G.R. No.
127325 March 19, 1997 exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments
or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established
all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it
is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed,
be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI,7Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition
is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE
VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally
filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication
of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in
three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol
ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground
that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which
petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee
on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle
II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in
the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that
law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative
on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to
provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor
any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would
entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180
million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides,
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition.
They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN
AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING
THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO
REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING
GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE
LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC.
12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT
 IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN
G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign
to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the
day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution
because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a
plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same
as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed
that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted
the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed
him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear
to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the
State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and
local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as
many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of
political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good
performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file
the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the
petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is
the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources
of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role
in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition
and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative
to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress
or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN
to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
in Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence
in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing
or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
 On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of
the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions
in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time,
their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an
urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of
man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and
the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by
setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as
follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This
is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may
I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments
to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass
the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to
the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through
the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that
five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise
of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to be carried out —
is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature
rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification
through the process of an initiative.
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent
power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a
lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection
in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede
to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover
all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative
is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which
is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account
the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the
proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that
it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to
the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1.
So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment
to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved
by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and
the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal,
by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article
was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph
of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A.
No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through
the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment
by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried
out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House
of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which
dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article
X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate
Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and
by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national
laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit
the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions
of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph
(c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative
on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of
Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves
no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we
quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane
to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c)
of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called
for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both
national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative
on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may
be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number
of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe
the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on
the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should
not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders
the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No.
5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has
no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments
to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with
the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the
legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation. 1 Stated otherwise, intent is the
essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history
of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 215053 and Senate Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No.
17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions
and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative
Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5expressly included people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship
remarks:6
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional basis of the proposed
measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced by the 1935
Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, the
1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang
Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between the Legislature and
the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration
in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the
people and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress; however, to
institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the people, through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers since
reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same Article mandates Congress to
pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers
with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of
the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed on Congress to
implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the
beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the
Local Government Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes,
decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations
of the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and
referendum are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the subject which he will
later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the instant Bill among
which are the constitutions of states in the United States which recognize the right of registered voters
to initiate the enactment of any statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum.
These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum
apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures, which are likewise incorporated in House
Bill No. 21505. He added that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the
requirements of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to electors
are substantially similar to the provisions in American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners
saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature
show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an
opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws which are
necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as advocated in House Bill
No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of
the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once
every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by Congress; and the initiative to amend local
ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on measures that they have
approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by
presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the signing of said petition by at least
10 percent of the total of registered voters at which every legislative district is represented by at least
three percent of the registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC
shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within
45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required number of votes, it shall
become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot ignore the people's
call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech together with the footnotes
be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the Constitution was
stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador Escudero III in his sponsorship
remarks, viz:7
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever
since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial segment of the population
feels, he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution, and requested
that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be
made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited Constitutional
provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition among cause-oriented
 and sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in
forming an enlightened public opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the
Bill will also give street parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic forum,
he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so that it can be
initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House Bill No. 21505 will show
that the Members can set aside their personal and political consideration for the greater good of the
people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a
Bicameral Conference Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989, 9 the members
agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated version should include
people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript
of the meeting states:
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman Roco upon
interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. The record of the House Representative states: 11
xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill
No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the
bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and the House Representatives
correctly provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.

CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because this is new in our political system, MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
the Senate decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to the local government units
because even with that stage where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It has been attempted
on a national basis. Alright. There has not been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And, THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
second, we consider also that it is only fair that the local legislative body should be given a chance to
adopt the legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect system of initiative. If after all, the MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
local legislative assembly or body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any reason for
initiative, ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that there should be some limitation on the frequency THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please proceed.
with which it should be applied. Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance
that is beyond the scope of authority of the local legislative body, otherwise, my God, mag-aassume MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
sila ng power that is broader and greater than the grant of legislative power to the Sanggunians. And version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
Number 5, because of that, then a proposition which has been the result of a successful initiative can
only carry the force and effect of an ordinance and therefore that should not deprive the court of its
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the
jurisdiction to declare it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of
House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.
local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence namin, so we concentrated on that. And that
is why . . . so ang sa inyo naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the Constitution eh . . .
national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that, alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated?
statute. Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, and magiging basic nito, let
us not discuss anymore kung alin and magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
it is the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills
approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan. MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin amendment and national legislation.
na consolidation of both bills.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill No. so and so. 10

MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution
whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can
be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)

MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I said earlier, ironically was about
local, provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section
5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states
that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the
1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker. Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

APPROVAL OF C.C.R. It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505 its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to the
(The Initiative and Referendum Act) Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy
thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be expected for
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505. legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or
in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved. the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente
Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use
of inapt or inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to amend the
ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature. We have
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the
letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is susceptible
literal meaning of the words used.
of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent
of the legislature will be adopted. 12
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium.
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement
Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to
of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to
reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is
very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses. 14
replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or
spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly
disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the
law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee
Yorac, then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means
can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard — the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance
of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law,
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances,
and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating
the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy
of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed
by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the
delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law
states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how initiative
proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for
initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment
takes effect 23 and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these
standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out
the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is
to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In
enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law
implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will
show that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that the rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking
another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response
to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the legislature over
the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the amendment) is submitted to the
people,' it could authorize another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the COMELEC,
for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it
will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by
the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition
against the legislature is to impair the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the
Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of
initiative or to delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation.
As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard,
the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from
constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders of the military
commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to any order. But the
Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They
were parts of a single program and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption
by Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations themselves followed
a standard authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of protecting military resources in the
designated areas against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law
cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards can
also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or Revisions.
There is thus no reason to hold that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in
other cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards such as "simplicity and
dignity," 30 "public interest," 31 "public welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and
equity,"34 "adequate and efficient instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater national
interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and
"promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and respect to the
legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from
refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The
inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at bar
started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the
petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The
petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed
by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the
Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization
was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist
from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On December 19,
1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative
to amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against
the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without
equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation
of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part
of the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can
trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution strengthening the
sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas
are participating in the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says their right
cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise
of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos
Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom of
speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of
speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the
Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are
no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress
and we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that the only constant in life is
change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987 Constitution.
On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of faith in our
Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to
be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few
days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan
City involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of
the tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque
abstraction to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom
in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting
back the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people
who are pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change
into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy
nobody can claim any infallibility.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit,
itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this time would only
be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his
capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a people
initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is explicit. Section
2, Article XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional imperatives, the
petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would
require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal
Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a
right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed themselves.
The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has
taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the
consent of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if
it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves the Court,
I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No.
