ESSHC Vienna 2014

Session V-10 - RUR09:

Private Credit and Social Change in the Countryside.

Indebted landlords or rentiers with a new strategy? Landlords in the face of the
agrarian crisis at the end of the 19th century. The Catalan example.

Ricard Garcia-Orallo
Centre de Recerca d’Història Rural – University of Girona
ricard.garcia@udg.ed

Introduction1

During the last third of the 19th century Catalonia's large landed estates were subject to
significant stresses. In a process that much of Europe also experienced, the fall in the prices
of agricultural products and the rise in agricultural wages reduced profitability of agricultural
estates. Historical research has shown that this situation resulted in the “defeat of the rentier”
which led to the liquidation of many rural estates, either voluntarily or as the result of a final
spiralling of debts (Cannadine, 1990; Hubscher, 1979; Desert, 1976; Thebault, 2002; Villares,
1982; Robledo, 1999; Saguer, 1998). At the same time, certain groups of small tenants
gained ownership of the land. Niek Koning (1994) in his study of Holland, Great Britain, the
United States and Germany, has viewed this double phenomenon as a demonstration of the
failure of agrarian capitalism, understood this to be a system in which the leading role was
played by large farms worked by hired labour.2 Small farms demonstrated a greater capacity
to adapt to changing conditions in the agricultural markets, even when having to resort to a
higher degree of self-exploitation. Likewise, this would explain why many owners of large
properties gave up on the direct exploitation of their lands and chose to assign contracts
such as those of share-cropping (Garrabou, Planas, Saguer, 2012).

However, although the differences in trajectories are considerable with respect to the various
regions, the territorial aristocracy continued to play a prominent role in the development of
capitalism in Western Europe even at the start of the 20th century (Malatesta, 2004). This
evidence requires the continued study of other possible factors, beyond the transformations
of agricultural markets, which could have caused the bankruptcy of some of the large
landowners and not others. Were the owners who sold their assets or who lost them after
painful lawsuits examples of a purely rentier mindset, unable to compete in a new economic
context?

1
This work forms part of the research project The processes of impoverishment and enrichment in
rural societies. An analysis of social dynamics in history. The project is funded by the Catalan
government's Ministry of Science and Innovation (HAR2011-25077) and is under the leadership of the
principal researcher Rosa Congost Colomer.
2
For Catalonia, see Garrabou, Planas, Saguer, 2001.

1
When attempting to answer questions such as these, one of the principal obstacles is the
lack of knowledge, even today, regarding the volume and fluidity of relations between various
economic sectors, such as those that linked the urban and rural worlds. Little is known, for
example, on how industrial and financial business cycles were transmitted to the rural
environment, given the negligible presence of institutional credit in the rural capital market.
Spanish and Catalan historiographies have traditionally insisted on a contrary causative
relationship: the agrarian crisis impacted on the secondary and tertiary sectors through the
fall in demand of a largely rural population, within the framework of a structurally backward
agriculture that was unable to increase surpluses. As is well known, this is a classic
interpretation that faults the primary sector for the failure of the Spanish economic
transformation during the 19th century (Nadal, 1975). During the last few decades, however,
Spanish agrarian historians have, for the most part, revised this interpretation and have
brought more attention to many other factors, including those originating in non-agrarian
sectors (Pujol et al, 2001). This historiographical evolution is similar to that experienced by
the Italian case (Carter, 2011).

For a long time it was British historiography that had most profoundly studied the
interrelationships between the various economic sectors and areas. Tom Nicholas (1999) and
Julia Smith (2000) have debated the importance of land purchases by British businessmen
during the Victorian era, picking up on H. J. Habakkuk's (1940) classic theme and discussed
by, amongst others, W. D. Rubinstein (1961) and F. M. L. Thompson (1963). The literature
that deals explicitly and systematically with the opposite position, that is to say, with the
investments made by representatives of the great landed estates in non-agricultural sectors,
appears to be less abundant (Lieven, 1993; Ward and Wilson, 1971; Rothery, 2007). The old
approach regarding the greater or lesser degree of persistence of feudal traits in Western
European societies has been gradually replaced by the question of up to what point had the
traditional large landed estates and the relatively new bourgeoisie fortunes converged into a
single landed aristocracy (Malatesta, 2004).

Within the Catalan sphere the approaches to the cross-relationships between economic
sectors have been primarily studied in regard to the political and economic elites (Solà, 1977;
McDonogh, 1989). Such studies include some commentaries on the agrarian or landowning
bourgeoisie. Somewhat more tangentially, the question is also addressed in some analyses
regarding the distribution of land ownership (Segura, 1993) or in the management of some
the large agricultural estates (Garrabou, Planas and Saguer, 2001).3 A good many of these
studies appear to agree in demonstrating that the privileged groups of the Catalan economy,
independent of the sector of their primary activity, shared some fundamental interests, such
as a common ideology on many aspects that defined them as the dominant class. It has
been some time since Ramon Garrabou reflected that “it makes little sense to separate
between the industrial, commercial, financial and agrarian bourgeoisie [in that] a fusion was
created around basic and fundamental interests of all of the different types of owners that
appeared during the 19th century” (quoted by Segura, 1993: 215). Àngels Solà, one of the
most knowledgeable authorities on the economic elites of 19th century Barcelona, for the
most part assumed that this perspective encompassed the different types of “owners”,

3
Another possible avenue of study is that developed by Llorenç Ferrer (2011), although his study is
not focused on the economic elites, but on the processes of industrialisation in the comarca (county)
of Bages, province of Barcelona, in which following the trajectories of various families plays a key role.
In his work, the fluidity of interchanges between agriculture and industry is very apparent.

2
including the old landed gentry, under the designation of “plural bourgeoisie” (Solà, 1995).
Probably, however, a detailed analysis is still lacking that would allow a definite confirmation
of this conclusion.

This paper has as its objective the examination of a group of owners of large landed estates
in the provinces of Barcelona and Girona, and to investigate their trajectories during the
second half of the 19th century and first few years of the 20th. The first section examines the
difficulties experienced by the said social group during the agrarian crisis at the end of the
19th century and examines, through a prosopographical exercise, some of the characteristics
of the owners whose assets were sold at auctioned as a result of having incurred unpaid
debts. In the second section the levels of diversification of income sources for the 50
principal taxpayers of Girona province are analysed for the year 1875. The third section
focuses on one of the possible placements, that of financial assets, for the investments of the
large landowners. The fourth, and final, section demonstrates how the evolution of the
number of large-estate auctions was linked to the convulsions experienced by the financial
markets. The paper ends with some necessarily tentative conclusions.

1. The effects of the crisis at the end of the 19th century on indebted property

In 19th century Catalan rural society household debt probably remained a structural, everyday
and pervasive phenomenon, just as it had in previous centuries (Congost, 1990: 93). In any
era, the total aggregate of loans in the rural environment is constituted by a combination of
credits directed at fixed-capital acquisitions (land purchases, technological improvements),
the financing of working capital (to address the seasonality of the agricultural cycle, for
example), or to satisfy consumer needs (Ray, 2002: 517). Within the realm of Catalan
privileged society as a cause of indebtedness should be included the cost associated with
the construction or remodelling of homes and also, dominant in Catalonia, certain family
obligations dictated by the sole-heir system, such as payments to non-firstborn children or
the need to provide daughters with dowries (Congost, 1990: 226). In whatever case, the
diversity of factors that could lead to indebtedness makes it difficult to use this variable as an
indicator of the economic situation: Was a higher level of indebtedness the result of an
economic downturn? Or, on the contrary, did it indicate improved expectations that lead to
greater confidence and translated into more investments? Quite some time ago, F. M. L.
Thompson discussed the scope and significance of the indebtedness of the English
aristocracy during the 19th century diminishing the importance of the phenomenon, against
those who saw the situation as a clear example of profound changes in social behaviour.
Thompson stated that a high level of indebtedness was to some extent inherent to large
properties and could even be viewed as an indicator of prosperity. The problem was to find
an equilibrium level between the volume of debt and a current income that could meet the
costs of carrying the debt. From Thompson's point of view, debt loads reached disastrous
levels relatively infrequently.4

From this point of view, a more useful way of evaluating the impact of the late-19th century
crisis on the rural economy is to quantify the number of judicial proceedings instigated by
unpaid debts (Abel, 1974). That is why the publication date of the auction listing, at the end of

4
The debate is examined in Cannadine (1977).

3
the corresponding judicial proceeding for debt recovery, marks the final failure of the debtor's
attempts at refinancing their financial obligations. Regardless of when the said obligations
originated, the date of when the economic difficulties of the debtor are made public signified
a point of no return for the estates in question. Under these assumptions, the annual
variations in the numbers of auctions, whose publication was obligatory according to
prescribed procedures, is a good indicator of the overall financial situation.5

In fact, during the period under study there was a significant increase in judicial rulings which
led to the auctioning of the assets of debtors who had been prosecuted for unpaid debts
(Garcia-Orallo, 2009). After more than a decade, from 1886 to 1896, in which the judicial
proceedings were almost triple the previous levels, toward the end of the century the
situation began to improve, following the recovery of the prices for agricultural products. The
fact that different paths for judicial districts can be discerned, as shown in Figure 1,
depending on whether the cultivation of vines or cereals predominated in the district, allows
for defending the existence of a link between the evolution of the numbers of auctions and
the agricultural situation.

