1 The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave Doobo Shim Introduction Since the 1980s, Korea had been under daunting bilateral (argely from the United States) and multilateral pressures to open its markets, inthe name of elobalization, in various sectors including the cinema and television, These elobal economic dynamics influenced Korea Inc's industrial formations ‘While taking on the defensive, the Korean economy began to promote Production and commodification of media and ealtaral content, including fim, television programming, animation, etc, against the backdrop of the worldwide diffusion of “information society” discourses. The media Iberalization measures, also pushed for by citizens who were fed up with Jong years of state control of the media, led to a considerably competitive domestic media environment that eventually cultivated commercially sensitive Productions, Ironically, the global media market openings in the 1990s fcilitated the export of Korean popular culture, By early 2006 Korean caitral productions, including television drama, ‘lm, pop music, etc., have become widely consumed by audiences in Asia, ‘Starting with What I: Love All About and Stars in My Heart in the late 1990s, and Winter Sonata and Dac Jang Geum in recent years, Korean television deatna, and is stars including Bue Yong Jun, Ahn Jae Wook, Lee Byung Heon, and Kim Hee Seon, have enchanted Asian audieness, The popular consumption (oF Korean television dramas has coincided with that of cinema. Seating with ‘Shin Joint Scauity Area and My Sassy Gil, Korean films have become regular16 Doobo Shim fixtures in theatres across Asia. At the same time, Korean pop music, or K~ pop, has ako produced such international celebrities 3s H.O.T., BoA, and Rain (*Bi"), The regional media call chis new popular culturabphenomenon in Asia the Korean Wave (or, Halys) "The everydayness of Korean pop culture in Asia is evidenced by the fact that it has become material fora song CAVE ASRIE) ("Lam not... Song Seung Hon”) in Malaysia, Two male singers express the feelings of a man who has a gitliiend infatuated with the Korean actor Song Seung Heon. Its words, “You want me to say Salanghe (*A}33") / You complain that our romance is not like that im the Korean soap opera... . You order me to have only a pack of Korean instant noodles a day ...",' show how much Korean popular culkure is embedded in people's lives in Asia In order to account for the growth of Korean popular culture into an export industry and its international appeal, chis chapter examines the trajectory of Korean popular culture industries linking them to global and local political economic relations and the domestic cultural environment. Because of time and space constraints, this chapter focuses on cinema and television dramas forts analysis of the development of Korean popular culture. For a start, we shall discuss the government policies and domestic conglomerates’ busines: moves that helped transform the Korean cinema industry, taking account of the global political economic context. ‘The Korean Cinema in the 1990s The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s was an important juncture for the Korean cinema industry because of the market opening to foreign distributors. Under USS. pressure, in 1988 the Korean government allowed forcign flm companies to distribute cheir films withoue passing through local distributors in Korea, which the domestic film industry fiercely opposed in vain, Aer this measure, poorly performing homemade flicks marked a record low of 15.9% domestic marker share in 1993. While the annual number of local film productions was decreasing, that of foreign film imports was increasing. In 1984, the figures of local productions and foreign impors were 81 and 25, Ie changed to 87 and 175 in 1988, and 63 and 347 in 1993 (Korean Film Council, 2006). Ia this situation, commentators predicted the demise ofthe Korean cinema industry in the near future (Kim, 2003) ‘At around that ime, the Uruguay Round (UR) trade negotiation, searted in 1986, eventually concluded in 1994 transforming the General Agreement ‘on Tariff; and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization (WTO) ‘The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 17 in 1995, It meant that all member countries of GATT, including Kores, were soon obliged to open their markets in media communications and culture, ‘This sector had been protected from foreign competition, having been considered “exceptional categories” to the fice trade principle since the early days of GATT, which began in 1947. The Korean press begas to write that while culture was emerging as a new sector in global economic competition, l-was in danger of ts indigenous culture being debased by foreign media, and also of dollar drain (Shim, 2002). The press also echoed Peter Drucker, ‘Alvin Toller and their il’sfuturological discourses om the cultaral industry's contribution to national economies in the coming 21st century. For