[G.R. NO. 150723 : July 11, 2006] machine.
machine. Manaban then urged him to calm down and referred him to their
RAMONITO MANABAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review of the Decision dated 21 May 2001 and the
1 2
Resolution3 dated 8 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
23790. In its 21 May 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 ("trial court"), finding
Ramonito Manaban ("Manaban") guilty of the crime of homicide. In its 8 November
2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals modified its Decision by reducing the award
for loss of earning capacity.
The Facts
The facts as narrated by the trial court are as follows:
On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o'clock in the morning, Joselito Bautista, a
father and a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who
complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. There, the doctors
prescribed certain medicines to be purchased. Needing money therefore, Joselito
Bautista, who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan
Branch to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM).
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because he
could not effectively withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding on the
machine. For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban,
approached and asked him what the problem was. Bautista complained that his
ATM was retrieved by the machine and that no money came out of it. After
Manaban had checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal
Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just return the
next morning. This angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the
customer service over the phone. Still not mollified, Bautista continued raging and
striking the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he fired a
warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire
against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a
shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista.4
On 24 October 1996, Manaban was charged with the crime of murder. The
Information states:
That on or about the 11th day of October 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill, qualified by
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSELITO BAUTISTA, by then
and there, shooting him at the back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon
said JOSELITO BAUTISTA mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
JOSELITO BAUTISTA.5
When arraigned on 4 December 1996,6 Manaban pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. Trial then followed.
The Trial
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1) Faustino Delariarte ("Delariarte"); (2)
SPO1 Dominador Salvador ("SPO1 Salvador"); (3) Rodolfo Bilgera ("Bilgera"); (4)
Celedonia H. Tan ("Tan"); (5) Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas ("Dr. Vargas"); and (6) Editha
Bautista ("Editha").
Delariarte was a security guard who was employed by the same security agency as
Manaban. Delariarte testified that in the early morning of 11 October 1996, their
duty officer, Diosdado Morga, called him and informed him that one of the guards
stationed at the BPI Kalayaan Branch ("BPI Kalayaan") was involved in a shooting
incident. When he arrived at the bank, Delariarte saw Manaban inside the bank
using the phone. He also saw Joselito Bautista ("Bautista") lying on the ground but
still alive. He then told their company driver, Virgilio Cancisio ("Cancisio"), to take
Bautista to the hospital but to be careful since there was a gun tucked in Bautista's PNP Police Inspector Percival Fontanilla, he conducted a ballistic examination on
waist. Bautista allegedly reeked of alcohol. Delariarte further testified that when the following specimens submitted to him:
Manaban came out of the bank, Manaban admitted to Delariarte that he shot
Bautista.7 1. One (1) ARMSCOR 2015, Caliber .38 Revolver, SN-28909 marked "DBS";

SPO1 Salvador was a police investigator assigned at Station 10, Philippine National 2. One (1) ARMSCOR 200, Caliber .38 Revolver, SN-P03471 marked "DBS";
Police-Central Police District Command (PNP-CPDC) of Quezon City. SPO1 Salvador
testified that on 11 October 1996, about 2:05 a.m., the duty desk officer SPO2 3. One (1) Caliber .38 one badly deformed copper coated lead bullet marked "RM";
Redemption Negre sent him, SPO1 Jerry Abad and SPO1 Ruben Reyes to BPI
Kalayaan to investigate an alleged shooting incident. SPO1 Salvador testified that 4. Two (2) Caliber .38 empty shells marked "RM-1" and "RM-2";
when they arrived at BPI Kalayaan, they were met by Delariarte and Cancisio.
Manaban then approached them and surrendered his service firearm, a .38 caliber 5. One (1) Caliber .38 misfired ammunition marked "RM-3";
revolver, to SPO1 Salvador. Manaban allegedly admitted shooting Bautista. SPO1
Salvador and his team investigated the crime scene. According to SPO1 Salvador, 6. Nine (9) Caliber .38 ammunition marked "RM-4", "RM-5", "RM-6" and "JB-1" to
he saw Bautista lying on his back near the Automated Teller Machine ("ATM"). A "JB-6"; andcralawlibrary
.38 caliber revolver inside a locked holster was tucked in Bautista's right waist.
SPO1 Salvador noticed that Bautista, who was still breathing, had been shot in the 7. One (1) Caliber .38 deformed copper coated lead bullet marked "JB". (Re-FID No.
back. They brought Bautista to the East Avenue Medical Center where Bautista later 606-14-1096 [N-96-2047]).13
died. Thereafter, they proceeded to the police station and turned over Manaban to
their desk officer for proper disposition and investigation.8 Based on the examination, Bilgera concluded that the bullet which was extracted
from Bautista's body by the medico-legal officer was fired from the ARMSCOR
Dr. Vargas, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Officer, conducted 2015 .38 Caliber revolver with Serial No. 28909 14and that the empty shells also
an autopsy on Bautista's cadaver. Dr. Vargas testified that Bautista died of a came from the same gun. Bilgera submitted a written report15 on the result of his
gunshot wound. According to him, the point of entry of the bullet was at the back, examination.
on the right side of the body and there was no exit point. He stated that he was
able to recover the slug from the left anterior portion of the victim's body and that
Editha, the widow of Joselito Bautista, testified that she was married to Bautista on
he later submitted the slug to the NBI Ballistics Division. Dr. Vargas further stated
22 December 1993 in civil rites and that they have four children, the eldest of
that the bullet wound was fatal because the bullet hit the right lung and lacerated
whom was 13 years old. Editha stated that her husband, who was a member of the
parts of the liver, stomach and the pancreas. Based on the location of the gunshot
University of the Philippines Police Force ("UP Police Force") since 1985, was
wound, Dr. Vargas deduced that the assailant must have been behind the victim,
receiving a monthly salary of P5,050 at the time of his death. She narrated that on
on the right side, when he shot the victim.9 Dr. Vargas also testified that the
11 October 1996, about 1:25 a.m., her husband brought their daughter Frinzi who
absence of signs of near-fire indicates that the distance between the muzzle of the
had an asthma attack to the UP Health Center where she was confined for three
gun and the point of entry was more than 24 inches. During cross-examination, Dr.
days. According to Editha, her husband then left to withdraw money at BPI
Vargas testified that he was able to take blood samples from the victim which,
Kalayaan for the purchase of medicines. Later, she was fetched by members of the
based on the NBI Chemistry Division analysis, tested positive for alcohol. 10 Dr.
UP Police Force who informed her that her husband had been shot. Editha claimed
Vargas issued a certificate of post-mortem examination11 and an autopsy report.12
that as a consequence of her husband's death, she spent more than P111,00016 for
the nine-day wake, embalmment and funeral services.17
Bilgera was a ballistician at the Firearms Investigation Division (FID) of the NBI.
Bilgera testified that upon receiving a letter-request dated 11 October 1996 from
The prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with the testimony of Tan, the
Assistant Manager of BPI Kalayaan. Instead, they just agreed to stipulate that on 11
October 1996, about 7:45 a.m., Tan and BPI Custodian Elma R. Piñano retrieved BPI
Express Teller Card No. 3085-2616-21 issued to Bautista which was captured by the
ATM because a wrong Personal Identification Number (PIN) was entered.18
The Defense's Version
The defense presented four witnesses: (1) Manaban; (2) Renz Javelona ("Javelona");
(3) Tan; and (4) Patrick Peralta ("Peralta").
Manaban, the accused, testified that he was employed by Eagle Star Security
Agency as a security guard and was assigned at BPI Kalayaan. On 10 October 1996,
he was on duty from 7:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day.
Manaban narrated that on 11 October 1996, about 1:40 a.m., Bautista tried to
withdraw money from the ATM. Manaban then saw Bautista pounding and kicking
the ATM. When Manaban asked Bautista what was the problem, Bautista replied
that no money came out from the machine. According to Manaban, Bautista
appeared to be intoxicated.
Manaban looked at the receipt issued to Bautista and saw that the receipt
indicated that a wrong PIN was entered. Manaban informed Bautista that the ATM
captured Bautista's ATM card because he entered the wrong PIN. He then advised
Bautista to return the following day when the staff in charge of servicing the ATM
would be around.
Bautista replied that he needed the money very badly and then resumed pounding
on the ATM. Manaban tried to stop Bautista and called by telephone the ATM
service personnel to pacify Bautista. Bautista talked to the ATM service personnel
and Manaban heard him shouting invectives and saw him pounding and kicking
the ATM again.
