3. G.R. No. 108946 January 28, 1999 FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and BJ PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, GABRIEL ZOSA, WILLIAM ESPOSO, FELIPE MEDINA, JR., and CASEY FRANCISCO,
respondents.

Facts: Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright Rhoda and Me, a dating game show
aired from 1970 to 1977. While watching television, petitioner Francisco Joaquin, Jr., president of BJPI, saw on RPN Channel 9
an episode of It's a Date, which was produced by IXL Productions, Inc. (IXL). On July 18, 1991, he wrote a letter to private
respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president and general manager of IXL, informing Zosa that BJPI had a copyright to Rhoda and Me
and demanding that IXL discontinue airing It's a Date.

Upon complaint of petitioners, an information for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filed against private respondent Zosa together
with certain officers of RPN Channel 9. However, private respondent Zosa sought a review of the resolution of the Assistant
City Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.

Respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Assistant City Prosecutor's findings and directed him to move
for the dismissal of the case against private respondents. Petitioner Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion
denied by respondent Secretary of Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition.

Issue: The format of a show is not copyrightable under Section 2 of P.D. 49 or the Copyright Law.

Held: No, the format of a show is not copyrightable.

Section 2 of P.D. No. 49, otherwise known as the DECREE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, enumerates the classes of work
entitled to copyright protection, to wit:

(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories, and gazetteers;
(b) Periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;
(d) Letters; (e) Dramatic or dramaticomusical compositions; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb shows,
the acting form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise;
(e) Musical compositions, with or without words;
(f) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography, and other works of art; models or designs
for works of art;
(g) Reproductions of a work of art;
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not patentable, and other works of
applied art;
(i) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works and works produced by a process analogous to photography;
(l) lantern slides;
(m) Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making
audiovisual recordings;
(n) Computer programs;
(o) Prints, pictorial illustrations advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps;
(p) Dramatizations, translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements and other alterations of literary, musical or
artistic works or of works of the Philippine government as herein defined, which shall be protected as provided in
Section 8 of this Decree;
(q) Collections of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to in Section 9 of this Decree which by reason of
the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, the same to be protected as such in
accordance with Section 8 of this Decree;
(r) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

The format or mechanics of a television show is not included in the list of protected works in §2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason,
the protection afforded by the law cannot be extended to cover them. Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a
statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a preexisting right regulated by the
statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with
respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. Since . . . copyright in
published works is purely a statutory creation, a copyright may be obtained only for a work falling within the statutory
enumeration or description. Regardless of the historical viewpoint, it is authoritatively settled in the United States that there is
no copyright except that which is both created and secured by act of Congress

The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides: SEC. 175. Unprotected Subject Matter.—Notwithstanding the provisions of
Sections 172 and 173, no protection shall extend, under this law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or operation, concept,
principle, discovery or mere data as such, even if they are expressed, explained, illustrated or embodied in a work; news of the
day and other miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information; or any official text of a legislative,
administrative or legal nature, as well as any official translation thereof

Here, petitioner BJPI’s copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within the class of
works mentioned in P.D. 49, §2(M), to wit: Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to
cinematography or any process for making audiovisual recordings; The copyright does not extend to the general concept or
format of its dating game show. Accordingly, by the very nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI’s copyright, the investigating
prosecutor should have the opportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows

—Mere description by words of the gen-eral format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; the presentation of the
master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by
respondent Secretary of Justice: A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the
general copyright/format of both dating game shows. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari

4. G.R. No. 131522 July 19, 1999 PACITA I. HABANA, ALICIA L. CINCO and JOVITA N. FERNANDO, petitioners, vs.
FELICIDAD C. ROBLES and GOODWILL TRADING CO., INC.

Facts: Pacita Habana et al., are authors and copyright owners of duly issued of the book, College English For Today (CET).
Respondent Felicidad Robles was the author of the book Developing English Proficiency (DEP). Petitioners found that several
pages of the respondent's book are similar, if not all together a copy of petitioners' book. Habana et al. filed an action for
damages and injunction, alleging respondent’s infringement of copyrights, in violation of P.D. 49. They allege respondent
Felicidad C. Robles being substantially familiar with the contents of petitioners' works, and without securing their permission,
lifted, copied, plagiarized and/or transposed certain portions of their book CET.

On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her own intellectual creation, and was not a copy of
any existing valid copyrighted book and that the similarities may be due to the authors' exercise of the "right to fair use of
copyrighted materials, as guides."