Koreans, there was nothing that illustrated the importance of the cultural industry to the national economy better than what I would call the “Jurassic Park factor” (Shien, 2006). In 1994, the Presidential Advisory Board 6a Science and Technology proposed to President Kim Young-Sam that Korea should develop cinema and other media content production as a national strategic industry. What the proposal highlighted was the fact that Hollywood movie Jurasc Park's total revenue cane up to the foreign sales of 1.5 million Hyundai cars, and ths “unlikely” anecdote made the headlines the next morning in Korea It was a “paradigm shift” for the Koreans who Tong had strongly believed that the heavy and chemical industries, including ‘automobile, chemical, construction and electronics industries, would lead their country through to a more prosperous future. In this envitonment, the National Assembly enacted the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1995 to replace the Motion Picture Lave that had long steatjackcted the cinema industry. By the new law, the government would provide tax incentives for film production, attracting corporate capital into the cinema industry, In fact, major domestic conglomerates, or chaebol, including Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai, which had home electronics interests, had already been planning for cultural content production taking cues from Japanese Sony Electronics’ acquisition of Columbia Pictures and CBS Records in the lte 1980s, Based on the concept of hardware-software synergy, these companies attempeed to synchronize connections between electronic device production and areas of entertainment. In relation to this, Samsung and Daewoo started film financing ot video production in the late 1980s, In addition, Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai secured their interests in cable television services, started in 1995, as program providers (PPS). Following these initiatives, many Korean chaebols advanced into the cultural industry ranging from video production, film impor, financing and production, and theatre operation to music production. As @ newspaper commented: “The yourgsang san-eop loosely translated into “visual industry”18 Doobe Shin» or “image industry"] is rising ¢o the surface as a new field for chaebol competition” (Kooktin Ito, 1994). Table 1.1 below illustrates the five largest ‘chaebol's involvement in cinema and other audiovisual industries as of miid- 1995. Table 1.1 Five largest chaebor's audiovisual indusby activities as of 1985, Ghasber Subsidiary ae a Samsung | Gach One Bay cab caval Drea Box Fi porte: home vido poder [loam Ar Hall Theater — | Myungbo | Cinema fuse Sornang lensed wo sreans | | der contract) | i New Fim import producer De [0s] | CD-ROM, | Starmax _ | Film importer’ film producer a | hei Youngeang | Film mporter/eesson progam producer | ‘diosa ai importer for home video production / | | Video Business film producer Wooilvideo| [[Dong-woo vidso | Home video pace | Seshin Video Home vo poder ‘Daewoo Cinema ‘Cable channel (PP) 7 Network | ‘ati roder and daar “Hyundar | Seoul Peducion | Fim protcer Hs Cable channel i ic meta Fm wire / rode of CDs (Ds | CROWS, an ns \ | Busines Dison | [Pan Production \ t Mido Fl Film importer film producer ‘Seorjung Production | Fil importer for home video production ‘ture Wel Chosun 1995) ad Won 1988) - 1 PP stands x proge provide. The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 19 ‘After several years of operation, chese ventures suffered losses. In addition, the Korea Inc. of the mid-1990s bogan to show signs of economic downturn, ‘Thesefore, many chaebols were looking for opportunities to exit from the caltural industry. In a sens, the nancial cisis in Jate 1997 gave them apposite excuses to fold their businesses, In January 1998 SK drastically reduced its video and film businesses and later that year Daewoo abandoned its cinema interests. In particular, the breakup of the Samsung Entertainment Group, ‘which was launched in September 1995 as an integrated organization by bringing all cultural industry-related ventures within Samsung under its ‘umbrella, in January 1999, marked the ending of “the chaebol age of Korean cinema industry” in the 1990s (Ko, 2005b). “The chaebol age of Korean cinema industry, however, did not simply end up as a passing fad but actualy Inid the foundation for a renaissance of the cinema industry. By holding independent film festivals and film scenario contests with considetable eath prizes, chaebol-run fm companies recruited fies talent, who infused new sensibilities into Korean cinema. In particular, the chaebols supported young directors, equipped with diplomas from prestigious film schools all over the world, who would otherwise have to syaie for many years for their debut film, During this period, many competent stall members from diverse lines of business within che chacbols were put nto the cinema busines. By this, chaebol transplanted their advanced business