When Manaban failed to pacify Bautista, Manaban fired a warning shot in the air.
Bautista then faced him and told him not to block his way because he needed the
money very badly. Bautista allegedly raised his shirt and showed his gun which was
tucked in his waist. Manaban stepped back and told Bautista not to draw his gun,
otherwise he would shoot.
However, Bautista allegedly kept on moving toward Manaban, who again warned
Bautista not to come near him or he would be forced to shoot him. Bautista
suddenly turned his back and was allegedly about to draw his gun. Fearing that he
would be shot first, Manaban pulled the trigger and shot Bautista.
Manaban recounted that he then went inside the bank and called the police and
his agency to report the incident. While he was inside the bank, a fellow security
guard arrived and asked what happened. Manaban answered, "wala yan, lasing."
Later, a mobile patrol car arrived. Manaban related the incident to the police officer
and informed him that Bautista was still alive and had a gun. Manaban then
surrendered his service firearm to the police officer. According to Manaban, he
fired his gun twice - once in the air as a warning shot and the second time at
Bautista who was about four meters from him.19
On cross-examination, Manaban further explained that after he fired the warning
shot, Bautista kept coming toward him. Manaban pointed his gun at Bautista and
warned him not to come closer. When Bautista turned his back, Manaban thought
Bautista was about to draw his gun when he placed his right hand on his waist.
Fearing for his life, he pulled the trigger and shot Manaban. According to
Manaban, "[n]oong makita ko siya na pabalikwas siya, na sadya bubunot ng baril,
sa takot ko na baka maunahan niya ako at mapatay, doon ko na rin nakalabit yung
gatilyo ng baril." Manaban declared that it did not occur to him to simply disable
the victim for fear that Bautista would shoot him first. 20
Javelona was an ATM Service Assistant of BPI. Javelona testified that on 11 October
1996, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., she received a call from a client at BPI
Kalayaan. The client, who was later identified as Bautista, complained: " Nagwi-
withdraw ako dito sa ATM Kalayaan. Mali daw yung PIN ko, alam ko tama yung PIN
ko. Ilang beses ko nang ginamit, mali pa rin. Kailangan kong mag-withdraw."
Javelona tried to placate Bautista and advised him not to insert his card anymore
because it might be captured by the machine and to try again later in the morning.
Bautista allegedly answered angrily: "Na capture na nga, eh! Tama na nga yung PIN
number [sic]. Hindi ako pwedeng hindi makakuha ng pera. Kailangan kong bumili
ng gamot para sa anak ko. Hindi ko naman kasalanan ito." Javelona replied: "Sir,
hindi ho natin makukuha ang card ninyo ngayon kasi ang makaka-open lang ho ng
ATM machine ay ang officer ng Kalayaan Branch. Even if makuha natin ang card
ninyo ngayon, hindi pa ninyo magagamit ngayon. Magagamit lang ninyo as soon
as mag-pa-encode kayo ng PIN number [sic]."
Bautista then reiterated angrily his dire need to withdraw money for the medicine
of his daughter. Javelona apologized to Bautista and informed him that there was
really nothing she could do at that time. She also advised Bautista to go back to
the bank at 9:00 a.m. to get his ATM card and also to withdraw money over the
counter. Bautista refused to be pacified and started cursing so Javelona decided to
hang up the phone.21
Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalayaan, testified that when she reported for
work in the morning of 11 October 1996, she discovered that the ATM was out of
order. According to Tan, the ATM keyboard was not properly mounted and the
keys were damaged. Also, the telephone beside the ATM was hung up. Tan then
called Peralta, the technician, to have the ATM repaired. When Peralta opened the
ATM, they found Bautista's ATM card which was captured by the machine.22
Peralta, a Customer Engineer Specialist, testified that on 11 October 1996, BPI
Kalayaan sought his assistance regarding their ATM. When Peralta arrived at BPI
Kalayaan, he talked to Tan and then proceeded to the ATM to assess the damage.
According to Peralta, the ATM keyboard was damaged and mis-aligned.23
The Trial Court's Ruling
On 14 April 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Pris[i]on Mayor,
as maximum; to pay indemnity to the heirs of Joselito Bautista for his death in the
amount of P75,000.00; and actual damages in the amount of P111,324.00 for the
nine-day wake, embalm[ing] and funeral services, and P1,418,040.00 for the loss of
Bautista's earning capacity, the last to be paid by installment at least P3,030.00 a
month until fully paid with the balance earning interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.24
The trial court held that the defense failed to establish self-defense as a justifying
circumstance. According to the trial court, unlawful aggression, which is the most
essential element to support the theory of self-defense, was lacking in this case.
The trial court found that, contrary to Manaban's claim, Bautista was not about to
draw his gun to shoot Manaban. Evidence show that Bautista's gun was still tucked
in his waist inside a locked holster. Furthermore, the trial court held that Bautista
could not have surprised Manaban with a preemptive attack because Manaban
himself testified that he already had his gun pointed at Bautista when they were
facing each other. The trial court likewise rejected Manaban's claim of exemption
from criminal liability because he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury. The trial court held that the requisites for the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear under paragraph 6, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code are not present in this case. However, the trial court credited
Manaban with two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and obfuscation.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of
Appeals later reconsidered and modified its decision with respect only to the award
of loss of earning capacity. Using the formula 2/3 [80 - age at the time of death] x
[gross annual income - 80% gross annual income], the Court of Appeals
recomputed the award for loss of earning capacity. In its Resolution dated 8
November 2001, the Court of Appeals reduced the award for the loss of the
victim's earning capacity from P1,418,040 to P436,320.
The Issues
In his Petition for Review, Manaban submits that:
1. The Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming the erroneous factual
appreciation and interpretation by the trial court a quo in practically affirming the
decision of the latter court which are based on a clear misappreciation of facts and
findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures "in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court."
2. The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring petitioner's self-defense on the
sole fact that the entrance of the deceased victim's wound was from the back.
3. The Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding that petitioner failed to
establish unlawful aggression just because the holster of the victim was still in a
lock position.
4. Granting arguendo that petitioner made a mistake in his appreciation that there
was an attempt on the part of the deceased victim to draw his gun who executed
"bumalikwas," such mistake of fact is deemed justified.
5. Finally, the Respondent Court gravely erred in awarding exorbitant and baseless
award of damages to the heirs of deceased victim.25
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The reviewing
tribunal can correct errors though unassigned in the appeal, or reverse the lower
court's decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.26
Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self-Defense
When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect admits killing the victim and
the burden is shifted to him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. 27 The
accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that all the requisites of
self-defense are present.28
Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to
prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from
criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person
defending himself.29 Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-
defense.30 Self-defense is founded on the necessity on the part of the person being
attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. 31Thus, without prior unlawful
and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense.32
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or
inflict physical injury upon a person.33 A mere threatening or intimidating attitude
is not considered unlawful aggression,34unless the threat is offensive and
menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. 35There must be
an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the
defendant's life in real peril.36
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First,
Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet.
Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and
tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban,
Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances
clearly belie Manaban's claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part. Manaban
testified:
ATTY. ANCANAN
Q: You said the victim showed his gun by raising his shirt?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The victim never drew his gun?
A: He was about to draw the gun when he turned around.
Q: My question is when the victim was facing you, the victim never drew his gun?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: And when you told the victim not to come close, he did not come closer
anymore?
A: He walked towards me, sir.
Q: For how many steps?
A: I cannot remember how many steps.
Q: And according to you, while he was facing you and walking towards you he
suddenly turned his back to you, is that correct?
A: Bumalikwas po at parang bubunot ng baril.
Q: Let us get the meaning of "bumalikwas", tumalikod sa iyo?
A: Bumalikwas po (witness demonstrating).
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us how the victim "bumalikwas"?
A: When he was facing me and I told him, "Sir, you just be there otherwise I am
going to take the gun" and at that moment, he, the victim turned his back and
simultaneously drew the gun.
Q: When he was facing you, the victim never drew his gun, is that correct? A: Noong makita ko siya na pabalikwas siya, na sabay bubunot ng baril, sa takot ko
A: Not yet, sir. na baka maunahan niya ako at mapatay, doon ko na rin nakalabit yung gatilyo ng
Q: And according to you, it was at that point when he turned his back on you that baril ko.
he tried to draw his gun? ATTY. ANCANAN
A: Yes, sir. Q: Mr. Witness, how long have you been a security guard before this incident?
