a pot session was about to be held,
the police team restrained two of the five persons and immediately proceeded
to Ogayon's house. After introducing themselves as police officers, Senior
Police Officer Herminigildo Caritos (SPO4 Caritos) informed Ogayon that they
had a warrant to search his place. SPO4 Caritos handed a copy of the warrant
to Ogayon, who allowed the police team to conduct the search.11
Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police team went to the comfort
room located about five meters away from Ogayon's house. When they
searched the area, they found an object (wrapped in a piece of paper with blue
prints) that fell from the wooden braces of the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos'
inspection, the paper contained two (2) small, heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets that the police team suspected to contain shabu. The search of the
comfort room also uncovered four (4) disposable lighters, one (1) knife
measuring six inches long, used aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil,
and a "Dorco" blade.12 SPO4 Caritos then placed his initials on the two (2)
plastic sachets before joining the rest of the police officers who were
conducting a search in Ogayon's house. The police officers who searched
Ogayon's house found live ammunition for an M-16 rifle.
After conducting the search, the police team prepared a Receipt of Property
Seized.13 The receipt was signed by the seizing officers, representatives from
the Department of Justice and the media, and two (2) barangay officials who
were present during the entire operation.14
The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the two (2) other persons who
had earlier been restrained, and brought them to Camp Simeon Ola for
booking. The seized items were likewise brought to the camp for laboratory
examination. In his Chemistry Report,15 Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo
(forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory)
reported that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from Ogayon's place tested
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.16
 The Defense Version
The defense presented a different version of the events.
Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the prohibited
drugs and claimed that he saw the seized items for the first time only when
they were being inventoried. His statements were corroborated by the
testimony of his wife, Zenaida Ogayon.
Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was asleep in his house. His wife
Zenaida woke him up because several policemen and barangay officials came
to his house. He claimed that the police team did not present any search
warrant before conducting the search, and it was only during trial that he saw
a copy of the warrant.
He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two groups, conducted a
simultaneous search of his house and the comfort room located nearby. He
noticed that SPO4 Caritos, who was part of the group that searched the
comfort room, came out and went to the Barangay Hall. Shortly after, SPO4
Caritos returned, accompanied by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went
inside the comfort room, leaving Tanod Lagana waiting outside. SPO4 Caritos
thereafter came out from the comfort room and ran towards Ogayon's house
while shouting "positive, positive."17
The RTC Ruling
On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint judgment convicting Ogayon
of the two criminal charges against him. Relying on the presumption of
regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon's frame-up defense. The dispositive
portion of the joint judgment reads:
cralawlawl ibra ry
WHEREFORE, under the above considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows: c ralawlawl ibra ry
a. In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 12, Art. II,
Republic Act No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,
namely: four (4) pcs. small aluminum foil, one (1) roll aluminum foil,
four (4) pcs. disposable lighters, and one (1) pc. blade; thereby
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay a FINE
often thousand pesos (P10,000.00); ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
b. In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Art. II,
Republic Act No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful possession of two (2) pcs. small
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," with total net weight of 0.0400 gram;
thereby, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and to pay a FINE of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00).18
chanrobles law
Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity of the search
warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He argued that the search warrant
was defective for lack of transcript showing that the issuing judge conducted
an examination of the applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
The CA Ruling
In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a judge must
examine under oath and in writing an applicant for search warrant and his
witnesses. Although the CA found no evidence in the records showing
compliance with this requirement, it nevertheless upheld the search
warrant's validity due to Ogayon's failure to make a timely objection
against the warrant during the trial.
That Ogayon objected to the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits, which
included the search warrant, was not sufficient for the CA. Ogayon merely
claimed that the chemistry report was not executed under oath, the items were
not illegal per se, and that he did not sign the Receipt of Property Seized since
he was not present when the seized items were confiscated. The CA noted that
the objections were not based on constitutional grounds, and for this
reason, concluded that Ogayon is deemed to have waived the right to
question the legality of the search warrant.19
Based on the search warrant's validity, the CA affirmed Ogayon's conviction for
possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was
located outside Ogayon's house, the CA declared that he exercised exclusive
control over it and should rightly be held responsible for the prohibited drugs
and paraphernalia found there.
As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of regularity of the police
team's operation and found Ogayon's claim of frame-up to be
unsupported. The CA thus ruled that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Ogayon was liable for the crimes charged.
The Issues
In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment of errors: cra lawlawlib rary
I.
The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question
the legality of the search warrant.
II.

Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already waived his
right to question the legality of the search warrant, the search
conducted was still highly irregular, thereby rendering the seized
articles as inadmissible in evidence. chanrobleslaw
Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his constitutional
right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. He denies waiving the right through his
supposed failure to assail the search warrant's validity during the trial. On the
contrary, he claims to have objected to the prosecution's formal offer of the
search warrant.
Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant's validity only during
appeal, Ogayon contends that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his
right. Since an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review, any objection made on appeal, though not raised before the trial court,
should still be considered.
Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police team on his
premises, pursuant to an already defective search warrant, was highly
irregular. He and his spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly
discovered the shabu in the comfort room located outside their house, so they
were not able to witness the search. Moreover, he claimed that there were
other persons near the premises of his house (and the comfort room) when the
search was conducted. Hence, it could not indubitably be concluded that the
seized items were under his actual and effective control and possession.
The Court's Ruling
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the
fundamental constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
reads:cralawlaw lib rary
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized, [emphasis ours] cha nro bleslaw
This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos
Constitution20 and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing
the Philippines during the American colonization,21 the 1935 Constitution,22 and
the 1973 Constitution.23
The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its recognition as a
fundamental human right under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24to both of
which the Philippines is a signatory.25 Both the Covenant and the Declaration
recognize a person's right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one's
privacy and property.26
Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its
stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards
put in place for its protection are observed.
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its
existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the
examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the Rules of Court
specifically require that -
cra lawlawlib ra ry
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours] chanrob leslaw
Ogayon's appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search
warrant was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes
of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the
required searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence
of probable cause."28We find that the failure to attach to the records the
depositions of the complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript
of the judge's examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by
itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is merely a procedural
rule and not a component of the right. Rules of procedure or statutory
requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.29
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an
"examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce," after which he determines the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The examination
requirement was originally a procedural rule found in Section 98 of General
Order No. 58,30 but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right under
the 1935 Constitution.31 The intent was to ensure that a warrant is issued not
merely on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but
only after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As
the same examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution,
we declared that affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient
to establish the factual basis for probable cause.32 Personal examination by the
judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the examination
should be probing andexhaustive, not merely routinary or a rehash of the
affidavits.33
The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and transcript does
not necessarily indicate that no examination was made by the judge who
issued the warrant in compliance with the constitutional requirement. True,
since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that -
[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the
examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights
does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the
records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not
necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record
showing what testimony was presented.35
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the
depositions and the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still
be upheld if there is evidence in the records that the requisite
examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There
must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were
considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the
existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.36
The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of depositions
and transcripts, the records indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a
statement in the search warrant itself attests to this:
Search Warrant
xxxx
GREETINGS:
chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under
oath of the applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to
believe that respondent, without authority of law, has under his possession and
control the following articles to wit: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
—Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia
which are kept and concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the
kitchen and in the CR outside his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as
described in the sketch attached to the Application for Search Warrant, located
at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay.37(emphasis and underscore ours)
Generally, a judge's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as
there was substantial basis for that determination.38"Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched."39
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing
in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally
and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence
of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the
cralawlawl ibra ry application for the search warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged
by Ogayon himself,40 could not be found in the records. Unlike in Tee, where
the testimony given during trial revealed that an extensive examination of the
applicant's witness was made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies
given during Ogayon's trial made no reference to the application for the search
warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the
surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made. However,
chanrobles law
he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did
not know who applied for it.41chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that
the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis
for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A search
warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its
issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that
the search warrant was issued after the requisite examination of the
complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search
Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.
cralawlawlib rary
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering
Ogayon's belated objections thereto.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely
objection against the search warrant's validity before the trial court. It based
its ruling on the procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search
warrant should be made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence obtained thereby: cralawlawlib ra ry
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where
to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the
court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been
instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be
chan roble slaw
resolved by the latter court, [emphasis ours] chanro bles law
We find the CA's casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It
prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the
safeguards for a constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor
modify substantial rights;42their non-compliance should therefore not
serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the
constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause
chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
determined after examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved
over technical rules of procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; we should not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.43 In People v.
Decierdo,44 the Court declared that "[wjhenever a protection given by the
Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
presumption is always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a
constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was
his failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to
suppress the presentation of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone,
to our mind, is not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically,
knowingly, and intelligently made a waiver.45 He cannot reasonably be
expected to know the warrant's defect for lack of data in the records
suggesting that defect existed. It would thus be unfair to construe Ogayon's
failure to object as a waiver of his constitutional right. In People v.
Bodoso,46 the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases where life, liberty and
property are all at stake... The standard of waiver requires that it 'not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.'"
At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court - a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure(effective December 1, 2000).
The provision was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals47 to resolve the main issue of where motions to
quash search warrants should be filed. In other words, the provision was
"intended to resolve what is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file
a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue
thereof... ,"48 It was certainly not intended to preclude belated objections
against the search warrant's validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not
immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant,
otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress."
A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly brushed aside
belated objections would reveal that the objections were disregarded because
they had been cured or addressed based on the records.
In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted that the search
warrant was never produced in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court,
however, noted that "there were supposed testimonies of its existence."
In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing judge failed to
exhaustively examine the complainant and his witnesses, and that the
complainant's witness (a National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no
personal knowledge of the facts comprising probable cause, but the Court
brushed these claims aside. It found that the witness' knowledge of the facts
supporting probable case was not based on hearsay as he himself assisted the
accused in handling the contraband, and that the issuing judge extensively
questioned this witness.
In People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the validity of the search conducted
pursuant to a search warrant as it was supposedly made without the presence
of at least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise, citing the testimonies
taken during the trial contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made by
the accused in People v. Nuñez52, but the Court noted the testimony of the
officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in the presence of
the accused himself and two barangayofficials.
The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53People v. Court of
Appeals,54 and People v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case.
As mentioned, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question
of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed, and the guidelines
set therein was applied in People v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the
other hand, involved a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search warrants
during trial is a procedural rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or
noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any way diminish the
constitutional guarantee that a search warrant should be issued upon a finding
of probable cause. Ogayon's failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to
cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity of the void
warrant would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed
in our Constitution.
In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the
search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Under the
Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.56 With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon's
home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no
reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and
the Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31154 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of
conviction, as stated in the joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ligao City, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738
and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner HONESTO
OGAYON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against him for
violation of Republic Act No. 9165.
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended, under an Information1 whose accusatory portion reads as
follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her
possession NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT
HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding prescription or
license.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0189 and raffled to
Branch 110 of said court.
SUSAN entered a plea of not guilty upon her arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Forensic Chemist
Julieta Flores, lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc, and SPO4 Victorio de los
Reyes.
For its part, the defense presented SPO2 Jerome Cause as its witness
and had prosecution witness Mylene Cabunoc recalled to be presented
as hostile witness. It opted not to let SUSAN take the witness stand.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 12 February 1998,
at about 1:30 p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam.2 When
she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the
National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the
frisker on duty at that time, called her attention, saying "Excuse me
ma’am, can I search you?"3 Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt
of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that the
package contained what felt like rice granules.4 When Mylene passed her
hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN’s genital area and
thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter
refused and said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the
matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.5
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna
Jalac and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical
examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room, Mylene touched
something in front of SUSAN’s sex organ. She directed SUSAN to
remove her skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna
discovered three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray
colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to them.6 The first
was taken from SUSAN’s abdominal area; the second, from in front of her
genital area; and the third, from her right thigh.7 Mylene turned over the
packages to SPO4 De los Reyes.8 The latter forthwith informed his
superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident.
Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs
examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white
crystalline substances9 which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a regulated drug.10
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an investigator of the First
Regional Aviation Office, testified that no investigation was ever
conducted on SUSAN.11 However, SUSAN signed a receipt of the
following articles seized from her: (1) three bags of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one American
passport bearing Number 700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia
plane ticket with stock control number 0414381077; and (4) two panty
girdles.12 He said that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but
admitted that she did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt.13 Yet he told her that she had the option to sign or not to sign the
receipt.14
When recalled as witness for the defense, Mylene merely reiterated the
circumstances surrounding the arrest and search of SUSAN and the
seizure of the prohibited items found on her person.15
After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a
decision16 finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of P1 million.
SUSAN filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,17 alleging
therein that the trial judge erred in (1) giving weight to the medical
certificate executed by a certain Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena because it
was not presented in court nor marked or admitted, and is therefore
hearsay evidence; (2) upholding the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc
is not even a police officer; (3) making statements which gave the
impression that the burden of proof was shifted to the accused; and (4)
deliberately ignoring the decisive issue of how the evidence was secured.
SUSAN also assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without
warrant on the ground that the seized items were not in plain view.
Furthermore, alleging bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge,
SUSAN filed a motion to inhibit Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg from
resolving the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial.18
After conducting a hearing on 24 November 2000 to resolve appellant’s
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well as the Motion to
Inhibit the Judge, the trial court issued an order19 on 26 November 2001
denying the motions. According to the trial judge (1) he explained to
SUSAN’s counsel the effects of the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
but the latter chose to magnify the judge’s statement which was uttered in
jest; (2) SUSAN’s conviction was not based on the medical report which
was not presented in court; (3) there was no violation of SUSAN’s
constitutional rights because she was never interrogated during her
detention without counsel; and (4) the specimens seized from her were
found after a routine frisk at the airport and were therefore acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN seasonably
appealed to us, imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in
justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged
existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante
delicto and that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest;
(3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits of the "Terry
search" doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial
investigation without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case
the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not testified on or
offered in evidence, and using the same in determining her guilt; (6) in
justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical
report that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling
in People v. Johnson.20
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN asserts that the strip
search conducted on her in the ladies’ room was constitutionally
infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because
at the time of the strip search, the arresting officers could not
have known what was inside the plastic containers hidden on her
body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At that
point then, they could not have determined whether SUSAN was
actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore
nothing but a fishing expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that
she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search
was incidental to a lawful arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains that, following the
doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio,21 such stop and frisk search
should have been limited to the patting of her outer garments in
order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and
therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges that from the moment
frisker Mylene felt a package at her abdominal area, started
inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and decided to
submit her to a strip search in the ladies’ room, she was under
custodial investigation without counsel, which was violative of
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN assails the propriety of
the admission of the medical report executed by Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was neither testified on
nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of People v.
Johnson22 because of its sweeping statement allowing searches
and seizures of departing passengers in airports in view of the
gravity of the safety interests involved. She stresses that the
 pertinent case should have been Katz v. United States,23 which
upholds the Fourth Amendment of the United States of America
that "protects people and not places."
In its Appellant’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares
that SUSAN was found flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated
drug without being authorized by law. Thus, the case falls squarely within
the exception, being a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure
when she allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room
for further inspection by airport security personnel. It likewise maintains
that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN during the
routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport
security procedures.
Anent the admission of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena, the OSG argues that SUSAN’s conviction was not
solely based on the questioned document but also on the fact that she
was caught flagrante delicto in possession of a regulated drug without
being authorized by law. Consequently, it supports SUSAN’s conviction
but recommends the reduction of the fine from P1 million to P100,000.
We affirm SUSAN’s conviction.
We do not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of
the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her
constitutional rights.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
… crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed
Sec. 3….
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search in any particular
case is a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved. The rule is that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with
the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court. 24
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1)
search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.25
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search
and seizure conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful
arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not precede the search. When the
metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the
lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the
former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN’s
abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of
ascertaining what were the packages concealed on SUSAN’s
body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and
liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section
1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense." lawphi 1.ñet
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the
ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet
of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body; hence, they did not know
yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the
strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white
to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that
 there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the
process cannot be reversed.26
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not
confined only to search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case
where a police officer approaches a person who is acting
suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.27
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6235 reading as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air
carrier concerned shall contain among others the following
condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not
be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of
the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and
shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is
stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final
security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said
provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is
not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for
prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented
to be frisked, which resulted in the discovery of packages on her
body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be further
searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents
felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her
obviously false statement that the packages contained only
money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was
hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235
authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit
the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her
entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by
appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the ability and facility
to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of
society."28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room was justified
under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
The case of People v. Johnson, which involves similar facts and
issues, finds application to the present case. That case involves
accused-appellant Leila Johnson, who was also a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines
CS-912. Olivia Ramirez was then the frisker on duty, whose task
was to frisk departing passengers, employees and crew to check
for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods and
explosives. When Olivia frisked Leila, the former felt something
hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Leila explained
that she needed to wear two panty girdles, as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not
satisfied with the explanation, Olivia reported the matter to her
superior, who then directed her to take Leila to the nearest
women’s room for inspection. In the comfort room, Leila was
asked "to bring out the thing under her girdle." She acceded and
brought out three plastic packs which contained a total of 580.2
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. This Court
ruled that the packs of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" seized
during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures and are therefore
admissible in evidence against Leila. Corollarily, her subsequent
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified, since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto. The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches
are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances
are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
SUSAN’s reliance on Katz v. U.S. is misplaced. The facts and
29
circumstances of that case are entirely different from the case at
bar. In that case, the accused was convicted in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California of transmitting
wagering information by telephone. During the trial, the
government was permitted, over the accused’s objection, to
introduce evidence of accused’s end of telephone conversations,
which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which he placed his calls. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. On
certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of the United States of
America reversed the decision, ruling that antecedent judicial
authorization, which was not given in the instant case, was a
constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
involved. It ruled that what a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject the Fourth
Amendment protection, but what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.
The maxim – stare decisis et non quieta movere – invokes
adherence to precedents and mandates not to unsettle things
which are established. When the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it must
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the
facts are substantially the same.30 There being a disparity in the
factual milieu of Katz v. U.S. and the instant case, we cannot
apply to this case the ruling in Katz.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully
arrested without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted
Section. The search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the
discovery and recovery of three packages containing white
crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As
discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were
legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a
crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were
duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her
subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was
 effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person
flagrante delicto.
V. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was not violated.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only when a person
is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody
interrogation."31 Custodial investigation refers to the "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."32 This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to
elicit information or a confession from him.33And the right to
counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation.34 The
objective is to prohibit "incommunicado" interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.35
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense,
SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted
after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her signature to the receipt of
the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told
that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied upon by the prosecution
to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken from her
during her detention and used in evidence against her.36 Hence,
her claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand
on.
VI. The admission of the medical report was erroneous.
SUSAN assails, on the ground of violation of the hearsay rule, the
admission of the medical report on the physical and medical examination
conducted upon appellant’s request, which contained the following:
On subsequent examinations, she was seen behaved and cooperative.
She related that she was an illegitimate daughter, married, but divorced
in 1995. She verbalized, "I gamble like an addict. I gambled since I was
young and I lost control of myself when I played cards. When I lost
control, I want my money back. I owe other people lots of money. I lost all
the cash of my husband. This is the first time I carried shabu. I need the
money." She denied having any morbid thoughts and perceptual
disturbances. (Emphasis supplied).
This argument is meritorious. The admission of the questioned document
was erroneous because it was not properly identified. Nevertheless, even
without the medical report, appellant’s conviction will stand, as the court’s
finding of guilt was not based on that document.
VII. SUSAN’s conviction and the penalty imposed on her are correct.
Having found the warrantless search and seizure conducted in
this case to be valid, we do not hesitate to rule that that the three
packages of shabu recovered from SUSAN are admissible in
evidence against her. Supported by this evidence and the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, her conviction must
inevitably be sustained.
Sections 16 and 20 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.--The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.
…
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, confiscation and Forfeiture of
the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.--The penalties for
offenses under Section 3,4,7, 8, and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved [are] in any of the following quantities:
…
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride….
 There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63(2) of
the Revised Penal Code.

As regards the fine, courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law. For possession of regulated drugs, the law
fixes the range of the fine from P500,000 to P10 million. In view of
the net weight of methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the
possession of SUSAN, the trial court’s imposition of fine in the
amount of P1 million is well within the range prescribed by law.

VIII. The other items seized from the appellant should be returned to her.

Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

authorizes the confiscation of the following:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may

be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of

the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of

committing an offense.

Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN’s passport, plane tickets, and

girdles exceeded the limits of the afore-quoted provision. They,
therefore, have to be returned to her.37

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding
appellant SUSAN CANTON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic
Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000)
and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellant’s passport, plane
tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L.
YU, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 161266
PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
to set aside the Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the
Resolution2 dated 27 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence
Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed
applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to
search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation
(WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood
City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner
Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F
Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig
City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll
bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential
Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or
Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the
applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera
(Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern
Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should
pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone network
(PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international gateway facilities
(IGFs)7 in the Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the other country
through voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave
radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the
IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then meter the call,
which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the
circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long
distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone
lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a
"method of routing and completing international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly
to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or
the country where the call is originated."9
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT
and registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk,
"an internet-based international call service, which can be availed of via
prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a test call using
GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the
given access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user
code and personal identification number (PIN) provided under a
GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the
destination number, which included the country code, phone number and
a pound (#) sign. The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan.
However, when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only
directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the
international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered
to WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald
Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular
inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the
occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone
lines registered to WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a
server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been
illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the
international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,13 on unauthorized installation of
telephone connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because through
their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear
intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly
belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT,
they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while
"piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus
stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls.
Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No.
6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first
securing type approval license from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT
computed a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged
that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the
payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the
government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office
premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the
location of particular computers and servers that would be taken.14
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search
warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the
office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various
items:
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of
paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of
the Revised Penal Code against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L.
Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B. Masi,
Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova
Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison
with business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188
Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of
accepting information, applying the process of the
information and supplying the results of this process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device
used for recording or storing information; and c) Manuals,
application forms, access codes, billing statements,
receipts, contracts, communications and documents
relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or
equipment.
2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D.
401 against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson
S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C.
Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103,
21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San
Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that
enables data terminal equipment such as computers to
communicate with other data terminal equipment via a
telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of
accepting information applying the prescribed process of
the information and supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device
capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as
an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables
two or more signals from different sources to pass
through a common cable or transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or
device capable of connecting telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device
used for recording or storing information; and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing
statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications
and documents relating to securing and using telephone
lines and/or equipment.
 3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of
paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of
the Revised Penal Code against Planet Internet
Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with
business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that
enables data terminal equipment such as computers to
communicate with other data terminal equipment via a
telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of
accepting information applying the prescribed process of
the information and supplying the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device
capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as
an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables
two or more signals from different sources to pass
through a common cable or transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or
device capable of connecting telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device
used for recording or storing information; and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing
statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders,
communications and documents, lease and/or
subscription agreements or contracts, communications
and documents relating to securing and using telephone
lines and/or equipment.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives
of the National Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units
19
(CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a
laptop computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its
employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission
of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information
Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken
computers, were also seized. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and
Planet Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash the search
warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were
issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not
constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime;
(3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized
pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls
alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of
Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital
Wireless (Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire
both provided international direct dialing services, which Planet Internet
marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT
lines for the first phase of the call; but for the second phase, it used the
IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT
for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage.
None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants
issued were in the nature of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties
seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the
ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior
to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
THE CA RULING
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and
declared the search warrants valid and effective.28
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA
ruling.29 Among the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a
petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC
Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for
Reconsideration.30
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll
Yu,31 and Planet Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The
Court consolidated the two Petitions.33
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal
despite the following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor,
had no personality to question the quashal of the search
warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather
than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon
probable cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly
do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed
search warrants were not general warrants.
OUR RULING
I.
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal
of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor.
They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor
has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is
obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the
filing of an application therefor.34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,35 an application
for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application
for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize
what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is
inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over
which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores
the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a
search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,
merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction
as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It
is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered
merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its
ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes
of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of
authorities herein.36(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.
Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to
question orders quashing those warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the
CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary
before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting
a motion to quash search warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash
was interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite,
as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held
therein as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the
search warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in
character, or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court,
citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of
goods seized, the order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory
and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of
defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is
such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other
hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely,
but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against
this criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is
indisputably of interlocutory character because it leaves something more
to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of
the accused therein.39
Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either
as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in
anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of which
the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial
court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from
a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal
case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely
interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in
anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the
warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the
judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case.
Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal
proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the
search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there
was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may
be properly taken therefrom.
II.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their
judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of
the search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched."42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the
issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the
finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial
function.44 They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed" by the offender.45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be searched.46
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application
for search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival
Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the witnesses and
particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass
operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence presented.
Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the
trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of
probable cause necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime
or an offense was committed in the first place. In support of their
contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.
Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the act
complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would
justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as
local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the
PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates;
payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC
regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited,
because it deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the
compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed
through its network."47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft,
because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is
no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT
partake of the nature of "future earnings and lost business opportunities"
and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and
conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and
opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the
Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the
search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass
perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business
committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be
shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal
property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5)
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or the use of force upon things.48
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the
earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in
Laurel v. Abrogar,49 we have already held that the use of PLDT’s
communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its
telephone services and business:
x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen
in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said
that such international long distance calls were personal properties
belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership
over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes
and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure
and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it
could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its
consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of
PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of
the telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the
telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction"
penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information
describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only
later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which
the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy
of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the
prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state
that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of
respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by
a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the
dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119,
Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the
crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the
amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently
apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus
guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the
generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything
susceptible of appropriation."50 It includes ownership of telephone
services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We therein
upheld the Amended Information charging the petitioner with the crime of
theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was
engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized routing
and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly
to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these
communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is
the unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then
concluded that the business of providing telecommunications and
telephone services is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction"
penalized under said article.
Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished
without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT
telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for violation of
P.D. 401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or
piped gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas
Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water,
electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water,
electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped
gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes
or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or
gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone
wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be
punished with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging
from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule
further on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the
motions to quash the search warrants, the test calls conducted by
witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either
Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.
A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search
warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person
against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing
evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they
committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on
matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable
cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because
the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or
misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search
warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test
calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They
neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may
have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly
what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate
falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test
calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and
haphazardly."55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must
be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based
on lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA
erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are
general warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of
general warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be
seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the implementing
officers wide discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA
observed that the targets of the search warrants were not illegal per se,
and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were
given blanket authority to determine whether the objects were legal or
not, as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in
telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the
requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v.
Makalintal,57 in which the Court allowed leeway in the description of things
to be seized, taking into consideration the effort and the time element
involved in the prosecution of criminal cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the
CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants
in view of the OSG’s position that the scheme was a case of electronic
theft, and that the items sought to be seized could not be described with
calibrated precision. According to the OSG, assuming that the seized
items could also be used for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains
that the items were used in the commission of an offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized."59 It
is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over
which items to take.60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the
warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our
1âwphi 1
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have
been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched
only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections
3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the
following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search
warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law
enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched, especially
when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the
illegal operation is largely unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of
Appeals61 ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical
precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to
be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the
rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant
as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any
description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer
making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing
is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the
items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of
its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the
search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of
petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching
equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes,
manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass
operations."67
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld a s
milady worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search
warrants, because these items had been sufficiently identified physically
and s own to bear a relation to the offenses charged. WHEREFORE, the
petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 20 August
2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190
are AFFIRMED.

Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of
the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is
required "wherever and whenever it is feasible."62 A search warrant need
not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.63 The
warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized.64

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods"
were being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they
were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In

People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be

hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of
performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to
technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."65

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description

of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.66
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila,
Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto
P. Fernandez, Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D.
Tacorda Virgilio L. Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's
motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20
April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier
order.
It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of
the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a
search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for
VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)
entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente,
Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient
reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may
be found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his
control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades
and ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended
to be used as the means of committing an offense which
the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and
concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, to wit:
a. Offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor
and other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio
Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other
rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found
it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search
Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned or
any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio
C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a
"Deposition of Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to
before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles
declared, inter alia, as follows:
Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw, the applicant for a Search
Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence
and Special Action Division, Western
Police District.
Q: Do you know the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines at
Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
 A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the
subject of our surveillance and
observation during the past few days.
Q: Do you have personal knowledge that
in the said premises is kept the following
properties subject of the offense of
violation of PD No. 1866 or intended to be
used as a means of committing an
offense:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted
weapons with ammunitions?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you know who is or who are the
person or persons who has or have
control of the above-described premises?
A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente,
President of the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines.
Q: How do you know that said property is
subject of the offense of violation of Pres.
Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used
as the means of committing an offense?
A: Sir, as a result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days,
we gathered information from verified
sources that the holder of said firearms
and explosives as well as ammunitions
aren't licensed to possess said firearms
and ammunition. Further, the premises is
a school and the holders of these firearms
are not students who were not supposed
to possess firearms, explosives and
ammunition.
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search
Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after
examining under oath applicant ALLADIN M.
DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES
that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
(probable cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his
control in the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
properties which are subject of the above offense or
intended to be used as the means of committing the said
offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate
search at any time in the day or night of the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly
(a) offices of the Department of Military Science and
Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground
floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at
PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor,
and forthwith seize and take possession of the following
personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant
was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula
Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto,
Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a
member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a
cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown
envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows
(a) one (1) pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11)
pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.—
PRB—423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He
claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles,
had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the
issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness
was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search
warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly
describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific
offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No.
19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under
oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate
and Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner
had filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to
quash. 8
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an
order, 9denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the
order 11 dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge
has decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law
or applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction,
in issuing the disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which
is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.12 The probable cause must be in connection with one
specific offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
arid prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce
and not based on mere hearsay. 16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground
that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not
within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based
on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio
Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives
described therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a
fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for
several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the
holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess
them. In other words, the applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for
issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge
thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major
Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier
received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is
nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant
verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion
that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this
point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were
none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether
searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the
only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said
deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the
police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several
days of the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered
information from verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms
and explosives are not licensed to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in
determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant
or in a supporting deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not—
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused.
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search
warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt.
Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his
personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable
for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned
search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for
applying for a search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a
person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used
by him in connection with his activities as a money lender, challenging
usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held that this was
insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that
there had been a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered
reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent books, correspondence
and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of
issuing a search warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the
application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt.
Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the
issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as
required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows
that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in
the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the
questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no"
answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for
issuance of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence
of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court
also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites,
handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the
application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search
warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live
fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to
the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search
warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are
stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the
individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both
meaningful and effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground
that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending
that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of
the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify
the place intended .22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant
and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the
premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at
Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of
the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and
the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor
and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be
searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even
if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the
PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the
ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can
be issued only in connection with one specific offense. The search
warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued
without any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was
violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held
that no specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search
warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of the highest order to
convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was
captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms,
etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged
violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of
firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred
to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was
issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a
gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and
illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it
cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various
laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such
illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related
offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As
observed by respondent Judge: 24
The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative
with the title of PD 1866 can only mean that illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential
Decree so much so that the second and third are
forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under
Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the
investigative and prosecution arm of the government, to
designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of
firearms, etc.' The Constitution as well as the Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of
one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one
warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and
another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the
filing of three different informations for each of the above
offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual
practice adopted by the courts is to file a single
information for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint
or information must charge but one offense, except only
in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers
did not search for articles other than firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search
Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent with
said rule and is therefore valid and enforceable.
(Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the
applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the
search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered
the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular
No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which reads:
 3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance
of and acted upon by any judge of the court having
jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases
the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath,
to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is
urgent.

it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely
provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily
affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED.

