THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS i COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES i Partha Chatterjee - PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS "ETON, NEW JERSEYCHAPTER TWO The Colonial State ‘THE COLONIAL STATE AS A MODERN REGIME OF POWER | will begin by asking the following question: Does it serve any useful analytical purpose to make a distinction between the colonial state and the forins of the modern state? Or should we regard the colonial state as simply another specific form in which the modern state has generalized itself across the globe? Ifthe latter is the case, then of course the specifi- cally colonial form of the emergence of the institutions of the modern state would be of only incidental, or at best episodic, interest; it would not bea necessary part ofthe larger, and more important, historical narcative of modernity. ‘The idea that colonialism was only incidental to the history of the de- velopment of the modern institutions and technologies of power in the countries of Asia and Africa is now very much with us. In some ways, this isnot sucprising, because we now tend to think of the period of colonial- ism as something we have managed to put behind us, whereas the prog- ress of modernity is a project in which we are all, albeit with varying, degrees of enthusiasm, still deeply implicated. Curiously though, the notion that colonial rule was not really about colonial rule but something else was a persistent theme in the rhetoric of colonial rule itself. As late as ten years before Indian independence, a British historian of the development of state institutions in colonial India began his book with the following words: “It was the aim of the greatest among the early British administrators in India to train the people of India to govern and protect themselves ... rather than to establish the rule of a British bureaucracy.”! And at about the same time, Edward ‘Thompson and G. T. Garratt two liberal British historians sympathetic toward the aspirations of Indian nationalism, closed their book with the following assessment: “Whatever the furuce may hold the dzect influence ofthe West upon India is likly to deccease. But it would be absurd to imagine thatthe British connec tion will not leave a permanent mack upon Indian life. On the merely mate- rial side the new Federal Government (the Government of India reorganized under the 1935 constitutional arcangements] will take over the largest irriga~ tion system in the world, with thousands of miles of canals and warer-cuts THE COLONIAL STATE 15 fertlsing between thirty and forty milion acres; some 60,000_miles of metalled roads; over 42,000 miles of railway, of which three-quarters aze State-owned; 230,000 scholastic institutions with over twelve million schol- ars; and a great number of buildings, including government offices inspec tion bungalows, provincial and central legislatures. The vast area of India hhas been completely surveyed, most ofits lands assessed, and a regulac cen- sus taken ofits population and its productivity. An effective defensive system has been built up on ts vulnerable North-East fronties it has an Indian army ch century-old traditions, and a police force which compares favourably with any outside 2 few Western countries. The postal department handles nearly 1500 million articles yearly, the Forestry Department not only pee- vents the denudation of immense areas, but makes a nee profi of between two and three crozes, These great State activities are managed by a trained bureaucracy, which is to-day almost entirely indian? Having read our Michel Foucault, we can nov recognize in this account a fairly accurate description of the advance of the modern regime of power, a regime in which power is meant not to prohibit bur to facilitate, to produce, It is not without significance, therefore, that Thompson and Garratt should mention this as the “permanent mark” left by the colonial presence in India, It is also significant that they entitle their history the Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India, Indian nationalists are not, of course, quite so generous in attrib- uting benevolent intentions to the colonial mission. But their judgment on the historical value of the state institutions created under British rule is not fundamentally different. The postcolonial state in India has after all only expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrange- ments of colonial law and administration, of the courts, the burcau- ‘racy, the police, the army, and the various technical services of govern ment. M. V. Pylee, the constitutional historian, describes the discursive constraints with disarming simplicity. “India,” he says, “inherited the British system of government and administration in its original form. The of the new Constitution could not think of an altogether new ‘As a matter of fact, the criticism Indian nationalists have made in the postcolonial period is that the colonial institutions of power were not moder enough, that the conditions of colonial rule necessarily limited and corrupted the application of the teue principles of a modern admin- istration. B. B. Misra, the nationalist historian of colonial bureaucracy, identified these limits as proceeding from two premices. The first was the Indian social system which was gov cemmed by icrational and prescriptive customs rather than a well-regulated ‘ational system of law and a common code of morality. The second... was16 CHAPTER TWO the British Imperial interest, which bred discrimination in the Secvices on racial grounds as well a differentiation in respect of social status and condi tions of service. Yet, despite these limits, “the degree of administrative rationalization during this period of bureaucratic despotism was far ahead of the coun- tty’s Brahmanic social order, which knew of no rule of law in the contrac- tual sense.”