Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action

Author(s): Quentin Skinner

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Aug., 1974), pp. 277-303
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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 111.SOME PROBLEMSIN THE
ANALYSISOF POLITICAL
THOUGHTAND ACTION

QUENTIN SKINNER
christ'sCollege (Cambridge,England)

h AM MOST GRATEFUL to Professors

notjust fortheirgenerosity
accuracyin reporting
in commenting
myarguments
Schochetand Wiener
on mywork,butalso fortheir
and theirperceptiveness
seemspossibleto respondto theirremarks
as critics.It
in one of twoways.One would
be to pursuetheimplications of Wiener'sarticleand tryto providesome
more historicalinformation about the contextof Hobbes's political
thought.Thisstrikes me as an attractive especiallysinceI agree
alternative,
withhis suggestion thatI oughtto devotemoreattention to analysingthe
natureof the social pressures whichhelpedto promptHobbes and his
sympathisersto espousetheirpeculiarbrandof absolutism. (He does not
mention, however, thatthisthemehas alreadybeenbrilliantly exploredby
K. V. Thomas,1965.) The otheralternative is to say something more
aboutmygeneralapproachto thestudyof politicaltheory,ofwhichmy
workon Hobbes(as Schochetand Wienerbothacknowledge) has mainly
been intendedto serveas an example.This strikesme as even more
andit is thislineof argument
attractive, whichI shallpursue.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am verygrateful to StefanColliniand JohnThompson

for
readingthedraftof thisarticle.I owe a specialdebtto JohnDunnfornumerous
abouttheissuesI haveconsidered
discussions init.
Political Theory, Vol. 2 No. 3, August 1974, )1974 Sage Publications, Inc.

[2771

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[278] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

Thereare two mainreasonsforthischoice.One is mywishto defend

myselfagainsta numberof attackswhichhaverecently beenmountedon
the methodologicaland philosophicalessaysin whichI have triedto
formulate my approachto studying thehistoryof politicalthought. The
firstof these was publishedin 1970 by Dr. Leslie in PoliticalStudies
(Leslie, 1970). This was followedby a moretechnicalcriticism by Dr.
Mew in The PhilosophicalQuarterly (Mew, 1971). Two further critical
articlesappearedin 1973, one by Dr. ParekhandDr. Berkiin theJournal
of theHistoryof Ideas (Parekhand Berki,1973), theotherby Professor
Tarltonin Historyand Theory(Tarlton,1973).1 And now Professor
Schochethas added a further seriesof criticisms as theconclusionto the
accounthe has givenofmywork.
My firstaim in whatfollowswill be to discussthesecritics,someof
whom,I cannothelp feeling,havesometimes misstated mycase. Parekh
and Berki,for example,beginby promising what theycall a detailed
criticalappreciation,but theythengo on to concentrateon a single
methodological article(forwhichtheygivethewrongreference) without
everindicatingthat it was presentedas one of a seriesor thatit was
underpinned by a numberof historicalexamples.Although mostof my
criticshavebeenmuchmorescrupulous, I stillfeelthatwhatis neededis
not theabandonment ofmyapproach(as theyall suggest)andstilllessthe
acknowledgment of its impossibility(as Schochetin particular demands),
but simplyan attemptto providea more carefuland less polemical
statement of mycentralclaims.I hope thiswillserveto removea number
of misconceptions, as well as to showthatmyargument in factemerges
moreor less unscathed fromthecriticisms whichhaveso farbeendirected
againstit.
My chiefreason,however,forconcentrating on thesemethodological
questionsis myhope thatthismayalso serveto uncovertwoimplications
of myapproach,bothof whichperhapsdeserveto be morefullypursued.
The firstof these (which I shall considerin sectionI) concernsthe
questionof whatpreciselyoughtto be studiedin thehistoryof political
thought-whether we oughtmainlyto focuson the traditional canonof
so-called'classictexts,'on the leadingtraditions of politicalanalysis,or
perhapson the entire'language'of politicsat a giventime.The other
implicationI wish to examine(to whichI shall turnin sectionII) is
concernedwith the intractably large but crucialquestionof how to
analyse the relationsbetweenthe professedprinciplesand the actual
practicesof politicallife.My mainaim in whatfollowsis to avoidmerely
repeating myselfin a clearervoice,and to moveon-howeversketchily-to
a considerationof thesefurther points.

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 Skinner/SYMPOSIUM [279]

The aimsof myearliestmethodological essays(Skinner,1966a, 1969)

wereavowedlypolemical,withtheresult-which I nowmildlyregret-that
theywerewritten in a toneof 'enthusiasm' forwhichI haverecently been
rebuked(Tarlton,1973: 311). My primaryconcernwas to expose the
weaknessesof two prevailing assumptions about thestudyof theclassic
textsin thehistoryofpoliticalthought. One ofthese,to whichParekhand
Berkiunrepentantly retum,was thebeliefthat"in somecases thesource
of a text'sintelligibility
lies withinitselfand its understanding does not
requirethe commentator to considerits context"(Parekhand Berki,
1973: 183). The otherwas the beliefthata satisfactory historycan be
constructed out of the'unitideas' containedin suchtexts,or else out of
linkingsuchtextstogether in a chainof allegedinfluences. As Wiener has
indicated,myreasonforattacking thesemethodologies wasmysensethat
theyhad givenriseto a numberof exegetically plausiblebuthistorically
incredibleinterpretations of theclassictexts.I took thecase ofHobbes's
Leviathanand triedto showthatthisappliedbothto Warrender's (1957)
and Hood's (1964) interpretations, as well as to Strauss's(1953) and
Macpherson's (1962) accountsof Hobbes'splace in seventeenth-century
thought.
Althoughthis was intendedto be revisionist, therewas at least one
crucialpointat whichtheassumptions governing myapproachwereof a
whollyconventional kind.As Schochetobserves,I assumedthroughout
thatthe classictextswereworthyof studyin themselves, and thatthe
attemptto understand themoughtto be treatedas one of theleadingaims
inanyhistoryofpoliticalthought. Thismakesit unfairofTarltonto claim
that the objects of analysisin my proposedmethodologyremained
"vaguelyand arbitrarily specified"(Tarlton,1973: 312). Myconcernwas
in factwiththesameobjectswhichhad alwaysbeenanalysed-the'select
few books,' as a recentwriterhas called them,which,for whatever
reasons,"havebeen raisedto thestatusof 'classics'" (Levin,1973: 462).
My originalaim was merelyto analysethenatureoftheconditions which
are necessaryand perhapssufficient foran understanding of anyone of
thesetexts.As Wienerpointsout, I triedto establishthatone of the
necessaryconditionsmustbe therecovery ofthehistorical meaningofthe
text.I thusconcludedthatit canneverbe sufficient in itself(pace Parekh
and Berki) to be able to supplyeven the mostplausibleand coherent
internalanalysisof theirarguments.
This approachhas been assailed,however,both forbeingexcessively
historicaland for not beinghistoricalenough.The lattercriticism, as

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[2801 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

