How Balochistan became a part of Pakistan – a historical perspective

The true history of Balochistan is

never shared or talked about among
the general public of Pakistan

Balochistan consists of the south west of Pakistan. In the west it borders with Afghanistan and Iran
and in the south it has the Arabian Sea. It accounts for nearly half the land mass of Pakistan and
only 3.6% of its total population. The province is immensely rich in natural resources, including oil,
gas, copper and gold. Despite these huge deposits of mineral wealth, the area is one of the poorest
regions of Pakistan. A vast majority of its population lives in deplorable housing conditions where
they don’t have access to electricity or clean drinking water.
3/12/2019 How Balochistan became a part of Pakistan – a historical perspective

Before the partition of India and Pakistan, Balochistan consisted of four princely states under the
British Raj. These were Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran. Two of these provinces, Lasbela and
Kharan, were fiduciary states placed under Khan of Kalat's rule by the British, as was Makran which
was a district of Kalat. Three months before the formation of Pakistan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah had
negotiated the freedom of Baluchistan under Kalat from the British. Discussions were made about
Kalat's relationship with Pakistan as it was formed. This ensued a series of meetings between the
Viceroy, as the Crown’s Representative, Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat. This resulted in a
communique on August 11, 1947, which stated that:

a. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state in treaty

relations with the British Government with a status different from that of Indian States.
b. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases will be inherited by the
Pakistan Government.

c. Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.

d. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to
reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.

Referring to a telegram of October 17, 1947 from Grafftey-Smith, the Political Department, in a note
on Pakistan-Kalat negotiations, says that Jinnah had second thoughts regarding the recognition of
Kalat as an independent sovereign state, and was now desirous of obtaining its accession in the
same form as was accepted by other rulers who joined Pakistan. The same note mentioned that an
interesting situation is developing as Pakistan might accept the accession of Kalat’s two feudatories,
Lasbela and Kharan.

By October 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a change of heart on the recognition of
Kalat as an “Independent and a Sovereign State”, and wanted the Khan to sign the same form of
instrument of accession as the other states which had joined Pakistan. The Khan was unwilling to
abandon the nominally achieved independent status but ready to concede on defence, foreign
affairs and communications. However, he was unwilling to sign either a treaty or an Instrument, until
and unless he had got a satisfactory agreement on the leased areas. Fears were also being voiced
that officials of the Government of Pakistan might start dealing with the two feudatories of Las Bela
and Kharan, and accept their de facto accession.

By February 1948, the discussions between Kalat and the Government of Pakistan were coming to
a head. The Quaid wrote to the Khan of Kalat: “I advise you to join Pakistan without further delay…
and let me have your final reply which you promised to do after your stay with me in Karachi when
we fully discussed the whole question in all its aspects.” On February 15, 1948, Jinnah visited Sibi,
Baluchistan and addressed a Royal Durbar, where he announced that until the Pakistan Constitution
is finally written in about two years’ time, he would govern the province with the help of an advisory
council that he would nominate. However, the main reason for Jinnah’s visit was to persuade the
Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan. As it transpired, the Khan failed to turn up for the final meeting
with him, pleading illness. In his letter to Jinnah, he said that he had summoned both Houses of the
Parliament, Dar-ul-Umara and Dar-ul-Awam, for their opinion about the future relations with the
Dominion of Pakistan, and he would inform him about their opinion by the end of the month.

When the Dar-ul-Awam of Kalat met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede, but to negotiate
a treaty to determine Kalat’s future relations with Pakistan. On March 9, 1948 the Khan received
communication from JInnah announcing that he had decided not to deal personally with the Kalat
https://nation.com.pk/05-Dec-2015/how-balochistan-became-a-part-of-pakistan-a-historical-perspective?fbclid=IwAR2d_R2xuC_4244QAxNSkqMME… 3/13
state negotiations, which would henceforth be dealt with by the Pakistan Government. So far there
had not been any formal negotiations but only an informal request made by Jinnah to the Khan at
Sibi.

The US Ambassador to Pakistan in his dispatch home on March 23, 1948 informed that on March
18, “Kharan, Lasbela and Mekran, feudatory states of Kalat” had acceded to Pakistan. The Khan of
Kalat objected to their accession, arguing that it was a violation of Kalat’s Standstill Agreement with
Pakistan. He also said that while Kharan and Lasbela were its feudatories, Mekran was a district of
Kalat. The British Government had placed the control of the foreign policy of the two feudatories
under Kalat in July 1947, prior to partition.

On March 26, 1948, the Pakistan Army was ordered to move into the Baloch coastal region of Pasni,
Jiwani and Turbat. This was the first act of aggression prior to the march on Kalat by a Pakistani
military detachment on April 1, 1948. Kalat capitulated on March 27 after the army moved into the
coastal region and it was announced in Karachi that the Khan of Kalat has agreed to merge his state
with Pakistan. Jinnah accepted this accession under the gun. It should be noted that the Balochistan
Assembly had already rejected any suggestion of forfeiting the independence of Balochistan on any
pretext. So even the signature of the Khan of Kalat taken under the barrel of the gun, was not viable,
because the parliament had rejected the accession and the accession was never mandated by the
British Empire either, who had given Balochistan under Kalat independence before India. The
sovereign Baloch state after British withdrawal from India lasted only 227 days. During this time
Baluchistan had a flag flying in its embassy in Karachi where its ambassador to Pakistan lived.

To say that the Baloch have been ill-treated by all governments and military establishments since
their land was illegally and forcefully taken over would be an understatement. As a result there have
been continuous insurgencies, the largest of which was started in 2006 after the killing of Sardar
Akber Bugti and 26 of his tribesmen by the Pakistan Army. A 2006 report by the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) documented arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, extra judicial
and summary executions, disappearances and the use of excessive and indiscriminate violence by
the Pakistan police, military, security agencies and intelligence forces. These figures are
corroborated by Amnesty International. Kachkol Ali Baloch who is the former leader of Opposition in
the Balochistan Assembly, alleged that about 4,000 people have been either missing or are detained
without trial. The missing persons included around 1,000 students and political activists. Lately his
own son was kidnapped and was finally released after being held captive for 14 months. Sardar
Akhter Mengal, leader of the Baloch Nationalist Party (BNP) was one of the people arrested in 2006
on framed terrorism charges. The reality was he was planning a long march against the then
President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. He was later released in 2008 and all cases
against him were dropped. The current Chief Minister of Balochistan, Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch,
recently spoke at a seminar held in Punjab called ‘Stability in Balochistan – Challenges and
possibilities”. He clearly stated that if the Baloch people are not given a right to the resources of their
province, we would be looking at yet another insurgency and no one will be able to control it.

The true history of Balochistan is never shared or talked about among the general public of
Pakistan. Our textbooks and other publications narrate a rhetoric which is far from the truth, and
which has made the general public believe in a lie. It is the responsibility of the intellectuals, the
teachers and the professors to learn and reveal the real facts according to non-tempered historical
documents.
 Balochistan: Heart of doval doctrine

Abdul Rasool Syed

March 25, 2019 (Pakistan Observer)

With assumption of country’s top office, premier Modi, {in-}famous for his hawkish inclination, kicked
off a Machiavellian campaign to upset the regional balance of power. He is found to be madly in love
to install India as a regional hegemon, an aspiration endearing cherished by his political mentors and
ideologues. To further his mission, he needed a man having same offensive proclivity. He therefore,
selected Ajit Doval, the former Director IB (Intelligence Bureau) as National Security Advisor—a man
widely notorious for his covert operations against Pakistan. Mr. Doval without an iota of any doubt is
a real hawk in all connotations of the term “Hawk”. This claim was substantiated by the former head
of RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) A.S Daulat who characterized Doval in one of his talks as “the
hawkish Ajit Doval”. What is more is that Doval like his boss Modi is a key advocate and mouthpiece
of Hinduvta and aggressively promotes Hindu nationalism. That’s why, he is the blue eyed boy of
Modi.
This duo (Doval- Modi) with hawkish tendencies is extremely dangerous for the region especially for
Pakistan. Doval stationed in Pakistan for seven years. He used to frequent to mosques to offer
prayers and befriended with the local people in order to collect the sensitive information. Doval is
fluent in Urdu and also has an impressive knowledge of Islam. Given these individualities, he deems
himself as an unmatched security expert on Pakistan affairs. He claims that living here in Pakistan;
he has learnt the Achilles heel of Pakistan. In February 2014, while unleashing his nefarious plot
against Pakistan, Doval said:” Pakistan is a neighbor which continues to bleed us. What if we get
highly vulnerable domestic situation? How do we go about? We have to find a solution which is a long
term, sustainable and affordable. So, first, accept reality. Second, define problem. “Then, let us
make a response. If we go to response, we have to understand what terrorism is. Generally, when
we talk terrorism, it is said senseless, inhuman etc. Yes it is, but these are tactical issues. Indeed,
terrorism is a tactic to achieve ideological or political advantages.” He, further, expatiated on
“Political Islam” and asked: “So how to tackle Pakistan? You know, we engage enemy in three
modes. One is a defensive mode. That is, you see what the chokidars and chaprasis do, i.e. to
prevent somebody from coming in. One is defensive-offensive. To defend ourselves, we go to the
place from where the offence is coming. We are now in defensive mode. The last mode is called
offensive mode. When we come in defensive-offense, we start working on the vulnerabilities of
Pakistan. It can be economic, it can be internal, it can be political; it can be international isolation,
defeating their policies in Afghanistan, making it difficult for them to manage internal political lands
security balance. It can be anything. “I am not going into details. But you need to change the
engagement from the defensive mode because in defensive mode you throw 100 stones on me, I
stop 90. But 10 still hurt me and I can never win. Because, either I lose or there is a stalemate. You
throw a stone when you want, you have peace when you want, and you have talks when you want.
In defensive-offense we see where the balance of equilibriums lies.
“Pakistan’s vulnerabilities are many times higher than us. Once they know that India has shifted its
gear from defense mode to defensive-offense, they will find that it is unaffordable for them.” Then
came the line that went viral: “You may do one Mumbai you may lose Balochistan.” It was a
giveaway, an eye-opener. This is the heart of the Doval doctrine in all its clarity. He added: “We
don’t need Pakistan. Let Pakistan bleed with Taliban problem if they do not leave terrorism as an
instrument of their state policy. The second thing is how you deal [with] terrorist organizations. Third
thing is to deny them weapons, funds and manpower. Now funding may be denied with countering
funds. If they have budget of 500 crores, we can match it with 1,800 crores. So they would be on our
side. They are mercenaries. Do you think they are great fighters? No. So, go for more covert steps.
We will match them with money, we are a bigger country. So work amongst the Muslim
organizations, they are more willing. There are only a few bad families. Last, make the paradigm
shift; go for high technology, and in response, prepare for intelligence driven operations”, covertly, of
course, in commando style.
What is most alarming in Doval doctrine for our country is the launching of covert operations which
India has been doing and would keep doing so. This time, they may be more devastating. To this
end, it may connive with the proscribed terrorist outfits and the secessionist forces of Balochistan. In
addition, covert operations choreographed by India in Balochaistan were confirmed by well-known
Indian newspaper The Indian Express. It reported in September 2013 that army had destroyed
documents of the so-called “Technical Service Division” (TSD) before the army chief V.K Singh’s
tenure ended. Sushant Singh wrote:” As per reports, the inquiry report (set up after his retirement)
said that TSD had claimed to have carried out at least eight covert operations in foreign country. The
TDS also allegedly claimed that in October and November 2011, it had paid money from secret
service funds to try and enroll the secessionist chief in a province of neighbouring country.” There
were thus two operations, eight covert and one of bribery. Is it far-fetched to guess that the “foreign
country” was Pakistan and the” province” was Balochistan? To encapsulate, the yearning for peace
between India and Pakistan in the presence of Ajit Doval and the like –minded in the Indian security
establishment is just like crying for moon. What we can expect is more covert operations in our
country especially in Balochistan. Warmongers like Modi and Doval would leave no stone unturned to
regain their lost hubris. Therefore, we need to remain alert, cautious and proactive …what is more
important and the need of the hour is to forge unity among us; Since “By union “remarked Sallust
“the smallest states thrive. By discord the greatest are destroyed.”
Global terror map

Dr Niaz Murtaza | March 26, 2019 (Dawn Newspaper)

The writer is a Senior Fellow with UC Berkeley and heads INSPIRING Pakistan think tank.

THE Christchurch tragedy represents the union of two extremist tendencies — white
supremacy and Islamophobia. White supremacy says that whites are superior to
other races and hence must dominate them. It targets Muslims, but also blacks,
Hispanics, Asians and Jews. Islamophobia represents prejudice and hate against
Muslims in Western and Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish societies.

Both are old views. White supremacy was the official view in the West for centuries and spawned
great evils like colonialism, slavery, genocide and Nazism. It was gradually displaced to the fringes
over the last century. But only the overt use of force against other races has declined. Non-violent
racial dominance via socioeconomic policies continues, eg in the US under conservatives. So there is
class-based economic exploitation at work via the unfair division of profits between capital and
labour. Then there is social discrimination at and beyond work against weaker races and ethnicities
of all classes. The two combine to privilege rich whites.

The forms of social prejudice vary across the conservative spectrum. Moderate conservatives
practise it via quiet socioeconomic policies that mainly harm minorities. Severe conservatives use
openly racist rhetoric that demonises and marginalises minorities. Finally, fringe ones still engage
in violence against minorities, which has now become passé among other conservatives.