know-how, including systematic planning and marketing and transparent accounting, to the Korean cinema industry which had Jong been caught by “mom-and-pop”, "pre-modlem” business practices. Affer the chaebols folded their flm business, quite a number of those people remained in the cinema industry. For example, when Samsung Enterainment Group ws disbanded, 30 out of 45 staff members in its cinema business teain went to other film ‘companies instead of retuming to their original positions in Samsung Electronics or elsewhere. Its reported that many successfil Korean films in recent years have been planned, financed or marketed by those ex-members of the Samsung Entertainment Group (Ko, 2005b). ‘The Korean Cinema on the Rise Chaebol’s business rationalization of the local film industry facilitated new players’ entrances into the sector. When asked, “What do you think is Sunsung’s contribution to the Korean cinema industry?", Choi Wan, who oversaw Samsung Entertainment Group’s cinema business team but is now a CEO of IM Pictures, made his answer short and clear: “Samsung made20° Deobo Shim the lm busines eatsparent, making way fora new form of capital” (Kim, Min Gycong, 2004). When chaebol were leaving the cinema industry, venture capitalists and investment fms were entering, looking for ft profits, Right after the Samsung Entertainment Group officially announced its breakup, an action thriller, Shii, which Samsung had planned and funded as its final project, ironically was a big hit. By attracting 3.8 million theatergoets nationwide, it set a new box-office record in Korea. That Slr ‘was also parly funded by a venture capitalist gave many prospective investors cues co finance film productions. This new trend must be understood in. relation to the revision of the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1999 which Geilitaed venture capital's fanding the film production (Kim, Dong Ho, 2005). Venture capitalists finded (partly or exclusively) 23 out of 58 Korean Sims produced in 2000 (Hwang, 2001). With the indlax of capita, as of 2004 the average cost of production per film amounted to 42 billion won, a considerable increase fiom 0.9 billion won in 1998 (Korean Film Council, 2006)2 ‘The revision of the Motion Pictare Promotion Law in 1999 noted above indeed made it posible for individuals o finance film productions, What it turned out was the so-called netizen fund, Taking advantage of the existence ‘of huge pumbers of online film buffs based on Kores's developed broadband facilities, a film studio Bom raised a US$85,000 fund from among them. It ‘recruited 200 investors for $425 each, lter paying 200% returns (Kim, 2002). After this, many film projects employed netizen funds not only as a source of investinent but also a means of marketing. In 2001, Hana Bank launched the “Hana Cinema Trust Fund No.1” of USS7.8 million (Kirn, 2003). In this fvorable environment, the Korean cinema industry churned out ‘more blockbusters. In 2001, Shin's box-office record was broken by Joint Steurty Area, whose record was again smashed by Friends a fow months aeer with 8.2 million admission tickets sold in Korea. 2004 saw two movies that set new box-office records by hitting 11.08 million and 11.74 million in viewership, respectively. Silmido revisited North-South Korean relations in the 1970s and TacGukGi: The Brotherhood of War was a movie about two brothers’ experiences during the Korean War. In March 2006, King and the Clown, a fiction film depicting a king during the Joseon (ox, Choson) Period (1392-1910) filling in love with a pretty male clown, seta new Korean record by drawing in more than 12 million audiences. Upheld by these and other well-performing local flicks, the Korean cinema's domestic market share has. continuously increased fiom 15.9% in 1993 to 35.5% in 2000, and even recorded over 50% in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005 (Korean Filn Council, 2006) The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 24 The infux of capital into the cinema industry hat facilitated not only {lm production but ao its consumption, For one, more comforable viewing conditions introduced by multiplex theaters, largely begun to be builtin the late 1990s by some chacbol. Located in major shopping malls i big cities in Korea, inuliplexes have enticed consumers back to theaters (Kirn, 2003), According to directot/producer Kang Woo-suk (2002), multiplexes have become a “playground’ for the youth where they can spend time eating, stinking and enjoying movies, The muleiplex building boom — the number of screens nationwide increased ffom 497 in 1997 to 1,132in 2003 — farther ‘acitated flm production, Simply pu, in ordcr co fill those increasing screens, saulplexes, many of which were linked to production companies, funded Korean film production, which were showing signs of entertainment-quality improvement and were enjoying more audience acclaim, In the 2000s, by making strategic alliances with flm producers or through vertical integration, Korean