Schochetnotes,is one whichI suggested myselfin myearliestmethodo-

logical article.I shouldnow be moreinclinedto emphasiseit. We can
hardlyclaimto be concerned withthehistoryofpoliticaltheoryunlesswe
are preparedto writeit as realhistory-that is, as therecordof an actual
activity,and in particularas the historyof ideologies.Such a history
wouldhavemanyvalues,quiteapartfromproviding us forthefirsttime
witha realistic pictureofhowpoliticalthinking in all itsvariousformswas
carriedon in thepast. It wouldenableus to illuminate thevarying roles
playedby intellectual factorsin politicallife.It wouldthusenableus to
beginto establishtheconnections betweentheworldofideologyandthe
worldof politicalaction.Andthisin turnwouldenableus to add an extra
dimension to thestudyof generalhistorywhichseemsat themomentto
be missingevenin theworkofitsmostdistinguished practitioners.(It has
becomea commonplace, forexample,thatthisis themajorweaknessof
Braudel'sattemptto write'total history.')It is clear,however,thatthe
chiefobstacleto writingsuch a historyof social and politicalideas is
constitutedby our continuing tendencyto concentrate on the received
canonofclassictexts.Theyimposea distorting perspective whenwe tryto
writehistorically about thedevelopment ofsocialandpoliticalideas.And
they encouragethe adoption of a naive diffusionist account of the
relationsbetweenthe workof leadingsocial theorists and the popular
acceptanceof new socialandpoliticalattitudes. As an exampleof thefirst
danger,considerthe attemptof Professor C. B. Macpherson to writethe
historyof 'possessiveindividualism,' and theunhistorical levelof abstrac-
tion at which the whole work proceeds(Macpherson,1962). As an
exampleof the second,considerthe attemptswhichhave recently been
madeto vindicatetheinfluence ofBentham's ideason thedevelopment of
nineteenth-century socialpolicies(Parris,1960; Hart,1965a).
It is possible,however,to endorsethislineofcriticism (as I do) andstill
feelthata caveatneedsto be enteredagainsttheoverenthusiastic adoption
of a completelysociologicalapproach,throughwhich the object of
analysisbecomesnothingless than the whole gamutof 'languages'in
which a nation articulatesits politicalexperienceover time(see, for
example,Pocock, 1971: 341). Thereis a dangerthatthisnewsociology,
when writ large, will turn out to be nothingmore than the most
discredited formof inductivism in fashionabledisguise.This dangerhas
alreadybecomeapparentin the recenthistoriography of the historyof
scientific ideas,in whichtheold, 'internal'historyof rationaldiscoveries
has tendedto be superseded in favorof theattemptto gain"a fullpicture
of thenewscience"(see,forexample,Rattansi,1968: 131). The problems

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 Skinner/SYMPOSIUM [2811

thisis likelyto generateare strictly analogousto thosein thehistoryof

politicalideas, and have recentlybeen excellently discussed(see Hesse,
1973). If we tryto produce'the fullpicture,'we areboundsoonerrather
thanlaterto be reducedmerelyto coloringin themostboringandtrivial
details.We are in any case bound to fail.For the factsare infinitein
number, and unlesswe have someideas aboutwhereto beginandwhyto
beginthere,we mayliterallycondemnourselvesto goingon forever.It
followsthatwe mustbe preparedto makesomecrucialdecisionsat the
outsetaboutwhatdeservesto be studiedand whatis bestignored.It will
not do, moreover, to acceptthesolutionproposedbyButterfield and the
other opponentsof 'whig'history,who have arguedthat,even if we
proceedin thisway,we mustbe carefulto 'adopttheoutlook'andapply
onlythosecriteriaof significance whichwerecurrent andacceptedat the
relevant historicaltime(Butterfield, 1973: 28). It is highlyimplausible
to
supposethattherewilleverbe suchan agreement aboutwhatmattersin
anyhistorical period.But eveniftherehappensto be completeagreement
amongsttheircontemporaries thatcertainwriters do not matter,we can
scarcelyhope to writesatisfactory historyif we are contentmerelyto
endorsesuchjudgements. Thiswouldbe to leaveus, forexample,witha
historyof seventeenth-century ethicaltheoryin whichSpinozais totally
ignored,a historyof nineteenth-century logicaltheoryin whichFregeis
barelymentioned, and so on. It seemsessential,in short,to place a very
strongemphasison whatseemsa veryobviouspoint:thatthedecisionswe
haveto makeaboutwhatto studymustbe our own decisions,arrivedat
byapplying ourowncriteria forjudgingwhatis rationalandsignificant.
Once thisinsightis restoredto its rightful statusas a commonplace,
however, it beginsto seempossiblebothto endorsethevalueof a strictly
historical approachto thestudyofpoliticalthought, andyetto allowthat
a certainprimacystilldeservesto be assignedto studying thetraditional
canonof classictexts.Thisassumes,ofcourse(as I havealwaysassumed),
thatto speak of a textas a classicis to implythattheremaybe special
reasonsforwishingto understand it. The degreeof primacywhichthis
assignsto theclassictextsis simplythattheybecomeone obviousfocus
aroundwhichit mightseemappropriate to organise someofourhistorical
researches.I do not say thattheyrepresent the sole or even the most
interesting focuswe mightchoose.As I havealreadyhinted,andhope by
the end of thisarticleto make clear,I believethatthequestionof the
relationsbetweenpoliticalideologyand actionsuggests a widerandmore
fruitfulfieldfornew research.I certainly agree,however,thattheclassic
textscontinueto provideus withone potentialanswerto theinescapable

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[2821 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1974

question of where our historicalresearchesought to begin,and one

potentialmeansofinvesting themwiththeirpoint.
It mayseem,however,thatthisconclusionmerelyservesto underline
the alternative criticism, to the effectthatthisrepresents an excessively
historicalapproachfora politicalscientistto endorse.This is the main
criticism whichLesliemakes.My approachis saidto involvea paradoxical
commitment, since it beginsby presupposing the value of seekingto
understand the classictexts,but ends by proposinga methodof study
which"threatensto destroythe verytreasurewe seek,leavingonlythe
dustof scholarship" (Leslie, 1970: 433). Tarltonhas repeatedthesame
fearandexpressed it as a certainty.Myplea for'stricthistoricity' is saidto
makeit "difficult to see how, even if it wereworkable,anything might
issue thatwouldbe of any morethanthedustiestantiquarian interest"
(Tarlton,1973: 314). I failto see,however,whyit shouldbe thought to
followfromquestioning theimmediate relevanceof theclassictextsthat
we are bound to be left withnothingbut antiquarianscholarship. To
proffer theseas exhaustivealternatives is simplyto discountthepointI
havebeen seekingto emphasise:thatif we are interested in suchissuesas
theprocessofideologicalformation andchange,we cannotavoidinvolving
ourselvesin extensivehistoricalenquiries;and if we are genuinely
concerned to understand suchissues,it seemsonlysensibleto demandthat
theseenquiriesshouldbe conductedwithas muchcare and exactitudeas
possible.
My replyto thissecondline of criticism is thusthe same as before.
Althoughthe analysisof politicalideologyis inescapablya historical
subject,it is themerestparochialism to implythatthisconstitutes a reason
forrefusing to assignit theplacewhichit clearlydeserves in anyacademic
studyof politics.It is truethatTarltonprofessesto findthistypeof
answer"too thinto be consideredan authenticconfrontation of the
problem"(Tarlton,1973: 314 n.). He givesno grounds forthisjudgement,
however, andin theabsenceof anysuchargument I stillcannotsee whatis
so unsatisfactory about this conclusion.I originally feltencouragedin
reaching it by thefactthata numberofsocialphilosophers (forexample,
Professor Maclntyre) had alreadymadeuse ofa similarsetofassumptions
inproducing someimportant contributions to ethicalandpoliticalthought
(see Maclntyre,1966, 1971). Since then,I have beenheartenedto find
some congenialarguments presentedby a numberof politicaltheorists
whohaveno connections withthe'school'whichTarltoncastigates forits
allegedabsorption withitself(see, forexample,Greenleaf, 1970;Krieger,
1973).

