1
the rear left side of the Subsequently on 2
MAURICIO MANLICLIC The vehicles involved in
and PHILIPPINE this case are: (1)
RABBIT BUS LINES, Philippine Rabbit Bus
INC., Petitioners, No. 353 with plate
vs. number CVD-478,
MODESTO owned by petitioner
CALAUNAN, PRBLI and driven by
Respondent. petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic; and (2)
owner-type jeep with
DECISION plate number PER-290,
owned by respondent
Modesto Calaunan and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
Assailed before Us is
the decision1 of the At around 6:00 to 7:00
Court of Appeals in o’clock in the morning of
CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 12 July 1988,
which affirmed in toto respondent Calaunan,
the decision2 of the together with Marcelo
Regional Trial Court Mendoza, was on his
(RTC) of Dagupan City, way to Manila from
Branch 42, in Civil Case Pangasinan on board
No. D-10086, finding his owner-type jeep. The
petitioners Mauricio Philippine Rabbit Bus
Manliclic and Philippine was likewise bound for
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. Manila from Concepcion,
(PRBLI) solidarily liable Tarlac. At approximately
to pay damages and Kilometer 40 of the
attorney’s fees to North Luzon
respondent Modesto Expressway in Barangay
Calaunan. Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The
The factual antecedents front right side of the
are as follows: Philippine Rabbit Bus hit
jeep causing the latter to December 1991,
move to the shoulder on respondent filed a 4. The extent of the Francisco Tuliao
the right and then fall on complaint for damages injuries suffered by testified that his
a ditch with water against petitioners plaintiff Modesto brother-in-law,
resulting to further Manliclic and PRBLI Calaunan and the respondent Calaunan,
extensive damage. The before the RTC of existence of the medical left for abroad sometime
bus veered to the left Dagupan City, docketed certificate; in November, 1989 and
and stopped 7 to 8 as Civil Case No. has not returned since
meters from point of D-10086. The criminal then. Rogelio Ramos
collision. case was tried ahead of 5. That both vehicles took the stand and said
the civil case. Among were going towards the that his brother,
those who testified in the south; the private jeep Fernando Ramos, left
Respondent suffered criminal case were being ahead of the bus; for Amman, Jordan, to
minor injuries while his respondent Calaunan, work. Rosalia Mendoza
driver was unhurt. He Marcelo Mendoza and testified that her
was first brought for Fernando Ramos. 6. That the weather was husband, Marcelo
treatment to the Manila fair and the road was Mendoza, left their
Central University well paved and straight, residence to look for a
Hospital in Kalookan In the civil case (now although there was a job. She narrated that
City by Oscar Buan, the before this Court), the ditch on the right side she thought her
conductor of the parties admitted the where the jeep fell into.3 husband went to his
Philippine Rabbit Bus, following: hometown in Panique,
and was later Tarlac, when he did not
transferred to the When the civil case was return after one month.
Veterans Memorial 1. The parties agreed on heard, counsel for She went to her
Medical Center. the capacity of the respondent prayed that husband’s hometown to
parties to sue and be the transcripts of look for him but she was
sued as well as the stenographic notes informed that he did not
By reason of such venue and the identities (TSNs)4 of the go there.1awphil.net
collision, a criminal case of the vehicles involved; testimonies of
was filed before the RTC respondent Calaunan,
of Malolos, Bulacan, Marcelo Mendoza and The trial court
charging petitioner 2. The identity of the Fernando Ramos in the subpoenaed the Clerk of
Manliclic with Reckless drivers and the fact that criminal case be Court of Branch 8, RTC,
Imprudence Resulting in they are duly licensed; received in evidence in Malolos, Bulacan, the
Damage to Property with the civil case in as much court where Criminal
Physical Injuries, as these witnesses are Case No. 684-M-89 was
docketed as Crim. Case 3. The date and place of not available to testify in tried, to bring the TSNs
No. 684-M-89. the vehicular collision; the civil case. of the testimonies of

respondent Calaunan,5
Marcelo Mendoza6 and
Fernando Ramos7 in
said case, together with
other documentary
evidence marked therein.
Instead of the Branch
Clerk of Court, it was
Enrique Santos Guevara,
Court Interpreter, who
appeared before the
court and identified the
TSNs of the three
afore-named witnesses
and other pertinent
documents he had
brought.8 Counsel for
respondent wanted to
mark other TSNs and
documents from the said
criminal case to be
adopted in the instant
case, but since the
same were not brought
to the trial court, counsel
for petitioners
compromised that said
TSNs and documents
could be offered by
counsel for respondent
as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants,
petitioner Manliclic and
bus conductor Oscar
Buan testified. The
TSN9 of the testimony of
Donato Ganiban,
investigator of the
PRBLI, in Criminal Case The parties differed only
No. 684-M-89 was on the manner the
marked and allowed to collision between the
be adopted in the civil two (2) vehicles took
case on the ground that place. According to the
he was already dead. plaintiff and his driver,
the jeep was cruising at
the speed of 60 to 70
Respondent further kilometers per hour on
marked, among other the slow lane of the
documents, as rebuttal expressway when the
evidence, the TSNs10 of Philippine Rabbit Bus
the testimonies of overtook the jeep and in
Donato Ganiban, Oscar the process of
Buan and petitioner overtaking the jeep, the
Manliclic in Criminal Philippine Rabbit Bus hit
Case No. 684-M-89. the rear of the jeep on
the left side. At the time
the Philippine Rabbit
The disagreement arises Bus hit the jeep, it was
from the question: Who about to overtake the
is to be held liable for jeep. In other words, the
the collision? Philippine Rabbit Bus
was still at the back of
the jeep when the jeep
Respondent insists it was hit. Fernando
was petitioner Manliclic Ramos corroborated the
who should be liable testimony of the plaintiff
while the latter is and Marcelo Mendoza.
resolute in saying it was He said that he was on
the former who caused another jeep following
the smash up. the Philippine Rabbit
Bus and the jeep of
plaintiff when the
The versions of the incident took place. He
parties are summarized said, the jeep of the
by the trial court as plaintiff overtook them
follows: and the said jeep of the
plaintiff was followed by
the Philippine Rabbit
Bus which was running
very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in
which he was riding.
After that, he heard a
loud sound. He saw the
jeep of the plaintiff
swerved to the right on a
grassy portion of the
road. The Philippine
Rabbit Bus stopped and
they overtook the
Philippine Rabbit Bus so
that it could not moved
(sic), meaning they
stopped in front of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus.
He testified that the jeep
of plaintiff swerved to
the right because it was
bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus
from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic
and his driver, Oscar
Buan admitted that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep in
question. However, they
explained that when the
Philippine Rabbit bus
was about to go to the
left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep
swerved to the left
because it was to
overtake another jeep in
front of it. Such was their
testimony before the
RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before
this Court in the instant
case. [Thus, which of the
two versions of the
manner how the collision
took place was correct,
would be determinative
of who between the two
drivers was negligent in
the operation of their
respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI
maintained that it
observed and exercised
the diligence of a good
father of a family in the
selection and
supervision of its
employee, specifically
petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the
trial court rendered its
decision in favor of
respondent Calaunan
and against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI.
The dispositive portion
of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants
2
ordering the said
defendants to pay
plaintiff jointly and
solidarily the amount of
P40,838.00 as actual
damages for the towing
as well as the repair and
the materials used for
the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00
as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and
P15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees,
including appearance
fees of the lawyer. In
addition, the defendants
are also to pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the
decision via Notice of
Appeal to the Court of
Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28
September 2001, the
Court of Appeals, finding
no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court,
affirmed it in all
respects.14
Petitioners are now
before us by way of
petition for review
assailing the decision of
 3

the Court of Appeals. THE COURT OF children, Virgilio following requisites must Criminal Case No. the right to object is
They assign as errors APPEALS ERRED ON Calaunan, Carmelita be satisfied: (a) the 684-M-89, had no merely a privilege which
the following: A QUESTION OF LAW Honeycomb, Evelyn witness is dead or opportunity to the party may waive.
IN AFFIRMING THE Calaunan, Marko unable to testify; (b) his cross-examine the three Thus, a failure to except
TRIAL COURT’S Calaunan and Liwayway testimony or deposition witnesses in said case. to the evidence because
I UNFAIR DISREGARD Calaunan.15 was given in a former The criminal case was it does not conform to
OF HEREIN case or proceeding, filed exclusively against the statute is a waiver of
PETITIONER PRBL’s judicial or administrative, petitioner Manliclic, the provisions of the law.
THE COURT OF DEFENSE OF In their Reply to between the same petitioner PRBLI’s Even assuming ex gratia
APPEALS ERRED ON EXERCISE OF DUE respondent’s Comment, parties or those employee. The cases argumenti that these
A QUESTION OF LAW DILIGENCE IN THE petitioners informed this representing the same dealing with the documents are
IN AFFIRMING THE SELECTION AND Court of a Decision16 of interests; (c) the former subsidiary liability of inadmissible for being
TRIAL COURT’S SUPERVISION OF ITS the Court of Appeals case involved the same employers uniformly hearsay, but on account
QUESTIONABLE EMPLOYEES. acquitting petitioner subject as that in the declare that, strictly of failure to object
ADMISSION IN Manliclic of the present case, although speaking, they are not thereto, the same may
EVIDENCE OF THE charge17 of Reckless on different causes of parties to the criminal be admitted and
TSN’s AND OTHER IV Imprudence Resulting in action; (d) the issue cases instituted against considered as sufficient
DOCUMENTS Damage to Property with testified to by the their employees.23 to prove the facts therein
PRESENTED IN THE Physical Injuries witness in the former asserted.24 Hearsay
CRIMINAL CASE. THE COURT OF attaching thereto a trial is the same issue evidence alone may be
APPEALS ERRED ON photocopy thereof. involved in the present Notwithstanding the fact insufficient to establish a
A QUESTION OF LAW case; and (e) the that petitioner PRBLI fact in a suit but, when
II IN AFFIRMING THE adverse party had an was not a party in said no objection is made
TRIAL COURT’S On the first assigned opportunity to criminal case, the thereto, it is, like any
QUESTIONABLE error, petitioners argue cross-examine the testimonies of the three other evidence, to be
THE COURT OF AWARD OF DAMAGES that the TSNs containing witness in the former witnesses are still considered and given
APPEALS ERRED ON AND ATTORNEY’S the testimonies of case.22 admissible on the the importance it
A QUESTION OF LAW FEE. respondent Calaunan,18 ground that petitioner deserves.25
IN AFFIRMING THE Marcelo Mendoza19 PRBLI failed to object on
TRIAL COURT’S and Fernando Ramos20 Admittedly, respondent their admissibility.
RELIANCE ON THE With the passing away should not be admitted failed to show the In the case at bar,
VERSION OF THE of respondent Calaunan in evidence for failure of concurrence of all the petitioner PRBLI did not
RESPONDENT ON during the pendency of respondent to comply requisites set forth by It is elementary that an object to the TSNs
HOW THE ACCIDENT this appeal with this with the requisites of the Rules for a testimony objection shall be made containing the
SUPPOSEDLY Court, we granted the Section 47, Rule 130 of given in a former case or at the time when an testimonies of
OCCURRED. Motion for the the Rules of Court. proceeding to be alleged inadmissible respondent Calaunan,
Substitution of admissible as an document is offered in Marcelo Mendoza and
Respondent filed by his exception to the hearsay evidence; otherwise, the Fernando Ramos in the
III wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate For Section 47, Rule rule. Petitioner PRBLI, objection shall be criminal case when the
Vda. De Calaunan, and 13021 to apply, the not being a party in treated as waived, since same were offered in
 4

evidence in the trial Marcelo Mendoza and another case despite witnesses that have Manliclic was sued for then being driven by one
court. In fact, the TSNs Fernando Ramos in the therein petitioner’s been admitted. his negligence or Mauricio Manliclic of
of the testimonies of criminal case and to assertion that he would Accordingly, they shall reckless imprudence in San Jose, Concepcion,
Calaunan and Mendoza admit the TSN of the be denied due process. be given the same causing the collision, Tarlac, who was then
were admitted by both testimony of Ganiban In admitting the TSN, the weight as that to which while petitioner PRBLI travelling recklessly at a
petitioners.26 Moreover, would be unfair. Court ruled that the the testimony may be was sued for its failure to very fast speed and had
petitioner PRBLI even raising of denial of due entitled.29 exercise the diligence of apparently lost control of
offered in evidence the process in relation to a good father in the his vehicle;
TSN containing the We do not subscribe to Section 47, Rule 130 of selection and
testimony of Donato petitioner PRBLI’s the Rules of Court, as a On the second assigned supervision of its
Ganiban in the criminal argument that it will be ground for objecting to error, petitioners employees, particularly "6. That as a result of
case. If petitioner PRBLI denied due process the admissibility of the contend that the version petitioner Manliclic. The the impact of the
argues that the TSNs of when the TSNs of the TSN was belatedly done. of petitioner Manliclic as allegations read: collision the
the testimonies of testimonies of Calaunan, In so doing, therein to how the accident above-described motor
plaintiff’s witnesses in Marcelo Mendoza and petitioner waived his occurred is more vehicle was forced off
the criminal case should Fernando Ramos in the right to object based on credible than "4. That sometime on the North Luzon Express
not be admitted in the criminal case are to be said ground. respondent’s version. July 12, 1988 at around Way towards the
instant case, why then admitted in the civil case. They anchor their 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was rightside where it fell on
did it offer the TSN of It is too late for petitioner contention on the fact on board the its driver’s side on a
the testimony of PRBLI to raise denial of Petitioners contend that that petitioner Manliclic above-described motor ditch, and that as a
Ganiban which was due process in relation the documents in the was acquitted by the vehicle travelling at a consequence, the
given in the criminal to Section 47, Rule 130 criminal case should not Court of Appeals of the moderate speed along above-described motor
case? It appears that of the Rules of Court, as have been admitted in charge of Reckless the North Luzon vehicle which maybe
petitioner PRBLI wants a ground for objecting to the instant civil case Imprudence Resulting in Expressway heading valued at EIGHTY
to have its cake and eat the admissibility of the because Section 47 of Damage to Property with South towards Manila THOUSAND PESOS
it too. It cannot argue TSNs. For failure to Rule 130 refers only to Physical Injuries. together with MARCELO (P80,000) was rendered
that the TSNs of the object at the proper time, "testimony or MENDOZA, who was a total wreck as shown
testimonies of the it waived its right to deposition." We find then driving the same; by pictures to be
witnesses of the adverse object that the TSNs did such contention to be To be resolved by the presented during the
party in the criminal not comply with Section untenable. Though said Court is the effect of pre-trial and trial of this
case should not be 47. section speaks only of petitioner Manliclic’s "5. That approximately case;
admitted and at the testimony and acquittal in the civil case. at kilometer 40 of the
same time insist that the deposition, it does not North Luzon Express
TSN of the testimony of In Mangio v. Court of mean that documents Way, the "7. That also as a result
the witness for the Appeals,27 this Court, from a former case or From the complaint, it above-described motor of said incident, plaintiff
accused be admitted in through Associate proceeding cannot be can be gathered that the vehicle was suddenly sustained bodily injuries
its favor. To disallow Justice Reynato S. admitted. Said civil case for damages bumped from behind by which compounded
admission in evidence of Puno,28 admitted in documents can be was one arising from, or a Philippine Rabbit Bus plaintiff’s frail physical
the TSNs of the evidence a TSN of the admitted they being part based on, with Body No. 353 and condition and required
testimonies of Calaunan, testimony of a witness in of the testimonies of quasi-delict.30 Petitioner with plate No. CVD 478 his hospitalization from

July 12, 1988 up to and
until July 22, 1988, copy
of the medical certificate
is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and made an
integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular
collision resulting in the
total wreckage of the
above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily
(sic) sustained by
plaintiff, was solely due
to the reckless
imprudence of the
defendant driver
Mauricio Manliclic who
drove his Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a
fast speed without due
regard or observance of
existing traffic rules and
regulations;
"9. That defendant
Philippine Rabbit Bus
Line Corporation failed
to exercise the diligence
of a good father of (sic)
family in the selection
and supervision of its
drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be
held liable for the
collision and be found
negligent
notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court
of Appeals that there
was an absence of
negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner
Manliclic in the criminal
case, the Court of
Appeals said:
To the following findings
of the court a quo, to wit:
that accused-appellant
was negligent "when the
bus he was driving
bumped the jeep from
behind"; that "the
proximate cause of the
accident was his having
driven the bus at a great
speed while closely
following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of
Calaunan’s jeep when it
tried to overtake the
vehicle in front of it was
beyond the control of
accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of
negligence, therefore,
accused-appellant
cannot be held liable for
Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical
Injuries as defined in
Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.32
From the foregoing
declaration of the Court
of Appeals, it appears
that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but
on the ground that he is
not the author of the act
complained of which is
based on Section 2(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure
which reads:
(b) Extinction of the
penal action does not
carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact
from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling,
petitioner Manliclic can
still be held liable for the
mishap. The
afore-quoted section
applies only to a civil
action arising from crime
or ex delicto and not to a
civil action arising from
quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. The extinction
of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2
(b) of Rule 111], refers
exclusively to civil
liability founded on
Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability
for the same act
considered as a carry
quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not
extinguished even by a
declaration in the
criminal case that the
criminal act charged has
not happened or has not
been committed by the
accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under
the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is
entirely apart and
independent from a
delict or crime – a
distinction exists
between the civil liability
arising from a crime and
the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The
same negligence
causing damages may
produce civil liability
arising from a crime
under the Penal Code,
or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under
the Civil Code.34 It is
now settled that acquittal
of the accused, even if
based on a finding that
he is not guilty, does not
with it the
extinction of the civil
liability based on quasi
delict.35
In other words, if an
accused is acquitted
based on reasonable
doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from
the crime may be proved
by preponderance of
evidence only. However,
if an accused is
acquitted on the basis
that he was not the
author of the act or
omission complained of
5
(or that there is
declaration in a final
judgment that the fact
from which the civil
might arise did not exist),
said acquittal closes the
door to civil liability
based on the crime or ex
delicto. In this second
instance, there being no
crime or delict to speak
of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is
not possible. In this case,
a civil action, if any, may
be instituted on grounds
other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability
arising from quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana, same
will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether
it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that
accused was not the
author of the act or
omission complained of
(or that there is
declaration in a final
judgment that the fact
from which the civil
liability might arise did
not exist). The
responsibility arising
from fault or negligence
in a quasi-delict is
entirely separate and

distinct from the civil on the Supreme
liability arising from Court.38 Not being a
negligence under the trier of facts, this Court
Penal Code.36 An will not allow a review
acquittal or conviction in thereof unless:
the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the
civil case37 based on (1) the conclusion is a
quasi-delict or culpa finding grounded entirely
aquiliana. on speculation, surmise
and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is
Petitioners ask us to manifestly mistaken; (3)
give credence to their there is grave abuse of
version of how the discretion; (4) the
collision occurred and to judgment is based on a
disregard that of misapprehension of
respondent’s. facts; (5) the findings of
Petitioners insist that fact are conflicting; (6)
while the PRBLI bus the Court of Appeals
was in the process of went beyond the issues
overtaking respondent’s of the case and its
jeep, the latter, without findings are contrary to
warning, suddenly the admissions of both
swerved to the left (fast) appellant and appellees;
lane in order to overtake (7) the findings of fact of
another jeep ahead of it, the Court of Appeals are
thus causing the contrary to those of the
collision. trial court; (8) said
findings of fact are
conclusions without
As a general rule, citation of specific
questions of fact may evidence on which they
not be raised in a are based; (9) the facts
petition for review. The set forth in the petition
factual findings of the as well as in the
trial court, especially petitioner's main and
when affirmed by the reply briefs are not
appellate court, are disputed by the
binding and conclusive respondents; and (10)
the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are
premised on the
supposed absence of
evidence and
contradicted by the
evidence on record.39
After going over the
evidence on record, we
do not find any of the
exceptions that would
warrant our departure
from the general rule.
We fully agree in the
finding of the trial court,
as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that it was
petitioner Manliclic who
was negligent in driving
the PRBLI bus which
was the cause of the
collision. In giving
credence to the version
of the respondent, the
trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the
two versions of the
manner how the collision
took place was correct,
would be determinative
of who between the two
drivers was negligent in
the operation of their
respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should Philippine Rabbit Bus
be noted that in the was behind the said jeep.
statement of Mauricio In his testimony before
Manliclic (Exh. 15) given the Regional Trial Court
to the Philippine Rabbit in Malolos, Bulacan as
Investigator CV well as in this Court, he
Cabading no mention alleged that the
was made by him about Philippine Rabbit Bus
the fact that the driver of was already on the left
the jeep was overtaking side of the jeep when
another jeep when the the collision took place.
collision took place. The For this inconsistency
allegation that another between his statement
jeep was being and testimony, his
overtaken by the jeep of explanation regarding
Calaunan was testified the manner of how the
to by him only in Crim. collision between the
Case No. 684-M-89 jeep and the bus took
before the Regional Trial place should be taken
Court in Malolos, with caution. It might be
Bulacan and before this true that in the
Court. Evidently, it was a statement of Oscar
product of an Buan given to the
afterthought on the part Philippine Rabbit
of Mauricio Manliclic so Investigator CV
that he could explain Cabading, it was
why he should not be mentioned by the former
held responsible for the that the jeep of plaintiff
incident. His attempt to was in the act of
veer away from the truth overtaking another jeep
was also apparent when when the collision
it would be considered between the latter jeep
that in his statement and the Philippine
given to the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place.
Rabbit Investigator CV But the fact, however,
Cabading (Exh. 15), he that his statement was
alleged that the given on July 15, 1988,
Philippine Rabbit Bus one day after Mauricio
bumped the jeep of Manliclic gave his
Calaunan while the statement should not
6
escape attention. The
one-day difference
between the giving of
the two statements
would be significant
enough to entertain the
possibility of Oscar Buan
having received legal
advise before giving his
statement. Apart from
that, as between his
statement and the
statement of Manliclic
himself, the statement of
the latter should prevail.
Besides, in his Affidavit
of March 10, 1989, (Exh.
14), the unreliability of
the statement of Oscar
Buan (Exh. 13) given to
CV Cabading rear its
"ugly head" when he did
not mention in said
affidavit that the jeep of
Calaunan was trying to
overtake another jeep
when the collision
between the jeep in
question and the
Philippine Rabbit bus
took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the
testimony of the
defendant, Mauricio
Manliclic, and his

conductor, Oscar Buan, employee, there
that the Philippine instantly arises a process that petitioner
Rabbit Bus was already presumption of law that
somewhat parallel to the there was negligence on
jeep when the collision the part of the master or
took place, the point of employer either in the
collision on the jeep selection of the servant
should have been or employee, or in
somewhat on the left supervision over him
side thereof rather than after selection or both.
on its rear. Furthermore, The liability of the
the jeep should have employer under Article
fallen on the road itself 2180 is direct and
rather than having been immediate; it is not
forced off the road. conditioned upon prior
Useless, likewise to recourse against the
emphasize that the negligent employee and
Philippine Rabbit was a prior showing of the
running very fast as insolvency of such
testified to by Ramos employee. Therefore, it
which was not is incumbent upon the
controverted by the private respondents to
defendants.40 prove that they
exercised the diligence
of a good father of a
Having ruled that it was family in the selection
petitioner Manliclic’s and supervision of their
negligence that caused employee.43
the smash up, there
arises the juris tantum
presumption that the In the case at bar,
employer is negligent, petitioner PRBLI
rebuttable only by proof maintains that it had
of observance of the shown that it exercised
diligence of a good the required diligence in
father of a family.41 the selection and
Under Article 218042 of supervision of its
the New Civil Code, employees, particularly
when an injury is caused petitioner Manliclic. In
by the negligence of the the matter of selection, it
7
showed the screening everything that was constant concern of the We emphatically
incumbent on them.44 employer, acting reiterate our holding, as
Manliclic underwent through dependable a warning to all
before he became a supervisors who should employers, that "the
regular driver. As to the In Metro Manila Transit regularly report on their formulation of various
exercise of due diligence Corporation v. Court of supervisory functions. company policies on
in the supervision of its Appeals,45 it was safety without showing
employees, it argues explained that: that they were being
that presence of ready In order that the defense complied with is not
investigators (Ganiban of due diligence in the sufficient to exempt
and Cabading) is Due diligence in the selection and petitioner from liability
sufficient proof that it supervision of supervision of arising from negligence
exercised the required employees on the other employees may be of its employees. It is
due diligence in the hand, includes the deemed sufficient and incumbent upon
supervision of its formulation of suitable plausible, it is not petitioner to show that in
employees. rules and regulations for enough to emptily recruiting and employing
the guidance of invoke the existence of the erring driver the
employees and the said company guidelines recruitment procedures
In the selection of issuance of proper and policies on hiring and company policies on
prospective employees, instructions intended for and supervision. As the efficiency and safety
employers are required the protection of the negligence of the were followed." x x x.
to examine them as to public and persons with employee gives rise to
their qualifications, whom the employer has the presumption of
experience and service relations through his or negligence on the part of The trial court found that
records. In the its employees and the the employer, the latter petitioner PRBLI
supervision of imposition of necessary has the burden of exercised the diligence
employees, the disciplinary measures proving that it has been of a good father of a
employer must formulate upon employees in case diligent not only in the family in the selection
standard operating of breach or as may be selection of employees but not in the
procedures, monitor warranted to ensure the but also in the actual supervision of its
their implementation and performance of acts supervision of their work. employees. It
impose disciplinary indispensable to the The mere allegation of expounded as follows:
measures for the breach business of and the existence of hiring
thereof. To fend off beneficial to their procedures and
vicarious liability, employer. To this, we supervisory policies, From the evidence of
employers must submit add that actual without anything more, the defendants, it seems
concrete proof, including implementation and is decidedly not that the Philippine
documentary evidence, monitoring of consistent sufficient to overcome Rabbit Bus Lines has a
that they complied with compliance with said such presumption. very good procedure of
rules should be the recruiting its driver as
 8

well as in the We agree. The presence For failure to adduce likewise, be lowered to Associate Justice Decision were reached
maintenance of its of ready investigators proof that it exercised P50,000.00.50 The Chairperson in consultation before
vehicles. There is no after the occurrence of the diligence of a good award of P15,000.00 for the case was assigned
evidence though that it the accident is not father of a family in the attorney’s fees and to the writer of the
is as good in the enough to exempt selection and expenses of litigation is MA. ALICIA opinion of the Court’s
supervision of its petitioner PRBLI from supervision of its in order and authorized AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Division.
personnel. There has liability arising from the employees, petitioner by law.51 Associate Justice
been no iota of evidence negligence of petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
introduced by it that Manliclic. Same does responsible for the SR. REYNATO S. PUNO
there are rules not comply with the damages caused by WHEREFORE, Asscociate Justice Chief Justice
promulgated by the bus guidelines set forth in petitioner Manliclic’s premises considered, ATTESTATION
company regarding the the cases negligence. the instant petition for
safe operation of its above-mentioned. The review is DENIED. The
vehicle and in the way presence of the decision of the Court of I attest that the
its driver should manage investigators after the We now go to the award Appeals in CA-G.R. CV conclusions in the above Republic of the
and operate the vehicles accident is not enough of damages. The trial No. 55909 is AFFIRMED Decision were reached Philippines
assigned to them. There supervision. Regular court correctly awarded with the MODIFICATION in consultation before SUPREME COURT
is no showing that supervision of the amount of that (1) the award of the case was assigned Manila
somebody in the bus employees, that is, prior P40,838.00 as actual moral damages shall be to the writer of the EN BANC
company has been to any accident, should damages representing reduced to P50,000.00; opinion of the Court’s G.R. No.
employed to oversee have been shown and the amount paid by and (2) the award of Division. L-11318 Oct
how its driver should established. This, respondent for the exemplary damages ober 26, 1918
behave while operating petitioner failed to do. towing and repair of his shall be lowered to THE MANILA
their vehicles without The lack of supervision jeep.47 As regards the P50,000.00. Costs CONSUELO RAILROAD CO.,
courting incidents similar can further be seen by awards for moral and against petitioners. YNARES-SANTIAGO plaintiff-appellant,
to the herein case. In the fact that there is only exemplary damages, Associate Justice vs.
regard to supervision, it one set of manual same, under the Chairperson, Third LA COMPAÑIA
is not difficult to observe containing the rules and circumstances, must be SO ORDERED. Division TRANSATLANTICA,
that the Philippine regulations for all the modified. The defendant-appellee.
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. drivers of PRBLI. 46 P100,000.00 awarded and
has been negligent as How then can all the by the trial court as MINITA V. CERTIFICATION THE ATLANTIC GULF
an employer and it drivers of petitioner moral damages must be CHICO-NAZARIO & PACIFIC CO.,
should be made PRBLI know and be reduced to Associate Justice defendant-appellant.
responsible for the acts continually informed of P50,000.00.48 Pursuant to Section 13,
William A. Kincaid &
of its employees, the rules and regulations Exemplary damages are Article VIII of the
Thomas L. Hartigan for
particularly the driver when only one manual is imposed by way of WE CONCUR: Constitution, and the
plaintiff-appellant.
involved in this case. being lent to all the example or correction Division Chairperson’s
Lawrence, Ross & Block
drivers? for the public good.49 Attestation, it is hereby
for defendant-appellant
The amount awarded by CONSUELO certified that the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
the trial court must, YNARES-SANTIAGO conclusions in the above
Co.