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any liability. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
in favor of respondents Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. In this appeal, petitioners submit that the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court's decision.

Issue: Whether respondents committed no copyright infringement despite the apparent textual, thematic and sequential
similarity between DEP and CET

Held: Yes, A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if not identical with the text of CET.

We believe that respondent Robles' act of lifting from the book of petitioners substantial portions of discussions and
examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of petitioners' copyrights. In
determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important
consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have
been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author
are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy. 2
 respondents' claim that the copied portions of the book CET are also found in foreign books and other grammar books,
and that the similarity between her style and that of petitioners can not be avoided since they come from the same
background and orientation may be true. However, in this jurisdiction under Sec 184 of Republic Act 8293 it is provided
that: Limitations on Copyright: The making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and
only to the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of
press summaries: Provided, That the source and the name of the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners presented several pages of the books CET and DEP that more or less
had the same contents. It may be correct that the books being grammar books may contain materials similar as to some
technical contents with other grammar books, such as the segment about the "Author Card". However, the numerous pages
that the petitioners presented showing similarity in the style and the manner the books were presented and the identical
examples can not pass as similarities merely because of technical consideration.

In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying must produce an "injurious effect". Here, the
injury consists in that respondent Robles lifted from petitioners' book materials that were the result of the latter's
research work and compilation and misrepresented them as her own. She circulated the book DEP for commercial use did
not acknowledged petitioners as her source. the least that respondent Robles could have done was to acknowledge
petitioners Habana et. al. as the source of the portions of DEP. The final product of an author's toil is her book. To allow
another to copy the book without appropriate acknowledgment is injury enough.

5. G.R. No. 130360 August 15, 2001 WILSON ONG CHING KlAN CHUAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
LORENZO TAN, respondents.4

Facts: Petitioner Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan ("Ong"), imports vermicelli from China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs
Import and Export Corporation, based in Beijing, China, under the firm name C.K.C. Trading. He repacks it in cellophane
wrappers with a design of two-dragons and the TOWER trademark on the uppermost portion. Ong acquired a Certificate of
Copyright Registration from the National Library on June 9, 1993 on the said design
.
Ong discovered that private respondent Lorenzo Tan repacked his vermicelli he imports from the same company but based in
Qingdao, China in a "nearly" identical wrapper. On September 16, 1993, Ong filed against Tan a verified complaint for
infringement of copyright with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City

Ong alleged that he was the holder of a Certificate of Copyright Registration over the cellophane wrapper with the two-dragon
design, and that Tan used an identical wrapper in his business. He prayed for preliminary injunction in addition to damages, he
asked that Tan be restrained from using the wrapper
Tan filed an opposition, stating that Ong was not entitled to an injunction since Ong did not have a clear right over the use of
the trademark Pagoda and Lungkow vermicelli as these were registered in the name of CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS OIL AND
FOODSTUFFS IMPORT AND EXPORT CORPORATION, SHANDONG CEREALS AND OILS BRANCH.

ISSUE:
· W/N the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent was proper?

HELD: Petition is partially granted. The prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Tan from using the cellophane
wrapper with two-dragon device is denied, but the finding of the respondent appellate court that Ong’s copyrighted wrapper is
a copy of that of Ceroilfood Shandong is SET ASIDE for being premature. Case was remanded to RTC.

RATIO:
A person to be entitled to a copyright must be the original creator of the work. He must have created it by his own skill,
labor and judgment without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. The copies of the certificates of
copyright registered in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong sufficiently raise reasonable doubt. With such a doubt, the preliminary
injunction asked by Ong against Tan is unavailing.
To be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In this case, the Court found that petitioner’s right has not been
clearly and unmistakably demonstrated.

The Court added it was premature for the CA to declare that the design of petitioner’s wrapper is a copy of the wrapper allegedly
registered by Ceroilfood Shandong. The only issue brought before the CA involved the grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by the trial court in granting the writ of preliminary injunction, and not on the merits of the infringement case. That
matter remains for decision after appropriate proceedings at the trial court.

6. G.R. No. 132604 March 6, 2002 VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment
Enterprises, petitioner, vs. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., and LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.), INC., respondents.

Venancio Sambar, doing business under the name and style of CVS Garment Ent. vs. Levi Strauss & Co. and Levi Strauss (Phil.) Inc.
Doctrine: To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own
skill, labor and judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another.

