1.) GAMBOA VS TEVES Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale fifty years.

r of PLDT, the sale fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or
by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent right be granted except under the condition that
FACTS: In 1969, General Telephone and
of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
Electronics Corporation (GTE), sold 26 percent
million shares or about 6.3 percent of the repeal by the Congress when the common good
of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to
outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the so requires. The State shall encourage equity
Philippine Telecommunications Investment
sale, First Pacific common shareholdings in participation in public utilities by the general
Corporation (PTIC). In 1977, Prime Holdings,
PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, public. The participation of foreign investors in
Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares
thereby increasing the common shareholdings of the governing body of any public utility
of stock of PTIC. In 1986, the 111,415 shares of
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This, enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by
according to petitioner, violates Section 11, share in its capital, and all the executive and
the Presidential Commission on Good
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution managing officers of such corporation or
Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares,
which limits foreign ownership of the capital of association must be citizens of the Philippines.
which represent about 46.125 percent of the
a public utility to not more than 40 percent.
outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in
declared by this Court to be owned by the
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant imposing limitations and restrictions on fully
Republic of the Philippines.
petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory nationalized and partially nationalized activities
relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the is for Filipino nationals to be always in control
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered
111,415 PTIC shares. of the corporation undertaking said activities.
acquired the remaining 54 percent of the
Otherwise, if the Trial Court ruling upholding
outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20
ISSUE: Does the term "capital" in Section 11, respondent's arguments were to be given
November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization
Article XII of the Constitution refer to the credence, it would be possible for the ownership
Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government
total common shares only or to the total structure of a public utility corporation to be
through a public bidding sold the same shares to
outstanding capital stock of PLDT, a public divided into one percent (1%) common stocks
Parallax Venture who won with a bid of P25.6
utility? and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred stocks.
billion or US$510 million.
Following the Trial Court ruling adopting
HELD: Section 11, Article XII (National respondent's arguments, the common shares can
Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would
Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an
exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC
Constitution mandates the Filipinization of absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are
stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by
public utilities, to wit: supposed to be minority shareholders, control
matching the bid price of Parallax. On 14
the public utility corporation.
February 2007, First Pacific, through its
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any
subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional
other form of authorization for the operation of a The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of
Sale and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415
public utility shall be granted except to citizens the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the
of the Philippines or to corporations or entitled to vote in the election of directors, and
outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with the
associations organized under the laws of the thus in the present case only to common shares,
Philippine Government for the price of
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose and not to the total outstanding capital stock
P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The sale
capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such comprising both common and non-voting
was completed on 28 February 2007.
franchise, certificate, or authorization be preferred shares.
exclusive in character or for a longer period than
1
2. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. P-04-1795 March 25, 2009
[Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 02-1447-P]
ROQUE R. MARTINEZ, MARIA ELENA
M. FELIPE, ROBERT R. MIñANO,
ROSALINDA G. MACASA and CIRIACO
D. MARIVELES, JR., Complainants,
vs.
NORVELL R. LIM, Sheriff III, Regional
Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch
81, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This complaint involves two interrelated
administrative charges against respondent
Norvell R. Lim, Sheriff III of the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81.
On March 11, 2002, respondent sent a letter to
Arsenio
R.M. Almaddin, officer-in-charge of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Romblon
stating:
I wish to inform you that today, Monday, March
11, 2002, at 8 a.m., and for the month of March
2002, [it] is the turn of the [OPP] to lead the flag
ceremony.
However, this morning, this was not done
because none of the personnel of your office was
present.
We hope that we would be able to look forward
to seeing all the personnel of [the OPP] in the
Hall of Justice, Romblon, Romblon, participate
in [the flag ceremony] every Monday morning
and Friday afternoon.1
On May 16, 2002 complainants Roque R.
Martinez, Maria Elena M. Felipe, Robert R.
Miñano, Rosalinda G. Macasa and Ciriaco D.
Mariveles, Jr., all employees of the OPP, filed
an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct against respondent in the Office of
the Ombudsman.2 They asserted that
respondent’s March 11, 2002 letter portrayed
them as unpatriotic Filipinos, tarnished their
reputation as public officers and cast dishonor,
disrepute and contempt on their persons.
