3 The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today Anyone who attempts to locate the place of “Critical Theory” today is tasily exposed to suspicions of nostalgically misjudging the current sit- uation in philosophical thought. For in its original sense as an inter- disciplinary endeavor to critically diagnose social reality, this tradition ceased to exist some time ago. If I nevertheless undertake such an attempt in what follows, it should not be confused with an intention to explore the conditions under which a revival of the old Frankfurt School tradition might be made. I do not believe that the original research program deserves to be further developed in an unmodified form, nor am I convinced that a complex and quickly changing reality can be investigated within the framework of a single theory, even if it is of an interdisciplinary character. In what follows, a “critical theory of society” is not intended in the sense of the Frankfurt School's original program. What is intended, nonetheless, is more than a mere reference to just any arbitrary theory of society insofar as it subjects its object to critical examination or diag- nosis. After all, this applies in an all but self-evident manner to every type of theory of society that really deserves its name — to Weber no less than to Marx, to Durkheim no less than to Tonnies. Rather, by @ “critical theory of society” we mean that type of social thought that shares a particular form of normative critique with the Frankfurt ‘School's original program — indeed, perhaps, with the whole tradition of Left Hegelianism - which can also inform us about the pre- theoretical resource (vorwissenschafiliche Instanz) in which its own “This the text of my inaugural lecture atthe Otto Suhr Insitute ofthe Free University Berlin (Navernber 1993).64 The Tasks of Social Philosophy critical viewpoint is anchored extratheoretically as an empirical interest or moral experience. Hence, as a first step I wish to recall briefly Critical Theory’s Left Hegelian legacy, since this can be considered the only theoretical element that functions as an identifying feature, as an unrenounceable premise of the old tradition. It is by virtue of its specific form of cri- tique that the Frankfurt tradition of social theory differs from all other currents or directions of social theory in its form of critique. Only after recalling this methodological aspect can I begin to outline where the Critical Theory of society finds itself today. I shall endeavor to do this, = in careful demarcation from Habermas's theory of communication — by sketching step by step the basic assumptions of an approach that can satisfy the methodological requirements of the old theory. The core of this approach consists in unfolding the social phenomenon men- tioned in the title of my paper: the “social dynamics of disrespect.” I Critique and pre-theoretical praxis ‘The methodological starting point of the theory Horkheimer attempted. to initiate at the beginning of the thirties is determined by a problem whose source lies in the acceptance of a Left Hegelian legacy. Among. Hegel's left-wing disciples, i, from Karl Marx to Georg Lukacs, it was considered self-evident that a theory of society could engage in critique only insofar as it was able to rediscover an element of its own critical viewpoint within social reality; for this reason, these theorists contin- ually called for a diagnosis of society that could bring a degree of intra- mundane transcendence to light Horkheimer had this task in mind when in one of his famous earlier essays he defined the uniqueness of Critical Theory by referring to it as “the intellectual side of the historical process of emancipation.”* In order to accomplish this, a theory must always be able to reflect both ‘on its emergence in pre-theoretical experience and on its application in future praxis. Unlike Lukécs, however, Horkheimer realized that by defining his point of departure in this way, he not only established 2 methodological requirement, but also called for regulated cooperation among the various individual social scientific disciplines. Critical ‘Theory can claim a link to its pre-theoretical dimension of social eman- cipation only if it gives a sociological account of the condition of the society’s state of consciousness or its desire for emancipation, The specific relation in which Horkheimer - continuing the tradition of Left Hegelianism — brought together theory and praxis presupposes aThe Social Dynamics of Disrespect 6 determination of the social forces that in their own right urge us to crit- icize and overthrow established forms of domination. Thus whatever its congruence with other forms of social critique, Critical Theory in its, innermost core is dependent upon a quasi-sociological specification of an emancipatory interest in social reality itself. However, a series of investigations in the history of theory have shown in the meantime (convincingly, I believe) that the Frankfurt Institute's social-philosophical instruments were not sufficient for attaining this demanding goal. Horkheimer’s early writings remained trapped within a Marxist philosophy of history that could tolerate 2 pre-theoretical interest in social emancipation only in one class, the pro- letariat. Early on, Adorno had founded the point of departure for his critique of society so decisively on Marx's critique of fetishism that he could no longer find any trace of an intramundane transcendence in the social culture of everyday