So the aim across the spectrum evolves from keeping minorities marginalised, to openly
humiliating and keeping them out, to physically eliminating them. Moderate and severe
conservatives usually congregate, but keep fringe ones at arm’s length. Still, the racist rhetoric of
severe conservatives feeds the fury and terrorism of fringe ones, who obtain ideological sustenance
from mainstream conservatism. But the sheer global hegemony of whites via less overt and violent
tools and greater policing powers keep white supremacist terrorism small in the West.

The targets of white supremacy have evolved

over time.

The targets of white supremacy have evolved over time — natives, blacks, Jews, Asians, Hispanics,
and now Muslims, as white supremacy intersects with Islamophobia. Western Islamophobia has a
history stretching back to early Muslim conquests. More recently, it has been reignited by the
Iranian revolution, Muslim extremism and growing Muslim migration to the West.

These trends have reignited latent Islamophobic terrorism among some groups in other societies
too — Hindu, Jewish and now even Buddhist-majority ones. As in the West, the aim is limited to
keeping a weak group subjugated, though the intensity and tools vary: from isolated attacks in India
and Sri Lanka, occupation in Israel and Indian-held Kashmir, to ethnic cleansing in Myanmar.

But the most potent form of terrorism still emerges from some Muslim groups; it differs from other
forms in key ways. Firstly, the aims are more diverse. As in the states mentioned, in some Muslim
states too, it is wreaked by dominant groups aiming to keeping weak groups subjugated. But
militancy is also employed to pursue freedom, overthrow secular regimes, end Western dominance,
and establish a global ‘caliphate’. Related to this is the organisational diversity, ranging from lone
operators and small groups in the West to well-trained insurgent groups and even armies in other
places.

Secondly, the claimed links and references to religion are more explicit. Thirdly, the global reach is
wider, covering several continents, with only white supremacist terrorism coming somewhat close.

Fourthly, it is the only one which has managed to conquer and hold territories. Also, the links of
some militant groups with certain Muslim countries are much stronger and overt, with only
Myanmar being ahead of them. Finally, the bulk of their violence is visited upon people of their own
faith.

But unlike other forms of militancy, which are all currently expanding, it is in decline as seen in the
clean-up in Pakistan and the Levant. Even so, it beats others in potency. It is unlikely that other
forms will come close to it in potency. This is important to realise, for there is much injured
indignation being expressed after the New Zealand attack to the effect that it shows that militancy is
not only a Muslim problem.

That certainly is true and there is much that non-Muslim states must do to curb their own terrorist
groups. However, there is a widespread need to do much more in Muslim states like Pakistan. Here
too, overall societal biases against other faiths have fed local terrorism while misplaced state
policies spawned regional ones. Is the state willing to eliminate both? Until the state does so, the
recent gains against terrorism may just be temporary.
Kashmir and freedom
There are events that de ne the future course of history. Mangal Pandey, a
sepoy in the 34th Regiment of the Bengal Native Infantry of the East India
Company, is remembered in Indian history as a hero and the rst Indian sepoy
to attack his British o cers. He was captured and hanged on April 8, 1857.

India treats Madan Lal Dhingra as another icon and the rst revolutionary of
the Indian freedom movement. As a student in England, he assassinated Sir
William Hutt Curzon Wyllie with four bullets to his face. Captured attempting
suicide, he spoke at his trial about “the terrible oppression and horrible
atrocities committed in India; the killing of Indians and the outraging of our
women”.

His last words at the gallows on Aug 17, 1909 were: “A nation held down by
foreign bayonets is in a perpetual state of war.... The only lesson required in
India is to learn how to die, and the only way to teach it is by dying ourselves.”

These are only two of the many who took up arms or urged taking up arms
against the British occupiers. They are revered by India as iconic freedom
ghters; to the British they were rebels and traitors.

Today, Indian crimes, documented by international agencies, nd a convenient

scapegoat in Pakistan; a country which itself has borne the brunt of terrorism
perpetrated and abetted also by India. Today, Gen Bipin Rawat gives vent to the
occupier mindset by saying: “In fact, I wish these people (Kashmiris), instead of
throwing stones at us, were ring weapons at us. Then I would have been
happy. Then I could do what I want to do”.

Irrespective of what Kashmiris do, the brutal Indian occupation has seen the
martyrdom of millions of Kashmiris, rape of minor girls, and the young and
old, maiming and blinding of thousands by pellet guns, arson and internments
under draconian laws. Can one expect anything but anger and militancy from
young Kashmiris who see the world oblivious to the horrendous genocide and
to brutalities of such dastardly proportions?

Ronald Reagan feted a group of Afghan mujahideen at the White House in 1985
and gushed over them as “the moral equivalent of America’s founding fathers”.
This at a time when Nelson Mandela, incarcerated as prisoner number 466/64
in a cell at Robben Island for standing up to the apartheid regime, was labeled a
“terrorist” by the Pentagon’s o cial watch list. Taliban leader Mullah Baradar,
once incarcerated and deemed a terrorist, was released recently on American
request. He now sits across the table, heading Taliban negotiations with a
desperate Washington seeking exit from Afghanistan after seventeen ruinous
years of a war that took millions of lives and cost trillions of dollars.

India, bent upon suppressing the Kashmiri yearning for Azaadi should ponder
as to how a land known as Pir Waer (land of su s and saints) and Amir
Khusro’s ‘Firdaus bar roy e zamin’ (paradise on earth) has morphed into an
inferno and how hands that wove the fabled and delicate Shahtoosh and
Pashmina have come to hold slings and guns, and drive explosives-laden
vehicles.

Kashmiris follow the path taught by the examples of aspiration for freedom in
Indian history, and at times choose death to remain free. Today, every single
Kashmiri is ready to sacri ce his life to be free. The only deafening sound that
reverberates in the once pristine land that was Kashmir is of brutal gun re –
countered by Azad and Azaadi.
 TODAY'S PAPER | MARCH 12, 2019

In ation in Pakistan
multiple causes
Nadir Cheema | Dawn, March 11, 2019

The writer teaches economics at SOAS University of London, and is a senior research fellow at Bloomsbury Pakistan.

INFLATION is once again the news, having risen further to 8.2 per cent in February.
That inflation comes with costs is not news. For the poor, a rise in the prices of
essential items (if it exceeds income growth) can be a death knell, both literally (for
subsistence households), and indirectly, due to the inability to afford needed medical
and health spending. It can also force parents to choose between whether their child
goes to school or works.

Importantly, inflation is a tax that erodes the purchasing power of the currency. Thus, the poor,
who hold much of their assets in cash, bear this tax disproportionately, while the rich can partly
evade it by holding assets that are return-bearing (like bonds), increasing in value (like land), or in
a stable foreign currency (like the dollar).

Then, by raising uncertainty about the future, inflation discourages investment in projects that raise
the economy’s productive capacity. Businesses start focusing on projects with short-term returns, or
transactions in foreign currency.

Insofar as inflation erodes trust in the national currency as a store of value, it also erodes the
associated national pride, and this is felt by all citizens. In Pakistan, this erosion has been
significant: by the mid-1970s, the Pakistani rupee had lost half of the purchasing power it had in
1956; and by the early 1990s, it had lost 90pc. Large as it seems, it is a much less dramatic decline
than witnessed by Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. And a comparison starting in 1980, and excluding
rich countries, suggests Pakistan has done no worse than its South Asian neighbours.
 Although inflation has
picked up in the past
few months, its level is
still low by recent
historical standards.

Next, we ask if all inflation is bad and whether it

should be zero. The answer is no. Most
economists today only consider inflation above

high single digits to be

bad. Moderate inflation, in the 3pc to 6pc range is generally considered desirable, and inflation
below 3pc can actually be risky. Why? Moderate inflation can serve as a useful signal of demand
pressures in normal times, and also lends flexibility to an economy adjusting to adverse shocks: if
inflation is near zero, disinflation must involve nominal wage cuts, which are politically difficult.

For much of Pakistan’s history, inflation has been moderate, with two noticeable exceptions: 1972-
76 and 2008-14, both of which coincided with record-high international oil prices; and followed/
accompanied public or private spending booms. Although inflation has picked up in the past few
months and is now in the upper single digits, its level is still low by recent historical standards.

Given this, the key policy issues for inflation management are: avoiding the big spikes (that take
inflation above the desirable range); and ensuring that the poor are well protected against inflation.
On the former, we note that there are several (not one) drivers of inflation:

The first is money growth. For a fixed supply of goods, more money in circulation means higher
prices. Monetary loosening can happen due to structural factors like fiscal dominance, where the
central bank is forced to print money to finance fiscal deficits; and/ or cyclical surges in capital
inflows, and the accompanying credit/ real estate booms.

Fiscal dominance has been a perennial problem in Pakistan, as evinced by the strong co-movement
of inflation and State Bank credit to government over the past 15 years (only Egypt is worse in this
regard). Two things can help fix it: a rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio so that there is a buffer in public
finances; and greater de jure and de facto independence for the State Bank (progression on this has
been quite uneven).

Capital inflow booms have been rarer but equally impactful, eg the mid-2000s real estate boom
financed by Gulf money, which ended badly for the economy. With the government trying to lure
investments from China and the Gulf, care would have to be taken to ensure the resource inflow
expands the productive capacity of the economy, and does not just fuel prices.

The second is factors that affect import prices. As a heavily oil-reliant importer, and with no real
foreign exchange or fiscal buffers to limit pass-through to domestic prices, a part of Pakistani
inflation is simply determined by global oil price movements. At one level, a government neither
deserves credit for lower inflation when oil prices fall (as they did from 2014-16), nor the blame for
higher inflation when they rise (as they sporadically did in 2017-18). However, to be constantly at
the mercy of a known exogenous quantity is not pardonable: Pakistan must make a concerted effort
to diversify its energy reliance away from oil and towards hydro, solar, nuclear, clean coal.
Currency depreciations affect inflation similarly, except that they raise the domestic price of all
imported goods, not just oil. Depreciations are needed to fix balance-of-payments problems which
can arise due to unsustainable spending booms (as in the aftermath of the mid-2000s, as well as
2014-17); adverse terms of trade shocks (like oil price rises); or weakening global demand for
Pakistani goods and services (as occurred during the 2008 global financial crisis). Governments
cannot do much to avoid depreciations when they are needed, but they can make them less
dramatic by allowing a more flexible exchange rate regime.

The third is domestic supply shocks. Floods, droughts, crop pests can all raise the price of domestic
goods, and often goods that are essential to the poor. While governments cannot wish these shocks
away, it can and must invest in resilience mechanisms, as these are likely to benefit the poor most.

In sum, inflation is a multi-source problem. It has been high, but manageable, in Pakistan. But
because it affects the poor disproportionately, the government must continue to take structural
measures to keep it low, and to compensate the poor via lifeline tariffs and cash transfers for any
temporary surges.

Nadir Cheema teaches economics at SOAS University of London, and is a senior research fellow
atBloomsbury Pakistan.
By News desk - March 21, 2019