Figure 1
Judicial auctions of goods and rights of a rural nature in judicial jurisdictions in
cereal-growing and wine-making areas of the provinces of Barcelona and Girona
(100 = 1875-1905; centred moving averages of 5 years)

The cereal-growing judicial districts include: Berga, La Bisbal, Girona, Olot, Puigcerdà, Santa
Coloma de Farners and Vic; the wine-making districts include: Igualada, Manresa, Mataró,
Sabadell, Sant Feliu de Llobregat, Terrassa, Vilafranca del Penedès and Vilanova i la Geltrú.
Source: Garcia-Orallo, 2009: 122; Balcells,1968: 287-91; Garrabou, Tello, Roca, 1999: 451-2.

5
The Civil Procedures Act of 1881 (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) stipulated the publication of the edicts
of announcement for auctions, resulting from any judicial proceeding, in the Official Bulletin of the
province.

4
Can the same conclusions be made with respect to the financial difficulties of the large
landowners? To answer that question this study selected, from a total of 2,794 judicial
proceedings which concluded in auction sales in the two provinces and whose
announcements were published between 1875 and 1905, on the one hand, those 128
proceedings where the properties in question had areas greater than 100 hectares—an area
which within the Catalan context can be characterised as a “large estate”.6 On the other
hand, included with the sampling of “great estates” is a subgroup of 68 other judicial
proceedings where the estates in question had values at auction that surpassed 100,000
pesetas and included a minimum land area of 5 hectares. Thus the intent was, to work with
those court proceedings that affected all types of “great landowners”, not just those that were
exclusively rural but always with those that had interests in rural areas.7

Figure 2
Judicial auctions of estates that included lands greater than 100 hectares,
or with assets valued at more than 100,000 pesetas and with at least 5 hectares of land.
18
12
16
11
14 30
7 21 29
12 10 16 28
6 9
10 15
27
8 17 20 23 32
26
6 19 25 33 37
5 8 14 18
4 1 4 13
2 22 24 31 35 36
2 3 34

0
1874 1876 1878 1880 1882 1884 1886 1888 1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 1906

Source: BOPB and BOPG, 1875-1905, and sources cited in the text.

The annual distribution of auction announcements for the selected 196 large estates is
shown in Figure 2. Of course, over time the same owner in financial difficulties could be
subject to various debt-collection procedures. In addition, the same owner could put up for
sale different properties or, on occasion, a property that had been subject to previous
procedures. As can be imagined, sifting through the original database, in order to detect
duplicate auctions on the same property that could inflate the aggregate data, constituted

6
For a commentary on the possible definition of “large estates” in Catalonia refer to Saguer (2006:
365-374).
7
The original database was composed of all the auction edicts published in the official bulletins of the
provinces of Barcelona and Girona between 1875 and 1905 that included goods of a rural character,
covered under this label were any rural real estate, but also other assets or rights located in
municipalities with a population of less than 5,000 inhabitants (according to the census of 1887).

5
one of the main tasks of this study. Moreover, in the cases of successive appearances of
owners, the graph shows the first year of the first edict of an auction announcement although
the owner may have put for sale assets that are worth less than in subsequent years, it is
understood that this was a difficult moment, a point of no return, for the indebted owner.
Finally, the graph shows the individual estates sorted from the lowest value, from the lower
part of the column, to the highest in the upper part (thus, for example, the one marked with a
7 corresponds to the estate of highest value auctioned in 1886).

To assess the social impact of such a number of financial failures by owners who can be
considered as belonging to the rural economic elite two elements at least should be taken
into consideration. First, the fact that the 196 cases under consideration affect property
located in 184 Catalan municipalities (about 20 percent of Catalan municipalities) and add up
to 33,090 hectares, almost 65 percent of the total area auctioned off during the period
(50,918 hectares). Secondly, judicial auctions for indebtedness represented for the whole of
the large landowners the visible tip of an iceberg under which, in all probability, would be
found a very large number of forced sales, conveyances of payments or other types of
agreements with creditors, which very often allowed debtors to avoid the humiliation of a
public auction.8

The changes in the number of large estates put up for auction annually, at first glance, seems
to support the classic thesis that the large landed estates suffered very visibly during the fin
de siècle agricultural situation. This translated into a dramatic reduction in the incomes of that
social group. Thus the two peaks shown in Figure 2, in the mid-1880s and the first half of the
1890s, could be related to the incidence in distinct geographic zones of differential changes
in the prices of wheat and wine, as shown in Figure 1. However, this hypothesis fails to
explain the phase, in the centre of the graph, where the two crisis in prices overlap and did
not result in major increase in the numbers of large-estate auctions, but on the contrary
coincides with a relative decrease in their numbers. Thus Figure 2 put into doubt that
agricultural situation was the only factor determining the frequency of auctions. Assuming
that the oscillation in numbers, which, in fact, are in absolute numbers quite low, not simply
the result of individual random cases: What other factors could have played a role in the
evolution of those numbers?

To answer this question it is essential to more closely examine each particular case.
Unfortunately, however, the announcement proclamations for the auctions are short on the
information regarding the debtor in question: limited in most cases to simply providing a
name and often not even the actual residence of the debtor. Under such conditions it is only
when the procedure has been made against a commercial enterprise or some other type of
company is there the assurance that the practical difficulties that led to the judicial execution
are not related to the agrarian situation. This situation corresponds to three of the cases that
are considered in the Figure (see the Appendix).

The data on auction goods is, generally, more abundant which allows for some comparisons
that can be useful in classifying debtors according to the types of assets that they owned. In

8
Of the 107 judicial enforcement proceedings for the collection of incurred debts heard by the
Juzgado de Primera Instancia in the town of Manresa in the period 1890-189, only nine of those cases
resulted in the publication of auction edicts in the official bulletin of the province.

6
this manner, it has been established that amongst the 196 estates in bankruptcy, there were
14 in which the auctioned assets included industrial infrastructure. The predominant type of
installations were textile factories, in at least six cases, followed by paper factories, in
another four cases (in two of which they formed part of the same estate with some of the
textile installations previously cited). Also sold at auction were two flour mills, two liqueur
distilleries, one cement factory and a pottery factory.

Other clues, provided by the edicts themselves, allow for going beyond what is provided by a
bare description of the assets to be auctioned. The type of judicial proceeding, for example,
indirectly provides useful information. Thus, procedures labelled as “bankruptcy”, as stated in
the Law of Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil), affected merchants and
corporations. This is the case in two other auctions.9 Including these two cases there are a
total of nineteen judicial proceedings that, mostly likely, were not entirely due to the agrarian
situation, since the respective auction edicts state that the persons affected also had non-
agricultural sources of income.

Obviously, another way of classifying the debtors subjected to judicial proceedings with
respect to their source of income is by attempting to find other documentary or bibliographic
evidence and then produce at least a minimal biography from which their principal
occupations can be deduced. This work, which is still in progress, has been the most
laborious part of the exercise. The results are presented under the “Observations” column of
the Appendix where the debtors in question are linked to Figure 2 by their assigned numbers.
Thus, it can be seen that 17 individuals have been identified as industrialists, businessmen
or investors with various assets, demonstrating the existence of diversified sources of income
and, in many cases, with assets that went much beyond the lands or other property seized in
the court proceedings. In five of these cases it has been found that the debtor in question
was an industrialist or a manufacturer—two of them in the cork sector, the other three were
involved in textiles, paper, and soap making respectively. In another five cases, the debtors
were mayor shareholders—in at least two of these cases the debtors were founders of their
respective companies—or senior officials of railway companies. To this group probably
should be added two other individuals, who were important “Indianos”—individuals whose
wealth originated in Spain's American colonies—established in the Garraf county (comarca),
and known for their notable investments in a wide range of activities, in addition to both being
ambitious buyers of real estate.10 In three cases, the imputed debtors are characterised by
their political involvement and by holding high public offices. This included a mayor of the city
of Barcelona and two separate governors of the provinces of Girona and Ciudad Real. The
group of identified debtors is rounded out by a small shareholder of the textile company La
España Industrial, a wine merchant and a prestigious architect.

Consequently, the 37 examples discussed in the previous paragraphs permit making an

initial conclusion: in a significant number of cases, the economic difficulties that led to the
auctioning of property and assets had little to do with the agrarian situation, contrary to what
could be deduced from the group of all debtors in Figure 1. Moreover, the verification of the

9
The label “concurso de acreedores”, literally “meeting of creditors”, raises some questions, given that
the procedure was intended for application against “non-merchants”, which could apply to hisendats
(great landowners) or to all kinds of businessmen not specifically merchants.
10
See the study on the role played by the capital of “Indianos” from Cuba in the Catalan economy in
Rodrigo (2007).