Facts:

Private respondents, through a letter, demanded that CVS Garment Enterprises (CVSGE) desist from using their stitched
arcuate design on the Europress jeans which CVSGE advertised in the Manila Bulletin. CVSGE asserted that the arcuate design
on the back pockets of the Europress jeans was different than that of Levi’s and that CVSGE had a copyright on the design it
was using.

Private respondents allege that Levi Strauss and Co. (LS&Co.), an internationally known clothing manufacturer, owns the
arcuate design trademark which was registered under U.S. Trademark Registration and in the Principal Register of trademarks
with the Philippine Patent Office; and that CVSGIC* and Venancio Sambar, without the consent and authority of private
respondents and in infringement and unfair competition, sold and advertised, and despite demands to cease and desist,
continued to manufacture, sell and advertise denim pants under the brand name Europress with back pockets bearing a design
similar to the arcuate trademark of private respondents, thereby causing confusion on the buying public, prejudicial to private
respondents goodwill and property right.

*CVSGE already stopped operation and CVSGIC took over when the original summons was served.

CVSGIC admitted it manufactured, sold and advertised and was still manufacturing and selling denim pants under the brand
name of Europress, bearing a back pocket design of two double arcs meeting in the middle. However, it denied that there was
infringement or unfair competition because the display rooms of department stores where Levis and Europress jeans were
sold were distinctively segregated by billboards and other modes of advertisement. CVSGIC avers that the public would not be
confused on the ownership of such known trademark as Levis, Jag, Europress, etc… Also, CVSGIC claimed that it had its own
original arcuate design, as evidenced by Copyright Registration No. 1-1998, which was very different and distinct from Levis
design.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which it later made permanent, restraining CVSGIC and Sambar
manufacturing, advertising and selling pants with the arcuate design on their back pockets and ordered CVSGIC and Sambar to
pay jointly and solidarily P50, 000 as temperate and nominal damages, P10, 000 as exemplary damages and P25, 000 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

The court granted private respondents’ MR praying for cancellation of petitioner’s copyright registration. CA decided in favor
of private respondents.

Issue: WON the cancellation of petitioner’s copyright is proper.

Ruling:
The award of damages and cancellation of petitioner’s copyright are appropriate. Award of damages is clearly provided in
Section 23 of RA 166 or Trade Mark Law while cancellation of petitioners copyright finds basis on the fact that the design was a
mere copy of that of private respondents trademark.

To be entitled to copyright, the thing being copyrighted must be original, created by the author through his own skill, labor and
judgment, without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another.

However, the Court agrees with petitioner that it was error for the CA to affirm the award of nominal damages combined with
temperate damages by the RTC. What respondents are entitled to is an award for temperate damages, not nominal
damages. For although the exact amount of damage or loss cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the fact that there
was infringement means they suffered losses for which they are entitled to moderate damages. We find that the award of P50,
000 as temperate damages fair and reasonable, considering the circumstances herein as well as the global coverage and
reputation of private respondents LS&Co. and Levi Strauss (Phil.), Inc.

7. G.R. No. 165306 September 20, 2005 MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC., Petitioners, vs. DADODETTE
ENTERPRISES AND/OR HERMES SPORTS CENTER, Respondent.