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [283]

All thisbringsme to whatis obviouslythemainquestion:how is the

recovery of thehistorical meaningof a textto be achieved?As Schochet
implies,it may be thatthepolemicalorganisation of myoriginalarticles
preventedme fromstatingmy positive answer to thisquestionwith
sufficient clarity.My originalanswer,however,was a verysimpleone. I
arguedthatthekeyto excluding unhistorical meanings mustlie inlimiting
our rangeof descriptions of any giventext to thosewhichthe author
himself mightin principle haveavowed,and thatthekeyto understanding
theactualhistorical meaningof a textmustlie in recovering thecomplex
intentions of theauthorin writing it.
I shouldnowliketo makethreequalifying remarks aboutthisdoctrine,
in the hope of removing a numberof misunderstandings of mypresent
views.The firstis thatitsapplication wasalwaysintendedto be limitedin
two wayswhichI triedto spell out. These are perhapsworthstressing,
since some of my criticshave chosen to ignorethem and have, in
consequence,devotedthemselves to thedemolition of a positionwhichI
haveneverwishedto defend.I havebeencriticised (by ParekhandBerki)
forassumingthatwe can speakas thoughtheauthorof a complexwork
had "a definite'intention'in performing a singleactionto bringabouta
definiteresult"(Parekhand Berki,1973: 169). But I have nevermade
suchan assumption. I haverejectedit as explicitlyas possible,in thehope
thatthismisunderstanding mightbe avoided(see Skinner,1972a: 145).
Second,I have been criticised(again by Parekhand Berki,and also by
Tarlton)forassuming thatthe tasksof recovering and statingan author's
intentions maybe "sufficient in themselves fora properunderstanding of
theworkin question"(ParekhandBerki,1973: 170; Tarlton,1973: 321).
But againI havenevermadesuchan assumption. I havetriedto prevent
preciselythis misunderstanding by insisting as strongly as possible(the
italicsarein theoriginal)that"I havebeenconcernedonly"to argue"that
amongstthe interpreter's tasks must be the recoveryof the author's
intentions." I have soughtto distinguish thisargument "fromthemuch
stronger claimwhichis oftenadvanced"to theeffectthat"therecovery of
these intentions"must "form the whole of the interpreter's task"
(Skinner,1972b:404405).
My secondremarkis thatI haveneverbeen concernedto suggestthat
thereis anythingparticularly dramaticor originalabout my argument.
Tarltonis quite correctto speakof mydebtto Mr.Dunn'sandProfessor
Pocock'srecentwritings, andall threeofus havein turnacknowledged the
influence whichR. G. Collingwood has exercisedoverourmethodological
studies.It is worthstressing thisimportant commonsource,forParekh

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[2841 POLITICAL THEORY I AUGUST 1974

and Berkihave devotedmuchof theirspace to 'explaining'how I have

cometo occupymypresentintellectual position,and theyallegethatthe
"most conspicuoustradition"on whichI have drawnis "closelylinked
withlogicalpositivism"(Parekhand Berki,1973: 175). The factthatI
have explicitlypointedto Collingwoodas a majorintellectual influence,
coupled with the fact that Collingwoodis unquestionably the leading
anti-positivistIdealistin recentEnglishphilosophy, is perhapsenoughto
suggest thepreposterousness oftheirargument at thispoint.
My finalqualification is thatI now feelthisoriginalstatement of my
position-on whichit happens that most of my criticshave concen-
trated-tohave been defectivein at leasttwo respects.First,it reliedon
theidea thateveryagenthas a privileged accessto hisownintentions, as a
way of 'closingthe context'on the historicalmeaningof a text.I now
acceptthatI mayhaveappliedthisnotiontoo rigidly, as Dr. J.W.Burrow
has since implied(Burrow,1970: xxii-xxiv).I have also becomemore
convincedaboutcertaindifficulties in thetheoryitself,whicha numberof
philosophers havemorerecently explored(see, forexample,Olsen,1969,
and the referencesin Alston, 1971). I have since become clearer,
moreover,that I have no real need to relyon thistheoryin orderto
establishmy own case, and I have gone on to restatethisaspectof my
argument in such a way as to leave it freeof thisfault(see Skinner,
1972b). The otherdefectin myoriginalpresentation was thatI misused
theargument whichI borrowed fromJ.L. Austinaboutthe'illocutionary
force'of utterances. I triedto employit in thecourseofan attackon the
idea thatpoliticaltheoriesare merelyderivations frompoliticalpractices,
an attack which I now feel completelymisfired(see Skinner,1969:
4546). Since thenI believeI havemadeuse of thisargument in a more
satisfactory way (see Skinner,1972a, 1972b). I do notfeel,however, that
I have evermanagedto providea satisfactory replyto the epiphenom-
enalistcase,andforthisreasonI shouldliketo addressmyself againto this
taskin thesecondhalfof thesepresentremarks.
Severalof mycritics(notablyParekhand Berki)writeas thoughI had
nevermadeanyattemptto repairthesedefectsor to refineandextendthe
originalpresentation ofmycase.As Tarltonveryfairly indicates,however,
I have since moved on to focus on the conceptof a convention, and
especiallythe conventionssurrounding the performance of complex
linguisticacts,in an attemptto providea moreeffective thoughclosely
relatedmeansof 'closingthecontext'on thehistorical meanings oftexts.I
havesoughtin particular to ask questionsaboutwhata givenwritermay
havebeendoing,and to answerthemby appealingto theextentto which

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [285]

hisintentions mustnecessarily havebeenconventional iftheyincludedthe

intention to communicate and be understood (see Skinner,1970, 1972b).
I have also triedto strengthen thesepurelymethodological considerations
bylocatingtheirfoundations in thelogicofexplanation. I havetried,that
is, to showhow therecovery of an agent'sintentions andtheconventions
surrounding themcan serveto providea valid(thoughnot a causal)form
of explanationfor at least some of his voluntary actions(see Skinner,
1971, 1972a).
I do notwishto pretendthatthissomewhat ambitious extensionofmy
originalargument has left it entirelyfreeof difficulties. I accept the
criticismwhichMew has made, by means of some ingeniouscounter-
examples,of myattemptto arguethatit mustinvariably be necessary to
invokea set of socialas wellas linguistic conventions in orderto decode
the intendedforce of certainutterances(see Mew, 1971). I am also
grateful to acknowledge therefinements whichhavesincebeensuggested
by Dr. Close and ProfessorHancherin the course of the generally
congenialcommentswhichboth of themhave made about my recent
accountsofauthorialintentionality (see Close,1972;Hancher,1972.) And
I shouldlike to emphasisemy feelingthatbeforeanyonecan hope to
arguewithconfidence about theseissues,a greatdealmoreworkwillhave
to done on the analysisof the conceptof a convention, especiallyin
relationto the idea of someone'smeaningsomething by sayingor doing
something(for two recentand impressive contributions, see Schiffer,
1972;especiallysee Lewis,1969).
Nevertheless,I see no reasonto doubtthatmyargument in itsrevised
and extendedformis capableof sustaining boththemainconclusions on
whichI havesoughtto insist:thattherecovery of thehistorical meaning
of anygiventextis a necessary conditionofunderstanding it,and thatthis
processcan neverbe achievedsimplyby studying the text itself.Even
Parekhand Berkiseem preparedto concede that this is sometimes true,
thoughtheyinsistthatin othercases "the contextis negligible and the
audienceirreducibly generaland transhistorical" (ParekhandBerki,1973:
174). They go on to arguethat"perhapsthe mostobviouscase" of a
classictextwhich"makeseminentsenseon itsown" and "hasno specific
contextand no limitedand identifiable audience"is thecase ofHobbes's
Leviathan(Parekhand Berki,1973: 170, 173). I agreethatLeviathanis
probablythe mostplausiblecandidate,but one of themainpurposesof
myhistoricalarticlesaboutHobbeshas been to establishthatevenin this
case such an assumptionwould in fact be misplaced.Unlesswe are
preparedto askquestionsaboutwhatHobbesis doinginLeviathan,andto