6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to
directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by the Court at this point
would at best be only a non-binding, albeitpossibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by
the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional
amendments.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and
well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate
to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has given more
significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose,
enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to propose
amendments to the constitution as well.2 To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to
my mind, amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is
based principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and
on their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. [And] [t]his
indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not constitutional amendments, because
constitutional amendments take effect upon ratification not after publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in
providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted
in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose".6The same section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on
the constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the constitution" 7 Paragraph (e)
again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution
is approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of the registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the
implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal
provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever
thereon". 8 That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it was noted:
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill
No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative
and referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and
referendum and the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum an the
Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in
the House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution
to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it five
years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p.
960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and as approved and enacted into law, the
proposal included initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws. 9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other construction as
what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any
action (such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996
[Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents'
petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof
of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is
filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with the required
percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate
petition before the Commission on Elections, any determination of whether private respondents'
proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an
"inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. I,
however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition
for initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported by proof
of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
"initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through initiative,"
there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number
of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an
initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be
amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all
the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify,
abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority
holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when
there is already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is
guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent
to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What
Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes
a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the
right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are
Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative
on the Constitution.1 I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato
S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently
implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en
banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for
initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to
trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735
wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its
Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern
the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,"
not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson
Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama
and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired
from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest,
sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations,
it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The
source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from
exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private
respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be
stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly
believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to
propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free
assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and
persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with
what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the
thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate." 5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum
and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are
institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they
are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to
be used as their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and
faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously
protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but
not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order
issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa
from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders
the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No.
5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has
no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments
to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with
the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the
legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation. 1 Stated otherwise, intent is the
essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history
of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 215053 and Senate Bill No. 17.4 Senate Bill No.
17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions
and Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative
Body." Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5expressly included people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship
remarks:6
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional basis of the proposed
measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced by the 1935
Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, the
1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang
Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between the Legislature and
the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration
in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the
people and all sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress; however, to
institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the people, through the system of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers since
reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same Article mandates Congress to
pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers
with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of
the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed on Congress to
implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the
beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the
Local Government Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes,
decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations
of the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and
referendum are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the subject which he will
later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the instant Bill among
which are the constitutions of states in the United States which recognize the right of registered voters
to initiate the enactment of any statute or to project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum.
These states, he said, are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum
apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures, which are likewise incorporated in House
Bill No. 21505. He added that the procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the
requirements of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to electors
are substantially similar to the provisions in American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political
structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the Constitutional Commissioners
saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature
show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an
opportune time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws which are
necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as advocated in House Bill
No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for the consideration of
the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the Constitution once
every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by Congress; and the initiative to amend local
ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on measures that they have
approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of plebiscite by
presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the signing of said petition by at least
10 percent of the total of registered voters at which every legislative district is represented by at least
three percent of the registered voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC
shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within
45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required number of votes, it shall
become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot ignore the people's
call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech together with the footnotes
be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the Constitution was
stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador Escudero III in his sponsorship
remarks, viz:7
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular democracy ever
since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial segment of the population feels,
he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the
increasingly elitist approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means whereby the people
can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution, and requested
that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be
made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited Constitutional
provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong competition among cause-oriented and
sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming
an enlightened public opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill will also
give street parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so that it can be initially
used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House Bill No. 21505 will show that the
Members can set aside their personal and political consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a
Bicameral Conference Committee.8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989, 9 the members
agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated version should include
people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of
the meeting states:
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because this is new in our political system, the
Senate decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to the local government units because
even with that stage where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It has been attempted on a
national basis. Alright. There has not been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And, second,
we consider also that it is only fair that the local legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the
legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect system of initiative. If after all, the local
legislative assembly or body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any reason for initiative,
ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that there should be some limitation on the frequency with which
it should be applied. Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that is beyond
the scope of authority of the local legislative body, otherwise, my God, mag-aassume sila ng power that
is broader and greater than the grant of legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5, because
of that, then a proposition which has been the result of a successful initiative can only carry the force and
effect of an ordinance and therefore that should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare it null
and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond powers of local government units to enact.
Iyon ang main essence namin, so we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa inyo naman
includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist
on that, alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute. Alright, and we can agree, we
can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill. Logically it should be
ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number
niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng
national at saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman Roco upon
interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. The record of the House Representative states: 11
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill
No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the
bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and the House Representatives
correctly provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the
House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution
whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can
be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I said earlier, ironically was about
local, provincial and municipal legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section
5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states
that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the
1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker. Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

APPROVAL OF C.C.R. It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505 its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to the
(The Initiative and Referendum Act) Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy
thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be expected for
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated bill on Senate Bill laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505. legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or
in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved. the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente
Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use
of inapt or inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to amend the
ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the legislature. We have
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the
letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have also held that where a law is susceptible
literal meaning of the words used.
of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent
of the legislature will be adopted. 12
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium.
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement
Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to
of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to
reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is
very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses. 14
replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or
First, the policy statement declares:
spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly
disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
II
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
 COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee
Yorac, then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 to the COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means
can this delegation of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 17 this Court, thru former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, viz:
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) to fix standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and, without
the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating
the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of
the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized
and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power
to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number
of signatures necessary to start a people's initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition
is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the amendment takes effect 23 and what matters
may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure, these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out the
boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances
under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In enacting R.A. No. 6735,
it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's
initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided
the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure
to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In response
to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the legislature over
the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the amendment) is submitted to
the people,' it could authorize another body to check the proper form. It could also authorize the
COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of petitioners. Davide concluded:
'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to
be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly,
the prohibition against the legislature is to impair the substantive right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce
the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation.
As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the
standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it
can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United States, 29 viz:
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders of the military
commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite to any order. But the
Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be read in isolation from each other. They
were parts of a single program and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an
adoption by Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations themselves
followed a standard authorized by the Executive Order — the necessity of protecting military resources
in the designated areas against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the
law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and standards
can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or
Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are
insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards such as "simplicity
and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31 "public welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and
equity,"34 "adequate and efficient instruction," 35 "public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater national
interest", 38 "protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and
"promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and respect to the
legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from
refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The
inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at bar
started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the
petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The
petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed
by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the
Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization
was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist
from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On December 19,
1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative
to amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against
the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without
equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation
of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part
of the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can
trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution strengthening the
sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas
are participating in the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says their right
cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise
of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos
Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom of
speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of
speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the
Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are
no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress
and we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that the only constant in life is
change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987 Constitution.
On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of faith in our
Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to
be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few
days ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan
City involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of
the tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque
abstraction to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom
in full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting
back the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people
who are pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change
into a sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy
nobody can claim any infallibility.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit,
itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this time would only
be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his
capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a people
initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is explicit. Section
2, Article XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional imperatives, the
petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would
require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal
Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a
right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed themselves.
The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has
taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the
consent of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if
it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves the Court,
I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No.