* ‘Whether imperialist or colonialist, all sem to share a belicf in the self evident legitimacy of the principles that are supposed universally to gov- ‘ern the modern regime of power. It is something of a surprise, therefore, to discover that a persistent theme in colonial discourse until the earlier half of this century was the steadfast refusal to admit the universality of those principles. ‘THE RULE OF COLONIAL DIFFERENCE, Although Vincent Smith was not the most distinguished imperial histo- rian of India, he was probably the most widely known in India because of the success of his textbooks on Indian history. In 1919, Smith published a rejoinder to the Montagu-Chelmsford constitutional proposals secking to placate nationalist demands by conceding a certain measure of “re- sponsible government” to Indians. The proposals, Smith said, were based ‘on two propositions: “(1) that a policy, assumed to have been successful in Western communities, can be applied to India; and (2) that such a policy ought to be applied to India, even at the request of an admittedly sinall body of Indians, because Englishmen believe it to be intrinsically the best.”® His argument was that both propositions were false. The policy of responsible and democratic government, “supposed to be of universal application,” could not be applied to India because it went against “a deep stream of Indian tradition which has been flowing for thousands of years. ... The ordinary men and women of India do not understand impersonal government. ... They crave for government by a person to whom they can render loyal homage.” The reason for the legit- imacy of British cule in India lay in the fact that the King-Emperor was regarded by the Indian people as “the successor of Rama, Asoka and Akbar. Their heartfele loyalty should not be quenched by the cold water of democratic theory.” In terms of social divisions, “India has been the battle-ground of races and religions from time immemorial,” and the an- ticipation of a common political identity was “not justfed either by the facts of history or by observation of present conditions.” The fundamen- tal principle of social organization in India was caste, which was incom- THE COLONIAL STATE 17 patible with any form of democratic government. More importantly, the spread of modern institutions or technologies had not weakened the hold of caste in any way. ‘The necessities of cheap railway traveling compel people to crowd into cat= Fiages and touch one another closely for many hours... . The immense prac- tical advantages of a copious supply of good water from stand-pipes in the larger towns ace permitted to outweigh the ceremonial pollution which un- ddoubtedly takes place. ... But such merely superficial modifcations of caste regulations... do not touch the essence ofthe institution, ... The Brahman who tides in a third-class carriage or drinks pipe-water does not think any better of his low-caste neighbour than when he travelled on foot and drank froma dirty well... So long as Hindus continue to be Hindus, caste cannot be destroyed or even materially modified,” Smith then went on to argue that contrary to the plea of the reformers, the policy of promoting responsible government in India was bad ev a practical strategy of power. It would produce not consent for auth but its very opposite. a Contentment, so far as it exists, is to be deliberately disturved by the rulers of India in order to promote the ideal of Indian nationhood, the formation of a genuine electorate, and the development of the faculty of self-help. Do the high officials charged with the government of India, who propose delib- eately to disturb the contentment of three hundred millions of Asiatic peo- ple, mostly ignorant, superstitious, fenatical, and intensely suspicious, real- ize what they are doing? Have they counted the cost? Once the disturbance ‘of content has been fairly started emong the untutored masses, no man can tell how far the fre may spread. Discontent will not be directed to the polit ical objects so dear to Mr. Montagu and Mr. Curtis, Ie will be turned fiercely ‘upon the casteless, impure foreigner, and, inflamed by the cy of “religion in danger,” will attract every disorderly element and renew the hottors of 1857 or the great anarchy of the eighteenth century. The lesson of history cannot be mistaken Our reaction today would be to dismiss these arguments as coming froma dichaed conservative imperialist putting up what was even then a quixotic defense of old-style paternalistic colonialism. Yet