film distributors experienced consolidation and ‘concentration. In this regard, some observers noted that Korean blockbusters \were posible because they were productions of local cinema majors which controlled distribution networks (Kim, 2003). As of 2006, Cinema Service, CJ Entertainment, Showbox Inc., and Lotte Cinema formed an oligopoly of the Korean cinema industry ranging from production and investment 0 istribution and theaters. While Cinema Service is founded on traditional Korean cinema industry resources, the other three are subsidiaries of mid- site chaebol. C] Entertainment, which originally started its cinema business in 1995, has extended its busines since 1999, and Showbox Inc,, and Lotte Cinema advanced into the sector in 1999 (Cinema Service, 2006; CJ Entertainment, 2006; Lotte Cinema, 2006; Showbox, 2006). Bused on its domestic success, Korean cinema has even attracted larger audiences overseas, The blockbuster Shisf was sold to several Asian countries and received both critical and commercial acclaim. In particulas, t earned ‘USSI4 million at the Japanese box office from 1.2 million theatergoers and topped che Hong Kong box office, a rare overseas achievement for a Korean film at that time (Kim, 2000). Since then, many Korean films have been released for commercial run in foreign theaters and won prizes at such prestigious film festivals as Cannes, Berlin and Venice. In 2004 a total of 193 Korean films were exported to 62 countries earning about US$58 million in marked contrast to 1995's export figure of 15 films with earnings of ‘US$208,679 (please see the table 1.2 below). As of 2004, Japan was the biggest Korean film importer, accounting for 69.3% ofall Korean film exports, Korea camed US$40.4 million from these Japanese exports, With 33 Korean films released in Japan in 2004, Korean flicks took a 1096 share of the Japanese22° Dobe Shim Son market, a hoge jump fom thei 3.8% matket shace in 2000 (please se thetable 1.3 below). Accondng to Kim Mee-hyun 2008), hed of Fn Poy Divison at the Korean Fin Council the majoniy af the Japanese andiones fr Korean fn in 2008 were middle-aged women spied by thet fandom of television drama Winter Sonata and is male lsd Bae Yong Jon, As sac Korean cinemas achievement overseas should ao be undentood sgn the Seckitop fhe Roe Wve le bythe poplin of Korean leon Table 1.2 Korean flm expor (1995-2004), unit: US) Therese Rate 7% — Table 1.3 Number of Korean films released in Japan as agains total number ‘of ims released in Japan (2000-2004), er ime inset napa (2000-2008) Year Tota number offs | Market share | ‘eleased in Japan 3000} [3 a) [201] pa 202 eal 7, [= 2003, 14 35 200% 3S 00 aaasIcs) Source: Kim Mee hyun 2005) The Growth of Karean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 23 ‘The Commercialization of Korean Television Asnoted, the globally flourished “information society” discourse, upheld by advances in IT (information technology) and digital development, and citizens’ demands for a more liberal public communication environment led to the sedis liberalization in Korea beginning in the late 1980s. In 1989, the government-assigned Commission for Broadcasting System Research suggested an idea to launch cable television in 1995 as the mainstay of digitized, integrated communication infastrcture in the coming Information ‘Age. In 1990 the Nasional Assembly enacted the new Broadcasting Law, by ‘which the govemment granted license to the commercial Seoul Broadcasing System (SBS) to begin operation from 1991. SBS was the fist commercial television station to be extblished since 1980 when the then Chun Doo- whan regime forcibly reshuffled 29 broadcasters into an oligopoly of two public broadcasters, Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) and Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBO) In December 1991 the National Assembly passed the Cable Television ‘Act. Based on the Act, in August 1993 the Ministry of Information selected 20 applicans to become eable television program providers (PPS) who would run their own channel. As planned, in March 1995 cable television services| sarted acros the county. In ation, four new regional commercial terrestrial television stations started operation in the same year. In 1997 another set of four regional chanaes started to cover their respective provinces. In 2002, satellite channels were added to this television platform, and digital multimedia broadcasting (DMB) started in 2005. In a nutshell, since the 1990s Korea has cencered a multi-channel television era, marked by intense competition for audience attention (Korean Broadcasting Commission, 2006). ‘This competition was speatheaded by SBS, the new commercial broaddaster. Although technically a regional broadcaster covering Seoul and its vicinities, it accounted for almost haf of the Korean population. In addition, by providing its programs to other regional stations newly launched inthe 1990s, SBS practically fancsoned as a network ike KBS and MBC. Theadvent