7
activities of many of the identified property owners permits deducing that they had diverse
social backgrounds, who in an effort to diversify their risks consented to other types of
investments. Some were members of the traditional landed elite, who in their efforts to
diversify risks had access to other types of investments. Others belonged to the commercial
or financial bourgeoisie that throughout the 19th century had seen investment opportunities in
certain types of agricultural operations or acquired their property in search of social
recognition.

However, the questions persist when considering the group of large landowners, with respect
to the examples that have been presented: Do they constitute exceptional cases that,
precisely for the risks that they undertook jumping from one economic sector to another, that
where then condemned to failure and their appearances in the judicial pages of the official
bulletins are examples of non-viable projects? Or were they, rather, examples of a
generalised strategy of diversification amongst the rural elites, regardless of their historical
background, which would explain that the numbers of auctions of large estates were less
sensitive to the agricultural situation than the overall numbers? There are no sources that
can provide in a direct manner an overall picture of the economic behaviour of the landed
classes. The approaches to the answers, therefore, must be made by selecting certain cases
that can be considered, to a greater or lesser degree, as being representative. In the
following section such an attempt is made, based on a sample of large landowners in the
province of Girona.

2. Diversification of income sources of the great Catalan landowners: the fifty principal
taxpayers in the province of Girona in 1875

One way to approach the study of the group of the largest landowners in the province of
Girona is to use the lists prepared by the Spanish Ministry of Finance during the second half
of the 19th century of individuals in each province who had contributed most to the Land Tax
(Contribución Territorial) (Congost, 1981).11 Although the lists are not completely accurate to
serve as a compilation of who could actually be considered to be at the top of society, they
do serve as a first approach for determining who were the local elites, especially in those
regions where the basis for social prestige, and social and political influence was still the
ownership of land.

11
The Tax on Property, Farms and Livestock (Contribución de Inmuebles, Cultivo y Ganadería), was
the result of the tax reforms of 1845, also known as the Land Tax (Contribución Territorial), and fell
mainly on rural properties and agricultural holdings, but was also levied on income derived from
ownership of urban real estate and livestock. It constituted, by far, the main source of income for the
Spanish state during the second half of the 19th century (Comín, 1988). Lists were produced of all
major taxpayers, compiled in all provinces and published in the Gaceta de Madrid and in the official
bulletin of each province, including a second digest with the 20 largest industrial and commercial
taxpayers. The lists had an electoral objective, as they listed the seventy people in each province who
could aspire to be elected as senators.

8
 Table 1
Principal taxpayers based on value of lands, houses and
livestock assets in the province of Girona (1875)

Rank Name AI AF D O
1 Pelayo Camps y de Matas
2 Joaquín de Carles
3 Manuel Benet Subirá
4 Conde de Perelada
5 Marqués de la Torre
6 Joaquín de Pastors
7 Diego de Moxó
8 Marqués de la Quadra
9 Conde de Solterra
10 Martín Guitó
11 Joaquín Olivas
12 Barón de les quatre Torres
13 Florencio Nouvilas
14 Melchor Ferrer
15 José lglesias
16 José de Falgás i Masanet
17 Joaquín de Ferrer
18 Salvador Torroella
19 Joaquín de Berenguer Benages y Camps
20 Marqués de Monistrol
21 José Pont de Viñals
22 Joaquín de Cárcer
23 Francisco Delás
24 Ramón Pujolá
25 Salvador Negre
26 Jacinto Descatllar
27 Narciso Fages de Roma
28 Joaquín de Senmenat
29 Francisco d'A. Llobet
30 Narciso de Pol
31 José Perxés
32 Marqués de Castillo de Torrente
33 Antonio Llambi
34 Juan Planas
35 José Felip y Moy
36 Francisco Javier Rosés
37 Alberto de Quintana
38 Ramón de Batlle
39 José María Barraquer
40 Joaquín de Cabirol
41 José de Verges del Vilar
42 Antonio Vidal de Llobatera
43 Antonio Vidal i Matlló
44 José Mundet
45 Manuel Laporta
46 Conde de Creixell
47 José Vall-llovera
48 Gumersindo Aromer
49 José Guitó y Llach

9
 50 Bonaventura Viñals

Columns: AI: activities of an industrial or commercial nature; AF: activities of a

financial nature; D: deputy or senator; O: other activities.
Source: Boletin Oficial de la Provincia de Gerona, November 26, 1875 and
sources cited in the text.

Of those available, the lists published in 1875 are the most comprehensive as they provide
the amounts of taxes paid by each individual in each municipality in which the taxpayer
owned property. The taxpayers corresponding to the province of Girona present, from the
outset, a high degree of diversity. Amongst them are representatives of the characteristic
Catalan minor nobility12, descendants of emphyteutic tenant families that had acquired their
fortunes over the previous centuries (Congost, 1997) and individuals from other economic
sectors that had only recently turned themselves in major landowners—during the process of
configuration of the Spanish liberal state.13 It is those diverse backgrounds that invite a closer
look at some of those individuals who are on the lists and examine, albeit somewhat
superficially, what were their sources of income beyond their rights to the products of the
land.

Table 1 shows, in broad terms, up to what point the province of Girona elites had diversified
their incomes during the last quarter of the 19th century. It can be seen that participation in
economic activities not strictly tied to agriculture were not unimportant, from it. At least eight
of the listed taxpayers can be linked to industrial-type activities; another seven, to the
financial sector; and five to some other types of investments.

From a general perspective, the industrialisation of the Gironese provincial economy was a
late phenomenon, of low intensity and of little comparison with what the neighbouring
province of Barcelona experienced during the course of the 19th century. Beyond this
affirmation, however, the cork-stopper industry should be mentioned, which had a strong
tradition in some parts of the province. During the second half of the century at various
locations in the counties of Baix Empordà and Alt Empordà the province's most active
industrial centres had been established. At least three of the taxpayers on the list had made
the transition from the simple selling of cork bark obtained from their properties to
involvement in industrial projects for processing the cork.14 This is the case of Jose Perxés
(number 31 on the list), a landowner in the municipality of Agullana and owner of substantial

12
In addition to the eight individuals who are listed under their titles of nobility, another six enjoyed
varying degree of nobility: Joaquín de Cárcer (marquis de Castellbell) and Joaquín de Sentmenat
(marquis de Sentmenat) were part of the titled nobility; Joaquín de Carles and Joaquín de Pastors
were entitled to some of the privileges of nobility, the degree of the non-titled Catalan nobility; Ramón
de Berenguer, for his part, would later obtain the title of pontifical count de Berenguer; and Pelayo
Camps y de Matas, meanwhile, would be granted in 1876 the title of pontifical count of marquis de
Camps.
13
For example, the father of Florencio Nouvilas (number 13), Ramon Nouvilas, significantly increased
the family estate by acquiring seized church land, mainly in the municipality of Rabós. Salvador Negre,
meanwhile, extended his properties by acquiring a sold-off property apparently with the objective of
reaching the level of tax payments required to be elected senator (Ferrer, 1981).
14
A different trajectory was taken, apparently, by other of the owners of large-estates: Martín Güitó
(number 10), Antonio Llambi (number 33), Antonio Vidal de Llobatera (number 42), José Mundet
(number 44), José Vall-llovera (number 47) i José Güitó y Llach (number 49) received significant
incomes from the sale of cork from his forests, without being involved in known processing activities.

10
tracts of cork oaks. In addition to marketing the cork, he had been involved since the mid-19th
century in the making of finished cork stoppers, with a factory in Agullana. In the early 20th
century, municipal industrial registers show his son, Jaume Perxés, continuing in that activity
(Alvarado, 2002: 87). Another taxpayer Alberto de Quintana y Combis (number 37), in
addition to being an agrarian landowner and winemaker, with substantial properties in
Torroella de Montgri, was an important industrial cork processor, with particular interests in
modernized production methods. Similarly, Manuel Laporta (number 45), heir to a large
forested estate in the municipality of La Jonquera, turned himself into an important cork
businessman. In 1859 he was one of four founding partners of a cork stopper factory in the
same municipality (Alvarado, 1996: 292). Laporta continued in the purchases of cork oak
forests in order to ensure the supply of raw materials, which in addition to selling in raw form,
served to supply his own factory in La Jonquera. According to the municipality's industrial
register the factory was in operation, at least, between 1889 and 1904 (Alvarado 1996: 300).