The questioned orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as
Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to

Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the
washroom of petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the
Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.
SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO
GOLES and REYNALDO MAYOTE, Respondents.
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not
reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with
the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent
Judge was based merely on the application for search warrant and a joint
affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed,
and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore,
there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the
necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records
of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata
offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets
known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that
nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant
and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he
had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry
respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then handed the
records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. chanroble s.c om : virtual law lib rary
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section
4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by
respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and
Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC
Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that
effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were
not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. 2 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court, with the instant
petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to
be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as
evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed
is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126
which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has
become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he
examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the
questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court
since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at
the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he
filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said
affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any
certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the
said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the
certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by
respondent Judge’s own admission, while insisting that she did examine
thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and
Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which
will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the persons subject of
the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere
else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the
warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the
records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore
quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal
gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer
who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in
order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it
more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and
publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a
broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more
technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written
testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance
of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of
a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a
commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and
cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching
questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his
witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just
as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by
law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or
investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be
held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough
and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must
be in writing.
c ralawna d

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant
but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has
been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books,
and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search
and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government." 6

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal
construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the
Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8

While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the
search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession
of which is prohibited.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979
denying the motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March
21, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the
search warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such
illegality, the things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao"
tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers;
stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be
returned as sought by petitioner. No costs.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and
KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO
D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and
Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for
respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the
margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several
judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on
different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to
the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits
of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted
to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter
alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4)
the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
— on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and
prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors,
their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and
void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives
to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of
the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys
seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents
and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause
of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has
been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized
and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could
not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property
had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference
to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F.
501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786,
789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June
29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority
thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is
in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used
in evidence against petitioners herein. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the
nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected
upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation
of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice
or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would
happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that
the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with
the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position
was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should
not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law
action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting
in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this
is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language
of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is
true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had
already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
 established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous
decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to
the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal
officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection
and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the
Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an
essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as
an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf
Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by
Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional
privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful
seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to
deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to
like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of
any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on
reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission
of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure
an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures
would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By
agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority
could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably —
finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight
of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the
party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81
and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard,
House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy
Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert
P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said
petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged
possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and
effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June
29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of
that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of
the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said
petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated
in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not
deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must
be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three
(3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June
29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made
are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in
said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the
writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other
effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that
the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and
the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as
to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this
case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore
proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People,
80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and
 seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is
made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move
for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized
in the places other than the three residences adverted to above,
the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches
and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the
immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in
accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this
time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the
three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures
conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental
political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court
from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without
exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving
warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore
unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no
legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects
seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any
manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search
warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the
said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words
of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of
the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of
a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the
pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal
standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents,
papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation
of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded
as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the
fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows;
(a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of
premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person"
doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search
warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that,
excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In
some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the
designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate
defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the
said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the
control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against
the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2,
1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually
made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the
control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring
a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location
at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)
(narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel
vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and
corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was
president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics
seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United
States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the
defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United
States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk
neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December
12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against
unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the
fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies
upon when he places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some
thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he
has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel
room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers
in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which
the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose
factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966).
See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November
13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and
documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and
suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of
the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not
be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent,
directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91,
84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished
such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were
stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations
involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the
premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move
for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the
nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to
maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be
the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower
courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and
ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle
distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in
evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost
any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those
distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers'
Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform
Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those
between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning
procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See
also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have
standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States,
216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from
whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved
for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp.
870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal
search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property,
"either his own or the corporation's was entitled to protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were
unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized
article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the
place searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke
the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite
States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the
shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view
finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was
articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years
later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S.
Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the
apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that
the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include
"anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole
stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two
independent grounds: First —he had a sufficient interest in the property
seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises
searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully
searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the
corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one
as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It
tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from
objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the
corporation's books and records merely because the appellant
did not show ownership or possession of the books and records
or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . .
(Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680,
683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks
from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did
not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees
(including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee
had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and
seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in
storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a
grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files.
The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because
the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian,
and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and
unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to
enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a
third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed
against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs.
Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had
stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the
name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in
the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under
his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be
private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even
claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at
bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court
which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the
records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return ofall the
papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs.
U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155
F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra,
pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in
question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The
only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as
having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United
States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership,
gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even
before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of
the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any
interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United
States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument;
the United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation
in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as
in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from
premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches
were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against
the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners
connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the
warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in
the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal
papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal
control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order
the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects
seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the
things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the
petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and
things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I
submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the
petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences
offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually
or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn
applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b)
purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized
papers, documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners
or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which
issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the
petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression
of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the
corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in
my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the
constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not
withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.
 G. R. No. 110604 - October 10, 2003 5. assorted radio components;

BUENAVENTURA S. TENORIO, Acting Chief, Law Division, MARIANO 6. calculators; and

ABANILLA, Chief, Prosecution & Investigation Division, ROMEO
SARTE, Special Counsel, all of the Bureau of Customs, P/LT. 7. radio boosters.4
CHRISTOPHER TAMBUNGAN, Chief, Investigation Branch RPIU-
CAPCOM, P/LT. GILBERT CRUZ, PNP-RPIU-CAPCOM, Petitioners,
The court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No. 18-91 on
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G.
August 12, 1991 with specific orders to the police officers to search No.
ESTRELLA, Presiding Judge, Br. 68 of the Regional Trial Court of
267 or 106 P. Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro Manila, for the articles
Pasig, Metro Manila, HON. MANUEL L. VILLAMAYOR, Presiding
therein described and to bring the same to the court to be dealt with as
Judge, Br. 57 of the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila,
the law requires:
and ANTONIO COSENG, Respondents.

ASSORTED 20 PIECES HAND-HELD RADIO (ICOM), 30 PIECES OF TV SETS

DECISION
(SANYO and SONY), 40 PIECES STEREO CASSETTES, ASSROTED (SIC)
BETAMAX TV, ASSORTED RADIO COMPONENTS, CALCULATORS, AND
CALLEJO, SR., J.: RADIO BOOSTERS.5 c räläwvi rtua lib räry

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the June 9, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR No. 14090, affirming on
appeal, the January 22, 1993 Resolution2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila (now Pasig City), Branch 68, which affirmed with
The court authorized Tambungan to serve the warrant day and night and
directed that the search be made in the presence of witnesses or barangay
officials.6
cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

modification the April 7, 1992 Resolution3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

San Juan, Metro Manila, Branch 57, citing the petitioners for indirect
contempt in People of the Philippines v. Antonio Coseng, Search Warrant
No. 18-91 for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
This case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
On August 12, 1991, P/Lt. Christopher L. Tambungan of the RPIU
CAPCOM, Philippine National Police (PNP) applied with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of San Juan, Metro Manila, Branch 57, for the issuance
of a warrant to search the dwelling of private respondent Antonio Coseng.
The private respondent was suspected of having in his possession or
control untaxed and smuggled goods, said to be at No. 267 or 106, P.
Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro Manila. The application was docketed as
People v. Antonio Coseng, Search Warrant No. 18-91. Therein, it was
prayed that a search warrant issue to enable any agent of the law to take
possession of and bring to the Court the following articles:
1. Assorted 20 pcs. Hand-held radio (ICOM);
2. 30 pcs. of TV sets (Sanyo and Sony);
At about 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Tambungan and some police officers
served the search warrant on a certain Johnny Corpuz who was in the
house to be searched. However, he refused to receive the warrant.
Nevertheless, the police officers conducted a search in the presence of the
barangay officials and counsel for the private respondent Atty. Pedro
Aguilar. The private respondent was reportedly outside the country at that
time.7 The search team seized assorted articles, not only those described
in the search warrant but also other goods, enumerated and described as
follows:
1. 372 pcs. Clarion Radio, packed in 21 boxes
2. 90 pcs. Tech WEM 17 microphones
3. 6 pcs. Maclin Songmate
4. 4 pcs. VM 200 HL Audio & Video Monitors
5. 104 pcs. Sony RM 50; 9 pcs. Wesstone; 38 pcs. Microphone 230 Sony
RM 50; 34 pcs. VCR Stabilizer, 4 pcs. Western Playback

3. 40 pcs. stereo cassettes; 6. 2 pcs. ICOM Handheld Radios.8

4. assorted betamax TV;