Facts: Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"), a Delaware, United States corporation, owns the copyright and trademark to
several computer software
Microsoft and Beltron entered into a Licensing Agreement ("Agreement")
Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to:
(i) xxx reproduce and install no more than one (1) copy of [Microsoft] software on each Customer System hard disk or Read
Only Memory ("ROM"); [and]
(ii) xxx distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of the Product (reproduced as per Section 2(a)(i) and/or acquired
from Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor) in object code form to end users[.]
The Agreement also authorized Microsoft and Beltron to terminate the contract if the other fails to comply with any of the
Agreement's provisions. Microsoft terminated the Agreement effective 22 June 1995 for Beltron's non-payment of royalties.
Microsoft learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft software.
The receipt issued to Sacriz and Samiano... for the CPU and monitor bore the heading "T.M.T.C. (PHILS.) INC. BELTRON
COMPUTER.
Microsoft applied for search warrants against respondents in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila... the NBI searched
the premises of Beltron and TMTC and seized several computer-related hardware, software, accessories, and paraphernalia.
Among these were 2,831 pieces of CD-ROMs... containing Microsoft software.
Microsoft and a certain Lotus Development Corporation ("Lotus Corporation") charged respondents before the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") with copyright infringement under Section 5(A) in relation to Section 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 49, as amended, ("PD 49")[18] and with unfair competition under Article 189(1)[19] of the Revised Penal Code.
Microsoft alleged that respondents illegally... copied and sold Microsoft software.
respondents moved to quash Search Warrant Nos. 95-684 and 95-685. The RTC partially granted their motion in its Order of
16 April 1996. Microsoft sought reconsideration but the RTC denied Microsoft's motion
In its Decision of 29 November 2001, the Court of Appeals granted Microsoft's appeal and set aside the RTC Orders
DOJ State Prosecutor Jocelyn A. Ong ("State Prosecutor Ong") recommended the dismissal of Microsoft's complaint for lack of
merit and insufficiency of evidence.
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Lualhati R. Buenafe ("Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Buenafe") approved State Prosecutor
Ong's recommendations.
Microsoft appealed to the Office of the DOJ Secretary. In the Resolution of 3 August 2000, DOJ Undersecretary Regis V. Puno
dismissed Microsoft's appeal
Issues:
Whether the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to charge respondents with copyright
infringement and unfair competition.
Ruling:
The DOJ Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion... in not Finding Probable Cause to Charge Respondents with
Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition
Unlike the higher quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt required to secure a conviction, it is the lower standard of
probable cause which is applied during the preliminary investigation to determine whether the accused should be held for
trial.
Section 5[39] of PD 49 ("Section 5") enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJ's
ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized "manufacturing" of intellectual works but
rather the... unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts
under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owner's prior consent renders himself civilly[40] and criminally[41]... liable
for copyright infringement... under Section 5(A), a copyright owner is vested with the exclusive right to "copy, distribute,
multiply, [and] sell" his intellectual works.
the elements of unfair competition under Article 189(1)[43] of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the (3)
device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their appearance[;]
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a
like purpose[; and]
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.
The element of intent to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods or their appearance
Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its rights in filing the complaint
Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ... to hold... the filing of the complaint under I.S. No. 96-193, merely to pressure Beltron
to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft.
There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior "resolution from the proper court of (sic) whether or not
the [Agreement] is still binding between the parties."... some of the counterfeit CD-ROMs bought from respondents were
"installer" CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software only or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft software. These articles are
counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone... to) produce such CD-ROMs
The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CD-ROMs and their distribution are illegal even if the
copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee.
The Court finds that the 12 CD-ROMs ("installer" and "non-installer") and the CPU with pre-installed Microsoft software...
suffice to support a finding of probable... cause to indict respondents for copyright infringement under Section 5(A) in relation
to Section 29 of PD 49 for unauthorized copying and selling of protected intellectual works.
The installer CD-ROMs with Microsoft software, to repeat, are counterfeit per se.
On the other hand, the illegality of the "non-installer" CD-ROMs purchased from respondents and of the Microsoft software
pre-installed in the CPU is shown by the absence of the standard features accompanying authentic Microsoft products, namely,
the Microsoft end-user license... agreements, user's manuals, registration cards or certificates of authenticity.
Being a mere reproducer/installer of one Microsoft software copy on each customer's hard disk or ROM, Beltron could only
have acquired the hundreds of Microsoft
CD-ROMs found in respondents' possession from Microsoft distributors or replicators.
However, respondents makes no such claim. What respondents contend is that these CD-ROMs were left to them for
safekeeping. But neither is this claim tenable for lack of substantiation.
These circumstances give rise to the reasonable inference that respondents mass-produced the CD-ROMs in question without
securing Microsoft's prior authorization.
Principles:
the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized "manufacturing" of intellectual works but rather the...
unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under
Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owner's prior consent renders himself civilly[40] and criminally[41]... liable for
copyright infringement.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and,
therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists
in the doing by... any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is
conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.
8. G.R. No. 175769-70 January 19, 2009 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE MULTI-
MEDIA SYSTEM, INC., CESAR G. REYES, FRANCIS CHUA (ANG BIAO), MANUEL F. ABELLADA, RAUL B. DE MESA, AND
ALOYSIUS M. COLAYCO, Respondents.

Facts: Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc. (PMSI), operator of Dream Broadcsating System, delivers a digital direct-to-home
(DTH) television satellite to its subscribers all over the Philippines, was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 8630
and was given a Provisional Authority by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to install, operate and maintain
a nationwide DTH satellite service. When it commenced operations, it offered as part of its program line-up, together with
other paid premium program channels, ABS-CBN Channels 2 and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC, Channel 5, GMA, Channel 7, RPN,
Channel 9, and IBC, Channel 13, pursuant to Memorandum Circular 4-08-88 which mandated all cable television system
operators, operating within the Grade “A” and “B” CONTOURS to carry out the television signals of the authorized television
broadcast stations.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), a licensed television and radio broadcasting network, demanded PMSI to cease
and desist from “rebroadcasting” Channels 2 and 23. In its reply, PMSI contended that the “rebroadcasting” was in accordance
with the authority granted by NTC under its obligations under NTC MC 4-08-88.