Islamophobia wave in the West

Reema Shaukat
Pakistan Observer
March 21, 2019

SOME say that had 9/11 attacks revenge was limited to the doers only and punishing them, then
war against terrorism had not been there for millions of Muslims to suffer. Unfortunately, the
West has created this sense of Islamophobia in its societies over the years. Islamophobia is
generally defined as the fear, hatred or prejudice against the religion Islam and its followers-
Muslims especially when it is seen as a geopolitical force or perceived as the source of terrorism.
History suggests that the Islamophobia existed before 9/11 but this terminology got more
influential in the West in past one and half decades. Several researchers doing research on this
particular subject have mentioned that this terminology was found in 1991 in one of the US
fortnightly newspapers, ‘Insight News’ while many have found out this lexis was reconsidered
orientalism in 1985. In some of historical findings researchers have quoted that word
Islamophobia is mentioned in 1923’s Journal of Theology too. So the history says that this fear of
Muslims and Islam was created by powers of that time about 125-130 years ago. In the history of
sub-continent we find lecture series by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, great Muslim educationist to
counter the propaganda by West on Islamophobia in his writings of “Khutbat-e-Muhammadia”.
In a recent incident on 15 March 2019 that happened in two of mosques in New Zealand in which
50 Muslims belonging to different countries were martyred while offering prayers by a terrorist.
Among them were also 9 Pakistanis who lost their lives in brutal incident in Christchurch. This
tragic incident was condemned throughout the world particularly Muslim countries raised serious
concerns over the safety of Muslims in western countries. It is now observed that this concept of
white supremacy is holding strength in the past few years. Obviously many factors are responsible
for this white supremacy mind-set which is the racist belief that white people are superior to
people of other races and therefore should be dominant over them. History says that white
supremacy has roots in scientific racism and it often relies on pseudoscientific arguments. Several
movements in past have supported white supremacy and they have opposed members of all races
belonging to any religion. This white supremacy notion is not limited to any particular country and
unfortunately many examples around us tell how Muslims are victim of this.
Be it is Punish a Muslim Day in UK, blasphemy in Denmark, women targeted for wearing hijab in
France or mass shootings in USA, Muslims are victim of such heinous acts. In USA we can often
find such injustices on the basis of religion and not to forget that President Trump used this notion
of racism against Muslims to win his presidential elections. His tweets often criticise Muslims and
when President Donald Trump called PM of New Zealand Jacinda Ardern to offer his sympathies
and ask what assistance the US might provide, Ardern said she would welcome sympathy and
love toward Muslim communities. It truly pointed toward the perception of Trump as being anti-
Islamic. According to FBI report there are 872 hate groups working in USA only, so this raises a
question on the spread of Islamophobia in USA only. However, Jacinda Ardern in this crucial time
has won hearts of many Muslims when she in NZ Parliament addressed starting with greeting
Assalam-o-Alaikum and said peace be upon you and peace be upon all of us. She clearly
mentioned in her speech that the killer sought many things from his act of terror but one was
notoriety and that is why you will never hear me mention his name.
Organization of Islamic Cooperation has called on emergency meeting of the Council of Foreign
Ministers of the OIC in Istanbul to discuss the causes and the way forward in the aftermath of the
New Zealand terror attacks. During the meeting, efforts will be made to unify the Ummah and
devise a strategy to know the root causes of growing Islamophobia in West and its implications
for Muslims around the world as many Muslim communities living in different countries strongly
believed there was a real threat to their safety which understandably caused fear, offense and
worry. After this incident in NZ and many past happenings with Muslims across the globe, it
becomes essential that Muslims should in real terms follow the religion. Islam is a religion of
peace, love and tolerance but the West has portrayed it as terror and something insane.
Particularly after war against terrorism and in Middle East crises where millions of Muslims had to
migrate to different countries, western societies though accepted them as migrants but perceived
all of them and Islam as a threat to their society. That’s why whenever something bad happens in
the world, it is often inked to Muslims.
It is need of the hour that peace literature be produced or if there comes an anti-Islamic literature
that must be countered through strong narrative and literature. Muslims have to come in
leadership role in western countries to have their strong say at higher level and indeed they can
play a positive role in eliminating such phobias through their goodwill gestures. Research suggests
that when it comes to religion and culture, politics is often overtaken and religious affinities and
cultural similarities become a root cause of tension between Muslims and western world. Same
goes for Islamophobia where political interests are often dominated and according to “Fear, Inc.”
report a network of misinformation experts actively promotes Islamophobia in USA. Hence to
counter such negative elements and propaganda in the West, Muslims have to play a significant
role through their positive actions, deeds and gestures so that they are not considered as threat
anywhere.
— The writer works for Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, a think-tank based in
Islamabad.
Everyone wants a piece of
Afghanistan
A U.S. withdrawal has opened the door to a possible political settlement, but success will
depend on regional powers and the country’s neighbors.
BY BARNETT R. RUBIN | MARCH 11, 2019

P
resident Donald Trump’s intention to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan
has given new life to the quest for a political settlement after 41 years of war,
including over 17 directly involving the U.S. military. According to both U.S.
government and Taliban sources, negotiations between the two sides have led to
agreement on the outline of a framework for a deal in which the United States would
withdraw troops and the Taliban would guarantee that any future government in which
they participate would cooperate with international efforts against terrorism. The
Taliban will have to disavow al Qaeda explicitly for the first time.

The U.S. government is negotiating directly with the Taliban because Washington has
finally accepted that there is no better military option. Meanwhile, the Islamist group
refuses to engage the Afghan government until it has reached agreement with the
United States on ending what it calls the “occupation” of Afghanistan.

The U.S. government is negotiating directly with the Taliban

because Washington has finally accepted that there is no better
military option.

Under the framework being negotiated by the U.S. government and the Taliban,
however, the agreement between these two would be implemented only as one
component of a broader pact, including a ceasefire and a domestic political settlement
derived from negotiations including the Afghan government and the Taliban, with the
representation of a broad range of Afghan society, including women and youth. The
main parties to the conflict will also have to agree on the sequencing of the troop
pullout, the ceasefire, the political settlement, and long-term assistance to Afghanistan
to ensure that the foreign troop withdrawal does not lead to collapse of the government,
as was the case in Afghanistan after the 1988 Geneva Accords.

In addition to those core parties to the conflict, for any deal to endure, other regional
actors need to agree as well—especially Pakistan. Pakistan supported the Taliban while
they were in power and has hosted their leadership and logistics bases since U.S. forces
expelled them from Afghanistan.

Pakistan has used support for the Taliban’s military and terrorist activities to pressure
Washington and Kabul over five issues: The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan,
which could threaten Pakistan, especially its nuclear arsenal, and, Islamabad believes,
provide cover for Indian activities against Pakistan; Afghanistan’s refusal to recognize
the international boundary with Pakistan, known as the Durand Line, and its claims on
the loyalties of Pashtun and Baloch ethnic groups in the two countries; commercial and
transit access to Central Asia via Afghanistan, which Pakistan could obtain at any time
by allowing Afghanistan reciprocal access to India, which it has so far refused; some
understanding on limiting the Indian presence in Afghanistan, at least in provinces
directly bordering Pakistan—while there are no Indian troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan
claims that Indian aid and diplomatic missions provide cover for intelligence
operations; and limits on building dams on waterways such as the Kabul River that flow
into Pakistan, which is experiencing a severe water crisis.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have made some progress on these issues, especially in talks
brokered by China, which is involved because it views instability in Pakistan and
Afghanistan as a threat to its massive transcontinental infrastructure project, the Belt
and Road Initiative.

Pakistan’s financial crisis has made it more vulnerable to pressure. The balance of
payments deficit has so drained the country’s central bank that by the end of 2018 it had
only two months of sovereign debt payments in reserves. Pakistan refused the IMF’s
tough conditions for a bailout, and China likewise declined to reward its client’s
profligacy, leaving it with no alternative but to look to Persian Gulf oil states for help. In
December 2018, Saudi Arabia reportedly promised $6 billion in a series of
disbursements that U.S. officials claim are conditional on cooperation with the Afghan
peace process. The United Arab Emirates simultaneously allocated $3 billion for
Pakistan under similar conditions.

Pakistan’s financial crisis has made it more vulnerable to

pressure.

The Pakistani military appears to have applied selective pressure on Taliban leaders to
join the process. At the request of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the Afghan-born
former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations whom Trump has
named special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, Pakistan released former
Taliban deputy leader Mullah Baradar Akhund after nearly nine years of detention.

Baradar was captured in a 2010 CIA counterterrorism raid in Karachi, coordinated with
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, which wanted to halt an unauthorized
dialogue reportedly sponsored by Baradar with the government of then-Afghan
President Hamid Karzai. One of the Taliban’s founders, with extensive influence over
fighters in southern Afghanistan, Baradar has long been considered one of the Taliban
leaders most inclined toward a peaceful settlement. Upon his release, the Taliban
reinstated him to his deputy leader position and placed him in charge of the
negotiations. He then traveled to Doha, where he is acting as Khalilzad’s counterpart in
the talks.

In addition to providing conditional bailouts of Pakistan, the Saudis and Emiratis are
seeking to expand their coalition against Iran and Qatar to include Pakistan and to court
the favor of the U.S. government. They have offered to use their supposed influence
with the Taliban to bring them together with the Afghan government in Abu Dhabi and
Jeddah.
The U.S. government agreed to an official opening of a Taliban political office in Doha in
June 2013, but Washington blocked the effort when Qatar and the Taliban violated an
agreement not to claim the office represented the “Islamic Emirate” of Afghanistan. The
members of the office nonetheless stayed on in Qatar, where they have operated
without official recognition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are trying, but have so far failed,
to demonstrate that they could replace Qatar as Washington’s broker with the Taliban.
The negotiations have continued in Qatar, but Saudi Arabia has used its new leverage
with Pakistan to buy a stake in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, to China’s
apparent annoyance, and to continue its effort to recruit Pakistan to its anti-Iran
coalition.

Iran, meanwhile, charges that Saudi and Emirati intelligence agencies are behind
several terrorist attacks in Iran, in some cases making use of Afghan or Pakistani
territory. It also charges that U.S. intelligence has established massive facilities to spy
on Iran from Afghanistan. After Saudi Arabia’s failed attempt to insert itself in the U.S.-
Taliban negotiations, Tehran informed Kabul that it had upgraded its relations with the
Taliban from intelligence to diplomatic contacts and reminded it that Iran reserved the
right to take action against U.S. interests and those of the Gulf States if they engage in
hostilities against it. Washington and Tehran have exchanged messages signaling that
they do not want Afghanistan to become another Yemen, but the risks are rising.

Russia may be changing from a spoiler to a U.S. partner in the process, as Moscow is
starting to believe that the United States may no longer insist on monopolizing
influence in Afghanistan. Russia’s presidential special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir
Kabulov, a native of Uzbekistan, started his Afghan diplomacy as second secretary in
charge of press relations for the Soviet Embassy in Kabul in the 1980s at the same time
as Khalilzad was introducing President Ronald Reagan to the mujahideen leaders in
Washington. Kabulov claims that he tried to advise the U.S. government how not to
repeat Soviet mistakes in Afghanistan, but that it not only did so but even added some
new mistakes of its own invention.

Russia may be changing from a spoiler to a U.S. partner in the

process

In December 2017, Kabulov launched the so-called Moscow Process for a political
settlement in Afghanistan as a challenge to Washington and what Moscow sees as a U.S.
client government in Kabul. While Russia helped the Americans gain bases in Central
Asia to enter Afghanistan in 2001, it expected the U.S. military presence to end within
five years and has increasingly viewed it as a hostile bridgehead on the Asian continent.
The goal of the Moscow Process was to orchestrate a peace process based on a
consensus of Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and China that would lead to the withdrawal of U.S.
forces and the containment of U.S. influence in Afghanistan.

The United States declined Russia’s invitation to participate in the first few rounds of
the Moscow Process. After Khalilzad’s appointment, the U.S. government for the first
time sent a diplomat from the Moscow embassy to participate in the November 2018
round, which was attended by delegations from both the Taliban and the Afghan
government’s High Peace Council. (The government refused to send direct
representatives to a meeting where they would be treated as just another Afghan group,
equivalent to the Taliban or the opposition).

A December 2018 meeting between Khalilzad and Kabulov in Moscow seems to have led
to discussion of further cooperation. Rather than calling another round of the Moscow
Process to challenge both the U.S. and Afghan governments, Russia used an association
of Afghans resident in Russia to convene an Afghan gathering in Moscow in February.
At this meeting, the Taliban political office met with a high-level Afghan delegation led
by former President Karzai.

Except for forces aligned with President Ashraf Ghani, virtually the entire Afghan male
political gerontocracy was represented. Russian officials did not appear at the forum to
claim credit, and the U.S. government did not criticize it. The meeting furthered U.S.
goals by increasing pressure on Ghani to allow broader participation in the intra-Afghan
part of the peace process. And on a visit to Qatar earlier this month, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed support for U.S.-Russian cooperation on the Afghan
peace process.

Indian officials also participated in the November round of the Moscow Process, the
first time that India has joined a meeting with Taliban representatives, as India has long
regarded the Taliban as an integral part of the terrorist networks sponsored by Pakistan
with the primary goal of targeting India. Russia and Iran long echoed the same position
as India against any engagement with the Taliban, but as their view of the Taliban has
shifted, India has become more isolated.

India strongly supported Trump’s pro-Indian South Asia strategy but has chafed at U.S.
restrictions on its dealings with Iran and Russia. India is also re-evaluating its
relationship with China. It is wary of increased Pakistani influence in Afghanistan
through any process that includes the Taliban, but it is also exploring possibilities of
cooperation with China, including on projects in Afghanistan.

India strongly supported Trump’s pro-Indian South Asia strategy

but has chafed at U.S. restrictions on its dealings with Iran and
Russia.

India is the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. And according to public opinion
surveys, it is the most popular foreign country in Afghanistan, but it lacks a common
border and has little leverage over the actors involved in negotiations. (Territory
claimed by India as part of the Kashmir dispute does border on Afghanistan, but that
territory, now including the provinces of Gilgit and Baltistan, has been under Pakistan’s
control since 1947.) Through cooperation with Iran in developing the port of Chabahar,
however, India has developed a transit route to Afghanistan that evades Pakistan,
helping Afghanistan achieve a major strategic objective of decreasing dependence on its
eastern neighbor.

China has quietly pressured Pakistan to cooperate by declining to bail it out of its
balance of payments crisis and increasingly siding with Afghanistan in Afghanistan-
Pakistan bilateral conflicts. It lacks the capabilities and personnel to intervene in such
quickly moving events in an area where it is only starting to reengage, after centuries
during which the ancient Silk Road connections atrophied. China is less interested than
many think in Afghanistan’s mineral riches—after all, in January, Beijing landed a
space rover on the dark side of the moon, which may have even greater mineral
resources than Afghanistan, and where neither U.S. nor Chinese visitors have yet
encountered armed resistance.

China’s leadership believes (mistakenly, in all likelihood) that its massive investments
in internal repression and border cooperation with Afghanistan and Tajikistan have
neutralized the threat to Xinjiang from ethnic Uighur separatists. Its main concern is
that of any would-be hegemon: establishing stability that facilitates its economic and
strategic expansion. While China opposes permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan, the
time horizon by which it defines “permanent” is longer than that of most other
countries. In practice, it has been more concerned that the United States may withdraw
too quickly, leading to instability.

China is likely to be a major participant in implementing and sustaining any Afghan

peace agreement. Its cooperation with Washington to manage Pakistan could
potentially be important, as Pakistani military cooperation, even if unavowed, will be
needed to implement a cease-fire and any demobilization of Pakistan-based Taliban
fighters and their integration into the Afghan security forces.