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[2861 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

seek the answersby relatinghis workto the prevailing conventions of

politicalargument at thetime,we can neverhope to elucidatetheprecise
characterof his counter-revolutionary theoryof politicalobligation, nor
can we hope to understand thepreciseroleofhisepistemology in relation
tohispoliticalthought. Ifwe areprepared, however, to considerLeviathan
in relationto its appropriate intellectualand ideologicalcontext,we can
readilybeginto answerthesequestions,and in thisway to add to our
understanding of thework.We can also beginto see theextentto which,
even if Hobbes may have had the ambitionto speak 'transhistorically'
(whichI haveneversoughtto deny),his workwas addressedto a strictly
limitedandprecisely identifiable
audience.
My reasonsfor insistingon theseconclusionshave been veryfairly
paraphrased by Wiener,and thereis no need to rehearse themhere.Since
Parekhand Berkievidently rejectthemoutright, I can onlyconcludethat
theyfindmy historicalarguments in some waygrosslydefective. It is a
disappointing featureof theircritique,however,that they offerno
commentson thenew information whichI havesoughtto presentabout
thecontextof Hobbes'sthought, and in consequencegiveno reasonsfor
theirflatrejectionofmyclaims.Theysimplyinsist,on thecontrary, thatI
have nevermade any attemptto corroborate mygeneralmethodological
claimsby any "detailedinvestigation of pastthinkers" (ParekhandBerki,
1973: 172).
I am preparedto admit,however,thatmy allegeddiscoveries about
Hobbesmaywellbe controversial in someway,so I shallrevert insteadto
a simplerexample,whichI haveconsideredbeforeandwhichcan equally
well be used to substantiate both my centralclaims.Locke,in his Two
Treatises,makesno appeal to theprescriptive forceof theancientEnglish
constitution. An examinationof the prevailing conventionsof debate
about politicalobligationat the timerevealsthatthiswas an extremely
unusuallacunaforhimto haveleftinhisargument. Thismaywelllead us
to askwhatLockemayhavebeendoinghere.Weareboundto answerthat
he was rejectingand repudiatingone of the most widespreadand
prestigiousformsof politicalargument at thetime.Wemayalso be led to
questionwhether he maynothavehad theintention to shiftthediscussion
of politicalobligationonto a moreabstract levelat thispoint,byignoring
theclaimsof prescription and arguing entirely in termsof theconceptsof
naturallaw and naturalrights. Thisseemsto substantiate bothmycentral
claims.We can scarcelybe said to haveunderstoodLocke's textuntilwe
have consideredwhathe was doingat thiscrucialstagein his argument.
But we can neverhope to attainsuchan understanding simplyby reading

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [2871

the textitself'overand overagain'in theway thatsomecommentators

haveurged(see Plamenatz,1964: x).
It is not difficult,moreover,to defendthis basic methodological
commitment againstthe chiefaccusationwhichhas beenlevelledagainst
it. Accordingto Parekhand Berki,it "meansthedenialof thepossibility
of newinsights andexperience"(ParekhandBerki,1973: 168). According
to Tarlton,it involvesdenying thatsomewriters "operateat orbeyondthe
boundariesof established'languages'" (Tarlton, 1973: 325). And,
accordingto Schochet,we may become 'blinded to such goals' as
innovationand 'creativity' if we followthisapproach.This accusation
seemsto reston a confusionbetweentheunexceptionable claimthatany
agentwhois engagedin an intendedact ofcommunication mustbe limited
by the prevailing conventions of discourse,and thefurther claimthathe
mustbe limitedonly to followingtheseconventions. I have obviously
neverintendedto commitmyselfto the absurdityof denyingthatit is
open to anywriterto indicatethathis aimis to extend,to subvert, orin
some otherway to alter a prevailing set of acceptedconventions and
attitudes.I am astonishedto be told thatmy approachwould makeit
impossibleto map out thiskindofinnovation andchange.It seemsto me,
on thecontrary, thatI am providing themeans-theonlysuremeans-of
exhibitingthe precisecharacterof thesechanges,and of indicating the
precisemomentat whichtheyactuallytookplace.Thiscan readilybe seen
if I revertto theexampleI havejust citedfromLocke'sTwo Treatises. It
is onlyif and whenwe havemappedout all theprevailing conventions of
politicaldiscussionthatwe can beginto observethepointsat which,and
the extentto which,Locke may be concernedto breachor repudiate
them.So far fromdenyingsuch momentsof creativity, my approach
seems in this way to provide the only means of recognising and
illuminating themin a genuinely historical
way.
I shouldlike fmallyto claimone specialmeritformyapproachwhichI
have not previously discussed.I believeit providesa meansof avoidinga
weaknesswhichotherwise seemsendemicin anyattemptto taketheidea
of a 'language'or a tradition as a unitof studyin thehistoryofpolitical
thought.I am not,of course,hostileto theseaimsin themselves, formy
ownattemptto focuson theconventions of politicalargument obviously
tendsto culminatein a studyof genresand traditions of discourse.It
wouldhardlyseemnecessaryto offerthisreassurance, wereit not that
Parekhand Berkihavereported me as sayingthatit canneverbejustifiable
for an intellectualhistorianto write"in termsof traditions, periods,
schoolsof thoughtand thelike" (ParekhandBerki,1973: 184). It is hard

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to see how theyhavegainedthisimpression. As I havetriedto makeclear,

I sharethe enthusiasm whichtheyregister forattempts suchas thoseof
Professor Greenleaf to writeaboutleadingtraditions of politicalanalysis,
eventhoughI cannotentirely endorsetheirclaim(forreasonswhichI have
at
given lengthelsewhere)2 thatGreenleaf has in factachievedthisresult
"withoutany distortion"(Parekhand Berki,1973: 180). (I also findit
surprising thattheygivethewrongtitlefora book whichtheysingleout
as so well known.) I do feel, however,thatif Greenleaf'sstresson
traditionsor Pocock's on languagesare treatedas methodologiesin
themselves, theyare proneto generate at leasttwodifficulties. Thereis an
obviousdangerthat if we merelyfocus on the relationsbetweenthe
vocabularyused by a givenwriterand the traditions to whichhe may
appearconnectedbyhisuse of thisvocabulary, we maybecomeinsensitive
to instancesof irony,obliquity,and othercasesin whichthewritermay
seemto be sayingsomething otherthanwhathe means.The chiefdanger,
however,is that if we merelyconcentrateon the languageof a given
writer,we may run the riskof assimilating him to a completelyalien
intellectualtradition,and thusof misunderstanding thewholeaim of his
politicalworks.
An obviousexampleof the firstdangeris providedby the workof
Bayle,as I havesoughtto illustrate elsewhere(see Skinner,1969: 32-35).
An obviousexampleof thesecondis providedbytherecentdiscussions of
Bolingbroke's politicalworks.It happensto be Bolingbroke, the arch-
enemyof thewhigs,who suppliesin his mainpoliticalworkstheclearest
summaryof a numberof radicallywhigand especiallyHarringtonian
politicalbeliefs.It is, of course,necessaryto focus on the political
traditions whichBolingbroke was exploiting in orderto be ableto expose
this paradox, and this has been the great strengthof the recent
commentaries. Theirgreatweakness, however, has beentheirincapacity to
go on to explainorevento commenton thispuzzle.Theyhavemerely left
us with the question-begging observationthat "Bolingbroke, the tory,
showswhiggish traits"andwiththepotentially misleading characterisation
of Bolingbroke as "the mostspectacular of theneo-Harringtonians" (see
Hart,1965b: 142;Pocock,1971: 134;see,similarly, Robbins,1959: 284).
I am suggesting thatwhatis needed,in orderto be able to carrythe
argument beyondthisrather unsatisfactory point,is notmerelyto indicate
thetraditions of discourseto whicha givenwritermaybe appealing,but
also to askwhathe maybe doingwhenhe appealsto thelanguageofthose
particular traditions.
Since manydifferent thingscan alwaysbe done by
different writers
witha given'language,'thefocusoughtnot,I think,to be

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on thelanguageor thetraditions in themselves,butratheron therangeof

thingswhichcan in principlebe done withthem(and to them)at any
giventime.To cite theprevailing jargon,whatwe need to go on to askis
whatrangeof speech-acts can standardly be performed by a givenwriter
whenhe makesuse of a givenset of conceptsor terms.If thisfurther
questionhad been askedin thecase of Bolingbroke, forexample,I believe
it couldhavebeen shownthatone of his mainaimsinhispoliticalworks
maynot so muchhave been to articulatea set of politicalprinciples in
whichhe necessarily believedhimself, but ratherto remindhisopponents
of theprincipleswhichtheyprofessed to believe(I haverecentlysoughtto
demonstrate thisconclusion;see Skinner,1974). Ifwe merelyfocuson the
languageof Bolingbroke's politicalworksandthetraditions withwhichhe
appearsto alignhimself, thislevelof analysiswillremainclosedoff.Ifwe
go on to engagewithit,however,we maybe able to answerthequestions
which are currentlybeing begged,and so to reach a new level of
understanding in ourstudyof theseandmanyotherhistorically important
politicalworks.