Gilbert, Cohn & Fisher Atlantic Company
for defendant-appellee consisted in bringing it s
Compañia floating crane alongside
Transatlantica. the Alicante, lifting the
boilers our of the ship's
hold, and transferring
STREET, J.: them to a barge which
In March 1914, the would be placed ready
steamship Alicante, to receive them.
belonging to the Upon the arrival of the
Compañia Alicante, the Atlantic
Transatlantica de company sent out its
Barcelona, arrived at crane in charge of one
Manila with two Leyden. In preparing to
locomotive boilers hoist the first boiler the
aboard, the property of sling was unfortunately
The Manila Railroad adjusted near the middle
Company. The of the boiler, and it was
equipment of the ship for thus raised nearly in an
discharging heavy cargo horizontal position. The
was not sufficiently boiler was too long to
strong to handle these clear the hatch in this
boilers, and it was position, and after one
therefore necessary for end of the boiler had
the Steamship Company emerged on one side of
to procure assistance in the hatch, the other still
the port of Manila. remained below on the
The Atlantic, Gulf and other side. When the
Pacific Company boiler had been gotten
(hereafter called the into this position and
Atlantic Company) was was being hoisted still
accordingly employed further, a river near the
by the Steamship head of the boiler was
Company, as having caught under the edge
probably the best of the hatch. The weight
equipment for this on the crane was thus
purpose of any increased by a strain
contracting company in estimated at fifteen tons
the city. The service to with the result that the
be performed by the cable of the sling parted
and the boiler fell to the
bottom of the ship's hold.
The sling was again
adjusted to the boiler but
instead of being placed
near the middle it was
now slung nearer one of
the ends, as should
have been done at first.
The boiler was gain
lifted; but as it was being
brought up, the bolt at
the end of the derrick
book broke, and again
the boiler fell.
The crane was repaired
and the boiler
discharged, but it was
found to be so badly
damaged that it had to
be reshipped to England
where it was rebuilt, and
afterwards was returned
to Manila. The Railroad
Company's damage by
reason of the cost of
repairs, expenses and
loss of the use of the
boiler proved to be
P23,343.29; and as to
the amount of the
damage so resulting
there is practically no
dispute. To recover
these damages the
present action was
instituted by the Railroad
Company against the
Steamship Company.
the latter caused the
9
Atlantic Company to be which may without crane had possibly been
brought in as a exaggeration be weakened by the jar
codefendant, and denominated gross. The received in the first
insisted that whatever sling was in the first accident. The foreman
liability existed should place improperly was therefore guilty of
be fixed upon the adjusted, and the negligence in attempting
Atlantic Company as an attention of Leyden was to hoist the boiler the
independent contractor at once called to this by second time under the
who had undertaken to the man in charge of the conditions that had thus
discharge the boilers stevedores. developed. It should be
and had become Nevertheless he noted that the operation
responsible for such proceeded and, instead was at all its states
damage as had been of lowering the boiler entirely under Leyden's
done. when it was seen that it control; and, although in
The judge of the Court of could not readily pass the first lift he utilized the
First Instance gave through the hatch, he ship's tackle to aid in
judgment in favor of the attempted to force it hoisting the boiler,
plaintiff against the through; and the ship's everything was done
Atlantic Company, but tackle was brought into under his immediate
the absolved the use to assist in this supervision. There is no
Steamship Company maneuver. The second evidence tending to
from the complaint. The fall was, it appears, show that the first fall of
plaintiff has appealed caused by the the boiler might have
from the action of the weakening of the bolt at been due to any hidden
court in failing to give the head of the derrick defect in the lifting
judgment against the boom, due to the shock apparatus; and if it had
Steamship company, incident to the first not been for the
while the Atlantic accident. This defect additional strain caused
company has appealed was possibly such as not by one end of the boiler
from the judgment to be patent to external catching under the hatch,
against it. observation but we are the operation would
The mishap was of the opinion that a doubtless have been
undoubtedly due, as the person of sufficient skill accomplished without
lower court found, to the to be trusted with the difficulty. The accident is
negligence of one operation of machinery therefore to be attributed
Leyden, the foreman in of this character should to the failure of Leyden
charge; and we may add be trusted with the to exercise the degree of
that the evidence tends operation of machinery care which an ordinarily
to show that his of this character should competent and prudent
negligence was of a type have known that the person would have

exhibited under the
circumstances which
then confronted him.
This conclusion of fact
cannot be refuted; and,
indeed, no attempt is
here made by the
appellant to reverse this
finding of the trial court.
Three questions are
involved in the case,
namely: (1) Is the
steamship company
liable to the plaintiff by
reason of having
delivered the boiler in
question in a damaged
condition? (2) Is the
atlantic company liable
to be made to respond
to the steamship
company for the amount
the latter may be
required to pay to the
plaintiff for the damage
done? Is the Atlantic
company directly liable
to the plaintiff, as the
trial court held?
It will be observed that
the contractual relation
existed between the
railroad company and
the steamship company;
and the duties of the
latter with respect to the
carrying and delivery of
the boilers are to be
discovered by
considering the terms
and legal effect of that
contract. A contractual
relation also existed
between the Steamship
company and the
atlantic company; and
the duties owing by the
latter to the former with
respect to the lifting and
the transferring of the
boiler are likewise to be
discovered by
considering the terms
and legal effect of the
contract between these
parties. On the other
hand, no contractual
relation existed directly
between the Railroad
Company and the
Atlantic Company.
We are all agreed, that,
under the contract for
transportation from
England to Manila, the
Steamship company is
liable to the plaintiff for
the injury done to the
boiler while it was being
discharged from the ship.
The obligation to
transport the boiler
necessarily involves the
duty to convey and
deliver it in a proper
condition according to its
nature, and conformably
with good faith, custom,
and the law (art. 1258,
Civ. Code). The contract
to convey import the
duty to convey and
deliver safely and
securely with reference
to the degree of care
which, under the
circumstances, are
required by law and
custom applicable to the
case. The duty to carry
and to carry safely is all
one.
Such being the contract
of the Steamship
Company, said company
is necessarily liable,
under articles 1103 and
1104 of the Civil Code,
for the consequences of
the omission of the care
necessary to the proper
performance of this
obligation. The contact
to transport and deliver
at the port of Manila a
locomotive boiler, which
was received by it in
proper condition, is not
complied with the
delivery at the port of
destination of a mass of
iron the utility of which
had been destroyed.
Nor does the Steamship
Company escape
liability by reason of the
fact that it employed a
competent independent
contractor to discharge
the boilers. The law
10
applicable to this feature the steamship company, due care in getting the
of the case will be more and secondly, that the boilers out, no
fully discussed further atlantic company should responsibility was
on in this opinion. At this be absolved under the assumed for damage
point we merely observe last paragraph of article done either to ship or
that in the performance 1903 of the civil code, cargo. The intermediary
of this service the inasmuch as it had used who acted as agent for
Atlantic company, and it due care in the selection the Steamship Company
has never yet been held of the employee whose in arranging for the
that the failure to comply negligent act caused the performance of this
with a contractual damage in question. service stoutly denied
obligation can be At the hearing in first that any such terms
excused by showing that instance the Atlantic were announced by the
such delinquency was Company introduced officials or anybody else
due to the negligence of four witnesses to prove connected with the
one to whom the that at the time said Atlantic Company at any
contracting party had company agreed to lift time while the
committed the the boilers out of the arrangements were
performance of the Alicante, as upon other pending.
contract. later occasions, the In the conflict of the
Coming to the question steamship company not evidence, we recognize
of the liability of the be responsible for that, by a
Atlantic Company to damage. The preponderance of the
respond to the vice-president of the evidence, some
Steamship Company for atlantic company reservation or other was
the damages which the testified that hew as made as to the
latter will be compelled present upon the responsibility of the
to pay to the plaintiff, we occasion when the Atlantic Company; was
observe that the defense agent of the Steamship made to the
of the Atlantic company company made responsibility of the
comprises two arrangements for the atlantic company and
contentions, to-wit, first, discharge of the boilers though the agent who
that by the terms of the and he heard the acted on behalf of the
engagement in conversation between steamship company
accordance with which the president and said possibly never
the Atlantic company agent. According to this communicated this
agreed to render the witness the substance of reservation to his
service, all risk incident the agreement was that, principal, the latter
to the discharge of the while the Atlantic should nevertheless be
boilers was assumed by Company would use all held bound thereby. It

thus becomes
necessary to discover
what the exact terms of
this supposed
reservation were.
We think that we must
put aside at once the
words of studies
precision with which the
president of the Atlantic
company could exclude
the possibility of any
liability attaching to his
company, though we
may accept his
statement as showing
that the excepted risk
contemplated breakage
of the lifting equipment.
There is undoubtedly a
larger element of truth in
the more reasonable
statement by the
vice-president of the
company. According to
this witness the contract
combined two features,
namely, an undertaking
on the part of the
Atlantic Company to use
all due care, combined
with a reservation
concerning the
company's liability for
damage.
The Atlantic Company
offered in evidence, a
number of letters which
had been written by it at
different times,
extending over a period that instance as being
of years, in response to too onerous.
inquiries made by other The letters directed to
firms and person in this parties, it may
Manila concerning the observed, would not,
terms upon which the generally speaking, be
Atlantic Company was admissible as against
not accustomed to the plaintiff for the
assume the risk incident purpose of proving that
to such work and a similar reservation was
required the parties for inserted in the contract
whom the service might with it on this occasion;
be rendered either to but if knowledge of such
carry the risk or insure custom is brought home
against it. One such to the steamship
letter, dated nearly four company, the fact that
years prior to the such reservation was
occurrence such letter, commonly made is of
dated nearly four years some probative force.
prior to the occurrences Reference to a number
which gave rise to this of these letters will show
lawsuit, was addressed that no particular
to the Compañia formula was used by the
Transatlantica de Atlantic Company in
Barcelona one of the defining its exemption,
defendants in this case. and the tenor of these
It was stated in this various communications
communication that the differs materially. We
company's derrick would think, however, that
be subject to inspection some of the letters are of
prior to making the lift value as an aid in
but that the Atlantic interpreting the
Company would not reservation which the
assume responsibility for Atlantic Company may
damage that might occur have intended to make.
either to ship or cargo We therefore quote from
from any whatsoever. some of these letters as
The steamship company follows:
rejected the services of
the Atlantic company in
We will use our best
endeavors to carry out
the work successfully
and will ask you to
inspect our plant but we
wish it distinctly
understood that we
cannot assume
responsibility for
damage which may
occur . . . while the lift is
being made. (To Rear
Admiral, U.S.N., Oct. 4,
1909.)
Our quotation is based
on the understanding
that we assume no
responsibility from any
accident which may
happen during our
operations. We always
insert this clause as
precautionary measure,
but we have never had
to avail ourselves of it as
yet and do not expect to
now. (To "El Varadero
de Manila," Nov. 1,
1913.)
As is customary in these
cases, we will use all
precaution as necessary
to handle the gun in a
proper manner. Our
equipment has been
tested and will be again,
before making the lift,
but we do not assume
11
any responsibility for It is not pretended that
damage to the gun ship, negligence on the part of
or cargo. (To Warner, the Atlantic Company or
Barnes & Co., June 7, its employees was
1909.) expressly included in the
excepted risk, and we
The idea expressed in are of the opinion that
these letters is, we think the contract should not
entirely consonant with be understood as
the interpretation which covering such an
the vice-president of the exemption. It is a
company placed upon rudimentary principle
the contract which was that the contractor is
made with the responsible for the work
steamship company executed by persons
upon this occasion, that whom he employees in
is, the company its performance, and this
recognized its duty to expressed in the Civil
exercise due Code in the form of a
supervisory care; and positive rule of law (art.
the exemption from 1596). It is also
liability, whatever may expressly declared by
have been its precise law that liability arising
words had reference to from negligence is
disasters which might demandable in the
result from some fulfillment of all kinds of
inherent hidden defect in obligations (art. 1103,
the lifting apparatus or Civil Code). Every
other unforeseen contract for the
occurrence not directly presentation of service
attributable to therefore has annexed
negligence of the to it, as an inseparable
company in the lifting implicit obligation, the
operations. Neither party duty to exercise due
could have supposed for care in the
a moment that it was accomplishment of the
intended to absolve the work; and no reservation
Atlantic Company from whereby the person
its duty to use due care rendering the services
in the work. seeks to escape from

the consequences of a
violation of this
obligations can viewed
with favor.
Contracts against
liability for negligence
are not favored by law.
In some instances, such
as common carriers,
they are prohibited as
against public policy. In
all cases such contracts
should be construed
strictly, with every
intendment against the
party seeking its
protection. (Crew vs.
Bradstreet Company,
134 Pa. St., 161; 7 L. R.
A., 661; 19 Am. St. Rep.,
681.)
The strictness with
which contracts
conferring such an
unusual exemption are
construed is illustrated in
Bryan vs. Eastern &
Australian S. S. Co. (28
Phil. Rep., 310). The
decision in that case is
not precisely applicable
to the case at bar, since
the court was there
applying the law of a
foreign jurisdiction, and
the question at issue
involved a doctrine
peculiar to contracts of
common carriers.
Nevertheless the case is
instructive as illustrating
the universal attitude of
courts upon the right of a
contracting party to
stipulate against the
consequences of his
own negligence. It there
appeared that the
plaintiff had purchased
from the defendant
company a ticket for the
transportation of himself
and baggage from
Hongkong to Manila By
the terms of the contract
printed in legible type
upon the back of the
ticket it was provided
that the company could
not hold itself
responsible for any loss
or damage to luggage,
under any
circumstances
whatsoever, unless it
had been paid for as
freight. It was held that
this limitation upon the
liability of the defendant
company did not relieve
it from liability of the
defendant company for
negligence of its
servants by which the
baggage of the
passenger was lost.
Said the court: Ordinarily
this language would
seem to be broad
enough to cover every
possible contingency,
including the negligent
act of the defendant's
servants. To so hold,
however, would run
counter to the
established law of
England and the United
States on that subject.
The court then quoted
the following proposition
from the decision of the
King's Bench Division in
Price & Co. vs. Union
Lighterage Co. ([1903],
1 K. B. D., 750, 754):
"An exemption in
general words not
expressly relating to
negligence, even though
the words are wide
enough to include loss
by negligence or default
of carriers' servants'
must be construed as
limiting the liability of the
carrier as assurer, and
not as relieving from the
duty of the exercising
reasonable skill and
care."
Even admitting that,
generally speaking, a
person may stipulate
against liability for the
consequences of
negligence, at least in
those cases where the
negligence is not gross
or willful, the contract
conferring such
exemption must be so
clear as to leave no
room for the operation of
the ordinary rules of
liability consecrated by
experience and
sanctioned by the
express provisions of
law.
If the exemption should
be understood in the
scene that counsel for
the Atlantic Company
now insists it should
bear, that is, as an
absolute exemption from
all responsibility for
negligence, it is evident
that the agreement was
a most inequitable and
unfair one, and hence it
is one that the
steamship company can
not be lightly assumed
to have made.
Understood in that
sense it is the equivalent
of licensing the Atlantic
Company to perform its
tasks in any manner and
fashion that it might
please, and to hold it
harmless from the
consequences.
It is true that, in these
days insurance can
usually be obtained in
the principal ports of
commerce by parties
circumstanced as was
the steamship company
in the case now before
us. But the best
insurance against
disasters of this kind is
found in the exercise of
due care; and the chief
incentive to the exercise
of care is a feeling of
responsibility on the part
of him who undertakes
the work. Naturally the
courts are little inclined
to aid tin the efforts of
contractors to evade this
responsibility.
There may have been in
the minds of the officials
of the Atlantic Company
an idea that the promise
to use due care in the
lifting operations was not
accompanied by a legal
obligation, such promise
being intended merely
for its moral effect as an
assurance to the
steamship company that
the latter might rely upon
competence and
diligence of the
employees of the
Atlantic Company to
accomplish the work in a
12
proper way. The
contract can not be
permitted to operate in
this one-sided manner.
The two features of the
engagement, namely,
the promise to use due
care and the exemption
from liability for damage
should be so construed
as to give some legal
effect to both. The result
is, as already indicated,
that the Atlantic
Company was bound by
its undertaking to use
due care and that he
exemption was intended
to cover accidents use
to hidden defects in the
apparatus or other
unforeseeable
occurrences not having
their origin in the
immediate personal
negligence of the party
in charge of the
operations.
We now proceed to
consider the contention
that the Atlantic
Company under the last
paragraph of article
1903 of the Civil Code,
which declares that the
liability there referred to
shall cease when the
persons mentioned
therein prove that they
employed all the

diligence of a good
father of a family to
avoid the damage. In
this connection the
conclusion of fact must
be conceded in favor of
the Atlantic Company
that it had used proper
care in the selection of
Leyden and that , so far
as the company was
aware, he was a person
to whom might properly
be committed the task of
discharging the boilers.
The answer to the
contention, however is
the obligation of the
Atlantic Company was
created by contract, and
article 1903 is not
applicable to negligence
arising in the course of
the performance of a
contractual obligation.
Article 1903 is
exclusively concerned
with cases where the
negligence arises in the
absence of agreement.
In discussing the liability
of the Steamship
Company to the plaintiff
Railroad Company we
have already shown that
a party is bound to the
full performance of his
contractual
engagements under
articles 1101 et seq. of
the Civil Code, and other following passage from
special provisions of the the opinion of this Court
Code relative to in the well-known case
contractual obligations; of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
and if he falls short of Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil.
complete performance Rep., 359, 365), and in
by reason of his own this quotation we
negligence or that of any reproduce the first
person to whom he may paragraph of here
commit the work, he is presenting a more
liable for the damages correct English version
resulting therefrom. of said passage.
What was there said is
also applicable with The acts to which these
reference to the liability articles are applicable
of the Atlantic Company are understood to be
upon its contract with those not growing out of
the Steamship Company, preexisting duties of the
and the same need not parties to one another.
be here repeated. It is But where relations
desirable, however, in already formed give
this connection, to bring arise to duties, whether
out somewhat more fully springing form contract
the distinction between or quasi-contract, then
negligence in the breaches of those duties
performance of a are subject to articles
contractual obligation 1101, 1103, and 1104 of
(culpa contractual) and the same code. A typical
neligence considered as application of this
an independent source distinction may be found
of obligation between in the consequences of
parties not previously a railway accident due to
bound (culpa aquiliana). defective machinery
This distinction is well supplied by the
established in legal employer. His liability to
jurisprudence and is fully his employee would
recognized in the arise out of the contract
provisions of the Civil for passage, while that
Code. As illustrative of of the injured by-stander
this, we quote the would originate in the
negligent act itself. This
distinction is thus clearly
set forth by Manresa in
his commentary on
article 1093:
"We see with reference
to such obligations, that
culpa, or negligence,
may be understood in
two different senses,
either as culpa,
substantive and
independent, which of
itself constitutes the
source of an obligation
between two person not
formerly bound by any
other obligation; or as an
incident in the
performance of an
obligation which already
existed, and which
increases the liability
arising from the already
existing obligation."
Justice Tracey, the
author of the opinion
from which we have
quoted, proceeds to
observe that Manresa, in
commenting on articles
1101 and 1104, has
described these two
species of negligence as
contractual and
extra-contractual, the
latter being the culpa
aquiliana of the Roman
13
law. "This terminology is demonstrate that the
unreservedly accepted Atlantic Company is
by Sanchez Roman liable to the Steamship
(Derecho Civil, fourth Company for the
section, chapter XI, damages brought upon
article II, No. 12), and the latter by the failure of
the principle stated is the Atlantic company to
supported by decisions use due care in
of the supreme court of discharging the boiler,
Spain,. among them regardless of the fact
those of November 29, that the damage was
11896 (80 caused by the
Jurisprudencia Civil, No. negligence of an
151), and June 27, 1894 employee who was
(75 Jurisprudencia Civil, qualified for the work
No. 182.)" and who had been
The principle that chosen by the Atlantic
negligence in the Company with due care.
performance of a This brings us to the last
contract is not governed question here to be
by article of the Civil answered, which is, Can
Code but rather by the Atlantic Company be
article 1104 of the same held directly liable to the
Code was directly Railroad Company? In
applied by this court in other words, can the
the case of Baer Senior judgement entered in
& Co.'s successors vs. the trial court directly in
Compañía Maritima (6 favor of the plaintiff
Phil. Rep., 215); and the against the Atlantic
same idea has been Company be sustained?
impliedly if not expressly To answer this it is
recognized in other necessary to examine
cases (N. T. Hashim & carefully the legal
Co. vs. Rocha & Co., 18 relations existing
Phil. Rep., 315; Tan between the Atlantic
Chiong Sian vs. Company and the
Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. Railroad Company with
Rep., 152). reference to this affair;
What has been said and we shall for a
suffices in our opinion to moment ignore the

existence of the contract
between the steamship
company and the
atlantic company, to
which the railroad
company was not a
party.
Having regard then to
the bare fact that the
Atlantic Company
undertook to remove the
boiler from the ship's
hold and for this purpose
took the property into its
power and control, there
arose a duty to the
owner to use due care in
the performance of that
service and to avoid
damaging was obviously
in existence before the
negligent act may, if we
still ignore the existence
of the express contract,
be considered as an act
done in violation of this
duty.
The duty thus to use due
care is an implied
obligation, of a quasi
contractual nature, since
it is created by
implication of liability
with which we are here
confronted is somewhat
similar to that which is
revealed in the case of
the depositary, or
commodatary, whose
legal duty with respect to
the property committed In the passage which we
to their care is defined have already from the
by law even in the decision in the Rakes
absence of express case this Court
contract; and it can not recognized the fact that
be doubted that a the violation of a
person who takes quasi-contractual duty is
possession of the subject to articles 1101,
property of another for 1103, 1104 of the Civil
the purpose of moving Code, and not within the
or conveying it from one purview of article 1903.
place to another, or for Manresa also, in the
the purpose of paragraph reproduced
performing any other above is of the opinion
service in connection that negligence,
therewith (locatio operis considered a down that one of the
faciendi), owes to the substantive and
owner a positive duty to independent source of
refrain from damaging it, liability, does not include
to the same extent as if cases where the parties
an agreement for the are previously bound by
performance of such any other obligation.
service had been Again, it is instructive in
expressly made with the this connection to refer
owner. The obligation as to the contents of article
if an agreement made 1103 of the Civil Code,
with the owner. The where it is demandable
obligation here is really in the fulfillment of all
a species of contract re, kinds of obligations.
and it has its source and These words evidently
explanation in vital fact, comprehend both forms
that the active party has of positive obligations,
taken upon himself to do whether arising from
something with or to the express contract or from
property and has taken it implied contract (quasi
into his power and contract).
control for the purpose In this connection it is
of performing such instructive to recall
service. (Compare art. celebrate case of Coggs
1889, Civil Code.) vs. Bernard (2 Ld. Raym,
909), decided in the
court of the King's
Bench of England in the
year of 1803. The action
was brought by the
owner of certain casks of
brandy to recover
damages from a person
who had undertaken to
transport them from one
place to another. It was
alleged that in so doing
the defendant so
negligently and
improvidently put then
casks was staved and
the brandy lost. The
complaint did not allege
that the defendant was a
common carrier or that
he was to be paid for his
services. It was
therefore considered
that the compliant did
not state facts sufficient
to support an action for
breach of any express
contract. This made it
necessary for the court
to go back to
fundamental principles
and to place liability on
the ground of a violation
of the legal duty incident
to the mere fact of
carriage. Said Powell, J.:
"An action indeed will
not lie for not doing the
thing, for want of a
14
sufficient consideration; stated in so many words,
but yet if the bailee will this decision recognizes
take the goods into his that from the mere fact
custody, he shall be that a person takes the
answerable for them; for property of another into
the taking of the goods his possession and
into his custody is his control there arises an
own act." S9 Gould, J.: obligation in the nature
". . . any man that of an assumpsit that he
undertakes to carry will use due care with
goods in liable to an respect thereto. This
action, be he a common must be considered a
carrier or whatever he is, principle of universal
if through his neglect jurisprudence, for it is
they are lost or come to consonant with justice
any damage: . . . . " and common sense and
Behind these as we have already
expressions was an seen harmonizes with
unbroken line of ancient the doctrine above
English precedents deduced from the
holding persons liable provisions of the Civil
for damage inflicted by Code.
reason of a misfeasance The conclusion must
in carrying out an therefore be that if there
undertaking. The had been no contract of
principle determined by any sort between the
the court in the case Atlantic company and
cited is expressed in the the Steamship Company,
syllabus in these words: an action could have
'If a man undertakes to been maintained by the
carry goods safely and Railroad Company, as
securely, he is owner, against the
responsible for any Atlantic Company to
damage they may recover the damages
sustain in the carriage sustained by the former.
through his neglect, Such damages would
though he was not a have been demandable
common carrier and was under article 1103 of the
to have nothing for the Civil Code and the
carriage." Though not action would not have