life. Perhaps the theoretical impetus to seek a different, more productive point of access to the emancipatory potential of everyday social reality could have come only from those ion the fringe of the Institute ~ Walter Benjamin or Otto Kirchheimer? But on the whole, Horkheimer and his circle remained bound to a Marxist functionalism that misled them into accepting such a closed theoretical sphere of capitalist domination and cultural manipulation that there could be no room for a domain of practical-moral critique. This led in turn to the embarrassing fact that these approaches were theoretically dependent upon a pre-theoretical resource for emancipa- tion whose very existence could no longer be proved empirically - a problem that had to become more acute for Critical Theory inasmuch as their hitherto practically nourished hopes for change necessarily lost their plausibility: The victory of fascism and the ultimate establishment of Stalinism destroyed any possibility of giving the theory's critical per- spective an objective foothold in a pre-theoretical resource, be ita social movement or an existing interest. Critical Theory’s tun to Adorno’s historico-philosophical negativism finally marked the historical point at which the endeavor to link critique back to social history failed com- pletely. In the reflections contained in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, the only remaining place for something like intramundane transcendence was in the experience of modern art. Having returned from exile to the Federal Republic of Germany, Horkheimer and Adorno did not make any significant changes to the empirical premises of their critical undertaking. True, itis open to argu- ment whether both thinkers actually unwaveringly adhered to the approach of The Dialectic of Enlightenment until the end of their lives, but itis less disputable that neither remained willing to entertain any66 The Tasks of Social Philosophy beliefs in an intramundane possibility for emancipation. This can be seen in Adorno’s Negative Dialects and in Horkheimer’s turn to Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism late in life. Whatever the details oftheir various accounts, the fundamentally negativist orienta- tion of their later writings gave rise to a problem that ever since has stood at the head of every renewed attempt to link up with Critical ‘Theory. If the Left Hegelian model of critique is to be retained at all, ‘we must first re-establish theoretical access to the social sphere in which an interest in emancipation ean be anchored pre-theorcticaly. Without some form of proof that its critical perspective is reinforced by a need or a movement within social reality, Critical Theory cannot be further pursued in any way today, for it would no longer be capable of distinguishing itself from other models of social critique in its claim toa superior sociological explanatory substance or in its philosophical procedures of justification. Itis solely by its attempt (which still has not been abandoned) to give the standards of critique an objective foothold in pre-theoretical praxis that it may be said to stand alone. But because this sphere has been buried in the course of the history of Critical Theory, it must again be brought to light today by means of arduous conceptual work. For this reason, I see the key to updating critical social theory in the task of categorially disclosing social reality in such a manner that an element of intramundane transcendence will again become visible. Thus the question of how theorists today might respond to this problem can serve as a theoretical guideline that can give a provisional direction to our attempt to locate Critical Theory today. TI Alternative ways of renewing Critical Theory ‘We can easily distinguish two diametrically opposed responses to the problem outlined thus far. In the first of these, the negativist social cri- tique practiced by Adorno in his later writings is radicalized one further degree, such as to prognosticate a self-dissolution of the social core of society as a whole; here the focus is on phenomena such as the wholly uncontrolled growth of major technological systems, the com- plete uncoupling of system-steering from the social life-world, and finally, the accelerated hollowing of the human personality. However much this list of developmental tendencies might recall the kind of diagnosis once drafted by conservative authors such as Arnold Gehlen, today it is found primarily in theoretical circles that have inheritedThe Social Dynamics of Disrespect 7 Adomo’s negativist legacy. In the German-speaking world, the writ- ings of Stefan Breuer are primarily representative of this line of argu- mentation, while the disciples of French post-structuralism and their focus on these social phenomena in their diagnosis of society represent this legacy abroad? The theoretical image of the social life-world generated in diverse variations of negativist social critique is always characterized by a tendency toward dehumanization: what generally transforms human beings into mere objects of an auto-poietically reproducing systemic power is, for Breuer, a quasi-religious belief in the omnipotence of technology and science. For Foucault in his middle period, itis passive reaction to strategies of the apparatuses of power; for Baudrillard, finally, itis the dramatically widespread tendency toward semblance, toward mere simulation. This way of conceiving social reality makes the theoretical consequences for our