6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to
directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by the Court at this point
would at best be only a non-binding, albeitpossibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by
the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional
amendments.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and
well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate
to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has given more
significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose,
enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to propose
amendments to the constitution as well.2 To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to
my mind, amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is
based principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and
on their allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. [And] [t]his
indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not constitutional amendments, because
constitutional amendments take effect upon ratification not after publication.3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b) thereof is clear in
providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted
in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.5
In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose".6The same section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on
the constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the constitution" 7 Paragraph (e)
again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution
is approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of the registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be
exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the
implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal
provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless surplusage, and
accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever
thereon". 8 That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it was noted:
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No.
17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both
versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and
the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum an the Constitution and on
national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the
House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution to
enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it five years
in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960;
quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the Constitution. When
consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and as approved and enacted into law, the proposal
included initiative on both the Constitution and ordinary laws.9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other construction as what
petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any action
(such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C
and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents' petition. This is so
because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of procurement of the
required percentage of registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional
requirement.
Thus:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised
only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with the required
percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an appropriate
petition before the Commission on Elections, any determination of whether private respondents' proposal
constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an
"inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. I,
however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for
initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported by proof of strict
compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
"initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through initiative,"
there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number
of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an
initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be
amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all
the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify,
abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority
holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when
there is already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is
guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to
burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What
Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes
a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the
right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 Are
Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on
the Constitution.1 I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently
implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for initiative . . . are
(to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the
voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to trivialize the
effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735
wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B.
Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary
effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations,
it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source
of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from
exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private
respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be
stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly
believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to
propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free
assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and
persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with
what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the
thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate." 5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum
and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are
institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they
are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to
be used as their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and
faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously
protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but
not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order
issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa
from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition
in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections 8 declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus
to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due
course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their
petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification
of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that
the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of
initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group's petition. The supporting intervenors 10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors 11 hold
the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement
for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance
with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving
the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the
people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they
sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are
asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached
to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every
one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove
that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which
allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must
sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts.
Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not
first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of
the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe
orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even
flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger
seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of
the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures
to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described
in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information
so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the
elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote
intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote
in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative
void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the
full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's
initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the
framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested
parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum
on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature
sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT;
AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall
form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to
August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the
Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When
asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed
his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering
signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition,
as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a
registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown
by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories
hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines" 22 has posted the full
text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS
A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a
common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on
Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for
Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of
Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December
2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against
the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend
the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional
reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means
to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-
LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the
Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August
2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The
proposals of the Consultative Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the
COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have
profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution,
provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed
changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction
of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the
filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC.
However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused
the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with
the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino
Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's
proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition
was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering.
Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed
to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court
that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did
not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets
circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed
to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature
sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino
Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended
petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they
circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a
proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority
the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with,
or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino
Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundumpulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later
with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition
during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000
copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but
he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty.
Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself
caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one
copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets
could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures.
Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes,
either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of
such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this
admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in
 the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the
full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of
the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can
be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of
the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene
to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during
the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections.
However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which
shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with
the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall
be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-
year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the
6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3
million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on
the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding
in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets.
The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles
of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and
the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling -
when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them
to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only
the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed
amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot
must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to
state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only
one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme
Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject
rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or
less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More
importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal.
These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to
be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament
to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament
has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4),
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again
the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of
the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because
the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon
of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However,
there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if
their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present
Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament
after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises
all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the
House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be
used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of
the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general
or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know
the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the
petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply
with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and
not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate
given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies
the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments
to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution
as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be
limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in
the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1
refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden
v. Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only
to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution'
and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of
the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope
of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if
such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected,
then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon
by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised,
it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one
of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an
amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it
is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The
document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission
for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963
Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses
required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section
1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular
clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change
the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One
of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies
such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like
in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." 38 A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles -
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
 separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes
a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or
that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have
over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be
altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was
defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other
provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside
the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change
in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult
to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the
American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government
in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical
facilities necessary to carry on government.
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the
General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to
revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission
of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the
government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1
of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples
too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of
the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts
and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could
disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative
petition here.43(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would
be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary
people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common
people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because
that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is
their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and
"amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for
purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be
in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same
proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute
a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the
present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter
of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such
a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment
and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and
that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a
defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the
most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article
XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted
by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution
may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing
Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means
of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising
the constitution."
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at
the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at
the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul
of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring
far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting
any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.
For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years 47 is an amendment and not
a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent
to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. 48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. 49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of
government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in
a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article
II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-
case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government,
the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent
with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform
with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law,
the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by
stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to
conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate
constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded
during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is
not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes.
The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to
the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish,
German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments.
Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but
only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the
Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-
settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on
initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty.
Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended
petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the
basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form
of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino
Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's
Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)
v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all
the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to
be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast 53 −
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group,
can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will
of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society ―
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through
false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will"
in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and
protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively
gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin 1
Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective arguments
-- both oral and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my
esteemed colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.
 I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous Opinions
and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,2 I opined "that taken together and interpreted properly
and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 provide more than sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent
to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What
Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes
a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the
right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on
the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently
implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall
no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to
be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters
of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735
wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao. All of
these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and thus we
cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life
to a cherished right of our people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations,
it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source
of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising
their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should
not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using
public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court
has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments
to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would
be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to
his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to
the death your right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice
Holmes wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum
and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are
institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they
are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be
used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. Comelec,3 I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that
no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago,
nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition
which was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do,
that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I cannot fault the
Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio
decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no
choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on
the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have
constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and
contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the Constitution,
and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law are satisfactorily
provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution 2300 is sanctioned by Section
2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec the power to "enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to
enforce and administer x x x." Finally and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes
Comelec "to promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
Act."
"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and
for the right reason." Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may avail themselves
of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. Even the
majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for implementation of the right
(of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs.
Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996], this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections,
initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect
and promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly and
liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide
more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution." Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by outlining, in concrete terms, the
steps to be taken – the right way – to amend the Constitution through a people's initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition which shall
contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall
state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a formal
designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing
of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission shall motu
proprio reject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence file the
petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards. In deciding
whether the petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an
initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the
electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution
2300 will not ipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its sufficiency, the
Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite should not be earlier than
sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of
the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the
validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead
to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle
the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change – the lifting of the term limits of elective officials -- constitute a mere
amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is relevant
considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national elections was voided
after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may be used starting only in the elections
of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the people who
signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating
such move to advance their own political self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm bodies
comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and 2
above, while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by argumentation and
memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues but gargantuan hurdles of factual
determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein
petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just alleging -- that six million voters of this country
indeed want to amend the Constitution, what power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the
Comelec, not even the President or Congress.
facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far
from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very rafters and
foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA and
its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many,
these six million signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a
signature-verification process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen of this country,
would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of
statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and the
validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the proposed
change to the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition for initiative? Or is it
the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to advance their own political
self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in accordance with
our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted exercise legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the 'ultimate
weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic Bay, we specified
that 'initiative is entirely the work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives.' As ponente of Subic
Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to amend through initiative belongs only to
the people – not to the government and its minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances
of many constitutional commissioners like those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with the National
Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that they are dissatisfied." --
Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the legislature is not
as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment
and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people [which] should not
be frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter itself
provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or constituting
Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But initiative belongs to the
people.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations or are they
merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question which,
unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because the Supreme Court majority ruled that
the law that implements it, RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions
are concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people.