Q: You said that he tried to draw, but the fact is he merely placed his hand on his A: Around 7 months, sir.
waist? Q: Now, before you were employed as security guard by the Eagle Star Security
A: No, sir, when I saw him, when he was hit, I saw him, the hand was already on the Agency, did you undergo any training as a security guard?
gun but still tucked on his waist (witness places his hand on his right waist with A: Yes, sir.
fingers open). Q: Where?
Q: And it was at that precise moment while the victim's back was turned on you A: Camp Crame, sir.
that you fired your shot? Q: For how long?
A: Three (3) days, sir.
A: When he was about to turn his back and it seems about to take his gun, that is Q: And what did you learn from those 3 days training as security guard?
the time I shot him because of my fear that he would be ahead in pulling his gun A: Our duties as security guard were lectured to us, sir.
and he might kill me. Q: Now, were you not taught during the training that in any given situation, your
Q: When you said, when you fired your shot, the victim's gun was still tucked in his first duty is to disable first an aggressor?
right waist, is that correct? ATTY. CARAANG
Objection, your Honor, I think that is no longer material besides, that is not part of
A: Yes, sir, his hand was on his waist. my direct examination.
Q: You just answer the question. Was the victim's gun still tucked on his waistline? COURT
A: Yes, sir. Witness may answer.
Q: And his hand was merely placed on his hips. The victim's right hand was merely A: It was taught to us, sir, but it depends on my situation. If the person kept on
placed on his right hip?cralawlibrary doing what I told him not to do and it would reach a point that it would endanger
ATTY. CARAANG my life, of course even if you were in my place, you would do the same thing, so
I object. The witness testified that he was about to draw his gun. nakipagsabayan na ako, sir.
COURT Q: But in this particular case when you fired your second shot, the victim's back was
He is asking the question so he has to answer. towards you, is that not correct?
A: No, sir, the gun was on his waist. ATTY. CARAANG
ATTY. ANCANAN Objection, already answered, your Honor.
Q: At the precise time that you fired your second shot, you could have aimed your COURT
gun at the extremities of the victim, meaning legs or arms, is that Witness may answer.
correct?cralawlibrary A: No, sir, I shot him only once, not twice.
A: When I saw him that he was about to draw his gun because of my fear that he Q: Please answer the question. When you fired your second shot . . .
would get ahead of me and he would kill me, I did not mind anymore, I just A: Bumalikwas ho 'yon eh.
inunahan ko siya. Q: Please answer the question.
ATTY. CARAANG A: Yes, sir.
May I request that the answer of the witness be quoted as is? Q: And because his back was towards you, you could have easily disabled him by
firing at his leg or at his arms, is that not correct?
ATTY. CARAANG
I object, your Honor, it was already answered. He said he was not given the
opportunity to have a second thought and at that moment he was able to pull the
trigger of his gun.
ATTY. ANCANAN
The witness already admitted that when he fired his gun, the victim's back was
towards the witness, so my last question is just a follow-up.
ATTY. CARAANG
But the witness testified that he was not given the opportunity to have a second
thought, that is why right then and there, he pulled the trigger of his gun.
COURT
Objection noted, witness may answer.
A: What I was thinking at that time, was just to disarm him but when he turned,
bumalikwas, and I saw that he was going to draw a firearm and that was when I
decided to "makipagsabayan."
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. CARAANG
Q: Mr. Witness, when you and the victim were facing each other, the gun was
already pointed to him, is it not? Your gun?cralawlibrary
A: Yes, sir, I pointed my gun at him.37
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he
turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was already
aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. In that
situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering that Manaban, who
had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who
was a policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not have
attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster tucked in his
waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista was about to draw his
gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by shooting his
arm or leg considering that Manaban's firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life
and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.38 Absent
such actual or imminent peril to one's life or limb, there is nothing to repel and
there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another. 39
Voluntary Surrender and Obfuscation
The trial court credited Manaban with two mitigating circumstances: voluntary
surrender and obfuscation.
It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report the shooting incident.
When the police arrived, Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily
went with the police to the police station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is
entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to such
mitigating circumstance. Under paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is appreciated where the
accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion
or obfuscation. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation are: (1) that there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) that the act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity.40
In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting Bautista because Bautista turned
around and was allegedly about to draw his gun to shoot Manaban. The act of
Bautista in turning around is not unlawful and sufficient cause for Manaban to lose
his reason and shoot Bautista. That Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as
preparatory to drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make Bautista's act
unlawful. The threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is mere speculation
which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is mitigating.41 Besides, the
threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the
advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already pointing his firearm at
Bautista when the latter turned his back. The defense failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the cause that allegedly produced obfuscation.
Award of Damages
The records42 reveal that Bautista was 36 years old at the time of his death and not
26 years old as stated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. 43 Moreover, the
annual salary of Bautista at the time of his death was already P60,864 and
not P60,600.44 We likewise modify the formula applied by the Court of Appeals in
the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity. In accordance with
current jurisprudence,45 the formula for the indemnification for loss of earning WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals
capacity is: dated 21 May 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 November 2001. We find petitioner
Ramonito Manaban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
Net Earning = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual - Living Expenses] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating
Capacity Income (GAI) circumstance of voluntary surrender, Ramonito Manaban is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one day of prision
= 2/3(80 - age of deceased) x (GAI - 50% of GAI) mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Ramonito Manaban is ordered to pay the heirs of Joselito Bautista: P892,570.56 as
Using this formula, the indemnification for loss of earning capacity should be: indemnity for loss of earning capacity; P69,500 as actual damages; and P50,000 as
indemnity for death.
Net Earning = 2/3 (80 - 36) x [P60,864 - (50% x P60,864)]
Capacity SO ORDERED.

= 29.33 x P30,432
G.R. No. 160341 October 19, 2004
= P892,570.56
EXEQUIEL SENOJA, petitioner,
With regard to actual damages, the records show that not all the expenses that the vs.
Bautista family allegedly incurred were supported by competent evidence. Editha PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
failed to present receipts or any other competent proof for food expenses and
rental fee for jeeps for the funeral. Editha merely submitted a typewritten DECISION
"Summary of Food Expenses & Others."46 A mere list of expenses, without any
official receipts or any other evidence obtainable, does not to prove actual CALLEJO, SR., J.:
expenses incurred.47 Competent proof of the actual expenses must be presented to
justify an award for actual damages.48 In this case, only the following expenses Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of
were duly supported by official receipts and other proof : Appeals (CA) in People v. Exequiel Senoja, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 26564,
affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
1. Embalming fee49 P11,000 Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. 2259, for homicide.

2. Bronze Casket 50
25,000
The Case For the People
3. Cadillac Hearse fee51 3,500
4. Funeral Services52 30,000 As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its comment on the
petition, the case stemmed from the following:
Total P69,500
1. On April 16, 1997, petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and
Thus, we reduce the actual damages granted from P111,324 to P69,500. Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay
Zarah, San Luis, Aurora. An angry Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived at the said place,
We likewise reduce the indemnity for death from P75,000 to P50,000 in accordance holding a bolo in his right hand and looking for his brother Miguel. Petitioner and
with prevailing jurisprudence.53 Jose tried to pacify Leon. But when petitioner approached Leon, the latter tried to
hack him so he embraced Leon and Jose took Leon’s bolo. Then, Leon and
petitioner talked things out and later reconciled (pp. 2-4, TSN, November 16, 1998;
pp. 2-4, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 2, TSN, April 21, 1998; p. 5, TSN, March 14, 2001;
p. 2, CA Decision).
2. Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisanto’s hut followed by petitioner.
Suddenly, about ten meters from the hut, petitioner stabbed Leon at the back.
When Leon turned around, petitioner continued stabbing him until he fell to the
ground. Then, petitioner ran towards the barangay road and threw away the
"kolonial" knife he used in stabbing Leon. The latter died on the spot (pp. 2-6, TSN,
November 22, 2000; p. 5, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 3, CA Decision).