of SBS was “threatening” so KBS and MBC whieh, although tagged as “public” broadcasters, had relied om advertising for theit finances. In the early 1990, KBS relied more on advertising revenue than on the reception fee by 61% to 39%. In the same petiod, 99% of MBC’s revenue came ftom advertisements (Kim, 2001). Indeed, SBS publicly announced that i would compete with the established broadcasters for audience ratings in television dramas, in particular. ‘The television drama has always been the centerpiece of television ‘watching among Korean audiences. For example, in the annual lists of ren24 Doobo Shim television programs wit he highs audience ating, 5 oF 6 ate my televon dra (Les, 2015). By proenting the every ie of ody beople inching thir oc elton, agony, Soa oy iad ven tes dan have etrsned ore arg Ia he 1 sone tating became the mater of primary concem for bonds, wh oa rps on lero daa commecalsm, Spe by SBSY selon Shama oes" chartered by need munton sd venice of television drat, ronan engaged the “nana wt” by nolang every eft entunce sean ings of eleven daa Re 200 ‘They extended into previowly untouched topes, shot om Ita tg incded foc counties pel pte ow of ons wih eer ep od pisos npn ter emer aly le ns = ako improved whl dts forth ow tat an ea rs the clitist press, sled "These dj many Korn evn ras eon ing of ore hn 2 30% share ins make whee the dice tema ete sar ay tnore than 30 elevisio dramas per week (¥,Byoung, 208), Fre enti fxteion dane dar tey on fr ee nes fin db of thee vos elevion danas and provide eink the form of presure”to alr sorines to tevbon poder ond produce parodies othe dma inthe for of maine Acvipape sod poses Becte thee dent fit ans in ops ou te pogea tnd they form the guaranteed make forthe ema ses of ide a demand, DD an ter pmlc, nora cane deg th tom, Neworks nd tren rn rose oe re fn ca ember lst range mecings wth cer and ve ao hs {ly minr voles in devon cana (Gu 2009, Aconiga Sece i008, a eevnion ct, Korean evson proces ve ade eet or vo gaily audiences Korean Television Drama Exports {ewas around the tum of the 1990s when the Korean television industry began to export television dramas. According to Bak Jaebok, the head of the International Exchange Department at MBC, it was not unt 1992 that MBC cst put up its own booth at the Cannes international television programming, ‘market (Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Insitute, 2005), At that time, MBC sold Eyes ofthe Daun to Turkiye Radyo Televizyon (TR), Turkey's national broadcaster, marking the first Korean television drama to be exported to a The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 25 European county, and Hat Is Love All Abou to Hong Kong's Asa Television Led. (ATV) (Rim and Han, 2001). With media liberalization sweeping across ‘Ais, the scale of Korean television programming exports gradually increased, “Most observers agree thatthe Korea Wave, a phenomenon where Korean popular culture is enjoying fandom oversess, started in China with the broadcast of What Js Love All About, In 1997, China's national China Central Television (CCTV) aired it, where it became a massive hit. On popular demand, CCTV had to rebroadcast the Korean television drama in 1998. Since then, more Korean television dramas have received popular receptions fiom audiences in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Vietnam. In particular, Korean television dramas accounted for 56% of all foreign programming imports to Vietnam in 1998 (Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Insitute, 2008), About chat time, boy band H.O.T. and dance music dao Clon were ‘winning popularity ia the region thanks to their pretty faces and powerful dance moves. Therefore, commentators in East Asia began to talk about the ‘iH (Korean Wave") of popular culture (Heo, 2002). ‘According to Chae Jiyoung, senior researcher at the Korea Culture and ‘Tourism Policy Insitute, the Korean Wave was possible not because the government or broadcasters in Korea had certain visions or strategies for popular cultaral exports, Rather, international market conditions worked favourably for the exports of Korean television dramas which were gradually improving in commercial quality based on domestic competition (Korea CCultace and Tourison Poicy Insitute, 2005). I the late 1990s, the popularity ‘of Japanese television dramas began to wealcen in Taiwan, At this juncture, ‘Taiwanese importers begaa to import cheaper Korean television dramas to fil this opening. As middlemen, they aso helped Korean television dramas penetrate into mackets in Hong Kong and China, In addition, the economic downturn in Asia in the late 1990s made the cheaper Korean programming a popular akemative in these media markets. Korean television dramas were 2 quarter of the price of Japanese ones, andi tenth of the price of Hong. Kong television dramas 2s of 2000 (Lee, 2003). ‘The siactural context of media liberalization in East Asia should be father taken into account. ast Asia was not a region in which