Instead of bringing the seized goods to the court, Tambungan called
Senior Inspector Alex Bautista of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on August
14, 1991, and reported the seizure of the goods. Without authority from
the court, Tambungan later turned over the seized goods to P/Lt. Gilbert
Cruz of the CAPCOM. He later turned over the goods to Bautista who
issued a receipt therefor:
1. 40 pcs. Sony RM 50;
2. 37 pcs. Mini-phone HD11-4;
3. 34 pcs. VCR Image Stabilizer VP-5010;
4. 34 pcs. Fuji Den Automatic Car Antenna;
5. 90 pcs. TECT Wireless Microphone Model WEM-17;
6. 21 boxes car radio AM;
7. 5 pcs. Bigstar Deluxe Car Stereo Speaker;
8. 13 pcs. Sanyo Model MW 323K;
9. 7 pcs. Maclin Karaoke;
10. 11 pcs. Weston T-2510 FM/AM StereoTuner/Amplifier;
11. 4 pcs. Weston Playback Stereo Deck PD-113;
12. 27 Boxes Sony Radio Cassettes;
13. 4 pcs. audio/TV system;
14. 2 pcs. ICOM handheld;
15. 1 pc. Opto-Electronics Inc.9
Bautista in turn turned over the goods to the Legal and Investigation Staff
Enforcement and Security Service of the BOC, which then stored the goods
at the Bureaus Warehouse No. 6.
In the meantime, Tambungan filed his return on the writ, including an ex-
parte motion praying for a post facto authority for Senior Inspector Alex
Bautista to retain custody of the seized evidence, preparatory to the filing
of a criminal complaint for violation of Section 102 (Smuggling) of the
Tariff and Customs Code against private respondent Antonio
Coseng.10 However, no such criminal complaint for violation of the TCC
was filed against the private respondent.
On September 2, 1991, the court issued an order denying Tambugans
motion and directing him to turn over all the seized articles to the trial
court within ten days from notice of the said order. The next day, the
private respondent filed a motion with the MeTC for the release of the
seized articles, alleging that except for 13 pieces of Sanyo appliances, 27
pieces of long radio cassettes, and 2 pieces of ICOM, the search team also
seized articles from his house which were not included in Search Warrant
No. 18-91.11 In his Answer to the Order dated September 16, 1991,
Tambungan alleged that:
3. Above-mentioned seized items were turned-over to the Bureau of
Custom for the following grounds:
a. This office has no secured and air-conditioned stock room for the seized
properties.
b. Further investigation and proper disposition of the case has been
consolidated with the legal and investigation service of the Bureau of
Custom who has jurisdiction on the implementation of the Custom and
Tariff Code of the Philippines particularly smuggling offenses.
4. That I am aware that all evidences seized should be turned-over to the
competent authority or Bureau of Custom within a reasonable time.12
In the meantime, seizure proceedings were instituted at the BOC,
docketed as Seizure Identification Case No. 91-379.13 On October 3, 1991,
Acting District Customs Collector Buenaventura C. Maniego issued a
warrant of seizure and detention of the goods owned by Tambungan for
violation of Section 2530 of the TCC.
Acting on the motion of the private respondent, the trial court issued an
Order on October 4, 1991 directing Tambungan and the Bureau of
Customs to turn over all the seized articles to the court within fifteen
days.14 The hearing in SI No. 91-379 was reset to October 25, 1991.
In the meantime, on October 21, 1991, during the hearing of Cosengs
motion for the return of the seized articles not included in the search
warrant issued by the trial court, it was manifested that P/Lt. Gilbert Cruz
turned over the said articles to the Chief Enforcement and Security Service
of the BOC, through Senior Inspector Alex Baustista, who recommended
that the goods be placed in their custody. It was, likewise, manifested that
a warrant of seizure and detention over the goods had been issued by
Acting District Collector of Customs Buenaventura Maniego. The trial court
forthwith ordered Alex Bautista, Buenaventura Maniego and Gilbert Cruz to
appear before the court on November 6, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. to explain why
they should not be declared in contempt for their failure to deliver the
seized articles to the court.15 In its order, the court stated that the seizure
of the goods was made on the strength of the search warrant issued by it;
hence, the goods must be turned over to the court. The BOC had no
authority to take custody of the seized goods until the court so ordered
therefor.
During the November 6, 1991 hearing, the trial court learned that the
following articles were seized by the CAPCOM officers and turned over to
the BOC but were not included in the inventory submitted to the court:
m) 4 pcs. Audio/TV System
n) 2 pcs. ICOM hand-held radio and
o) 1 pc. Opto-Electronics Inc.16
Consequently, Maniego and Bautista, represented by Atty. Godofredo
Bernardino, were ordered to account for the said articles within ten days
from receipt of the order of the court.17 Similarly, the trial court ordered
the BOC to surrender the seized items to the court, including the additional
missing items.18 The court warned that failure to comply with the order
would amount to indirect contempt of court.
Maniego and Bautista failed to comply with the said order and failed to
appear during the hearing on December 2, 1991. On the said date, the
court issued an order requiring Maniego, Bautista and their counsel to
explain within five days why they should not be declared in contempt of
court for such failure to comply with the order.19 The hearing for contempt
was reset to December 17, 1991. Maniego, Bautista and Bernardino once
more failed to comply with the order of the court. The hearing was again
reset to January 30, 1992. On the said date, the court issued an order
requiring Tambungan and Cruz to explain within five days from notice why
they should not be punished for contempt for turning over the custody of
the seized goods to the BOC without court authority. Again, Maniego was
ordered to turn over the items to the court within five days from notice
thereof.20 On January 22, 1992, Tenorio furnished the Chief of the
Enforcement Security Service of the Bureau of Customs with an undated
and unsigned copy of the decision purportedly rendered by District
Customs Collector Emma M. Rosqueta in Seizure Identification Case No.
91-379, forfeiting all the goods kept by Tambungan in favor of the
government to be disposed of in the manner provided for by law.
During the hearing of the contempt incident on February 1, 1992,
Maniego, Bautista and their counsel failed to appear. The court issued an
order requiring them to explain why they should not be held in contempt
for such failure to appear. Attys. Buenaventura S. Tenorio and Emma M.
Rosqueta were likewise ordered to explain in writing within five days why,
notwithstanding BOCs lack of jurisdiction, the confiscation of the seized
items was ordered.21 On February 18, 1992, Tambungan and Cruz filed
their Joint Manifestation that:
. . . [T]he reason why we have turned over because basically during the
search there was coordination with the Bureau of Custom agents and the
laws which we believed that being violated by the accused lies upon the
Tariff and Custom Code whose jurisdiction confined with the Bureau of
Custom to prosecute the same, unless there is a written approval
authorizing this unit to prosecute the case hence, we have no alternative,
but to turn-over the item subject of this case; furthermore, in our
command we have no warehouse wherein which said item should be
embarked thereof, thereby exposing said item into damage if we have
taken custody of the aforesaid item therefore we have turned over the
item seized thereof;
2.) That the turn-over made to the Bureau of Custom does not violate the
provision of the Rules of Court and particularly under Sec. 11, Rule 126
since the Bureau of Custom is the agency whom [sic] authorized to
prosecute the case being the laws which is violated by the accused fall
within the Tariff and Custom Code, and that our personality were just
witness to the said case hence this written manifestation in compliance to
an order dated 30th January 1992.22 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry
On February 28, 1992, the court again ordered the BOC to turn over the
goods within 10 days.23 Solicitor Herminio R. Miranda, counsel for the
BOC, manifested to the court that the seized articles would be turned over
to the court within the said period. In the meantime, a warrant of arrest
was issued against Cruz for his failure to appear before the court during
the hearing.24 The private respondent was likewise required to submit
documents to prove that the seized goods were not acquired in violation of
the law.
During the March 10, 1992 hearing on the contempt charge, Atty. Sarte,
special counsel of the BOC, manifested to the court that the BOC would
turn over the seized articles to the court. However, Atty. Sarte failed to do
so, explaining that the BOC, after assessing the facts and in light of the
opinion of Atty. Mariano Abanilla, BOC Chief of the Prosecution Division,
decided to retain custody of the goods. Thus, Atty. Sarte and Solicitor
Miranda were ordered to submit to the court their respective memoranda
on the incidents prior to March 31, 1992. Attys. Tenorio and Rosqueta
were ordered to manifest whether they would adopt Solicitor Mirandas
memoranda. The court also ordered Attys. Abanilla, Tenorio, Maniego,
Rosqueta, Cruz, Tambungan and Bautista to appear before the court on
March 31, 1992.25 For his part, the private respondent filed a compliance 17 microphone Auction Sale on 30
stating that of the goods seized by Tambungan and the other police Sept. 1987. . . .
officers the rest of the goods seized were not covered by the search
warrant issued by the court: 3) 6 pcs. MACLIN 1 pc. Maclin Electronics. . . .
Songmate
3. On the face of the Return of the Writ, it is self-evident that except for
nine (9) pieces of SANYO radio cassettes, twenty-seven (27) boxes of 4) 4 pcs. VM 200 XL Pengson International
SONY radio cassettes and two (2) pieces of ICOM hand-held radios, all of Audio/Video Monitor Trading Corporation. .
the articles seized were not covered or included in Search Warrant No. 18-
91 issued by the Court. ..
5) 104 pcs. Sony RM- Part of the Auction
3.1. Of the total twenty-seven (27) boxes of SONY radio cassettes and
nine (9) pieces of SANYO radio cassettes seized, twenty-three (23) boxes 50 Sale held on 28 June
of the twenty-seven (27) Sony radio cassettes were part of the assorted 9 pcs. Weston 1984 under Sale Lot
electronics, together with the nine (9) pieces Sanyo radio cassettes,
38 pcs. Mini-phone No. 11 of the Notice of
bought by Mr. Antonio Coseng and his partner, Mr. Eddie Uy, from Mr.
Raul R. Estrella, a winning bidder in an Auction Sale held by the Bureau of 230 pcs. Sony RM- Sale dated 13 June
Customs on 28 June 1984 under Lot No. 11 of the Notice of Sale dated 13 50 1984. . . .27
June 1984. (Please see Exhs. "1" to "1-I"). Four (4) of the twenty-seven
34 pcs. VCR Image
(27) boxes were bought from Mr. Eddie Uy, a winning bidder in an Auction
Sale held on May 31, 1990, under Sale Lot No. 3. Stabilizer
4 pcs. Western
3.2 The two (2) pieces of ICOM hand-held radios seized are duly registered playback
with the National Telecommunications Commission.26
5 pcs. Big Star
The private respondent also stated that the other articles seized by
Speaker
Tambungan were acquired by him lawfully, thus:
Copies of documents showing how the aforesaid goods were acquired were
also appended therein.
ARTICLES SOURCE
1) 572 pcs. of Clarion a) Auction Sale On March 18, 1992, the public respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed their Memorandum, contending that they should not
radio packed in 21 conducted by the be cited for contempt for the following reasons:
boxes Bureau of Customs on
9 July 1981. . . . a) No criminal complaint or information was filed with the court in
connection with the goods seized by virtue of the search warrant. As such,
there was no basis for the court to proceed criminally against the
b) Some were bought claimants and/or the goods;
from Bombay Bazar, a
winning bidder in an b) It is the BOC alone that decides the course of action to take against the
claimants and/or the goods; and,
Auction Sale held on 7
July 1981. . . . c) Since there was already a decision which validated the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, the goods belonged to the government. Until the
2) 90 pcs. TECT WEM Bureau of Customs reversal of the BOC decision, the court may not make any disposition of
the seized goods; hence, the failure of the public respondents to turn over
the goods to the court did not constitute indirect contempt of court.
On April 8, 1992, the court issued a resolution holding the respondents
therein guilty of indirect contempt. The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, the following are declared to have committed INDIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT and are therefore sentenced as follows:
P/LT. CHRISTOPHER L. TAMBUNGAN, for his utter disregard of Section 11,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and his unwarranted turn over of the seized
articles to the Bureau of Customs to suffer the penalty of TWO (2)
MONTHS imprisonment (Aresto [sic] Mayor) and a FINE of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
P/LT. GILBERT CRUZ, for his participation in the illegal turn over to suffer
ONE (1) MONTH imprisonment (Aresto [sic] Menor);
ATTYS. MARIANO ABANILLA and ROMEO SARTE, are each sentenced to
pay a FINE of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; ATTY. ROMEO SARTE
for his promise and failure to accomplish his promise to turn over the
articles to this Court and ATTY. MARIANO ABANILLA, for his order of
refusal to turn over the articles as promised;
ATTYS. BUENAVENTURA S. TENORIO and EMMA M. ROSQUETA, as Chief of
the Prosecution Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila, and District Collector,
Port Area, Manila, respectively, for their contemptous [sic] act of ordering
the confiscation of the articles sans jurisdiction or authority and while this
case is being heard before this Court; are each sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period of THIRTY (30) DAYS and to pay a FINE of TWO
THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS.
By reason of their continued refusal to surrender the seized articles in
defiance of the orders of this Court and being the ones capable and
responsible for the surrender of the seized articles; Attys. Buenaventura S.
Tenorio and Emma M. Rosqueta in addition and independently of the
foregoing, must be held in the custody of the Court indefinitely until they
shall have complied with the orders of this court; but considering that only
a superior court can order the Warrant of Arrest for the indefinite
detention of these Customs Officials until they shall have obeyed the
orders of this Court, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; let
the records of this case be forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila, for the issuance of the proper Warrants of Arrest against
Attys. Emma M. Rosqueta and Buenaventura S. Tenorio.
...
Let a copy of this Order likewise be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever action they wish to take on the basis of the
foregoing.28cräläwvirtuali brä ry
The trial court ratiocinated that there was a well-grounded fear that the
seized articles no longer existed. The court stated that it had reason to
believe that the respondents refusal to turn over the articles seized was
due to the fact that they had already been lost. Thus, for their continued
and contumacious failure to turn over the goods as ordered, the
respondents therein were held in contempt of court.
Aggrieved, the therein respondents filed notices of appeal on April 10 and
11, 1992.29 On July 21, 1992, the RTC issued a resolution affirming with
modification the resolution of the MeTC. The RTC explained its ruling,
thus:
The acts of the public respondents in its deliberate failure to turn over the
seized articles to the inferior Court (which was the Court that issued the
search warrant) within the time frame mandated by law is highly irregular.
The public respondents particularly the police officers who seized the items
listed in the inventory instead turned it over to the Bureau of Customs
without any permission from the issuing Court. This Court, however, takes
note of the fact that the Acting Collector of Customs, Port Area, Manila,
thru respondent, the appellant, Emma Rosqueta issued a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention on October 3, 1991 per Seizure Identification No.
91-379 while the order to turn over the seized items was issued by the
Court on October 4, 1991 or one day after the warrant of seizure and
detention was issued by the Bureau of Customs. Likewise, the Court takes
note of the fact that the Orders of the inferior Court were received by the
Bureau of Customs as of October 14, 1991 (Decision, p. 226, third par.).
This readily explains the reason why the public respondents herein could