China is likely to be a major participant in implementing and

sustaining any Afghan peace agreement.

Russia has helped build a consensus about Afghanistan with Iran, Pakistan, and China.
Like the Taliban, these governments see the U.S. presence and predominance in
Afghanistan to a greater or lesser extent as a threat, but they are also ambivalent about
the terms under which the Americans should leave. They see their main strategic stakes
in the development of regional infrastructure and integration through projects such as
the Belt and Road Initiative and Chabahar, which require stability.

Any U.S. exit inevitably raises the question of what might replace the near-total
dependence of the Afghan state on Washington for funding, training, technology, and
equipment. However concerned these neighboring countries are that Afghanistan has
become an extension of U.S. power projection into the region, they have not proposed
any alternative way to sustain the Afghan state.

Stabilization of Afghanistan even after an agreement between the Taliban and the
government, and a U.S. troop withdrawal, would require a degree of regional consensus
over Afghanistan’s final status security issues, namely: What (minimal) redlines can all
stakeholders endorse concerning the composition and structure of the Afghan
government? What, if any, international military advisory or counterterrorist presence
will international actors offer Afghanistan? What will be the size, mission, and
composition of the security and defense forces that international actors will support?
Who will finance, equip, and train those forces and fund service provision by the state?
How will landlocked Afghanistan be integrated into the regional and global economy?

Since the transition from NATO-U.S. security leadership was completed in December
2014, Afghanistan has centered its strategy for security and stability on the Bilateral
Security Agreement with the United States that Ghani’s administration signed soon
after taking office in September 2014. As Washington withdraws its physical troop
presence and reduces its level of assistance, residual U.S. support will have to be
coordinated with regional support, for which there is no corresponding agreement or
understanding. While most of the Bilateral Security Agreement is the equivalent of a
status of forces agreement for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, its other provisions could be
broadened rather than abrogated by being replaced with a Multilateral Security
Agreement, or it could be supplemented with a set of harmonized bilateral agreements.

At present there is no agreed regional framework corresponding to the Doha talks—and

neither the U.S. nor Afghan government can lead it. The only regional organization with
the appropriate scope seems to be the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which
includes not only its original members—Russia, China, and Central Asian countries—
but also India and Pakistan, with Afghanistan as an observer. The organization remains
diplomatically weak, however, and is perceived by the U.S. government as a front for
Russia and China. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation could bring some symbolic
legitimacy to an agreement with the Taliban, but it is headquartered in Saudi Arabia
and largely impotent on the ground. There seems little alternative to the U.N. as
convener of any official regional process, but so far Afghanistan, the United States, and
Russia have all shown reluctance to cede political space to it on such a sensitive issue.

Multilateral cooperation through the U.N. would in any case seem to contradict every
tenet of Trump’s “America first” foreign policy. The administration’s determination to
confront Iran in alliance with the Gulf monarchies could crash head-on into its attempt
to stabilize Afghanistan, which depends on Iran’s cooperation. At least a minimal
understanding with Russia and China, which the administration’s National Security
Strategy defines as the top global threats, and an ability to shield the process from the
periodic crises between India and Pakistan, will be needed. And a single Trump tweet
signaling troop withdrawal or any other unilateral decision could upset the entire
process.

The administration’s determination to confront Iran in alliance

with the Gulf monarchies could crash head-on into its attempt to
stabilize Afghanistan

With the apparent support of Secretary Pompeo, Khalilzad has thus far enjoyed
considerable autonomy from the chaos at the commanding heights of the Trump
administration. He or his successors may need to outlast it. Afghanistan certainly will.

Barnett R. Rubin is director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the author of
Afghanistan from the Cold War
through the War on Terror. From April 2009 to October 2013 he served as senior advisor to the special representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the U.S. Department of State.
India-Pakistan tension: Is there a role for SAARC?
K. YHOME RAISINA DEBATES MAR 02 2019

The eight-member SAARC is the only

important regional institution where
both India and Pakistan a members.

SAARC leaders at inaugural session of the 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu, Nepal.

Reacting to the rising tension between India and Pakistan following the Pulwama terror attack, Nep al
the current chair of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has urged India an
Pakistan to exercise restraint. This statement assumes significance in the backdrop of the
inconsequential role played by the South Asian regional organisation in conflict resolution and peace
building in the region.

The eight-member South Asian organisation is the only important regional

institution where both India and Pakistan are members.

Largely viewed as a ‘failure’ in promoting regional cooperation, the inability to make progress is, in
turn, attributed to the unending hostility between India and Pakistan.

India-Pakistan conflict has long defined the boundary of South Asia’s security dynamics. Far from
playing a role in interstate conflict, the regional organisation has stayed away from crisis in fellow
member states. Moreover, the SAARC Charter bars discussion on contentious bilateral issues.

Within this context, the regional bloc may not be able to play any meaningful role in the current crisis
between India and Pakistan. However, Nepal’s statement raises the question of how regional countri es
view the developments following the Pulwama terror attack. Furthermore, can SAARC envision itse lf
as a provider of regional public goods in promoting peace and security?

The SAARC nations were among the first to condemn the Pulwama terror attack. Nepal’s Prime
Minister K.P. Sharma Oli called Prime Minister Narendra Modi to condemn the terrorist attack as
Nepal’s foreign office in a statement “strongly” condemned the “heinous act.”

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wikremesinghe in a Twitter post “strongly condemn” the brutal
terrorist attack. In a letter to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, the Maldivian foreign minister
Abdulla Shahid conveyed his country’s commitment “to fight against terrorism” and “to work close with
India, and the international community in eliminating this global menace.”

Bhutan’s foreign minister in a statement posted on Twitter “strongly condemn” the attack and
expressed solidarity with the government of India.” Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina
extended support to India to fight terror jointly after the Pulwama attack. Afghanistan “strongly”
condemned the terrorist attack and stressed the need for “closer cooperation of countries in the fight
against this common enemy.”

As tension increased between India and Pakistan after the downing of a fighter jet each following
the Pulwama attack, concerns shifted to regional peace and stability.

“As the current Chair of SAARC, Nepal… calls on (India and Pakistan) to exercise utmost restraint
and not engage in actions that would threaten peace and security in the region,” Nepal’s ministry of
foreign affairs said in a statement. The statement further urged both sides to “seek solution through
dialogue and peaceful means in order to ease tension and normalize the situation” and stressed “the
importance of peace and stability in South Asia.”

Other SAARC nations echoed Nepal’s concerns. Sri Lankan’s foreign office in a statement “strongly
supports peace and stability in the South Asia region” and urged India and Pakistan to diffuse
tension through dialogue to ensure peace and stability of the entire region. Similarly, the Maldives
urged India and Pakistan “to exercise utmost restraint, and to preserve the stability, peace and
security in the region” and stressed the need for speedy resolution through diplomacy and dialogue.

There is a strong regional dimension in these statements emphasising the

implications of India-Pakistan conflict on the entire South Asian region and
stressing the need for peaceful solution through dialogue and diplomacy.

Although the Sri Lankan statement mentions India and Pakistan, the other two statements were not
explicit. In a way implying the need for parties in conflict to consider regional voices, if not the
existence of a space for a regional role in the crisis.
There has not been any proposal for the regional organisation to play a role in the current crisis
between India and Pakistan. This is understandable, particularly when the parties in conflict are the
two biggest and most powerful members of the organisation.

Nevertheless, an issue where SAARC as a regional organisation could have taken a more proactive
stance is in countering terrorism. As noted above, all the SAARC members have vehemently
condemned the Pulwama attack. Nepal did it in its national capacity, but not as chair of SAARC, as
did in the implications of the conflict on regional peace and stability.

A statement condemning the attack from the SAARC chair would have sent out a
strong message about the regional body’s stance on extremism and terrorism.

Such a move would also be in line with the regional organisation’s principled stance on terrorism as
highlighted in the 18 th SAARC Summit held in November 2014 when the SAARC leaders
“unequivocally condemned terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations” and
“underlined the need for effective cooperation among the Member States to combat them.”

Furthermore, in 2016, four members of the grouping boycotted the SAARC Summit after the Uri terror
attack. In the backdrop of these precedents and at a time when most of its members have expressed
their willingness to work together to combat terrorism, a statement would have strengthened the
SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. If SAARC were to reinvent itself as a
relevant actor in regional security, issues such as counter-terrorism need to form the base of regional
security cooperation.

It may be too late for the SAARC’s chair to issue a statement condemning the Pulwama terror attack
In fact, such a move would create a precedent for its successors to emulate in the future. For SAAR to
succeed, opportunities such as this need to be seized.

On the wider regional role on interstate conflicts that threatens regional peace and security, the
inability of SAARC to play any role beyond issuing a cautionary statement tells a lot about the low
level of SAARC as an actor in promoting peace and preventing conflict. There is a long way to go for
SAARC to be an effective actor in regional security issues and perhaps, Nepal’s diplomatic push on
India and Pakistan is a beginning.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Politics of language
Rafiullah Khan February 17, 2019 The News

To promote mother languages means to use them as venues for mutual understanding and
human emancipation, and not for hegemonic designs, exploitation and otherisation. An
interesting case of Pashto understood through the binary of Pakistaniat and Afghaniat

As February 21 draws near, great passion and commitment with respect to preservation and
promotion of mother languages can be seen in certain sections of every society. Some of them
might also feel marginalised. However, there is an overall consciousness about the
importance of mother tongue from ethno-national, cultural and heritage viewpoints.

Of course, such cultural idealism is appreciable. Still, in the name of service, certain thoughts
and patterns of domination and rivalry also work. It can be both in the context of inter-state
relations and at parochial levels, such as conflicts between different language groups in a
single locality.

In this article, an interesting case is presented about the politics of Pashto, also called
Pukhto/Pakhto, language.

Pashto is a language, having so many regional variations, which is spoken by millions of

people in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A considerable Pashto speaking diaspora is also found
across the world. It has been since the beginning of the last century that Pashtun nationalism
actualised and narrativised itself through Pashto. Khudai Khidmatgars, the movement led by
Abdul Ghaffar Khan aka Bacha Khan, played a singularly crucial role in this connection. The
creation of Pakistan added a new dimension to the politics around Pashto language and
culture.

Pashto became almost a stigma in the early years of Pakistan. One of the reasons was the
Khudai Khidmatgars’ association with the Congress and not with the Muslim League.
However, the official position, on the surface, turned to soften soon — it is obvious from the
establishment of Pukhto Academy at the University of Peshawar in 1955. The academy works
parallel to such institutions on the Afghan side of the Durand Line.
 Encore
The Pukhto Academy was envisaged as a service Sports
to Pashto language and Pashtun » culture
through research and publication. The same has been true regarding the Pashto Academy in
Afghanistan. The Peshawar Pukhto Academy has been working in a network of workable
relationship with Pakistan Academy of Letters, Lok Virsa and institutions dedicated to the
promotion of Sindhi, Punjabi and Balochi. Its counterpart in Kabul was a section in the
combined Afghan Academy, established in 1967. The Afghan Academy also include[d] the
Historical Society of Afghanistan; the Ariana Encyclopaedia Department; the Book
Publishing Institute; the Public Libraries Department and the Press Awards Bureau. The
Afghan Academy worked in the framework of the Ministry of Information and Culture (L.
Dupree, Afghanistan, 1973). A reference may also be made to the Kabul Literary Society
which also had similar goals to pursue: to study and clarify Afghan historical heritage; to
study and promote Afghan literature and folklore; to engender and promote the Pashto
language, and to spread knowledge about Afghanistan and its culture.

There is no denying that Maulana Abdul Qadir, the Aligarh University graduate and the first
director of Pukhto Academy, has to his credit commendable efforts and services concerning
the establishment of the Academy. His pioneering research activities about Pashto language
and literature defined the future course of action for the Academy. In spite of all this, I would
argue that the great literary and scholarly environment of the time, primarily due to the
renaissance ushered in by Khudai Khidmatgars, had made the work easier.

The political context of Pashto scholarship on both sides of the Durand Line was much more
complicated during the later twentieth century. It is common sense to invoke the creation of
Pakistan and the attendant issues of Pashtunistan/Pukhtunistan and Afghanistan’s
irredentist claims. No doubt, all this played havoc with Pashto language and literature and
Pashtun literati in Pakistan. To publish in Pashto was tantamount to treachery and disloyalty
to the newly-found state.

This situation, nevertheless, took an important twist soon. Some Pashtun intellectuals and
scholars thought why not to embed Pashto into the institutional apparatus of Pakistan. A
lukewarm response from the state could not be politically expedient for long.

On the Afghan side, the

scene was also dominated Pashto became almost a stigma in the early years of
by identity construction Pakistan. One of the reasons was the Khudai
through history and Khidmatgars’ association with the Congress and
language. Since the 1920s, not with the Muslim League.
archaeological evidence
was used to add further
depth to Afghan national antiquity. The concepts of Ariana and Khurasan were designed to
apply them to the pre-Islamic and medieval Afghanistan respectively. Both were seen as not
only covering modern Afghanistan but also parts of northern Indo-Pakistan. These efforts
seem to have had the twin aims of irredentism with respect to the Durand Line and resistance
to historical Persian cultural hegemony. Great ideologues in this context are Abdul Hai
Habibi, Sadiqullah Rishtin, Qiyam-ud-Din Khadim, Abd al-Rauf Benawa and many more.
Others who worked in the field of Afghan historiography, especially in Persian, are Ahmad
Ali Kuhzad, Fayz Muhammad Katib, Mir Ghulam Muhammad Ghubar, Aziz al-Din Wakili
Pupalzai etc.