Negotiations were ensued between the parties in an effort to reach a settlement; however, the same was terminated by ABS-
CBN allegedly due to PMSI’s inability to ensure the prevention of illegal “retransmission” and further “rebroadcast” of its
signals, as well as the adverse effect of the rebroadcasts on the business operations of its regional television stations.

ABS-CBN filed with the Intellectual Property Rights Office (IPO) a complaint for “Violation of Laws Involving Property Rights,
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction” alleging that PMSI’s
unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright. The TRO was granted by
the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of IPO. PMSI, pursuant to the TRO, suspended the retransmission of PMSI of Channels 2 and
23 and likewise filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of PMSI and
reversed the decision of the BLA. ABS-CBN filed its appeal however it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore,
ABS-CBN’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
1. Whether or not PMSI violated the Laws on Property Rights.
2. Whether or not the issuance MC 4-08-88 by the NTC is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

Held:

1. NO. PMSI did not violate the Laws on Property Rights because it is not engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
Rebroadcasting has been defined as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of
another broadcasting organization.” It is also “the transmission by wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of
images or of representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are
provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent.” PMSI is only engaged in the carrying of signals of
ABS-CBN coming from ABS-CBN and transmitting signals. PMSI is not the origin nor does it claim to be the origin of the
programs broadcasted by the ABS-CBN. PMSI did not make and transmit on its own but merely carried the existing signals of
the ABS-CBN. When PMSI subscribers view ABS-CBN’s programs in Channels 2 and 23, they know that the origin thereof was
the ABS-CBN.
The nature of broadcasting is to scatter the signals in its widest area of coverage as possible. On this score, it may be said that
making public means that accessibility is undiscriminating as long as it is within the range of the transmitter and equipment of
the broadcaster. That the medium through which the PMSI carries the ABS-CBN’s signal, that is via satellite, does not diminish
the fact that it operates and functions as a cable television. It remains that the PMSI’s transmission of signals via its DTH
satellite television service cannot be considered within the purview of broadcasting.

Furthermore, there is no rebroadcasting on the part of the PMSI of the ABS-CBM’s programs on Channels 2 and 23, as defined
under the Rome Convention, which defines rebroadcasting as “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting
organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI
merely carries such signals which the viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the
programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or author of such programs.
Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-
08-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its
viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged
in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.

Therefore, the retransmission of ABS-CBN’s signals by PMSI – which functions essentially as a cable television – does not
constitute rebroadcasting in violation of the former’s intellectual property rights under the IP Code.

2. YES. The law on copyright is not absolute. The carriage of ABS-CBN’s signals by virtue of the must-carry rule in
Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 is under the direction and control of the government though the NTC which is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction to supervise, regulate and control telecommunications and broadcast services/facilities in the
Philippines. The imposition of the must-carry rule is within the NTC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations, as public
safety and interest may require, to encourage a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective competition among private entities in these activities whenever the
Commission finds it reasonably feasible.

The “Must-Carry Rule” is in consonance with the principles and objectives underlying Executive Order No. 436, to wit:

The Filipino people must be given wider access to more sources of news, information, education, sports event and
entertainment programs other than those provided for by mass media and afforded television programs to attain a well
informed, well-versed and culturally refined citizenry and enhance their socio-economic growth.

Moreover, radio and television waves are mere franchised which may be reasonably burdened with some form of public
service. It is a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional
provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress
when the common good so requires.”

The must carry rule is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. It favors both broadcasting organizations and the public.
It prevents cable television companies from excluding broadcasting organization especially in those places not reached by
signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television companies from depriving viewers in far-flung areas the enjoyment of programs
available to city viewers. In fact, this Office finds the rule more burdensome on the part of the cable television companies. The
latter carries the television signals and shoulders the costs without any recourse of charging. On the other hand, the signals
that are carried by cable television companies are dispersed and scattered by the television

9. G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015 ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. FELIPE GOZON, GILBERTO R. DUAVIT, JR.,
MARISSA L. FLORES, JESSICA A. SORO, GRACE DELA PENA-REYES, JOHN OLIVER T. MANALASTAS, JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, Respondents.