the television programming trade was active up until the 1980s. According to Waterman and Rogers (1994), “countries of the Asian region as a whole have [si a relitively low dependence on imported programming, and a relatively very Jow dependence om intra-regional program trade” (p. 107) before 1990s. Many Asian governments had fora long time been on the defensive against cultural influences fom foreign countries. They, however, began f0 open. their television programming markets in the 1990s following the global trend,26 Dobe Shim At the same time, economic development among many Asian countries afforded their citizens leisure and fies to consume more cultural areficts. Even the previously tightly conteolied television markets in China and Vietnam bave loosened their television programming import policies, For example, a ofthe early 1970s impored programs occupied less than 1% of total srtime in CCTV of China. Inthe late 1990s, the percentage rote to 20-30% according to different cegions in China (Hong, 1998, p. 71) Since ther instil popular reception within what Chua Beng Huat (2004) calls the pan-Chinese pop sphere (comprising China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia) and Viemam, Korean television dramas gradually expanded their reach. A teat-etker Winer Sonata was ist broadcast on the Japanese NHK BS Satelite in April 2003, and was e-aired fon the NHK BS in December of the same year. Qn popular demand, NHK aired it forthe third time, this time on its terrestrial network inthe summer of 2004, Although it was the third run, and despite the fict chat i was sired fon Saturdays at 11:10 pm, Winter Sonata, nicknamed Fuyusona in Japanese, commanded an average 16-17% share ofthe market. In late 2004, the Korean television drama made a fourth run, a record for a foreign programme, on the Japanese public broadcasting network. This tine, Winter Sonate was sired with subtitles instead of dubbing (which is conventional for imported programs), in compliance with the local fans’ demands to enjoy the drama with a “genuine Korean feet” (Kim, Hyeon Gi, 2004). In particular, actor ‘Bae Yong Jun’s fandom in Japan was such that when he visited the country in April 2004, about 5,000 female fans gathered at Tokyo's Haneda airport co grect him (Korea Tines, 2004) When the populatity of Korean television dramas was gradually ‘weakening in the pan-Chinese pop sphere, Dae Jang Geum (“Jewel in the Palace) ignited a bigger craze for Korean popular culture. Dae Jang Geum is an epic drama about a real ie story of a woman who rose from lower cass to the postion of master chet inthe royal palace doring King Jungjong’s reign (1506-1544) inthe Joseon dynasty. In May 2005, the show's final episode became the most-watched television show in Hong Kong history with more than 40% audience ratings. Chinese president Hu Jintao and Hong Kong fm stars including Andy Lau and Chow Yun-fat have publicly confewed that they ate fins of Dae Jong Gewn (Pack, 200 (One may wonder why Korean television dram ate poplar among foreign audiences. would argue that the cultural consumption isa negotiation process bbeeween consumers and cultural arteficrs, In ths process, consumers inves their time, money, energy and emotional allowances i culrural commodities in onder ‘o acquire pleasure and make meaning, Many commentators note that Korean, The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 27 teevion rash erg chord of Asian etmens och yee tne mspet for ellen (ho, 2001 Heo, 2002, Jopanete howe, forsale reported wo ave been ataced to Winer Sonat bea ‘etn tof ool ns when they chee plore in Hyeon as; Kore Ove nora Srv, 2909, Fo ins Aeveoping coors suc China and Viena, Korea enon dea Stomorerccpae han pee o escan nes bee thee en cna alas havngahived he technical pico compare Teather Thecore Kores"ewed ss prominent nado owe Greathup, both cur ad economy (Choe, 200), nese we cca peoer tt Korean eevsion danas hve provide aienes oh eter te of wean fos pear than the anal rodocton “Theor Wave snow expandingto Europe, Af, ante Assis (1,205) es epoed the when the Korean president Rok Moo-hyn vied Mexico tn 205 local n cab member of Koss atoning Dong tp a Aim roo satin ous Rots ot! nd lly ed i 9 send tart Mexico (Choe, 2009), Acconing tthe Minisry of Care 1h Tou (205) the tol amount af Kevan tevison progam expors Geomatics fom USES 3 milion in 1995 to USS71.4 mio a 2004 The Mins of Cat and Toussm enpcs ht broad ogra exponen 2005 wl supa the USS1O0 maion ma lene ee Pgwre 1 below) Pak 2005, ‘Annual Export & Import of Broadcasting Programs Export mlmport Source: Park (2005); Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2005) Figure 1.1 Korean television program export and import (1995-2008)28 oobo Shim Government Reaction to the Korean Wave ‘The phenomenon of Korean pop culture, having become the rage across ‘Asia, had begun to hit the headlines in Korea since the late 1990s. By this, Korean policy makers saw that the export-oriented economy had found a new overseas market in