problem obvious: every form of critique attempting to locate itself within social reality must itself be considered impossible, since this reality is no longer constituted in such a way that it might harbor social anomalies, even emancipatory inter- ests or attitudes. In radicalizing the later Adorno’s critique of reifica- tion, every sacial-theoretical basis is definitively closed off to any effort to identify an intramundane element of transcendence in order to secure a social foothold for critique. With this form of a Critical Theory of society, the attempt to enter into a reflexive relationship with pre- theoretical praxis would have reached its end. However, that this is not necessarily the case is made clear by the second theoretical current through which the tradition of Critical ‘Theory is continued today. Habermas's theory of communication, to which of course I am referring here, represents a counterpoint to neg- ativist social theories precisely in the sense that it has re-established access to an emancipatory sphere of action. His construction of the theory of communicative action can be understood as recovering the categorial means necessary for a revival of Horkheimer's idea of social critique. It first pursues this goal by shifting from the Marxist paradigm of production to the paradigm of communicative action, within whose framework it should become clear that the conditions of social progress are located not in social labor but in social interaction. It then proceeds from here to the development of a pragmatics of language intended to identify the specific normative presuppositions constituting the ratio- nal potential of communicative action. Based on this, Habermas then drafts a theory of society that pursues the process of rationalization of communicative action to the historical point at which it leads to the for- mation of media through which society is steered."68 The Tasks of Social Philosophy Asis generally known, Habermas's theory of society leads to a diag- nosis of the times according to which the power of self-steering systems has increased to such an extent that they threaten the communicative achievements of the life-world: under the corrosive force with which the controlling media of money and bureaucratic power currently invade everyday culture, the human potential for reaching under- standing (Verstindigung) in language is beginning to dissolve. With regard to this image of a colonization of the life-world, Habermas's theory of society ultimately seems to agree with the pessimistic social critique we find in the negativist current of contemporary Critical ‘Theory. Both of these models’ respective diagnoses assert that systemic powers have become independent in a way that threatens to dissolve the social core of society. The decisive difference between these two approaches consists in Habermas's ability to provide a systematic concept of what is currently threatened by the domination of systems. At the place in negativist theoretical models where unclarified premises of a barely articulated anthropology predominate, in his model we find a theory of language that can demonstrate convincingly that the endan- gered potential of human beings consists in their ability to reach com- municative understanding. Unlike all other versions of Critical Theory, Habermas’s approach contains a concept able to present the structure of that form of practical action threatened by the developmental ten- dencies of society. From this perspective, it is easy to see that the formal construc- tion of Habermas's theory of communication meets the demands Horkheimer’s original program had made on social critique. What the latter locates in social labor, Habermas identifies in communicative understanding - a pre-theoretical sphere of emancipation through which critique can ground its normative standpoint within social reality. However, a comparison with Horkheimer’s model also exposes a problem in Habermas's theory that I would like to take as the point of departure for my further reflections. It concerns the question of how we are to determine more precisely the reflexive connection held to obtain between pre-theoretical praxis and Critical Theory. When. Horkheimer formulated his program, he had — in keeping with the Marxist tradition — a proletariat in mind that supposedly had already developed a sense of the injustice of capitalism in the production process. His idea was that these moral experiences, this sense of injus- tice, merely had to be systematically articulated by theory at a more reflexive level in order to give its critique an objective foothold. But we know today —and Horkheimer might have realized this, had he viewed this issue more dispassionately — that social classes do not experienceThe Social Dynamics of Disrespect 6 the world in the way an individual subject does, nor do they have any common, objective interest. It is with good reason that we have aban- doned the notion that emancipatory interests or experiences can be attributed to a group of people who have nothing but socio-economic circumstances in common. But what, in the construction of the theory, can take the place occupied in Horkheimer’s model by those moral experiences that he — very much a disciple of Georg Lukécs in this respect - attributed to the working class as a whole? As we have seen in our historical retrospective, Critical Theory must be able to believe itself capable of identifying empirically experiences and attitudes that give a pre-theoretical indication