Facts:
On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of copyright
infringement under Sections 177 and
211 of the Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293, as amended), because the respondent aired footage of the arrival and
homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an
agreement with Reuter's that the petition will contribute news and content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of
the latter's news and video material, and Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country.

The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and CNN live feeds. After it received the live feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and
homecoming from Reuter's, it immediately aired the video from that news feed. The respondent alleged that its news staff was
not aware that there was (a news embargo) agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters. Respondent alleged that it was not also
aware that it aired petitioner's footage.

Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued resolution on 3 December 2004 which found probable cause to indict Dela
Penñ a-Reyes and Manalastas. The respondents appealed the Prosccutor's resolution before DOJ. DOJ Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents in his resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held that good faith may be raised as a
defense in the case.

Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued a resolution on 29 June

2010 which reversed Sec. Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Penñ a-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to
indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for violation of the Intellectual Property Code (due to copyright infringement).

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on 9 November 2010, which granted the
Petition for Certiorari to reverse and set aside DOJ Sec. Alberto Agra's resolution and a prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

The appellate court stated that the petitioner has copyright of its news coverage, but respondents’ act of airing five (5) seconds
of the homecoming footage without notice of the “No Access Philippines” restriction of the live Reuter's video feed, was
undeniably attended by good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under the Intellectual Property Code.

ISSUES
W/N there is probable cause to find respondents to be held liable criminally for the case of copyright infringement
under the Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293, as amended)?

HELD
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBN’s petition and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to continue with the criminal
proceedings against Grace Dela Penñ aReyes and John Oliver Manalastas due to copyright infringement. The other respondents,
Atty. Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit Jr., Marissa L. Flores, and Jessica A. Soho were held not liable for the (criminal) act of
copyright infringement. The Court held that their mere membership in GMA7's Board of Directors does not mean that they
have knowledge, approval, or participation in the criminal act of copyright infringement as there is a need for their
direct/active participation in such act. Also, there was lack of proof that they actively participated or exercised moral
ascendancy over Manalastas and Dela Cruz-Pena. Contrary to GMA’s contention, the Supreme Court deemed GMA's mere act of
rebroadcast of ABS-CBN’s news footage (arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq last 22 July
2004) for 2 mins and 40 secs.without the latter's authority creates probable cause to find GMA's news personnel Manalastas
and Dela Penñ a-Reyes criminally liable for violating provisions of Intellectual Property Code (Section 216¬217 of RA 8293,
as amended) that imposes strict liability for copyright infringement, since they have not been diligent in their functions to
prevent that footage from being aired on television. They knew that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s
footage in their broadcast – which is why they allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN’s logo and reporter.
The difference of an act mala in se and mala prohibita was stated in the present case. Acts mala in se requires presence of
criminal intent and the person's knowledge of the nature of his/her act, while in acts mala prohibita, presence of criminal
intent and the person's knowledge is not necessary. The Court also stated that Philippine laws on copyright infringement does
not require criminal intent (mens rea) and does not support good faith as a defense. Thus, the act of infringement and not the
intent is the one that causes the damage. It held that ABS-CBN's video footage is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual
works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making
audiovisual recordings.” It also stated that news or the event itself is not copyrightable. The Court differentiated idea and
expression – idea meant as “a form, the look or appearance of a thing” while expression is its reality or the “external,
perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that others can understand.” Thus, the Supreme Court
stated that “only the expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea itself”, citing the US Supreme Court's decision
in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. 99). In the present case, expression applies to the event captured and presented in a specific
medium via cinematography or processes analogous to it. The Court also gave the four-fold test under the Fair Use Doctrine
(stated in section 185 of RA 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code, as amended) to determine fair use: a. The purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; b. The
nature of the copyrighted work; c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Fair use, which is an
exception to copyright owner’s monopoly of the work's usage, was defined by the Supreme Court as privilege to use the
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the copyright owner's consent or by copying the material's theme or
idea rather than its expression. It also said that determination of whether the Angelo dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is
better left to the trial court where the proceedings are currently pending.

10. G.R. No. 166391 OCTOBER 21, 2015 MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. ROLANDO D. MANANSALA and/or
MEL MANANSALA, doing business as DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY, Respondent

Facts: Petitioner (Microsoft Corporation) is the copyright and trademark owner of all rights relating to all versions and
editions of Microsoft software (computer programs) such as, but not limited to, MSDOS (disk operating system), Microsoft
Encarta, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, Microsoft Works, Microsoft Powerpoint,
Microsoft Office, Microsoft Flight Simulator and Microsoft FoxPro, among others, and their user’s guide/manuals

Private Respondent-Rolando Manansala is doing business under the name of DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC
ALLEY with business address at 3rd Floor, University Mall Building, Taft Ave., Manila. Private Respondent Manansala, without
authority from petitioner, was engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs.