II

Thefinaloutcomeofmyapproach,according to severalofmycritics, is
a refusalto assignanycausalroleto politicalideasorprinciples in relation
to theexplanationof politicalactionsandevents.It is truethattheyhave
sometimes confusedthiswiththeratherdifferent accusationwhichI have
already considered,to the effectthat my approachis incapableof
accommodating thenovelinsights whicharecharacteristically foundin the
mostcreativepoliticalworks.It is clear,however,thatwhenParekhand
Berki accuse me of "not seeing anythingelse in politicsbeyondits
immediate,pragmaticaspects,"what theyhave in mindis my alleged
failureto recognisetheinfluenceofgeneralideologicalstructures uponthe
worldof politicalevents(Parekhand Berki,1973: 176). And Tarlton
appearsto have thesamecriticism in mindwhenhe eventually insistson
aligningme withthosewho believethatthe worldof thought"merely
reflectsan underlying and somehowmore real worldof non-linguistic
activity"(Tarlton,1973: 313; see also 321-322).
I feelsomewhataggrieved by thesecriticisms, since one of mymain
hopes,in proposinga moreideologicalsubject-matter forthehistoryof
politicalthought,was thatthismightenableus morereadilyto exhibitthe
dynamicnatureof the relationship whichI believeto existbetweenthe

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(2901 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1974

professed principlesand theactualpracticesof politicallife(see Skinner,

1969: 3943). I stillfeel thatthesuggestion I originallymadeaboutthe
way in whichthisrelationship mightbe analysedwas correctas faras it
went-thesuggestion thatit mightbe possibleto makeuse of theapproach
and the insightsaffordedby the theoryof speech-acts. It may wellbe,
however,that I have brought this particular misunderstanding upon
myself.For, as I have alreadyconceded,the firstattemptI made to
formulate and apply thistheorywas undoubtedly a failure.It is forthis
reasonthat I shouldnow like to revertto my originalsuggestion and
attemptto exploreit in an entirely newdirection.
Thereseem to be two main typesof situationin whicha professed
principleis capableof makinga difference to a socialor politicalaction,
and a fortiori needsto be citedin orderto explainit. The mostobvious
case is wheretheprinciple servesas themotivefortheaction.To explaina
voluntary actionis normallyto cite the end whichthe agentdesiresto
bringabout-corresponding to his motivefor acting-together withhis
belief that the performance of the givenaction will conduce to the
attainment of thedesiredend. If theagentprofesses to be actingforthe
sakeof a principle, and if theprinciple he citesis genuinely hismotivefor
acting,it is obviousthattheprinciple makesa difference to theactionand
thusneedsto be citedto explainit.
The questionis whetherthissimplestructure of conceptscan everbe
appliedto analysetherelations betweenan ideologyanda complexcourse
of social or politicalaction.One recentattemptto applyit in thiswayhas
been made by a numberof historiansand politicalscientists who have
beenanxiousto repudiatetheinfluential scepticism expressedbySirLewis
Namierand his followers about theroleof ideologicalfactorsin political
life.Professor Holmes,forexample,has attempted to construct hismassive
accountof BritishPoliticsin theAge of Anne aroundthebeliefthatthe
politicalconflictsof theage werenot merelyconcerned with"powerand
the quest for office,"as all the Namieriteshave alleged,but were
"concernedwith real issues, involvingthe conflictof sincerely-held
principles"(Holmes,1967: 114). And Professor Kramnickhas similarly
to
attempted analyse the politics of the opposition partiesin early
eighteenth-century England in terms of the assumption thattheprotag-
onistsweregenuinely motivated by "political idealsand principles" and
notjust by "the commoninterest of the outsider" (Kramnick, 1968: 5).
Despitesuchrecentexamples,however,it stillseemsa safegeneralisa-
tion to say that this sort of attemptto treatprinciplesas sufficient
conditionsof actionshas by now been fairlygenerallyabandoned.One

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reasonmightseem to be the doubts whicha numberof philosophers

(particularly someof thefollowers of Wittgenstein) haveexpressedabout
the underlying assumptionthatmotivesare causes.I do not myselffeel,
however,that thereis any reasonto quarrelwiththisassumption, the
difficulties of which seem to have been somewhatexaggerated(see
Skinner,1972a: 146-148). The most obviousreasonis simplythat a
numberof the most powerfulcurrentsin modernsocial theoryhave
converged in rejecting thisway of analysing thedirectionof thecausality
betweenprinciples and actions.Thisappliesnotmerelyto theNamierites,
but evenmoreclearlyto theMarxists (at leastin certainmoods)andmore
recentlyto the behaviorists. Theyhave all insisted,fordifferent reasons,
on thesametwo claims.First,thattheprinciples professedin politicallife
are commonlythe merestrationalisations of quite differentmotivesand
impulses.As Namier(a greatadmirerof bothParetoand Freud)putsthe
commonclaim,suchprinciples are usuallyinventedex postfacto,merely
in orderto investpoliticalbehaviorwitha quitespurious"appearanceof
logic and rationality" (Namier,1930: 147). Second,thatitfollowsfrom
thisthatsuch principles playno causalrolein politicallife,and scarcely
everneedto figure in consequenceinexplanations ofpoliticalbehavior. As
Namieragainputsthepoint,such'partynamesand cant'provideus with
no guideat all whenwe are trying to explain'the underlying realities'of
politicallife(Namier,1957: vii).
It is oftenimplied,moreover, thatthisis theend of thestory.Thisis
due to the factthateventhosewhohavesoughtto opposetheseclaims
havegenerally acceptedthesamebasicassumption aboutthenatureofthe
causal relationshipbetween politicalthoughtand action. They have
tended,thatis,to concedethatwhattheymustshow,in orderto vindicate
the relevanceof someone'sprofessed principlesin explaining theirsocial
and politicalactions,is thatmanypoliticalagents(as Butterfield insistsin
his polemicagainstthe Namierites) are in fact'sincerelyattachedto the
ideals' for the sake of which they characteristically professto act
(Butterfield, 1957: 209). But thisis simplyto endorsetheiropponents'
basic assumption,which amountsto the claim (as Namier'saccount
sufficiently indicates) that the question of the relationship between
politicalthoughtand action is equivalentto the empiricalquestionof
whether an agent'sprofessed politicalprincipleseverserveas themotives
ofhis politicalactions.The resulthas been to makeit seemobviousthat
politicalprincipleshave no role to play in the explanationof political
behavior.For as soon as this basic assumptionis accepted by the
opponentsof this sort of epiphenomenalism, they are committedto

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[292] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

sustainingthe empiricalclaim (which intuitivelymay seem rather

implausible)that the sincereattachmentof politicalagentsto their
professed principles actuallyconstitutes theirstandard motiveforpolitical
action.And this,in turn,allowstheiropponents(suchas theNamierites)
to presentthe epiphenomenalist case in the formof a simpleappeal to
realismand commonexperience.All theyhaveto do is to taketheirstand
on the alternative empiricalclaim(whichis usuallytakento be farmore
plausible)that"politicalideals,"as one ofNamier'sdisciples has putit,are
"rarelyin themselves thedeterminants of humanaction"(Brooke,1963:
341). Sinceit is agreedthata principle can onlymakea difference ifitis a
motive,and sinceit is intuitively clearthatprinciples arerarelymotives, it
is obvious,theyconclude,that we do not usuallyhave to referto an
agent'sprofessedprinciples whenwe come to explainhis actualpolitical
behavior.
It is this sharedassumption, however,whichseemsto be mistaken.
Even if we concedethatan agent'sprofessed principlesareneverhis real
motives,we are stillleftwithat leastone typeof situation in whichthey
arenevertheless capableof makinga difference to hisbehavior. Thisis the
situationin whichthe agentis engagedin a formof social or political
actionthatis (as I shallputit) in somewayuntoward, andalso possessesa
strongmotive for attempting(in Weberianphrase) to legitimateit.
Suppose-to takean examplein whichWeberhimselfwas interested-the
agent is a merchantengaged in some highlyprofitablecommercial
enterprise in Englandat the turnof thesixteenth century.His expected
profitssupplyhimwitha recognisable andpowerful motiveforwanting to
ensurethathe is able to continuewithhis enterprise. But thesocialand
religiousstandardsof theage ensurethattheenterprise itselfis boundto
appearin a morallyand perhapsevena legallydubiouslight.It is evident
thatin thesecircumstances it becomesdesirable,perhapsevenessential,
fortheagentto be able to describehisbehaviorin sucha wayas to defeat
or at least to overrideany hostileappraisalsof it, and in thisway to
legitimatewhat he is doing to those who mayhave doubtsabout the
morality ofhisactions.
The suggestion I now wishto exploreis that,if we concentrate on the
meansby whichan agentin thistypeof situationcan hope to legitimate
his behavior,we may be able to uncovera furthertype of causal
connectionbetweenthe principlesforthesake of whichhe professes to
act andhisactualsocialorpoliticalactions.As a prefaceto thisdiscussion,
however,it is vitalto concedethatI havecharacterised thesituation in an
simpleway.I haveimpliedthatthesolemotiveforoffering
artificially an