Respondent explained that, in the absence of the
presiding judge, he was the administrative
officer-in-charge of the Hall of Justice. As such,
it was his duty to require complainants to attend
the flag ceremony. Thus, he wrote Almaddin to
remind him that the OPP had been assigned to
lead the flag ceremony for the month of March
2002 and to inform him that no one from his
office attended the ceremony that morning.
Respondent denied ill-will against complainants.
Subsequently, complainants filed another
complaint against respondent charging him of
violation of PD3 264 which provides:
(1) Judges of the Courts of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, Courts of
Agrarian Relations, Court of Industrial
Relations, Military Tribunals and City and
Municipal Courts, may transmit in the
mail, free of charge, all official
communications and papers directly
connected with the conduct of judicial
proceedings.
(2) The envelope or wrapper of the privileged
mail matter shall bear on the left upper corner
the name, official designation and station of the
official sending such mail matter and on the
right upper corner, the words: "Private or
unauthorized use to avoid payment of postage
is penalized by fine or imprisonment or both."
(emphasis supplied)
Complainants stated that respondent did not pay
for postage stamps when he mailed copies of his
counter-affidavit to them. Since the mailed
matter neither involved a court process nor was
in any way connected to the conduct of judicial
proceedings, he was guilty of violating the said
decree.
Respondent asserted that the allegations against
him were baseless. In fact, the Ombudsman
dismissed for lack of probable cause the
complaint for violation of PD 26.5
But the Ombudsman referred the administrative
aspect of the complaints against respondent to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).6
With regard to the complaint for grave
misconduct, the OCA found that respondent
bore no malice when he sent the March 11, 2002
letter. It noted:
There is nothing in the letter that is suggestive of
complainants’ lack of patriotism as to impute
bad faith on the part of respondent. Respondent
was merely expressing his concern so that any
similar incident may not happen again mindful
of everyone’s bounden duty to express and
2
manifest their patriotism and love of country and
respect for the flag.
Thus, it recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.
With regard to the complaint for violation of PD
26, the OCA found that respondent mailed his
counter-affidavit in the previous complaint (for
grave misconduct) using envelopes intended for
free postage. Inasmuch as the mailed matter was
not an official communication related to the
conduct of judicial proceedings, respondent was
guilty of violating the law. Hence, it
recommended that complainant be fined ₱1,000.
We adopt the findings of the OCA with a
modification of the penalty.
Misconduct implies wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment; an act that is corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or a
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.7
Flag ceremonies inspire patriotism and evoke
the finest sentiments of love of country and
people.8 Section 18 of RA9 8491 provides:
Section 18. All government offices and
educational institutions shall henceforth observe
the flag-raising ceremony every Monday
morning and the flag lowering ceremony every
Friday afternoon. The ceremony shall be simple
and dignified and shall include the playing or
singing of the Philippine National Anthem.
Pursuant to this mandate, Supreme Court
Circular No. 62-2001 (dated September 21,
2001) provides:
All Executive Judges shall supervise the holding
of the flag raising and flag lowering ceremonies
in their respective Hall of Justice buildings or
courthouses and shall ensure the attendance of
all judges and court personnel in the rites.
In deference to these mandates, the Chief State
Prosecutor directed the personnel of the OPP to
attend the flag ceremony.10lawphil.net
Consequently, as administrative officer-in-
charge of the Hall of Justice of Romblon,
respondent was duty-bound to remind the
employees to attend the flag ceremony.
Furthermore, the March 11, 2002 letter (quoted
above) was courteously written. Respondent
neither used offensive language nor insinuated
that complainants were unpatriotic. Thus, there
was no misconduct on the part of respondent.
Nonetheless, we agree that respondent violated
PD 26. In Bernadez v. Montejar,11 we held that
the franking privilege granted by PD 26
extended only to judges and referred to official
communications and papers directly connected
with the conduct of judicial
proceedings.12 Respondent was not a judge nor
was the mailed matter related to the discharge of
judicial functions. Thus, respondent violated PD
26 for which a fine of ₱500 should be imposed
on him. Considering that respondent
compulsorily retired on September 7, 2003, the
fine of ₱500 shall be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for grave
misconduct against Sheriff Norvell R. Lim is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit. But he is
found guilty of violating Presidential Decree No.