been subject to the
qualification expressed
in the last paragraph of
article 1903.
The circumstance that a
contract was made
between the Atlantic
Company and the
Steamship company
introduces, however, an
important, and in our
opinion controlling factor
into this branch of the
case. It cannot be
denied that the
Steamship company has
possession of this boiler
in the capacity of carrier
and that as such it was
authorized to make a
contract with Atlantic
Company to discharge
the same from the ship.
Indeed, it appears in
evidence that even
before the contract of
affreightment was made
the Railroad Company
was informed that it
would necessary for
steamship company to
procure the services of
some contractor in the
port of Manila to handle
the discharge, as the
ship's tackle was
inadequate to handle
heavy cargo. It is
therefore to be assumed
that the Railroad
Company had in fact
assented to the
employment of a developed in attempting
contractor to perform
this service.
Now, it cannot be
admitted that a person
who contract to do a
service like that
rendered by the Atlantic
company in this case
incurs a double
responsibility upon
entering upon
performance, namely, a
responsibility to the
party with whom he
contracted, and another
entirely different
responsibility to the
owner, based on an
implied contract. The
two liabilities can not in
our opinion coexist. It is
a general rule that an
implied conract never
arises where an express
contract has been made.
If double responsibility
existed in such case as
this, it would result that a
person who had limited
his liability by express
stipulation might find
himself liable to the
owner without regard to
the limitation which he
had seen fit to impose
by contract. There
appears to be no
possibility of reconciling
the conflict that would be
to give effect to those
inconsistent liabilities.
The contract which was
in fact made, in our
opinion, determine not
only the character and
extent of the liability of
the Atlantic company but
also the person or entity
by whom the obligation
is eligible. It is of course
quite clear that if the
Atlantic company had
refused to carry out its
agreement to discharge
the cargo, the plaintiff
could have enforced
specific performance
and could not have
recovered damages for
non-performance. (Art.
1257, Civil Code;
Donaldson, Sim & Co.
vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 2
Phil. Rep., 766; Uy Tam
and Uy Yet vs. Leonard,
30 Phil. Rep., 471.) In
view of the preceding
discussion it is equally
obvious that, for lack of
privity with the contract,
the Railroad Company
can have no right of
action to recover
damages from the
Atlantic Company for the
wrongful act which
constituted the violation
of said contract. The
rights of the plaintiff can
only be made effective
through the Compañia
Trasatlantica de
Barcelona with whom
the contract of
affreightment was made.
The judgment entered in
the Court of First
Instance must, therefore
be reversed not only
with respect to the
judgment entered in
favor of the plaintiff
directly against the
Atlantic company but
also with respect to the
absolution of the
steamship company and
the further failure of the
court to enter judgment
in favor of the latter
against the Atlantic
Company. The
Compañía Transatlantic
de Barcelona should be
and is hereby adjudged
to pay to the Manila
Railroad Company the
sum of twenty nine
thousand three hundred
forty three pesos and
twenty nine centavos
(P23,343.29) with
interest from May 11,
1914, until paid; and
when this judgment is
satisfied, the Compañia
Transatlantic de
Barcelona is declared to
be entitled to recover the
same amount from the
Atlantic & Pacific Gulf
Company, against whom
judgment is to this end
hereby rendered in favor
of the Compañia
Transatlantica de
Barcelona. No express
adjudication of costs of
either instance will be
made. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres,
Araullo and Avanceña,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J.,
dissenting:
The only question
presented by the
appellant the Atlantic
Gulf & Pacific Company
is whether or not it is
liable, either to the
Manila railroad company
or to the Compañía
Transatlantica de
Barcelona for the
damage caused to a
certain locomotive boiler
while being discharged
at the port of Manila.
15
The essential facts
important for a decision
upon the rights and
liabilities of the Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Company
may be stated as
follows:
(1) That the Manila
Railroad Company
purchased certain
locomotive boilers in
Europe and contracted
with the Compañia
Transatlantica de
Barcelona to transport
the same to Manila by its
steamship Alicante; (2)
That the tackle and
equipment of the
steamship Alicante
being insufficient to
discharge said
locomotive boilers, the
Compañía
Transatlantica entered
into a contract with the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company by virtue of
the terms of which the
latter company agreed
to discharge the said
locomotive boilers from
the said steamship
Alicante by using its
tackle and equipment for
that purpose;' (3) that in
the effort of the Atlantic
Gulf & Pacific Company
to discharge in the
manner described in the

complaint and damaged
to the amount found by
the lower court (4) That
while the Atlantic Gulf &
Pacific Company
attempted to show,
during the trial for the
cause, that it and its
employees exercised
due care and diligence,
it admitted in this court
that its employees had
perhaps been negligent
in the performance of
their duties.
Considering that the
relations between the
Compañía
Transatlantica and the
Atlantic Gulf & Pacific
Company were
contractual, it becomes
important to ascertain
what were the terms of
the contract, in order to
properly understand the
rights and liabilities of
the parties thereto, in
relation tot he admission
of the Atlantic Gulf &
Pacific Company that is
employees had perhaps
been guilty of
negligence in the
discharge of said boiler.
The contract was not
wholly reduced to writing;
it was partly written and
partly oral. The
Compania
Transatlantica alleged custom in making similar
that under the terms of contracts. The Atlantic,
the contract said boilers Gulf & Pacific Company
form the steamship also showed that the
Alicante, using its tackle Compañía
and apparatus therefore, Transatlantica had
and that no condition of actual knowledge of
any character was such custom.
imposed, while the A careful examination of
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific the proof in our opinion,
Company alleged that it clearly shows by a large
agreed to discharge said preponderance that the
boilers and to use its contract in question was
tackle and equipment for as the Atlantic Gulf &
that purpose, but with Pacific Company
the express conditions alleged and that by its
that it was, under no terms said company was
circumstances or relieved of any
conditions, to assume responsibility for any
any responsibility for any damage which might
damage whatever which occur either to the ship,
might be occasioned cargo or persons, from
thereby, either to the any cause whatsoever."
cargo ship or persons. The contract is the law
In support of the governing the rights and
allegation of the obligations of the parties,
Compañía subject to certain well
Transatlantica, it really defined exceptions.
presented but one Persons have a right to
witness, while the enter into any contact
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific with any clauses, or
Company presented conditions, or limitations
several witnesses, which they may deem
including its president, convenient and
vice-president and advisable so long as
several others, together such clauses or
with a number of conditions do not conflict
documents showing that with the existing laws,
the contract was in morals or public order.
conformity with its usual (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
There are some well
defined exceptions to
that rule, the most
notable of which are
contracts with common
carriers. (Hartford F. Ins.
Co., vs. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Railway Co., 175
U.S., 91, 97.) The
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company, so far as the
record shows, is not a
common carrier, and the
exception, therefore, just
noted does not apply to
it. Neither was the
contract between the
Compañía
Transatlantica and the
Atlantic a company for
the carriage of
merchandise. It was a
contract for services of
an entirely different
character from that of a
common carrier.
If then, generally
speaking, persons may
enter into contractual
relations with any
clauses or conditions
which they may deem
advisable and
convenient, which do not
conflict with existing
laws, morals, or public
order, we may ask: Is a
contract of the character
of that before us in
which one of the parties
stipulates that he will not
assume any
responsibility for any
damage which may
occur from any cause
whatsoever in the
execution of said
contract, contrary to the
laws morals or public
order?
The contract in question
was not one which the
parties were obliged to
enter into. In that
respect, it differed from
contracts with common
carriers, wherein the
latter have no option,
generally speaking. In
the preset case, the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company has a perfect
right to refuse to enter
into the contract in
question until and unless
its terms were
satisfactory and
acceptable. The parties
being at perfect liberty to
enter into the contract or
to refuse to do, they
must be bound by the
law which they
themselves have made
for themselves. Having
voluntarily made the law
(contract), they must
abide by its terms until it
can be shown that the
same is contrary to the
16
laws, morals or public
order.
It is a fundamental rule
of the law that what one
may resume to do
entirely, he may agree to
do upon such terms as
her pleases so long as
he does not contravene
the laws, morals or
public order. The atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Company
having had the right to
refuse to enter into it
except upon just such
terms and conditions as
it was fir to require. The
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company, therefore,
had a right to refuse to
enter into the contract in
question until and unless
the Compañía
Transatlantica agreed to
relive it of all
responsibility for any
damages which might
occur either to the ship,
cargo or persons from
any cause whatsoever.
By the terms of the
contract the Compañia
Trasatlantica assumed
all responsibility for
damages in the
discharge of the said
locomotive boilers. That
must be true considering
that, by the terms of the
contract, the Atlantic,

Gulf & Pacific Company Pittsburgh, etc. Railway
was relieved from any Co. vs. Mahoney, 148
and all damages Ind., 196; Russell vs.
whatsoever which might Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.,
occur.1awph!l.net 157 Ind., 305; 55 L. R.
The only purpose on the A., 253; Hartford Fire Ins.
part of the Atlantic Gulf Co. vs. Chicago, M. & St.
& Pacific Company, in P. Railway Co., 175 U.
imposing the condition S., 91, 97; Baltimore, etc.
above-mentioned was to Railway Co. vs. Voigt,
avoid the consequences 176 U. S., 498; Osgood
of the negligence of its vs. Railway Co., 77
agent or employees or Vermont, 334; 70 L. R.
of any act or accident A., 930.)
which might cause In the case of the
damage, and to avoid Hartford Insurance
possible lawsuits Company vs. Chicago,
growing out of the M. & St. P. Railway Co.
alleged negligent acts. (175 U. S., 91, 97, supra)
The question which we a contract was made by
are discussing is not a which one of the parties
new one in was relieved from all
jurisprudence. The liability for damage, et
courts have been called cetera, et cetera, even
upon many times to the liability for damage
interpret contract with which might result "from
conditions like those the careless ness or
contained in the contract negligence of
before us. (Coup vs. employees or agents of
Wabash, St. Louis & said railway company,"
Pac. Railway Co., 56 and the Supreme Court
Mich., 111; 56 Am. Rep., of the United States held
374; Mann vs. Pere that such a condition in
Marquette R. Co., 135 contracts of that
Mich., 210; Stephens vs. character was not void
Southern Pacific co., as against public policy,
109 Cal., 86; 29 L. R. A., or public morals or
751; Quimby vs. Boston contrary to law.
& Maine R., 150 Mass., (Baltimore, etc.
365; 5 L. R. A., 846; Railaway Co. vs. Voigt,
176 U. S., 498; Osgood
vs. Central Vermont R.
Co., 77 Vermont, 334;
70 L. R. A., 930.)
Court must not forget
that they are not to
extend, arbitrarily, those
rules which say that a
given contract is void as
being against public
policy, or public laws,
because if there is one
thing which more than
another public policy
requires, it is that men of
full age and competent
understanding shall
have the utmost liberty
of contracting, and that
the contracts when
entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held
sacred and must be
enforced in courts of
justice. Courts should
not lightly interfere with
the freedom of contracts.
(Baltimore, etc., Railway
Co. vs. Voigt, 176 U.S.,
498; Printing, etc.
Company vs. Sampson,
Law Reps., 19 Equity,
465; Osgood vs. Central
Vermont R. Co., 77
Vermont, 334.)
The record shows that
the Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Company had, at
various times,
discharged other freight
from steamships in
Manila Bay of much
greater weight than the
boiler in question, by
means of the same
tackle and equipment
and by the same
employees which were
used in the present case.
the records also shows
that the tackle and
equipment was ample
and that the men
incharged were
experience in the work
they were to perform.,
The record further
shows that the Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Company
undertook the discharge
of said boilers at a very
low price, for the very
reason that they were
relived of all liability
whatsoever for damages
in the discharge of the
same. The record further
shows that the
representative for the
Compañía
Transatlantica who
made the contract in
question, was requested
to and did make a
causal examination of
the tackle equipment
which were to be used in
the discharge of the
boilers. The records
further shows that said
company, after receiving
the information that the
tackel and equipment
and employees of the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company had
discharged, on various
occasions, other and
heavier freight without
accident or mishap, and
after having made a
casual examination of
such equipment,
voluntarily and willingly
and without any
objection or protest for
and on behalf of the
Compañia Trasatlantica,
entered into the contract
as above described,
accepting fully and
without protest the
conditions imposed by
the Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Company.
Having entered into the
contract in question and
the same not being in
contravention of the
laws, morals or public
order, the Compania
Trasatlantica is bound
by its terms.
The rule above
announced may seem to
be a hard one, but when
we remember that the
right to enter into
contracts carries with it
the freedom to impose
17
such conditions as the
parties may see fit to
impose, subject to
specific limitations, the
hardship if any, is one
self-imposed by the
parties.
An example may serve
to make the rule which
we have announced
plainer:
A is the owner of an
automobile at Manila
which desires to deliver
at Baguio. B. is the
owner of a garage at
Manila and has in his
employ experienced
chauffeurs. A desires to
employ B to take the
automobile to Baguio
and offers a certain price
for the services. B
accepts A's proposition
with the condition that
he will assume no
responsibility whatever
for any damages which
might occur to the said
automobile in the course
of its delivery. In passing
the zigzag on the way to
Baguio, an unforseen
accident happens
through the casual
neglect or lack of care
on the part of the
chauffeur and the
automobile is damaged.
Can B held liable, in an

action upon the contract,
for the damages in the
face of the fact that A
had relieved him of all
liability for any damages
which might occur? The
cases which we have
cited above, together
with many others which
might be cited, all
answer that question in
the negative. That
question is answered in
the negative upon the
theory that A, by the
terms of his contract,
relieved B, in an action
upon the contract from
all liability whatsoever.
It must not be forgotten
that what we have said
relates the actions upon
the contract with the
conditions mentioned
and not t actions for
damages in an action ex
delicto resulting from the
negligent performance
of duties and obligations
assumed.
The appellant, the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
company, contends that
inasmuch as it had
exercised the care of a
good father of a family in
selecting its employees,
that it should be relieved
from all liability by virtue
of the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We do not believe
that the provisions of
said article can be
invoked when the rights
and liabilities of parties
to an action depend
upon a contract. The
right of parties are
defined by the contract
and there is no occasion
t invoke the statute. The
argument employed by
the Atlantic, Gulf &
Pacific Company if valid,
would also relieve the
Compañia Transatlantic
had not exercised the
care of a good father of
a family in selecting it for
the discharge of said
boilers. Neither d we
believe that the
provisions of article
1902 of the Civil Code
can be invoked in favor
of the Compañia
Transatlantica for the
reason that the contract
governs the rights and
liabilities and by the
terms of the contract the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company is relieved
from all liability
whatsoever. A relief
from all liability is a relief
from any liability caused
by negligence,
especially so when the
action is based upon a FLORENTINO and
contract. Whether or not THERESA
the rule should be VALLEJERA,
followed in an action of respondents.
tort growing out of willful
negligence, square?
From all the foregoing, DECISION
we are persuaded that
the judgment of the
lower court should be GARCIA, J.:
modified and that the
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific
Company should be Assailed and sought to
relieved from all liability be set aside in this
under the complaint. petition for review on
certiorari is the
Decision1 dated April 25,
2003 of the Court of
SECOND DIVISION
Appeals (CA), as
reiterated in its
Resolution of July 10,
G.R. No.
2003,2 in CA-G.R. SP
158995 Sept
No. 67600, affirming an
ember 26, 2006
earlier Order of the
Regional Trial Court
L.G. FOODS (RTC) of Bacolod City,
CORPORATION and Branch 43, which denied
VICTORINO GABOR, the petitioners' motion to
Vice-President and dismiss in Civil Case No.
General Manager, 99-10845, an action for
petitioners, damages arising from a
vs. vehicular accident
HON. PHILADELFA B. thereat instituted by the
PAGAPONG-AGRAVIA herein private
DOR, in her capacity respondents - the
as Presiding Judge of spouses Florentino
Regional Trial Court, Vallejera and Theresa
Branch 43, Bacolod Vallejera - against the
City, and SPS. petitioners.
18
The antecedent facts conscience and remorse.
may be briefly stated as On account thereof, the
follows: MTCC, in its order of
September 30, 1998,
dismissed the criminal
On February 26, 1996, case.
Charles Vallereja, a
7-year old son of the
spouses Florentino On June 23, 1999, in the
Vallejera and Theresa RTC of Bacolod City, the
Vallejera, was hit by a spouses Vallejera filed a
Ford Fiera van owned by complaint3 for damages
the petitioners and against the petitioners
driven at the time by as employers of the
their employee, Vincent deceased driver,
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. basically alleging that as
Charles died as a result such employers, they
of the accident. failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection
and supervision of their
In time, an Information employees. Thereat
for Reckless docketed as Civil Case
Imprudence Resulting to No. 99-10845, the
Homicide was filed complaint was raffled to
against the driver before Branch 43 of the court.
the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, docketed In their Answer with
as Criminal Case No. Compulsory
67787, entitled People Counterclaim,4 the
of the Philippines v. petitioners as
Vincent Norman defendants denied
Yeneza. liability for the death of
the Vallejeras' 7-year old
son, claiming that they
Unfortunately, before had exercised the
the trial could be required due diligence in
concluded, the accused the selection and
driver committed suicide, supervision of their
evidently bothered by employees, including

the deceased driver. to hold them liable. Ergo,
They thus prayed in their since the driver died
Answer for the dismissal during the pendency of
of the complaint for lack the criminal action, the
of cause of action on the sine qua non condition
part of the Vallejera for their subsidiary
couple. liability was not fulfilled,
hence the of lack of
cause of action on the
During pre-trial, the part of the plaintiffs.
defendant petitioners They further argue that
insisted that their since the plaintiffs did
dismissal prayer be not make a reservation
resolved. Hence, the to institute a separate
trial court required them action for damages
to file within ten days a when the criminal case
memorandum of was filed, the damage
authorities supportive of suit in question is
their position. thereby deemed
instituted with the
criminal action. which
Instead, however, of the was already dismissed.
required memorandum
of authorities, the
defendant petitioners In an Order dated
filed a Motion to Dismiss, September 4, 2001,6 the
principally arguing that trial court denied the
the complaint is motion to dismiss for
basically a "claim for lack of merit and set the
subsidiary liability case for pre-trial. With
against an employer" their motion for
under the provision of reconsideration having
Article 1035 of the been denied by the
Revised Penal Code. same court in its
Prescinding therefrom, subsequent order7 of
they contend that there September 26, 2001, the
must first be a judgment petitioners then went on
of conviction against certiorari to the CA in
their driver as a CA-G.R. SP No. 67600,
condition sine qua non imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of
the trial judge in refusing
to dismiss the basic
complaint for damages
in Civil Case No.
99-10845.
In the herein assailed
decision8 dated April 25,
2003, the CA denied the
petition and upheld the
trial court. Partly says
the CA in its challenged
issuance:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the
complaint neither
represents nor implies
that the responsibility
charged was the
petitioner's subsidiary
liability under Art. 103,
Revised Penal Code. As
pointed out [by the trial
court] in the Order of
September 4, 2001, the
complaint does not even
allege the basic
elements for such a
liability, like the
conviction of the
accused employee and
his insolvency. Truly
enough, a civil action to
enforce subsidiary
liability separate and
distinct from the criminal
action is even
unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case
No. 99-10845 exacts
responsibility for fault or
negligence under Art.
2176, Civil Code, which
is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil
liability arising from
negligence under the
Revised Penal Code.
Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180,
Civil Code, is direct and
immediate, and not
conditioned upon prior
recourse against the
negligent employee or
prior showing of the
latter's insolvency.
(Underscoring in the
original.)
In time, the petitioners
moved for a without regard to traffic
reconsideration but their
motion was denied by
the CA in its resolution9
of July 10, 2003. Hence,
the petitioners' present
recourse on their
19
submission that the registered owner of a
appellate court Ford Fiera Van with
committed reversible Plate No. NMS 881 and
error in upholding the employer sometime
trial court's denial of February of 1996 of one
their motion to dismiss. Vincent Norman Yeneza
y Ferrer, a salesman of
said corporation;
We DENY.
4. That sometime
As the Court sees it, the February 26, 1996 at
sole issue for resolution around 2:00 P.M. at
is whether the spouses Rosario St., Bacolod
Vallejeras' cause of City, the minor son of
action in Civil Case No. said plaintiffs [now
99-10845 is founded on respondents], Charles
Article 103 of the Vallejera, 7 years old,
Revised Penal Code, as was hit and bumped by
maintained by the above-described vehicle
petitioners, or derived then driven by said
from Article 218010 of employee, Vincent
the Civil Code, as ruled Norman Yeneza y
by the two courts below. Ferrer;
It thus behooves us to 5. That the mishap was
examine the allegations due to the gross fault
of the complaint for and negligence of
damages in Civil Case defendant's employee,
No. 99-10845. That who drove said vehicle,
complaint alleged, inter recklessly, negligently
alia, as follows: and at a high speed
condition and safety of
xxx xxx xxx other road users and
likewise to the fault and
negligence of the owner
3. That defendant [LG employer, herein
Food Corporation] is the defendants LG Food

Corporation who failed 8. That the injuries and
to exercise due diligence complications as well as
in the selection and the resultant death
supervision of his suffered by the late
employee, Vincent minor Charles Vallejera
Norman Yeneza y were due to the
Ferrer; negligence and
imprudence of
defendant's employee;
6. That as a result of
said incident, plaintiffs'
son suffered multiple 9. That defendant LG
body injuries which led Foods Corporation is
to his untimely demise civilly liable for the
on that very day; negligence/imprudence
of its employee since it
failed to exercise the
7. That a criminal case necessary diligence
was filed against the required of a good father
defendant's employee, of the family in the
docketed as Criminal selection and
Case No. 67787, (earlier supervision of his
filed as Crim. Case No. employee, Vincent
96-17570 before RTC) Norman Yeneza y Ferrer
before MTC-Branch III, which diligence if
entitled "People v. exercised, would have
Yeneza" for "Reckless prevented said incident.
Imprudence resulting to (Bracketed words and
Homicide," but the same emphasis ours.)
was dismissed because
pending litigation, then
remorse-stricken Nothing in the foregoing
[accused] committed allegations suggests,
suicide; even remotely, that the
herein petitioners are
being made to account
xxx xxx xxx for their subsidiary
liability under Article 103
of the Revised Penal
Code. As correctly
pointed out by the trial
court in its order of
September 4, 2001
denying the petitioners'
Motion to Dismiss, the
complaint did not even
aver the basic elements
for the subsidiary liability
of an employer under
Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code,
such as the prior
conviction of the driver in
the criminal case filed
against him nor his
insolvency.
Admittedly, the
complaint did not
explicitly state that
plaintiff Vallejeras were
suing the defendant
petitioners for damages
based on quasi-delict.
Clear it is, however, from
the allegations of the
complaint that
quasi-delict was their
choice of remedy
against the petitioners.
To stress, the plaintiff
spouses alleged in their
complaint gross fault
and negligence on the
part of the driver and the
failure of the petitioners,
as employers, to
exercise due diligence in
the selection and
20
supervision of their damage to another may is for quasi-delict, the
employees. The give rise to two separate plaintiff may hold the
spouses further alleged civil liabilities on the part employer liable for the
that the petitioners are of the offender, i.e., 1) negligent act of its
civilly liable for the civil liability ex delicto;12 employee, subject to the
negligence/imprudence and 2) independent civil employer's defense of
of their driver since they liabilities, such as those exercise of the diligence
failed to exercise the (a) not arising from an of a good father of the
necessary diligence act or omission family. On the other
required of a good father complained of as felony hand, if the action
of the family in the (e.g., culpa contractual chosen is for culpa
selection and or obligations arising criminal, the plaintiff can
supervision of their from law;13 the hold the employer
employees, which intentional torts;14 and subsidiarily liable only
diligence, if exercised, culpa aquiliana15); or (b) upon proof of prior
could have prevented where the injured party conviction of its
the vehicular accident is granted a right to file employee.18
that resulted to the an action independent
death of their 7-year old and distinct from the
son. criminal action.16 Either Article 116119 of the
of these two possible Civil Code provides that
liabilities may be civil obligation arising
Section 2, Rule 2, of the enforced against the from criminal offenses
1997 Rules of Civil offender.17 shall be governed by
Procedure defines penal laws subject to the
cause of action as the provision of Article
"act or omission by Stated otherwise, 217720 and of the
which a party violates victims of negligence or pertinent provision of
the right of another." their heirs have a choice Chapter 2, Preliminary
Such act or omission between an action to Title on Human Relation,
gives rise to an enforce the civil liability and of Title XVIII of this
obligation which may arising from culpa Book, regulating
come from law, criminal under Article damages. Plainly, Article
contracts, quasi 100 of the Revised 2177 provides for the
contracts, delicts or Penal Code, and an alternative remedies the
quasi-delicts.11 action for quasi-delict plaintiff may choose
(culpa aquiliana) under from in case the
Articles 2176 to 2194 of obligation has the
Corollarily, an act or the Civil Code. If, as possibility of arising
omission causing here, the action chosen indirectly from the

delict/crime or directly
from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the
plaintiff who makes
known his cause of
action in his initiatory
pleading or complaint,21
and not with the
defendant who can not
ask for the dismissal of
the plaintiff's cause of
action or lack of it based
on the defendant's
perception that the
plaintiff should have
opted to file a claim
under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer
is direct or immediate. It
is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against
the negligent employee
and a prior showing of
insolvency of such
employee.22
Here, the complaint
sufficiently alleged that
the death of the couple's
minor son was caused
by the negligent act of
the petitioners' driver;
and that the petitioners
themselves were civilly
21
liable for the negligence intervened prior to the Code to recover The argument is reality, therefor, it is as if
of their driver for failing termination of the damages primarily from specious. there was no criminal
"to exercise the criminal proceedings, the petitioners as case to speak of in the
necessary diligence the spouses' recourse employers responsible first place. And for the
required of a good father was, therefore, to sue for their negligent driver To start with, the petitioners to insist for
of the family in the the petitioners for their pursuant to Article 2180 petitioners' reliance on the conviction of their
selection and direct and primary of the Civil Code. The Maniago is obviously driver as a condition
supervision of [their] liability based on obligation imposed by misplaced. There, the sine qua non to hold
employee, the driver, quasi-delict. Article 2176 is civil case was filed while them liable for damages
which diligence, if demandable not only for the criminal case against is to ask for the
exercised, would have one's own acts or the employee was still impossible.
prevented said Besides, it is worthy to omissions, but also for pending. Here, the
accident." note that the petitioners, those of persons for criminal case against the
in their Answer with whom one is responsible. employee driver was IN VIEW WHEREOF,
Compulsory Thus, the employer is prematurely terminated the instant petition is
Had the respondent Counter-Claim,24 liable for damages due to his death. DENIED for lack of
spouses elected to sue repeatedly made caused by his Precisely, Civil Case No. merit.
the petitioners based on mention of Article 2180 employees and 99-10845 was filed by
Article 103 of the of the Civil Code and household helpers the respondent spouses
Revised Penal Code, anchored their defense acting within the scope because no remedy can Costs against the
they would have alleged on their allegation that of their assigned tasks, be obtained by them petitioners.
that the guilt of the driver "they had exercised due even though the former against the petitioners
had been proven diligence in the selection is not engaged in any with the dismissal of the
beyond reasonable and supervision of [their] business or industry. criminal case against SO ORDERED.
doubt; that such employees." The Court their driver during the
accused driver is views this defense as an pendency thereof.
insolvent; that it is the admission that indeed Citing Maniago v. CA,25 Puno, Chairperson,
subsidiary liability of the the petitioners petitioner would argue Sandoval-Gutierrez,
defendant petitioners as acknowledged the that Civil Case No. The circumstance that Corona, Azcuna, J.J.,
employers to pay for the private respondents' 99-10845 should have no reservation to concur.
damage done by their cause of action as one been dismissed for institute a separate civil
employee (driver) based for quasi-delict under failure of the respondent action for damages was
on the principle that Article 2180 of the Civil spouses to make a made when the criminal Republic of the
every person criminally Code. reservation to institute a case was filed is of no Philippines
liable is also civilly separate civil action for moment for the simple SUPREME COURT
liable.23 Since there damages when the reason that the criminal Manila
was no conviction in the All told, Civil Case No. criminal case against the case was dismissed THIRD DIVISION
criminal case against the 99-10845 is a driver was filed. without any G.R. No.
driver, precisely negligence suit brought pronouncement having 168512 Marc
because death under Article 2176 - Civil been made therein. In h 20, 2007

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, examination at the
JR., doing business Community Diagnostic
under the name and Center (CDC). Garcia
style COMMUNITY who is a medical
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER technologist, conducted
and BU CASTRO,1 the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B
Petitioners, Surface Antigen) test
vs. and on October 22,
RANIDA D. 1993, CDC issued the
SALVADOR and test result5 indicating
RAMON SALVADOR, that Ranida was "HBs
Respondents. Ag: Reactive." The result
DECISION bore the name and
YNARES-SANTIAGO, signature of Garcia as
J.: examiner and the rubber
This is a petition for stamp signature of
review2 under Rule 45 of Castro as pathologist.
the Rules of Court When Ranida submitted
assailing the February the test result to Dr. Sto.
27, 2004 Decision3 of Domingo, the Company
the Court of Appeals in physician, the latter
CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 apprised her that the
finding petitioner findings indicated that
Orlando D. Garcia liable she is suffering from
for gross negligence; Hepatitis B, a liver
and its June 16, 2005 disease. Thus, based on
Resolution4 denying the medical
petitioner’s motion for report6submitted by Sto.
reconsideration. Domingo, the Company
On October 1, 1993, terminated Ranida’s
respondent Ranida D. employment for failing
Salvador started the physical
working as a trainee in examination.7
the Accounting When Ranida informed
Department of Limay her father, Ramon,
Bulk Handling Terminal, about her ailment, the
Inc. (the Company). As latter suffered a heart
a prerequisite for regular attack and was confined
employment, she at the Bataan Doctors
underwent a medical Hospital. During
Ramon’s confinement,
Ranida underwent
another HBs Ag test at
the said hospital and the
result8 indicated that she
is non-reactive. She
informed Sto. Domingo
of this development but
was told that the test
conducted by CDC was
more reliable because it
used the Micro-Elisa
Method.
Thus, Ranida went back
to CDC for confirmatory
testing, and this time,
the Anti-HBs test
conducted on her
indicated a "Negative"
result.9
Ranida also underwent
another HBs Ag test at
the Bataan Doctors
Hospital using the
Micro-Elisa Method. The
result indicated that she
was non-reactive.10
Ranida submitted the
test results from Bataan
Doctors Hospital and
CDC to the Executive
Officer of the Company
who requested her to
undergo another similar
test before her
re-employment would be
considered. Thus, CDC
conducted another HBs
Ag test on Ranida which
indicated a "Negative"
22
result.11 Ma. Ruby G. Garcia denied the explanation behind the
Calderon, Med-Tech allegations of gross conflicting test results on
Officer-in-Charge of negligence and Ranida.17
CDC, issued a incompetence and Respondents appealed
Certification correcting reiterated the scientific to the Court of Appeals
the initial result and explanation for the "false which reversed the trial
explaining that the positive" result of the court’s findings, the
examining medical first HBs Ag test in his dispositive portion of
technologist (Garcia) December 7, 1993 letter which states:
interpreted the delayed to the respondents.15 WHEREFORE, the
reaction as positive or For his part, Castro decision appealed from
reactive.12 claimed that as is REVERSED and SET
Thereafter, the pathologist, he rarely ASIDE and another one
Company rehired went to CDC and only entered ORDERING
Ranida. when a case was defendant-appellee
On July 25, 1994, referred to him; that he Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to
Ranida and Ramon filed did not examine Ranida; pay plaintiff-appellant
a complaint13 for and that the test results Ranida D. Salvador
damages against bore only his moral damages in the
petitioner Garcia and a rubber-stamp signature. amount of P50,000.00,
purportedly unknown On September 1, exemplary damages in
pathologist of CDC, 1997,16 the trial court the amount of
claiming that, by reason dismissed the complaint P50,000.00 and
of the erroneous for failure of the attorney’s fees in the
interpretation of the respondents to present amount of P25,000.00.
results of Ranida’s sufficient evidence to SO ORDERED.18
examination, she lost prove the liability of The appellate court
her job and suffered Garcia and Castro. It found Garcia liable for
serious mental anxiety, held that respondents damages for negligently
trauma and sleepless should have presented issuing an erroneous
nights, while Ramon Sto. Domingo because HBs Ag result. On the
was hospitalized and he was the one who other hand, it
lost business interpreted the test exonerated Castro for
opportunities. result issued by CDC. lack of participation in
On September 26, 1994, Likewise, respondents the issuance of the
respondents amended should have presented a results.
their complaint14 by medical expert to refute After the denial of his
naming Castro as the the testimonies of motion for
"unknown pathologist." Garcia and Castro reconsideration, Garcia
regarding the medical filed the instant petition.