3. Dr. Pura Deveza Valenzuela-Uy, San Luis Municipal Health Officer, examined the
cadaver of Leon and found multiple lesions on his body and five fatal wounds on
his chest. Dr. Uy issued a medico-legal report and death certificate (Exhibits A and
B, pp. 13-14, Records; pp. 3-5, TSN, November 20, 1997).3
On August 13, 1997, an Information was filed charging petitioner Exequiel Senoja
with homicide, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 o’clock in the morning in Barangay Zarah, San
Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to
kill, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Leon
Lumasac by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon locally known as
"kolonyal" at the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of
self-defense. His version of the fatal incident is set forth in his petition at bar:
1. On April 16, 1997 at about 11 o’clock in the morning, Crisanto Reguyal, Fidel
Senoja, Jose Calica, Miguel Lumasac, and Exequiel Senoja were in the hut of
Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, drinking gin;
2. Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived holding a bolo and hacked the doorpost of
Crisanto’s hut, angrily demanding for his brother, Miguel Lumasac, whom he
suspected of drying up the ricefield he was plowing;
3. At this time, Miguel Lumasac was no longer inside the hut but fetching water;
4. To prevent Leon Lumasac from entering the hut, Exequiel Senoja (appellant) and
Jose Calica stood by the door while simultaneously trying to pacify Leon Lumasac;
5. Exequiel Senoja with a knife then went outside and tried to pacify Leon Lumasac
but the latter angered by the gestures of the former tried to hack Exequiel Senoja;
6. To avoid any injury, Exequiel Senoja embraced Leon which gave an opportunity
to disarm the duo. Jose Calica got the bolo of Leon and threw it away while Fidel
Senoja took the "colonial" knife of Exequiel;
7. Jose Calica and Fidel Senoja were able to pacify Leon Lumasac so they invited
him to get inside the hut. Inside the hut, Leon Lumasac tried to box Fidel Senoja for
siding with his brother, Miguel, but was prevented by Exequiel Senoja who held
Leon’s hands;
8. After a while, Leon Lumasac left but returned and angrily demanded for his bolo.
Jose Calica gave his own bolo with a sabbard to replace the bolo of Leon which he
threw away;
9. With Jose Calica’s bolo in him, Leon Lumasac left but only after leaving a threat
that something will happen to Exequiel Senoja for siding with his brother;
10. After walking for about 10 meters away from the hut, Leon Lumasac turned
around and saw Exequiel Senoja on his way home following him;
11. Leon Lumasac walked back to meet Exequiel Senoja and upon reaching him,
the former suddenly and treacherously hacked the latter at the left side of his head
and right thigh;
12. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon Lumasac who persisted in his
criminal design, Exequiel Senoja drew his "colonial" knife and stabbed Leon
Lumasac in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his
death.5
On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Exequiel Senoja
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the death of victim
Leon Lumasac and hereby sentences him, applying Article 64, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, (a) to suffer
the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum; (b) to pay the heirs
of the victim the amount of Fifteen (sic) Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) by way of
civil indemnity; and (c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered
judgment affirming, with modification, the decision of the RTC. The petitioner now
seeks relief from this Court, contending that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts which, if considered,
would probably alter the result of this case on appeal finding appellant’s plea of
self-defense credible.7
The petitioner faults the CA for its analysis of his testimony, as follows:
The injuries suffered by the petitioner at the left side of his head and right thigh
was confirmed by Dr. Rodolfo Eligio in open court. The relative positions of the
wounds clearly show that the drunken Leon Lumasac brandished and executed
several hacking blows against Exequiel Senoja before he was stabbed, neutralized
and finished by the latter. It would be physically and highly improbable for the
victim if he was treacherously hit at the left buttock and as he turned around to
face the petitioner, the latter stabbed him successively and without let-up hitting
him 9 times resulting in 9 fatal wounds. This did not give a chance to the victim to
retaliate and inflict those wounds upon the aggressor. The victim used Mr. Jose
Calica’s bolo which was secured by its scabbard. Unless earlier drawn, it would be
impossible for the victim to use it in defending himself from the surprise attack and
stabbing at a lightning fashion inflicting nine (9) fatal wounds. Time element was
the essence of this encounter which, as narrated by the Honorable Court, after the
assailant poked the victim at the left side of the buttock with the use of the
"colonial" knife he stabbed him successively until he fell down dead. Under these
circumstances, how could Exequiel Senoja suffered (sic) those hacking (sic) wounds
inflicted by the victim using Calica’s bolo? In all indications, it was Leon Lumasac
who attacked his adversary first but lost in the duel considering that he was older
than Exequiel Senoja and drunk. Clearly, therefore, it was Leon Lumasac who was
the aggressor both in the first and second phases of the incident and Exequiel
Senoja was compelled to defend himself.
A closer scrutiny of the attending circumstances which resulted in this stabbing
incident shows that Exequiel Senoja has no compelling reasons to kill his
godfather. On that same occasion, Mr. Exequiel Senoja was with the brother of the
victim, Miguel Lumasac, which only shows that there was no pre-existing grudge
between these families. And still, what titillates our imagination is the fact that
Miguel Lumasac, who was then with the group drinking gin at the hut of Crisanto
Reguyal did not clearly impute this crime to petitioner. On the contrary, when he
was presented to the witness stand, he was very evasive in answering the questions
profounded by the prosecutors if he wanted the petitioner to be imprisoned.
Miguel Lumasac could have told the real truth that Senoja murdered his brother. 8
The CA declared that, based on the evidence on record:
As seen from appellant’s testimony, Leon Lumasac’s actions can be divided into
two (2) phases: the first phase, when Leon entered Crisanto Reguyal’s hut, up to the
time he and the appellant reconciled. The second phase was when Leon left to go
home. In phase one where Leon entered Reguyal’s hut, Leon was the aggressor but
his aggression was mostly directed to his brother Miguel who was not inside the
hut anymore, although it was also partly directed at the appellant and even at Fidel
Soneja (sic). But Leon’s aggression against the appellant and Fidel Senoja ceased
since, as appellant testified, when Leon tried to box Fidel Senoja and he (appellant)
told Leon "Huwag po, Huwag po," Leon was pacified.
In the second phase, when Leon left the hut to go home, his aggression had
already ceased.
It is uncontroverted that the appellant followed the victim when the latter went out
of the hut to go home. Appellant’s testimony is that when he was two meters
outside the hut, Leon turned around to face him saying "if you’re not only my
godson" in a threatening way, then approached and hacked him (with Calica’s
bolo) inflicting wounds on the left side of his head and his right thigh, thus, he
(appellant) attacked the victim with the kolonial knife he was holding. That
appellant suffered such injuries was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Rodolfo
Eligio.9
The petition is denied.
Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or incomplete. It is
complete when all the three essential requisites are present; it is incomplete if only
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two essential
requisites were present. In fine, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a
condition sine qua non to self-defense, complete or incomplete. Whether or not
the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like alibi, the affirmative
defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has
demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.10
The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The right
begins where necessity does, and ends where it ends.11 There is, however, a
perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense, which is that, self-
defense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies the invasion of a right.
Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should be a defense against a present
unlawful attack.12
Life can be taken under the plea of necessity, when necessary for the preservation
of the life on the party setting up the plea. Self-defense is an act to save life; hence,
it is right and not a crime.13 There is a need for one, indeed, for it is a natural right
for one to defend oneself when confronted by an unlawful aggression by another.
It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be
confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided
is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Absent such an actual or imminent
peril to one’s life or limb, there is nothing to repel; there is no necessity to take the
life or inflict injuries on another.14
But then what is the standard to use to determine whether the person defending
himself is confronted by a real and imminent peril to his life or limb? We rule that
the test should be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due exercise of
his reason, his life or limb is in danger? After all, the rule of law founded on justice
and reason: Actus no facit remin, nisi mens sit rea. Hence, the guilt of the accused
must depend upon the circumstances as they reasonably appear to him. 15
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.16 Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one
making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. 17 After the
danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life.
The conflict for blood should be avoided if possible.18 An assault on his person, he
cannot punish when the danger or peril is over. When the danger is over, the right
of self-defense ceases. His right is defense, not retribution.19
When the accused offers the affirmative defense of self-defense, he thereby admits
killing the victim or inflicting injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on
the accused to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victim
or inflicted injuries on him to defend himself. The accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution
because if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, the accused can no longer
be acquitted.20
We agree with the CA that, as gleaned, even from the testimony of the petitioner,
there were two separate but interrelated incidents that culminated in the
petitioner’s stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The first was the
arrival of the victim, who was armed with a bolo, in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal,
looking for his brother Miguel Lumasac, whom he was angry at. The victim hacked
the wall of the house in anger. The petitioner, who was armed with a knife, tried to
pacify the victim. The victim attempted to hack the petitioner; nevertheless, the
latter embraced and managed to pacify the victim. Forthwith, Jose Calica took the
bolo of the victim and threw it away. For his part, Fidel Senoja took the petitioner’s
knife. As it was, the victim was already pacified. He and the petitioner were already
reconciled.21 Fidel even gave back the knife to the petitioner.