Another family of great landowners, the Berenguer-Benages, was known for its involvement
in promoting the second technological revolution. Joaquin Berenguer-Benages y Camps
(number 19) died relatively young in 1876, leaving his son Ramón de Berenguer the
management of an estate that included extensive holdings in Girona province and the county
of Balaguer in the province of Lleida. At the end of the century, the son began to introduce
major changes in the management of the family business. After a long lawsuit for the
management of the waters of the Ter River, Ramón Berenguer under the auspices of
Empresas Eléctricas, S.A., a company founded by him, undertook the construction of three
hydroelectric plants in Girona in the municipalities of Vilanna, Bescanó and within the city of
Girona itself. In 1908 the first plant began distributing electricity.15

The Planas family, represented by Juan Planas (number 34), conforms somewhat less to the
typical profile of the other major taxpayers that are discussed here. Despite having an
agricultural background, the family's involvement with industrial activities can be traced back
to the 18th century. From origins in textile manufacturing, the Planas family eventually
established a metallurgical company that became one of the largest in Catalonia. In 1875 its
inclusion on the lists of major contributors was due to the taxes paid to the city of Girona
(Nadal, 1992).

Meanwhile, Narciso Fages de Romà (number 27), a key personality in the attempts to
modernise Catalan agriculture during the second half of the 19th century, was heir to the large
properties from the estates of several distinct families which were sometimes involved in non-
agrarian initiatives. As well, his grandfather, Joaquin de Roma was one of the principal
promoters of the coal mines in the municipalities of Ogassa and Sant Joan de les
Abadesses, worked since the 1830s, and the mining railway project which was to facilitate
the exploitation of the mineral (Gómez-Alba, 2007: 22).

15
The Gironese writer Miquel de Palol, who for a long time had worked at the power plant promoted
by Berenguer described the clash between the activities of the entrepreneur and the mindset of his
mother: “The good woman held the belief that the only thing to do was to preserve the inherited lands
and live as the ancestors had; it forgave—and she had a certain complacency—the excitement that
could mark one's youth, as long as the game or enchantment of a leap of faith had no scenario other
than the magnificence of the environment in which she lived: however, to get tied up in the bourgeoisie
of commerce, while living in a milieu of hired labour or artisanship, was beyond her comprehension.”
(Original in Catalan and quoted in Sole, 2003: 302).

11
The same railway project with which Joaquin de Roma had been involved with and had as a
goal to join Barcelona and Sant Joan de les Abadesses via Granollers, had also attracted the
attention of another on the list of major taxpayers, the marquis de la Quadra (number 8),
Juan Maria de Oliveras. The marquis was among those promoters of the “Compañía del
Camino de Hierro del Norte”, a company incorporated in 1850 in order to build the
Barcelona-Granollers section of the railway (Pascual, 1999: 53).16

The initiatives promoted by Joaquín de Cabirol (number 40) also move him away from the
profile of the typical rentier landlord, although he too owned properties throughout the
province. He was a board member and owner of the fire insurance company “La Catalana”
and a major shareholder and director general of the Sociedad General Alumbrado de España
y Portugal (April 25, 1882 edition of the newspaer La Vanguardia, page 5). He also served as
vice-president of the Compañía Vitícola de la Corona de Aragón, and as a director of the
Banco de Cataluña, the Banco Universal and the Grand Hotel Continental. As is obvious,
along with his promoting of initiatives both in the industrial and service sectors, his activities
in the financial sector are of especial importance, a characteristic that he shared with many
other members of the Girona landed elite.

It is perhaps the career of Pelayo de Camps y de Matas, the marquis de Camps, the biggest
taxpayer with landed estates in Girona province, which best represents the compatibility of
defending agrarian interests with more or less traditional roots and the search for business
possibilities in initiatives outside of the agricultural sector, amongst which was the promotion
of financial institutions occupied a privileged position. The marquis de Camps was a founding
shareholder of the Crédito Gerundense company (Clara, 1976b) and of the Banco de
Barcelona; for several years he was chairman of the board for Caja de Ahorros y Monte de
Piedad de Barcelona and of the Caja Provincial de Maternidad (Pons and Adroer, 1988: 87).
He was also one of the founding members of “La Previsión”, a company dedicated to the
lucrative business of “seguros contra quintas”—payments in lieu of compulsory military
service—and a member of its board of directors from 1881 (Palomas, 2002: 543).17

16
There is another of the major taxpayers who can be linked to railway sector, although more
indirectly, and which consequently does not appear in Table 1. This is the case of Melchor Ferrer
(number 15), a prestigious composer, he was the second son of the marquis de Puerto Nuevo and
brother, and as such, the future marquis, Manuel Ferrer whose son was active as a shareholder of the
company Ferrocarriles de Tarragona a Barcelona y Francia, especially after the suspension of
payments in1888 (Pascual, 1999: 472).
17
Spanish law made it possible to avoid compulsory military service by paying a cash amount or by
finding a substitute to serve instead. Insurance companies advanced families the cash amount in lieu
of conscription in exchange for an annual fee. This was an investment opportunity that attracted many
of the leading families of the Catalan bourgeoisie, as in the case of the Guell, Sentmenat, Robert or
Vidal Ferrer families. The belligerent military situation in the West Indies encouraged the business at
the height of that year saw “an unmatched increase in production, a booming prosperity” that paid
dividends of 16% to shareholders. In 1898, the company “La Prevision” merged with Suazo Jover to
form the Banco Vitalicio de España (Sales, 1970: 175).

12
In a rather similar vein are the activities undertaken by Joaquin de Sentmenat y de
Villallonga, the marquis de Sentmenat (number 28). The Sentmenat family managed
numerous large agricultural estates distributed throughout much of Catalonia. Consequently,
Joaquin Maria de Sentmenat was one of the founding partners of the IACSI (Institut Agrícola
Català de Sant Isidre) in 1850—an institution that served as an agricultural management
association. His son, Ramón de Sentmenat y Despujol, who was also involved in the
founding of the IACSI, was implicated in many aspects of the world of business, especially,
once again, in the financial sector. Ramón de Sentmenat was on the board of directors of
Banco de Cataluña and a shareholder of Crédito Mercantil, in addition to having many
investments in Spanish state debt. He also participated in the conscription-avoidance
company “La Previsión”, of which he was a founding shareholder.

The marquis de la Torres may be included in the same group as the previous three
taxpayers. Eduard de Fondesviela y Diaz (number 5) is listed as a founding shareholder of
the Canal Alto Ampurdán company (Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Gerona, December 11,
1882) and incorporated November 9, 1882, with the objective of promoting the channelling of
Fluvia River and undertake its economic exploitation. Although the project was never
completed, the initiative demonstrates the willingness of sectors of the county's affluent
members, often led by Narciso Fages de Romà who has already been noted, to promote the
modernisation of agriculture and renew the prestige of the landowning elites (Pavón, 2006).
The marquis de la Torre also figures as one of the founders and first president of Caja de
Ahorros y Monte de Piedad del Ampurdán, an institution founded in 1884 (Bernils, 1993).

Situated on a somewhat lower level with respect to the quantities of its investments is the
Falgas family. The son of Jose de Falgás y Masanet (number 16), Raimón de Falgas y de
Pouplana, in addition to experimenting with the production and sale of sparkling wine (cava)
and developing agricultural related institutional activities—he served as a member of the
executive board for the Cámara Agrícola del Ampurdán (Ampurdan Chamber of Agriculture)
(Planas: 2003: 294)—and participated as a founding partner of “Credito Gerundense”
company (Clara, 1976b).

Some of the other major taxpayers on the list shared interests in financial activities.
Francisco de A. Llobet (number 29), for example, a lawyer who was not known to have been
involved in activities that were not related to the exercise of his profession or to the
exploitation of his agrarian properties, is listed as a founding partner of the Banco de Gerona
(Clara, 1976a). Also the Fages family (number 27), which has already been noted, eventually
established a close relationship to the financial world. The son of Narciso Fages, Carles
Fages de Perramón, a doctor at law, was one of the founders in 1884 of the Caja de Ahorros
y Monte de Piedad del Ampurdán (Bernils, 1993: 248).

Another area of activity shared by many of the taxpayers represented on the list was the
investing in urban real estate. In fact, the incomes from these sources made up a significant
part of the European territorial elite's earnings both from short and long-term leases for these
types of properties, and went on to become increasingly important as the 19th century
advanced. The acceleration of the process of urbanization, which forced many cities to
promote expansion projects, was an opportunity that was not lost by the estate owning-
families (Sturgess, 1971; Lieven, 1993: 109-118). The Girona elites were not immune to this
phenomenon. Thus, the count of Peralada (number 4), Tomás de Rocabertí de Dameto y

13
Veri, in addition to his incomes derived from immense agrarian estates, had significant
investments in urban real estate in Palma de Mallorca (Palomas, 2002: 540). There was a
similar situation with the marquis of Monistrol (number 5), Josep María Escrivá de Romaní y
Dusay, a representative of the old Catalan nobility and owner of large rural estates distributed
throughout the provinces of Barcelona and Girona. The marquis of Monistrol also had
considerable investments in real estate in the cities of Barcelona and Madrid, as evidenced
by his membership in both cities' associations of major urban property owners. Similarly, for
the baron de las cuatro Torres (number 12), the only clue to his activities not tied to his
agricultural estates (or to his intellectual interests as a writer and historian) has to do with his
membership in the Madrid association of major urban real estate owners. The already
mentioned marquis de Sentmenat, who also benefited from numerous urban properties in
Barcelona, was a founding member of the Barcelona association of major real estate owners.