not have turned over the seized goods to the inferior Court. While this
maybe true, public respondents, Emma Rosqueta and Buenaventura
Tenorio should have exercised prudence and the necessary precaution
before issuing the warrant of seizure and detention. They are presumed as
the Court perceives they are fully aware that the seized items which were
the objects of the warrant of seizure and detention issued were seized as a
consequence of the issuance of the search warrant made by the inferior
Court. Being lawyers, both respondents are presumed to know that after
any search warrant is implemented, the same shall be returned to the
issuing Court together with the seized articles and an inventory shall be
conducted. Likewise, both respondents who are members of the Bar
should know as they are presumed to know that before any seized articles
object of a search warrant may be retained by any person or entity aside
from or apart from the issuing Court, Court approval must first be
obtained. It is for this reason that this Court feels that the public
respondents action as found by the inferior Court are plainly and simply
contumacious and was lone in complete disregard of the integrity and
authority of a judicial body.30
...
WHEREFORE, the Court finds nothing in the questioned resolution of the
inferior Court which may be considered reversible errors. However, and
because justice should be tempered with mercy, this Court hereby affirms
the findings of the inferior Court with the following modifications:
1. As to respondent P/LT. CHRISTOPHER L. TAMBUNGAN, for his utter
disregard of Section 11, Rules 126 of the Rules and his unjustified failure
to turn over the seized articles to the Court, he is hereby sentenced to pay
a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or
failure to pay such fine;
2. As to respondent P/LT. GILBERT CRUZ, for his participation in the
unwarranted turn over of the seized goods to the Bureau of Customs, he is
hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency or failure to pay the same;
3. As to respondents Attys. Mariano [Abanilla] and Romeo Sarte, each are
sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency or failure to pay such fine for his promise and failure to
accomplish his undertaking and commitment to turn over the articles to
the lower Court and Atty. Mariano Abanilla for his order of refusal to turn
over the articles as promised;
4. As to respondents Attys. Buenaventura S. Tenorio and Emma M.
Rosqueta, as Chief of the Prosecution Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila,
and District Collector, Port Area, Manila, respectively, for their
contemptuous act of ordering the confiscation of the articles sans
jurisdiction or authority are each sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or failure to pay said fine.
Costs against the respondents.31 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the said resolution. On January 22, 1993, the RTC rendered a Resolution,
granting respondent Rosquetas motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, respondent Rosquetas motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED and she is hereby acquitted of the contempt charge. The inferior
courts resolution dated April 7, 1992 is reversed and set aside insofar as it
finds her guilty of contempt.32
cräläwvirt uali brä ry
The RTC ruled that Rosqueta was not the signatory in the warrant of
search and seizure issued by the BOC. Likewise, it was found that there
was no restraining order which prevented Rosqueta from exercising her
statutory functions as Collector of Customs. The court found that the
January 20, 1992 Order of the MeTC was not used as the basis for the
declaration of contempt. Furthermore, the said order was apparently not
received by Rosqueta.33
cräläwvirtual ibrä ry
Meanwhile, the other respondents filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14090, alleging that:
I
The assailed Resolutions, including all the Orders to turn-over seized items
to court, are not only unlawful but also uncompliable.
II
Respondent court acted in excess of jurisdiction in the imposition of
penalties on petitioners. 34
On June 19, 1993, the CA rendered a decision denying the petition with
modifications:
WHEREFORE, except for the penalty in excess of P100.00 which is hereby
declared void, the petition is DENIED.35
c räläwvi rtua lib räry
The CA ruled that the goods seized by Tambungan were in custodia legis.
Tambungan was mandated by Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
to deliver the goods seized to the court that issued the search warrant.
The said warrant was applied for and issued for the prosecution and
conviction of the accused for possession of smuggled goods, an offense
under Section 3601 of the TCC. According to the appellate court, the
disposition of the seized goods is but a consequence of the said criminal
proceedings. Moreover, only the court that rendered judgment in the
criminal case may order its release. Invoking the jurisdiction of the court
and inducing it to issue a search warrant on the ground that an offense
had been committed, only to later repudiate the authority of the court
after the warrant had already been implemented, and the goods seized, is
a reprehensible act, constituting an unlawful interference of the courts
custody of the goods seized as objects of the crime. Petitioners
Tambungan and Cruz had even promised to turn over the goods to the
court, only to later renege on such promise.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed the petition at bar, asserting that contrary
to the ruling of the CA, the search warrant was applied for and issued by
the court to enforce the administrative authority of the Bureau of Customs
over the res. Under the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC), the role of the
courts is merely to aid in the implementation of the customs laws, via the
issuance of a search warrant, when the items are concealed in a house or
dwelling. According to the petitioners, the Collector of Customs (COC) had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases,
particularly on the determination of the legality or illegality of the search
and seizure of goods. Hence, it behooved the court to grant petitioner
Tambungans motion to deliver the goods to the BOC. The State had a lien
over the goods seized, and the enforcement of the said lien over the
goods, which was covered by a judicial warrant and/or warrant of seizure
and detention, is a matter purely within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the BOC. The petitioners assert that the MeTC may not
interfere therein by ordering the release of the goods especially after a
decree of forfeiture had already been issued, and a decision thereon
already rendered by the BOC. They insist that it was the COC who issued a
writ of seizure and detention to the exclusion of the court, and ordered the
release of the said goods; hence, petitioners Tambungan and Cruz could
not have complied with the orders of the court to turn over the goods
seized.
The petition is denied.
Rule 126, Section 11(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court. - The officer
must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
The duty of petitioner Tambungan to deliver the items seized by him to the
court which issued the search warrant is mandatory in character. This is
evident by the use in the rule of the word "must." The rule is not merely a
piddling procedural rule. The requirement is to preclude substitution of the
items seized by interested parties or the tampering thereof,36 or the loss of
such goods due to the negligence of the officers effecting the seizure or
their deliberate acts. On the face of the search warrant issued by the
court, petitioners Tambungan and Cruz were "commanded to bring the
goods described therein to the court to be dealt with as the law requires."
The officers enforcing the search warrant were acting on orders of the
court; hence, were under its supervision and control.37 The Court has
inherent disciplinary power over such officers and can thus enforce its
powers against them. Such officers may not retain possession and custody
of the items seized unless with the approval of the court that issued the
warrant.38 Absent such approval, the said officers had no authority to
deliver the items seized to another person or agency of the government. If
the items seized are delivered to others or another government agency
without the approval of the court that issued the search warrant, goods
are not considered in the custody of the court.39 If the officers enforcing
the warrant refuse to turn over the goods, as ordered by the court, they
may be cited for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3(b) of the
Rules of Court which reads:
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;40
cräläwvirt ualib räry
Case law has it that the court which issued the search warrant acquires
jurisdiction over the items seized under the said warrant. Goods seized
lawfully on the basis of the said warrant or its accepted exceptions are in
custodia legis.41 Only that court which issued the warrant may order the
release or disposition thereof.42 The jurisdiction, custody and control of the
court over the items seized cannot be interfered with even by the BOC via
a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the COC over the said goods.
In this case, petitioner Tambungan and Cruz of the CAPCOM turned over
the seized goods to Senior Inspector Alex Bautista of the BOC, who, in
turn, delivered the goods to the Legal and Investigation and Security
Service of the BOC without any authority from the court. Although
petitioner Tambungan filed an ex parte motion for Bautista to retain
possession and custody of the goods, the court denied the said motion and
ordered him and Bautista to turn over the goods to the court as mandated
by the Rules of Court and as stated in the warrant. Not only did the
petitioner deprive the court of its custody of the goods; the petitioner
simply refused to comply with the courts orders.
Petitioners Tambungan and Cruz secured the search warrant from the
court with full awareness of their concomitant duty under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure to turn over the goods described in the said warrant to
the court. By their acts, the petitioners defied the Rules of Court,
repudiated their mandate, and abused and demeaned court processes. As
aptly ruled by the CA:
Invoking the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court and inducing the
latter to issue a search warrant on the ground that an offense has been
committed, only to later on repudiate the authority of the judge
thereunder after a search and seizure pursuant thereto has been made is
reprehensible and constitutes an unlawful interference with the Courts
lawful custody of what has been lawfully seized as objects of a crime. This
should not receive the sanction of this Court.
The refusal of petitioners to comply with the lawful and mandatory
obligation imposed by the search warrant which they themselves obtained
from the Court, to deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant after denial of their motion to retain custody, and order for them
to deliver the property to the judge who issued the warrant as mandated
by the rules constitutes not only a gross abuse of the process of the Court
but a defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the court which both
respondent judge properly found as contempt of court.43 cräläwvirt uali brä ry
A search warrant may issue to respond to an incident in the main case if
one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof.44In this case,
petitioner Tambungan secured the search warrant in anticipation of the
private respondents prosecution for violation of the TCC (smuggling of
goods) and not for the purpose of enforcing the administrative authority of
the BOC for the seizure and confiscation of the goods in favor of the
government. The release and disposition of the goods seized were for the
court in the criminal case to delve into and resolve. Until the institution of
the appropriate criminal action with the proper court, the court which
issued the search warrant retained custody and control of the goods
seized. The issuing court had exclusive jurisdiction to delve into and
resolve issues thereon, such as the legality of the seizure of the goods and
the release and disposition of the goods seized.45 The court may even
receive evidence in connection with the motion filed by the aggrieved
party for the return of the goods seized.
As it was, the private respondent alleged that many of the goods seized by
petitioner Tambungan were not covered by the said warrant. He procured
some of them through a public auction sale conducted by the BOC. Some
of the items seized were not even included in the inventory of the goods
submitted by petitioner Tambungan. This prompted the private respondent
to file a motion for the release of the goods to him, including the missing
items. Thus, the Court had to order the petitioner to account for the goods
seized based on the warrant and determine whether or not the allegations
of the private respondent were true. Only the court which issued the
warrant, and not the BOC, could resolve the motion, absent any criminal
action filed in connection with the said warrant. To enable the court to
resolve the private respondents pending motion, it was imperative that the
goods be brought before it.
The petitioners intractable refusal to produce the goods and turn over the
same to the court generated veritable suspicion that the items seized were
no longer available, and that the seizure proceedings in the BOC was
merely an afterthought to cover up for the their loss:
Parenthetically, the contumacious refusal of petitioners to deliver the
seized merchandise to the custody of the Court has generated the
suspicions that the merchandise is no longer available and that the seizure
proceedings is merely a cover-up. The MTC observed:
Acting on the well grounded fear that the seized articles may have already
disappeared, the Criminal Investigation Service of the San Juan Police
Department, PNP, is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation leading to
the filing of the corresponding criminal charges for Theft or Infidelity
against the parties concerned. ...
The private respondent, on the other hand , pointed out:
21. The trial court was correct in saying that the seized articles at the time
that they were ordered turned over to the Court, no longer existed, hence,
the overt cover-up. Consider this string of events:
a) The police officers, instead of turning over the articles to the Court,
immediately delivered the same to the Bureau of Customs and only
thereafter did they ask the Court for authority to retain the same;
b) The Bureau, thru its lawyers, repeatedly promised in open court that
they will deliver the seized goods only to renege for [sic] the flimsy and
ridiculous reason that the Court had no air-conditioned warehouse in which
the goods could be kept; and,
c) The abrupt order of confiscation dated 20 January 1992 issued by
Rosqueta, the icing on the case, so to speak.
22. All the foregoing were part of a conspiracy to cover up the mess
created by the illegal seizure of the goods belonging to the accused which,
from all indications, appear to have been lost. Having participated therein,
nay, having given the coup de grace to that conspiracy, petitioners were
aptly held in contempt of Court. ...
The foregoing observations all the more render imperative the surrender of
the seized items to the custody of the court who ordered their seizure
upon application of one of the petitioner himself. After all, the court may
be presumed to know how to properly dispose of the case in accordance
with law, if said merchandise are really smuggled items.46
cräläwvi rtua lib räry
In People v. CFI, et al.,47 the Court held that "it is not for this Court to do
less than it can to implement and enforce the mandates of the customs
and revenue laws. The evils associated with tax evasion must be stamped
out."48 But the Court emphasized that the campaign to stamp out tax
evasion should be without disregard of any constitutional right of private
persons to unreasonable search and seizure.49 c räläwvi rtua lib räry
The petitioners aver that this Court has held that, conformably with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the question of seizure and detention as
well as the forfeiture of imported goods is for the COC to determine at the
first instance, and may later be appealed to the Commissioner of Customs
and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals. The petitioners also assert that
the Court has also ruled that the COC has exclusive jurisdiction over
seizure and detention as well as forfeiture cases, the determination of the
ownership of the goods and/or the legality of their acquisition, and the
legality or illegality of the warrant of seizure and detention issued by the
Collector. Thus, even the ordinary courts may not deprive the COC of his
jurisdiction therefor.