The second incident took place when the victim demanded that Calica return his
bolo as he wanted to go home already. Because he had thrown away the victim’s
bolo, Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The victim then warned the
petitioner three times, "May mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas," and left
the hut. When the victim had already gone about ten meters from the hut, the
petitioner followed the victim. The victim turned around and told the petitioner,
"Kung hindi lang kita inaanak." The victim then hacked the petitioner, hitting the
latter on the left side of his head and thigh. Believing that the victim would attack
him anew, the petitioner stabbed the victim frontally several times.22 He also
stabbed the victim on the left buttock. The petitioner could not recall how many
times he stabbed the victim and what parts of the latter’s body had been hit.
The first episode inside the hut had been completed with the protagonist, the
victim, and the petitioner reconciled. The second episode commenced inside the
hut and continued outside, and ended with the petitioner stabbing the victim
several times.
The trial and the appellate courts gave no credence and probative weight to the
testimony of the petitioner. So do we.
First. The findings of fact of the trial court and its conclusions based on the said
findings are accorded by this Court high respect, if not conclusive effect, especially
when affirmed by the CA. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court
of having been able to observe, at close range, the demeanor and behavior of the
witnesses as they testify. This rule, however, is inapplicable if the trial court ignored,
overlooked, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered,
will alter or reverse the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records and
found no justification for a reversal of the findings of the trial court and its
conclusions based thereon.
Second. The victim sustained six hack wounds and one lacerated wound. This is
gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Pura Uy, to wit:
FINDINGS: The victim lies in supine position, stocky in built; his clothing completely
soaked with fresh blood.
CHEST:
(+) stab wound 2 inches below the L nipple 4 inches deep running medially to the
anterior median line.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the L of the anterior median line at the level of the L
nipple 5½ inches deep running posteriorly.
(+) stab wound 1 inch above the L nipple 4 inches deep running inferomedially.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the left of the anterior median line 4 inches deep running
inferoposteriorly.
(+) stab wound 1 inch to the right of the anterior median line at the level of the
second right intercostal space 0.5 inch in depth.
(+) stab wound ½ inch to the right of the anterior median line at the level of the
xyphoid process 3½ inches deep running superiorly.
(+) stab wound at the level of the L nipple L anterior axillary line 4½ inches in depth
running superiorly to the left armpit.
(+) hack wound at the left armpit 3 inches long injuring the muscles and the blood
vessels.
(+) lacerated wound on the left palm almost cutting off the proximal phalanx of the
left thumb.23
Five of the wounds of the victim on his chest were fatal. 24 The victim also sustained a
stab wound on the left buttock. According to the doctor, it was unlikely for the
victim to have survived even with medical attention.25 After the doctor made her
initial autopsy and submitted her report, she noted that the victim sustained a stab
wound of about two inches deep at the left buttock, thus:
Q In this medico-legal report, you indicated that the cause of death of the victim is
"Hypovolemic shock 2º to multiple stab wounds, chest." Will you please explain this?
A "Ito pong nakalagay o dahilan ng pagkamatay ng biktima sa sobrang natapon na
dugo gawa ng maraming saksak na tinamo ng biktima sa kanyang dibdib ang
nagbigay ng daan sa kanyang kamatayan."
Q Will you please tell us, Dr. Uy, if there is one amont (sic) these lesions that is
located at the back of the victim?
A I forgot to tell you that a day after I submitted the report, the funeral parlor which
attended the victim has called my attention because of the wound at the back of the
victim and I attended immediately to see these lesions at the home of the victim. I
reviewed for (sic) these lesions and I saw one lesion located at the left buttock of the
victim.
Q What is the nature of the injury?
A Stab wound, about two inches deep.
Q By the nature of the lesion, is it not fatal?
A It is not that fatal.
Q In your expert opinion, by the nature of the wound sustained by the victim, what
could have been the relative position of the victim in relation to his assailant?
A Based on my examination, I think the victim and the assailant were facing each
other. "Masyadong malapit."
Q How many fatal wounds have (sic) the victim sustained in his chest?
A Five fatal stab wounds on the chest.26
Considering the number, nature and location of the wounds sustained by the victim,
the petitioner’s plea of self-defense is incredible.27 It bears stressing that the
petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the buttock and insisted that he
stabbed the victim frontally:
Q As a matter of fact, he sustained an injury at the back of his buttock (pigi) and
when he faced you, you stabbed him again several times?
A That is not true, Sir.
Q But you are admitting that you stabbed him several times frontally?
A Yes, Sir, because I am (sic) defending myself.
Q You also stabbed him in his left armpit?
A I don’t know, Sir.
Q But you knew that you stabbed him in his buttock?
A No, Sir.
Q After stabbing him several times and felt that he was already dead, you already
left the place?
A Yes, Sir.28
The testimony of the petitioner is belied by the physical evidence on record. The
settled rule is that physical evidence is evidence of the highest order; it speaks
more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.29
Third. The petitioner threw away his knife and failed to surrender it to the
policemen; neither did he inform the policemen that he killed the victim in self-
defense. The petitioner’s claim that the victim was armed with a bolo is hard to
believe because he even failed to surrender the bolo.30
Fourth. The petitioner’s version of the events that transpired immediately before he
stabbed the victim does not inspire belief. He claims that when he saw the victim
emerged from the hut, the victim walked towards the petitioner saying, "Kung
hindi lang kita inaanak," but hit and hacked the latter on the left buttock.31 As
gleaned from his statement, the victim was not disposed, much less determined to
assault the petitioner. And yet, the petitioner insists that without much ado, the
victim, nevertheless, hit him on the head and on the thigh with his bolo.
Fifth. According to the petitioner, the victim warned him three times before leaving
the hut, "May mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas." The petitioner
testified that shortly before the victim uttered these words, the latter even touched
the blade of the bolo to see if it was sharp.32 The petitioner was, thus, aware of the
peril to his life if he followed the victim. The petitioner, nevertheless, followed the
victim and left the hut after the victim had gone barely ten meters. He should have
waited until after the victim had already gone far from the hut before going home
to avoid any untoward incident.
Sixth. The petitioner presented his brother-in-law Ruben Dulay to corroborate his
testimony that the victim stabbed the petitioner and that this impelled the latter to
stab the former. But the testimony of Dulay contradicted the testimony of the
petitioner:
Q When Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac several times, he immediately fell to
the ground and was fatal[ly] wounded, immediately died because of several stabs
and lay (sic) down?
A I did not see that scene because Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac, I turn (sic)
back upon seeing Leon Lumasac hack Exequiel Senoja, I turn (sic) back because I was
afraid then. When I turn (sic) back I saw them embracing each other, Sir.
Q And that is the time when Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac?
A I did not see the stabbing. What I only saw was that they were embracing each
other, Sir.
Q So you are now changing your answer, you actually saw Exequiel Senoja stabbing
Leon Lumasac several times, after he was hack[ed] by Leon Lumasac?
A I did not see that Exequiel Senoja stab Leon Lumasac, Sir.33
Seventh. The bare fact that the petitioner sustained a five-centimeter wound at the
left temporal region and an eight-centimeter hack wound on the anterior portion of
his right thigh does not preclude the fact that he was the unlawful aggressor; nor
buttress his plea that he acted in self-defense. The petitioner failed to inform the
doctor that he sustained the wounds to defend himself. Moreover, the doctor A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.
testified that the wounds the petitioner sustained were slight: Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case?
Pros. Ronquillo: A Yes, Sir.
Q Does (sic) the wound at the right anterior thigh vertical, diagonal or what? Q Where?
A I did not place it, Sir. A Here, Sir.
Q So, you don’t know? And Witness is pointing to his left head.
A It is vertical, Sir, but I did not place it on the record. And the hack wound on the Q Where else?
temporal region is oblique. A (His) right thigh.
Q Were the injuries only slight? Q In what place did this incident happen?
A Yes, Sir. A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.
Q So, it is (sic) possible that these injuries were self-inflicted? Q What is his real name?
A Probably, Sir, but I cannot comment on that. A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.36
Q You said that the patient was under the influence of alcohol? Would you say that
the patient was then so drunk at that time? But then, after the said incident, the petitioner and the victim had reconciled. We
A When I saw him at that time, he was moderately drunk.34 agree with the following findings of the appellate court:
The doctor gave the petitioner due medications for 30 minutes and the petitioner
then went home: The question that must be resolved is whether or not the victim was the unlawful
Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim in this case Mr. Leon aggressor as the appellant’s testimony pictures him to be. The Court rules in the
Lumasac? negative. The victim had already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it.