That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action "is equivalent
to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly
maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is no need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If
PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can be exposed as such in the ways I have discussed – short of
abrogating the right itself. On the other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate – if it hurdles
the four issues I outlined earlier – by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's
theory of statutory inadequacy has pre-empted – unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view – any judicial
determination of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of
the PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed. Section 2 of
Article XVII precludes amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor oftener than once
every five years thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has never been amended. Hence,
the five-year prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may theoretically be proposed at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe – given the present circumstances – that there is no more time to lift term
limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and the next
national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified warm
bodies comprising at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of RA
6735 was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the motion
for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is also raised by the petitioners, took two
months, not counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These time spans could not be abbreviated
any further, because due process requires that all parties be given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 – as I believe it should –
and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be enough to tackle
the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions.
The Comelec's decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to this Court for review, and
reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again be sought.
"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is enormously time-
consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every signature,
initially before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally, before this Court in
a separate proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itself – assuming such stage can be reached – may be
scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from the time the Comelec and this
Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions may
start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on November 27, 1997;
the period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998; the election period
and campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other
elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time PIRMA's proposition is ready – if ever –
for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have been overcome by the elections. Time will simply
run out on PIRMA, if the intention is to lift term limits in time for the 1998 elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's initiative does not
detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to implement this
constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to initiate changes in local
and national laws and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even
more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the 1998
elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and
the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's
right to initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy – in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will
and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and civil strife. It is
an inherent right of the people – as basic as the right to elect, the right to self-determination and the right
to individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves,
to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their
posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or group of
officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm conviction that there
is an adequate law implementing the constitutional right of initiative does not ipso facto result in the
victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient
safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and
abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners'
signatures must be validated against an existing list of voters and/or voters' identification
cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by the people, not of incumbent officials and their
machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures must be verified as real and genuine; not
concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to do this is to enable the Commission on Elections
to conduct a nationwide verification process as mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such
verification, it bears stressing, is subject to review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at EDSA in 1986, and
yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from the
National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this claim through the invention of its novel
theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal method of determining
whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected
officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In
suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the
benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats,
it burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously divested the people of a basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way at the
right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested
against them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be
DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is being rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong
reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After
all, the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This mission is
undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build the pathways of
tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial litigation is the verity of facts and the
application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in this mission of discovery, our country and our
people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier noted, but also of the
judicial opportunity to verify the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.4 Neither
can whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the
contrary, it prudently followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming
arguendo that Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still
cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action. 6
The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences
pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the
present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not
make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is
"contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino
Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment:
DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the
Commission had "only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by
Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even
remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because the signatures were
unverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of
signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. 7 Without
those signatures, the Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the
exercise of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord
with this Court's pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise,
to refuse enforcement of any final decision of this Court.8 The refusal of the poll body to act on the
Lambino Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous,
but also contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been
struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court
as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my Opinions
in Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend
the Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following
prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to
change the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law.9
I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the form of the
legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government.
The ponencia has amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches
under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction," will "radically
alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have
an overall implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic
provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic
generosity, as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments)
may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the
third mode -- people's initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have
cited the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their respective positions. I will not add to
the woes of the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in
the Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted,
defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a
deliberative body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be
scrutinized, as their adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to
spend many months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they
could agree on the wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of
government of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take several
weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve them. How
much more when it comes to constitutional changes?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-
unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be
rammed down our people's throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative
assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting
petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."10 The present initiative covers at
least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the
change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.11 Thus, even under Republic Act 6735 -- the law
that Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement
that it be supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent
of the registered voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors
One Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages
required.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve
"contentious facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand
to the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates
the said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required
percentages is fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and
unconstitutional. It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement
that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply
established that petitioners were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated
by attachment, the full text of the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the Commission,
the Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross
violation of the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more than one subject, in violation of
Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice Puno
who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative
is a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe
that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative
wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the Constitution,
because the present Petition violates the following:
· The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires
definite percentages of verified signatures)
· The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one subject)
· Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under
consideration on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused
its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is
a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe
we must confront the issues head on, because the people expect no less from this august and
venerable institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.13 Initiative, like referendum and recall,
is a treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and
often-imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy
must be cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people,
between each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed
their will that all of them shall be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants
to promote the common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we
must faithfully abide by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring about
a peaceful, just and humane society. Assuming arguendo that six million people allegedly gave their
assent to the proposed changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social
covenant -- the present Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years
ago.14 I do not denigrate the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest
perch, because our government must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the
Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign
will, they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and
degraded by the assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court must single-
mindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant
voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in submission. On the
other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks
independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the
Rule of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to
perform its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.15
During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about alleged
carrots offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case. 16 There being no
judicial proof of these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good
Book, which says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be
known and come to light."17
Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of
its members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand
years -- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked
about, either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred
Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.
Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation
and the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO.,
LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioner.
Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an
order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I,1 declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged
ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and
tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable,
the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for.
Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of
execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth
thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of
respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and
against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject
of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an
Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of
Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said
Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26,
1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with
several Banks, specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank
received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the
Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3,
1969 by the AFP Controller,..."2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged:
"12. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution
against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and
notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void."3 In the answer filed by respondents,
through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the
only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. 4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that
the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."5 Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent
decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,6 with its affirmation that
"a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle
to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy
required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined."7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter.
It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both
dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,9 such a
well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where
the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce
and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that
score. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public
officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees
in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to
garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government,
belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.
And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully
allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the
order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of
execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby
made permanent.
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official
duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.
Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us
any longer than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of
the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of
the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen
with permanent residence in the Philippines,3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years
ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the
NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to
protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and
regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing
officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent
full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special
Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders
disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated
recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-
workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath
not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved
in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint)
purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in
Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's
employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was
signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of
Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976.8 The plaintiffs
claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused
them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their
personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that
the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that,
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March
8, 1977, 9 on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were
official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the
defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of
petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make
matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its
order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers,
were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court,
on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their
private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for
damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and,
if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable
not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the
government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and
tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the
evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence
was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question,
we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the
proceedings in this case in the court a quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined
from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to
require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be
superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable
inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general
of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that
the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American
government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation
in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a where we
motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting
officially in the name of the American government. The United States had also not waived its immunity
from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the
lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several
of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and
certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the
other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts
complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the
private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request
from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private
respondents.14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting
to the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special Services was
practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act
is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained
recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was
nothing personal or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the
petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied
not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal.