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [2931

ideologicaldescriptionof one'suntowardsocialactionswillnormally be to
legitimate themto otherswho mayhave doubtsabout theirlegalityor
morality.I have thusimpliedthatthereis no reasonto supposethatthe
agenteverneeds to offerthesedescriptions forhis own benefit,or even
needsto believein themat all. I haveadoptedthistactic,however, onlyin
orderto avoidhavingto raisesomehighlycomplexand purelyempirical
questionswhichin no wayaffectthevalidityofmygeneralargument. It is
obviousthatan agent'smotivesin thissituation willusuallybe mixedand
complicated,and it is arguablethat the need to attainan appropriate
self-image bylegitimatinghisbehaviorto himself andhissympathisers may
oftenbe of paramountimportance.To preservethe simplicityof the
argument, however,I am willingin whatfollowsto concedewhatis from
mypointof viewthehardestcase: thesituationof an imagined agentwho
neveractuallybelievesin any of the principles he professes, and whose
principles neverservein consequenceas themainmotivesof his actions.
My aim is to show thateven in thiscase it stilldoes not follow(as the
Namierites, forexample,have supposed)thatwe haveno needto referto
thisagent'sprofessedprinciples ifwe wishto explainhisbehavior.
If we now turn to ask how this centraltask of an innovating
ideologist-thatof legitimating untowardsocial actions-canactuallybe
performed, the theoryof speech-acts immediately seemsto providean
importantclue to the answer.A numberof recentphilosophersof
language-having thrownout as an old piece of positivist bric-a-brac the
allegedlogicaldistinctionbetweenfactualandevaluative statements-have
been able to concentrate on a groupof termswhichperform an evaluative
as wellas a descriptive
function in thelanguage.3Theyarestandardly used
to describeindividualactionsor statesof affairs, and to characterise the
motivesforthesake of whichtheseactionscan be performed. But if the
criteriaforapplyingone of thesetermscan be plausiblyclaimedto be
presentin a givensetof circumstances, thisnotonlyservesto describethe
givenactionor stateofaffairs, butalso to evaluateit in a certainway.The
specialcharacteristicof thisrangeof descriptive termsis thusthatthey
have a standardapplicationto perform one of two contrasting rangesof
speech-acts.They are standardlyused, thatis, to performsuch acts as
commending (and expressing approval,etc.) or else of condemning (and
expressing disapproval,etc.) theactionsor statesof affairs whichtheyare
also employedto describe(see Searle,1962).
To focuson thisgroupof termsis to takeoveran insight developedby
the so-calledemotivists in ethicaltheory,who contrastedthe 'emotive'
with the 'descriptive'componentsof the meaningof ethicalterms(see

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[294] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

Stevenson,1963: 10-31).But as Urmsonhas pointedout(Urmson,1968:

24-29) in applyingAustin'stheoryof speech-acts to clarify
theiraccount,
the emotivists in effectconfusedwhatAustindubbedthe'illocutionary'
withthe 'perlocutionary' sensein whichan agentmaysucceedin doing
somethingin or by using one of these terms.(HenceforthI shall
inelegantly referto themas 'evaluative-descriptive terms.')The sortsof
perlocutionary effectswhichan agentmayhope to achievebyusingthese
termsare effectssuch as incitingor persuading hishearersor readersto
adopta particular pointof view.But thequestionofwhether he succeeds
in realisingsuchhopes is not primarily a linguisticmatter,but simplya
matterfor empiricalinvestigation. The sorts of illocutionary effects,
however,whichit is open to an agentto achievein usingtheseterms, are
effectssuchas evincing, expressing,
and solicitingapprovalordisapproval
of the actionsor statesof affairswhichhe uses themto describe.The
questionof whetherhe succeedsin realisingthis sort of intentionis
essentiallya linguisticmatter,a matterof applyingthe relevantterms
correctly.And it is this fact whichgivesthemtheirgreatanalytical
significance (see Austin,1962: 99-105).
It is essentiallyby manipulating this set of termsthat any society
succeedsin establishing its moralidentity.It is bydescribing
and altering
and therebycommending certaincoursesof actionas (say) courageousor
honest,whiledescribing andcondemning othersas treacherous ordisloyal,
thatwe sustainour pictureof theactionsand statesof affairs whichwe
wish eitherto disavowor to legitimate. This beingso, the task of the
innovatingideologistis a hard but an obviousone. His concern,by
definition, is to legitimate a newrangeof socialactionswhich,in termsof
the existingways of applyingthe moralvocabularyprevailing in his
society,are currently regardedas in somewayuntowardor illegitimate.
Hisaimmusttherefore be to showthata numberofexisting andfavorable
evaluative-descriptive termscan somehowbe applied to his apparently
untowardactions.If he can somehowperform thistrick,he can thereby
hope to arguethatthe condemnatory descriptions whichare otherwise
liableto be appliedto hisactionscan in consequencebe discounted.
Two footnotesneed to be added at thisstageof the argument, one
emphatic,the otherconcessive.The point whichperhapsneeds to be
emphasisedis that,howeverrevolutionary the ideologistconcernedmay
be, he will nevertheless be committed, once he has acceptedtheneed to
legitimate his behavior,to attempting to showthatsomeof theexisting
rangeof favorableevaluative-descriptive termscan somehowbe appliedas
apt descriptions of his own apparently untowardactions.Everyrevolu-

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [2951

tionaryis to this extent obliged to marchbackwardinto battle.To

legitimatehis behavior,he is committedto showingthat it can be
describedin such a way thatthosewho currently disapproveof it can
somehowbe broughtto see thattheyoughtto withholdthisdisapproval
afterall. And to achievethisend,he has no optionbut to showthatat
leastsomeof thetermswhichhisideologicalopponents use whentheyare
describing the actionsand statesof affairsof whichtheyapprovecan be
appliedto includeand thuslegitimate hisownuntoward behavior.
The concessivepointis thatthesituationin therealworldis in at least
one importantrespectmore complicatedthan my model has so far
implied.It is not simplythattheagenttriesto applyto hisownbehavior
whatever favorableevaluative-descriptive termsare in factbestadaptedto
legitimating it. It is ratherthathe appliesthose.hehappensto believeare
bestadaptedto thispurpose.Andit is obviousthathe mayalwaysmakea
mistakeor evenan irrational choicein assessingthebestmeansto attain
thisdesiredend. Nevertheless, it stillseemscorrectto beginby assuming
thatthe agentwillhave actedin a rationalway.I say thisnot merelyto
preservethe simplicity of my generaldiscussion, but also as a methodo-
logicalpreceptwhenit comesto thediscussionof actualexamples.Ifwe
beginby assumingtheagent'srationality and fmdthisassumption borne
out,thiswillprovideus withan explanation fortheagent'sapparentbelief
thathe was actingrationally.It will in fact provideus withthe best
possibleexplanation-namely, thathe was actingrationally. Conversely,
unlesswe beginby assumingthe agent'srationality, we leave ourselves
withno meansof explaining his behavior,or evenof seeingexactlywhat
thereis to explain about it, if it shouldhappenthathe is not acting
rationally.To adopt thismethodology is thusto remindourselvesoftwo
important lessons.One is thatto exhibita socialactionas rationalis to
explainit. The otheris thatto explainwhyan agentactsas he doesmust
alwaysinvolvethe capacityto explainwhyhe evidently believedit was
rationalforhim to perform a particular actionwhenit was not in fact
rationalforhimto do so.
These pointscan readilybe underlined if we revertto theexampleof
those who were concernedin early seventeenth-century Englandto
legitimate theirnovelcommercial andcapitalist enterprises.Theychoseto
attemptto legitimate thisuntoward behaviorinpartbyseekingto describe
it in termsof the conceptsnormallyused to commendan ideal of the
religiouslife.It is clearthatthiswasin facta rationalchoice.If theycould
somehowplausiblyapplytheseconceptsto describetheirown behavior,
this would obviouslyprovidethemwith a most powerfullegitimating