A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir. There is no showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware that appellant was
Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case? following him, or that the appellant called out to him so that he (the victim) had to
A Yes, Sir. turn around and notice him. It is clear that at that point in time, the victim was
Q Where? simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was the
A Here, Sir. appellant who, smarting from the earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him
And Witness is pointing to his left head. "hindi ka tatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi
Q Where else? ngayon, bukas" repeated three times, wanted a confrontation. Appellant stabbed
A (His) right thigh. or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when
Q In what place did this incident happen? the latter turned around, successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit
A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir. and chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine (9) wounds.
Q What is his real name?
A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.35 It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon Lumasac had ceased
If, as claimed by the petitioner, the victim stabbed him frontally, it is incredible that being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was
the victim was able to hack the anterior part of his right thigh. now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation. It bears
Eighth. The testimony of the petitioner that the victim stabbed him outside the hut mentioning that appellant contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the reason
on the left side of his head and the anterior portion of his right thigh is belied by why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon and the second reason was that he
his testimony on direct examination that the victim stabbed him while still inside was going home.
the hut of Reguyal:
Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim in this case Mr. Leon
Lumasac?
As for appellant’s injuries, it is clear that they were sustained in the course of the
victim’s attempt to defend himself as shown by the lacerated wound on the
victim’s left palm, a defensive wound.37
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107874 August 4, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GEORGE DECENA y ROCABERTE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Aquilino P. Bolinas for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
It is said that a fool shows his annoyance at once, but a prudent man overlooks an
insult. 1 Had herein accused-appellant George Decena reflected upon and
hearkened to this biblical precept, he would not have found himself charged with
murder for allegedly stabbing to death one Jaime Ballesteros in San Fabian,
Pangasinan on — of all dates — December 25, 1990. 2
Appellant thereafter stood trial on a plea of not guilty. On September 20, 1991,
judgment was rendered by the trial court convicting him of murder, imposing on
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00, plus the additional amounts of
P4,500.00 and P2,300.00 representing the funeral expenses for the victim, with
costs. 3
A motion for reconsideration filed by appellant was denied on August 26, 1992 for
lack of merit, 4 hence this appellate review wherein appellant contends, in his
assigned errors, that the lower court blundered in disregarding his claim of self-
defense, and in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor, granting arguendo that he is guilty. 5
The case for the prosecution, anchored mainly on the testimony of Luzviminda
Ballesteros, a 14-year old daughter of the victim, is to the effect that on Christmas
Day of 1990, at around 4:00 P.M., said Luzviminda was playing with her siblings at
home. She recalled being asked by her mother, Teresita Ballesteros, to fetch her
father, Jaime Ballesteros, who was then watching a game in the basketball court.
On her way to the hardcourt, Luzviminda met her father walking home in an
intoxicated state. Suddenly, she saw appellant rushing towards her father with a
long bladed weapon, prompting Luzviminda to warn her father to run for safety by
shouting in the vernacular "Batik kila, Tatay!" Instead, Jaime simply raised his hand,
thus allowing appellant to stab him on the right chest just below the nipple.
Appellant then fled from the crime scene, while the victim also managed to run but
stumbled and fell to the ground. 6
Finding that her father was too heavy for her to carry, Luzviminda called for her
mother at their house, which was only fifteen meters away from the scene of the
crime, saying: "Mother, come! My father has been stabbed by George Decena." Her
mother immediately called for a tricycle and rushed Jaime to the Provincial
Hospital where, however, the victim was declared dead on arrival. 7
A different account of the incident was presented by the defense. It was claimed
that at about 4:00 P.M. of that day, appellant was watching a basketball game. The
victim, Jaime Ballesteros, went around the basketball court, walking in a wobbly
manner due to drunkenness. Jaime stopped near the place where appellant was
sitting and, for no apparent reason, held the latter by the neck with one arm and,
at the same time, poking a fork against it with the other arm. Barangay
Tanod Romeo Decena who was also watching the basketball game, intervened. He
took the fork from Jaime and advised appellant to go home. The latter left and was
followed later by Jaime.
Fernando Biala, an uncle of appellant, additionally testified that while he was
walking on the barangay road of Longos-Patalan, he chanced upon Jaime attacking
appellant with a balisong. Fortunately, he claims, appellant was able to parry the
stabbing blow and a struggle ensued between them. Appellant overpowered Jaime
and succeeded in twisting the wrist of the victim and thrusting the knife into the
latter's body. 8
In criminal cases, the burden of proof is, of course, on the prosecution which must
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Herein
appellant, however, invokes self-defense, thereby shifting the burden of evidence
to him and the onus of which he must satisfactorily discharge, otherwise conviction
would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. 9 Furthermore, appellant
must this time rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, for even if that was weak, it cannot be disbelieved after
appellant himself admitted the killing. 10
The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there
was an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. It must be
positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked attack that
placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or less
severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist
said attack. 11 The primal issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not appellant
acted in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros, as claimed, thus
absolving him from criminal liability.
Long has it been accepted that for the right of defense to exist, it is necessary that
one be assaulted or that he be attacked, or at least that he be threatened with an
attack in an immediate manner, as, for example, brandishing a knife with which to
stab him or pointing a gun to be discharged against him. 12 So indispensable is
unlawful aggression in self-defense that, without it, there is no occasion to speak of
the other two requisites for such a defense because both circumstances
presuppose an unlawful aggression.
The theory of the defense is that the unlawful aggression started in the basketball
court, when the victim tried to poke a fork on the neck of appellant, and continued
thereafter. Even on the elementary rule that when the aggressor leaves, the
unlawful aggression ceases, it follows that when appellant and Jaime heeded the
advice of the barangay tanod for them to go home, the unlawful aggression had
ended. Consequently, since unlawful aggression no longer existed, appellant had
no right whatsoever to kill or even wound the former aggressor. The supposed
continuation of the unlawful aggression which could have justified self-defense
would have been the circumstance that Jaime persisted in his design to attack
appellant while the latter was already in front of his house. This fact, however, the
defense ruefully failed to establish.
It is an old but a respected and consistent rule that courts must determine by a
balance of probabilities who of the participants in a fight had, in the natural order
of things, the reason to commence the aggression. 13 When appellant claimed that
Jaime suddenly and without any provocation tried to strangle him and poked a
fork against his neck, in front of so many people in the basketball court, 14 then he
must necessarily have been deeply offended, if not insulted, and this fact
undoubtedly fired him with a desire to get even with the deceased.
The case at bar calls to mind the scenario and logical view that when a person had
inflicted slight physical injuries on another, without any intention to inflict other
injuries, and the latter attacked the former, the one making the attack was an
unlawful aggressor. The attack made was evidently a retaliation. And, we find this
an opportune occasion to emphasize that retaliation is different from an act of self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In
self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or
disabled by the person making a defense. 15 We find these observations apropos to
the situation presented by the instant case.
It will be recalled that, as claimed by appellant, the unlawful aggression
complained of also took place in front of his house, where Jaime allegedly tried to
attack him with a balisong, and not only in the basketball court. To support his
theory of continuing aggression, appellant alleged that whenever the victim was
drunk, he would look for trouble. Again, the defense utterly failed to prove this
hypothesis. On the contrary, the wife of the victim testified that the latter has no
such record in their barangay 16 and, significantly, her said testimony was never
refuted nor objected to by appellant.
Witnesses for and against the appellant testified that throughout the incident
Jaime was inebriated and that he was staggering or wobbling as he walked. 17 If he
had such difficulty even in performing the normal bodily function of locomotion, it
could not be expected that he would muster enough courage to persist in
attacking and attempting to kill appellant, as posited by the defense, considering
that the latter was decidedly stronger than him.
Essentially involved, in view of the conflicting submissions of the parties, is the
matter of the credibility of their respective witnesses. Accordingly, we are
constrained to once again advert to the jurisprudential rule that the evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court which is better
circumstanced because of its direct role in the reception of the testimonial
evidence. 18 After examining and evaluating the conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense, we agree with the court a quo that the prosecution's
account is deserving of more credence. On the other hand, we note grave
inconsistencies in the declarations of the defense witnesses.
First. Appellant, in his direct examination, testified that a fork was poked at his neck
but, on cross-examination, he vacillated and testified that it was a knife
instead.19 Surely, appellant must know the difference between a fork and a knife.
Second. Appellant insisted that after the stabbing incident in the late afternoon of
December 25, 1990 and until his surrender early next morning,
he never went out of his house. This is contradicted by the unchallenged Entry No.