that its normative standpoints have some basis in social reality. What systematic experiences indeed, what phenomena at all, I would further like to ask — assume in Habermas's, theory the role of providing everyday evidence of the cogency of cri- tique prior to all theoretical reflection? I surmise that at this point, a fissure appears in the theory of communicative action, one that is not of chance origins but which has a systemic character. III Pre-theoretical praxis and moral experiences In shifting Critical Theory from the production paradigm to the para- digm of communication, Habermas unveiled a social sphere that ful- fills all the presuppositions included in the claim to intramundane transcendence. In communicative action, subjects encounter each other within the horizons of normative expectations whose disappointment becomes a constant source of moral demands that go beyond specifi- cally established forms of domination. Whereas Horkheimer saw capilalist relations of production as setting unjustified limits on the development of the human capacity for labor, Habermas sees the social relations of communication as putting unjust restrictions on the emancipatory potential of intersubjective understanding. With the help of his conception of universal pragmatics, Habermas reveals the specific normative justifications contained in the process of social interaction. According to his conception of pragmatics, the linguistic rules on which communicative action is based possess a normative character insofar as they also determine the conditions governing the process of reaching understanding, a process that must be free from domination? If we regard these linguistic conditions as a normative core struc~ turally built into human communication, the critical perspective ‘embedded in Habermas's theory of society becomes somewhat more7 The Tasks of Social Philosophy evident: an analysis of the social and cognitive restrictions that place limits on the unimpeded application of those linguistic rules. By turning to universal pragmatics, Habermas has taken a course that ulti- mately equates the normative potential of social interaction with the linguistic conditions of a way of reaching understanding free from domination. However great the advantages of such a language- theoretic version of the communication paradigm might be, its dis- advantages are just as great. A first difficulty becomes evident as soon as we ask, as would Horkheimer, which moral experiences within social reality are supposed to correspond to this critical standpoint. For Habermas, the pre-theoretical resource grounding his normative perspective in reality has to be that social process by which the lin- guistic rules of communicative understanding are developed. In The Theory of Communicative Action, he refers to this process as the com- municative rationalization of the life-world. However, such a process is typically something which could be said — with Marx ~ to occur lbchind the backs of the subjects involved; its course is neither directed by human intentions nor can it be grasped within the consciousness of a single individual. The emancipatory process in which Habermas socially anchors the normative perspective of his Critical Theory in no way appears as an emancipatory process in the moral experiences of the subjects involved. They experience an impairment of what we can call their moral experiences, ie, their “moral point of view,” not as a restriction of intuitively mastered rules of language, but as a violation of identity claims acquired in socialization. The communicative ratio- nalization of the life-world may unfold historically, but it does not appear as a moral state of affairs in the experiences of human subjects. For this reason, a correlate cannot be found within social reality for the pre-theoretical resource referred to in Habermas's normative perspec- tive; his conception is not aimed in the same way as Horkheimer’s (which was of course also under the influence of a destructive illusion) at giving expression to an existing experience of social injustice. ‘Away out of this dilemma can only be found if we follow Haber- mas’s communication paradigm more in the direction of its intersub- jective, indeed sociological, presuppositions. For the time being, this would merely consist in the proposal that we not equate the normative potential of social interaction with the linguistic conditions of reaching understanding free from domination. We have already pointed in this, direction by claiming that moral experiences are not aroused by a restriction of linguistic capabilities, but by a violation of identity claims acquired in socialization. Today, studies pointing in the same direction include those by Thomas McCarthy, who attempts to give theThe Social Dynamics of Disrespect 7m Habermasian communication paradigm a more experiential formula- tion by reconstructing the normative presuppositions of interaction with the help of ethnomethodology* To be better able to understand the moral expectations embedded in the everyday process of social communication, we should first turn to the historical and sociological studies devoted to the resistance engaged in by the lower social classes. Because their members are not culturally specialized in articulating moral experiences, we perceive in their utterances ~ prior to all philosophical or academic influence, as it were — what normative expectations are generally directed at in every- day social life. When considering these studies, it becomes constantly evident that the social protests of the lower classes are not motivated by positively formulated moral principles, but by the experience of having their intuitive notions of justice violated. The normative core of such notions of justice is always constituted by expectations of respect for one’s own dignity, honor or integrity.’ If we generalize these results beyond their particular research context, we arrive at the conclusion that the normative presupposition of all communicative action is to be seen in the acquisition of social recognition: subjects encounter each other within the parameters of the reciprocal expectation that they be given recognition as moral persons and for their social achievements. If this thesis is plausible, we further get an inkling of which occurrences are perceived as morally unjust in everyday social life: moral injustice is at hand whenever, contrary to their expectations, human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve, I would like to refer to such moral experiences as feelings of social disrespect. (On the basis of these reflections, we have already reached the point where the first outlines of an alternative to the language-theoretic version of the communication paradigm are becoming visible. The point of departure for such a theory is found in the notion that the normative presuppositions of social interaction cannot be fully grasped if they are defined solely in terms of the linguistic conditions of reaching understanding free from domination; rather, we must con- sider above all the fact that social recognition constitutes the norma- tive expectations connected with our entering into communicative relationships. If the communication paradigm is thus extended beyond the language-theoretic framework, it can then indicate the degree to which any harm to the normative presuppositions of inter- action must be directly reflected in the moral feelings of those involved. Because the experience of social recognition represents @ condition upon which the development of human identity depends, its denial, i.c,, disrespect, is necessarily accompanied by the sense of an The Tasks of Social Philosophy threatening loss of personality. Unlike Habermas's model, this model asserts a close connection between the kinds of violation of the nor- mative assumptions of social interaction and the moral experiences subjects have in their everyday communication. If those conditions are undermined by the fact that people are denied the recognition they deserve, they will generally react with moral feelings that accompany the experience of disrespect - shame, anger or indignation. Thus a communication paradigm conceived not in terms of a theory of lan- guage, but in terms of a theory of recognition, can ultimately close the theoretical gap left open by Habermas in his further development of Horkheimer’s program. The feelings of injustice that accompany struc~ tural forms of disrespect represent a pre-theoretical fact, on the basis, of which a critique of the relations of recognition can identify its own, theoretical perspective in social reality. Now, the idea I have just summarized contains so many unclarified presuppositions that I cannot justify them all in this context. Elsewhere, with the help of George Herbert Mead, I have reconstructed the model of recognition developed by the young Hegel; there I attempted to justify the communicative presuppositions of a successful development of identity.’ I proposed a distinction between three patterns of recipro- cal recognition, a distinction I consider necessary but have so far only touched upon here, Furthermore, I myself am currently unable to fully justify the claim that the expectation of social recognition belongs to the structure of communicative action, for this would require solving the difficult problem of replacing Habermas's universal pragmatics with an anthropological conception that can explain the normative presuppositions of social interaction. With regard to the question of where Critical Theory finds itself today, other aspects are in any case of greater importance. If social rela- tions of communication are to be analyzed primarily in terms of the structural forms of disrespect they generate, the critical perspective found in Habermas's model must be modified before it can be adopted for the purpose of making diagnoses of contemporary society. The focus of interest can no longer be the tension between system and life- ‘world, but the social causes responsible for the systematic violation of the conditions of recognition. Critical social theory must shift its atten- tion from the self-generated independence of systems to the damage and distortion of social relations of recognition. As we shall sec, this will lead, in contrast to Habermas, to a re-evalution of the role played by the experience of labor in the categorial framework of Critical Theory.The Social Dynamics of Disrespect 73 IV _Pathologies of capitalist society There has been a tendency in the tradition of the Frankfurt School to accept the fact that instrumental reason has attained predominance over other forms of action and knowledge as constituting the decisive “disorder” of modern societies. All occurrences and phenomena that might appear “pathological” are interpreted here as consequences of a self-generated independence of social attitudes aimed at dominating nature. The same tendency is also continued in Habermas’s work inasmuch as his draft of a theory of communicative