Mr. John Benedict A. Sacriz, a private investigator accompanied by an agent from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
was able to purchase six (6) CD-ROMs containing various computer programs belonging to petitioner. As a result of the test-
purchase, the agent from the NBI applied for a search warrant to search the premises of the private respondent.

a Search Warrant was issued and served on the private respondent’s premises and yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft
programs. Subsequently, petitioner, through Atty. Teodoro Kalaw IV filed an Affidavit-Complaint in the DOJ based on the results
of the search and seizure operation conducted on private respondent’s premises.

However, in a Resolution dated March 20, 2000, public respondent State Prosecutor dismissed the charge against private
respondent for violation of Section 29 P.D. 49 in this wise, to quote: ‘The evidence is extant in the records to show that
respondent is selling Microsoft computer software programs bearing the copyrights and trademarks owned by Microsoft
Corporation. There is, however, no proof that respondent was the one who really printed or copied the products of
complainant for sale in his store. WHEREFORE, it is hereby, recommended that respondent be charged for violation of Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge for violation of Section 29 of PD No. 49 is recommended dismissed for lack of
evidence.’

Issue: The petitioner insists that printing or copying was not essential in the commission of the crime of copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49; hence, contrary to the holding of the DOJ, as upheld by the CA, the
mere selling of pirated computer software constituted copyright infringement.

Held: yes, Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged theexistence of computer programs as works or creations
protected by copyright. To hold, as the CA incorrectly did, that the legislative intent was to require that the computer programs
be first photographed, photo-engraved, or pictorially illustrated as a condition for the commission of copyright infringement
invites ridicule. Such interpretation of Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49 defied logic and common sense because it
focused on terms like “copy,” “multiply,” and “sell,” but blatantly ignored terms like “photographs,” “photo-engravings,” and
“pictorial illustrations.” Had the CA taken the latter words into proper account, it would have quickly seen the absurdity of its
interpretation

The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to show the existence of probable cause for
copyright infringement. There was no need for the petitioner to still prove who copied, replicated or reproduced the software
programs. Indeed, the public prosecutor and the DOJgravely abused their discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s charge for
copyright infringement against the respondents for lack of evidence. There was grave abuse of discretion because the public
prosecutor and the DOJ acted whimsically or arbitrarily in disregarding the settled jurisprudential rules on finding the
existence of probable cause to charge the offender in court. Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ of
the petitioner’s petition for review. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
11. G.R. No. 195835, March 14, 2016 SISON OLAÑO, SERGIO T. ONG, MARILYN O. GO, AND JAP FUK HAI, Petitioners, v.
LIM ENG CO, Respondent

Facts: The petitioners are the officers and/or directors of Metrotech Steel Industries, Inc. (Metrotech).6 Lim Eng Co
(respondent), on the other hand, is the Chairman of LEC Steel Manufacturing Corporation (LEC), a company which specializes
in architectural metal manufacturing. Sometime in 2002, LEC was invited by the architects of the Manansala Project (Project),
a high-end residential building in Rockwell Center, Makati City, to submit design/drawings and specifications for interior and
exterior hatch doors. LEC complied by submitting on July 16, 2002, shop plans/drawings, including the diskette therefor,
embodying the designs and specifications required for the metal hatch doors.8 After a series of consultations and revisions, the
final shop plans/drawings were submitted by LEC on January 15, 2004 and thereafter copied and transferred to the title block
of Ski-First Balfour Joint Venture (SKI-FB), the Project's contractor, and then stamped approved for construction on February 3,
2004.9 LEC was thereafter subcontracted by SKI-FB, to manufacture and install interior and exterior hatch doors for the 7 th to
22nd floors of the Project based on the final shop plans/drawings.10 Sometime thereafter, LEC learned that Metrotech was
also subcontracted to install interior and exterior hatch doors for the Project's 23rd to 41st floors.11 On June 24, 2004, LEC
demanded Metrotech to cease from infringing its intellectual property rights. Metrotech, however, insisted that no copyright
infringement was committed because the hatch doors it manufactured were patterned in accordance with the drawings
provided by SKI-FB.12

A Copyright certificate was issued to LEC showing that it is the registered owner of plans/drawings or interior and exterior
hatch doors, This copyright pertains to class work "I" under Section 172 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, The Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, which covers "illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and threedimensional works
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science."