The main issue for
resolution is whether the
Court of Appeals, in
reversing the decision of
the trial court, correctly
found petitioner liable for
damages to the
respondents for issuing
an incorrect HBsAG test
result.
Garcia maintains he is
not negligent, thus not
liable for damages,
because he followed the
appropriate laboratory
measures and
procedures as dictated
by his training and
experience; and that he
did everything within his
professional
competence to arrive at
an objective, impartial
and impersonal result.
At the outset, we note
that the issues raised
are factual in nature.
Whether a person is
negligent or not is a
question of fact which
we cannot pass upon in
a petition for review on
certiorari which is limited
to reviewing errors of
law.19
Negligence is the failure
to observe for the
protection of the interest
of another person that
degree of care,
23
precaution and vigilance operation of negligence. Where the Administrative Order No. sufficient available
which the circumstances substandard, improperly law imposes upon a 49-B Series of 1988, pathologist.
justly demand,20 managed and person the duty to do otherwise known as the xxxx
whereby such other inadequately supported something, his omission Revised Rules and Sec. 11. Reporting: All
person suffers injury. clinical laboratories and or non-performance will Regulations Governing laboratory requests shall
For health care by improving the quality render him liable to the Registration, be considered as
providers, the test of the of performance of whoever may be injured Operation and consultations between
existence of negligence clinical laboratory thereby. Maintenance of Clinical the requesting physician
is: did the health care examinations.22 Their Section 2 of Republic Laboratories in the and pathologist of the
provider either fail to do business is impressed Act (R.A.) No. 4688, Philippines, read: laboratory. As such all
something which a with public interest, as otherwise known as The Sec. 9. Management of laboratory reports on
reasonably prudent such, high standards of Clinical Laboratory Law, the Clinical Laboratory: various examinations of
health care provider performance are provides: 9.1 Head of the Clinical human specimens shall
would have done, or that expected from them. Sec. 2. It shall be Laboratory: The head is be construed as
he or she did something In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. unlawful for any person that person who consultation report and
that a reasonably v. Court of Appeals, we to be professionally assumes technical and shall bear the name of
prudent health care found the owner of a in-charge of a registered administrative the pathologist or his
provider would not have furniture shop liable for clinical laboratory unless supervision and control associate. No person in
done; and that failure or the destruction of the he is a licensed of the activities in the clinical laboratory shall
action caused injury to plaintiff’s house in a fire physician duly qualified laboratory. issue a report, orally or
the patient;21 if yes, then which started in his in laboratory medicine For all categories of in writing, whole portions
he is guilty of establishment in view of and authorized by the clinical laboratories, the thereof without a
negligence. his failure to comply with Secretary of Health, head shall be a licensed directive from the
Thus, the elements of an an ordinance which such authorization to be physician certified by the pathologist or his
actionable conduct are: required the renewed annually. Philippine Board of authorized associate
1) duty, 2) breach, 3) construction of a firewall. No license shall be Pathology in either and only to the
injury, and 4) proximate In Teague v. Fernandez, granted or renewed by Anatomic or Clinical requesting physician or
causation. we stated that where the the Secretary of Health Pathology or both his authorized
All the elements are very injury which was for the operation and provided that: representative except in
present in the case at intended to be maintenance of a clinical (1) This shall be emergencies when the
bar. prevented by the laboratory unless such mandatory for all results may be released
Owners and operators of ordinance has laboratory is under the categories of as authorized by the
clinical laboratories have happened, administration, direction free-standing clinical pathologist.
the duty to comply with non-compliance with the and supervision of an laboratories; all tertiary xxxx
statutes, as well as rules ordinance was not only authorized physician, as category hospital Sec. 25. Violations:
and regulations, an act of negligence, but provided for in the laboratories and for all 25.1 The license to
purposely promulgated also the proximate preceding paragraph. secondary category operate a clinical
to protect and promote cause of the death.23 Corollarily, Sections hospital laboratories laboratory may be
the health of the people In fine, violation of a 9(9.1)(1), 11 and located in areas with suspended or revoked
by preventing the statutory duty is 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH by the Undersecretary of
 24

Health for Standards Medicine, the following examination may be by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas, as conducting laboratory whenever a specific
and Regulation upon shall be punished by a released only to the M.D., Undersecretary for examinations and are function is entrusted by
violation of R.A. 4688 or fine of not less than two requesting physician or Health Facilities, allowed to sign for and in law or regulation to a
the rules and regulations thousand pesos nor his authorized Standards and behalf of the clinical subordinate; direct the
issued in pursuance more than five thousand representative upon the Regulation, laboratory. The performance of duty;
thereto or the pesos, or imprisonment direction of the defendant-appellee defendant pathologist, restrain the commission
commission of the for not less than six laboratory pathologist. Castro was named as and all pathologists in of acts; review, approve,
following acts by the months nor more than These rules are the head of CDC.25 general, are hired by revise or modify acts
persons owning or two years, or both, in the intended for the However, in his Answer laboratories for and decisions of
operating a clinical discretion of the court: protection of the public with Counterclaim, he purposes of complying subordinate officials or
laboratory and the xxxx by preventing stated: with the rules and units.27
persons under their (b) Any medical performance of 3. By way of affirmative regulations and orders Second, Garcia
authority. technologist, even if duly substandard clinical and special defenses, issued by the conducted the HBsAG
(1) Operation of a registered, who shall examinations by defendant pathologist Department of Health test of respondent
Clinical Laboratory practice medical laboratories whose further avers and plead through the Bureau of Ranida without the
without a certified technology in the personnel are not as follows: Research and supervision of
pathologist or qualified Philippines without the properly supervised. The Defendant pathologist is Laboratories. Defendant defendant-appellee
licensed physician necessary supervision of public demands no less not the owner of the pathologist does not Castro, who admitted
authorized by the a qualified pathologist or than an effective and Community Diagnostic stay that long period of that:
Undersecretary of physician authorized by efficient performance of Center nor an employee time at the Community [He] does not know, and
Health or without the Department of clinical laboratory of the same nor the Diagnostic Center but has never known or met,
employing a registered Health; examinations through employer of its only periodically or the plaintiff-patient even
medical technologist or From the foregoing laws compliance with the employees. Defendant whenever a case is up to this time nor has
a person not registered and rules, it is clear that quality standards set by pathologist comes to the referred to him by the he personally examined
as a medical a clinical laboratory must laws and regulations. Community Diagnostic laboratory. Defendant any specimen, blood,
technologist in such a be administered, We find that petitioner Center when and where pathologist does not urine or any other tissue,
position. directed and supervised Garcia failed to comply a problem is referred to appoint or select the from the plaintiff-patient
And Section 29(b) of by a licensed physician with these standards. him. Its employees are employees of the otherwise his own
R.A. No. 5527, authorized by the First, CDC is not licensed under the laboratory nor does he handwritten signature
otherwise known as The Secretary of Health, like administered, directed Medical Technology arrange or approve their would have appeared in
Philippine Medical a pathologist who is and supervised by a Law (Republic Act No. schedules of duty.26 the result and not merely
Technology Act of 1969, specially trained in licensed physician as 5527) and are certified Castro’s infrequent visit stamped as shown in
reads: methods of laboratory required by law, but by by, and registered with, to the clinical laboratory Annex "B" of the
Section 29. Penal medicine; that the Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a the Professional barely qualifies as an Amended Complaint.28
Provisions.- Without medical technologist licensed Medical Regulation Commission effective administrative Last, the disputed
prejudice to the must be under the Technologist.24 In the after having passed their supervision and control HBsAG test result was
provision of the Medical supervision of the License to Open and Board Examinations. over the activities in the released to respondent
Act of 1959, as pathologist or a licensed Operate a Clinical They are competent laboratory. "Supervision Ranida without the
amended relating to physician; and that the Laboratory for the years within the sphere of their and control" means the authorization of
illegal practice of results of any 1993 and 1996 issued own profession in so far authority to act directly
 25

defendant-appellee conducting the clinical moral damages, we see MA. ALICIA the case was assigned
Castro.29 examination and no reason to disturb the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ to the writer of the
Garcia may not have releasing the clinical award of exemplary Associate Justice opinion of the Court’s BARREDO, J.:
intended to cause the report. damages and attorney’s Division.
consequences which Article 20 of the New fees. Exemplary REYNATO S. PUNO Appeal from the order of
ROME MINITA V.
followed after the Civil Code provides: damages are imposed, Chief Justice the Court of First
O J. CHICO-NAZ
release of the HBsAG Art. 20. Every person by way of example or Instance of Quezon City
CALLE ARIO
test result. However, his who, contrary to law, correction for the public Republic of the dated January 29, 1965
JO, SR. Asscociate
failure to comply with the willfully or negligently good, in addition to Philippines in Civil Case No. Q-8102,
Associa Justice
laws and rules causes damage to moral, temperate, SUPREME COURT Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
te
promulgated and issued another, shall indemnify liquidated or Manila Reginald Hill et al.
Justice
for the protection of the latter for the same. compensatory SECOND DIVISION dismissing, upon motion
public safety and The foregoing provision damages,33 and to dismiss of defendants,
interest is failure to provides the legal basis attorney’s fees may be ANTONIO EDUARDO B. G.R. No. L-24803 May the complaint of plaintiffs
observe that care which for the award of recovered when, as in NACHURA 26, 1977 for recovery of damages
a reasonably prudent damages to a party who the instant case, Associate Justice from defendant Reginald
health care provider suffers damage exemplary damages are ATTESTATION PEDRO ELCANO and Hill, a minor, married at
would observe. Thus, whenever one commits awarded.34 I attest that the PATRICIA ELCANO, in the time of the
his act or omission an act in violation of WHEREFORE, the conclusions in the above their capacity as occurrence, and his
constitutes a breach of some legal provision.30 Decision of the Court of decision were reached Ascendants of Agapito father, the defendant
duty. This was incorporated Appeals in CA-G.R. CV in consultation before Elcano, deceased, Marvin Hill, with whom
Indubitably, Ranida by the Code No. 58668 dated the case was assigned plaintiffs-appellants, he was living and getting
suffered injury as a Commission to provide February 27, 2004 to the writer of the subsistence, for the
direct consequence of relief to a person who finding petitioner opinion of the Court’s vs. killing by Reginald of the
Garcia’s failure to suffers damage because Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. Division. son of the plaintiffs,
comply with the another has violated guilty of gross CONSUELO REGINALD HILL, named Agapito Elcano,
mandate of the laws and some legal provision.31 negligence and liable to YNARES-SANTIAGO minor, and MARVIN of which, when
rules aforequoted. She We find the Court of pay to respondents Associate Justice HILL, as father and criminally prosecuted,
was terminated from the Appeals’ award of moral ₱50,000.00 as moral Chairperson, Third Natural Guardian of the said accused was
service for failing the damages reasonable damages, ₱50,000.00 Division said minor, acquitted on the ground
physical examination; under the circumstances as exemplary damages, CERTIFICATION defendants-appellees. that his act was not
suffered anxiety bearing in mind the and ₱25,000.00 as Pursuant to Section 13, criminal, because of
because of the mental trauma suffered attorney’s fees, is Article VIII of the "lack of intent to kill,
Cruz & Avecilla for
diagnosis; and was by respondent Ranida AFFIRMED. Constitution and the coupled with mistake."
appellants.
compelled to undergo who thought she was SO ORDERED. Division Chairperson’s
several more tests. All afflicted by Hepatitis B, CONSUELO Attestation, it is hereby Actually, the motion to
Marvin R. Hill &
these could have been making her "unfit or YNARES-SANTIAGO certified that the dismiss based on the
Associates for
avoided had the proper unsafe for any type of Associate Justice conclusions in the above following grounds:
appellees.
safeguards been employment."32 Having WE CONCUR: Decision were reached
scrupulously followed in established her right to in consultation before

1. The present action is examining the
not only against but a arguments therein
violation of section 1, contained, the Court
Rule 107, which is now finds the same to be
Rule III, of the Revised meritorious and
Rules of Court; well-founded.
2. The action is barred WHEREFORE, the
by a prior judgment Order of this Court on
which is now final and or December 8, 1964 is
in res-adjudicata; hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of
3. The complaint had no the above entitled case.
cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, SO ORDERED.
because he was relieved
as guardian of the other Quezon City, Philippines,
defendant through January 29, 1965. (p. 40,
emancipation by Record [p. 21, Record
marriage. on Appeal.)
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Hence, this appeal
Record on Appeal.]) where
plaintiffs-appellants, the
was first denied by the spouses Elcano, are
trial court. It was only presenting for Our
upon motion for resolution the following
reconsideration of the assignment of errors:
defendants of such
denial, reiterating the THE LOWER COURT
above grounds that the ERRED IN DISMISSING
following order was THE CASE BY
issued: UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF
Considering the motion DEFENDANTS THAT -
for reconsideration filed
by the defendants on I DEFENDANT MARVIN
January 14, 1965 and
after thoroughly
26
THE PRESENT GUARDIAN OF THE motion to dismiss source of obligation
ACTION IS NOT ONLY OTHER DEFENDANT above-referred to. which was firmly
AGAINST BUT ALSO A THROUGH established in this
VIOLATION OF EMANCIPATION BY As We view the jurisdiction in Barredo vs.
SECTION 1, RULE 107, MARRIAGE. (page 4, foregoing background of Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In
NOW RULE 111, OF Record.) this case, the two that case, this Court
THE REVISED RULES decisive issues postulated, on the basis
OF COURT, AND THAT It appears that for the presented for Our of a scholarly
SECTION 3(c) OF killing of the son, resolution are: dissertation by Justice
RULE 111, RULES OF Agapito, of Bocobo on the nature of
COURT IS plaintiffs-appellants, 1. Is the present civil culpa aquiliana in
APPLICABLE; defendant- appellee action for damages relation to culpa criminal
Reginald Hill was barred by the acquittal of or delito and mere culpa
II prosecuted criminally in Reginald in the criminal or fault, with pertinent
Criminal Case No. 5102 case wherein the action citation of decisions of
THE ACTION IS of the Court of First for civil liability, was not the Supreme Court of
BARRED BY A PRIOR Instance of Quezon City. reversed? Spain, the works of
JUDGMENT WHICH IS After due trial, he was recognized civilians, and
NOW FINAL OR acquitted on the ground 2. May Article 2180 (2nd earlier jurisprudence of
RES-ADJUDICTA; that his act was not and last paragraphs) of our own, that the same
criminal because of "lack the Civil Code he given act can result in
III of intent to kill, coupled applied against Atty. Hill, civil liability not only
with mistake." notwithstanding the under the Penal Code
THE PRINCIPLES OF Parenthetically, none of undisputed fact that at but also under the Civil
QUASI-DELICTS, the parties has favored the time of the Code. Thus, the opinion
ARTICLES 2176 TO Us with a copy of the occurrence complained holds:
2194 OF THE CIVIL decision of acquittal, of. Reginald, though a
CODE, ARE presumably because minor, living with and The, above case is
INAPPLICABLE IN THE appellants do not getting subsistenee from pertinent because it
INSTANT CASE; and dispute that such indeed his father, was already shows that the same act
was the basis stated in legally married? machinist. come under
IV the court's decision. And both the Penal Code
so, when appellants filed The first issue presents and the Civil Code. In
THAT THE COMPLAINT their complaint against no more problem than that case, the action of
STATES NO CAUSE appellees Reginald and the need for a reiteration the agent killeth
OF ACTION AGAINST his father, Atty. Marvin and further clarification unjustified and
Hill, on account of the of the dual character, fraudulent and therefore
HILL BECAUSE HE death of their son, the criminal and civil, of fault could have been the
WAS RELIEVED AS appellees filed the or negligence as a subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was

held to be also a proper have been prosecuted
subject of a civil action and convicted in a
under article 1902 of the criminal case and for
Civil Code. It is also to which, after such a
be noted that it was the conviction, he could
employer and not the have been sued for this
employee who was civil liability arising from
being sued. (pp. his crime. (p. 617, 73
615-616, 73 Phil.). 1 Phil.) 2
It will be noticed that the It is most significant that
defendant in the above in the case just cited,
case could have been this Court specifically
prosecuted in a criminal applied article 1902 of
case because his the Civil Code. It is thus
negligence causing the that although J. V.
death of the child was House could have been
punishable by the Penal criminally prosecuted for
Code. Here is therefore reckless or simple
a clear instance of the negligence and not only
same act of negligence punished but also made
being a proper subject civilly liable because of
matter either of a his criminal negligence,
criminal action with its nevertheless this Court
consequent civil liability awarded damages in an
arising from a crime or of independent civil action
an entirely separate and for fault or negligence
independent civil action under article 1902 of the
for fault or negligence Civil Code. (p. 618, 73
under article 1902 of the Phil.) 3
Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate The legal provisions,
individuality of a authors, and cases
cuasi-delito or culpa already invoked should
aquiliana, under the Civil ordinarily be sufficient to
Code has been fully and dispose of this case. But
clearly recognized, even inasmuch as we are
with regard to a announcing doctrines
negligent act for which that have been little
the wrongdoer could understood, in the past,
it might not he
inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised
Penal Code in articles
365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or
negligence not punished
by law, accordingly to
the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal
institution of culpa
aquiliana would have
very little scope and
application in actual life.
Death or injury to
persons and damage to
property- through any
degree of negligence -
even the slightest -
would have to be
Idemnified only through
the principle of civil
liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of
affairs, what sphere
would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath
to impute to the
lawmaker any intention
to bring about a situation
so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of action under articles
the laws, disposed to 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
uphold the letter that Code. Otherwise. there
killeth rather than the would be many
spirit that giveth life. We instances of
will not use the literal unvindicated civil
meaning of the law to wrongs. "Ubi jus
smother and render Idemnified remedium."
almost lifeless a (p. 620,73 Phil.)
principle of such ancient
origin and such Fourthly, because of the
full-grown development broad sweep of the
as culpa aquiliana or provisions of both the
cuasi-delito, which is Penal Code and the Civil
conserved and made Code on this subject,
enduring in articles 1902 which has given rise to
to 1910 of the Spanish the overlapping or
Civil Code. concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and
Secondary, to find the for lack of understanding
accused guilty in a of the character and
criminal case, proof of efficacy of the action for
guilt beyond reasonable culpa aquiliana, there
doubt is required, while has grown up a common
in a civil case, practice to seek
preponderance of damages only by virtue
evidence is sufficient to of the civil responsibility
make the defendant pay arising from a crime,
in damages. There are forgetting that there is
numerous cases of another remedy, which
criminal negligence is by invoking articles
which can not be shown 1902-1910 of the Civil
beyond reasonable Code. Although this
doubt, but can be habitual method is
proved by a allowed by, our laws, it
preponderance of has nevertheless
evidence. In such cases, rendered practically
the defendant can and useless and nugatory
should be made the more expeditious
responsible in a civil and effective remedy
27
based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But
we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the
harms done by such
practice and to restore
the principle of
responsibility for fault or
negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so
that its waters may no
longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the
better safeguarding or
private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and
additional remedy, and
for the further reason
that an independent civil
action, not depending on
the issues, limitations
and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party
wronged or his counsel,
is more likely to secure
adequate and

efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an
immediate impression
one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that
the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of
negligence and not
intentional voluntary
acts - deeper reflection
would reveal that the
thrust of the
pronouncements therein
is not so limited, but that
in fact it actually extends
to fault or culpa. This
can be seen in the
reference made therein
to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain
of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a
case of fraud or estafa,
not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of
the Civil Code of Spain,
in force here at the time
of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations
"which are derived from
acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence,
not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, that the concept of culpa
Title XV of this book aquiliana includes acts
(which refers to which are criminal in
quasi-delicts.)" And it is character or in violation
precisely the underline of the penal law,
qualification, "not whether voluntary or
punishable by law", that matter. Thus, the
Justice Bocobo corresponding
emphasized could lead provisions to said Article
to an ultimo construction 1093 in the new code,
or interpretation of the which is Article 1162,
letter of the law that simply says,
"killeth, rather than the "Obligations derived
spirit that giveth lift- from quasi-delicto shall
hence, the ruling that be governed by the
"(W)e will not use the provisions of Chapter 2,
literal meaning of the Title XVII of this Book,
law to smother and (on quasi-delicts) and by
render almost lifeless a special laws." More
principle of such ancient precisely, a new
origin and such provision, Article 2177 of
full-grown development the new code provides:
as culpa aquiliana or
quasi-delito, which is ART. 2177.
conserved and made Responsibility for fault or
enduring in articles 1902 negligence under the
to 1910 of the Spanish preceding article is
Civil Code." And so, entirely separate and
because Justice Bacobo distinct from the civil
was Chairman of the liability arising from
Code Commission that negligence under the
drafted the original text Penal Code. But the
of the new Civil Code, it plaintiff cannot recover
is to be noted that the damages twice for the
said Code, which was same act or omission of
enacted after the Garcia the defendant.
doctrine, no longer uses
the term, 11 not According to the Code
punishable by law," Commission: "The
thereby making it clear foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at
first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the
exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of
the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict,
of ancient origin, having
always had its own
foundation and
individuality, separate
from criminal negligence.
Such distinction
between criminal
negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of
the Supreme Court of
Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and
perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal
from an accusation of
criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be
a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil
liability arising from
criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said
article forestalls a congruent with the spirit
double recovery.",
(Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this
Article 2177 does seem
to literally refer to only
acts of negligence, the
same argument of
Justice Bacobo about
construction that
upholds "the spirit that
giveth lift- rather than
that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be
observed in applying the
same. And considering
that the preliminary
chapter on human
relations of the new Civil
Code definitely
establishes the
separability and
independence of liability
in a civil action for acts
criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32)
from the civil
responsibility arising
from crime fixed by
Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the
Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c),
Rule 111, contemplate
also the same
separability, it is "more
28
of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony
with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in
Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf
and Pacific Co., 7 Phil.
359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176,
where it refers to "fault
or negligencia covers
not only acts "not
punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in
character, whether
intentional and voluntary
or negligent.
Consequently, a
separate civil action lies
against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally
prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted,
provided that the
offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally,
to recover damages on
both scores, and would
be entitled in such
eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards
made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111,

refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on
Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability
for the same act
considered as a While it is true that
quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not
estinguished even by a
declaration in the
criminal case that the
criminal act charged has
not happened or has not
been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated,
We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent
acts which may be
punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that
the acquittal of Reginal
Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant
action against him.
Coming now to the
second issue about the
effect of Reginald's
emancipation by
marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that
the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill
is already free from
responsibility cannot be
upheld.
parental authority is
terminated upon
emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage
of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by
marriage of the minor is
not really full or absolute.
Thus "(E)mancipation by
marriage or by voluntary
concession shall
terminate parental
authority over the child's
person. It shall enable
the minor to administer
his property as though
he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber
real property without the
consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He
can sue and be sued in
court only with the
assistance of his father,
mother or guardian."
29
Now under Article 2180, offending child under their consent. (Art. 399;
"(T)he obligation Article 2180 is that is the Manresa, supra.)
imposed by article 2176 obligation of the parent Separate Opinions
is demandable not only to supervise their minor Accordingly, in Our
for one's own acts or children in order to considered view, Article
omissions, but also for prevent them from 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
those of persons for causing damage to third notwithstanding the AQUINO, J, concurring:
whom one is responsible. persons. 5 On the other emancipation by
The father and, in case hand, the clear marriage of Reginald. Article 2176 of the Civil
of his death or implication of Article 399, However, inasmuch as it Code comprehends any
incapacity, the mother, in providing that a minor is evident that Reginald culpable act, which is
are responsible. The emancipated by is now of age, as a blameworthy, when
father and, in case of his marriage may not, matter of equity, the judged by accepted
death or incapacity, the nevertheless, sue or be liability of Atty. Hill has legal standards. "The
mother, are responsible sued without the become milling, Idea thus expressed is
for the damages caused assistance of the subsidiary to that of his undoubtedly board
by the minor children parents, is that such son. enough to include any
who live in their emancipation does not rational conception of
company." In the instant carry with it freedom to WHEREFORE, the liability for the tortious
case, it is not enter into transactions or order appealed from is acts likely to be
controverted that do any act that can give reversed and the trial developed in any
Reginald, although rise to judicial litigation. court is ordered to society." (Street, J. in
married, was living with (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, proceed in accordance Daywalt vs. Corporacion
his father and getting pp. 766-767, 776.) And with the foregoing de PP. Agustinos
subsistence from him at surely, killing someone opinion. Costs against Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587,
the time of the else invites judicial appellees. 600). See article 38,
occurrence in question. action. Otherwise stated, Civil Code and the ruling
Factually, therefore, the marriage of a minor Fernando (Chairman), that "the infant tortfeasor
Reginald was still child does not relieve Antonio, and Martin, JJ., is liable in a civil action
subservient to and the parents of the duty to concur. to the injured person in
dependent on his father, see to it that the child, the same manner and to
a situation which is not while still a minor, does Concepcion Jr., J, is on the same extent as an
unusual. not give answerable for leave. adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812
the borrowings of money cited by Bocobo, J., in
It must be borne in mind and alienation or Martin, J, was Magtibay vs. Tiangco,
that, according to encumbering of real designated to sit in the 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Manresa, the reason property which cannot Second Division.
behind the joint and be done by their minor
solidary liability of married child without
presuncion with their
 30