action leads to a diagnosis of the times that proceeds from the danger of a “coloniza- tion” of the life-world by systems organized according to purposive rationality. The “disorder” said to threaten the life of our society is in turn the fact that instrumental orientations are attaining supremacy, even though their growth is no longer simply explained by the objec: tive of dominating nature, but by the increase in organizational ratio- nality. And we hardly need mention that the negativist social theories arising in the wake of Adorno’s work are also tied to a critical diagno: sis in which a particular type of instrumental reason is perceived as growing into a life-threatening power in technology, science and systems of control. What should be recognized as being characteristic of all these ‘models of social critique is the fact that they consistently judge social pathologies or anomalies only according to the stage marked by the development of human rationality. That is why only those anomalies which occur in human beings’ cognitive dimensions can be regarded as deviations from an ideal that must be presupposed categorially as the standard for a “healthy” or intact form of society. Accordingly, this, perspective is accompanied by a rational-theoretic narrowing of social critique ~ likewise a legacy of Left Hegelianism. As a result, all those social pathologies that do not refer to the developmental level of human rationality cannot come to light at all. For instance, Critical Theory cannot perceive the disorders of social life Durkheira had in mind when he analyzed the process of individualization, for these dis- orders transpire as a dissolution of a socially binding force, a dissolu- tion only indirectly related to changes in human rationality. In terms of the basic assumptions I have made so far in my attempt to locate Critical Theory today, there would be no point in contenting ourselves with such a narrow view of the disorders and pathologies of our society, for how can the pathological developments of social life connected to the structural conditions of reciprocal recognition74 The Tasks of Social Philosophy become visible if the only criteria available for the evaluation of anom- alies refer to the respective stage of human rationality? As soon as the ‘communication paradigm is grasped not in the sense of a conception of rational understanding, but as a conception of the conditions of recognition, the critical diagnosis of the times may no longer be pressed into the narrow scheme of a theory of rationality. The rational conditions of a process of reaching understanding free from domina- tion can no longer be employed as a criterion for what has to be regarded as a “disorder” or pathological development of social life; rather, the criterion now becomes the intersubjective condition of human identity development. These conditions can be found in social forms of communication in which the individual grows up, acquires a social identity and ultimately has to learn to conceive of him- or herself as both an equal and unique member of society. If these forms of communication do not provide the amount of recognition necessary to accomplish the various tasks involved in forming an identity, then this must be taken as an indication of a society’s pathological devel- ‘opment. Therefore, as soon as the communication paradigm is grasped not in terms of a theory of language but of recognition, pathologies of recognition move to the center of critical diagnosis. Accordingly, the basic concepts of an analysis of society have to be constructed in such, a way as to be able to grasp the disorders or deficits in the social framework of recognition, while the process of societal rationalization loses its central position However, these reflections do not at all specify the relationship between these pathologies of recognition and the social structure of a given society. If the model of Critical Theory outlined thus far is to be more than a merely normative analysis of the present, then it must pri- marily be able to reveal the socio-structural causes responsible for a distortion of the social framework of recognition in each particular case. Only then can it be decided whether there is a systematic con- nection between specific experiences of disrespect and the structural development of society. Here I must restrict myself to a few remarks which primarily serve the function of preparing for a further, final step in moving away from Habermas's version of the communication par- adigm. By returning to the young Hegel, as mentioned above, I distin- guished three forms of social recognition which can be regarded as the communicative presuppositions of a successful formation of identity: emotional concern in an intimate social relationship such as love or friendship, rights-based recognition as a morally accountable member of society and, finally, the social esteem of individual achievements and abilities. The question of how a particular society’s framework of recog-The Social Dynamics of Disrespect 5 nition is constituted can be answered only by analyzing the empirical state in which the institutional embodiments of these three patterns of recognition are found. For our society, this would first require studies on practices of socialization, familial forms and relations of friendship; secondly, on the content and application of positive law; and finally, on actual patterns of social esteem. With regard to this last dimension of recognition, and considering