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[296] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

device.It was, moreover, plausibleto makesuchan attempt, sincethere

was a certain element of structuralsimilarity-which they eagerly
exploited-between the specificallyProtestantideal of individualservice
and devotion(to God) and the allegedcommercial ideals of service(to
one'scustomers) and dedication(to one'swork.)
Thisbrings me to thepracticalquestion:howis it possible(in theabove
or anyothercase) actuallyto manipulate an existingnormative vocabulary
in sucha wayas to legitimate suchnew and untowardcoursesof action?
Theremay be said to be two distinctmethods,thoughtheyare often
confused.(They are systematically confused,forexample,by thewriters
of dictionaries.) The firstconsistsin effectof manipulating thestandard
speech-act potentialof an existing setofdescriptiveterms.The agent'saim
in thiscase is to describehis ownactionsin sucha wayas to makeit clear
(fromthecontext)to his ideologicalopponentsthateventhoughhe may
be usinga setof termswhicharestandardly appliedto expressdisapproval,
he is nevertheless usingthemto expressapprovalor at leastneutrality on
this particularoccasion. The point of this strategyis, of course,to
challengehis opponentsto reconsider thefeelingsof disapproval orevenof
mereneutrality whichtheyare standardly expressing whentheyuse these
particularterms.
There are two main tacticsavailableto the innovating ideologistin
attempting to bringoffthisfirststrategy. He maytryto introducesome
whollynew and favorableevaluative-descriptive termsintothelanguage.
Thereare two possibilities here. One is simplyto coin new termsas the
descriptionsof alleged new principles,and then to apply them as
descriptions of whatever apparently untoward actionsone maywishto see
commended.This seemsto be the tacticwhichmostcommentators have
had in mind when they have discussedthe phenomenonof 'altered
meanings and new words'in politicaldebate(see,forexample,Parekhand
Berki,1973: 168). Thisis obviouslyan extremely crudedevice,however,
and it is comparatively rare to findit employedin ideologicaldebate.
Thereis,however,one important instanceofit in thecase of theideology
I have mentioned.The conceptof frugalityprovidesan exampleof an
entirelynew termwhichbecamewidelyused forthefirsttimeat theend
of thesixteenth centuryin orderto describea motiveanda formofsocial
actionforwhichapprovalwas beginning to be widelysought.The other
and farcommonerversionof thistactic,however,consistsof turning a
neutraldescription intoa favorable evaluative-descriptive
term(usuallyby
means of a metaphorical extensionof its uses) and thenapplyingit in
virtueof thisextendedmeaningto describesomecourseof actionwhich

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one wishes to see commended.There are manycases of this sort of

transformation in theideologyI havementioned. The metaphorical (and,
hence,evaluative)uses of such termsas discerning and penetrating, for
example,maketheirfirstappearancein thelanguageat therelevanttime
in orderto describea rangeof talentswhichmanypeoplehad come to
havea specialreasonforwishing to see commended.
The second and bolder tactic consistsof varyingthe range of
speech-actswhich are standardlyperformed with an existingset of
unfavorable terms.Againthereare two possibilities
evaluative-descriptive
here. The more usual is to apply a termnormallyused to express
disapproval in such a way as to neutralise thisspeech-act potential.The
agentthusmakesit clearthathe intendstheactionwhichthetermis being
used to describeto be appraisedon thisoccasionin a whollyneutralway.
One clear and ultimately successfulinstanceof thistacticis providedby
the concept of ambition.It was only at the startof the seventeenth
centurythatthistermbeganto acquireits currentneutraluses. It had
previouslybeen applied exclusivelyto expressthe strongestpossible
disapprovalof whatevercoursesof actionit was used to describe.The
otherand more dramaticpossibility is actuallyto reversethe standard
speech-actpotentialof an existingand unfavorable evaluative-descriptive
term.An equallyclearand successfulexampleof thistactic,againfrom
the same ideology,is providedby the conceptof shrewdness. Again,
beforethe startof the seventeenth century,this termhad been used
exclusivelyto expressdisapproval.During the ensuinggeneration, its
potentialwas completelyreversed, giving it the standard use which it still
fulfilsas a termof approbation.
It is, of course,conceptually possible,thoughit seemsto be empirically
less usual,to employa mirror-image of boththesetacticsas a meansof
trying to bringoffthisfirststrategy. It is possiblein thefirstplaceto coin
new and unfavorableevaluative-descriptive terms,and apply themto
describefamiliarformsof social behaviorwhichone mayhavecome to
wishto see condemned.Thishappenedin thecase of theideologyI have
been citingwiththe conceptof squandering and of beinga spendthrift.
Boththesetermsbecamewidelyused forthefirsttimeat theend of the
sixteenth century in orderto describeandexpressa newdisapproval ofthe
aristocratic ideal of conspicuousconsumption. It is also possibleto turn
existingneutraldescriptive termsinto unfavorable evaluative-descriptive
termsby meansof a metaphorical extensionof theiruses.Two examples
fromthe same ideologyare providedby the conceptsof errantand
exorbitantbehavior, bothof whichfirstattainedtheirmetaphorical (and

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[2981 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

henceevaluative)meaningsat thestartof theseventeenth century.And,

finally,thestandardapplicationof an existingevaluative-descriptive term
to expressapprovalcan also be reversed-as happenedwiththeconceptof
actingobsequiously.The termwas standardly used untiltheend of the
sixteenthcenturyto expressapprovaland onlyafterward becamea term
ofdisapprobation.
I now turnto thesecondstrategy, whichis bothmuchsimplerandof
fargreatersignificanceas a legitimating device.Thisconsists,ineffect, of
manipulating thecriteriafortheapplication of an existingsetoffavorable
evaluative-descriptive
terms.The ideologist'saim in thiscase is to insist,
withas muchplausibility as he can muster,that,in spiteof anycontrary
appearances, a numberoffavorable evaluative-descriptive termscanin fact
be applied as apt descriptions of his own apparentlyuntowardsocial
actions.The pointof thisstrategy is to challenge hisideologicalopponents
to reconsider whethertheymaynot be makingan empirical mistake(and
maythusbe sociallyinsensitive) in failingto see thattheordinary criteria
for applyingan existingrangeof favorableevaluative-descriptive terms
may be presentin the very actions they have been condemningas
illegitimate.
The attemptto make thismoveis, of course,ideologicalin themost
pejorativesense, since it depends on the performance of a linguistic
sleight-of-hand.The aimis to arguethata favorable evaluative-descriptive
termis beingappliedin theordinary way,whiletrying at thesametimeto
dropsome of thecriteriaforapplyingit, therebyextending therangeof
the actionswhichit can properlybe used to describeand commend.
(Again,themirror-image of thisstrategy is to tryto limittheapplication
of existingunfavorable evaluative-descriptive terms.)This willfailif too
manyof thecriteria aredropped,forin thiscase thefactthatthetermhas
undergone a 'changeof meaning'willbecometoo obvious.Butit willalso
failifnot enoughare dropped,forin thiscase thecapacityof thetermto
coverand thusto legitimate new formsofsocialactionwillnothavebeen
extendedafterall.
Despitethesedifficulties,thisprobablyrepresents themostwidespread
and important formof ideologicalargument. It wasextensively employed
in thecase of theideologyI havebeen citing:by meansofit,an attempt
was made to connectthe principlesof Protestant Christianity withthe
practicesof commercial life. Consider,forexample,the use of thetwo
mostimportant evaluative-descriptivetermsin thereligious vocabulary of
theage, theterm'providence' and theterm'religious' itself.Bytheend of
the sixteenthcentury, it beganto be suggested by thosewho wishedto