the mids ofthe “national plight” ofthe Intemational ‘Monetary Fund (IMF)-directed economic restructuring, Motivated by the phenomenal success of Korean popular cultural products abroad, the government designated “cultural technology” (meaning the technologies that produce television drama, film, pop music, computer games, animation, etc.) as one of the six key technologies along with IT and BT (Bio-technology) that should drive the Korean economy into the 2ist century, and pledged a hhuge amoune of financial investment and administrative support to domestic cultural industries, For this cause, the government established the Korea Culture and Content Agency in 2001, with a budget of US$90 million for that year (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2001), ‘The government has also encouraged content producers to cultivate overseas markets by providing financial support. In 2004, the government subsidized 473 million won to independent producers and cable channel Ps {or their participation in international content markets. Understanding the importance of such a marketplace, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has even hosted an international content market event, BCWW (Broadcast Worldwide), every year since 2001, I¢ was reported that about 3,500 buyers, investors and other media professionals from around the world attended the BCWW 2005. Domestic producers were reported to hnive made a US$15 million worth of sales during this four-day event, In particular, television dramas including Lovers in Prague and My Name is Kim Samsun accounted for about US§9 million of sales (Broadcast Worldwide, 2005). ‘The goverment support to the cultural industries is, however, not always, ‘frvourably evaluated, Shim Sangmin, an expert on Korean cultural industries, argues that the government is “hypocritical” in ies attitude to cultural industries. As noted above, the government announced 2 plan to support “cultural technology” (CT). On examination of the actual budget spending, the CT sector only accounted for 0.6% while the IT sector received 22.5% ‘of the total amount that the government spent on the “six key technologies” after the government's announcement (Korea Culture and Tourism Policy Institute, 2005). Some even argue that the govemmment's publiciey campaigns for the Korean Wave, such as the Korean Embasyy-sponsored road shows of Korean films, or the Korean Overseas Information Service's (which is under the Government Information Agency) provision of television dramas to The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 29 broadcasting networks in Egypt or Mongolia free of charge, only caused backlash against Korean popular culture among some foreign audiences (Ko, 2005a; Ko, 2008; Li, 2008). Government policies ave not aways been implemented smoothly at home. The “compulsory television programming oussourcing system” is a case in point. In expectation of the commercially motivated competitive television environment in the 1990s, the government adopted a measure to censure television programming diversity. In 1991 the goverament began enforcing the “outsourcing system” on terrestrial broadcasting channels so ‘that up to 3% ofall broadcasting programs should be supplied by independent production companies. Thereafter, annual increments in terms of the percentage of ousourced programming fad been putin force, finally reaching 35% on MBC and SBS, and 30% on KBS in 2004 (Ministry of Culture and “Tourism, 2008) ‘One may argue that this system contributed to an engendering of the Korean Wave since regionally popular television dramas like Winter Sonata, Lovers in Pars and Love Story in Harvard came fiom independent producers. However, there have been frictions in practicing this programming, outsourcing system. While the television networks understand the ‘government's intention ofthe system, they have a view that the latter is pushing. the system without fall consideration ofthe reality. Infact, most independent production companies ae small-sized and ill-equipped in terms of manpower, facilities, and financial conditions. Although there were 416 independent prodhiction companies registered with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism as of May 2004, 48.1% had not produced and supplied any programs to @ broadcasting network in the period of 2001 and 2004 (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005). When the networks make deals with independent production companies for program provision, they have to supervise the indies from program planning to actual production and post-production stages. In most cases, broaceasters also provide production equipment tothe indies. In this situation, the three television networks have resisted the compulsory programming outsourcing system itself and the government policy to push up the rate of outsourced programs on terrestrial television (Yi, Man-je, 2004) ‘Since the relationships between networks and independent productions are not on equal terns, it is