The services which both the academies have so far provided for Pashto language and
literature and Pashtun culture and history are obvious to all. Many classic Pashto books such
as Khair-ul-Bayan of Bayazid Ansari, Tawarikh-i-Hafiz Rahmat Khanii of Pir Muazzam
Shah, numerous diwans of classical poets and so on have been re/discovered and published
by Pakistani Pashtun scholars. Furthermore, researches on cultural, literary and historical
themes have been done and published. This work is matched by the scholastic pursuits in
Afghanistan. Needless to say, state sponsored institutions cannot afford to be indifferent to
national and political demands. So is the scenario of Pashto scholarship both in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.

While the role of the Afghan institutions has recently been critically investigated by various
scholars in Afghan History Through Afghan Eyes (edited by Nile Green, 2015), the Pukhto
Academy Peshawar is yet to be seen in a similar way. It was viewed as a counterpoise to the
Afghan claims in relation to Pashto, Pashtuns and Pashtunwali. Let me substantiate this
claim with two types of primary data.

First, it is clear from correspondence between well-known Pakistani academic, Prof. Ahmad
Hasan Dani, and the Ministry of Education on the one hand and Dani and the authorities of
Pukhto Academy on the other. All this happened in the UNESCO framework for the study of
the civilisations of Central Asia in the early latter half of the 20th century. The geographical
scope of Central Asia was so defined as to include India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia and
 the then Soviet Central Asia. The scheme
Encore Sports »
aimed at sponsoring various educational and
research programmes such as
seminar/conferences, publications,
fieldworks, etc. One of its mega projects was
to produce a comprehensive book —
comprising many volumes and covering a
chronological span from prehistoric to
modern times — on the civilisations of
Central Asia. And it ended up in what is now
History of Civilizations of Central Asia (multiple volumes).

As regards Pashto, two proposals were on the agenda of the meeting of the Consultative
Committee of the International Association for the Study of Central Asian Civilisations in
1976. They dealt with the study of Pashto in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghan
representative spoke for an International Centre for Pashto in Kabul. Dani, as he was
representing Pakistan and had already been briefed by the Ministry of Education, objected to
the word ‘international’. The controversy was, however, resolved by deciding that there
should be a Centre for Pashto in Kabul and a Pashto Academy in Peshawar.

It is important to note how Dani tried to expediently represent Pakistani viewpoint on the
occasion. The Pukhto Academy meant, he argued, “to give full justice to the language of our
ten million people who speak it just in the same fashion as other regional languages like
Sindhi, Balochi and Punjabi have their own academies and have done useful works in their
own fields.” He explained that besides being a degree awarding body — Honours, MA and
PhD — the Academy was busy in collecting and publishing Pashto manuscripts. The word
‘international’ from the proposed Afghan institution was, thus, expunged.

On his return, Dani told the ministry that the Pashto Centre at Kabul had made a great
breakthrough while the Pukhto Academy had not come forward with solid achievements. In
this respect, he had also been in contact with the director of the academy, Pareshan Khattak.

Second, Pukhto Academy, as already shown, was founded on the premise of serving Pashto
language and literature within the state of Pakistan. By implication, successful
representations of Pakistan against the backdrop of Muslim identity and pan-Islamism were
to be made. All this was actually done. In particular, I would like to refer to two works of one
of the former Directors of the Academy, Syed Rasool Rasa. His book Armaghan-i-Khushal
presents an absolute example of a discourse seeking Pakistanisation of Pakhtuns. He has
gone to the extent of actually declaring Khushal Khan Khattak as a poet of Pakistan. The
philosophy of Khushal and Iqbal was compared and interpreted as an Islamic response to the
respective political affairs of their times. The work seems to be a tacit, nay open,
condemnation of ethno-national politics of Pashtuns.

Rasa’s second poetic work Da Quran Pegham (The Message of Quran) is written in the style
of Altaf Hussain Hali’s Musaddas and Iqbal’s Shikwa/Jawab-i-Shikwa. It is nothing short of
systematic efforts towards integrating Pashtuns into the pan-Islamic agenda. A number of
other books, such as written by Faqir Muhammad Abbas and others, in this context, can be
mentioned as well.

The situation since the turn of the 21st century seems more complex. It is difficult to
understand it in terms of binary opposites, Pakistaniat and Afghaniat. It seems that such
ideologues and their socio-political patrons have exhausted their resources imprudently.
Moreover, populous, majoritarian and chauvinistic politics, and as such similar identities, no
more matter in an age characterised by a bitter experiential memory, cynicism and
uncertainties.

We stand in sheer need of inclusive philosophies both in relation to our present, future and
past. We should not let anyone exploit us in the name of ‘Indus land/man’, ‘Hindutva’,
‘Ariana/Khurasan’ or other such pure utopian pan-brotherhoods. Let us believe in what is
our shared humanity and shared heritage. Let us remind ourselves on the occasion of
February 21 this year that to respect and promote mother languages means to use them as
venues for mutual understanding and human emancipation. Using them for hegemonic
designs, exploitation, otherisation and domination is, no doubt, sacrilege.
Power of knowledge
Alauddin Masood February 17, 2019 The News

Why does the Muslim world lack the capacity to produce and disseminate knowledge?

The literacy rate in the Christian world is

over 90 percent whereas in the Muslim
world itis as low as 40 percent.

Over 20 percent of the world population — every fifth human being on the globe — is
Muslim. If we compare the statistics with the global population of adherents of some other
faiths, we find that for every single Hindu there are two Muslims, for every Buddhist there
are two Muslims and for every Jew there are 107 Muslims. Yet, some 14 million Jews are
more powerful than the entire around 1,500 million Muslims because Muslims, as a
community, have lost the capacity to produce knowledge.

The literacy rate in the Christian world is over 90 percent whereas in the Muslim world it is
abysmally as low as 40 percent. The literacy rate in 15 Christian majority-countries is 100
percent. In the Christian countries, the number of persons who have completed primary
education is 98 percent, while it is only 50 percent in the case of Muslim countries.

Some 40 percent of the population in the Christian countries attended university. On the
other hand, a dismal 2 percent in the Muslim countries enrol in universities. Resultantly,
Muslim majority countries have 230 scientists per one million whereas the USA has 5,000
scientists per million. The Christian world has 1,000 technicians per million, while the entire
Arab world possesses around 50 technicians per million. The Christian world spends 5
percent of their GDP on research/development against only 0.2 percent of GDP of the
Muslim world. These statistics explain why the Muslim world lacks the capacity to produce
knowledge.

Another way of testing the degree of knowledge is the degree of diffusing knowledge. In
Pakistan, 23 copies of daily newspapers are printed per 1000 citizens, while in Singapore 460
copies of daily newspapers are sold per 1000 citizens. In the UK, book titles per million is
2000, while in Egypt the ratio of book titles is only 17 per million. Conclusion: The Muslim
world is failing to diffuse knowledge.

Applying knowledge is another such test. The export of high-tech products from Pakistan is
0.9 percent of its total exports. It is 0.2 percent in the case of Saudi Arabia and 0.3 percent
for Kuwait, Morocco and Algeria; while high-tech goods constitute 68 percent of the total
exports of Singapore. This leads one to the conclusion that the Muslim world is failing to
apply knowledge.

This brings to the fore the paramount need for educating one and all, without compromising
on the promotion of education under any circumstances. However, it really pains one to
point out that Pakistan’s literacy rate, though low as compared to other countries, has further
declined from 60 percent to 58 percent, as revealed by the Economic Survey of Pakistan on
February 8, 2018.

At 22 million, the country has the second highest out-of-school children after Nigeria.
According to a rough estimate, there are over 30,000 out-of-school children in Islamabad
alone and FDE (Federal Directorate of Education) have so far managed to reach 11,029. On
February 2, 2019, the Balochistan Assembly adopted a resolution demanding establishment
Enc
of a large number of community schools in the province to beef up the existing ones so as to
provide education to “millions” of out-of-school children there. The assembly was informed
that some 40,000 students were already pursuing studies in community schools.

Multiple factors can be cited as the reason behind the low literacy rate in Pakistan. However,
the foremost remains lack of sufficient allocations by the successive governments to
education despite the constitutional obligation of the State to provide free and compulsory
quality education to children falling within the age group of 5 to 16 years.

In addition to feudal system and elite culture, other major contributing factor for the
widespread literacy is lack of well-equipped educational institutions, especially in the
Northern Areas. As a consequence, students have to move out to metropolises like
Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi, resulting in phenomenal increase in
admission merit in those cities.

When students are unable to get admission to public institutes, they have no option but to
pay fabulously high amounts to get admission in privately-administered institutes. Former
CJP Mian Saqib Nisar took notice of this phenomenon and the apex court ordered the
management of the private schools, charging monthly fees above Rs5,000 per month, to
reduce their fees by 20 percent. But, a majority of them have still to implement the orders of
the apex court in its true spirit; while the managements of some privately-managed schools
have retaliated by curtailing the monthly salaries of their teachers.

In addition, the other major reason is the outdated curriculum being taught in Pakistan’s
educational institutions. It is not innovative while it also lacks the capacity to meet our
present-day needs and necessities. Resultantly, when students go abroad for higher
education, they have to repeat the same course according to that country’s requirements and
system of education. This brings to the fore the need to reform the education system on a
priority basis.

In 1978, President General Ziaul Haq introduced ‘Masjid Schools Progamme’ with the aim to
raise literacy level by establishing 5,000 mosque schools initially. Even the National
Education Policy of 1998-2010 called for the utilisation of mosque schools to increase the
literacy rate, recommending expansion of the existing network of Masjid schools as a means
for providing non-formal basic education on a larger scale by opening 75,000 schools till
2001.

According to a study jointly published, in 2016, by the University of Punjab and Bahauddin
Zakariya University, “The experiment of Masjid or maktab schools was cost-effective to
achieve the goal of 100 percent literacy rate.” But, to achieve this goal it was imperative to
equip madaris with modern technology and education system.

Meanwhile, some patriotic Pakistanis have opened model makatab (religious schools) to
impart education to the youth both in the religious and other disciplines of life. On such
maktab — Madrassah Darul Huda — is functioning near Golra Railway Station in Islamabad
and catering to the educational needs of some 850 students. Amongst major objectives of this
institution is to produce Islamic scholars having proficiency in Arabic and English languages
besides subjects taught in public schools.

If we wish to banish illiteracy, there is need to replicate this model and establish such
madaris for providing free education to the youth nearer to their home towns. The countries
that realised the importance of knowledge and technology for embarking upon the high path
of growth now occupy top positions amongst the comity of nations; while some other
countries, despite their vast natural resources, lag far behind.
 The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
Treatyand the International Law
Pakistan Politico, March 16, 2019

Source: National Interest

Kamran Adil

While political analysis rules the analytical plane in International Relations; it leads to inchoate
assessments.The point of departure in the debate surrounding purported withdrawal of the US
from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) is that it is a ‘bilateral treaty’ between
the US and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( USSR)  now Russia. This premise misses
many important points. In the rst place, it is against the very text of the INF Treaty. The INF
Treaty text in its recitals clearly states that the US and the then USSR were undertaking the INF
Treaty due to their ‘obligation under  Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’ (NPT). The
‘obligation’ so acknowledged by both the states interconnects the INF Treaty with the larger and
multilateral legal framework on  nuclear weapons. This type of referral may be treated as
salutary by some, but what about the ‘legal obligation’ created under Article VI of the Nuclear
Non- Proliferation Treaty?

Should  the ‘legal obligation’ created by a multilateral treaty be retrograded to a symbolic

recital by alluding to it in a bilateral treaty? Another aspect, which cannot be ignored is that in
another recital of the same INF Treaty, the measures ‘agreed to’ were likely to contribute to
‘international
peace and security’, a  phrase which was frequently used in Chapter VII of the United
NationsCharter. The INF Treaty, it must be noted, is a combination of treaty text,
memorandum ofunderstanding and protocols that have been declared ‘integral part’ of
the Treaty in its Article I.The phrase ‘integral part’ implies that the protocol provisions are
to be treated as part of theTreaty. There are two protocols attached to the Treaty; the rst
one relates to elimination of theintermediate range nuclear weapons while the second
one relates to inspections. Article XV of theTreaty deals with the withdrawal from it by
providing that the state, which wants to withdraw cando so by giving a notice of the
‘extraordinary events’ necessitating its withdrawal; for a teleologicalinterpretation of the
Treaty, it is a must that the relationship between the INF Treaty and theinternational law
governing disarmament must be read and the interconnectedness of theinternational
legal framework be treated as an organic whole instead of an independent part.

Unfortunately, the impression is that the INF Treaty is not going to impact other nations;
nothingcan be farther from the truth as unlocking the ‘system’ of international law by
treating every legalinstrument as unconnected will lead not only to awed policy choices,
but also it will lead tounwinding the whole international legal order developed over the
last seven decades by theinternational community.

From the view point of international arrangements, the entry of the US into the Treaty was
not an individual country’s choice, as is now asserted by some like John Bolton, but it was
backed up by the collective security obligation derived from Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, 1949, which is further based on Article 51 of the UN Charter that
provides for collective self- defence.