Spain of February 14, vs. The antecedent facts of others alleges the defendant SAFEGUARD
1919. the case are as follows: following: and/or defendant
Separate Opinions THE COURT OF SUPERGUARD and, at
2 Referring to APPEALS, Former On December 7, 1988, 1. . . . the time of the incident
AQUINO, J, concurring: Manzanares vs. Moreta, Eighth Division, HON. an altercation between complained of, was
38 Phil. 821. TEODORO P. REGINO, Benigno Torzuela and Defendants under their control and
Article 2176 of the Civil in his capacity as Atty. Napoleon Dulay SAFEGUARD supervision. . . .
Code comprehends any 3 Referring to Bernal et Presiding Judge of the occurred at the "Big INVESTIGATION AND
culpable act, which is al, vs. House et al., 54 Regional Trial Court Bang Sa Alabang," SECURITY CO., INC., 3. On December 7, 1988
blameworthy, when Phil. 327. National Capital Alabang Village, (Defendant Safeguard) at around 8:00 a.m.,
judged by accepted Region, Quezon City, Muntinlupa as a result of and SUPERGUARD defendant TORZUELA,
legal standards. "The 4 Parenthetically, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD which Benigno Torzuela, SECURITY while he was on duty as
Idea thus expressed is Manresa seemingly INVESTIGATION AND the security guard on CORPORATION security guard at the
undoubtedly board holds. the contrary view SECURITY CO., INC., duty at the said carnival, (Defendant Superguard) "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
enough to include any thus: and SUPERGUARD shot and killed Atty. are corporations duly Alabang Village,
rational conception of SECURITY Napoleon Dulay. organized and existing Muntinlupa, Metro
liability for the tortious CORPORATION, in accordance with Manila shot and killed
acts likely to be respondents. Herein petitioner Maria Philippine laws, with NAPOLEON V. DULAY
developed in any Benita A. Dulay, widow offices at 10th Floor, with a .38 caliber
Republic of the
society." (Street, J. in of the deceased Manufacturers Building, revolver belonging to
Philippines
Daywalt vs. Corporacion Napoleon Dulay, in her Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, defendant SAFEGUARD,
SUPREME COURT
de PP. Agustinos BIDIN, J.: own behalf and in behalf Manila. They are and/or SUPERGUARD
Manila
Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, of her minor children, impleaded as alternative (per Police Report dated
SECOND DIVISION
600). See article 38, This petition for certiorari filed on February 8, defendants for, while the January 7, 1989, copy
Civil Code and the ruling prays for the reversal of 1989 an action for former appears to be the attached as Annex A);
that "the infant tortfeasor the decision of the Court damages against employer of defendant
is liable in a civil action of Appeals dated Benigno Torzuela and BENIGNO TORZUELA 4. The incident resulting
G.R. No. 108017 April 3,
to the injured person in October 29, 1991 in herein private (defendant TORZUELA), in the death of
1995
the same manner and to CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 respondents Safeguard the latter impliedly NAPOLEON V. DULAY
the same extent as an which affirmed the order Investigation and acknowledged was due to the
MARIA BENITA A. Security Co., Inc., responsibility for the acts concurring negligence of
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 of the Regional Trial
DULAY, in her own ("SAFEGUARD") and/or of defendant the defendants.
cited by Bocobo, J., in Court dismissing Civil
behalf and in behalf of Superguard Security TORZUELA by Defendant
Magtibay vs. Tiangco, Case No. Q-89-1751,
the minor children Corp. extending its sympathies TORZUELA'S wanton
74 Phil. 576, 579). and its resolution dated
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, ("SUPERGUARD"), to plaintiffs. and reckless discharge
BEVERLY MARIE and November 17, 1991
Footnotes denying herein, alleged employers of of the firearm issued to
NAPOLEON II, all defendant Torzuela. The him by defendant
petitioner's motion for Defendant BENIGNO
surnamed DULAY, complaint, docketed as SAFEGUARD and/or
1 Referring to Sentence reconsideration. TORZUELA is of legal
petitioners, Civil Case No. SUPERGUARD was the
of the Supreme Court of age, an employee of
Q-89-1751 among immediate and
 31

proximate cause of the duties, and that since subsidiary liability (Rollo, acting within the scope Court of Makati and was Articles 100 and 103 of
injury, while the the alleged act of p. 55-59). of their assigned tasks, docketed as Criminal the Revised Penal Code
negligence of defendant shooting was committed even though the former Case No. 89-1896. as distinguished from
SAFEGUARD and/or with deliberate intent Respondent are not engaged in any those arising from,
SUPERGUARD consists (dolo), the civil liability SAFEGUARD also filed business or an industry. On April 13, 1989, quasi-delict. The
in its having failed to therefor is governed by a motion praying that it respondent Judge dispositive portion of the
exercise the diligence of Article 100 of the be excluded as xxx xxx xxx Regino issued an order order dated April 13,
a good father of a family Revised Penal Code, defendant on the ground granting 1989 states:
in the supervision and which states: that defendant Torzuela (Emphasis supplied) SUPERGUARD'S
control of its employee is not one of its motion to dismiss and WHEREFORE, this
to avoid the injury. Art. 100. Civil liability of employees (Rollo, p. Petitioners contended SAFEGUARD'S motion Court holds that in view
a person guilty of a 96). that a suit against for exclusion as of the material and
xxx xxx xxx felony. — Every person alternative defendants is defendant. The ultimate facts alleged in
criminally liable for a Petitioners opposed allowed under Rule 3, respondent judge held the verified complaint
(Rollo, pp. 117-118) felony is also civilly both motions, stating Section 13 of the Rules that the complaint did and in accordance with
liable. that their cause of action of Court. Therefore, the not state facts the applicable law on the
Petitioners prayed for against the private inclusion of private necessary or sufficient matter as well as
actual, compensatory, Respondent respondents is based on respondents as to constitute a precedents laid down by
moral and exemplary SUPERGUARD further their liability under alternative defendants in quasi-delict since it does the Supreme Court, the
damages, and attorney's alleged that a complaint Article 2180 of the New the complaint is justified not mention any complaint against the
fees. The said Civil for damages based on Civil Code, which by the following: the negligence on the part of alternative defendants
Case No. Q-89-1751 negligence under Article provides: Initial Investigation Torzuela in shooting Superguard Security
was raffled to Branch 84 2176 of the New Civil Report prepared by Pat. Napoleon Dulay or that Corporation and
of the Regional Trial Code, such as the one Art. 2180. The obligation Mario Tubon showing the same was done in Safeguard Investigation
Court of Quezon City, filed by petitioners, imposed by Article 2176 that Torzuela is an the performance of his and Security Co., Inc.,
presided by respondent cannot lie, since the civil is demandable not only employee of duties. Respondent must be and (sic) it is
Judge Teodoro Regino. liability under Article for one's own acts or SAFEGUARD; and judge ruled that mere hereby dismissed. (Rollo,
2176 applies only to omissions, but also for through overt acts, allegations of the p. 110)
On March 2, 1989, quasi-offenses under those of persons for SUPERGUARD concurring negligence of
private respondent Article 365 of the whom one is extended its sympathies the defendants (private The above order was
SUPERGUARD filed a Revised Penal Code. In responsible. to petitioners (Rollo, pp. respondents herein) affirmed by the
Motion to Dismiss on the addition, the private 64 and 98). without stating the facts respondent court and
ground that the respondent argued that xxx xxx xxx showing such petitioners' motion for
complaint does not state petitioners' filing of the Meanwhile, an negligence are mere reconsideration thereof
a valid cause of action. complaint is premature Employers shall be Information dated March conclusions of law (Rollo, was denied.
SUPERGUARD claimed considering that the liable for the damages 21, 1989 charging p. 106). Respondent
that Torzuela's act of conviction of Torzuela in caused by their Benigno Torzuela with judge also declared that Petitioners take
shooting Dulay was a criminal case is a employees and homicide was filed the complaint was one exception to the assailed
beyond the scope of his condition sine qua non household helpers before the Regional Trial for damages founded on decision and insist that
for the employer's crimes punishable under
 32

quasi-delicts are not the question of whether Sec. 3. When civil action of the New Civil Code. Sec. 1. Institution of is precisely what the
limited to acts of Torzuela is an employee may proceed The civil action criminal and civil actions. petitioners opted to do in
negligence but also of respondent independently — In the contemplated in Article When a criminal action this case. However, the
cover acts that are SUPERGUARD or cases provided for in 2177 is not applicable to is instituted, the civil private respondents
intentional and voluntary, SAFEGUARD would be Articles 32, 33, 34 and acts committed with action for the recovery of opposed the civil action
citing Andamo v. IAC better resolved after 2176 of the Civil Code of deliberate intent, but civil liability is impliedly on the ground that the
(191 SCRA 195 [1990]). trial. the Philippines, the only applies to instituted with the same is founded on a
Thus, petitioners insist independent civil action quasi-offenses under criminal action, unless delict and not on a
that Torzuela' s act of Moreover, petitioners which has been Article 365 of the the offended party quasi-delict as the
shooting Napoleon argue that Torzuela's act reserved may be Revised Penal Code. waives the civil action , shooting was not
Dulay constitutes a of shooting Dulay is also brought by the offended Torzuela's act of reserves his right to attended by negligence.
quasi-delict actionable actionable under Article party, shall proceed shooting Atty. Dulay to institute it separately or What is in dispute
under Article 2176 of the 33 of the New Civil Code, independently of the death, aside from being institutes the civil action therefore is the nature of
New Civil Code. to wit: criminal action, and shall purely personal, was prior to the criminal the petitioner's cause of
require only a done with deliberate action. action.
Petitioners further Art. 33. In cases of preponderance of intent and could not
contend that under defamation, fraud, and evidence. (Emphasis have been part of his Such civil action The nature of a cause of
Article 2180 of the New physical injuries, a civil supplied) duties as security guard. includes recovery of action is determined by
Civil Code, private action for damages, And since Article 2180 indemnity under the the facts alleged in the
respondents are entirely separate and The term "physical of the New Civil Code Revised Penal Code, complaint as constituting
primarily liable for their distinct from the criminal injuries" under Article 33 covers only: acts done and damages under the cause of action
negligence either in the action, may be brought has been held to include within the scope of the Articles 32, 33, 34, and (Republic v. Estenzo,
selection or supervision by the injured party. consummated, employee's assigned 2176 of the Civil Code of 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
of their employees. This Such civil action shall frustrated and attempted tasks, the private the Philippines arising The purpose of an
liability is independent of proceed independently homicide. Thus, respondents cannot be from the same act or action or suit and the law
the employee's own of the criminal petitioners maintain that held liable for damages. omission of the accused. to govern it is to be
liability for fault or prosecution, and shall Torzuela's prior (Emphasis supplied) determined not by the
negligence and is require only a conviction is We find for petitioners. claim of the party filing
distinct from the preponderance of unnecessary since the It is well-settled that the the action, made in his
subsidiary civil liability evidence. (Emphasis civil action can proceed It is undisputed that filing of an independent argument or brief, but
under Article 103 of the supplied) independently of the Benigno Torzuela is civil action before the rather by the complaint
Revised Penal Code. criminal action. On the being prosecuted for prosecution in the itself, its allegations and
The civil action against In the same vein, other hand, it is the homicide for the fatal criminal action presents prayer for relief. (De
the employer may petitioners cite Section 3, private respondents' shooting of Napoleon evidence is even far Tavera v. Philippine
therefore proceed Rule 111 of the Rules of argument that since the Dulay. Rule 111 of the better than a compliance Tuberculosis Society,
independently of the Court which provides: act was not committed Rules on Criminal with the requirement of 112 SCRA 243 [1982]).
criminal action pursuant with negligence, the Procedure provides: express reservation An examination of the
to Rule 111 Section 3 of Rule 111. . . . . petitioners have no (Yakult Philippines v. complaint in the present
the Rules of Court. cause of action under Court of Appeals, 190 case would show that
Petitioners submit that Articles 2116 and 2177 SCRA 357 [1990]). This the plaintiffs, petitioners

herein, are invoking their
right to recover
damages against the
private respondents for
their vicarious
responsibility for the
injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act
of shooting and killing
Napoleon Dulay, as
stated in paragraphs 1
and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by
act or omission causes
damage to another,
there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage
done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual
relation between the
parties is called a
quasi-delict and is
governed by the
provisions of this
Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of
private respondents,
there is no justification
for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or
omissions resulting from
negligence. vary. In other words, the
Well-entrenched is the extinction of civil liability
doctrine that article 2176 referred to in Par. (e) of
covers not only acts Section 3, Rule 111,
committed with refers exclusively to civil
negligence, but also acts liability founded on
which are voluntary and Article 100 of the
intentional. As far back Revised Penal Code,
as the definitive case of whereas the civil liability
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA for the same act
98 [1977]), this Court considered as
already held that: quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not
. . . Article 2176, where it extinguished even by a
refers to "fault or declaration in the
negligence," covers not criminal case that the
only acts "not criminal act charged has
punishable by law" but not happened or has not
also acts criminal in been committed by the
character; whether accused. Briefly stated,
intentional and voluntary We here hold, in
or negligent. reiteration of Garcia, that
Consequently, a culpa aquiliana includes
separate civil action voluntary and negligent
against the offender in a acts which may be
criminal act, whether or punishable by law.
not he is criminally (Emphasis supplied)
prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, The same doctrine was
provided that the echoed in the case of
offended party is not Andamo v. Intermediate
allowed, if he is actually Appellate Court (191
charged also criminally, SCRA 195 [1990]),
to recover damages on wherein the Court held:
both scores, and would
be entitled in such Article 2176, whenever it
eventuality only to the refers to "fault or
bigger award of the two, negligence," covers not
assuming the awards only acts criminal in
made in the two cases character, whether
intentional and voluntary
or negligent.
Consequently, a civil
action lies against the
offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is
prosecuted or found
guilty or acquitted,
provided that the
offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor
is actually also charged
criminally), to recover
damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the
two, assuming the
awards made in the two
cases vary. [citing Virata
v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents
submit that the word
"intentional" in the
Andamo case is
inaccurate obiter, and
should be read as
"voluntary" since intent
cannot be coupled with
negligence as defined
by Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In
the absence of more
substantial reasons, this
Court will not disturb the
above doctrine on the
coverage of Article
2176.
Private respondents
further aver that Article
33 of the New Civil Code
applies only to injuries
intentionally committed
pursuant to the ruling in
Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA
193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages
allowed thereunder are
ex-delicto. However, the
term "physical injuries"
in Article 33 has already
been construed to
include bodily injuries
causing death (Capuno
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 638 [1965);
Carandang v. Santiago,
97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is
not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only
physical injuries but also
consummated,
frustrated, and
attempted homicide
(Madeja v. Caro, 126
SCRA 293 [1983]).
Although in the Marcia
case (supra), it was held
that no independent civil
action may be filed
under Article 33 where
the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it
must be noted however,
that Torzuela, the
33
accused in the case at
bar, is charged with
homicide, not with
reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged
with reckless
imprudence. Therefore,
in this case, a civil action
based on Article 33 lies.
Private respondents
also contend that their
liability is subsidiary
under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are
not liable for Torzuela's
act which is beyond the
scope of his duties as a
security guard. It having
been established that
the instant action is not
ex-delicto, petitioners
may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the
private respondents.
Under Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an
injury is caused by the
negligence of the
employee, there
instantly arises a
presumption of law that
there was negligence on
the part of the master or
employer either in the
selection of the servant
or employee, or in
supervision over him

after selection or both
(Layugan v.
Intermediate Appellate
Court, 167 SCRA 363
[1988]). The liability of
the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior
recourse against the
negligent employee and
a prior showing of the
insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran
Bus Lines v. Coronado,
176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the
private respondents to
prove that they
exercised the diligence
of a good father of a
family in the selection
and supervision of their
employee.
Since Article 2176
covers not only acts of
negligence but also acts
which are intentional
and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on
the part of the trial court
to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply
because it failed to
make allegations of
attendant negligence
attributable to private
respondents.
With respect to the issue
of whether the complaint
at hand states a Pundogar, 218 SCRA
sufficient cause of action,
the general rule is that
the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient
to constitute a cause of
action against the
defendants if, admitting
the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid
judgment upon the same
in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause
of action exist if the
following elements are
present, namely: (1) a
right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever
means and under
whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of
the named defendant to
respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part
of such defendant
violative of the right of
the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of
the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may
maintain an action for
recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel
Corporation v. CA, 210
SCRA 33 [1992]);
Development Bank of private respondents
the Philippines v. SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to
118 [1993]) exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family;
This Court finds, under and whether the
the foregoing premises, defendants are actually
that the complaint liable, are questions
sufficiently alleged an which can be better
actionable breach on the resolved after trial on the
part of the defendant merits where each party
Torzuela and can present evidence to
respondents prove their respective
SUPERGUARD and/or allegations and
SAFEGUARD. It is defenses. In determining
enough that the whether the allegations
complaint alleged that of a complaint are
Benigno Torzuela shot sufficient to support a
Napoleon Dulay cause of action, it must
resulting in the latter's be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have
death; that the shooting
to establish or allege the
occurred while Torzuela
was on duty; and that facts proving the
either SUPERGUARD existence of a cause of
and/or SAFEGUARD action at the outset; this
was Torzuela's will have to be done at
employer and the trial on the merits of
responsible for his acts. the case (Del Bros Hotel
This does not operate Corporation v. CA,
however, to establish supra). If the allegations
that the defendants in a complaint can
below are liable. furnish a sufficient basis
Whether or not the by which the complaint
shooting was actually can be maintained, the
reckless and wanton or same should not be
attended by negligence dismissed regardless of
and whether it was the defenses that may
actually done within the be assessed by the
scope of Torzuela's defendants (Rava Dev't.
duties; whether the Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA
34
152 [1992] citing SO ORDERED.
Consolidated Bank &
Trust Corporation v. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado,
Court of Appeals, 197 Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,
SCRA 663 [1991]). To concur.
sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause
of action, the complaint
must show that the claim Republic of the
for relief does not exist Philippines
rather than that a claim SUPREME COURT
has been defectively Manila
stated, is ambiguous, THIRD DIVISION
indefinite or uncertain
(Azur v. Provincial Board,
27 SCRA 50 [1969]).
Since the petitioners
G.R. No. 97336
clearly sustained an
February 19, 1993
injury to their rights
under the law, it would
be more just to allow GASHEM SHOOKAT
them to present BAKSH, petitioner,
evidence of such injury.
vs.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, HON. COURT OF
the petition for review is APPEALS and
hereby GRANTED. The MARILOU T.
decision of the Court of GONZALES,
Appeals as well as the respondents.
Order of the Regional
Trial Court dated April Public Attorney's Office
13, 1989 are hereby for petitioner.
REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Corleto R. Castro for
Q-89-1751 is remanded private respondent.
to the Regional Trial
Court for trial on the
merits. This decision is
immediately executory.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: said complaint that: she
is twenty-two (22) years
This is an appeal by old, single, Filipino and a
certiorari under Rule 45 pretty lass of good moral
of the Rules of Court character and reputation
seeking to review and duly respected in her
set aside the Decision1 community; petitioner,
of the respondent Court on the other hand, is an
of Appeals in CA-G.R. Iranian citizen residing
CV No. 24256 which at the Lozano
affirmed in toto the 16 Apartments, Guilig,
October 1939 Decision Dagupan City, and is an
of Branch 38 (Lingayen) exchange student taking
of the Regional Trial a medical course at the
Court (RTC) of Lyceum Northwestern
Pangasinan in Civil Colleges in Dagupan
Case No. 16503. City; before 20 August
Presented is the issue of 1987, the latter courted
whether or not damages and proposed to marry
may be recovered for a her; she accepted his
breach of promise to love on the condition
marry on the basis of that they would get
Article 21 of the Civil married; they therefore
Code of the Philippines. agreed to get married
after the end of the
The antecedents of this school semester, which
case are not was in October of that
complicated: year; petitioner then
visited the private
On 27 October 1987, respondent's parents in
private respondent, Bañaga, Bugallon,
without the assistance of Pangasinan to secure
counsel, filed with the their approval to the
aforesaid trial court a marriage; sometime in
complaint2 for damages 20 August 1987, the
against the petitioner for petitioner forced her to
the alleged violation of live with him in the
their agreement to get Lozano Apartments; she
married. She alleges in was a virgin before she
began living with him; a
week before the filing of In his Answer with
the complaint, Counterclaim,3 petitioner
petitioner's attitude admitted only the
towards her started to personal circumstances
change; he maltreated of the parties as averred
and threatened to kill her; in the complaint and
as a result of such denied the rest of the
maltreatment, she allegations either for
sustained injuries; lack of knowledge or
during a confrontation information sufficient to
with a representative of form a belief as to the
the barangay captain of truth thereof or because
Guilig a day before the the true facts are those
filing of the complaint, alleged as his Special
petitioner repudiated and Affirmative
their marriage Defenses. He thus
agreement and asked claimed that he never
her not to live with him proposed marriage to or
anymore and; the agreed to be married
petitioner is already with the private
married to someone respondent; he neither
living in Bacolod City. sought the consent and
Private respondent then approval of her parents
prayed for judgment nor forced her to live in
ordering the petitioner to his apartment; he did not
pay her damages in the maltreat her, but only
amount of not less than told her to stop coming
P45,000.00, to his place because he
reimbursement for discovered that she had
actual expenses deceived him by stealing
amounting to P600.00, his money and passport;
attorney's fees and costs, and finally,
and granting her such confrontation took place
other relief and with a representative of
remedies as may be just the barangay captain.
and equitable. The Insisting, in
complaint was docketed Counterclaim, that the
as Civil Case No. 16503. complaint is baseless
and unfounded and that
as a result thereof, he
35
was unnecessarily of Medicine, second
dragged into court and year medicine proper;
compelled to incur
expenses, and has 3. That the plaintiff is (sic)
suffered mental anxiety an employee at
and a besmirched Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
reputation, he prayed for Fernandez Avenue,
an award of P5,000.00 Dagupan City since July,
for miscellaneous 1986 up to the present
expenses and and a (sic) high school
P25,000.00 as moral graduate;
damages.
4. That the parties
After conducting a happened to know each
pre-trial on 25 January other when the manager
1988, the trial court of the Mabuhay
issued a Pre-Trial Luncheonette, Johhny
Order4 embodying the Rabino introduced the
stipulated facts which defendant to the plaintiff
the parties had agreed on August 3, 1986.
upon, to wit:
After trial on the merits,
1. That the plaintiff is the lower court, applying
single and resident (sic) Article 21 of the Civil
of Bañaga, Bugallon, Code, rendered on 16
Pangasinan, while the October 1989 a
defendant is single, decision5 favoring the
Iranian citizen and private respondent. The
resident (sic) of Lozano petitioner was thus
Apartment, Guilig, ordered to pay the latter
Dagupan City since damages and attorney's
no September 1, 1987 up to fees; the dispositive
the present; portion of the decision
reads:
2. That the defendant is
his presently studying at IN THE LIGHT of the
Lyceum Northwestern, foregoing consideration,
Dagupan City, College judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the
defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of
twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.
2. Condemning further
the defendant to play the
plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00)
pesos as atty's fees and
two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos at
(sic) litigation expenses
and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are
denied.6
The decision is
anchored on the trial
court's findings and
conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private
respondent were lovers,
(b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose
morals or questionable
virtue who readily
submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations,
deceit and false
pretenses, promised to
marry private
respondent, d) because
of his persuasive
promise to marry her,
she allowed herself to
be deflowered by him, (e)
by reason of that
deceitful promise,
private respondent and
her parents — in
accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions
— made some
preparations for the
wedding that was to be
held at the end of
October 1987 by looking
for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and
relatives and contracting
sponsors, (f) petitioner
did not fulfill his promise
to marry her and (g)
such acts of the
petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has
abused Philippine
hospitality, have
offended our sense of
morality, good customs,
culture and traditions.
The trial court gave full
credit to the private
respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she
would not have had the
temerity and courage to
come to court and
expose her honor and
reputation to public
36
scrutiny and ridicule if defendant with members plaintiff became defendant had informed
her claim was false.7 of plaintiff's family or pregnant, but defendant them of his desire to
with plaintiff, were taken gave her some medicine marry Marilou, he
The above findings and that day. Also on that to abort the fetus. Still already looked for
conclusions were culled occasion, defendant told plaintiff continued to live sponsors for the
from the detailed plaintiffs parents and with defendant and kept wedding, started
summary of the brothers and sisters that reminding him of his preparing for the
evidence for the private he intended to marry her promise to marry her reception by looking for
respondent in the during the semestral until he told her that he pigs and chickens, and
foregoing decision, break in October, 1987, could not do so because even already invited
digested by the and because plaintiff's he was already married many relatives and
respondent Court as parents thought he was to a girl in Bacolod City. friends to the
follows: good and trusted him, That was the time forthcoming wedding. 8
they agreed to his plaintiff left defendant,
According to plaintiff, proposal for him to went home to her Petitioner appealed the
who claimed that she marry their daughter, parents, and thereafter trial court's decision to
was a virgin at the time and they likewise consulted a lawyer who the respondent Court of
and that she never had a allowed him to stay in accompanied her to the Appeals which docketed
boyfriend before, their house and sleep barangay captain in the case as CA-G.R. CV
defendant started with plaintiff during the Dagupan City. Plaintiff, No. 24256. In his Brief,9
courting her just a few few days that they were her lawyer, her he contended that the
days after they first met. in Bugallon. When godmother, and a trial court erred (a) in not
He later proposed plaintiff and defendant barangay tanod sent by dismissing the case for
marriage to her several later returned to the barangay captain lack of factual and legal
times and she accepted Dagupan City, they went to talk to defendant basis and (b) in ordering
his love as well as his continued to live to still convince him to him to pay moral
proposal of marriage on together in defendant's marry plaintiff, but damages, attorney's
August 20, 1987, on apartment. However, in defendant insisted that fees, litigation expenses
which same day he went the early days of he could not do so and costs.
with her to her October, 1987, because he was already
hometown of Bañaga, defendant would tie married to a girl in On 18 February 1991,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, plaintiff's hands and feet Bacolod City, although respondent Court
as he wanted to meet while he went to school, the truth, as stipulated promulgated the
her parents and inform and he even gave her by the parties at the challenged decision 10
them of their relationship medicine at 4 o'clock in pre-trial, is that affirming in toto the trial
and their intention to get the morning that made defendant is still single. court's ruling of 16
married. The her sleep the whole day October 1989. In
photographs Exhs. "A" and night until the Plaintiff's father, a sustaining the trial
to "E" (and their following day. As a result tricycle driver, also court's findings of fact,
submarkings) of of this live-in relationship, claimed that after