The contention of the petitioners is based on a wrong premise and does

not hold water. Indisputably, the Collector of Customs has exclusive
original jurisdiction over seizure and detention proceedings and that the
regular courts cannot interfere with nor deprive him of such jurisdiction.
However, as correctly held by the CA, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Collector on the said goods pertains only to the goods seized pursuant
to the authority under the TCC. Goods seized on the basis of a search
warrant issued by the court under Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are in custodia legis, subject to the control and disposition of
the court that issued the search warrant. The court may not be divested of
its jurisdiction over the goods by a warrant of seizure and detention issued
by the Collector of Customs; and of its jurisdiction to dispose and release
the goods as the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Criminal Procedure
so mandate.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner,
vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic Act No.
9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to
the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court
may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.
Antecedents
On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph
(Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of
Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping and aiding each other, they not being authorized by
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade,
deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets
with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent
plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.2
Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another information charging only
Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information alleging:
That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control the following:
a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10)
transparent capsules containing white powdery substance
contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a
net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as
"Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235
grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded
positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper,
with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing
dried leaves with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive
results for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a
dangerous drug.3
In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett
filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that during his
arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several
personal non-drug effects from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car
with license plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed
that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to
himupon verification.4
On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its
Comment and Objection,5 proposingthereby that the delivery to the RTC
of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout
the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the
Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City
Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the
instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of
dangerous drugs.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or
custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the abovementioned
Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S.
Brodett and the return should be fully documented, and (2) bring the
personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S.
Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as
needed.
SO ORDERED.6
PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was
denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Court dated November
4, 2009 is upheld.
SO ORDERED.7
Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals
(CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC were
issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the
petition for certiorari thusly:
xxxx
Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is
owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more
particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous
drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore
see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
xxxx
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being
an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and
should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction,
especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that
the required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, PDEA appeals.
Issues
Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord
with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No.
9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda
Accord car, registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett),
had been seized from accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal
operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the
Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the
car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged
to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize
its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC
that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any
question of law that warranted a review by the Court;that Section 20 of R.
A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in
favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds
or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful
act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person
must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the
commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies
before filing the petition for review.
The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor
the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I only when the case is finally terminated.21
Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing
property confiscated in criminal proceedings
It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having
jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an
accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including
documents, papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to
commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of
which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the
accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or
the right to possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As
justification for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom
thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or proper,
because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the
contraband again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense
has theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime,
such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the
accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the
offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.14
In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the
convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the Government.15 But it
is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in
such manner that it can be said to be within its jurisdiction.16
According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in
connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant
or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is
by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seized
may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been
stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat
which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.17 If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be
made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or
may constitute proof in the commission of an offense.18 Should there be
no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is
used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to
the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may
order the return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made
Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the
matter of disposing of property claimed as evidence,22 and this discretion
extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused
claims the property was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial
court has the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful
owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the
Government.24 Property used as evidence must be returned once the
criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then
subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.25
II
Order of release was premature and made
in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms.
Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the illegal
possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that
were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any
other criminal proceedings.
In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:
A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and
forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and
properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to,
money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools
with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the
law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property
that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is
owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused
Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more
particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous
drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore
see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the same
according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly
adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called
only when such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of
law peremptorily calls for application.
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being
an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms. Brodett and
should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and
unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction,
especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove
doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that
the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional
guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)
The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including the properties or
proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and
precursors and essential chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which
pertinently providesas follows:
Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the
Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale,
trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation
or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources
of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other
laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in
favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act,
including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby,
and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered
destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this
Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal
case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the
confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the
assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in
the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however,
That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off
not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property,
or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited,
shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in
custodialegis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or
forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses
incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and
maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses for
publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above
expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against
illegal drugs.27
There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text
of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture
of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that
ofArticle 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person
not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.
The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal
Codein People v. Jose,28 concerning the confiscation and forfeiture of the
car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction
with rape, although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:
xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and
forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if
such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the
sense of this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of
the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be
ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29
Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar
the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third
person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person
either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not
suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient
ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.30
However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment
and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the RTC31 that the
delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be
held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the
Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value.
The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car
because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale
of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission
of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with
applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R. A. No.
9165,32 and contends that the car should not be released from the
custody of the law because it had been seized from accused Brodett
during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had
belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its
release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that
she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the
car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the
pendency of the trial.
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-
Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings
were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the
release of the car at that pointof the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income
derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the
Regional Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such
property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all
that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the
penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or
any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be
subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be
rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTCas being in
custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure
its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to
deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was
not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary
need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165.
Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or
reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26, 2011 the
RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208
and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and
further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person
the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because: who is not liable for the unlawful act.

The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.
chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot merely rely
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this
view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these decision to all trial courts for their guidance.
cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused
BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to

prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, RICHARD
BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and
09-209.

The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the non-
drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are
ordered returned to the accused.

The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the
genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered escheated in
favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National
Treasury for proper disposition. (emphasis supplied)33

The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition

for review as to render further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court
seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the
matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those
belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the
extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question about the
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of
repetition in the future.35
1âw phi 1

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly
with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not
release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for
Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing the
Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December 13, 2007
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed
the Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in
selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon,
after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock
in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went
to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to
petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to
petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's
residence is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the
second floor. When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and
informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they
can search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run
towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar
with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded
the place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his
men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder
sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of
petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for
cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the
nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white
crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated
were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of
the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to
laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner,
charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended. The Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in
the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in
his possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder,
having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without
license or prescription from any competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
pleaded not guilty.7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and
Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner,
Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be
summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was
installing the electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four
Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu.
He was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was
engaged by the owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was
able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he
learned from his wife that police operatives searched his house and
found nothing. According to him, the small structure, 20 meters away
from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by
his older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the
charge against him in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben
del Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo," GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article
III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six
(6) Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2)
Months as Maximum of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in
accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the
appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. 9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA,
petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF
COURT AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-
VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER
ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT
SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE
PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR
COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS
RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA
HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE
PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE
SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
THE ELEMENT OF "POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE
SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN
QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE
SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February
10, 2009, enumerated the following counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge
Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is
valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are
admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession
of prohibited drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer
who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale
of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of
the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the
petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the
search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence to
show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or
representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located
about 20 meters away from his house is no longer within the "permissible
area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and
that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the
places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities and not to private
individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper
containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession
of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating
that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other
building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable
cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally
by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known
to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.12 According to petitioner, there was
no probable cause. Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by
a fixed and rigid formula,15 and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This
Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the
judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination.17 Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought
to be searched.18 A review of the records shows that in the present case,
a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered
that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.19 In the
present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates
or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items,
having been found in a place other than the one described in the search
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The
OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another
place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be
admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against
government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the
search warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods,
thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay
tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver
get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative
what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop
because he ran from his shop, so we searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano,
Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded
paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others
inside the electric shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that
the items that were actually seized were found in another structure by
a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
still recall what took place?
xxxx
A We cordoned the area.
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader
A We waited for the barangay tanod. Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear? Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that
there were other persons or other person that followed after Masnayon?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del
Castillo's wife. A Then we followed suit.

Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo? Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?

A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face. A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.

Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted Q What about you?
the search?
A I also followed suit.
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate
Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away from his adjacent Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del him open the folded paper which contained four shabu deck.
Castillo?
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was the folded paper?
clean.
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.22
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic)
Ruben run from that store and furthermore the door was open. A At his residence, the two-storey house.

Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the
search at the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to
be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the
same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual
or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain
and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment
by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property, such as
barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes
the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.
Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal
Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and
members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be
deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order,
protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed
agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as
the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority
during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the
confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus, making the
same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's third argument that the
prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated
drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying,24 unless attended with arbitrariness
or plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings
are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal25 as in the present
case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation
of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession
of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused
has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of
regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an
essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control
is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is
located, is shared with another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellant’s control or possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.30 The records are void of any
evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it
established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well
as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to
the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the
investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by
occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the structure,
which housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the
respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said
structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not
also provide proof as to the ownership of the structure where the seized
articles were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without
stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of
petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even
outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by
petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed
to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there
was an electrical shop but denied what he said in his earlier testimony
that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that
correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the
shop.

Q Now, this shop is within a structure?

A Yes.

Q How big is the structure?

A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den

and at the other side is a structure rented by a couple.34

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drugs.35 With the prosecution's failure to
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there
casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it
is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of
the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the
charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence.37 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del
Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 199032 November 19, 2014
RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated
1 2
April 25, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407.4
The Facts
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police
Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to
search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims
summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be
found.5 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola)
was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in
fact, part of the group that buried the victims.6
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive
Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-144077 which
was later enforced by the elements ofthe PNP-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, in coordination withthe members of the Scene of the
Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.8
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud
(Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence9 premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no
authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been
automatically divested of his position asVice Executive Judge when
several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the
Court;10 (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant
No. 09-14407 which was to be enforced in Davao City;11 (c) the human
remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search
warrant;12 (d) the police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed
procedure for exhumation of human remains;13 (e) the search warrant was
issued despite lack of probable cause;14 (f) the rule against forum
shopping was violated;15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring
one specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be
searched and the articles to be seized.16
The Manila-RTC Ruling
In an Order17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of
Laud "after a careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein]."
Aside from this general statement, the said Order contained no
discussion on the particular reasons from which the Manila-RTC derived
its conclusion.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in an Order19 dated
December 8, 2009, wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its
reasons for the warrant’s quashal, namely: (a) the People failed to show
any compelling reason to justify the issuanceof a search warrant by the
Manila RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where the
offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court;20 (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost
four (4) years before the search warrant application was filed rendered
doubtful the existence of probable cause;21 and (c) the applicant, i.e., the
PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the subject matter of
the present search warrant application is exactly the sameas the one
contained in a previous application22 before the RTC of Davao City,
Branch 15 (Davao-RTC) which had been denied.23
Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certioraribefore the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People’s petition
and thereby annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for
having been tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were
satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor involving a heinous
crime, such as Murder, is an exception to the compelling reasons
requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as explicitly
recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC,26 provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOC-TF) or the Reaction Against Crime Task Force
(REACT-TF),27with the endorsement of its head, before the RTC of Manila
or Quezon City, and the warrant be consequently issued by the Executive
Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this
case.28
Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among
others, witness Avasola deposed and testified that he personally
witnessed the murder of six (6) persons in December 2005 and was
actually part of the group that buried the victims – two bodies in each of
the three (3) caves.29 Further, it observed that the Manila-RTC failed to
consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get
involved in a criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to
justify the delay attending the application of a search
warrant.30 Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a
protruding human bone in plain view in one of the caves, and Avasola’s
first-hand eye witness account both concur and point to the only
reasonable conclusion that the crime ofMurder had been committed and
that the human remains of the victims were located in the Laud
Compound.31
Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the
prior application for a search warrant filed before the Davao-RTC was
based on facts and circumstances different from those in the application
filed before the Manila-RTC.32
Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied
in a Resolution33 dated October 17, 2011,hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues for the Court’s resolution are as follows: (a) whether the
administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search
Warrant No. 09-14407; (b) whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling
reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule126 of the Rules of Court; (c)
whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description
were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the
applicant for the search warrant,i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against
forum shopping. 1âwphi 1
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A. Effect of Judge Peralta’s Administrative Penalties.
Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that
"[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate
to divest him of his position as such,"Laud claims that Judge Peralta had
no authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge and accordingly issue Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Court’s Resolution in Dee C. Chuan
& Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta34 wherein he was administratively penalized
with fines of ₱15,000.00 and ₱5,000.00.35
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative
penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s authority to act as
ViceExecutive Judge, it must be qualified thatthe abstraction of such
authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be considered
to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.
Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de factoofficer is and explains that his acts
are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jureofficer, in so far as
the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de factoofficer are just as valid
for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned.37
The treatment of a de factoofficer’s acts is premised on the reality that
third persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold
an important office and, as such, have a right to assume that officials
apparently qualified and in office are legally such.38 Public interest
demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office
created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public
– as distinguished from the officer in question – is concerned.39 Indeed, it
is far more cogently acknowledged that the de factodoctrine has been
formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but
rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in
the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers.40
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements
must concur: (a) there must be a de jureoffice; (b) there must be color of
right or general acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual
physical possession of the office in good faith.41
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case.
Undoubtedly, there is a de jureoffice of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge.
Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office as he was duly
appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue of
a supervening legal technicality – that is, the operation of Section 5,
Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be
said that there was general acquiescence by the public since the search
warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta
by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent
authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.42Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual
physical possession of the said office is presumed to bein good faith, as
the contrary was not established.43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be
considered to have acted as a de factoofficer when he issued Search
Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de
jureofficer suffering no administrative impediment.
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. 09- 14407;
Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement Under Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of
Manilaand Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to those
"involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and
other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and
included herein by the Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for
such cases may befiled by "the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Philippine National Police(PNP) and the AntiCrime Task Force
(ACTAF)," and "personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As
in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be
seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of
these RTCs] and,whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are
authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the said courts."
The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were
complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed
before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP
Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,44 particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized (as will be elaborated later on) in
connection with the heinous crime of Murder.45 Finding probable cause
therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge,
issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules state, may be
served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special
criminal case" excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
 place of the commission of the crime isknown, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application
shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
(Emphasis supplied)
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC,
the rule on search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon
City RTCs for the above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an
exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the
fact that a search warrant is being applied for in connection with a special
criminal case as above-classified already presumes the existence of a
compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect would be super
fluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section
12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City
RTCs to issue warrants to be servedin places outside their territorial
jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have
been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court
finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search Warrant No.
09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should not have overturned it.
C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the Issuance of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 and the One-SpecificOffense Rule Under
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) provides that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable causeto be determined personally by the judgeafter
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a
search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offenseto be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola
who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group
that buried the victims:
Q9-Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and buried in the
caves in December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.?
A9-I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when they
were still alive as Pedro and Mario. I don’t know the names of the other
four victims.
Q10-What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims were
killed?
A10-Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and bury
equally the bodies inthe three caves. We buried Pedro and Mario
altogether in the first cave, located more or less 13 meters from the
makeshift house of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the second cave
and the remaining two in the third cave.
Q11-How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of
December 2005?
A11-I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran errands [for]
him.46
Avasola’s statements in his deposition were confirmed during the hearing
on July 10, 2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the following
examination:
Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong naghukay,
nakatago o kasama ka?
Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.
Court: Mga ilang katao?
Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.
Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?
Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki. x x x.47
Verily, the facts and circumstancesestablished from the testimony of
Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently
show that more likely than not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had
been perpetrated and that the human remains in connection with the
same are in the place sought to be searched. In Santos v. Pryce Gases,
Inc.,48 the Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to
establish probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. A finding of probable cause needs only torest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that
it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of
the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reason.49
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to
establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That a
"considerable length of time" attended the search warrant’s application
from the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the
veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness
presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for
by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a
criminal case.50 Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable
cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by the
judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s
mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does not
dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable
cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of "the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place
to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly
to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement."51
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing
standard since it particularly describes the place to be searched, namely,
the three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3,
Barangay Maa, Davao City:
You are hereby commanded to makean immediate search at any time
[of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly the three (3)
caves (as sketched) inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-
a, Davao Cityand forthwith seize and take possession of the remains of
six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the just said premises.
x x x x52 (Emphases supplied)
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made
explicit reference to the sketch53 contained in the application. These, in
the Court’s view, are sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched, which they in fact
did.
The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the
remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the aforesaid
premises. Laud’s posturing that human remains are not "personal
property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a search warrant
deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense. (Emphases supplied) "Personal property" in the
foregoing context actually refers to the thing’s mobility, and not to
its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person.
Article416 of the Civil Code,54 which Laud himself cites,55 states
that in general, all things which can be transported from place to
place are deemed to be personal property. Considering that
human remains can generally be transported from place toplace,
and considering further that they qualify under the phrase
"subject of the offense" given that they prove the crime’s corpus
delicti,56 it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search
warrant under the above-cited criminal procedure provision.
Neither does the Court agree with Laud’s contention that the term
"human remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert the
particular description requirement. Asthe Court sees it, the
description points to no other than the things that bear a direct
relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also
perceived that the description is already specific as the
circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies
would have naturally decomposed over time. These observations
on the description’s sufficient particularity square with the Court’s
pronouncement in Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge
Ruiz,57 wherein it was held:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow(People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued(Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the
articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of
search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence. (Emphases supplied)58
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement
– both as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized – had
been complied with.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note,
was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those
which are issued for more than one specific offense. The defective nature
of scatter-shot warrants was discussed in the case of People v. CA59 as
follows: There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a
specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced in Stonehill v.
Diokno and of Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as
follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.— A search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the
search warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause,
omitting to continue that it was in connection withone specific offense. He
could not, of course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could
refer, in Judge Dayrit’s own words, "to robbery, theft, qualified theft or
estafa." On this score alone, the search warrantwas totally null and void
and was correctly declared to be so by the very judge who had issued it.60
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA,61 the Court, however, settled that a
search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense
does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, viz.:
That there were several counts of the offenseof copyright infringement
and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form
of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses
charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule. (Emphasis supplied)62
Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one
specific offense – that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts – it cannot be
said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.

That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum
shopping.

D. Forum Shopping.

There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several

judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another.63

Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case

considering the various points of divergence attending the search warrant
application before the Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For
one, the witnesses presented in each application were different.
Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection with Murder,
while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more
importantly, the places to be searched were different – that inManila
sought the search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was
for a particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no
identity of facts and circumstances between the two applications, the
ruleagainst forum shopping was therefore not violated.

Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the CA
Ruling which upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25,

2011 and the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.