In view of the internationalization of the INF Treaty, and it being part of the international law,
itwould be wiser to look at its depth before taking a policy decision on it. The impact of the
municipal law on the international law is another aspect of the matter, which is seldom
appraisedby analysts. The municipal law of the US especially the National Defence
Authorization Act forFinancial Year 2019 through its Section 1243 required the President to
submit a ‘determination’regarding the ‘material breach’ of Russia to its committees.
Requiring such a ‘determination’ by amunicipal law can have obvious adverse e ects on the
executive of any country. Article 27 of theVienna Convention of International Treaties, 1969
was perhaps designed to deal with suchsituations when it provided that the ‘internal law’
should not be used as a justi cation for failure to perform a treaty. Incorporating measures
in a municipal law that a ect the performance of atreaty must be carefully designed as they
are likely to bring unintended consequences, which maybe of purely political value within a
state. The impact of collective international legal order overnon-members to the Treaty and
on countries who are obliged by the NPT may be much more ascompared to isolated
treatment of the INF Treaty. The legal analysis may be of political value if it is properly
contextualized and the case of setting the debate on INF Treaty is just one suchinstance.
Foreign Affairs (March 14, 2019)

The Next Stage of the Korean Peace Process

Why Seoul remains optimistic after Hanoi?

CHUNG-IN MOON is Special Adviser for Foreign Affairs and National Security to South Korean
President Moon Jae-in and a Distinguished University Professor at Yonsei University.

When the U.S.–North Korean summit in Hanoi ended early, with no agreement whatsoever,
many South Koreans were shocked. The disappointing conclusion shook the public’s faith in
summit diplomacy and undermined Seoul’s efforts to foster parallel processes: for denuclearizing
North Korea, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and fostering inter-Korean
economic cooperation. In short, South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s strategy for bettering
relations among Seoul, Washington, and Pyongyang after the summit was shattered.

The summit may have failed, but Seoul observed several encouraging signs. There was neither
acrimony nor mutual recrimination at the summit, nor a sudden escalation of military tension in
its wake. Considering Pyongyang’s past behavior, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s restraint
was unusual. U.S. President Donald Trump’s response was also encouraging. He did not tweet
anything inflammatory about Pyongyang in the summit’s wake. Nor did he suggest new
sanctions or the renewal of U.S.–South Korean joint military exercises. On the contrary, he
expressed his unwavering trust in Kim and his commitment to continuing the dialogue even
though the summit didn’t end as he had hoped.

Moreover, if the Singapore declaration [1] could be criticized as producing nothing more than a
joint shopping list of hopes, the Hanoi summit at least made clear each side’s concrete and
specific demands. For Washington, it was the final, fully verified denuclearization (FFVD) by
Pyongyang. North Korea was also specific in its demands. As Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho
elaborated at a midnight press conference after the summit was over, Pyongyang offered to
dismantle the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon under the observation and verification of the United
States in exchange for partial lifting of five UN Security Council sanction resolutions imposed
since 2016. It was rare for North Korea to put forth such a specific proposal.

The Moon government sees such moves by both parties as positive signs. It believes that the
Hanoi summit was only a temporary setback on the long, treacherous odyssey toward
denuclearization and peace in Korea, and that talks between Pyongyang and Washington will
resume soon. Nonetheless, the way things concluded in Hanoi left Seoul anxious about a
number of potential ways in which future negotiations could derail.

POTENTIAL PERILS
The United States and North Korea went into the Hanoi summit with conflicting ideas of what
would constitute a good deal. Seoul now fears that this gap between Washington and
Pyongyang’s demands will stall further progress. The Moon government initially thought that the
United States could reasonably request that Pyongyang completely and verifiably dismantle
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon now, while committing to dismantle additional nuclear facilities and
ballistic missiles later; in return, Washington could offer the opening of liaison offices, a
declaration ending the Korean War, and partial sanctions relief such that inter-Korean economic
exchange and cooperation could resume. Seoul would stand ready to reopen the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourist project, two major inter-Korean economic
projects in the North that were kept closed as a result of both international and South Korean
sanctions.

Such an agreement would have set a firm foundation for the next phase of diplomacy. But when
the two parties met in Hanoi, the mismatch between U.S. demands, which were overly
ambitious, and the North Korean offer, which was excessively cautious, led to failure. South
Korea will not easily find a halfway point between these two extremes as negotiations continue.

Indeed, not just the demands themselves but the timeline for implementing them have led to
division and anxiety for Seoul. The United States has traditionally called for an all-or-nothing,
“dismantle first, reward later” model, whereas North Korea has pushed for incremental steps in
exchange for U.S. concessions. Seoul has made diplomatic efforts to narrow the gap, which until
Hanoi it thought had been somewhat successful. U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Stephen
Biegun’s January speech [2] at Stanford University, for example, emphasized a step-by-step
approach and the parallel pursuit of denuclearization, a peace regime, and the easing of
economic sanctions.

South Korea had been urging the North to take decisive steps toward the irreversible stage of
denuclearization, as evidenced by Article 5 of the Pyongyang Declaration, which underscores
the imperative of dismantling the missile engine test site and launching pad in Dongchang-ri
under the observation of U.S. experts and the permanent removal of nuclear facilities in
Yongbyon and the like. The small deal package that Kim offered in Hanoi was a kind of response
to Seoul’s efforts. After the summit, however, Washington seemed to have changed its mind
about the incremental approach. Speaking anonymously, a senior State Department official now
claimed [3] that “nobody in the administration advocates a step-by-step approach. In all cases,
the expectation is a complete denuclearization of North Korea as a condition for . . . all the other
steps being taken.” The Moon government’s ability to make a deal between the parties, and to
advance parallel processes, will be critically hampered if the Trump administration now rejects a
step-by-step process out of hand.

The administration’s renewed hard-line stance in Hanoi may have been partly rooted in domestic
political concerns, and the politicization of nuclear negotiations is yet another possibility that
South Korea greatly fears. A new political landscape in light of the 2020 U.S. presidential
election could divert Trump’s attention away from the North Korean nuclear issue. Trump
tweeted that his former attorney Michael Cohen’s testimony before Congress affected the
outcome of the summit. Trump may have felt that he could only pacify Democrats, along with the
news media critical of his negotiations with the North, if he came back with a bold all-or-nothing
deal, no matter how premature. Otherwise, he would return to face political fallout from the
Cohen hearing and an uproar over a deal perceived as too conciliatory.

North Korea’s leader exercises absolute power and authority at home—but he, too, could face
negative domestic political repercussions should negotiations falter. Conservative hard-line
forces in the military and security services, who do not benefit from rapprochement, may start to
grumble about Kim’s emphasis on peace-building and economic development. Kim has taken
some precautionary measures in Hanoi’s wake. At his first public appearance after the summit,
he reiterated that “No revolutionary tasks stand before us other than the improvement of the
economy and people’s daily lives.” This declaration is likely a well-calculated political move to
warn the military and other hard-line elements that negotiations will proceed. But if talks with
Washington continue to stall, Kim, who currently touts an economy-first policy, could be forced to
shift to the old military-first politics, thereby raising the risk of hard confrontation.

The Moon government, too, fears the political repercussions of Hanoi at home. At a time of
protracted economic hardship in South Korea, Moon has bet on the peace initiative to bring him
political gains. But without a diplomatic breakthrough, and with a general election scheduled for
April 2020, Moon could face a daunting and uncertain future.
THE PATH TO A BREAKTHROUGH
Despite recent setbacks, Seoul remains optimistic about the peace process because the
negotiation track is still open, and Pyongyang and Washington can be brought back to the table.
Both sides should sustain their hard-won dialogue and build on the momentum toward
reconciliation, making every effort to prevent the negotiations from derailing. Destroying the
negotiation track is easy, but restoring it is damn hard.
Given the fragility of the relationship, provocative rhetoric and actions, no matter how trivial they
may seem, can bring about catastrophic consequences. Policymakers should learn a lesson
from the exchange of harsh rhetoric between U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and Vice Foreign
Minister Choe Son-hui in May 2018, an exchange that almost aborted the Singapore summit that
June. Mutual restraint in word and deed is essential for the resuscitation of negotiation. The
surest way to derail the negotiations and precipitate a potential catastrophe would be for North
Korea to engage in any nuclear or missile tests.

Both sides need to be prudent and realistic. North Korea is highly unlikely to accept the all-or-
nothing deal that the Trump administration proposed in Hanoi. If Washington continues to balk at
an incremental approach, an exit from the current stalemate seems inconceivable. Nor does the
North Korean proposal at Hanoi seem workable. The United States will not exchange the
permanent dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and of nuclear and missile activities for
the lifting of major portions of the UN economic sanctions. Pyongyang should offer more—
perhaps a commitment to dismantle additional uranium enrichment facilities—while expecting
less, such as inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation instead of sweeping sanctions
relief. Otherwise, a win-win compromise will be unreachable.

South Korea has a pivotal role to play in the process’s coming phase. On his way home after the
Hanoi summit, Trump called Moon from the plane and urged him to take an active role in
persuading Kim to accept a big deal settlement. But Kim perceives Washington and Seoul as
working together, which means that Moon will have a hard time acting as a facilitator. To help
Moon succeed, Washington should allow Seoul some leverage, such as greater flexibility in
managing inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation. North and South Korean leaders
adopted the Panmunjom and Pyongyang Declarations in 2018 to promote precisely these
initiatives, and Moon is obliged to implement them in tandem with the denuclearization of North
Korea. Otherwise, his role will be fundamentally limited.

Seoul does not see the setback of the Hanoi summit as insurmountable. Prudence, mutual
restraint, innovative ideas, and, most important, resumption of dialogue and negotiation can help
overcome the current impasse. A compromise such as a comprehensive agreement on the
exchange of FFVD for what Pyongyang wants, one that is implemented incrementally based on
a mutually acceptable road map, is the surest way to achieve a breakthrough toward complete
denuclearization and peace in Korea.

Source URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-03-14/next-stage-korean-peace-process

Links
[1] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-19/there-were-no-losers-singapore-summit
[2] https://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2019/01/288702.htm
[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/09/satellite-images-suggest-north-korea-planned-space-launch-
even-before-hanoi/?utm_term=.6b8cb920c1ab
The Israel nexus
Hassan Yousaf Shah, Pakistan Today

Israel is just part of a much wider game

It’s a complicated multidimensional situation facing Pakistan with multiple

possibilities, of which very few lead Pakistan out of the mess. So what is “it” that
follows after the India-Pakistan standoff? It is important to first look at the twin
suicide attacks, one in Sistan, Iran and the other in Pulwama, which left
Pakistan in a diplomatically vulnerable position. The shock of the lives lost and
the public outcry in Iran and India respectively was strong. The intensity of the
attacks was conveyed by respective neighbours and Pakistan’s Foreign Office
was working feverishly to rescue Pakistan from falling into a diplomatic
collapse; while the Pakistani leadership was preparing itself for the much
anticipated visit of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman. Both were left
stunned to reflect on what actually had happened.
Only few weeks earlier, Pakistan was intensely engaged in the Taliban-US
negotiations with the Saudis in the backdrop. Were these events part of a
greater plan? Or did they form a pattern leading to a shift in the regional
politics? Let the dots reveal the connections.

Iran, India, and perhaps Israel? Is there a deeper connection at work?

India is strengthening its relationship with Israel and the USA on many issues,
including defence, terrorism, and perhaps against the Pakistan-China-Russia
alignment. However, the attack has certainly brought Iran amd India closer on
the diplomatic end, if not defense and terrorism. Iran, which is on the other end
of the spectrum, has had strained relations with the USA and none with the
Israel, but with this incident Iran has been drawn closer to India on the issue of
terrorism. Can India bring Iran closer to Israel on extremism, or the Taliban? It is
a very difficult equation to balance indeed, but will there be change in the long
term?

Regional Politico-Economic Realignment

In a regional scene, complex politico-economic interests are also remerging.

China has condemned the terror attacks, and does not approve of extremist
elements destabilizing the region, CPEC, BRI or any of its other strategic plans.
Pakistan in long term will find that any acute change from China’s socio-
economic line will only isolate Pakistan more. In short, Pakistan has to weigh
every action, move, and alignment it takes today, even in the short term,
whether it is aligned with regional dynamics, and Chinese consideration in
mind. Else easily Pakistan may find itself flying off the cliff.

The situation could not have been more disturbing, that the unfortunate
incidents happened right before the strategically awaited Saudi royal visit which
had been hallmarked by Saudi investment, strategic partnership, defense ties,
and venture into CPEC. Saudi Arabia too would be embarrassingly worried
about the state of affairs in Pakistan around her borders, especially since the
next stop on the trip was India.
Economics Always In Any Equation

Pakistan, recently at the brink of an economic collapse, had barely managed to

survive, when the escalation with India again threatens to take it back into a
bigger financial crisis. Pakistan, which barely won a few billion dollars from
friends, can find these precious dollar “support” and investments, “evaporate” in
case of an escalation with India or even a standoff at the borders. Will it have
repercussions? Who would benefit if Pakistan undergoes a financial crisis due
to escalation? Again is there a long term prospective on this one too? Did India
get Pakistan off its economic recovery track by its sabre-rattling?