This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought
to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in
many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own
government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. 16 In the case of foreign states, the rule
is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in
parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our
adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we
reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent
of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer
may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds
refuses to record a deed of sale; 18 or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law
claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already
appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments
from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer
impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him.
We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may
directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as
normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court
held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he
acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just
compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to
secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it
was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The
government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the
petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American
government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be
adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by
the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even
mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well settled
.25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged
communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not
defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the
petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves
American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking
cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if
they were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While
these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our
own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a
people, particularly since we became independent in 1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also
from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we
should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own
interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own
concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in
accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction
the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United
States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has
not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977,
and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No.
2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA,
ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair
labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition,
this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without bond.
The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees
Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran —
filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin
Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the
Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the
Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of
their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order
to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses,
alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda
and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them
for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for
the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. For relief, they
prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard,
petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction
raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the
determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge
of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the
theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and,
consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied
by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act
No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such
other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)
Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate
existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that
many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these
facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime
work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev.
Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such
payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that
it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character.
Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request,
as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit"
(sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the
Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.). As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most
of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and for
printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of
which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the
Bureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon.
The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent,
and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit because
it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private
printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional
work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be
deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary
function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction
over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the
case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction
to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations
not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because
the Industrial Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations
between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial
employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-15416, April 28, 1960;
University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion
College vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of
Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it
were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself,
and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat
River Workers' Union, et. al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against
some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of
General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts
prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out
of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments
and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring
subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in
effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees
under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE,
the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint
for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than
the respondent court.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country,
leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental
policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch,
as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to
remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and
bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes
on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into
action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most
vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects
and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-
in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely
Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf
of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and
several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
(Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians
Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C.
Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those
yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar
(Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and
several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates
who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in
their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and
several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political
party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section
12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates
the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed
to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who
seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners,
the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for
indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner
would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health
facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion
and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning.
The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious
groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same
breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product
is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in
defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents, 55 Congressman Edcel C.
Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and
Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was
also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a
period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine
and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were
to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further
orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days
and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the
parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A.
No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store
or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing
of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was
provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing
conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term
economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate
population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population
and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad
educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit
family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree.
(P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad
educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made
"available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being
a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely
choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development. 70 Thus, on August
14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the
full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI,
in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the
RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners
find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family
planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court
to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to
the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of
the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to
implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and
the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To
be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c)
the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of
powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for
the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In
order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts
of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse
of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be
it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point.
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches,
since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which
expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the
Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy
as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to
rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by
the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating
any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on
the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as
there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors'
rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective
does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe
for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the
press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on
the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to
be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming
the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of
society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child
is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are
praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1
), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being
one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of
modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem,
however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in
the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A
large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades
the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that
refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127 As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-
and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling,
Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title
of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which
bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as
to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child
under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the
State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution
since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods,
devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public. 134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical
field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass
judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not
of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing
rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country
has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order
to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives
and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to
one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the
overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to
afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court
could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section
12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of
the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their
plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation
of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under
normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the
State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or
cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly
refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. x x x.150
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself
at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum
is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with
the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to
use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it.
So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of
the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already.
The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if
we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed,
they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.
It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the
need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether
a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide
on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would
like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications
of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would
like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception"
we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being
encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn
yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as
the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route
to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing,
and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the
instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with
the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after
the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid
nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized
ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human
being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life
is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a
new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is
restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life,
begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is
never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of
a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion
is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that
a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the
WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does
not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168 Implantation
has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt
it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device
that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured
in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or
any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As
pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law
to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related
problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
Section 4.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree
or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or
is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms -
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination
of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at
all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either
that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the
fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH
Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not
at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as
it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used
as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive
product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have
a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second
paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient"
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed
out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck
down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed
ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There
is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a
contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as
pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives
which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives
cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of
the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives
to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that
do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect
of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that
the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold
increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and
(w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women
have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being
a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG
posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila
Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
(Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No.
5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements
are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that
the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the
sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription
of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the
public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by
respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other
Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the
RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more
than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or
drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or
hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes,
the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless. 186 [Emphases in the
Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute
to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall
coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and
distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current
levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions
of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health
must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility
and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may
be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available
to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack
on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be
measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case
presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains
their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The
FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or
intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports
this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be
a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also
the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX
explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the
sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate
with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition
is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to
refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health
procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those
working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in
Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer
the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting
healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory
sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the
religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces
the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic
teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by
the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public. 193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It
does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable
human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being
threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend
family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They
claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode
or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion
or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing
accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in
line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and
that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice,
which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they
invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that
the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry. 201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the
State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's
religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited
in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they
do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only
method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all
- the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people
generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance
and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution
reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our
nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is
embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in
so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach
into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally,
the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to
a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State
from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III,
Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources
for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that
the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and
449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They
have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms,
the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief
with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended
to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs
and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The
first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought.
So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed
only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." 215 In the same
case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case
on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom
is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden
religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and
overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present
danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form
or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other
hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the
only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the
test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo
where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as
speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from
having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate
in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious
belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in
preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any
interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise
Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of
Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in
Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A
mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not
appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to
religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do
otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty,
reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This
was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the
very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief.
For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to
rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine
whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion
or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs,
and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized
as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization:
Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and
their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations,
civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine
and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own
family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To
some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse
religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached
with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital
or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law
to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what
the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against
his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of
the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One
may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent.
With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The
Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed
consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree
of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and
the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to
be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person
was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could
not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH
Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section
7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom
of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in
the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it
was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance.
Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless
and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human
values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself
but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent
Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH
Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions.
Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected
the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it
says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of
hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with
this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the
subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that
the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the
curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions.
During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an
ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free
exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their
patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of
the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or
not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act
against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the
mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object
to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. 234 Other than the
assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves
the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may
still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter
reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all
times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's
mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect
shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right
of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to
the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted
diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and
other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall
be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and
legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors
with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development
of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude
for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest
was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives
changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from
reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that
time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute
a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for
Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures
if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases
that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a
denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during
the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are
objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother
of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the
child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However,
he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both,
provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of
the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would
not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives
are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child
may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted
above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A
cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all
violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions
which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives
the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision
of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which,
by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as
they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally
recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating
in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity,
and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. 241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because
the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not
to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as
they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their
destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such
state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In
our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, 243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas
in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with
regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off
just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of
her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing
her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-
child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose
of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition
of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering
into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be
made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that
of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both
the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to
make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such
information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents
might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or
reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent.