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [299]

legitimatethe characteristic interestof the commercial classesin being

foresightful in monetaryaffairsthatthisapparently miserly (and,hence,
untoward)patternof behavioroughtreallyto be seen as a commendable
working of providence and thusas a provident formof action.Theyalso
began to suggestthat theircharacteristic interestin punctuality and
exactitudeoughtnot to be condemnedas excessively rigorous andsevere,
but oughtratherto be appraisedand thuscommendedas a genuinely
religiousformof commitment. The bestproofof theideologicalmotives
at workin thesenew patternsof social descriptionand evaluationis
providedby thefactthatthemeanings of thesekeyevaluative-descriptive
termssoon becamestretched and confused.The conceptof providence
beganto be used in good faith(as it is stillused)to refersimplyto acting
with foresightabout monetaryaffairs,while the concept of acting
religiouslycame to be used simplyto referto casesofexactandpunctual
behavior.The standardization of thesenew meaningsboth date, as one
mightexpect,fromthestartof theseventeenth century.
My mainconclusion,whichtheseexamplesserveto underline, is that
all thosewhohavearguedabout therelations betweensocialandpolitical
thoughtand actionin the mannerof the Namierites or thebehaviorists
have in effectbeen involvedin a non sequitur.It does not,as theyhave
tended to suppose, follow from the fact that an agent'sprofessed
principles maybe ex post factorationalisations thattheyhaveno roleto
play in explaininghis behavior.As I have soughtto emphasise,this
argument ignoresthe implications of the factthatany agentpossessesa
standardmotivefor attemptingto legitimatehis untowardsocial or
politicalactions.This impliesfirstof all thathe will be committedto
claimingthathis apparently untowardactionswerein factmotivated by
some accepted set of social or politicalprinciples.And this in turn
impliesthat,even if the agentis not in factmotivatedby any of the
principles he professes,he willnevertheless be obligedto behavein sucha
waythathisactionsremaincompatible withtheclaimthattheseprinciples
genuinelymotivatedthem.To recognisetheseimplications is to accept
that the coursesof action open to any rationalagentin thistypeof
situationmustin partbe determined by therangeof principles whichhe
can professwithplausibility. Thereis botha generaland a morespecific
conclusionto be drawnout here.The generalconclusionderivesfromthe
factthatanycourseof actionis inhibitedfromoccurring if it cannotbe
legitimated. It followsthatanyprinciple whichhelpsto legitimate a course
of actionmustalso be amongsttheenablingconditionsofitsoccurrence.
The morespecificconclusionderivesfromthe factthatthe natureand

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[3001 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974

rangeof the evaluativeconceptswhichany agentcan hope to applyin

orderto legitimate his behaviorcanin no case be setby theagenthimself.
Theiravailabilityis a questionabouttheprevailing moralityofthesociety
in whichthe agentis acting;theirapplicability is a questionabout the
standardmeaningand use of thetermsinvolved,and abouthowfarthese
canbe plausiblystretched. Thesefactorsserveas ratherspecificconstraints
and directivesto theagentaboutwhatpreciselinesof conductafford him
thebestmeansofbringing hisuntowardactionsinlinewithsomeaccepted
principle,and thereby legitimating whathe doeswhilestillgaining whathe
wants.He cannothope to stretch theapplication of theexisting principles
indefinitely;correspondingly, he can onlyhope to legitimate a restricted
rangeof actions.It followsthatto studytheprinciples whichtheagent
finallychoosesto professmustbe to studyone ofthekeydeterminants of
hisdecisionto followout anyone particular lineof action.
Evenif theseconclusionsseemacceptable,however,it maystillbe felt
thatI havechosento illustrate themwithan unfortunate example.It has
become a commonplaceamongsthistoriansto repudiateany suggestion
thatthe principlesof Protestant Christianityplayeda causalrolein the
development ofcapitalistpractices.As Trevor-Roper (1963: 29) has putit,
any such theory"is exploded by the simple fact" that "large scale
industrialcapitalism"alreadyexistedbeforetheProtestant reformation. It
is true that if Weberimaginedthata preexisting Protestant ethiclater
helpedin sucha directwayto causetheriseofcapitalism, thenhistheory
is refutedby showingthattheemergence ofcapitalism predatedtheriseof
Protestantism. It is hard to believe,however,thathe intendedonlyto
suggestsuch a crude and easily discreditedconnection.It seemsmore
plausibleto construehimas havingintendedto arguethattheProtestant
ethicwas particularly welladjustedto legitimatingtheriseof capitalism,
and in thiswayhelpedit to developand flourish. My own argument can
thusbe readas an attemptto reinterpret whatI taketo havebeenWeber's
realmeaning.I do not wish,however,to pressthispointofinterpretation
here.I onlywishto emphasisethatevenifTrevor-Roper's criticismcan be
shownto point to a real weaknessin Weber'sargument, it cannotbe
shownto point to any weaknessin the argumentI have myselfbeen
concernedto advance.Mysuggestion thattheroleofProtestantism wasto
legitimatetheriseof capitalism is obviouslybasednoton ignoring buton
assuming thefactthatcapitalism predatedProtestantism. WhatI havetried
to show, however,is that it does not follow from this fact, as
Trevor-Roper and othersappearto conclude,thatProtestantism had no
causalroleto playin thedevelopment of capitalism.As I havesoughtto

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 Skinner/ SYMPOSIUM [3011

argue, this ignoresthe fact that the earliestcapitalistslacked any

legitimacy in the moralclimatein whichtheyat firstfoundthemselves,
and so needed-as one of the conditionsof beingable to flourishand
develop-to findsome means of legitimating theirbehavior.As I have
soughtto illustrate, one of the mostvaluablemeanstheyfoundwas to
appropriateand apply to themselvesthe normativevocabularyof the
Protestantreligion-greatly to the horror,in this case, of all sincerely
religiousProtestants,who naturally foundno difficulty in seeingthrough
thetrick.But thereis no doubtthatthe trickworked:thevocabulary of
Protestantism not onlyhelpedto increasetheacceptability of capitalism,
but arguablyhelped to channelits developmentin specificways-in
particulartowardan ethicof industriousness. The relativeacceptabilityof
thisnew patternof socialbehaviorthenhelpedin turnto ensurethatthe
systemdevelopedand flourished. It is forthisreasonthat,evenif the
emergence of capitalismpredatedtheemergence of itsideology,andeven
if the professedideologyneverprovidedthecapitalists withanyof their
realmotives,it is stillessentialto referto theideologyin orderto be able
to explainhow andwhythesystemdeveloped.

NOTES

1. Professor withthemethodological
Tarlton'scritiqueis alsoconcerned writings
of JohnDunn and J.G.A.Pocock.I have confinedmyremarks abouthis article
exclusivelyto thosesectionswhichareconcerned withmywork.
2. For thesereasons,see Skinner (1966b).
3. Whilethereis I thinkno doubtabouttheexistenceof sucha groupofterms,
the categoryis, of course,a diverseone. The spectrumincludesa numberof cases
wherethe criteriaforthe applicationof thegiventermare relatively fixed,while
theirevaluativedirectionislessso; a number ofcaseswheretheoppositeapplies;and
a numberof cases whereboth thecriteriaand theevaluation usesof thetermare
subjectsof ideologicaldebate(forfurther seeFoot, 1958).
examplesanddiscussion,

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