When Metrotech still refused to stop fabricating hatch doors based on LEC's shop plans/drawings, the latter sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which in turn applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 24.

On August 13, 2004, the respondent filed a ComplaintAffidavit17 before the DOJ against the petitioners for copyright
infringement.

Traversing the complaint, the petitioners admitted manufacturing hatch doors for the Project. They denied, however, that they
committed copyright infringement and averred that the hatch doors they manufactured were functional inventions that are
proper subjects of patents and that the records of the Intellectual Property Office reveal that there is no patent, industrial
design or utility model registration on LEC's hatch doors. Metrotech further argued that the manufacturing of hatch doors per
se is not copyright infringement because copyright protection does not extend to the objects depicted in the illustrations and
plans. Moreover, there is no artistic or ornamental expression embodied in the subject hatch doors that would subject them to
copyright protection.19

Issue:

Held: A copyright refers to “the right granted by a statute to the proprietor of an intellectual production to its exclusive
use and enjoyment to the extent specified in the statute.” Under Section 177 of R.A. No. 8293, the Copyright or
Economic Rights consist of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the following acts: 177.1 Reproduction of
the work or substantial portion of the work; 177.2 Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or
other transformation of the work; 177.3 The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale or
other forms of transfer of ownership; 177.4 Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic work, a
work embodied in a sound recording, a computer program, a compilation of data and other materials or a musical work
in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy which is the subject of the rental; 177.5 Public
display of the original or a copy of the work; 177.6 Public performance of the work; and 177.7 Other communication to
the public of the work

Copyright infringement is thus committed by any person who shall use original literary or artistic works, or derivative
works, without the copyright owner’s consent in such a manner as to violate the foregoing copy and economic rights. For
a claim of copyright infringement to prevail, the evidence on record must demonstrate: (1) ownership of a validly
copyrighted material by the complainant; and (2) infringement of the copyright by the respondent

—Since the hatch doors cannot be considered as either illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional
works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science, to be properly classified as a copyrightable class “I”
work, what was copyrighted were their sketches/drawings only, and not the actual hatch doors themselves. To constitute
infringement, the usurper must have copied or appropriated the original work of an author or copyright proprietor,
absent copying, there can be no infringement of copyright. “Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the
art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea — not the idea itself.”

“Ownership of copyrighted material isshown by proof of originality and copyrightability.” While it is true that where the
complainant presents a copyright certificate in support of the claim of infringement, the validity and ownership of the
copyright is presumed. This presumption, however, is rebuttable and it cannot be sustained where other evidence in the
record casts doubt on the question of ownership, as in the instant case. Moreover, “[t]he presumption of validity to a
certificate of copyright registration merely orders the burden of proof. The applicant should not ordinarily be forced, in
the first instance, to prove all the multiple facts that underline the validity of the copyright unless the respondent,
effectively challenging them, shifts the burden of doing so to the applicant.”

A “useful article” defined as an article “having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information” is excluded from copyright eligibility. The only instance when a useful
article may be the subject of copyright protection is when it incorporates a design element that is physically or
conceptually separable from the underlying product. This means that the utilitarian article can function without the
design element. In such an instance, the design element is eligible for copyright protection. The design of a useful article
shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article

In the present case, LEC’s hatch doors bore no design elements that are physically and conceptually separable,
independent and distinguishable from the hatch door itself. The allegedly distinct set of hinges and distinct jamb, were
related and necessary hence, not physically or conceptually separable from the hatch door’s utilitarian function as an
apparatus for emergency egress. Without them, the hatch door will not function. More importantly, they are already
existing articles of manufacture sourced from different suppliers. Based on the records, it is unrebutted that: (a) the
hinges are similar to those used in truck doors; (b) the gaskets were procured from a company named Pemko and are not
original creations of LEC; and (c) the locking device are ordinary drawer locks commonly used in furniture and office
desks. Being articles of manufacture already in existence, they cannot be deemed as original creations. As earlier stated,
valid copyright ownership denotes originality of the copyrighted material. Originality means that the material was not
copied, evidences at least minimal creativity and was independently created by the author. It connotes production as a
result of independent labor. LEC did not produce the door jambs and hinges; it bought or acquired them from suppliers
and thereafter affixed them to the hatch doors. No independent original creation can be deduced from such acts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.