It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed
to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the
parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures."
Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the
first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of
parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching
of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that
the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium
of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of
this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth
to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development
of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and
their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-
appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge
and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional
changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender
and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender
sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal
mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program
shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and
other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that
Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in
the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground
that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be
filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service
provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care
service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a
"private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that
is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider,"
viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in
the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training
programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care
services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are
used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly,
subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety;
and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness
or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a
sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in
medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal
opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution
as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those
mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of
equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general
may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of
the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those
that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention
that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a
truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring
private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have
the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out
that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners
with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that
it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened
with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect
the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control
such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth,
no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive
healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government
 entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under
the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and
to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments
and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether
or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order
is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been
observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable
the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that
ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication,
the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services
and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability
of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts
to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied
to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10
and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the
exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply
delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary
power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court
does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the
Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin
with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past
or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis
to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with
both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most
peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not
allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access
to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of
some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all,
the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed
to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for
diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and
harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it
seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that
the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth.
Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and
Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy.
These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they
are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
 And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino
Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen
if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would
not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the
law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or
what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into
the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful
of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself
to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the
prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court
decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365),
the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the
principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement
of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any
act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated
July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein
declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent
Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due
process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is
whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly
springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and
country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in
the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to
free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation
may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances
justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens
of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2)
an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15,
1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after
the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture
of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights
and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition
against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail
business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now
engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for
purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons
acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the
spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed
in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in
the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no
treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is
affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory
origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims
that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of
the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit
preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and
the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and
how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of
the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly
and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity
and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to
be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and
as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent
and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power
has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive
world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which
the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there
not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means
used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that
we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection
of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed
to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment
of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise
it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process
of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not
be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police
power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances
primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in
the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve
public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right,
have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They
have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse
of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and
courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If
the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that
it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject
is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been
open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce,
the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities
producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce,
the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in
production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of
living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the
retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and
needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions
of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members
of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He
ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and
things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn,
the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the
needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the
lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a
supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population
(Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be
invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even
pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily
needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable
fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade,
industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and
insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and
forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling
and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials,
clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers
of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost
all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores
of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco,
the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and
complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said
that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the
result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of
control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible.
The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters
of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon
and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white.
Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the
retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the
enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out
to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following
tables:
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation
has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number
of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales
which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in
retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times
more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of
foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor
retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino
retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted.
The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when
they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the
Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two
years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble
opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos
"of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and
other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the
concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in
connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country
is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no
guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest
from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation
and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government
as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the
leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way
that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed
invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil.
Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen,
manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they
express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July
18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved
on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in
the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have
editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination
and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien
retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing
of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and
even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of
dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and of the
consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed
completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be
prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or
because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to
agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a
substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article
suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation.
Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within
judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and
justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the retail
trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would
suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential
commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice
of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and
Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they
have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the
legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and
automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among
themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have
connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in
unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded
tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions,
control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have
engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and
corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both
by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a
prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future.
The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore,
becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in
this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well
organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the
communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person
and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy
of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is
not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire
and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the
economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage.
The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls
within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security
and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does
the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the
root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes
allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience;
he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he
temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his
Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.
The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved
kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found
necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution
to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and
profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase
national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would
indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a
national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These
 differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail
trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual
and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens.
Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is
the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and
reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification
is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within
its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons
is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a
wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can
also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and
succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary
thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the
power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is
purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already
been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the
case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus
denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the
encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We
held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its
constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as
follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing
gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character,
and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and
place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation
reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of
American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is
not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly
attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the
trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified
simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a
higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of
American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers
and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his
intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem
wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare,
good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and
conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain
persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of
race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that
an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to
appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore,
invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme
Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses
(pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is
prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a
relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that
it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative
appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an
apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one
at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking
was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the
scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle,
297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for
the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional
rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law
prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the
court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals,
the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission,
92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over
immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and
the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the
law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices
dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser
vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on
every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void
because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary
deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained. —
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that
the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision
the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the
result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved
or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court
declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other
than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if
Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the
Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised
of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's
belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it
would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the
operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the
power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility.
In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and
peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act
in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do
not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come
in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it
enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These
limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances,
especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton
vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between
the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate
knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that
certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural
and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose
ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely
different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as
well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself.
Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with
absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification, and
therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by
the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial
relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional
restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws
passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the
police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means
employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals
by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom
it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11
Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to
regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered
by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with
the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial
relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered. —
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long
ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and
honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This
arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this
country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien
in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without
ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we
have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national
security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the
facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner
in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The
law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to
free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law
is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but
actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens
of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this
vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no
profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare,
we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at
the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands
of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects
of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none
the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal
and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest
motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to
bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate
aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due
process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination,
thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature
full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people,
their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear;
they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of
the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade;
but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and
others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a
law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution.
Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as
corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization
of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or
any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic
protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued
with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval
of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards
the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and
refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and national
survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to
face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination
of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to
those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention
was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now
engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside,
the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will
not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment.
The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and
every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the
wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its
reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These
principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law
does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that
prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation;
that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be
repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed
wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be
violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the
bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily
and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two
main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be
stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the
subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting
intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs.
State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition
of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily
convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when
used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of
which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title
need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803,
p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the
regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition";
so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many
provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the
term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which
a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found
in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of
the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature
of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active
interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the
law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for
declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951
ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That
such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred
the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners
engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947
is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But
the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty
is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston
vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise
of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us
to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law
are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or
the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with
treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made
less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the
law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty,
however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not
transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies
against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power
and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO, vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs
therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it
is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has
a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests
in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising
from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan
of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic
uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
— nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph
6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of
the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-
being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert
that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
— usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of
the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short
of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or
a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence
to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by
the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and
noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources
as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development
and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of
the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive
to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as
trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
 . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION,
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof,
they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further
that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American
Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as
a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU, respondents.
Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner.
Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner,
who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation,
counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote
buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of
the 1971 Election Code.
Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered
on December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening
and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.
Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of
the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.