26 and is hereby fined ₱500 which shall be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
3
3.
Friday, June 08, 2018
CASE DIGEST: MAGDALO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190793 : June 19, 2012
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO)
filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based
in the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and
Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO
where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago
should be refused registration in accordance
with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution.
It is common knowledge that the partys
organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in
the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on
July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian
personnel were held hostage. This and the fact
that they were in full battle gear at the time of
the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means
to achieve their goals in the process defying the
laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc
for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation
and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23
December 2009, in which it clarified its
intention to participate in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections as a party-list
group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the Petition
for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the
ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals
through violent or unlawful means?
HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: election
To join electoral contests, a party or
organization must undergo the two-step process
of registration and accreditation, as this Court
explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows
juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to
the privileged participation that our election
laws grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a
registered political party, organization or
coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must
first take place before a request for accreditation
can be made. Once registration has been carried
out, accreditation is the next natural step to
follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987
Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means" shall be
denied registration. This disqualification is
reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which
provides that "no political party which seeks to
achieve its goal through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of
force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes
physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of
force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against
public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful
act is one that is contrary to law and need not be
a crime, considering that the latter must still
unite with evil intent for it to exist.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5)
of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in
the COMELEC to register political parties and
ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate
in the elections is purely administrative in
character. In exercising this authority, the
COMELEC only has to assess whether the party
or organization seeking registration or
accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not
necessarily criminal in nature. Although this
process does not entail any determination of
administrative liability, as it is only limited to
the evaluation of qualifications for registration,
the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is
nonetheless analogously applicable.
DISMISSED
4
4. JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV.
ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as
Governor of Sulu, et al.
G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN BANC
(Sereno, J.)
The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another of cial, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justi ed by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code.
Three members from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial
Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio
Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly
inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu
Provincial Jail when they were seized by three
armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A
Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu
Crisis Management Committee (Committee)
was then formed to investigate the kidnapping
incident. The Committee convened under the
leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan,
the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan
issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009,
declaring a state of emergency in the province of
Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration,
describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on
the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon
the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon
the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force
(CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that
Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1
and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE: Can a governor exercise the calling-out
powers of a President?
RULING: NO.
It has already been established that there is one
repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks
of executive power, it is granted to the President
and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the
President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section
23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as
what became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Springing
from the well-entrenched constitutional precept
of One President is the notion that there are
certain acts which, by their very nature, may
only be performed by the president as the Head
of the State.
One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of
Commander-in-Chief Powers to which the
“calling-out” powers constitutes a portion. The
power to declare a state of martial law is subject
to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the
factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the
calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity
than the power to declare martial law, is
bestowed upon the President alone.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military, making the civilian president the
nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect
of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article
VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the
armed forces. The Constitution does not require
that the President must be possessed of military
training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief,
he has the power to direct military operations
and to determine military strategy. Normally, he
would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military
experts; but the ultimate power is his.
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that
the calling-out powers belong solely to the
President as commander-in-chief: When the
President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom.
Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6,
Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The
State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and
5
civilian in character, to be administered and be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of
controlled by a national police commission. The the Local Government Code.
authority of local executives over the police
Respondents, however, justify this stance by
units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
stating that nowhere in the seminal case of
law.” A local chief executive, such as the
David v. Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the
provincial governor, exercises operational
issue of the declaration of a state of emergency,
supervision over the police, and may exercise
does it limit the said authority to the President
control only in day-to-day operations.
alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in
Furthermore according to the framers, it is still
David expressly limits the authority to declare a
the President who is authorized to exercise
national emergency, a condition which covers
supervision and control over the police, through
the entire country, and does not include
the National Police Commission.
emergency situations in local government units.
In the discussions of the Constitutional This claim is belied by the clear intent of the
Commission regarding the above provision it is framers that in all situations involving threats to
clear that the framers never intended for local security, such as lawless violence, invasion or
chief executives to exercise unbridled control rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the
over the police in emergency situations. This is President who possesses the sole authority to
without prejudice to their authority over police exercise calling-out powers.
units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and
their prerogative to seek assistance from the
police in day to day situations, as contemplated
by the Constitutional Commission. But as a
civilian agency of the government, the police,
through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not
endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police,
and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The
calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the
local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not

6
5.