The CPEC dimension

Post-attack scenes across Iran were far more intense than those in India. Public
opinion is different in the two countries as well. India has a different strategy for
the same objective. Iran and India are not going to be happy with the Saudi visit
or the CPEC project, or these two ending up together: Saudi investment, that
too in CPEC. The reason for India and Iran not liking the above to happen may
be different, but Pakistan, Gwadar, CPEC, Saudi Arabia, has given India and
Iran reasons to come closer while the suicide attacks provided the missing
motivation. However the most significant development was perhaps Pakistan’s
successfully handling Taliban-US negotiations which may have left India and
Iran feeling at a disadvantage. This perception may be misplaced but it will now
draw the new regional power flux with Pakistan emerging a clear winner. The
USA and the Taliban may converge their energies against Iran, a perception
which according to some analysts is perhaps making Iran extremely wary.

After the surgical strikes

The twin suicide attacks happening at a strategic time, around certain events,
was not a onetime random event; rather a significant plan to shift geopolitical
powers in the region. So what is next awaiting Pakistan?

There may be border incursions in Pakistan from Afghanistan, and extreme

anti-Pakistan elements in the tribal areas may resurface. There will be “players”
who would infuse such a feeling amongst local tribesmen. According to some
analysts perhaps PTM in KPK and BLA in Balochistan may rise again to agitate
against Pakistan. Who will be motivating them and will they be interlinked?

Pakistan will be under pressure to act and that too as per the “prerequisite”

“ set around it by Iran, China,Russia and perhaps the USA as well.

But there is one certainty that Pakistan will be under pressure to act and that
too as per the “prerequisite” set around it by Iran, China, Russia and perhaps
the USA as well. Iran will exert its pressure for Pakistan to take some “concrete”
steps which will be apparent in the coming days. Is it a possibility that perhaps
Iran may conduct its own border operations.

On the other hand India will exert pressure through global and regional players,
especially around the Financial Action Task Force. FATF is another point where
Pakistan has been, and will be, vulnerable and current geopolitics will be played
around this point. India will also exploit the current escalation to embarrass
Pakistan in front of Saudi Arabia and the USA, and seek serious actions
particularly on JeM and concessions in other areas, such as high-ranking Indian
spy Kulbhushan Yadav.
The Twins: Corruption
and Incompetence

Mohammad A Qadeer — March 8, 2019 (The Friday Times)

Anti-corruption drives do not change the system that breeds

corruption, but removes some of the corrupt to be replaced by others
cleverer in hiding their dishonesty, writes Mohammad A. Qadeer

C
orruption is so rampant in Pakistan that it is almost a norm of everyday life.
Everybody condemns it but most indulge in it without any qualms. These days
corruption is also an all-consuming topic in Pakistan’s politics and media.
Accusations of corruption are being used to beat opponents and eliminate competitors in
politics, administration and personal affairs.
The accountability judges and high courts are occupied with trials of former rulers, Sharifs,
Zardaris and others for allegedly parking unexplained billions in London, Dubai and other
safe havens. The threat of investigation for corruption hangs over almost every politician
and administrator. A national entertainment is scores of popular daily TV verbal cockfights
among political opponents, who accuse each other of corruption and illegal acts. This
ubiquitous talk of corruption has resulted in the loss of shame in being accused of
corruption.

What breeds corruption? Why has it infected so many? These questions have not been part
of public discussions.

Of course bribery, misappropriation of funds and properties, self-dealing, black market and
selling of fake (number two) stuff are various forms of corruption, all manifest in
unexplainable incomes. I contend that most of these activities are also closely tied with
incompetence. The two are twins.

Corruption is the encashment of one’s authority and benefiting illegitimately of one’s

position. It thrives on the lack of pride in one’s work and neglect of commitment to
professional ethics Doctors who do not care for patients, policemen who shake down
innocent citizens, merchants who sell fake medicines or officials who patronize land mafias
and property grabbers, do not only act illegally and immorally, but also are often
incompetent and willfully ignorant of their responsibilities. Not fully comprehending the
ethical and legal requirements of one’s job, having little or no pride in work, being
indifferent to the harm being done, are the hallmarks incompetence, which morphs into
corruption .

To address the problem of corruption, a

critical step is to improve both the
institutional and individual competence in
Pakistan

Competence has to be looked at with a wide-angle lens. It is more than just the knowledge
and skills required for a job. It also includes cultural, ethical and legal values required for
the performance of a job. For example, a milk seller’s competence includes knowledge
about milk’s purity, its source, and calculation of prices but his honesty, courtesy and
cleanliness also count. The same applies to every other job or activity from a military
commander or minister to a peon. In each case competence is embedded in legal and
ethical norms. The shortfall on these aspects of competence lays the ground for corruption.

Institutional competence is another level of performance with a bearing on corruption.

Over and above individual competence, the organizational culture has a direct bearing on
fulfilling responsibilities of work. An institution may have highly qualified and competent
individuals, but if they do not have a suitable structure to do their jobs, the sum of their
talents is collective incompetence.

Undoubtedly WAPDA, PIA, police, universities or hospitals in Pakistan have many well-
qualified and competent professionals, but their organizational cultures turn them into
ineffective cogs in rickety machines. This leaves lining one’s pockets and pursuing personal
interests as the satisfactions to be drawn from work.

The anti-corruption drives for catching the corrupt have had poor records. They do not
change the system that breeds corruption, but removes some of the corrupt to be replaced
by others cleverer in hiding their dishonesty. The history of Pakistan’s anti-corruption
efforts is largely a story of increasing corruption as the laws and agencies to combat
corruption multiply.

To address the problem of corruption, a critical step is to improve both the institutional and
individual competence in Pakistan. Not that the corrupt may not be prosecuted, but for
lasting change the so-called ‘system’ has to be reorganized. What it means is three types of
reform.

First, both at institutional and individual levels, codes of ethics should be formulated,
frequently affirmed and enforced. Make them explicit and consequential.

Second, the rewards and punishments for workers should be tied to their accountability,
transparency and efficiency. A citizens’ bill of rights should be enacted to empower people
to hold officials answerable for their decisions. For the private sector, clear and easy ways
of adjudicating consumers’ complaints need to be established.

Third, there should be incentives for individual workers in both public and private
organizations to improve their skills and knowledge through training and education.
Salaries, promotions and compensation should be based on performance, as should be job
security.

Such reforms will make both the institutions and individuals more competent, committed
to their work and take away the motivations for indulging in corruption.

The writer is the author of the book Pakistan – Social and Cultural Transformations in
a Muslim Nation
War and the economy
Daily Times
FEBRUARY 28, 2019

After the human cost, the economy is the biggest casualty of war. This has been made amply
clear by how the Indian and Pakistani stock markets have reacted to the Indian Air Force’s (IAF)
aggression inside Pakistani territory on Tuesday morning. According to reports, India’s Sensex
plunged 500 points in opening deals and Nifty slipped below the 10,740 level. Indian brokers
noted that market sentiments were down as domestic institutional investors initiated a fresh
round of selling. Meanwhile here in Pakistan, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) slipped 1,491
points to the 37,330 level after closing at 38,821 the previous day.

The subcontinent is one of the poorest regions in the world. A 2018 World Bank report entitled
Poverty and Shared Prosperity showed that India had over 170 million people living in poverty
(with the poverty line being set at $1.90) in 2015, while Pakistan had 9.9 million. In such a
situation, it is both irresponsible and callous of politicians, military personnel as well as media
personalities to engage in war-mongering.

Not only does the militaristic jingoism that has been broadcast from television screen and
twitter accounts lead to events like India’s recent violations which shook the economies of these
impoverished countries, it also makes it harder for India and Pakistan to get out of the vicious
arms race they have been embroiled in for years. The two states continue to spend billions every
year in attempts to one-up each other in terms of military superiority, while millions of their
citizens remain deprived of the basic amenities of life; including decent diets, potable water,
education, healthcare, and shelter.

New Delhi in particular needs to realise that even though India has made massive economic
strides in the past decade, not all Indian citizens have bene ited from this. As such, it must seek a
peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute and the issue of cross border terrorism. These
problems cannot be resolved while India and Pakistan are iring across the border at one
another. However, this will not happen while Indian anchors and journalists are actively
promoting illegal cross-border adventures and the cutting off of cultural and trade ties with
Pakistan.

It is hoped that better sense prevails in the days to come, and the resources currently being
wasted on bombs and bullets can be diverted towards making this a more prosperous
subcontinent for all. *
 Woman under different civilizations and religions

Asif Shar December 6, 2018 (Global Village Space)

Any animal didn’t do anything with its kindness, what the man has done with the woman. Islam has been accused
of having degraded woman; it has been attacked as having reduced her status- socially, morally and spiritually. It
is criticized for not having given the woman her rightful place as man’s comrade and companion in life.

However, a comparative study about the woman under different religious systems and civilizations will enable
one to appreciate the great services rendered by Islam in raising her status, legally, and socially. It is only
Islam, a complete code of life, which has granted unprecedented rights to a woman in all perspectives of life.

The value of paradise has been compared with a mother’s feet; keep in mind, here Islam talks about a woman not a man.
Last but not least, being a wife, sheis not only the master of her own property but she also has a part in husband’s property.

Roman history was totally based on the paternal power called patria potestas, in which the head of the family,
man, was its sole representative, and he alone had locus standi in the Councils of the state. Under Roman law, a
daughter, when she was married to a person became subject to different authorities. Legally, she had no
relationship with her grandfather’s family- once she entered into another household.
Similarly, the relation between husband and wife was depended on Roman’s manus formula which dealt with a
woman becoming uxor or matrona (wife or matron). In the same way, the father was allowed to kill his
daughter without any hesitation for any misconduct but, unfortunately, she was disallowed, even, to cry at her
father’s wrath to death. The same power was also given to a husband.
 There is no denying fact that woman’s position, in the Greek Civilisation, was about the same, if not worse. The
custom of selling daughters in marriages was common practice. The superiority of man over woman was
vehemently asserted on all side; therefore, physical strength was the tool to complete dominance. In the
historical age of Greece, the legal woman’s status had slightly improved, but their moral condition had undergone
a marked deterioration.

All virtuous women lived a life of perfect seclusion. Greek recognized two distinct orders of womanhood: first, the
wife’s duty was fidelity to her husband and, second, there was the hetaera or mistress who subsisted by her
fugitive attachments. Even Plato, a renowned philosopher, classed woman together with children and servant and
stated that generally that in all the pursuits of mankind the female sex is inferior to the male.
In the same way, Buddhism has not assigned to woman any definite place. Gautama Buddha’s life shows that he
could not find in woman a helpmate, and could not attain Nirvana while in the company of his beautiful wife. It
unequivocally indicates the woman’s inferiority. What a gulf yawns in this respect between the Lord Buddha and the
Prophet! The orphan of Abdullah found solace in his wife, Khadijah, at the most critical situation of his life.
Additionally, Buddhism also lays great stress on celibacy which leaves the relation of the sexes somewhat severely
alone.

The custom of selling daughters in marriages was common practice. The superiority of man over woman
was vehemently asserted on all side; therefore,physical strength was the tool to complete dominance.

Furthermore, the woman under Hinduism is being treated as a second class family member. The concept of
remarriage of widows is non- existent, as it is strictly prohibited especially among the Brahmins, on the other
hand, among the lower castes i-e Dalits, widows are permitted to remarry. Brahmanical prohibition was once
carried to such an extreme that a widow was enjoined and, sometimes, forcibly burnt alive on the funeral pyre
along with her husband’s corpse, or if he had died at distance, she was being burnt on a pyre of her own.

Adding more to it, woman, in Judaism, was being painted as the source of evil and death on the Earth- of the
woman came at the beginning of sins, and through her, we all die. By the Jewish law, as it still exists at the dawn
of the present modern epoch, divorce was the one-sided privilege of man.

Turning attention to woman’s condition in Christianity deep injustice prevails under which she has been
suffering since the time of Jesus. However, the present position of woman in Christian countries hasn’t been
achieved by Christian reformers, but by social and political thinkers who have swept aside the Biblical notions of
her inferiority to man.

It is said in the Bible that Eve was the root cause of man’s drawing out from heaven. Satan instigated her for eating
the forbidden fruit, and she instigated her husband. In this regards, the woman is being considered criminal.

“He has made for you your mates of your own kind”
 Al-Quran
On contrary to all, Islam has given equal rights to the woman which were never blessed to her by any religion. It
has not only acknowledged complete personhood of the woman but also protected her rights keeping in view her
weaknesses. It has assigned a position at a level according to her virtues.

Being unmarried, she has right to choose her life partner, even, after, she becomes widow or divorcee she has
the right to remarry. Islam stresses a father to provide her healthy nourishment and education.

The value of paradise has been compared with a mother’s feet; keep in mind, here Islam talks about a woman, not
a man. Last but not least, being a wife, she is not only the master of her own property but she also has a part in
husband’s property.
What constitutes power?
Shahid Siddiqui March 12, 2019

“…power is everywhere not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.” –
Michel Foucault

Power, being a complex concept, can be de ned in di erent ways. One common attribute in di erent
de nitions of is control. Most of the time power is considered as the ability or right to control people or
events. If we look at the history of mankind, we see people using force to demonstrate their power and
control others.

There was a time when large ghting forces and deadly weapons were considered important conditions of
power. We then see a change in the strategy as the focus shifted from large armies to more sophisticated
weapon systems, espionage equipments and computerised weaponry. The urge, however, remained the
same, controlling others by demonstrating power.