The returns and incomes derived from investments in urban real estate that had been made
by his ancestors, who were Girona businessman, also formed part of the income of
Francisco J. Roses (number 36). In this case, however, the real “novelty” in what is usually
known as diversification of income sources was due to the activities of his father, Miquel
Rosés, a pharmacist and landowner, who was in the business of purchasing censos
desamortizados —disentailed Church properties. Between 1845 and 1848 Miquel Rosés
acquired 122 censos from the Priory of Cervià, whose proceeds were carefully looked after.
The difficulties experienced by his son Francisco is another story (Congost, 2000).18

Moreover, as is well known, a considerable number of the landed aristocracy, especially

those with titles, were well received by the emerging liberal Spanish state through their roles
as provincial deputies, members of the Spanish legislature or Cortes, and as senators. These
were unpaid positions, but which, with all probability, opened the doors to a whole range of
possibilities, whether in the business world or in financial investments, as well as in public
administration. Access to certain senior management positions of the Spanish state became
another channel of income diversification (Ferrer, 2005: 493). The 12 individuals from the list
of 50 major taxpayers in 1875 who at some point in their careers served as members of the
Cortes or as senators have been identified in Table 1. Of those, in addition, to the already
noted Alberto de Quintana was civil Governor of province of Huesca and, amongst other
responsibilities, commissioner of agriculture, industry and commerce for the province of
Girona, director general of taxes or Intendant General of Finance for the island of Cuba
(Palomas, 2002: 547). Joaquín de Cabirol, as has been noted, was also civil governor of
several provinces, including that of Tarragona as well as commissioner of agriculture,
industry and commerce for the province of Barcelona (Palomas, 2002: 523).

The list of principal taxpayers for the province of Girona demonstrates, in short, the
considerable degree of diversification of income sources of its members. It is also a good
demonstration of how, at the start of the last quarter of the 19th century, there was a
confluence of the interests of individuals and families with diverse social backgrounds, that
led to the sharing of the same “ruling class experiences” and came to constitute an
established “social group”. They found ways of mobilising, of becoming a lobby group in

18
As an example of the business opportunities offered by these rights, Àngels Solà (1990: 223)
demonstrates that from the income derived from the control of wheat production in the counties of
Urgell and Segarra, a very significant part of Ignasi Girona's fortune was due to the leasing, between
1820 and 1860, of perception of manorial rights.

14
order to achieve specific objectives, either from their positions as senators or deputies, under
the banner of such associations as the IACSI, which functioned as a representative of the
landowners, or those that gathered together urban landowners, for example; or those
promoted by agricultural associations. The emergence and widespread use of the Catalan-
language term hisendat—hacendado in Spanish—with which the landowning Girona
aristocracy, regardless of the sources of its wealth, self-identified during the period under
study is a good indication of this (Congost, 1997).

3. The temptation of financial capitalism

The investment dynamics of the large landowners in the counties of Girona province during
the 19th century have traditionally been viewed as conservative. However, a review of some
of the strategies undertaken by the province's principal taxpayers has demonstrated
considerable involvement in non-agrarian activities. As has been established, among those
activities are some that are very markedly related to the financial sector. This behaviour was
not unusual amongst large landowners in Western Europe. Although systematic studies and
empirical evidence is statistically limited, numerous authors have demonstrated the
increasing attractiveness of investments representing various forms of financial assets in
industrial, railway and banking companies, to name the most common, or, in a more
conservative strategy, in public debt. In countries such as England, Belgium, Germany or, to
some extent, France, this was the principal means through which the landowning aristocracy
participated in their respective processes of industrialization. If during the agrarian expansion
in mid-19th century the said investments were a way of making a profit from the obtained
benefits, following the crisis at the end of the century, the tendency of de-ruralization of the
investments was due to the fall in incomes from the land (Cannadine, 1999; Malatesta,
2004). In those European regions where the opportunities offered by the process of
industrialization that were late coming or slower to develop, the phenomenon was not as
pronounced. Once again, the question to answer is to what degree this attraction was
present in Girona's rural society, straddling a predominately agricultural economy and a
dynamic process of industrial transformation that was taking place in close geographical
proximity.

In the Catalan case, the small number of studies on the management of large -and medium-
sized agricultural estates during the second half of the 19th century often reflect, to a greater
or lesser degree, the notable diversity of the income sources detected amongst the 50 major
landowners. And, again, amongst the various available business options there is the
instigation of a certain and notable amount of financial capitalism, including amongst those
owners who while they did form part of the most advantaged of the local rural or provincial
society, were not necessarily at the top of the landowning elite.

The Jordà family, from Pont de Molins in the county of Alt Empordà, is one of the most
representative examples of the diversification of income sources in estates that were
originally rooted in the exploitation of the land. This is the case of a family that acquired its
wealth in the 18th century from the accumulation of properties, but also as a consequence of
the first industrial-type investments, such as a wheat mill equipped with advanced
technology. The attractiveness of doing business in the financial sector led to Rafael Jordà's
funding, in 1885, of the Banca Jordà in the town of Fiqueres. On the other hand, the Jordà

15
family's history exemplifies the risks involved in financial investments: at the start of the
1920s the financial crisis, that was particularity significant in Barcelona, directly affected the
family's estate, practically forcing it to the point of ruin (Del Campo, 2000).

Another good example is provided by the Coll family estate, medium-sized landowners
residing in the town of Roses in the county of Alt Empordà, which also illustrates the spread
of an attitude that can be labelled as fully capitalist. The desire to find new sources of income
implies, on occasion, a considerable level of risk. Thus, during the first decade of the 20th
century, Miquel Coll y Caritg invested capital in several international initiatives which proved
to be unprofitable. Such as his investment in the Russian state railway company (1906), in
Mexican railways and in the construction of the Panama canal: also in the railways of
Alicante, of Japan (1910) and of Argentina (1886). Miquel Coll also invested in the Ottoman
Empire's public debt, as well as in bonds, shares, debentures and amortized debts of some
financial entities, such as the Banco Alemán Transatlántico de Barcelona. The amounts of
these investments were not negligible: in 1920 it amounted to more than 112,000 pesetas
(Barris and Buscató, 1998).

In the more mountainous regions of the country, society was also marked by transformations
in the economic and institutional framework of the 19th century that resulted in major
opportunities for the diversification of economic activity. The researcher Jacinto Bonales
(2007) demonstrated various examples of the possibilities available to the large landowners
in the Pyrenees Mountains of the Catalan province of Lleida. Some of those owners, in fact,
adapted to the new conditions and made a radical shift in the management of their estates. A
good example is offered by the baron de Abella who, in the first half of the 19th century,
devised a complex program of investments, that eventually failed, for the exploitation of
forestry resources. The program involved participation in wood-processing companies using
technological innovations, seeds and other forest products. There was well a project for the
creation of a reservoir with the objective of irrigating vast tracts of land and to encourage the
establishment of a textile industry in the area. The same author demonstrates an example of
the enrichment and social ascent of the administrator of an agrarian estate, eventually
becoming a large landowner through, basically, the yields obtained through the local credit
market, and who became the county's leading lender during the period 1840-60.

For many hisendats investments in financial assets were nothing more than minor
commitments. In other cases, however, the yields from these kinds of investments could
become a significant proportion of the total estate income. Thus, for example, the profits
derived from the financial assets of the marquis de Sentmenat's estate grew from non-
existent at mid-century to constituting almost 40% of his total income in 1883. The
Sentmenat family built-up a potent portfolio, by buying at the most opportune moments,
which included shares, amongst others, in government bonds, debentures in the Ferrocarril
del Norte de España company and shares in such companies as Central Carbonífera, La
Catalana General de Seguros, and La General de Crédito. Something similar occurred with
the Prat estate, landowners in Santa Coloma de Farners: the income derived from shares in
railways and banking companies, public debt bonds and bank deposits also reached about
40% of the estate's total income in 1890. Other families such as the Riba of the Valles
Oriental county, or the Torello in Anoia county, resolutely made commitments to investing in
financial shares, occasionally with clearly speculative determination (Garrabou, Planas,
Saguer, 2001: 162-170).

16
Other indicators of “financial temptation” that part of the Girona hisendats experienced are
their notable participation in various projects created by provincial financial institutions,
especially during the febre d'or (gold fever) prior to the crash of 1882. Already noted was the
participation of some of the major provincial taxpayers in the founding of Banco de Gerona
and del Crédito Gerundense, both incorporated in December 1881. In fact, in the first case,
eight of the 16 founding partners are identified in the notarial deed of incorporation as
hisendats.19 Meanwhile, Crédito Gerundense started out as a larger institution and with much
ambition—the subscribed capital was 20 million pesetas compared with the 5 million for the
Banco de Gerona—which attracted important Barcelona investors. Amongst the 28 founding
partners five of them were hisendats; and three others who between them subscribed for the
majority of the shares.20 Mention should also be made of the presence of the landed
aristocracy in the early foundation, in 1844, of Caja de Ahorros Provincial de Gerona (Clara,
1978) and in 1884 of the Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad del Ampurdán (Bernils, 1993),
whose objectives were, in both cases, to provide small loans to those sectors that had
difficulty accessing the established capital markets.