related research, we can claim with rela- tive certainty that a person’s social esteem is measured largely accord- ing to what contribution he or she makes to society in the form of formally organized labor. As regards social esteem, relations of recog- nition are thoroughly interwoven with the distribution and organiz: tion of social labor. To understand this requires, however, that the category of labor in the program of the Critical Theory developed here be accorded a greater significance than is granted to it by the theory of ‘communicative action. V_ Labor and recognition A mere glance at studies on the psychological effects of unemployment makes it clear that the experience of labor must be assigned a central position in the model emerging here. The acquisition of that form of recognition that I have called social esteem continues to be bound up with the opportunity to pursue an economically rewarding and thus socially regulated occupation. In upgrading the experience of labor, however, we should not fall behind the point achieved by Habermas twenty years ago in his cate- gorial purification of the concept of labor. In the Marxist tradition and even in Horkheimer, societal labor was held to play such a central role within their philosophies of history as a formational factor that only a very dispassionate concept of labor lacking all normative implications could guard against the danger of such an illusion. These contrary ten- dencies raise the question as to what extent the concept of labor can be neutralized without at the same time surrendering its significance as a central source of moral experiences. On the one hand, the process of societal labor must not be stylized, as in the tradition of Western Marxism, into a process of emancipatory consciousness formation; on the other, it must remain categorially embedded in moral experiences, to such a degroe that its role in obtaining social recognition does not disappear from view." is indeed the case that Habermas's recent theory of society no longer assigns a systematic role to the concept of “instrumental action”76 The Tasks of Social Philosophy into which he formerly transformed the Marxist concept of labor. The central distinctions he makes today in the praxis of human beings are no longer categorized according to differences in the specific object of this praxis ~ nature or other subjects ~ but according to differences in how actions conceived as being teleological in principle are coordi- nated. However, this conceptual strategy no longer allows the experi- ence of labor to appear systematically in this theory's categorial framework; the question of what experiences we have in dealing with external nature plays an equally insignificant role in Habermas's concept of personal identity formation as does the role played by the question of how societal labor is distributed, organized, and evaluated. But if individual identity formation is also dependent upon the social esteem enjoyed by one’s labor within society, then the concept of labor may not be constituted such that it categorially suppresses this psy- chosocial connection. The dangerous consequence of this would be that any effort to develop a theory of society that strives to re-evaluate or reshape particular forms of labor might remain incomprehensible, indeed indiscernible. Certain zones of pre-theoretical critique thus become evident only to the extent that they are analyzed in light of a concept of labor that also categorially encompasses the individual's dependence upon the social recognition of his or her own work ‘Most important for the further analysis of the connection between labor and recognition is the discussion, inspired by the feminist move- ment, concerning the problem of unpaid housework." In the course of, this debate, it has become clear from two different perspectives that the organization of societal labor is very closely linked to the ethical norms that regulate a particular system of social esteem. From a historical viewpoint, the fact that child-rearing and housework are not yet valued as equally worthy and necessary types of societal labor can only be explained by pointing out the low social esteem granted them in the context of a culture determined by male values. From a psychological viewpoint, this means that with the traditional distribution of roles, women have had few chances to receive the amount of social respect necessary to ensure a positive self-conception. It can be concluded from these two lines of argumentation that the organization and evaluation of societal labor play a central role in a society’s framework of recog- nition: because the culturally defined ranking of social tasks deter- mines the amount of social esteem an individual can obtain for his or her occupation and for the attributes associated with it, the chances of forming an individual identity through the experience of recognition are directly related to the societal institutionalization and distribution of labor. To gain insight into this pre-theoretical domain of recognitionThe Social Dynamics of Disrespect 7 and disrespect, however, we require a concept of labor that is norma- tive enough to be able to include the idea of our dependence upon the social acknowledgement of our own accomplishments and attributes. VI Conclusion All the reflections I have so far presented converge in the thesis that the multifarious efforts of a struggle for recognition are what will enable Critical Theory to justify its normative claims. The moral