 In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter,
more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and
approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly
ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March
31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent
Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have
been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further
submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are
only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under
Section 9 of Article XVII.
Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article
XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New
Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to hear and decide election
protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New
Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically abolish the office and position of municipal mayor
nor has it automatically cut short the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who is the
lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that election protests involve
public interest such that the same must be heard until terminated and may not be dismissed on mere
speculation that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and that the
motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.
Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of political
question; and reiterated his stand, expanding his arguments on the political question, thus:
It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for municipal mayoralty.
Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by the Board of Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this
present case. And before the termination of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people in the exercise
of their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF
GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced. We find this provision under Article XI of
the New Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be
amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local
government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.
It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that the New Constitution
"shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor has not been abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise,
the provisions of Section 9 of Article XVII, is meaningless.
All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, ...
In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees working in our government,
otherwise, by the force of the New Constitution they are all out of the government offices. In fact, in the
case above-cited (Javellana) we are all performing our duties in accordance with the New Constitution.
Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our
new Constitution should be dismissed because only those incumbent official and employees existing in
the new government are protected by the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental Law of the
Land. The protestant, we respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 Article XVII of
the Constitution. And in case he will win in this present case he has no right to hold the position of mayor
of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he was not then an official of the government at the time
the New Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His right if proclaimed a winner is derived
from the 1935 Constitution which is changed by the Filipino people.
On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question
theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:
There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new Constitution to replace
the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now living under its aegis and protection. ...
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those officials and employees
of the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines like the protestee herein, are given
protection and are authorized to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President of the
Philippines, while under Section 2 of Article XI of the new Constitution, also above-quoted, the intention
of completely revamp the whole local government structure, providing for different qualifications, election
and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is very clear. These present questions of
policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. With respect to
the fate of incumbent oficials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, as well as to the qualifications, election and removal, term of office, salaries, and powers of
all local officials under the parliamentary form of government — these have been entrusted or delegated
by the sovereign people or has reserved it to be settled by the incumbent Chief Executive or by the
National Assembly with full discretionary authority therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers,
the people have also decreed in a referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the United States,
questions relating to what persons or organizations constituted the lawful government of a state of the
Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12, L. Ed 58), and those relating to the political status of a state
(Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew, 57 S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835), have been held to be political
and for the judiciary to determine.
To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new Constitution has tainted
this case with a political complexion above and beyond the power of judicial review. As fittingly
commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a separate opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No. 36,
September 3, 1973, p. 8008:
The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest by understanding that in the final
analysis, what is assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, which is
merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or ratification, but the legitimacy of the government. It is
addressed more to the frame-work and political character of this government which now functions under
the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already effective. In other words, where a
complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through political action, the Court whose
existence is affected by such a change is, in the words of Mr. Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from
passing upon the fact of change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted as the change
relates to the existence of a prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate
merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of powers." It involves a matter which 'the sovereign
has entrusted to the so-called political departments or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-
governmental action." The present Government functions under the new Constitution which has
become effective through political action. Judicial power presupposes an established government and
an effective constitution. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority
of the Government under which it is exercising judicial power.
The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly Sections 7 and 8, Article
XVII (Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all existing laws not inconsistent with the new Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and that all
courts existing at the time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall continue and exercise
their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with the new Constitution, and all cases
pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force. Again, to the
mind of the Court, these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation
of a court's jurisdiction which have not been "entrusted to the so-called political department or has
reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action.
Hence, this petition.
We reverse.
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution,
through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its
ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office
as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the
incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI
thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the
enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and
expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still
continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take
cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislative or Executive branch of the government."
I
There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution which
are decisive in the resolution of the political question theory of respondent Yu.
WE ruled:
1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending
election protest cases (Santos vs. Castañeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA 211
[1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927, Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-
37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]).
2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the
benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new
Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who
at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest"
and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory
Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law
to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for elective position who, within the time-
frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper
determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office."' (Santos
vs. Castañeda, supra); and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have
intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold
that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding,
may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could
have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms
of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades,
Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only
by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently,
have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then
certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said
constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent
(protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein
petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee)
would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office
pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution" (Euipilag, supra).
5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office
is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions
and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to
hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the
period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein
whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New
Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein
petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their
respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the
office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with
the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New
Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their
respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still
under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga
and Valley cases, supra).
6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try
and decide election protests: "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all existing
laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed
by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220
of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against
those proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution 'all courts
existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction
until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts
shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' Consequently, the Courts of First
Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to
hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez, Parades,
Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as
elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power
does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.
7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers
under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify
the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra).
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral
contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for
said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the
existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain
crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts
issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his
decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction
because to do co "is nothing short of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly
imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever
think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is apparently unaware that it is a matter
of highly significant historical fact that this Court has always deemed General Order No. 3 including its
amendment by General Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation No.
1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. 1104 of January 17, 1973, placing the whole
Philippines under martial law. While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not
particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential decrees raise political questions
which the Judiciary would not interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the
Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We may take cognizance of any given case
involving the validity of acts of the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the martial
law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 SCRA 344 [1978]).
II
1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein involved
has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case.
Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed
or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question"
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure" (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The
term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction
or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a
prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission
on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to
characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch
thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited
with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either
in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..."
(Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).
2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political
question is who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu —
was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges
and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the
position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office;
otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the
issue therein involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and
after the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as
the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.
3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of
Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as between protestant
and protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence, entitled to enjoy the extended
term as mandated by said provision of the New Constitution. As construed by this Court, the elective
officials referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are limited to those duly elected as the right to said
extended term was not personal to whosoever was incumbent at the time of the ratification and
effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such judgment preempt, collide or interfere with the power
or discretion entrusted by the New Constitution to the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department, with respect to the extended term of the duly elected incumbents; because whoever
between protestant and protestee is declared the duly elected mayor will be subject always to whatever
action the President or the Legislative Department will take pursuant thereto.
4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political
color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local
government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members,
defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of
local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the
National Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent
Judge will render in the electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the
indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local
government in this country; subject always to whatever change or modification the National Assembly
will introduce when it will enact the local government code.
III
The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New Constitution
"... that these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's
jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called political department or reserved to be settled
by its own extra-governmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot be sustained in view of the result herein
reached on the issue of political question as well as Our previous pronouncements as above restated
on the same Sections 7 and 8 of the New Constitution.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND
DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS. THIS DECISION
SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Tañada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, Jesus Barrera and Leon
Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion, on August 26, 1949 to be exact,
this court had already passed upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December
16, 1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and
authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five members
held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress convened
in special session) according to Chief Justice Moran. Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes
and Torres in effect concluded that the powers delegated to the President had been withdrawn as to
matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on which the latter had demonstrated its readiness
or ability to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No.