173 of the local police blotter, especially its follow-up entry which the court below
quoted in its decision:
Relative entry no. 173, elements of this station proceeded to Barangay Longos this
town to locate the suspect and returned station with the information that said
suspect fled after the incident. One deformed
fork submitted by the father of the suspect Francisco Decena to Sgt. R.B. Diagan
allegedly owned by the victim. Under follow-up. Sgd. Ricardo Abrio, Pfc/PNP. 20
Third. Appellant's smug excuse for not immediately divulging to
Sgt. Romeo Diagan that he was not at fault for the death of Jaime was that he was
terribly afraid to do so. Strangely, however, this was not his demeanor and attitude
when he boldly professed and contended that it was Jaime who first poked a fork
against his neck while he was watching a basketball game. Parenthetically, the
other half of the story was deliberately not narrated. 21 Be that as it may, the Court
has heretofore noted that a righteous individual will not cower but would readily
admit the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were legally and morally justified
in doing so. A belated plea or denial suggests that it is false and only an
afterthought made as a last ditch effort to avoid the consequences of the crime. 22
Fourth. The supposed eyewitness of the defense who is appellant's uncle, Fernando
Biala, impresses us as either an imaginative or a coached witness. He avowed that
he saw the stabbing incident, but shock and surprise allegedly prevented him from
going near Jaime or appellant, when he saw Jaime about to stab appellant.
However, on cross-examination, he said that he merely chanced on them at the
time when Jaime was already actually stabbingappellant, for the reason that he did
not see where appellant or Jaime came from before the incident. When asked how
long the fight transpired, he vaguely answered that he could not tell because when
he went up the road, the two were already fighting. However, he again vacillated by
saying that when Jaime was about to deliver the stabbing blow, appellant caught
the hand of Jaime "squeezed and pushed it forward and Jaime Ballesteros hit
himself." 23This is a mercurial account since, to repeat, this witness categorically
admitted that even as he was still going up the road, the supposed combatants
were already fighting and that fight actually lasted only a few seconds.
Appellant declared that he is related to the victim's wife, that they are neighbors,
and that there was no grudge between him and the victim, nor with any member
of the family of the latter. 24 This was apparently to bolster his theory that he had
no motive to assault the victim. His assertions, however, work both ways for it also
established the fact that Luzviminda would likewise not just indiscriminately and
improvidently point her finger at anybody but to the culprit himself, in order to
obtain justice for the death of her father.
That the principal witness is the victim's daughter even lends more credence to her
testimony as her natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would
deter her from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise the latter
would thereby gain immunity. 25 This observation, however, could not be said for
the defense witnesses who are all relatives of appellant. As such, they may be
expected to cover up for the crime. While relationship between the accused and his
witnesses is not necessarily detrimental to the former's line of defense, this
relationship, taken together with the want of logic (of) in the declarations of said
witnesses, yields the conclusion that their testimonies lack credibility. 26
In contrast, and further reinforcing the case for the People, is the fact that when
Luzviminda shouted, "Mother, come! My father has been stabbed by George
Decena," that outcry and the identification of the culprit were unrehearsed and
spontaneously made at the spur of the moment. Having been given shortly after a
startling occurrence took place before the eyes of Luzviminda, who had thereby no
opportunity to concoct or contrive a story, that statement has all the earmarks of
the truth of what she said. Under the environmental circumstances hereinbefore
related, it easily passes the tests not only of admissibility in evidence but also of
weight in its veracity.
We, however, reject the trial court's holding that the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery. Any circumstance which would qualify a killing to murder
must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. 27 Here, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated, for none of the prosecution's
arguments can uphold its allegation that, in the language of the law, appellant
committed the crime by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tended directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It is true
that the attack was sudden, but that fact per se does not bespeak the circumstance
of alevosia. 28 It is further required that the means, methods or forms were
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. 29 The crime committed,
therefore, was simple homicide.
The reasons advanced by the lower court for appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of age are not persuasive. There was no showing that
appellant deliberately intended to insult the age of Jaime. We hold that for this
circumstance to constitute an aggravation of criminal liability, it is necessary to
prove the specific fact or circumstance, other than that the victim is an old man,
showing insult or disregard of age in order that it may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. 30 In the case at bar, that consideration does not obtain,
aside from the fact that while the victim was forty-three years of age, he was not
necessarily old, nor was there a radical disparity between his age and that of
appellant who was twenty-five years old.
The rule is that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may properly be
appreciated if the following requisites concur: (a) the offender had not actually
been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
an agent of a person in authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. We believe
that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be awarded to
appellant. The records disclose that appellant was, evidently with his concurrence,
accompanied and surrendered by his father to a person in authority, Sgt. Romeo
Diagan, early in the morning after the incident and before he could actually be
arrested. That mitigating circumstance can, therefore, be properly considered in his
favor to impose the penalty in its minimum period.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby MODIFIED by
finding accused-appellant George Decena y Rocaberte guilty of the crime of
homicide, and imposing upon him an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In all other respects, the said judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128359 December 6, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
For automatic review is the decision, dated 27 November 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Cabanatuan City, which has sentenced to
death Roberto E. de la Cruz for "Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition with Homicide."
The information charging the accused with the offense, to which he pled "not
guilty" when arraigned, read:
"That on or about the 27th day of May, 1996, in the City of Cabanatuan,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of one DANIEL MACAPAGAL, by shooting the latter with the use of an
unlicensed Caliber .38 snub nose firearm, with Serial No. 120958, thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on different parts of his body, which
caused also his death."1
The facts relied upon by the trial court in its judgment were narrated by the
Office of the Solicitor General in the People’s brief.
"The victm Daniel Macapagal, a married man, had been a live-in partner of
prosecution witness Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio for about two to three years
before San Antonio took appellant Roberto de la Cruz, widower, as lover and
live-in partner. At the time of the incident on May 27, 1996, appellant and San
Antonio were living in a house being rented by San Antonio at 094 Valino
District, Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City (pp. 2-3, TSN, July 6, 1996).
"At around 6:00 o’clock in the evening on May 27, 1996, San Antonio and
appellant were resting in their bedroom when they heard a car stop in front of
their house and later knocks on their door. San Antonio opened the front door
and she was confronted by Macapagal who made his way inside the house
holding a gun in his hand, despite San Antonio’s refusal to let him in. He
seemed to be looking for something or somebody as Macapagal walked
passed San Antonio and inspected the two opened bedrooms of the house. He
then went to the close bedroom where the appellant was and banged at the
door with his gun while yelling ‘Come out. Come out’ (p. 4, Ibid.). Appellant
then opened the door but he was greeted by Macapagal’s gun which was
pointed at him. Appellant immediately closed the door while Macapagal
continued banging at it. When appellant again opened the door moments later,
he was himself armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The two at that instant
immediately grappled for each other’s firearm. A few moments later shots were
heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor.
"Appellant told San Antonio to call the police on the phone. After a few minutes
police officers arrived at the scene. They saw the dead body of Macapagal
slumped on the floor holding a gun. San Antonio met them on the door and
appellant was by then sitting. He stood up to pick his .38 caliber revolver which
he surrendered to SPO3 Felix Castro, Jr. Appellant told the police that he shot
Macapagal in self-defense and went with them to the police station.
Dr. Jun Concepcion, Senior Medical Officer of the Cabanatuan City General
Hospital, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Macapagal and submitted a
report thereon (Exhibit H). Macapagal sustained four (4) gunshot wounds.
Three of the wounds were non-penetrating or those that did not penetrate a
vital organ of the human body. They were found in the upper jaw of the left
side of the face, below the left shoulder and the right side of the waist. Another
gunshot wound on the left side of the chest penetrated the heart and killed
Macapagal instantly.
It was later found by the police that the firearm used by Macapagal was a 9mm
caliber pistol. It had one magazine loaded with twelve (12) live ammunition but
an examination of the gun showed that its chamber was not loaded.