The attraction that part of the large landowning elite had for financial investments does not
seem to be an exclusively Catalan characteristic. Some of the examples given by different
authors demonstrate that, in general, local elites tended to be active in the financial sector
when there were clear commercial opportunities in some agricultural sub-sector. This is what
seems to have occurred in the sugar industry in the Grenadian municipality of Vega de Genil
(Martinez López, 2005), in the Valencian and in the Alicantian horticultural crops (Calatayud,
1989: 130-4; Cuevas, 2001), or with some of the projects in Navarra that were intended to
develop new methods of primary production (De la Torre, 1993). In all of these cases the
initiatives resulted in the establishment of financial institutions or corporations that required
cooperation amongst the traditional landowning elite, sometimes including the nobility, and
with a certain involvement of the commercial and financial urban bourgeoisie. Although these
projects did not always end successfully, in certain cases the consequences materialised into
a dramatic reorientation of the management of many rural estates that thus adapted fully to
the capitalist context (Martinez López, 2005: 473).

From a more general point of view, Ricardo Robledo (1988: 561-2) has demonstrated the
relevance of the large rural estates had with the shareholders of the Banco de España (Bank
of Spain). In 1854, a quarter of the 52 mayor Spanish landowners had shares of the national
bank; in 1875, amongst the 315 largest taxpayers are found 60 shareholders. On the other
hand, the Bank of Spain's shareholders consisted of industrialists, merchants, financiers and,
19
These were Narciso Heras de Puig, a hisendat from Girona; Clemente Botet y Franquesa, from
Girona; José Catalá y Fábregas, from Girona; Francisco Llobet y Parés, from Lloret de Mar; Juan
Vicens y Puig, from Solius; Buenaventura Madrenys y Boada, from Tossa de Mar; Narciso Gotarra y
Guinart, from Llagostera and José Esquena y Mas, from Olot (source: Boletín Oficial de la Provincia
de Gerona, January 6, 1882).
20
Pelayo de Camps y de Matas, a hisendat from Girona; Antonio Mataró y Vilallonga, from Lloret de
Mar; Joaquín Carreras y Massanet, from Girona; Ramón de Falgás y de Pouplana, residing in Quart
but based in Girona; and Mariano Bassols y Vilallonga, from Figueres. In addition to the founding
partners, the articles of incorporation contain a list of the first subscribers of shares in the company. At
the top of that list, each with 200 shares—a considerable amount with respect to the shareholding
structure of the bank—appear José Català, a hisendat from Girona; Baltasar Bacardí, from Barcelona
and Manuel Llistosella y Calzada, from Girona (source Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Gerona,
January 9, 1882).

17
has been seen, the owners of large estates, which again illustrates the existence of a
relatively fluid cross relationship between the distinct economic and social sectors.

The examples noted above, however, do yet not allow replacing the classic view of the great
Spanish landed estates that, especially those of the nobility with more traditional roots,
historically showed little interest in participating in investments unrelated to the management
of their rural estates (Bahamonde, 1991).21 Even after the Spanish Civil War, those
representatives of the landed estate nobility that entered the business world and turned
themselves, even partially, into financiers, merchants or industrialists were apparently
exceptions (Artola, 2013).

4. Why did the great Catalan estates go bankrupt?

The available sources do not allow determining with any precision to extent of the
diversification of investments in the management of the rural estates, nor if the financial
temptations to which reference has been made became a global phenomenon in the last
quarter of the 19th century. However, it seems apparent, that at that time, part of the Catalan
landed aristocracy had income not related to the agricultural markets and that these people
moved about financial sector with some degree of comfort. It was a sector in whose
expansion the aristocracy willingly participated. Consequently, with respect to this group of
large landowners the prices of wheat and wine, for example, should not have been the only
determining factors when it comes time to explain the numbers of bankruptcies sustained
during the period under study. In this respect, Figure 3 presents a hypothesis that is
consistent with the evidence thus far presented. The curve in the graphic representing the
number of judicial procedures that concluded in auctions of large estates—presented in the
form of a three-year centred moving average—has been superimposed on the average
discount rate applied by the Banco de Barcelona, used here as an approximation for the cost
of money. This last indicator, in turn, reacted directly to the vicissitudes experienced by the
stock markets. Comparison of the two curves enables discerning a certain correlation
especially apparent in the coinciding of some key points of inflection, as were those of the
years 1882 and 1890.

21
Unlike what apparently happened in England, Germany, Belgium, or, perhaps, Catalonia, where the
crisis in the late 19th century had prompted the transfer of capital into other assets, in large areas of
Spain the opposite may have occurred (Malatesta, 2004: 56). The question remains open and is
resistant to generalisations: in the region of Castile-Leon, for example, the attraction that the land
continued to pull as an asset coexisted with a certain “euthanasia of the rentier” (Robledo, 1999).

18
 Figure 3
Average discount rates applied by the Banco de Barcelona and judicial auctions
of estates that included lands greater than 100 hectares, or with assets valued
at more than 100,000 pesetas and with at least 5 hectares of land.

Sources: BOPB and BOPG, 1875-1905; Tafunell, 1991: 387.

A number of factors coincide with the boom experienced by the Catalan economy since
1875. The restoration of the Spanish monarchy marked the end of a period of political
instability and civil war. The return to calm, so desired by the Catalan political and economic
elites, seemed to set the stage for resuming investments in industry and transport. In
agriculture, meanwhile, there seemed to be a sort of golden age, driven by high wine prices
in response to the drop in French production due to the ravages of the phylloxera blight.
Although it had hardly been a decade since the last bursting of the financial bubble in 1866,
the Catalan economy again experienced a phase of excessive optimism, the so called Febre
d'Or (Gold Fever). The abundance of liquidity led to euphoria in the financial markets, pushed
up by the value of bank stocks and, as was the case in 1866, by railway stocks. During the
period an impressive quantity of money was invested into stocks and bonds of railway
companies and banks. Many of the investors were from the middle class who were probably
entering the stock market for the first time. The capital was largely brokered by a banking
system that, in another characteristic of the period, experienced an extraordinary expansion:
in all of Catalonia 27 banks were created in 1881 and 1882.22

22
The novel by the Catalan writer Narcis Oller entitled obviously “La febre d'or” and published in three
volumes between 1890 and 1892, describes the euphoria of the times: “There was a [bank] for each
major town in Catalonia, whether or not the town needed one, or was even feasible. There was one,
moreover, for every daring adventurer. They were created under the pretexts of reforms or major

19
The Febre d'Or ended abruptly in January of 1882 with a phenomenal stock market crash
and with serious repercussions to the banking system. Of the banks created in 1881 and
1882, ten of them were bankrupt by 1884 and some others did not hold out much longer—
only seven of them survived into the following decade (Tafunell, 1991: 396). On this
occasion, and unlike the immediate impact on the real economy following the 1866 failure,
the financial problems were gradually transmitted, over the subsequent years, to the
industrial and railway sectors. Only at the end of the decade was there a slow recovery that,
however, was cut short in 1890 by a new financial crisis. If the 1882 Barcelona stock market
crash had seriously affected both railway and bank securities, in 1890 the latter were by far
the hardest hit—the banking sector's collapse was spectacular (Castañeda and Tafunell,
2001).

Some of the large estates must have been directly affected by the fall in share prices.23 But
probably more serious than the immediate consequences of the stock market crash was the
effect this had in the long term on the credit market, as reflected, at least partially, by the
evolution of discount rates as applied by the principal Barcelona bank. In fact, both after 1882
as well as the aftermath of 1890, some of the consequences of the bankruptcies were the
rise in the cost of money, the decline in the money supply and the corresponding financial
weakness (Tafunell, 1991). In both cases, the sharp increase in rates and, probably in a
more direct way, the paralysis of the credit markets had an adverse effect on the debt
sustainability of the large landowners by making the refinancing of the accumulated debts
more difficult. Thus, scarcer and more expensive credit ended up translating into, with a
certain logical delay in the outbreak of the stock market crisis, the increase of judicial
proceedings. Those who found themselves in weaker financial situations were doomed to the
forced sale of their estates or to judicial proceedings for the reclamation of unpaid debts.