192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first
appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the
second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and
void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted
legislation on the same subjects.1
More or less the same considerations that influenced our pronouncement of August 26, 1949 are and
should be controlling in the case now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate Executive
Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500
for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in
the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the
national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and
Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the President, "during
the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary
to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the
National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet
been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to
the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has
in fact taken place when the President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency
Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the principal authority
to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance
to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be
fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the
President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular
statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the
termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to
produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In
other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not
right and is not, and ought not to be the law."2
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the
principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be
suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted only during the
emergency resulting from the last world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671
was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of
the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that
the actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the
following statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless
against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving
a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United
States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that
under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." 3 When President Quezon
said "in time of war", he an doubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that "since liberation conditions have
gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and
who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the
emergency created by the last war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is the declared
policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified
form."4 It is important to remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration was made bore
the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly
proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing rains artificially
created by seasonal partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains
that follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," — an admission, that such
emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the legislative department on the alleged
existence of emergency, reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred to,
repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed,
authorizes the delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency.
The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as
distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural
causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit
some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but were and could not
have been contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for necessary special
sessions, and it cannot let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727,
did not invoke any emergency resulting from the last world war, but only called attention to an impending
emergency that may be brought about by present complicated and troubled world conditions, and to
the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of democracy and freedom and
for the preservation of our Republic. The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the
war mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied
Powers on the other; and indications are that in the next world war, if any, the communist countries will
be aligned against the democracies. No departure can be made from the national policy declared in
section 1 of Act No. 671. New powers may be granted as often as emergencies contemplated in the
Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still technically at war with Japan pending the
ratification of the peace treaty. In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the second
place, the last world war was between the United States and Japan, the Philippines being involved only
because it was then under American sovereignty. In the third place, the United States had already
signed the peace treaty with Japan, and the Philippines has become an independent country since July
4, 1946.
It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that the emergency
powers are non-existent. But, from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill had to be approved
merely to remove all doubts, especially because this Court had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary
majority, to declare Act No. 671 entirely inoperative.
Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen and Senators and on House
Resolution No. 99, urging the President to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public
works and for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state, in reply, that the said petition
and resolution cannot prevail over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by two
chambers of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the resolution of one house, there is more reason
for accepting the solemn declarations of two houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress had shown its
readiness or ability to act on a given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had
been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal
anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly
been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many
others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have
long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.
If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in
respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly.
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing
"in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming
that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new
appropriations. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or
otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as
he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since
liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has
any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise
emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the
people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in
form and based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall
have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences
resulting from or inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and
executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks
in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man
or group of men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and
were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times
of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress
the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide
because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and the respondents
are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside
therein. So ordered, without costs.
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL
POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but
hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626
particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of
the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued
a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of
the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be
produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality
of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial
court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should
not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of
due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the
need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal
the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy
of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of
his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature
failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action,
he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have
the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive
order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the
President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this
time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is
the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and
the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by
the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an
"iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was
meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest
they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need
to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import
of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing
sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair
play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown
would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the
lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny
that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King
John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder
to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is
entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the
other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict
is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that
the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted
with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of
power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the
due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number
of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the
need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he
has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and
bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be
omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of
the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints
and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it
extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the
most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.
The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even
before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in
practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often
unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is
found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending
the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that
"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the
small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure.
In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps
to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own
carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals
and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn
had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective
measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute
was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as
these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably
and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where
they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary
permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing
their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive
order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there
be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that
"no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could
be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is
no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have
to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered
by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process.
It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.
There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been
proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him
under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-
A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property
as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation
of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For
these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President,
to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute
it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for
all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,
this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure
would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the
present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of
the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and
soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke
them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive
tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection.
They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept
bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to
121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after
the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of
the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is
premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in
question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely
affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former
the barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys
Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici
curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name
of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The
recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-
thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be
created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a
barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial
of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too
obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent
to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or
boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one
or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control
of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the
new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner
as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality
of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already
existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and
prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan
[34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the
common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425,
January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs.
Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the
power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat
of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said
Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment
of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes
enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748
— which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at
which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the
last part of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the
government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil.
328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards
for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases —
as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved
therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law
construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote
safe transitupon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the
authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the
sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power
is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal
Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d.
347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether
incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public
policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers,
state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should
be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission
the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall
be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by
statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a
given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of
the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex
rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area
and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof
and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar
as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be
included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such
incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may
require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of
Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is
in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case
the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same
(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case
of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The
Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him
by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions
on admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not
designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme
Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies
no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to
be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation,
correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing
codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public
welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the
delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment
to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required
by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers
of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system
established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills
for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of
the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions
can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise
of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter,
the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,
the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the
scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to
it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may
he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no
matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create
a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to
his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise
of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses
the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal
corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section
68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed
by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all
the proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been
impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim,
that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At
any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer
authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in
any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661,
Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned
municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere
agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly,
been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the
executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is,
however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has,
for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been
organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures
incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office
and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy
as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect,
and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.
It is so ordered.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid growth
has long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government.
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the
Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such as
fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the framework of the
Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details, did not entail abdication
of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona
vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory
authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. And Chief Executives
since then up to the present continued to avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue
executive orders providing for the creation of municipalities.
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders
to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public
funds thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent
or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It is
argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any
such power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and
Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).
Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix boundaries and
make new subdivisions. — The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal
district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may
divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province,
into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name
any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine
Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province
or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When
action by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary
a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the
[Governor-General] President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of
the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several
officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner
as may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by the [Governor-
General] President of the Philippines.
From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any political
division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue, however, is whether the
legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore
favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create
municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a
municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628).
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the
municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power
and the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it
says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore,
Section 5 of the same Code states:
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the permissive powers of all executive
or administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given
authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall be dependent on a
sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service and benefit of the public, whether so
expressed in the statute giving the authority or not.
Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the provision
in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle
of separation of powers.
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A proper
knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a
century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and rightful place
in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for its Organic Act the
Jones Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to.
Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was
separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the power
of the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction.
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general
supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands."
Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief
Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its development
and growth.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the
least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said supervision and
control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may be necessary to secure
and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." And the national government "shall
have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-
9158, July 28, 1958.)
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, with the
end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the administration
of their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution
(Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of control
over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron v. Reyes,
supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby became unavoidably
inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local governments.
Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case,
it was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities.
Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and controlling their local governments are
"two worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local governments can no
longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the power to create them,
all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.
I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has repealed
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the President to create
local governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been
sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there held that such repeal differs from
a declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so that only a majority vote of the
Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether Republic
Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any
rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant
the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of
barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-
existing barrios.

It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable to
create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two political units. The
smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national government's intervention
in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top
downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the supposedly
autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g.,
the barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom
upwards, so that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over
barrios without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that
because the President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a
municipality.

It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local governments.
And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in question
are null and void.

In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and independent
under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty
that it upholds. Executive orders declared null and void.