"Macapagal had a license to carry said firearm. On the other hand, appellant,
who denied ownership of the .38 caliber revolver he used, had no license
therefore."2
Unmoved by the claim of self-defense invoked by the accused, the trial court
pronounced a judgment of guilt and handed a death sentence.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so declares the
accused ROBERTO DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition with Homicide,
which is penalized under Presidential Decree 1866, Sec. 1, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer death; he is, likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim in the sum of P50,000.00; to pay actual damages in the sum
of P65,000.00 representing burial and interment expenses; and the sum of
P2,865,600.00 representing loss of income."3
In his plea to this Court, accused-appellant submits that the decision of the
court a quo is bereft of factual and legal justification.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
show that the killing has been legally justified.4 Having owned the killing of the
victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the court the
elements of self-defense in order that the might be able to rightly avail himself
of the extenuating circumstance.5He must discharge this burden by clear and
convincing evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be
excused mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. Self-
defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured
or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.6 All these conditions must concur.7
Here, the Court scarcely finds reversible error on the part of the trial court in
rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose
an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and
limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude8 - but most
importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. True, the victim barged into the house of accused-appellant and
his live-in partner and, banging at the master bedroom door with his firearm, he
yelled, "come out." Accused-appellant, however, upon opening the door and
seeing the victim pointing a gun at him, was able to prevent at this stage harm
to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead,
accused-appellant, taking his .38 caliber revolver, again opened the bedroom
door and, brandishing his own firearm, forthwith confronted the victim. At this
encounter, accused-appellant would be quite hardput to still claim self-
defense.9
The second element of self-defense would demand that the means employed
to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and necessary. The number
of the wounds sustained by the deceased in this case would negate the
existence of this indispensable component of self-defense.10 The autopsy report
would show that the victim sustained four gunshot wounds –
"1. Gunshot wound on the (L) shoulder as point of entry with trajectory toward
the (L) supra-scapular area as point to exit (through-through);
"2. Gunshot wound on the abdomen ® side laterally as point of entry (+) for
burned gun powder superficially with trajectory towards on the same side as
point of exit, through-through;
"3. Gunshot wound on the anterior chest (L) mid-clavicular line, level 5th ICS
as point of entry with trajectory towards the (L) flank as point of exit (through-
through) Internally: penetrating the heart (through-through) anterior then
posterior then (L) hemidia –prhagm and stomach; and
"4. Lacerated wound linear ½ inch in length (L) cheek area"11 -
which would, in fact, indicate a determined effort to kill.12
It would be essential, finally, for self-defense to be aptly invoked that there be
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
When accused-appellant, opening the bedroom door the second time
confronted, instead of merely taking precautionary measures against, the
victim with his own gun he had taken from the cabinet, accused-appellant
could no longer correctly argue that there utterly was no provocation on his
part.
The elements of illegal possession of firearm are (1) the existence of the
subject firearm, (2) the ownership or possession of the firearm, and (3) the
absence of the corresponding license therefor.13
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have animus possidendi in the use
and possession of the .38 caliber revolver since he has used it for just a
"fleeting moment" to defend himself. This assertion is not supported by the
evidence. Apparently, the subject revolver has all the while been kept in the
house of accused-appellant and his live-in partner. Accused-appellant himself
has thusly testified:
"Q: When for the first time did you see that firearm inside the drawer of Candy?
"A: Since the last week of April, sir.
"Q: Did you ask Candy why she was in possession of that gun?
"A: Once I opened her drawer and I asked her who owns that gun, sir.
"Q: And what was her reply as to who owns that gun?
"A: According to her that firearm was used as payment by a group of persons
who were her customers at the Videoke, sir.
"Q: And what else did Candy tell you about that firearm, if you know?
"A: She also told me that we can use that gun for protection, sir."14
The trial court has erred, however, in imposing the death penalty on accused-
appellant. Presidential Decree No. 1866 is already amended by Republic Act
1âwphi 1
No. 8294. Section 1, third paragraph, of the amendatory law provides that "if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." The provision is clear, and there would be no need to still
belabor the matter.15
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in
favor of accused-appellant. Immediately following the shooting incident, he
instructed his live-in partner to call the police and report the incident. He waited
for the arrival of the authorities and readily acknowledge before them his
having been responsible for the shooting of the victim.16
The aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm being
effectively offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,17 the
penalty prescribed by law for the offense should be imposed in its medium
period.18 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty
of reclusion temporal in the crime of homicide, the range of which is twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal, i.e., from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor,
anywhere in its range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.
The amount of P2,865,600.00 awarded by the trial court as damages for loss C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946
of earning capacity should be modified. The testimony of the victim’s surviving
spouse, Marina Villa Juan Macapagal, on the earning capacity of her husband THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Daniel Macapagal sufficiently established the basis for making possible such vs.
an award.19 The deceased was 44 years old at the time of his death in 1996, NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
with a gross monthly income of P9,950.00.20 In accordance with the American AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases21 decided by this Court,
the loss of his earning capacity should be calculated thusly: Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..
Net (50% of
Gross DE JOYA, J.:
earning life less living gross
= x annual
capacity expectancy expenses income
income
(x) annual) Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was
or acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months
2(80-44)
[119,400.00 - and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days
(x) = x
59,700.00] of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to
3
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000,
x = 24 x 59,700.00 and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the
period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
x = P1,432,800.00
=========== From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the
Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10,
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant 1944, claimed —
ROBERTO DELA CRUZ y ESGUERRA is hereby held guilty of HOMICIDE
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, an aggravating circumstance that is (1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and he is acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that she should be
accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years and one completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. The award of P2,865,600.00 for loss of (2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional
earning is reduced to P1,432,800.00. In other respects, the judgment of the mitigating circumstances that (a) she did not have the intention to
trial court is AFFIRMED. commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she
voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and
In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be credited with the full
time of his preventive detention if they have agreed voluntarily and in writing to (3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the
abide the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners pursuant alleged offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. having been committed in a sacred place.

SO ORDERED. The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has
sufficiently established the following facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased
Amado Capina lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of
Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by defendant
and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been
courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before
that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her,
bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being washed by her cousin,
Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house,
Amado approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused,
and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts,
on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped
Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself,
until the following morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then,
she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for
self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of
defendant and appellant, and surreptitiously entered the room where she was
sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She
immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought
them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in
Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for
forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her
husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not
realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant,
Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's
parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the
misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them
to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that
Amado had been falsely boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties
with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her and that if
he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina again
received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942,
Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which he
was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his
house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar
with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro
Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were electric lights.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious services, and
sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was
seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of
Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was
sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the
greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On
observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina,
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with
her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her
dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized
Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and
stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him
a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas
Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding
and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still holding the
bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and
answering him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado
Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro
Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her
why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang
bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly,
"I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate,
barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and
appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to
admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That father and
daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the
barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and
when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and
questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately
surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly
of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts and
conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and went with said
policemen to the police headquarters, where her written statements were
taken, and which were presented as a part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble
they may be, is universal. It has been entertained and has existed in all
civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a
virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives
and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their
honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all
reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances.
Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to
womanhood, as in the days of chivalry. There is a country where women freely
go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public gardens, they
always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the
legitimate defense of our own person, we have the right to property acquired
by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony (1
Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to
put her in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot
but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very existence;
and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing
cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left
for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal,
5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing
her aggressor, in the defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed
the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail,
holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without revealing his
identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that
she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, she was
considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in repelling what she
believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since
she had no other means of defending herself, and consequently exempt from
all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting
wounds on her assailant with a bolo which she happened to be carrying at the
time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people
nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place,
while she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of
making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by
someone touching her arm, and, believing that some person was attempting to
abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply, attacked
and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding
the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or
aggression to justify her completely in using deadly weapon. Although she
actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not
completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person,
who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his wife, did
not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her
honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when
the latter climbed up her house late at night on September 15, 1942, and
surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her,
as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for
help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the
authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned
trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and
appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and placed his
hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said
chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people,
about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio
lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped.
And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his
neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death
a few moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor
was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case,
she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and
unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting
having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and agreed to go
to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the
said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza,
12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before,
and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or
temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating
circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the
deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as
shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this
is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor
(United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the
offense was committed by the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating
circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious
worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the
defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel
that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under
the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of our
country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world
where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now
drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear,
therefore, to be well taken; and so is the first assignment of error to a certain
degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the
circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered
in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty
to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant
case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal
consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391;
United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its
medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently,
with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant
Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four
months, and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado
Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit
of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered
confiscated. So ordered..
Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., concurring:
In past dissenting and concurring opinions my view regarding the validity or
nullity of judicial proceedings in the Japanese-sponsored courts which
functioned in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation has been
consistent. I am not abandoning it. But in deference to the majority who sustain
the opposite view, and because no party litigant herein has raised the
question, I have taken part in the consideration of this case on the merits. And,
voting on the merits, I concur in the foregoing decision penned by Justice De
Joya.

The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide;
and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the
instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of