respondent Court made
the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then
only 21 years old when
she met defendant who
was already 29 years
old at the time, does not
appear to be a girl of
loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she
was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience
with defendant and
never had boyfriend.
She is, as described by
the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and
accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not
have allowed
"herself to be
deflowered by the
defendant if there was
no persuasive promise
made by the defendant
to marry her." In fact, we
agree with the lower
court that plaintiff and
defendant must have
been sweethearts or so
the plaintiff must have
thought because of the
deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would
not have allowed herself
to be photographed with
defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender
poses as those depicted
in the pictures Exhs. "D"
and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense
that plaintiff was a
nobody to him except a
waitress at the
restaurant where he
usually ate. Defendant in
fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's
hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan,
at least thrice; at (sic)
the town fiesta on
February 27, 1987 (p. 54,
tsn May 18, 1988), at
(sic) a beach party
together with the
manager and
employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly
talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to
marry her daughter (pp.
55-56, tsn id.). Would
defendant have left
Dagupan City where he
was involved in the
serious study of
medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon,
unless there was (sic)
some kind of special
relationship between
them? And this special
relationship must indeed
have led to defendant's
insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only
to her but also to her
parents, and (sic)
Marites Rabino, the
owner of the restaurant
where plaintiff was
working and where
defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also
knew of this love affair
and defendant's
proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, which she
declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned
from her job at the
restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand,
appellant does not
appear to be a man of
good moral character
and must think so low
and have so little
respect and regard for
Filipino women that he
openly admitted that
when he studied in
Bacolod City for several
years where he finished
his B.S. Biology before
he came to Dagupan
City to study medicine,
he had a common-law
wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also
lived with another
woman in Bacolod City
but did not marry that
woman, just like what he
did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he
felt so little compunction
or remorse in pretending
to love and promising to
marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country
girl, in order to satisfy his
lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly
convinced and so hold
that it was
defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for
and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and
to live with him on the
honest and sincere
belief that he would
keep said promise, and
it was likewise these (sic)
fraud and deception on
appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's
living-in with him
preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And
as these acts of
appellant are palpably
and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs,
and public policy, and
are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women,
coming as they do from
a foreigner who has
been enjoying the
hospitality of our people
and taking advantage of
the opportunity to study
in one of our institutions
of learning,
defendant-appellant
should indeed be made,
under Art. 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines,
to compensate for the
moral damages and
injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the
lower court ordered him
to do in its decision in
this case. 12
Unfazed by his second
defeat, petitioner filed
the instant petition on 26
March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue
of whether or not Article
21 of the Civil Code
applies to the case at
bar. 13
37
It is petitioner's thesis
that said Article 21 is not
applicable because he
had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or
violated any good
custom or public policy;
he has not professed
love or proposed
marriage to the private
respondent; and he has
never maltreated her.
He criticizes the trial
court for liberally
invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and
culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not
conversant with such
Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As
an Iranian Moslem, he is
not familiar with Catholic
and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he
had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent
failure to fulfill the same
is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then
alludes to the Muslim
Code which purportedly
allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and
concludes that on the
basis thereof, the trial
court erred in ruling that
he does not posses

good moral character.
Moreover, his
controversial "common
law life" is now his legal
wife as their marriage
had been solemnized in
civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to
his unlawful cohabitation
with the private
respondent, petitioner
claims that even if
responsibility could be
pinned on him for the
live-in relationship, the
private respondent
should also be faulted
for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that
he had professed his
love to the private
respondent and had also
promised to marry her,
such acts would not be
actionable in view of the
special circumstances of
the case. The mere
breach of promise is not
actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991,
after the private
respondent had filed her
Comment to the petition
and the petitioner had
filed his Reply thereto,
this Court gave due
course to the petition
and required the parties
to submit their
respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from
the foregoing
summation of the
petitioner's arguments in
support of his thesis, it is
clear that questions of
fact, which boil down to
the issue of the
credibility of witnesses,
are also raised. It is the
rule in this jurisdiction
that appellate courts will
not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the
credibility of witnesses,
the latter court having
heard the witnesses and
having had the
opportunity to observe
closely their deportment
and manner of testifying,
unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts
of substance or value
which, if considered,
might affect the result of
the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably
failed to convince Us
that both the appellate
and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of
substance or values
which could alter the
result of the case.
Equally settled is the
rule that only questions
of law may be raised in a
petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. It
is not the function of this
Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the
evidence introduced by
the parties before the
lower court. There are,
however, recognized
exceptions to this rule.
Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this
Court took the time,
again, to enumerate
these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion
is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93
Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)
When the inference
made is manifestly
mistaken, absurb or
impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there
is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453
[1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a
misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
(5) When the findings of
fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca,
L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the
case and the same is
contrary to the
admissions of both
appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401
[1958]);
(7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the
trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact
are conclusions without
citation of specific
evidence on which they
are based (Ibid.,); (9)
When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as
in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not
disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and
(10) The finding of fact
of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the
supposed absence of
evidence and is
contradicted by the
evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not
endeavored to joint out
to Us the existence of
any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the
factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal
issue.
The existing rule is that
a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17
Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft
of the New Civil Code
the provisions that would
have made it so. The
reason therefor is set
forth in the report of the
38
Senate Committees on
the Proposed Civil Code,
from which We quote:
The elimination of this
chapter is proposed.
That breach of promise
to marry is not
actionable has been
definitely decided in the
case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of
breach of promise suits
in the United States and
in England has shown
that no other action
lends itself more readily
to abuse by designing
women and
unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which
has led to the abolition
of rights of action in the
so-called Heart Balm
suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding,
the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21,
which is designed to
expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for
human foresight to
specifically enumerate

and punish in the statute
books. 20
As the Code
Commission itself stated
in its Report:
But the Code
Commission had gone
farther than the sphere
of wrongs defined or
determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps
in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have
actually suffered
material and moral injury,
the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in
the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who
wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a
manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs
or public policy shall
compensate the latter
for the damage.
An example will illustrate
the purview of the
foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the
nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A
promise of marriage
either has not been
made, or can not be
proved. The girl
becomes pregnant.
Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the
girl is above nineteen
years of age. Neither
can any civil action for
breach of promise of
marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong
has been committed,
and though the girl and
family have suffered
incalculable moral
damage, she and her
parents cannot bring
action for damages. But
under the proposed
article, she and her
parents would have
such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the
legislator, if the forgoing
rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that
untold number of moral
wrongs which it is
impossible for human
foresight to provide for
specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, which defines a
quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or
omission causes
damage to another,
there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage
done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual
relation between the
parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is
governed by the
provisions of this
Chapter.
is limited to negligent
acts or omissions and
excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent.
Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a
civil law concept while
torts is an
Anglo-American or
common law concept.
Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not
only negligence, but
international criminal
acts as well such as
assault and battery,
false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine
legal system envisioned
by the Commission
responsible for drafting
the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious
acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be
governed by the
Revised Penal Code
while negligent acts or
omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176
of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite
spectrums are injurious
acts which, in the
absence of Article 21,
would have been
beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even
postulated that together
with Articles 19 and 20
of the Civil Code, Article
21 has greatly
broadened the scope of
the law on civil wrongs; it
has become much more
supple and adaptable
than the
Anglo-American law on
torts. 23
In the light of the above
laudable purpose of
Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's
promise to marry is in
fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her
and that the promise
was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive
device to entice or
inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual
act, could justify the
award of damages
pursuant to Article 21
not because of such
promise to marry but
because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her
honor and reputation
which followed
thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such
injury should have been
committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
In the instant case,
respondent Court found
that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive
39
protestations of love for
and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and
to live with him on the
honest and sincere
belief that he would
keep said promise, and
it was likewise these
fraud and deception on
appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's
living-in with him
preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24
In short, the private
respondent surrendered
her virginity, the
cherished possession of
every single Filipina, not
because of lust but
because of moral
seduction — the kind
illustrated by the Code
Commission in its
example earlier
adverted to. The
petitioner could not be
held liable for criminal
seduction punished
under either Article 337
or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code
because the private
respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the
seduction.
 40

Prior decisions of this engagement even Phil. 121; U.S. vs. On the other hand, in an woman of adult age, In his annotations on the
Court clearly suggest before they had the Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). action by the woman, maintain intimate sexual Civil Code, 28 Associate
that Article 21 may be benefit of clergy. the enticement, relations with appellant, Justice Edgardo L.
applied in a breach of It has been ruled in the persuasion or deception with repeated acts of Paras, who recently
promise to marry where In Tanjanco vs. Court of Buenaventura case is the essence of the intercourse. Such retired from this Court,
the woman is a victim of Appeals, 26 while this (supra) that — injury; and a mere proof conduct is incompatible opined that in a breach
moral seduction. Thus, Court likewise hinted at of intercourse is with the idea of of promise to marry
in Hermosisima vs. possible recovery if To constitute seduction insufficient to warrant a seduction. Plainly there where there had been
Court of Appeals,25 this there had been moral there must in all cases recovery. is here voluntariness carnal knowledge, moral
Court denied recovery of seduction, recovery was be some sufficient and mutual passion; for damages may be
damages to the woman eventually denied promise or inducement Accordingly it is not had the appellant been recovered:
because: because We were not and the woman must seduction where the deceived, had she
convinced that such yield because of the willingness arises out of surrendered exclusively . . . if there be criminal or
. . . we find ourselves seduction existed. The promise or other sexual desire of curiosity because of the deceit, moral seduction, but not
unable to say that following enlightening inducement. If she of the female, and the artful persuasions and if the intercourse was
petitioner is morally disquisition and consents merely from defendant merely wiles of the defendant, due to mutual lust.
guilty of seduction, not conclusion were made in carnal lust and the affords her the needed she would not have (Hermosisima vs. Court
only because he is the said case: intercourse is from opportunity for the again yielded to his of Appeals,
approximately ten (10) mutual desire, there is commission of the act. It embraces, much less for
years younger than the The Court of Appeals no seduction (43 Cent. has been emphasized one year, without L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960;
complainant — who was seem to have Dig. tit. Seduction, par. that to allow a recovery exacting early fulfillment Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr.,
around thirty-six (36) overlooked that the 56) She must be in all such cases would of the alleged promises L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
years of age, and as example set forth in the induced to depart from tend to the of marriage, and would Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
highly enlightened as a Code Commission's the path of virtue by the demoralization of the have cut short all sexual Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz
former high school memorandum refers to a use of some species of female sex, and would relations upon finding Galang vs. Court of
teacher and a life tort upon a minor who arts, persuasions and be a reward for that defendant did not Appeals, et al., L-17248,
insurance agent are had been seduced. The wiles, which are unchastity by which a intend to fulfill his Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
supposed to be — when essential feature is calculated to have and class of adventuresses defendant did not intend words, if the CAUSE be
she became intimate seduction, that in law is do have that effect, and would be swift to profit. to fulfill his promise. the promise to marry,
with petitioner, then a more than mere sexual which result in her (47 Am. Jur. 662) Hence, we conclude that and the EFFECT be the
mere apprentice pilot, intercourse, or a breach person to ultimately no case is made under carnal knowledge, there
but, also, because the of a promise of marriage; submitting her person to xxx xxx xxx article 21 of the Civil is a chance that there
court of first instance it connotes essentially the sexual embraces of Code, and no other was criminal or moral
found that, complainant the idea of deceit, her seducer (27 Phil. Over and above the cause of action being seduction, hence
"surrendered herself" to enticement, superior 123). partisan allegations, the alleged, no error was recovery of moral
petitioner because, power or abuse of fact stand out that for committed by the Court damages will prosper. If
"overwhelmed by her confidence on the part of And in American one whole year, from of First Instance in it be the other way
love" for him, she the seducer to which the Jurisprudence we find: 1958 to 1959, the dismissing the complaint. around, there can be no
27
"wanted to bind" him by woman has yielded (U.S. plaintiff-appellee, a recovery of moral
having a fruit of their vs. Buenaventura, 27 damages, because here

mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL
damages, should there
be any, such as the
expenses for the
wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v.
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino 29 is also of the
same persuasion:
It is submitted that the
rule in Batarra vs.
Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the
incorporation of the
present article31 in the
Code. The example
given by the Code
Commission is correct, if
there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal
sense, but in the vulgar
sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is
accomplished without
any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse
of authority or influence,
but the woman, already
of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it
cannot be said that there
is an injury which can be
the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is
fraud, which is
characterized by
willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court,
however, must weigh
the degree of fraud, if it
is sufficient to deceive
the woman under the
circumstances, because
an act which would
deceive a girl sixteen
years of age may not
constitute deceit as to
an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But
so long as there is a
wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there
should be civil liability,
even if the act is not
punishable under the
criminal law and there
should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of
the criminal case for that
reason.
We are unable to agree
with the petitioner's
alternative proposition to
the effect that granting,
for argument's sake, that
he did promise to marry
the private respondent,
the latter is nevertheless
also at fault. According
to him, both parties are
in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article
1412(1) of the Civil These statements reveal
Code and the doctrine the true character and
laid down in Batarra vs. motive of the petitioner.
Marcos, 32 the private It is clear that he harbors
respondent cannot a condescending, if not
recover damages from sarcastic, regard for the
the petitioner. The latter private respondent on
even goes as far as account of the latter's
stating that if the private ignoble birth, inferior
respondent had educational background,
"sustained any injury or poverty and, as
damage in their perceived by him,
relationship, it is dishonorable
primarily because of her employment. Obviously
own doing, 33 for: then, from the very
beginning, he was not at
. . . She is also all moved by good faith
interested in the and an honest motive.
petitioner as the latter Marrying with a woman
will become a doctor so circumstances could
sooner or later. Take not have even remotely
notice that she is a plain occurred to him. Thus,
high school graduate his profession of love
and a mere employee . . . and promise to marry
(Annex "C") or a were empty words
waitress (TSN, p. 51, directly intended to fool,
January 25, 1988) in a dupe, entice, beguile
luncheonette and and deceive the poor
without doubt, is in need woman into believing
of a man who can give that indeed, he loved her
her economic security. and would want her to
Her family is in dire need be his life's partner. His
of financial assistance. was nothing but pure
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, lust which he wanted
1988). And this satisfied by a Filipina
predicament prompted who honestly believed
her to accept a that by accepting his
proposition that may proffer of love and
have been offered by proposal of marriage,
the petitioner. 34 she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner
clearly violated the
Filipino's concept of
morality and brazenly
defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can
even be said that the
petitioner committed
such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil
Code which directs
every person to act with
justice, give everyone
his due and observe
honesty and good faith
in the exercise of his
rights and in the
performance of his
obligations.
No foreigner must be
allowed to make a
mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule
does not apply in this
case for while indeed,
the private respondent
may not have been
impelled by the purest of
intentions, she
eventually submitted to
the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust,
but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is
41
apparent that she had
qualms of conscience
about the entire episode
for as soon as she found
out that the petitioner
was not going to marry
her after all, she left him.
She is not, therefore, in
pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto
means "in equal fault; in
a similar offense or
crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." 35At most, it
could be conceded that
she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes
for the relief of the less
guilty of the parties,
where his transgression
has been brought about
by the imposition of
undue influence of the
party on whom the
burden of the original
wrong principally rests,
or where his consent to
the transaction was itself
procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud,
37 We declared:
Appellants likewise
stress that both parties
being at fault, there

should be no action by
one against the other
(Art. 1412, New Civil
Code). This rule,
however, has been
interpreted as applicable
only where the fault on
both sides is, more or
less, equivalent. It does
not apply where one
party is literate or
intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs.
Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209).
We should stress,
however, that while We
find for the private
respondent, let it not be
said that this Court
condones the deplorable
behavior of her parents
in letting her and the
petitioner stay together
in the same room in their
house after giving
approval to their
marriage. It is the
solemn duty of parents
to protect the honor of
their daughters and
infuse upon them the
higher values of morality
and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding
no reversible error in the
challenged decision, the
instant petition is hereby
42
DENIED, with costs Eriberto Seno for criminal case was filed First Instance of Cebu, desires is a Writ of
against the petitioner. appellant. against the driver, respondent Judge mandamus (Annex "R").
Romeo Hilot, arising presiding, on September Petitioner's Motion for
SO ORDERED. Jose M. Mesina for from the same accident. 11, 1970, alleging that Reconsideration was
appellees. At the pre-trial in the civil the City Judge had denied by respondent
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero case, counsel for private acted with grave abuse Judge in an Order dated
and Melo, JJ., concur. respondents moved to of discretion in November 14,1970
suspend the civil action suspending the civil (Annex "S" and Annex
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on MELENCIO-HERRERA, pending the final action for being contrary "U").
leave. J.: determination of the to law and jurisprudence.
2
criminal suit, invoking Hence, this Petition for
Republic of the This is a Petition for Rule 111, Section 3 (b) Review before this
Philippines Review on certiorari of of the Rules of Court, On November 5, 1970, Tribunal, to which we
SUPREME COURT the Decision of the Court which provides: respondent Judge gave due course on
Manila of First Instance of Cebu dismissed the Petition February 25, 1971. 3
FIRST DIVISION rendered on November (b) After a criminal for certiorari on the
5, 1970. action has been ground that there was Petitioner makes these:
G.R. No. L-33171 May commenced. no civil no grave abuse of
31, 1979 The background facts to action arising from the discretion on the part of ASSIGNMENTS OF
the controversy may be same offense can be the City Court in ERROR
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, set forth as follows: prosecuted, and the suspending the civil
petitioner-appellant, same shall be action inasmuch as 1. THE TRIAL COURT,
suspended, in whatever damage to property is RESPONDENT JUDGE
Petitioner herein filed,
vs. stage it may be found, not one of the instances MATEO CANONOY,
on February 25, 1970, a
until final judgment in when an independent ERRED IN HOLDING
Complaint in the City
HON. MATEO the criminal proceeding civil action is proper; that THAT THE TRIAL OF
Court of Mandaue City,
CANONOY, Presiding has been rendered; petitioner has another THE CIVIL CASE NO.
Cebu, Branch II, for the
Judge of the Third plain, speedy, and 189 FILED IN THE CITY
recovery of damages on
Branch of the Court of The City Court of adequate remedy under COURT OF MANDAUE
account of a vehicular
First Instance of Cebu, Mandaue City in an the law, which is to SHOULD BE
accident involving his
HON. LORENZO B. Order dated August 11, submit his claim for SUSPENDED UNTIL
automobile and a
BARRIA City Judge of 1970, ordered the damages in the criminal AFTER A FINAL
jeepney driven by
Mandaue City, Second suspension of the civil case; that the resolution JUDGMENT IS
Romeo Hilot and
Branch ROMEO HILOT, case. Petitioner's Motion of the City Court is RENDERED IN THE
operated by Valeriana
VALERIANA PEPITO for Reconsideration interlocutory and, CRIMINAL CASE.
Pepito and Carlos
and CARLOS PEPITO, thereof, having been therefore, certiorari is
Pepito, the last three
respondents-appellees. denied on August 25, improper; and that the 2. THAT THE COURT
being the private 1
1970, petitioner Petition is defective ERRED IN HOLDING
respondents in this suit.
elevated the matter on inasmuch as what THAT IN ORDER TO
Subsequent thereto, a
certiorari to the Court of petitioner actually

AVOID DELAY THE of the Civil Code, which
OFFENDED PARTY provide:
MAY SUBMIT HIS
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES Art. 2176. Whoever by
IN THE CRIMINAL act or omission causes
CASE. damage to another,
there being fault or
3. THAT THE COURT negligence is obliged to
ERRED IN HOLDING pay for the damage
THAT THE PETITION done. Such fault or
FOR certiorari IS NOT negligence, if there is no
PROPER, BECAUSE pre-existing contractual
THE RESOLUTION IN relation between the
QUESTION IS parties, is caned a
INTERLOCUTORY. quasi-delict and is
governed by the
4. THAT THE COURT provisions of this
ERRED IN HOLDING Chapter. (1902a)
THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE. 4 Art. 2180. The obligation
imposed by article 2176
all of which can be is demandable not only
synthesized into one for one's own acts or
decisive issue: whether omissions but also for
or not there can be an those of persons for
independent civil action whom one is
for damage to property responsible.
during the pendency of
the criminal action. xxx xxx xxx
From the Complaint filed Employers shall be
by petitioner before the liable for the damages
City Court of Mandaue cause by their
City, Cebu, it is evident employees and
that the nature and household helpers
character of his action acting within the scope
was quasi-delictual of their assigned tasks,
predicated principally on even though the former
Articles 2176 and 2180
43
are not engaged in any contended, among quasi-delict, which is so absurd and
business or industry. others, that defendant, readily discernible from anomalous. Nor are we,
Valeriana Pepito, the foregoing codal in the interpretation of
xxx xxx xxx observed due diligence provision, has been the laws, disposed to
in the selection and expounded in Barredo uphold the letter that
The responsibility supervision of her vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. killeth rather than the
treated of in this article employees, particularly 607, 620-621, 6 thus: spirit that giveth life. We
shall cease when the of her co-defendant will not use the literal
persons herein Romeo Hilot, a defense Firstly, the Revised meaning of the law to
mentioned prove that peculiar to actions Penal Code in article smother and render
they observed all the based on quasi-delict. 5 365 punishes not only almost lifeless a
diligence of a good reckless but also simple principle of such ancient
father of a family to Liability being imprudence. if we were origin and such
prevent damage. predicated on to hold that articles 1902 full-grown development
(1903a) quasi-delict the civil to 1910 of the Civil Code as culpa aquiliana or
case may proceed as a refer only to fault or quasi-delito, which is
Thus, plaintiff made the separate and negligence not punished conserved and made
essential averments that independent civil action, by law, according to the enduring in articles 1902
it was the fault or as specifically provided literal import of article to 11910 of the Spanish
negligence of the driver, for in Article 2177 of the 1093 of the Civil Code, Civil Code.
Romeo Hilot, in the Civil Code. the legal institution of
operation of the jeepney culpa aquiliana would Secondly, to find the
owned by the Pepitos Art. 2177. Responsibility have very little scope accused guilty in a
which caused the for fault or negligence and application in actual criminal case, proof of
collision between his under the preceding life. Death or injury to guilt beyond reasonable
automobile and said article is entirely persons and damage to doubt is required, while
jeepney; that damages separate and distinct property through any in a civil case,
were sustained by from the civil liability degree of negligence — preponderance of
petitioner because of the arising from negligence even the slightest would evidence is sufficient to
collision; that there was under the Penal Code. have to be indemnified make the defendant pay
a direct causal But the plaintiff cannot only through the in damages. There are
connection between the recover damages twice principle of civil hability numerous cases of
damages he suffered for the same act or arising from crime. In criminal negligence
and the fault and omission of the such a state of affairs, which cannot be shown
negligence of private defendant. (n) what sphere would beyond reasonable
respondents. remain for quasidelito or doubt, but can be
The crucial distinction culpa aquiliana We are proved by a
Similarly, in the Answer, between criminal loath to impute to the preponderance of
private respondents negligence and lawmaker any intention evidence. In such cases,
to bring about a situation the defendant can and

should be made
responsible in a civil
action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, otherwise, there
would be many
instances of
unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that
there is only one way to
make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be
tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to
follow a devious and
cumbersome method of
obtaining a reliel True,
there is such a remedy
under our laws, but
there is also a more
expeditious way, which
is based on the primary
and direct responsibility
of the defendant under
article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Our view of the
law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs because the
procedure indicated by
the defendant is
wasteful and productive
of delay, it being a
matter of common
knowledge that latter's careful conduct
professional drivers of for the personnel and
taxis and similar public patrimonial safety of
conveyances usually do others. As Theilhard has
not have sufficient said, "they should
means with which to pay reproach themselves, at
damages. Why, then, least, some for their
should the plaintiff be weakness, others for
required in all cases to their poor selection and
go through this all for their negligence."
round-about, And according to
unnecessary, and Manresa, "It is much
probably useless more equitable and just
procedure? In that such responsibility
construing the laws, should fail upon the
courts have endeavored principal or director who
to shorten and facilitate could have chosen a
the pathways of right careful and prudent
and justice. employee, and not upon
the such employee
At this juncture, it should because of his
be said that the primary confidence in the
and direct responsibility principal or director."
of employers and their (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
presumed negligence Many jurists also base
are principles calculated this primary
to protect society. responsibility of the
Workmen and employer on the
employees should be principle of
carefully chosen and representation of the
supervised in order to principal by the agent.
avoid injury to the public. Thus, Oyuelos says in
It is the masters or the work already cited
employers who (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
principally reap the before third persons the
profits resulting from the employer and employee
services of these vienen a ser como una
servants and employees. sola personalidad, por
It is but right that they refundicion de la del
should guarantee the dependiente en la de
quien la emplea y utihza
(become as one
personality by the
merging of the person of
the employee in that of
him who employs and
utilizes him.) All these
observations acquire a
peculiar force and
significance when it
comes to motor
accidents, and there is
need of stressing and
accentuating the
responsibility of owners
of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the
broad sweep of the
provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject,
which has given rise to
overlapping or
concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and
for lack of understanding
of the character and
efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has
grown up a common
practice to seek
damages only by virtue
of the Civil responsibility
arising from crime,
forgetting that there is
another remedy, which
is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this
habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless
rendered practically
useless and nugatory
the more expeditious
and effective remedy
based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But
we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the
harm done by such
practice and to restore
the principle of
responsibility for fault or
negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we
cause the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so
that its waters may no
longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the
bet ter safeguarding of
private rights because it
re-establishes an
ancient and additional
remedy, and for the
further reason that an
independent civil action,
not depending on the
44
issues, stations and
results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party
wronged or his counsel
is more likely to secure
adequate and
efficacious redress.
(Garcia vs. Florida 52
SCRA 420, 424-425,
Aug. 31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied)
The separate and
independent civil action
for a quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in
section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court,
reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil
action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Are
independent civil action
entirely separate and
distinct from the c action,
may be brought by the
injured party during the
pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right
is reserved as required
in the preceding section.
Such civil action shag
proceed independently
of the criminal
prosecution, and shall

require only a has been rendered."
preponderance of
evidence.
Significant to note is the
fact that the foregoing
section categorically
lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, supra, as
allowing of an
"independent civil
action."
Tested by the
hereinabove-quoted
legal tenets, it has to be
held that the City Court,
in surrounding the civil
action, erred in placing
reliance on section 3 (b)
of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, supra which
refers to "other civil
actions arising from
cases not included in the
section just cited" (i.e.,
Section 2, Rule 111
above quoted), in which
case 6 once the criminal
action has being
commenced, no civil
action arising from the
same offense can be
prosecuted and the
same shall be
suspended in whatever
stage it may be found,
until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding
Stated otherwise, the
civil action referred to in
Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, which should be
suspended after the
criminal action has been
instituted is that arising
from the criminal offense
not the civil action based
on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil
Code then clearly
assumes relevance
when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil
action is based on an
obligation not arising
from the act or omission
complained of as a
felony, such civil action
may proceed
independently of the
criminal proceedings
and regardless of the
result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural
concept of a quasi-delict
is that of an independent
source of obligation "not
arising from the act or
omission complained of
as a felony." Article 1157
of the Civil Code
bolsters this conclusion
45
when it specifically done and "reparation" WHEREFORE, granting 6 Cited in Garcia vs.
recognizes that: for the harm done. And the Writ of certiorari Florido 52 SCRA 420,
with respect to harm it is prayed for, the Decision 424-425 (1973).
Art. 1157. Obligations plain that it includes both of the Court of First
arise from: injuries to person and Instance of Cebu sought 7 See Barredo vs,
property since "harm" is to be reviewed is hereby Garcia 73 Phil. 607, at
(1) Law; not limited to personal set aside, and the City 620, supra.
but also to property Court of Mandaue City,
(2) Contracts; injuries. In fact, Cebu, Branch 11, is
examples of quasi-delict hereby ordered to
(3) Quasi-contracts; in the law itself include proceed with the hearing
Republic of the
damage to property. An of Civil Case No. 189 of Philippines
(4) Acts or omissions instance is Article that Court. SUPREME COURT
punished by law; and 2191(2) of the Civil Manila
Code which holds Without pronouncement EN BANC
(5) Quasi-delicts. proprietors responsible as to costs. G.R. No.
(1089a) for damages caused by L-48006 July
excessive smoke which SO ORDERED. 8, 1942
(Emphasis supplied) may be harmful to FAUSTO BARREDO,
persons or property." Teehankee (Chairman), petitioner,
It bears emphasizing Makasiar, Fernandez, vs.
that petitioner's cause of In the light of the Guerrero and De Castro, SEVERINO GARCIA
foregoing disquisition, JJ., concur. and TIMOTEA
action is based on
quasi-delict. The we are constrained to ALMARIO,
hold that respondent respondents.
concept of quasidelica
Judge gravely abused Celedonio P. Gloria and
as enunciated in Article
his discretion in #Footnotes Antonio Barredo for
2176 of the Civil Code
(supra), is so broad that upholding the Decision petitioner.
of the City Court of 1 Annexes "N" and "O", Jose G. Advincula for
it includes not only
Mandaue City, Cebu, Petition, respondents.
injuries to persons but
suspending the civil BOCOBO, J.:
also damage to property.
7 It makes no distinction action based on a 2 Annex "P", Petition. This case comes up
quasi-delict until after from the Court of
between "damage to
the criminal case is 3 p. 84, Rollo. Appeals which held the
persons" on the one
finally terminated. petitioner herein, Fausto
hand and "damage to
Having arrived at this Barredo, liable in
property" on the other. 4 p. 17, Ibid.
conclusion, a discussion damages for the death
Indeed, the word
of the other errors of Faustino Garcia
"damage" is used in two 5 Article 2180, Civil
assigned becomes caused by the
concepts: the "harm" Code.
unnecessary.

negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said
Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in
the morning of May 3,
1936, on the road
between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a
head-on collision
between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven
by Pedro Fontanilla and
a carretela guided by
Pedro Dimapalis. The
carretela was
overturned, and one of
its passengers,
16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia,
suffered injuries from
which he died two days
later. A criminal action
was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal,
and he was convicted
and sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence
of one year and one day
to two years of prision
correccional. The court
in the criminal case
granted the petition that
the right to bring a
separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower
court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased
on March 7, 1939,
brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of
Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. On
July 8, 1939, the Court
of First Instance of
Manila awarded
damages in favor of the
plaintiffs for P2,000 plus
legal interest from the
date of the complaint.
This decision was
modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with
legal interest from the
time the action was
instituted. It is
undisputed that
Fontanilla 's negligence
was the cause of the
mishap, as he was
driving on the wrong
side of the road, and at
high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility,
the Court of Appeals
found:
... It is admitted that
defendant is Fontanilla's
employer. There is proof
that he exercised the
diligence of a good
father of a family to
prevent damage. (See p.
22, appellant's brief.) In
fact it is shown he was
careless in employing
Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for
violation of the
Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) —
violation which
appeared in the records
of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be
public and to himself.
Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs
under the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
The main theory of the
defense is that the
liability of Fausto
Barredo is governed by
the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only
subsidiary, and as there
has been no civil action
against Pedro Fontanilla,
the person criminally
liable, Barredo cannot
be held responsible in
the case. The
petitioner's brief states
on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals
holds that the petitioner
is being sued for his
failure to exercise all the
diligence of a good
father of a family in the
selection and
supervision of Pedro
Fontanilla to prevent
damages suffered by the
respondents. In other
words, The Court of
Appeals insists on
applying in the case
article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Article 1903 of the
Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book
IV of the Civil Code. This
fact makes said article to
a civil liability arising
from a crime as in the
case at bar simply
because Chapter II of
Title 16 of Book IV of the
Civil Code, in the precise
words of article 1903 of
the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those
(obligations) arising from
wrongful or negligent
acts or commission not
punishable by law.
The gist of the decision
of the Court of Appeals
is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to
the defendant's
contention. The liability
sought to be imposed
upon him in this action is
not a civil obligation
arising from a felony or a
misdemeanor (the crime
of Pedro Fontanilla,), but
an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil
Code by reason of his
negligence in the
selection or supervision
of his servant or
employee.
The pivotal question in
this case is whether the
plaintiffs may bring this
separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him
primarily and directly,
responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code
as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. The
defendant maintains that
Fontanilla's negligence
being punishable by the
Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as
an employer is only
subsidiary, according to
said Penal code, but
Fontanilla has not been
sued in a civil action and
his property has not
been exhausted. To
decide the main issue,
we must cut through the
46
tangle that has, in the
minds of many confused
and jumbled together
delitos and cuasi delitos,
or crimes under the
Penal Code and fault or
negligence under
articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. This should
be done, because
justice may be lost in a
labyrinth, unless
principles and remedies
are distinctly envisaged.
Fortunately, we are
aided in our inquiry by
the luminous
presentation of the
perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we
are likewise guided by
the decisions of this
Court in previous cases
as well as by the solemn
clarity of the
consideration in several
sentences of the
Supreme Tribunal of
Spain.
Authorities support the
proposition that a
quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate
legal institution under
the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is
entirely apart and
independent from delict
or crime. Upon this
 47

principle and on the subject to the provisions Owners or directors of that they are exercised for acts committed by The courts shall
wording and spirit article of Chapter II, Title XVI of an establishment or all the diligence of a any imbecile or insane determine, in their sound
1903 of the Civil Code, this book. business are equally good father of a family to person, and by a person discretion, the
the primary and direct liable for any damages prevent the damage. under nine years of age, proportionate amount for
responsibility of xxx xxxxxx caused by their or by one over nine but which each one shall be
employers may be employees while ART. 1904. Any person under fifteen years of liable.
safely anchored. ART 1902. Any person engaged in the branch who pays for damage age, who has acted When the respective
The pertinent provisions who by an act or of the service in which caused by his without discernment shares can not be
of the Civil Code and omission causes employed, or on employees may recover shall devolve upon those equitably determined,
Revised Penal Code are damage to another by occasion of the from the latter what he having such person even approximately, or
as follows: his fault or negligence performance of their may have paid. under their legal when the liability also
shall be liable for the duties. authority or control, attaches to the
CIVIL CODE damage so done. REVISED PENAL unless it appears that Government, or to the
The State is subject to CODE there was no fault or majority of the
ART. 1089 Obligations ART. 1903. The the same liability when it negligence on their part. inhabitants of the town,
arise from law, from obligation imposed by acts through a special ART. 100. Civil liability of and, in all events,
contracts and the next preceding agent, but not if the a person guilty of felony. Should there be no whenever the damage
quasi-contracts, and article is enforcible, not damage shall have been — Every person person having such has been caused with
from acts and omissions only for personal acts caused by the official criminally liable for a insane, imbecile or the consent of the
which are unlawful or in and omissions, but also upon whom properly felony is also civilly minor under his authority, authorities or their
which any kind of fault or for those of persons for devolved the duty of liable. legal guardianship, or agents, indemnification
negligence intervenes. whom another is doing the act performed, control, or if such person shall be made in the
responsible. in which case the ART. 101. Rules be insolvent, said insane, manner prescribed by
xxx xxxxxx provisions of the next regarding civil liability in imbecile, or minor shall special laws or
The father and in, case preceding article shall certain cases. — The respond with their own regulations.
ART. 1092. Civil of his death or be applicable. exemption from criminal property, excepting Third. In cases falling
obligations arising from incapacity, the mother, liability established in property exempt from within subdivisions 5
felonies or are liable for any Finally, teachers or subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, execution, in and 6 of article 12, the
misdemeanors shall be damages caused by the directors of arts trades and 6 of article 12 and in accordance with the civil persons using violence
governed by the minor children who live are liable for any subdivision 4 of article law. or causing the fear shall
provisions of the Penal with them. damages caused by 11 of this Code does not be primarily liable and
Code. their pupils or include exemption from Second. In cases falling secondarily, or, if there
Guardians are liable for apprentices while they civil liability, which shall within subdivision 4 of be no such persons,
ART. 1093. Those which damages done by are under their custody. be enforced to the article 11, the person for those doing the act shall
are derived from acts or minors or incapacitated following rules: whose benefit the harm be liable, saving always
omissions in which fault persons subject to their The liability imposed by has been prevented to the latter that part of
or negligence, not authority and living with this article shall cease in First. In cases of shall be civilly liable in their property exempt
punishable by law, them. case the persons subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of proportion to the benefit from execution.
intervenes shall be mentioned therein prove article 12 the civil liability which they may have
received.

ART. 102. Subsidiary
civil liability of
innkeepers, tavern
keepers and proprietors
of establishment. — In
default of persons
criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other
persons or corporation
shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in
their establishments, in
all cases where a
violation of municipal
ordinances or some
general or special police
regulation shall have
been committed by them
or their employees.
Innkeepers are also
subsidiarily liable for the
restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft
within their houses
lodging therein, or the
person, or for the
payment of the value
thereof, provided that
such guests shall have
notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him,
of the deposit of such
goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore
have followed the
directions which such
innkeeper or his
representative may have
given them with respect
to the care of and
vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery
with violence against or
intimidation against or
intimidation of persons
unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary
civil liability of other
persons. — The
subsidiary liability
established in the next
preceding article shall
also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for
felonies committed by
their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
xxx xxxxxx
ART. 365. Imprudence
and negligence. — Any
person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall
commit any act which,
had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its
minimum period; if it
would have constituted a
less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum and
medium periods shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by
simple imprudence or
negligence, shall commit
an act which would
otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a
less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period
shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that
while the terms of
articles 1902 of the Civil
Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the
instant case,
nevertheless article
1093 limits cuasi-delitos
to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But
inasmuch as article 365
of the Revised Penal
Code punishes not only
reckless but even simple
imprudence or
negligence, the fault or
negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been
crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes
the "confusion worse
confounded." However,
a closer study shows
that such a concurrence
of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction
between the civil liability
arising from a crime and
the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa
extra-contractual. The
same negligent act
causing damages may
produce civil liability
arising from a crime
under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
The individuality of
cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual looms
clear and unmistakable.
This legal institution is of
ancient lineage, one of
its early ancestors being
the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in
Spanish legal
terminology, this
responsibility is often
referred to as culpa
aquiliana. The Partidas
also contributed to the
genealogy of the present
fault or negligence under
the Civil Code; for
instance, Law 6, Title 15,
of Partida 7, says:
"Tenudo es de fazer
emienda, porque, como
quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en daño al
otro, pero acaescio por
su culpa."
The distinctive nature of
cuasi-delitos survives in
the Civil Code.
According to article 1089,
one of the five sources
of obligations is this
legal institution of
cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual: "los
actos . . . en que
intervenga cualquier
genero de culpa o
negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides
that this kind of
obligation shall be
governed by Chapter II
of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles
1902-0910. This portion
of the Civil Code is
exclusively devoted to
the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana.
48
Some of the differences
between crimes under
the Penal Code and the
culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the
public interest, while
cuasi-delitos are only of
private concern.
2. That, consequently,
the Penal Code
punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely
repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as
broad as quasi-delicts,
because the former are
punished only if there is
a penal law clearly
covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which
"any king of fault or
negligence intervenes."
However, it should be
noted that not all
violations of the penal
law produce civil
responsibility, such as
begging in contravention
of ordinances, violation
of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is
hurt. (See Colin and
Capitant, "Curso

Elemental de Derecho
Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain
what some jurists say on
the separate existence
of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and
direct liability under
article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
Dorado Montero in his
essay on
"Responsibilidad" in the
"Enciclopedia Juridica
Española" (Vol. XXVII, p.
414) says:
El concepto juridico de
la responsabilidad civil
abarca diversos
aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi,
existe una
responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que
en ningun casl lleva
aparejada
responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es
consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal
que nace de todo delito
o falta."
The juridical concept of
civil responsibility has
various aspects and
comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a
civil responsibility,
properly speaking,
which in no case carries
with it any criminal
responsibility, and
another which is a
necessary consequence
of the penal liability as a
result of every felony or
misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding
authority, was consulted
on the following case:
There had been a
collision between two
trains belonging
respectively to the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico
and the Ferrocarril del
Norte. An employee of
the latter had been
prosecuted in a criminal
case, in which the
company had been
made a party as
subsidiarily responsible
in civil damages. The
employee had been
acquitted in the criminal
case, and the employer,
the Ferrocarril del Norte,
had also been
exonerated. The
question asked was
whether the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico could still
bring a civil action for
damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte.
Maura's opinion was in
49
the affirmative, stating in ordinario, al Ministerio sociales y politicos del responsables
part (Maura, Dictamenes, Fiscal; y claro es que si mismo, desenvuelven y criminalmente. No
Vol. 6, pp. 511-513): por esta via se ordenan la materia de coincide en ello el
enmiendan los responsabilidades Codigo Civil, cuyo
Quedando las cosas asi, quebrantos y civiles nacidas de delito, articulo 1903, dice; La
a proposito de la menoscabos, el en terminos separados obligacion que impone
realidad pura y neta de agraviado excusa del regimen por ley el articulo anterior es
los hechos, todavia procurar el ya comun de la culpa que exigible, no solo por los
menos parece conseguido desagravio; se denomina aquiliana, actos y omisiones
sostenible que exista pero esta eventual por alusion a propios, sino por los de
cosa juzgada acerca de coincidencia de los precedentes legislativos aquellas personas de
la obligacion civil de efectos, no borra la del Corpus Juris. Seria quienes se debe
indemnizar los diversidad originaria de intempestivo un paralelo responder; personas en
quebrantos y las acciones civiles para entre aquellas la enumeracion de las
menoscabos inferidos pedir indemnizacion. ordenaciones, y la de la cuales figuran los
por el choque de los obligacion de dependientes y
trenes. El titulo en que Estas, para el caso indemnizar a titulo de empleados de los
se funda la accion para actual (prescindiendo de culpa civil; pero viene al establecimientos o
demandar el culpas contractuales, caso y es necesaria una empresas, sea por actos
resarcimiento, no puede que no vendrian a de las diferenciaciones del servicio, sea con
confundirse con las cuento y que tiene otro que en el tal paralelo se ocasion de sus
responsabilidades regimen), dimanan, notarian. funciones. Por esto
civiles nacidas de delito, segun el articulo 1902 acontece, y se observa
siquiera exista en este, del Codigo Civil, de toda Los articulos 20 y 21 del en la jurisprudencia, que
sea el cual sea, una accion u omision, Codigo Penal, despues las empresas, despues
culpa rodeada de notas causante de daños o de distribuir a su modo de intervenir en las
agravatorias que perjuicios, en que las responsabilidades causas criminales con el
motivan sanciones intervenga culpa o civiles, entre los que caracter subsidiario de
penales, mas o menos negligencia. Es trivial sean por diversos su responsabilidad civil
severas. La lesion que acciones conceptos culpables del por razon del delito, son
causada por delito o semejantes son delito o falta, las hacen demandadas y
falta en los derechos ejercitadas ante los extensivas a las condenadas directa y
civiles, requiere Tribunales de lo civil empresas y los aisladamente, cuando
restituciones, cotidianamente, sin que establecimientos al se trata de la obligacion,
reparaciones o la Justicia punitiva tenga servicio de los cuales ante los tribunales
indemnizaciones, que que mezclarse en los estan los delincuentes; civiles.
cual la pena misma asuntos. Los articulos pero con caracter
atañen al orden publico; 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del subsidiario, o sea, Siendo como se ve,
por tal motivo vienen Codigo Penal, atentos al segun el texto literal, en diverso el titulo de esta
encomendadas, de espiritu y a los fines defecto de los que sean obligacion, y formando

verdadero postulado de tenian jurisdiccion
nuestro regimen judicial aquellos juzgadores, se
la separacion entre redobla el motivo para la
justicia punitiva y obligacion civil ex lege, y
tribunales de lo civil, de se patentiza mas y mas
suerte que tienen unos y que la accion para pedir
otros normas de fondo su cumplimiento
en distintos cuerpos permanece incolume,
legales, y diferentes extraña a la cosa
modos de proceder, juzgada.
habiendose, por
añadidura, abstenido de As things are, apropos
asistir al juicio criminal la of the reality pure and
Compañia del simple of the facts, it
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, seems less tenable that
que se reservo ejercitar there should be res
sus acciones, parece judicata with regard to
innegable que la de the civil obligation for
indemnizacion por los damages on account of
daños y perjuicios que le the losses caused by the
irrogo el choque, no collision of the trains.
estuvo sub judice ante el The title upon which the
Tribunal del Jurado, ni action for reparation is
fue sentenciada, sino based cannot be
que permanecio intacta, confused with the civil
al pronunciarse el fallo responsibilities born of a
de 21 de marzo. Aun crime, because there
cuando el veredicto no exists in the latter,
hubiese sido de whatever each nature, a
inculpabilidad, mostrose culpa surrounded with
mas arriba, que tal aggravating aspects
accion quedaba which give rise to penal
legitimamente reservada measures that are more
para despues del or less severe. The
proceso; pero al injury caused by a felony
declararse que no or misdemeanor upon
existio delito, ni civil rights requires
responsabilidad restitutions, reparations,
dimanada de delito, or indemnifications
materia unica sobre que which, like the penalty
itself, affect public order;
for this reason, they are
ordinarily entrusted to
the office of the
prosecuting attorney;
and it is clear that if by
this means the losses
and damages are
repaired, the injured
party no longer desires
to seek another relief;
but this coincidence of
effects does not
eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to
ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the
present case (without
referring to contractual
faults which are not
pertinent and belong to
another scope) are
derived, according to
article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or
omission causing losses
and damages in which
culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is
unimportant that such
actions are every day
filed before the civil
courts without the
criminal courts
interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121
to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit
and the social and
50
political purposes of that Penal Code, in default of Seeing that the title of
Code, develop and those who are criminally this obligation is different,
regulate the matter of responsible. In this and the separation
civil responsibilities regard, the Civil Code between punitive justice
arising from a crime, does not coincide and the civil courts being
separately from the because article 1903 a true postulate of our
regime under common says: "The obligation judicial system, so that
law, of culpa which is imposed by the next they have different
known as aquiliana, in preceding article is fundamental norms in
accordance with demandable, not only for different codes, as well
legislative precedent of personal acts and as different modes of
the Corpus Juris. It omissions, but also for procedure, and
would be unwarranted to those of persons for inasmuch as the
make a detailed whom another is Compaña del Ferrocarril
comparison between the responsible." Among the Cantabrico has
former provisions and persons enumerated are abstained from taking
that regarding the the subordinates and part in the criminal case
obligation to indemnify employees of and has reserved the
on account of civil culpa; establishments or right to exercise its
but it is pertinent and enterprises, either for actions, it seems
necessary to point out to acts during their service undeniable that the
one of such differences. or on the occasion of action for
their functions. It is for indemnification for the
Articles 20 and 21 of the this reason that it losses and damages
Penal Code, after happens, and it is so caused to it by the
distriburing in their own observed in judicial collision was not sub
way the civil decisions, that the judice before the
responsibilities among companies or Tribunal del Jurado, nor
those who, for different enterprises, after taking was it the subject of a
reasons, are guilty of part in the criminal cases sentence, but it
felony or misdemeanor, because of their remained intact when
make such civil subsidiary civil the decision of March 21
responsibilities responsibility by reason was rendered. Even if
applicable to enterprises of the crime, are sued the verdict had not been
and establishments for and sentenced directly that of acquittal, it has
which the guilty parties and separately with already been shown that
render service, but with regard to the obligation, such action had been
subsidiary character, before the civil courts. legitimately reserved till
that is to say, according after the criminal
to the wording of the prosecution; but

because of the (for another), without
declaration of the including the author of
non-existence of the the act. The action
felony and the against the principal is
non-existence of the accessory in the sense
responsibility arising that it implies the
from the crime, which existence of a prejudicial
was the sole subject act committed by the
matter upon which the employee, but it is not
Tribunal del Jurado had subsidiary in the sense
jurisdiction, there is that it can not be
greater reason for the instituted till after the
civil obligation ex lege, judgment against the
and it becomes clearer author of the act or at
that the action for its least, that it is subsidiary
enforcement remain to the principal action;
intact and is not res the action for
judicata. responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a
Laurent, a jurist who has principal action. (Laurent,
written a monumental Principles of French Civil
work on the French Civil Law, Spanish translation,
Code, on which the Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Spanish Civil Code is
largely based and Amandi, in his
whose provisions on "Cuestionario del
cuasi-delito or culpa Codigo Civil Reformado"
extra-contractual are (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430),
similar to those of the declares that the
Spanish Civil Code, responsibility of the
says, referring to article employer is principal
1384 of the French Civil and not subsidiary. He
Code which writes:
corresponds to article
1903, Spanish Civil Cuestion 1. La
Code: responsabilidad
declarada en el articulo
The action can be 1903 por las acciones u
brought directly against omisiones de aquellas
the person responsible personas por las que se
debe responder, es
subsidiaria? es principal?
Para contestar a esta
pregunta es necesario
saber, en primer lugar,
en que se funda el
precepto legal. Es que
realmente se impone
una responsabilidad por
una falta ajena? Asi
parece a primera vista;
pero semejante
afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a
la maxima universal,
segun la que las faltas
son personales, y cada
uno responde de
aquellas que le son
imputables. La
responsabilidad de que
tratamos se impone con
ocasion de un delito o
culpa, pero no por causa
de ellos, sino por causa
del causi delito, esto es,
de la imprudencia o de
la negligencia del padre,
del tutor, del dueño o
director del
establecimiento, del
maestro, etc. Cuando
cualquiera de las
personas que enumera
el articulo citado
(menores de edad,
incapacitados,
dependientes,
aprendices) causan un
daño, la ley presume
que el padre, el tutor, el
maestro, etc., han
cometido una falta de
negligencia para
prevenir o evitar el daño.
Esta falta es la que la
ley castiga. No hay,
pues, responsabilidad
por un hecho ajeno, sino
en la apariencia; en
realidad la
responsabilidad se
exige por un hecho
propio. La idea de que
esa responsabilidad sea
subsidiaria es, por lo
tanto, completamente
inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the
responsibility declared in
article 1903 for the acts
or omissions of those
persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary
or principal? In order to
answer this question it is
necessary to know, in
the first place, on what
the legal provision is
based. Is it true that
there is a responsibility
for the fault of another
person? It seems so at
first sight; but such
assertion would be
contrary to justice and to
the universal maxim that
all faults are personal,
and that everyone is
liable for those faults
that can be imputed to
him. The responsibility in
question is imposed on
the occasion of a crime
or fault, but not because
of the same, but
because of the
cuasi-delito, that is to
say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father,
guardian, proprietor or
manager of the
establishment, of the
teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article
referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the
law presumes that the
father, guardian, teacher,
etc. have committed an
act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding
the damage. It is this
fault that is condemned
by the law. It is,
therefore, only apparent
that there is a (articulos 20 y 21); pero
responsibility for the act
of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is
for one's own act. The
idea that such
responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.
51
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto:
Principios, Doctrina y
Jurisprudencia,
Referentes al Codigo
Civil Español," says in
Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde
de hechos ajenos,
porque se responde solo
de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo
1902; mas por
excepcion, se responde
de la ajena respecto de
aquellas personas con
las que media algun
nexo o vinculo, que
motiva o razona la
responsabilidad. Esta
responsabilidad, es
directa o es subsidiaria?
En el orden penal, el
Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores
e incapacitados y los
demas, declarando
directa la primera
(articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda
en el orden civil, en el
caso del articulo 1903,
ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del
articulo que impone la
responsabilidad
precisamente "por los
actos de aquellas

personas de quienes se
deba responder."
That is to say, one is not
responsible for the acts
of others, because one
is liable only for his own
faults, this being the
doctrine of article 1902;
but, by exception, one is
liable for the acts of
those persons with
whom there is a bond or
tie which gives rise to
the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or
subsidiary? In the order
of the penal law, the
Penal Code
distinguishes between
minors and
incapacitated persons
on the one hand, and
other persons on the
other, declaring that the
responsibility for the
former is direct (article
19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20
and 21); but in the
scheme of the civil law,
in the case of article
1903, the responsibility
should be understood as
direct, according to the
tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes
responsibility "for the
acts of those persons for
whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the
sentences of the
Supreme Tribunal of
Spain, that court has
upheld the principles
above set forth: that a
quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual is a
separate and distinct
legal institution,
independent from the
civil responsibility arising
from criminal liability,
and that an employer is,
under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, primarily and
directly responsible for
the negligent acts of his
employee.
One of the most
important of those
Spanish decisions is that
of October 21, 1910. In
that case, Ramon
Lafuente died as the
result of having been run
over by a street car
owned by the "compañia
Electric Madrileña de
Traccion." The
conductor was
prosecuted in a criminal
case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon,
the widow filed a civil
action against the street
car company, paying for
damages in the amount de los limites de su
of 15,000 pesetas. The competencia que el
lower court awarded hecho de que se trata no
damages; so the era constitutivo de delito
company appealed to por no haber mediado
the Supreme Tribunal, descuido o negligencia
alleging violation of graves, lo que no
articles 1902 and 1903 excluye, siendo este el
of the Civil Code unico fundamento del
because by final fallo absolutorio, el
judgment the concurso de la culpa o
non-existence of fault or negligencia no
negligence had been califacadas, fuente de
declared. The Supreme obligaciones civiles
Court of Spain segun el articulo 1902
dismissed the appeal, del Codigo, y que
saying: alcanzan, segun el 1903,
netre otras perosnas, a
Considerando que el los Directores de
primer motivo del establecimientos o sentence of acquittal
recurso se funda en el empresas por los daños
equivocado supuesto de causados por sus
que el Tribunal a quo, al dependientes en
condonar a la compañia determinadas
Electrica Madrileña al condiciones, es
pago del daño causado manifesto que la de lo
con la muerte de Ramon civil, al conocer del
La fuente Izquierdo, mismo hehco baho este
desconoce el valor y ultimo aspecto y al
efectos juridicos de la condenar a la compañia
sentencia absolutoria recurrente a la
deictada en la causa indemnizacion del daño
criminal que se siguio causado por uno de sus
por el mismo hecho, empleados, lejos de
cuando es lo cierto que infringer los
de este han conocido mencionados textos, en
las dos jurisdicciones relacion con el articulo
bajo diferentes as 116 de la Ley de
pectos, y como la de lo Enjuciamiento Criminal,
criminal declrao dentro se ha atenido
estrictamente a ellos, sin
invadir atribuciones
ajenas a su jurisdiccion
propia, ni contrariar en
lo mas minimo el fallo
recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first
ground of the appeal is
based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial
court, in sentencing the
Compañia Madrileña to
the payment of the
damage caused by the
death of Ramon
Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and
juridical effects of the
rendered in the criminal
case instituted on
account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the
two jurisdictions had
taken cognizance of the
same act in its different
aspects, and as the
criminal jurisdiction
declared within the limits
of its authority that the
act in question did not
constitute a felony
because there was no
grave carelessness or
negligence, and this
being the only basis of
acquittal, it does no
exclude the
co-existence of fault or
52
negligence which is not
qualified, and is a
source of civil
obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil
Code, affecting, in
accordance with article
1903, among other
persons, the managers
of establishments or
enterprises by reason of
the damages caused by
employees under certain
conditions, it is manifest
that the civil jurisdiccion
in taking cognizance of
the same act in this
latter aspect and in
ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay
an indemnity for the
damage caused by one
of its employees, far
from violating said legal
provisions, in relation
with article 116 of the
Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly
followed the same,
without invading
attributes which are
beyond its own
jurisdiction, and without
in any way contradicting
the decision in that
cause. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the
case just cited:

First. That the conductor
was not sued in a civil
case, either separately
or with the street car
company. This is
precisely what happens
in the present case: the
driver, Fontanilla, has
not been sued in a civil
action, either alone or
with his employer.
Second. That the
conductor had been
acquitted of grave
criminal negligence, but
the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain said that this did
not exclude the
co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not
qualified, on the part of
the conductor, under
article 1902 of the Civil
Code. In the present
case, the taxi driver was
found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he
had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising
from the crime, he would
have been held primarily
liable for civil damages,
and Barredo would have
been held subsidiarily
liable for the same. But
the plaintiffs are directly
suing Barredo, on his
primary responsibility
because of his own
presumed negligence —
which he did not
overcome — under
article 1903. Thus, there
were two liabilities of
Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because
of the civil liability of the
taxi driver arising from
the latter's criminal
negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary
liability as an employer
under article 1903. The
plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to
take, and they preferred
the second remedy. In
so doing, they were
acting within their rights.
It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff
choose the more
expeditious and
effective method of relief,
because Fontanilla was
either in prison, or had
just been released, and
besides, he was
probably without
property which might be
seized in enforcing any
judgment against him for
damages.
Third. That inasmuch as
in the above sentence of
October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding
the acquittal of the
employee (the
conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with
greater reason should
Barredo, the employer in
the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a
civil suit filed against him
because his taxi driver
had been convicted. The
degree of negligence of
the conductor in the
Spanish case cited was
less than that of the taxi
driver, Fontanilla,
because the former was
acquitted in the previous
criminal case while the
latter was found guilty of
criminal negligence and
was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence
of one year and one day
to two years of prision
correccional.
(See also Sentence of
February 19, 1902,
which is similar to the
one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain,
dated February 14, 1919,
an action was brought
against a railroad
company for damages
because the station
agent, employed by the
company, had unjustly
and fraudulently,
refused to deliver certain
articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that
this action was properly
under article 1902 of the
Civil Code, the court
saying:
Considerando que la
sentencia discutida
reconoce, en virtud de
los hechos que consigna
con relacion a las
pruebas del pleito: 1.º,
que las expediciones
facturadas por la
compañia ferroviaria a la
consignacion del actor
de las vasijas vacias
que en su demanda
relacionan tenian como
fin el que este las
devolviera a sus
remitentes con vinos y
alcoholes; 2.º, que
llegadas a su destino
tales mercanias no se
quisieron entregar a
dicho consignatario por
el jefe de la estacion sin
motivo justificado y con
intencion dolosa, y 3.º,
que la falta de entrega
de estas expediciones al
tiempo de reclamarlas el
demandante le
originaron daños y y perjuicios producidos
perjuicios en cantidad
de bastante importancia
como expendedor al por
mayor que era de vinos
y alcoholes por las
ganancias que dejo de
obtener al verse privado
de servir los pedidos
que se le habian hecho
por los remitentes en los
envases:
Considerando que sobre
esta base hay
necesidad de estimar
los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso,
porque la demanda
inicial del pleito a que se
contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del
incumplimiento del
contrato de transporte,
toda vez que no se
funda en el retraso de la
llegada de las
mercancias ni de ningun
otro vinculo contractual
entre las partes
contendientes,
careciendo, por tanto,
de aplicacion el articulo
371 del Codigo de
Comercio, en que
principalmente
descansa el fallo
recurrido, sino que se
limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daños
en el patrimonio del
actor por la injustificada
y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega
53
de las mercancias a su
nombre consignadas,
segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya
responsabilidad esta
claramente sancionada
en el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, que obliga
por el siguiente a la
Compañia demandada
como ligada con el
causante de aquellos
por relaciones de
caracter economico y de
jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the
sentence, in question
recognizes, in virtue of
the facts which it
declares, in relation to
the evidence in the case:
(1) that the invoice
issued by the railroad
company in favor of the
plaintiff contemplated
that the empty
receptacles referred to
in the complaint should
be returned to the
consignors with wines
and liquors; (2) that
when the said
merchandise reached
their destination, their
delivery to the
consignee was refused
by the station agent
without justification and
with fraudulent intent,

and (3) that the lack of
delivery of these goods
when they were
demanded by the
plaintiff caused him
losses and damages of
considerable importance,
as he was a wholesale
vendor of wines and
liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when
he was unable to fill the
orders sent to him by the
consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon
this basis there is need
of upholding the four
assignments of error, as
the original complaint
did not contain any
cause of action arising
from non-fulfillment of a
contract of
transportation, because
the action was not
based on the delay of
the goods nor on any
contractual relation
between the parties
litigant and, therefore,
article 371 of the Code
of Commerce, on which
the decision appealed
from is based, is not
applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for
losses and damages
produced on the
patrimony of the plaintiff
on account of the
unjustified and
fraudulent refusal of the
carrier to deliver the
goods consigned to the
plaintiff as stated by the
sentence, and the
carrier's responsibility is
clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil
Code which binds, in
virtue of the next article,
the defendant company,
because the latter is
connected with the
person who caused the
damage by relations of
economic character and
by administrative
hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above case is
pertinent because it
shows that the same act
may come under both
the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case,
the action of the agent
was unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore
could have been the
subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to
be noted that it was the
employer and not the
employee who was
being sued.
Let us now examine the
cases previously
decided by this Court.
In the leading case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.,
359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court
awarded damages to the
plaintiff, a laborer of the
defendant, because the
latter had negligently
failed to repair a misconceived the plan of
tramway in
consequence of which
the rails slid off while
iron was being
transported, and caught
the plaintiff whose leg
was broken. This Court
held:
It is contended by the
defendant, as its first
defense to the action
that the necessary
conclusion from these
collated laws is that the
remedy for injuries
through negligence lies
only in a criminal action
in which the official
criminally responsible
must be made primarily
liable and his employer
held only subsidiarily to
him. According to this
theory the plaintiff
should have procured
the arrest of the
representative of the
company accountable
for not repairing the
track, and on his
prosecution a suitable
fine should have been
imposed, payable
primarily by him and
secondarily by his
employer.
This reasoning
the Spanish codes upon
this subject. Article 1093
of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from
faults or negligence not
punished by the law,
subject to the provisions
of Chapter II of Title XVI.
Section 1902 of that
chapter reads:
"A person who by an act
or omission causes
damage to another
when there is fault or
negligence shall be
obliged to repair the
damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The
obligation imposed by
the preceeding article is
demandable, not only for
personal acts and
omissions, but also for
those of the persons for
whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his
death or incapacity, the
mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the
minors who live with
them.
xxx xxxxxx
"Owners or directors of
an establishment or
enterprise are equally
liable for the damages
caused by their
employees in the service
of the branches in which
the latter may be
employed or in the
performance of their
duties.
xxx xxxxxx
"The liability referred to
in this article shall cease
when the persons
mentioned therein prove
that they employed all
the diligence of a good
father of a family to
avoid the damage."
54
As an answer to the
argument urged in this
particular action it may
be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our
general statutes is the
employer penalized for
failure to provide or
maintain safe
appliances for his
workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not
punished by the laws'
and falls under civil
rather than criminal
jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a
broader one. We should
be reluctant, under any
conditions, to adopt a
forced construction of
these scientific codes,
such as is proposed by
the defendant, that
would rob some of these
articles of effect, would
shut out litigants against
their will from the civil
courts, would make the
assertion of their rights
dependent upon the
selection for prosecution
of the proper criminal
offender, and render
recovery doubtful by
reason of the strict rules
of proof prevailing in
criminal actions. Even if
these articles had
always stood alone,

such a construction harmony with those of
would be unnecessary, articles 23 and 133 of
but clear light is thrown our Penal Code on the
upon their meaning by same subject.
the provisions of the
Law of Criminal An examination of this
Procedure of Spain (Ley topic might be carried
de Enjuiciamiento much further, but the
Criminal), which, though citation of these articles
never in actual force in suffices to show that the
these Islands, was civil liability was not
formerly given a intended to be merged
suppletory or in the criminal nor even
explanatory effect. to be suspended thereby,
Under article 111 of this except as expressly
law, both classes of provided in the law.
action, civil and criminal, Where an individual is
might be prosecuted civilly liable for a
jointly or separately, but negligent act or
while the penal action omission, it is not
was pending the civil required that the injured
was suspended. party should seek out a
According to article 112, third person criminally
the penal action once liable whose prosecution
started, the civil remedy must be a condition
should be sought precedent to the
therewith, unless it had enforcement of the civil
been waived by the right.
party injured or been
expressly reserved by Under article 20 of the
him for civil proceedings Penal Code the
for the future. If the civil responsibility of an
action alone was employer may be
prosecuted, arising out regarded as subsidiary
of a crime that could be in respect of criminal
enforced only on private actions against his
complaint, the penal employees only while
action thereunder they are in process of
should be extinguished. prosecution, or in so far
These provisions are in as they determine the
existence of the criminal
act from which liability
arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and
its enforcement in the
civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the
election of the injured
person. Inasmuch as no
criminal proceeding had
been instituted, growing
our of the accident in
question, the provisions
of the Penal Code can
not affect this action.
This construction
renders it unnecessary
to finally determine here
whether this subsidiary
civil liability in penal
actions has survived the
laws that fully regulated
it or has been abrogated
by the American civil
and criminal procedure
now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in
construing the articles of
the code above cited in
this case appears from
the briefs before us to
have arisen from the
interpretation of the
words of article 1093,
"fault or negligence not
punished by law," as
applied to the
comprehensive
definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of
the Penal Code. It has
been shown that the
liability of an employer
arising out of his relation
to his employee who is
the offender is not to be
regarded as derived
from negligence
punished by the law,
within the meaning of
articles 1902 and 1093.
More than this, however,
it cannot be said to fall
within the class of acts
unpunished by the law,
the consequence of
which are regulated by
articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code. The
acts to which these
articles are applicable
are understood to be
those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the
parties to one another.
But where relations
already formed give rise
to duties, whether
springing from contract
or quasi contract, then
breaches of those duties
are subject to articles
1101, 1103, and 1104 of
the same code. A typical
application of this
distinction may be found
in the consequences of
a railway accident due to
55
defective machinery crossing Real Street,
supplied by the because he had met
employer. His liability to vehicles which were
his employee would going along the latter
arise out of the contract street or were coming
of employment, that to from the opposite
the passengers out of direction along Solana
the contract for passage, Street, it is to be
while that to the injured believed that, when he
bystander would again started to run his
originate in the negligent auto across said Real
act itself. Street and to continue
its way along Solana
In Manzanares vs. Street northward, he
Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 should have adjusted
(year 1918), the mother the speed of the auto
of the 8 of 9-year-old which he was operating
child Salvador Bona until he had fully crossed
brought a civil action Real Street and had
against Moreta to completely reached a
recover damages clear way on Solana
resulting from the death Street. But, as the child
of the child, who had was run over by the auto
been run over by an precisely at the entrance
automobile driven and of Solana Street, this
managed by the accident could not have
defendant. The trial occurred if the auto had
court rendered judgment been running at a slow
requiring the defendant speed, aside from the
to pay the plaintiff the fact that the defendant,
sum of P1,000 as at the moment of
indemnity: This Court in crossing Real Street and
affirming the judgment, entering Solana Street,
said in part: in a northward direction,
could have seen the
If it were true that the child in the act of
defendant, in coming crossing the latter street
from the southern part of from the sidewalk on the
Solana Street, had to right to that on the left,
stop his auto before and if the accident had

occurred in such a way
that after the automobile
had run over the body of
the child, and the child's
body had already been
stretched out on the
ground, the automobile
still moved along a
distance of about 2
meters, this
circumstance shows the
fact that the automobile
entered Solana Street
from Real Street, at a
high speed without the
defendant having blown
the horn. If these
precautions had been
taken by the defendant,
the deplorable accident
which caused the death
of the child would not
have occurred.
It will be noticed that the
defendant in the above
case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal
case because his
negligence causing the
death of the child was
punishable by the Penal
Code. Here is therefore
a clear instance of the
same act of negligence
being a proper
subject-matter either of
a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and procession was held in
independent civil action Tacloban, Leyte.
for fault or negligence Fortunata Enverso with
under article 1902 of the her daughter
Civil Code. Thus, in this Purificacion Bernal had
jurisdiction, the separate come from another
individually of a municipality to attend
cuasi-delito or culpa the same. After the
aquiliana under the Civil procession the mother
Code has been fully and and the daughter with
clearly recognized, even two others were passing
with regard to a along Gran Capitan
negligent act for which Street in front of the
the wrongdoer could offices of the Tacloban
have been prosecuted Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.,
and convicted in a owned by defendants J.
criminal case and for V. House, when an
which, after such a automobile appeared
conviction, he could from the opposite
have been sued for this direction. The little girl,
civil liability arising from who was slightly ahead
his crime. of the rest, was so
Years later (in 1930) this frightened by the
Court had another automobile that she
occasion to apply the turned to run, but
same doctrine. In Bernal unfortunately she fell
and Enverso vs. House into the street gutter
and Tacloban Electric & where hot water from the
Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., electric plant was
327, the parents of the flowing. The child died
five-year-old child, that same night from the
Purificacion Bernal, burns. The trial courts
brought a civil action to dismissed the action
recover damages for the because of the
child's death as a result contributory negligence
of burns caused by the of the plaintiffs. But this
fault and negligence of Court held, on appeal,
the defendants. On the that there was no
evening of April 10, contributory negligence,
1925, the Good Friday and allowed the parents
P1,000 in damages from
J. V. House who at the
time of the tragic
occurrence was the
holder of the franchise
for the electric plant.
This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge
made the findings of fact
hereinbefore outlined,
he nevertheless was led
to order the dismissal of
the action because of
the contributory
negligence of the
plaintiffs. It is from this
point that a majority of
the court depart from the
stand taken by the trial
judge. The mother and
her child had a perfect
right to be on the
principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the
religious procession was
held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the
child to run along a few
paces in advance of the
mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence
of an automobile
appearing and of a
frightened child running
and falling into a ditch
filled with hot water. The
doctrine announced in
the much debated case
of Rakes vs. Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Co.
([1907]), 7 Phil., 359),
still rule. Article 1902 of
the Civil Code must
again be enforced. The
contributory negligence
of the child and her
mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to
recovery, but in its
strictest sense could
only result in reduction
of the damages.
It is most significant that
in the case just cited,
this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V.
House could have been
criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple
negligence and not only
punished but also made
civilly liable because of
his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an
independent civil action
for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the
Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes (30 Phil., 624
[year 1915), the action
was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's
daughter alleged to have
56
been caused by the
negligence of the
servant in driving an
automobile over the
child. It appeared that
the cause of the mishap
was a defect in the
steering gear. The
defendant Leynes had
rented the automobile
from the International
Garage of Manila, to be
used by him in carrying
passengers during the
fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Leynes was ordered by
the lower court to pay
P1,000 as damages to
the plaintiff. On appeal
this Court reversed the
judgment as to Leynes
on the ground that he
had shown that the
exercised the care of a
good father of a family,
thus overcoming the
presumption of
negligence under article
1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the
defendant has clearly
shown that he exercised
the care and diligence of
a good father of a family.
He obtained the
machine from a
reputable garage and it
was, so far as appeared,
in good condition. The

workmen were likewise
selected from a standard
garage, were duly
licensed by the
Government in their
particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly
competent. The
machine had been used
but a few hours when
the accident occurred
and it is clear from the
evidence that the
defendant had no notice,
either actual or
constructive, of the
defective condition of
the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the
case was discussed by
this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil
Code not only
establishes liability in
cases of negligence, but
also provides when the
liability shall cease. It
says:
"The liability referred to
in this article shall cease
when the persons
mentioned therein prove
that they employed all
the diligence of a good
father of a family to
avoid the damage."
From this article two The doctrine of the case
things are apparent: (1) just cited was followed
That when an injury is by this Court in Cerf vs.
caused by the Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year
negligence of a servant 1915]). In the latter case,
or employee there the complaint alleged
instantly arises a that the defendant's
presumption of law that servant had so
there was negligence on negligently driven an
the part of the matter or automobile, which was
employer either in the operated by defendant
selection of the servant as a public vehicle, that
or employee, or in said automobile struck
supervision over him and damaged the
after the selection, or plaintiff's motorcycle.
both; and (2) that This Court, applying
presumption is juris article 1903 and
tantum and not juris et following the rule in
de jure, and Bahia vs. Litonjua and
consequently, may be Leynes, said in part (p.
rebutted. It follows 41) that:
necessarily that if the
employer shows to the The master is liable for
satisfaction of the court the negligent acts of his
that in selection and servant where he is the
supervision he has owner or director of a
exercised the care and business or enterprise
diligence of a good and the negligent acts
father of a family, the are committed while the
presumption is servant is engaged in
overcome and he is his master's
relieve from liability. employment as such
owner.
This theory bases the
responsibility of the Another case which
master ultimately on his followed the decision in
own negligence and not Bahia vs. Litonjua and
on that of his servant. Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co.,
55 Phil., 18 (year 1930).
The latter case was an
action for damages
brought by Cuison for
the death of his
seven-year-old son
Moises. The little boy
was on his way to school
with his sister Marciana.
Some large pieces of
lumber fell from a truck
and pinned the boy
underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths,
Telesforo Binoya and
Francisco Bautista, who
were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant
Norton & Harrison Co.,
pleaded guilty to the
crime of homicide
through reckless
negligence and were
sentenced accordingly.
This Court, applying
articles 1902 and 1903,
held:
The basis of civil law
liability is not respondent
superior but the
relationship of pater
familias. This theory
bases the liability of the
master ultimately on his
own negligence and not
on that of his servant.
(Bahia vs.Litonjua and
Leynes [1915], 30 Phil.,
624; Cangco vs. Manila
57
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 this court in the cases
Phil., 768.) cited above, and the
defendant is therefore
In Walter A. Smith & Co. absolved from all
vs. Cadwallader Gibson liability.
Lumber Co., 55 Phil.,
517 (year 1930) the It is, therefore, seen that
plaintiff brought an the defendant's theory
action for damages for about his secondary
the demolition of its liability is negatived by
wharf, which had been the six cases above set
struck by the steamer forth. He is, on the
Helen C belonging to the authority of these cases,
defendant. This Court primarily and directly
held (p. 526): responsible in damages
under article 1903, in
The evidence shows relation to article 1902,
that Captain Lasa at the of the Civil Code.
time the plaintiff's wharf Let us now take up the
collapsed was a duly Philippine decisions
licensed captain, relied upon by the
authorized to navigate defendant. We study
and direct a vessel of first, City of Manila vs.
any tonnage, and that Manila Electric Co., 52
the appellee contracted Phil., 586 (year 1928). A
his services because of collision between a truck
his reputation as a of the City of Manila and
captain, according to F. a street car of the Manila
C. Cadwallader. This Electric Co. took place
being so, we are of the on June 8, 1925. The
opinion that the truck was damaged in
presumption of liability the amount of P1,788.27.
against the defendant Sixto Eustaquio, the
has been overcome by motorman, was
the exercise of the care prosecuted for the crime
and diligence of a good of damage to property
father of a family in and slight injuries
selecting Captain Lasa, through reckless
in accordance with the imprudence. He was
doctrines laid down by found guilty and

sentenced to pay a fine
of P900, to indemnify
the City of Manila for
P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
Unable to collect the
indemnity from
Eustaquio, the City of
Manila filed an action
against the Manila
Electric Company to
obtain payment,
claiming that the
defendant was
subsidiarily liable. The
main defense was that
the defendant had
exercised the diligence
of a good father of a
family to prevent the
damage. The lower
court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.
This Court held, in part,
that this case was
governed by the Penal
Code, saying:
With this preliminary
point out of the way,
there is no escaping the
conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal
Code govern. The Penal
Code in easily
understandable
language authorizes the
determination of
subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its
application by providing
that civil obligations
arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be
governed by the
provisions of the Penal
Code. The conviction of
the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the
Penal Code. The act of
the motorman was not a
wrongful or negligent act
or omission not
punishable by law.
Accordingly, the civil
obligation connected up
with the Penal Code and
not with article 1903 of
the Civil Code. In other
words, the Penal Code
affirms its jurisdiction
while the Civil Code
negatives its jurisdiction.
This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which
civil liability arises and
not a case of civil
negligence.
xxx xxxxxx
Our deduction, therefore,
is that the case relates
to the Penal Code and
not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out
by the trial judge, any
different ruling would
permit the master to
escape scot-free by
simply alleging and
proving that the master
had exercised all
diligence in the selection
and training of its
servants to prevent the
damage. That would be
a good defense to a
strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to
a civil action either as a
part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or
misdemeanor. (By way
of parenthesis, it may be
said further that the
statements here made
are offered to meet the
argument advanced
during our deliberations
to the effect that article
0902 of the Civil Code
should be disregarded
and codal articles 1093
and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the
above case could
support the defendant's
proposition, because the
Court of Appeals based
its decision in the
present case on the
defendant's primary
responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil
Code and not on his
subsidiary liability arising
from Fontanilla's
criminal negligence. In
other words, the case of
City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is
the subsidiary liability of
an employer arising from
a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the
foundation of the
decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present
case is the employer's
primary liability under
article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We have already
seen that this is a proper
and independent
remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila
Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75),
is another case invoked
by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ
of the Manila Electric
Company had been
convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and
sentenced, among other
things, to pay the heirs
of the deceased the sum
of P1,000. An action
was then brought to
enforce the subsidiary
liability of the defendant
as employer under the
Penal Code. The
defendant attempted to
show that it had
exercised the diligence
of a good father of a
family in selecting the
motorman, and
therefore claimed
exemption from civil
liability. But this Court
held:
In view of the foregoing
considerations, we are
of opinion and so hold,
(1) that the exemption
from civil liability
established in article
1903 of the Civil Code
for all who have acted
with the diligence of a
good father of a family,
is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability
provided in article 20 of
the Penal Code.
The above case is also
extraneous to the theory
of the defendant in the
instant case, because
the action there had for
its purpose the
enforcement of the
defendant's subsidiary
liability under the Penal
Code, while in the case
at bar, the plaintiff's
cause of action is based
on the defendant's
primary and direct
responsibility under
58
article 1903 of the Civil
Code. In fact, the above
case destroys the
defendant's contention
because that decision
illustrates the principle
that the employer's
primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the
Civil Code is different in
character from his
subsidiary liability under
the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two
cases just referred to,
counsel for the
defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction
between civil liability
arising from a crime,
which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the
responsibility for
cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil
Code, and has likewise
failed to give the
importance to the latter
type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner
also cites Francisco vs.
Onrubia (46 Phil., 327).
That case need not be
set forth. Suffice it to say
that the question
involved was also civil
liability arising from a
crime. Hence, it is as
inapplicable as the two
cases above discussed.

The foregoing
authorities clearly
demonstrate the
separate individuality of
cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they
show that there is a
distinction between civil
liability arising from
criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal
Code) and responsibility
for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same
negligent act may
produce either a civil
liability arising from a
crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or
negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the
authorities above cited
render it inescapable to
conclude that the
employer — in this case
the defendant-petitioner
— is primarily and
directly liable under
article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
The legal provisions,
authors, and cases
already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines
that have been little
understood in the past, it
might not be
inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised
Penal Code in article
365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or
negligence not punished
by law, according to the
literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope
and application in actual
life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to
property through any
degree of negligence —
even the slightest —
would have to be
indemnified only through
the principle of civil
liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of
affairs, what sphere
would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath
to impute to the
lawmaker any intention
to bring about a situation should be made
so absurd and responsible in a civil
anomalous. Nor are we, action under articles
in the interpretation of 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
the laws, disposed to Code. Otherwise, there
uphold the letter that would be many
killeth rather than the instances of
spirit that giveth life. We unvindicated civil
will not use the literal wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
meaning of the law to remedium.
smother and render Thirdly, to hold that
almost lifeless a there is only one way to
principle of such ancient make defendant's
origin and such liability effective, and
full-grown development that is, to sue the driver
as culpa aquiliana or and exhaust his (the
cuasi-delito, which is latter's) property first,
conserved and made would be tantamount to
enduring in articles 1902 compelling the plaintiff to
to 1910 of the Spanish follow a devious and
Civil Code. cumbersome method of
Secondly, to find the obtaining relief. True,
accused guilty in a there is such a remedy
criminal case, proof of under our laws, but
guilt beyond reasonable there is also a more
doubt is required, while expeditious way, which
in a civil case, is based on the primary
preponderance of and direct responsibility
evidence is sufficient to of the defendant under
make the defendant pay article 1903 of the Civil
in damages. There are Code. Our view of the
numerous cases of law is more likely to
criminal negligence facilitate remedy for civil
which can not be shown wrongs, because the
beyond reasonable procedure indicated by
doubt, but can be the defendant is
proved by a wasteful and productive
preponderance of of delay, it being a
evidence. In such cases, matter of common
the defendant can and knowledge that
59
professional drivers of patrimonial safety of
taxis and similar public others. As Theilhard has
conveyance usually do said, "they should
not have sufficient reproach themselves, at
means with which to pay least, some for their
damages. Why, then, weakness, others for
should the plaintiff be their poor selection and
required in all cases to all for their negligence."
go through this And according to
roundabout, Manresa, "It is much
unnecessary, and more equitable and just
probably useless that such responsibility
procedure? In should fall upon the
construing the laws, principal or director who
courts have endeavored could have chosen a
to shorten and facilitate careful and prudent
the pathways of right employee, and not upon
and justice. the injured person who
At this juncture, it should could not exercise such
be said that the primary selection and who used
and direct responsibility such employee because
of employers and their of his confidence in the
presumed negligence principal or director."
are principles calculated (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
to protect society. Many jurists also base
Workmen and this primary
employees should be responsibility of the
carefully chosen and employer on the
supervised in order to principle of
avoid injury to the public. representation of the
It is the masters or principal by the agent.
employers who Thus, Oyuelos says in
principally reap the the work already cited
profits resulting from the (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
services of these before third persons the
servants and employees. employer and employee
It is but right that they "vienen a ser como una
should guarantee the sola personalidad, por
latter's careful conduct refundicion de la del
for the personnel and dependiente en la de

quien le emplea y
utiliza." ("become as one
personality by the
merging of the person of
the employee in that of
him who employs and
utilizes him.") All these
observations acquire a
peculiar force and
significance when it
comes to motor
accidents, and there is
need of stressing and
accentuating the
responsibility of owners
of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the
broad sweep of the
provisions of both the
Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject,
which has given rise to
the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and
for lack of understanding
of the character and
efficacy of the action for
culpa aquiliana, there
has grown up a common
practice to seek
damages only by virtue
of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is
another remedy, which
is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this
habitual method is
60
allowed by our laws, it results of a criminal
has nevertheless prosecution, and entirely
rendered practically directed by the party
useless and nugatory wronged or his counsel,
the more expeditious is more likely to secure
and effective remedy adequate and
based on culpa efficacious redress.
aquiliana or culpa In view of the foregoing,
extra-contractual. In the the judgment of the
present case, we are Court of Appeals should
asked to help perpetuate be and is hereby
this usual course. But affirmed, with costs
we believe it is high time against the
we pointed out to the defendant-petitioner.
harm done by such Yulo, C.J., Moran,
practice and to restore Ozaeta and Paras, JJ.,
the principle of concur.
responsibility for fault or
negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so
that its waters may no
longer be diverted into
that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the
better safeguarding of
private rights because it
re-establishes an
ancient and additional
remedy, and for the
further reason that an
independent civil action,
not depending on the
issues, limitations and