For a long time, the terms ‘control’ and ‘hegemony’ were associated with coercion ie use of force. Antonio
Gramsci, an Italian thinker, however, o ered an alternative view of hegemony in his seminal book, ‘Prison
Notebooks’ written during 1929-35 in jail. Gramsci refers to two approaches to hegemony. The rst approach
to hegemony, according to Gramsci, is “through apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces
discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively”.

The second approach to hegemony is through spontaneous consent in which general directions are imposed
by dominant groups on social life.

“This consent is caused by the prestige which the dominant group enjoys because of its enjoys because of its
position andfunction in the world of production.” Hegemony through spontaneous consent is a clear reference to
thediscursive approach to hegemony which appears to be more e ective than the coercive approach.

The discursive approach draws our attention to another de ning attribute of power – in uence. Thus we can
see power as an ability to in uence other people’s choices, behaviours and acts. Coercive power is usually
used by the state ‘legally’ by exercising the authority vested in it. This suggests that ‘authority’ is a legalised
version of power.

Steven Luke, in his work, ‘Power: A radical view’ (1974) discusses three dimensions of power. The rst two
dimensions refer to decision-making and agenda-setting. The third dimension deals with shaping
ideologies, perception, and norms. Referring to the third dimension, Luke suggests, “Is it not the supreme
and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the
existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as
natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and bene cial?” This dimension of
power is closer to what Gramsci describes as spontaneous consent.

Foucault also delves into the issue of power. In fact, his search started with tracing the history of knowledge
when he realised the strong linkage between knowledge and power. Foucault discovered that with new
knowledge and technologies new manifests of power and control are invented. Instead of using the
traditional violent force and destroying the opponent altogether, modern technologies have di erent
strategies to control.

In ‘Discipline and Punish’, Foucault describes the contemporary version of power, “…it de ned how one may
have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that may do what one
wishes, but so that they operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the e ciency that one
determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile bodies’.” These techniques of
knowledge and power were initially used in isolated institutions like prisons, factories, and schools etc but
later on these techniques were used in other contexts as well.

The role of discourse is crucial in the formation of knowledge. It is the discursive formation of objects that
can construct a certain kind of knowledge that leads to new techniques of power and control. Power, by
contemporary thinkers, is not viewed as a product but as a process which means that it is not xed or
located in place; it is rather transitory and uid and relational in nature.

In other words, power, as Foucault puts it, is relation which is structured by discourse. This suggests that the
relationship between the powerful and powerless is not xed and permanent. The once powerful can
become powerless and vice versa in another moment in history. This has direct implications for the
possibility of resistance.

Foucault in ‘The History of Sexuality’ makes a reference to the points of resistance available in the dynamics
of power. “The strictly relational character of power relationships [is such that] their existence depends on a
multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power
relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.”

This view of power is optimistic in nature as it does not lump power in one location and views it as a static
object. On the contrary, it looks at power as something scattered around us in di erent networks. There is a
constant struggle between power and its adversary, and there are points of resistance available within the
process of power for the act of resistance.
What should determine Pakistan’s
foreign policy?
Herald
Updated Jun 05, 2015

Flags outside the United Nations headquarters in Geneva | EPA

W hen Saudi Arabia expects Pakistani soldiers to ght in Yemen, it invokes

religion and money to have its way. When Chinese President Xi Jinping
visits Pakistan, of cial propagandists go into overdrive to highlight the
economic and strategic imperatives that bind together Islamabad and Beijing.
When we speak of our other neighbours – India, Afghanistan and sometimes
Iran – we mostly do so with hostile undertones. And then there is the United
States, which looms large over everything that happens in Pakistan. What
should drive our relations with these countries and the rest of the world?
The Herald asks a few analysts with inside knowledge of Islamabad’s foreign policy
mechanisms.

Pursuing ‘national interest’

Pakistani troops ride Al-Zarar tanks during the Pakistan Day military parade in Islamabad on March 23,
2015 | AFP

National interest should be the only driving force behind Pakistan’s foreign policy.
All our alliances should be subjected to this keystone criterion. That said, no
country can remain isolated and all relationships between states, bilaterally and
multilaterally, are therefore based on mutual interests, which are freely
determined and pursued.

But what do we mean by national interest? It lies in enhancing our economic,

military and cultural power within our overall ideological framework. We should
use our foreign policy to, rst and foremost, defend our territory from outside
aggression and internal strife. That necessitates strong defense and deterrent
capabilities. We have to leverage our relations with nations in the region and
beyond, as well as with international multilateral institutions, to attract foreign
direct investment, start off joint ventures and promote trade. All these activities
should be geared towards accelerating our GDP growth, raising standards of living
and improving human development. Moreover, it is a core function of Pakistan’s
foreign policy practitioners to project the country’s soft power, one that must be
nurtured within Pakistan. A national interest-centred foreign policy will also act as
a catalyst for domestic economic development and international clout.

By Masood Khan, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad,

and former ambassador to the United Nations

Shifting regional dynamics

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in Islamabad | AFP

Pakistan’s sense of insecurity, vis-à-vis a more powerful India, has been the core
driver of its foreign policy since Partition. Its relations with its immediate
neighbours such as Afghanistan and Iran, and other regional countries such as
Turkey and the Gulf States, have all been ltered through this security prism. Its
close alliance with the United States-led regional security systems for the past six
decades was also shaped by this core insecurity dynamic. The normal pursuit of
national interest has been primarily de ned in hard security terms by successive
governing elites. A wider de nition which highlights the pursuit of economic and
social prosperity of the people of Pakistan as the rational end goal of its relations
with the wider world is mostly absent from strategic thinking.

Changing global trends in regional trade and the growth of Asian economies is
forcing Pakistan to readjust the focus of its foreign relations especially within its
neighbourhood. Pakistan’s reluctance in getting militarily involved in the Saudi-led
war in Yemen is evidence of this new thinking. As Iran looks to rejoin the global
economy after sanctions against its exports come to an end, Pakistan is
positioning to revive the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Getting too deeply enmeshed
in the Iranian-Saudi struggle in the Middle East would intensify tensions with Iran
and adversely impact security in the province of Balochistan. Pakistan’s improved
relations with the Ashraf Ghani administration in Afghanistan also re ect this
broader shift in its foreign policy framework.

By Simbal Khan, an academic and CEO of Indus Global Initiative

Playing to our strengths

Women work on agricultural land in Lahore | AFP

Pakistan’s foreign policy ought to be based on our country’s inherent strengths. As

the sixth-largest nation in the world by way of population – with reliable
demographic data indicating that we are closing in on 200 million people – we
should frame a policy which assumes that we possess a reasonable quality of
human resources and have an extremely useful geography.

Our human resource base was good enough to make us the only nuclearised
Muslim state in the world. Our strength is our agriculture, which enables us to be
food-suf cient with a considerable surplus of rice and wheat. We also enjoy an
abundance of fruit, vegetables and dairy products and have the capacity to launch
all these for export. Our next strength is located in our capacity to weave the
nest cotton fabrics in the world, based on indigenously grown raw cotton, which
commands strong markets abroad.

We can rightfully boast of the highest quality of craftsmanship in leather, metals,

pottery and stitched craft, and are now entering the fashion market at an
international level. Our jewellery, gemstones and marble – notably onyx – draw
interest worldwide. Moreover, our considerable mineral resources await
exploration, as do our deposits of natural gas.

Despite all these strengths, we have fallen into a debt trap because of poor
governance and mismanagement, rectifying which is certainly within the realm of
the feasible. A growth- and export-driven economy would enable us to exploit our
strategic advantage effectively and base our foreign policy on an economically
strong agenda.

Syeda Abida Hussain, a Pakistani politician and former ambassador to Washington

Regional cooperation

— AFP

The welfare of a nation, the power of a state and the importance of its voice in the
comity of nations is drawn from the strength of its economy. Therefore, Pakistan’s
foreign policy ought to be determined primarily by economic interests. For the
rst time in three centuries from the West to Asia, a historic shift is taking place in
the centre of gravity of the global economy. This provides a unique opportunity
for Pakistan to build a prosperous future for its people and emerge as a strong and
economically independent state.

Over the last two decades, China and India – with a billion citizens each – have
doubled their per capita incomes. According to a recent United Nations
Development Programme report, in terms of speed and scale, this economic
performance has had a greater impact on the world than the Industrial Revolution
in Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Given present trends, China
will emerge as the largest economy in the world over the next two decades and if
South Asia achieves economic integration as envisaged in South Asian Free Trade
Area (SAFTA), then South Asia can emerge as the second-largest economy in the
world, thereby making the China–South Asia region the greatest economic
powerhouse in human history.

A policy of economic integration with China on the one hand and South Asia on
the other will not only maximise Pakistan’s economic gains but also provide a
balance to its relationship with its larger neighbours. Accordingly, our foreign
policy should aim to build not only a North-South economic corridor with China,
but also an East-West corridor across Asia, from Iran to Myanmar.

By Akmal Hussain, an economist, author and a professor at Forman Christian

College, Lahore

This was originally published in Herald's May 2015 issue.

Strengthening democratic norms

By Talat Masood

The prevailing impression is that since the PTI government has come into power the civil-military relations have significantly
improved. And there is a greater level of understanding and mutual trust between them. This is largely true and the credit goes to
the prime minister and the army chief for building a harmonious and functional relationship. Circumstances and several
compelling factors have also played a major role in bringing about this change.

It was only natural that the military leadership would realise that military rule in the past had cost the nation dearly and was a
product of special external and domestic circumstances. It invariably ended in chaos as 71 years of our history testifies. Whatever
gains achieved in terms of economic development and stability during the period military remained in power was soon lost and
the nation had to start all over again. This was evident during every transition whether it related to Ayub, Zia or Musharraf’s
period. Moreover, a military government due to its inherent nature creates the succession problem. As a consequence military or
civilian dictators prefer to prolong their rule and either die while in position or are thrown out. Our history and that of other
developing countries like Sudan, Egypt and several Asian, African and Latin American countries bear testimony to this
assumption.

The military, however, in many developing states, including ours, wields greater influence in areas that would otherwise fall in the
preview of civilian domain. As is well known in Pakistan the military enjoys considerable influence in the area of foreign affairs,
security related matters and even in the economy. The circumstances that preceded and followed Pakistan’s birth gave the
military a unique position of importance. Defence of the country especially against India and later the growing insurgency and the
regional situation reinforced the role of the armed forces.

Essentially its involvement remains in those civilian areas where there is either a power vacuum or the institution considers it
vital in national interest to retain a foothold.

One expects that as the civilian government becomes more functional and credible in the eyes of its people democracy would be
strengthened. And state institutions would then harmonise with democratic norms and function within their constitutional
boundaries.

Moreover, the government and the opposition parties should take the activities in the parliament seriously. It is a matter of
serious concern the way parliament has been functioning for the last six months. Lack of diligence by the parliamentarians has
given greater space and power to the media and public to criticise the politicians. More worrisome other state institutions have
increased their influence while parliament remains dysfunctional. The irony is not that there is any dearth of talent among the
politicians it is the question of attitude and commitment on the part of its top leadership. In this the initiative has to come from
the government that is missing. The prime minister has been conducting the affairs of the state more in the presidential style than
as the leader of the House. His absence or weak attendance has robbed parliament of its importance. The prolonged controversy
on the chair of the Public Accounts Committee and mutual recrimination between politicians has not served the country or their
own interest well. Absence of opposition leaders from state functions during the Saudi Crown Prince’s visit was one such example
that reflected adversely on our democracy. It also deprived us of projecting forcefully the consensus that exists across the aisle for
strong relations with the Kingdom.

Democratic practices and culture within the political parties is as crucial as in parliament or in matters of governance. The era of
dynastic politics should come to an end. It does not imply that members of the same family cannot participate in politics or hold
high office. What is expected that it should be on the basis of merit and through a genuine and transparent process of elections!
After all we have many families in mature democracies that have held the highest positions. The Kennedys, Bushs and Clinton
family are recent examples from the United States. In India, the Nehru family for three generations had been in power. In all
these cases it was through a fair and transparent process the political leaders came to power.

In Pakistan too we have several examples where politicians from the same family have been on high positions by virtue of their
commitment and ability. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Benazir were immensely popular leaders and had come to power through
people’s vote. It is when favouritism and narrow interests prevail in the election of party leaders democracy gets weakened and
should be forcefully rejected.

Pakistan’s ability to resist foreign aggression and pressures would be greatly enhanced as our democratic institutions get
strengthened.

The country is facing formidable internal and external challenges. Indian growing hostility, Afghanistan’ precarious transition
and regional rivalry between Arab countries and Iran coupled with our weak economic situation demand political interaction
between the ruling and opposition parties both inside and outside parliament. Presenting Pakistan’s viewpoint at a press
conference by the foreign minister though necessary is not sufficient. It has to be accompanied and preferably preceded by his
briefing and in-depth discussion in parliament. This would provide greater clarity to our policy and send a stronger message to
India and the world. When national power is diffused or suffers from factional rivalry demoralisation sets in.

Recent differences that have surfaced between the information minister and the prime minister’s aide are not new phenomena as
rivalry and competition for proximity to power are common occurrence even in mature democracies. What is important is the
manner in which these are handled and not allowed to simmer, lest it adversely impacts on governance.

The current process of accountability and trial of our top opposition politicians is being closely watched at home and abroad for
their fairness and compliance with legal justice. And if conducted impartially would set the tone for a more just and equitable
social order.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 27th, 2019.