Conclusions

Between 1875 and 1905 the number of great estates that were annually sold at auctioned in
the provinces of Barcelona and Girona as a result of judicial proceedings to recover debts
does not entirely conform to the evolution of the agricultural markets. Undoubtedly, the
change in market conditions for some of the main agricultural products impacted on the
incomes of many of the large landowners and must have influenced the liquidation, whether
voluntarily or forced, of numerous large estates. But, the analysis of those proceedings
demonstrates that a significant number of the defendants had roles in activities that were not
exclusively related to the primary sector. Apparently, then, as they did in other parts of
Europe in the 19th century, the factors that traditionally led to the indebtedness of that social
group is related to investments made outside of the agrarian sector.

public works that were non-existent except in the minds of the planners. Often the only difficulty was
coming up with a creative name with which to baptise the child.” (Part 1, Chapter IV, quoted by Clara,
1976a: 41).
23
The stock market crashes seem to have had a clear role in the liquidation of at least two of the large
estates listed in Figure 2: those estates corresponding to Cristobal Juando y Rafecas and to Pedro
Domenech y Grau (Tubau, 2002; Bassegoda and Alcala, 2003).

20
It is very difficult to discern whether that behavioural mentality, isolated from the usual
conservatism of the typical rentier owner, can be viewed as something shared by all of the
landowners in the study area. However, the analysis of the 50 principal taxpayers in the
province of Girona opens that possibility. The landed aristocracy in Girona was a diverse
group, with members from all economic sectors, that, when looked at as a whole, had
diversified a good part of their sources of income. Almost half of the individuals on the list,
whether or not they enjoyed the privileges of nobility, had traces of some activity outside of
agricultural sector—many more if we include the cases of those who were senators, deputies
or high-level bureaucrats working in the Spanish state administration. The economic and
institutional transformations since the early 19th century had profoundly changed the
productive structure of the province. Despite being an agricultural area with a distinctive
character, its proximity to a powerful focus of industrialisation such as the Barcelona region
and the existence of some local industrial centres resulted in an economic fabric of
increasing complexity. In the same way that criss-cross of economic sectors materialised into
a competition for the labour force, which tended to push up agricultural wages (Tello, Roca,
Garrabou, 1999), also translated into more and greater investment opportunities outside of
the primary sector.

And amongst the possible uses of the capital of the great, and not so great, landowners of
Girona the financial sector held a special place. It was no longer simply a matter of
guaranteed government securities that offered a relatively safe return; the data suggests that
the large landowners participated decisively in the “Febre d'Or” bubble, buying and selling
shares in railway companies and banks. Some of them even played leading roles in the
promotion of banks during the euphoria of the moment. Once again this is a behaviour that
requires putting aside the stereotypical image of a landed aristocracy that stood passively
before the consolidation of capitalist relationships in the rural environment.

Although the empirical evidence is still insufficient to permit a categorical conclusion, the
described scenario would allow explaining the fact that the bankruptcies of the great estates
followed closely the evolution of the price of money, which in turn depended on the
vicissitudes of the financial markets and, in general, with the progress of the business world.
Therefore, in a way the auction sales of the great estates because of the debts incurred by
their owners demonstrate the risks implied by the new investment strategies. Paradoxically,
the liquidation of the great estates at the end of the 19th century, one of the symptoms
traditionally associated with the agrarian crisis, may have had much to do with factors largely
outside of the agricultural sector.

21
 Appendix. Large landowners with diversified sources of income subject to judicial proceedings (Figure 2)

Publication
date of auction
Value Area
No. announcement Debtors Creditors Municipalities Place name Description Observations
(pesetas) (hectares)
(Barcelona o
Girona)

1 22/2/1876 (B) Luis Cruells y Buenhijo Pasolas, 296,624 69.57 Barcelona (Sant mas Coll, among Two houses and land. Josefa Anguera was a minor
15/9/1876 (B) Parlades y Josefa Emilio y Cecilia Vicenç de Sarrià), others shareholder of the textile
28/2/1888 (B) Anguera y Soler Baldasano, Alella, el Masnou, manufacturing firm La Espana
8/12/1891 (B) Ernesto Cruells y Tiana Industrial (Gutierrez Medina
Anguera (1994: 166).
2 6/10/1878 (B) Antonio Ferrer y Joaquina Mañosas 266,500 98.69 Capellades, mas San Pedro Two houses and land. Industrial infrastructures were
Roca Mediona Sacarrera; Paper factory and flour auctioned.
mas Tort mill.

3 20/5/1880 (B) José Torra y 382,281 245.56 La Torre de mas Tort and Several urban and Industrial infrastructures were
Enrich Claramunt heretat Espolla country houses. Cotton auctioned..
factory and paper
factory.

4 3/8/1882 (B) Laureano de Mariano Andreu 225,000 85.00 Mediona heretat Santa One house and land. Senior manager with the railway
Ballester Margarita company Zaragoza al
Mediterráneo (Revista Ilustrada,
10/7/1896).
5 10/1/1885 (B) Cristóbal Juandó y María Monserrate 330,259 298.52 El Prat de Llobregat, heretats Eight houses and land. An aviation pioneer. Squandered
11/4/1889 (B) Rafecas Barata, Viladecans, Sant Boi Camprodons, Las his inheritance after having been
27/4/1889 (B) Síndicos de la quiebra de Llobregat, Marinas, Torre a financier, stock market
30/11/1890 (B) de "E. Vilumara y Viladecans Marina, Torre speculator, a shareholder of
17/6/1890 (B) Compañía", Maimó, Casa Ferrocarril de Barcelona a
Jaime Casanovas, José Groga, among Vilanova y a Valls Company
Rovira y Riera; y otros others. (1878) and of the Banco de
Vilanova (1881) (Tubau, 2002).

6 15/12/1886 (B) Enrique de Durán Salvador Puig y 291,055 52.89 Barcelona (Corts de mas Viñalet o One stately home, Served as mayor of Barcelona
Vendrell, Sarrià), Santa Durán de las several country houses, from 1881 to 1884
José Fábregas Eulàlia de Ronçana, Escalas, heretat auxiliary buildings; land
Tordera "Llampillas", and censos
among others
7 26/10/1886 (B) Santiago Serra y María Roca Donadeu y 527,206 26.17 Orpí, heretat Violante Several houses and Industrial infrastructures were
4/10/1891 (B) Crusells María Antonia Vall y Capellades land. Paper and auctioned.
Roca spinning mill.
8 4/10/1887 (B) Ramón Prou y Pedro Boixaderas y 90,600 123.50 El Brull, Tavertet masos Raurell and Factory with steam Industrial infrastructures were
11/11/1887 (B) Vendrell Clará, Sulroca engine; four houses and auctioned.
24/3/1891 (B) Rafael Soler y otros land.

22
9 21/9/1887 (B) Mercedes Juan Boyer y Vilaseca, 134,627 210.47 Òdena masos Martí de Two country houses and Industrial infrastructures were
15/4/1890 (B) Busquets y Camilo Francisco Andreu y Urania and heretat land. Liqueur distillery auctioned.
3/1/1896 (B) Aguilera García, Mañosa with auxiliary buildings.
Francisca Aguilera

10 10/6/1887 (G) Fernando de Narciso Casademont y 142,399 1.010.67 Sant Miquel de Colera, One house, two oil mills, Politician. Served as civil
24/6/1889 (G) Moradillo y Patxot Riera, y José Guich y Rabós land and censos. governor of the province Girona
22/12/1893 (G) Batlle, (1881). Mining interests in the
Juan Font y Vial y Rosa province of Girona (Estasén,
Vial y Cos, 1900: 287).
Antero Plaja
11 1/6/1887 (B) José de Ratés y José Planas Baliarda, 202,244 36.56 Santa Susanna mas Poch and One large country house Industrial infrastructures were
23/9/1893 (B) de Viñolas Pedro Forment Roig; casa Bonet and land. Flour mill. auctioned.
4/12/1896 (B)
26/5/1897 (B)
12 8/4/1887 (B) Razón social razón social "Hijos de 310,800 33.04 Barcelona (Sant Torre Jorge Puig Country house and land. This was a commercial
19/10/1887 (B) "Compte y J.M.Bofill” Vicenç de Sarrià), company.
Compañía" Sant Cugat del
Vallès
13 2/8/1888 (B) José Feyner y Narcisa Clarella, viuda 164,145 9.52 Torelló "Fábrica de Cotton factory and This was a bankruptcy
26/9/1888 (B) Portabella de Ricart, y Antonio Feiner" auxiliary buildings; proceeding. Industrial
Ricart y Clarella country house and land. infrastructures were auctioned.