expe- riences had by subjects whose identity claims have been disrespected constitute a pre-theoretical resource that show that a critique of soci- etal relations of communication is not entirely without a foundation in social reality However, this thesis could easily give the impression that feelings of disrespect are something morally valuable to which theory can refer directly and without qualification in its social self justification. How ‘wrong such an assumption is, how extremely ambivalent such experi- ences of injustice really are, can be seen clearly in a passage I would like to cite briefly Most young people who spoke to us were frustrated. They ad ab- solutely no future prospects. I supported them and praised them from time to time in order to boost their self-esteem. This kind of recognition made them completely independent of what we called the “group of comrades.” For many of them, this “group of comrades” became a kind of drug they couldn't do without. Since they didn’t experience any recog- nition outside the “group of comrades,” they were mostly isolated and didn’t have any other social contacts." These sentences come from a book written by the East Berliner Ingo Hasselbach about the experiences he had while in neo-Nazi youth groups. Though the depiction of these impressions may well be influ- enced by the language of the journalist who helped to prepare the manuscript, it nevertheless very clearly shows the potential political consequences of the experience of social disrespect: social esteem can just as well be sought in small militaristic groups, whose code of honor is dominated by the practice of violence, as it can in the public arenas of a democratic society. The sense of no longer being included within the network of social recognition is in itself an extremely ambivalent source of motivation for social protest and resistance. It lacks any nor- mative indication or direction that would stipulate in what ways one should struggle against the experience of disrespect and humiliation.78 The Tasks of Social Philosophy Tor this reason, a critical theory of society that wishes to further develop Habermas's communication paradigm in the direction of a theory of recognition is not in as good a position as might have appeared thus far. In the widespread sense of social disrespect, it can indeed find that element of intramundane transcendence which confirms pre-theoretically that its critical diagnosis is shared by the victims. The latter experience social reality as the theory critically describes it, namely as a social reality incapable of sufficiently gener- ating an experience of recognition. However, the theory may not regard this pre-theoretical acknowledgement as proof that the normative direction of its critique is shared by the victims of disrespect. There- fore, this theory can no longer be conceived of in Horkheimer’s sense, namely as the mere intellectual expression of a process of emancipa~ tion that is already under way; rather, this theory of society will have to concentrate its efforts on answering a question that Horkheimer — under the spell of a grand illusion — could not even see. The question of how a moral culture could be so constituted as to give those who are victimized, disrespected, and ostracized the individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere, rather than living them out in a counterculture of violence. Translated by John Farrell Notes 1 Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Crit York: Seabury Press, 1972), pp. 188-243 See, by way of summary, Axel Honneth, “Critical Theory,” Social Theory Today, Anthony Giddens and J. H. Turner (eds) (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), pp. 347-82 3. Exemplary for this, Stefan Breuer, Die Gesellschaft des Verschindens: Vor ddr Selbstzerstorung. der technischen Zicilisation (Hamburg: Junius, 1992); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Alan Sheridan (tz) (New York: Pantheon, 1977) 4 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vols. 1 and 2, ‘Thomas McCarthy (tr) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984, 1987), See primarily jirgen Habermas, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical justification,” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, C. Lenhardt and §. Weber Nicholsen (trs) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 43-115. 6 Thomas McCarthy, “Philosophy and Critical Theory: A Reprise,” David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, (eds), Critical Theory (Oxford: Blacksvel, 1994) 7 Exemplary for this, Barrington Moore, Injustice: The Socal Basis of Obed ‘ence and Revolt (Armonk: Sharpe, 1978). [have also referred to this in Axel cal Theory” Critical Theory (New10 u The Social Dynamics of Disrespect n Honneth, “Horal-bewu8tscin und soziale Klassenhereschalt,” Die zeris sene Welt des Sozalen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhskamp, 1990), pp. 182-20. “Axel Honneth, Kamp wn Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatiksoziler Konftikte (Frankfurt am Main: Subrkamp, 1982), esp. ch. 5. See my refiections in Axel Honneth, “Work and instrumental Action,” New German Critique 92 (1982): 31-54, Exemplary for this are the contributions to the topic “On the Social Phi- losophy of Labor” by Friedrich Kambartel, Angelika Krebs, and Ingrid Kurz-Scherf in Deutsche Zeitschri fr Philosophie 41 2 (1993): 237-75, Ingo Hasselbach and Winfried Bonengel, Die Abrechnung: Eine Neonaz sagt aus (Berlin: Aufbau, 1993), pp. 121-2.