Smith's rejec- tion of the claims to universality of the modern institutions of self govern ment raises, I think, an important question. Let me put this plainly, even at the risk of oversimplifcation. If the principal justification for the modern regime of power is that by making social regulations an aspect ofthe self-dsciplining of normalized individ uals, power is made more productive, effective, and humane, then there are three possible positions with regard to the universality of this argu-18 CHAPTER TWO ‘ment. One is that this must apply in principle to all societies iecespective of historical or cultural specificities. The second is that the principle is inescapably tied to the specific history and culture of Westetn societies and cannot be exported elsewhere; this implies a rejection of the univer- sality of the principle. The thicd is that the historical and cultural differ- ences, although an impediment in the beginning, can be eventually over- ‘come by a suitable process of training and education. The third position, therefore, while admitting the objection raised by the second, nevertheless seeks to restore the universality of the principle. ‘While these three positions have been associated with distinct ideo- logical formations, they are produced, however, in the same discursive field. My argument is, fist, that all three remain available today; second, that itis possible easily to slide from one to the other, because, third, all three adopt the same tactic of employing what I will call the rule of co- lonial difference. The implication of this argument is that ifa rule of colo- nial difference is part of a common strategy for the deployment of the modern forms of disciplinary power, then the history of the colonial state, far from being incidental, is of crucial interest to the study of the past, present, and future of the modern state. | will first demonstrate the application of this rule in two well-known colonial debates over bureaucratic rationality rule of law, and freedom of speech, I will then show that the same rule is effective in contemporary debates over colonial history. RACE AND RATIONAL BUREAUCRACY I isin the fitness of things that it took an event such as the suppression of 2 rebellion of the scale and intensity of the Great Revolt of 1857 for the various pieces of the colonial order properly to fall into place. The rebels tipped the veil off the face of the colonial power and, forthe first time, it ‘was visible in its true form: a modern regime of power destined never to fulfill its normalizing mission because the premise of its power was the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group. ‘The debates over colonial policy inthe decades following the revolt are instructive. Historians generally characterize this period as an era of con- servatism. Metcalf’s well-known study traces this shift ro a decline in the enthusiasm for Benthamism and evangelism in Britain. Strengthening this reluctance to embark upon any further reform in India was the suspicion that the earlier attack upon “immoral” native customs might have had something to do with the rebellion. Oficial opinion was now virtually unanimous in thinking that local customs were best left to themselves. “Radical reform,” says Metcalf, “was not just dangerous, it had ceased to be fashionable.”? THE COLONIAL STATE 19 In keeping with this move away from liberal reform was the hardening of a certain intellectual opinion in Britain that was particularly influential in the making of colonial policy. Distressed by the extension of suffrage and of the politics of Gladstonian liberalism at home, this school of opin- ion sought to reestablish the precepts of property and order upon un- ashamedly authoritarian foundations and increasingly turned to British India as the ground where these theories could be demonstrated, James Fitzjames Stephen and Henry Maine were two leading figures inthis cam- paign to unmask the “sentimentality” of all reformist postures in matters of colonial policy. The Indian people, Stephen reminded his countrymen, were “ignorant to the last degree” and “steeped in idolatrous supersti- tion.” The British were under no obligation to fit such people for repre- sentative institutions. All they were expected to do was administer the country and look after the welfare of the people. The empire, he said, is essentially an absolute Government, founded, not on consent, but on con- ‘quest. It does not represent the native principles of lfe or of government, and itcan never do so until it represents heathen and barbarism, Ie represents ‘belligerent civilization, and no anomaly can be so striking or so dangerous sits administration by men who, being at the head of a Government hhaving no justification for its existence except {the} superirity [of the con- {quering race), sheink from the open, uncompromising, straightforward as- sertion of it, seek to apologize for thei own position, and refuse, fzom whatever cause to uphold and support it.” ‘The merit of hard-nosed arguments such as this was to point un- ambiguously to the one factor that united the ruling bloc and separated it from those over whom it ruled. Marking this difference was race. As off-