14 28/7/1888 (B) Manuel Torres y razón social "Rumeu 415,691 32.55 Sallent, Heretat Casas de Houses and land. Industrial infrastructures were
22/7/1893 (B) Torrens Hermanos" Castellnou de Bages Santa Eulalia de Factory with steam auctioned.
1/7/1894 (B) Argensola", masos engine.
Corominas and Illa
15 1/2/1890 (B) Ramón María Congregación de la 198,131 92.73 Badalona masos Bofill and House and land. Was one of the original
Dodero y Caridad Cristiana Reixach (mas shareholders of the San Juan de
Montobbio Bellvitjes) Horta to la Sagrera tramway
company, and a member of the
company's board of directors
(Peris, 2012).
16 3/11/1890 (G) Enrique de Foxá y Francisco de Foxá, 792,060 763.36 Torroella de masos Castell de 17 country and urban Politician. Served as civil
17/11/1890 (G) de Bassols, Vicente Carreras Suñer, Montgrí, Foixà, Foxá, Cassá de houses, castle, censos governor of the province of
20/2/1891 (G) Conde de Foxá Teresa Soler y Adroher, Cassà de la Selva, las Serras, and other rights over Ciudad Real.
8/11/1892 (B) Crédito Gerundense y Sant Gregori, Figueras, Furgell, land.
12/12/1894 (B) y otros Aiguaviva, Cornellà La Abadia,
otros de Llobregat. Grimau, Pla de la
Torre, among
others
17 21/7/1891 (B) Juan Laureano Arango y 351,120 24.65 Orís, Torelló, Santa Heretats del Plá, Two spinning factories; Industrial infrastructures were
21/9/1892 (B) Casarramona y Portús, hoy su heredera Maria de Corcó Molino de Font de one house and land. auctioned.
20/12/1891 (B) Puigcercós, Josefa Arango y Portús, Conangle
herederos de Cipriano Giménez,
Paulina Parés

23
18 7/5/1892 (B) Agustí Font y Lorenzo Serra, Joaquín 104,222 118.78 Lloret de Mar mas Bohigas, One country house and Manufacturer of bottle corks.
24/8/1892 (B) Surés y Gerardo Parellada y José Roca, among others land. Served as mayor of Lloret de
Font y Vilarrubí, curadores de los Mar (Domènech, 2008: 102).
padre e hijo menores Amat y Pons
19 28/1/1892 (B) Antonio Samá Ramón de Rocafort 155,000 44.42 Vilanova i la Geltrú, Heretats Sol and Several country houses An “Indiano”, businessman,
(herederos de) Sant Pere de Ribes Crú, among and land. industrialist and landowner
others. (Rodrigo, 2007: 46-76).
20 18/5/1893 (B) Antonio Ferrer y Zenobia Ferrer y Soler 140,100 66.73 Capellades, Piera Heretat mas Paper mill, one house Industrial infrastructures were
18/4/1894 (B) Soler Farriol and land. auctioned.

21 1/4/1893 (B) Razón social Razón social "A. Ruffer 226,034 5.71 Barcelona (Sants) From mas Land This was a commercial company
"Badal hermanos" é hijos", Londres Boixadors
22 15/4/1894 (B) Modesto Concurso de acreedores 72,000 247.37 Vallirana Camp One country house and Industrial infrastructures were
Campderrós y Campderrós land. Cement factory auctioned.
Jauret and auxiliary buildings.

23 8/4/1894 (B) Antonio Rius y José Pellicer 518,812 85.63 El Prat de Llobregat, Masos Viader, Eight houses and land. This was a bankruptcy
6/10/1897 (B) Juliá Castellbisbal, Bonsoms, Regué, proceeding.
Hospitalet de among others.
Llobregat, among
others.
24 3/4/1895 (B) Antonio Torra y Andrés Pons y 12,700 141.88 Rajadell mas Torre del Several houses and Manufacturer in the textile
Prat Santacreu Forn land. industry. Owner of the company
town and factories of Cal Marsal
(Serra, 2005: 90).
25 21/2/1896 (B) “Augusto Vinyes Vidal Cuadras hermanos 100,400 91.55 La Jonquera La Comptesa, One country house and This was a trading company.
Reste y (razón social) Correch den Vitó land Augusto Vinyes Reste was
Compañía” (razón and la Puja o banker in the town of La
social) y María Sureda de la Cruz Jonquera (La Publicidad,
Reste y Juliá Blanca 6/6/1890).
26 1/9/1896 (B) Federico Aymamí Bernado María Collaso y 122,618 87.77 Montornès del Mas Calders ¾ of ownership without Architect and president of the
Salvador, curadores de Vallès usufruct of several Ateneu Barcelones in 1881-82.
houses and land. Municipal architect of the city of
Valencia (La Vanguardia,
20/6/1926).
27 3/6/1896 (G) Miguel Mitjavila y Buenaventura Puig y 154,753 52.40 Llivia Heretat casa Vidal One house and land. Industrial infrastructures were
29/04/1901 (G) Morer, Puigcerdà Garreta, de Ger, among Flour mill with auxiliary auctioned.
Francisco Mitjavila y others. “Fábrica buildings and water
Moser Vieja” and rights.
“Fábrica Nueva”

28 31/1/1896 (B) Sebastián Artés y Antonio Artés y Puig 254,235 90.68 Montornès del Mas Parellada One house and land. A funding shareholder of the
Badosa, Vallès, Vilanova del Igualada to Martorell railway
herederos de Vallès, Montcada i company (Gaceta de Madrid,
Reixac, Montmeló 8/2/1884).

24
29 23/3/1896 (G) Gerardo Rodés y Juan Corominas y 458,150 184.65 Llagostera, Tossa Mas las Ruescas, One house and land. Managing director in Barcelona
5/4/1896 (G) Moré Muxach, de Mar heretats La Tirona of the corporation that owned
Vicenta Mas y Parés y San Grau; among and operated the Olot to Gerona
su hija, Rosa Garriga y others. railway (La Vanguardia,
Mas 23/5/18891).
30 10/6/1896 (B) Pedro Doménech Manuel de Torrents é 509,071 552.06 Olivella, Sitges Heretats Plana Nine houses, land and An “Indiano”, businessman and
4/10/1896 (B) y Grau Hiquero, Novella, Los rights over land. landowner (Bassagoda and
23/02/1900 (B) Ramón Montaner y Censos and Las Alcala, 2003)
Francisco Simón; Picas

31 1/11/1898 (B) Agustín Armengol Isidro Soldevila Rosiñol 23,000 107.84 Sant Llorenç Savall Mas Armengol One country house with A wine merchant and grocer
Salallasera (Sant Felíu de auxiliary buildings and (National Library of Catalonia,
Vallcarca) land. Armengol-Fuster Archival
Collection).
32 2/4/1898 (B) Miguel Civil María del Pilar Martínez 110,5833 110.58 Gelida Heretats La Two country houses with In 1878 obtained a concession
de Arizala, albaceas de Farrería and auxiliary buildings and to construct a dam and canals in
Castany" land. order to build a paper factory in
Gelida (La Publicidad,
23/5/1878).
33 17/05/1900 (B) Baltasar A. Fiol y Josefa Martí y Calvell, 236,825 10.69 Centelles mas Can Textile factory; two Industrial infrastructures were
04/06/1903 (B) Vives (ignorados repr. de los menores Milhomes and houses and land. auctioned.
herederos) Fiol y Martí, Sociedades Cogull
"Credit Lyonnais",
"Blessig Braun y
Compañía", "Uhthoff y
Compañía", "Mancha y
Compañía"
34 13/10/1901 (B) Juan Torras y Clemente Asols, 998,284 254.35 Castellet i la Gornal Heretats Can Eight country houses Industrial infrastructures were
23/06/1901 (B) Rodó Pablo Bas Pascual, (Castellet), Sant Selma, can Valls, and land. 1/4 liqueur auctioned.
07/08/1904 (B) Bartolomé Rovirola y Quintí de Mediona, partida Puiggrané, factory with auxiliary
Bartrolí Castellví de la La Porxada, Can buildings.
Marca, Vilanova i la Fesol, Can Oliver
Geltrú, among de Laboria, among
others. others.
35 24/10/1902 (G) Joaquín Aldrich y Pedro Coll Rigau, 164,423 176.84 La Vall de Bianya, Masos Cort, Six country houses and Owner of a bottle cork factory,
04/12/1905 (B) de Pagés, que fue Narciso de Grassot y de Forallac , La Tallada Aldrich de Plasa, land. politician and deputy. Appears to
05/04/1905 (G) de la Bisbal, hoy Fuster, d'Empordà, Torelló, Aldrich, have squandered the family
07/08/1905 (G) de Barcelona Narciso Cusí y Jordá, Ullastret, Púbol, Aliu (o fortune in “Madrid, Monte Carlo
26/07/1905 (B) Martina Llach y Coll, Barceló), Massot, and other cities” (Cortadellas,
Joaquín Pujol y Carreras among others. 2006)

36 27/05/1903 (G) Pedro Lliurella y Francisco Monsalvatje 130,000 139.24 Maià de Montcal Casa de Marifont, Pottery factory. Eight Industrial infrastructures were
28/10/1903 (G) Rieradevall, Fossas, gerente de (Dosquers), Beuda, masos Salvatella, country houses and auctioned.
Dosquers "Hijos de F. Sales de Llierca y Carles, Serrat, land.
Montsalvatje" Quart Parer, Pagès and
Casals.
37 07/08/1903 (B) Vicente Torrens y Gustavo Peyra y 325,000 5.94 Alella One house and land. A soap manufacturer in
Bruguera Vildosola Barcelona (Saiz, 1999: 165).

25
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