reported that unfair “subcontracting” practices prevail benween them. For example, some independent producers are forced to make a contract in which a broadcasting network pays to them an amount of ess than half the actual production cost Itis ako reported thatthe networks have even “threatened” the indies with curtailing the payment specified in contract Further, once the indies’ programs are broadeast on terrestrial,ie 30 Dobe Shim copyrights of these programs are largely transferred to the networks, As of 2004, the three network broadcasters — KBS, MBC and SBS — owned 91, 2% of outsourced programs’ copyrights (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005). Therefore, while KBS enjoyed a net profit of more than 2 billion won froma television drama Full Howse staring Song Hyegyo and pop sensation Rain (‘Bi’), its production company is known to have put out a deficit (Yi, ‘Man-je, 2004). In order to correct this unfair relationship between network broadcasters and independent production houses, the Ministry of Culture and ‘Tourism is considering seting: up a new terrestrial channel which will air programs exclusively produced by independent productions (Ministry of | Culture and Tourism, 2005). Conclusion and Discussion ‘Whar the so-called Bae Yong Jun findom (or, “Yon-sama syndrome") fn Japan may cause an average Korean citizen like rte to feel would be “puzzled pleasure”... While we eel proud of ourselves, the longtime cultural importer, having become a cultural exporter, we are puzzled 36 ‘to what in our culture is enchanting the foreigners. (Lee, 2004) This seatement from a current affairs magazine nicely depicts Koreans’ reaction, to the Korean Wave phenomenon. Korea has long waged a struggle for cultural continuity, confronted by a series of threats of foreign cultural domination. Because of a deep-seated “underdog” consciodsness in terms of | cultural exchanges, it was not easy for them to believe the extent of Korean op culture being popularly consumed in other countries In fact, even the Korean government did not have a clear vision for popular cultural exports. Although it began to support domestic cultural industries in the 1990s, it was largely on the defensive. While the government ‘might be credited with drawing up policies to bring new players and funding, sources into the industry, many commentators and industry players in Korea tend to discount the government's contebution in engendering the Korean Wave. They even remarked that the government only jumped on the bandwagon when the phenomenon became very apparent, Rather, they gave treater credit to the roles of directors, planners, writers, actors and other production crews, avid fans, ancl pathbreaking traders in the growth of Korean popular culture and its international reach (The Sisa Press, 2003), In addition, the changing global and regional mediascape acted favourably on Korean popular cultural exports, In the end, Jeon Hyeon-tack, head of the Export The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave 31 Strategy Team at the Korea Culture and Content Agency, acknowledges that the Korean Wave phenomenon is an “unintended succes (Joong-Ang lo, 2008). ‘The much feared takeover of Korean culeure by foreign images brought bby imported media was not realized ‘Im, 2000). Local audiences, who had been longing for an alternative to Hollywood fire, welcomed new Korean ‘movies and television dramas, which rot only connected with their everyday lives but also achieved technical sopkistication. In January 2006, however, the Korean government announced its plan to halve the screen quota for domestic movies from 146 days to 73 chys fom July 2006 under USS, pressure. Domestic actors, directors and other members of film erews putt up protests, arguing for the necesity of maintaining the existing level of the screen quota policy to counterbalance Hollywood blockbusters (Kim, 2006). Despite the strong opposition from filmmakers, she Cabinet passed a bill to halve the screen quota in March 2006, The original problernatics which surrounded the Korean cultural industries decades ago are still round, ‘What cultural and politcal meanings can we elicit fom the Korean Wave phenomenon on the intemational level? For most Asians, other locales of Asia have long been the unknown, As Waterman and Rogers (1994) called American culture “the common denominator” of popular culture in East Asia, ‘most Asians have long referred to the West for melodramatic imagination as ‘well as for modemization. However, in the 2lst century, we are consuming images that originated from Japan, Thailand and Korea, The vitality of East Asian popular culture is growing, evidenced in the success of Japanese television drama and animation, Hong Kong and Thai movies, and what is, called the Korean Wave. These changes are meaningfal for regional cutaral exchanges that have long been denied their prosperity or existence by the dominance of a hegemonic global culture. Now, the dialogue among Asians thas begun