THE ICFAI UNIVERSITY

ICFAI LAW SCHOOL

Rajawala Road, Dehradun

IOS Assignment

ON

“Mischief Rule”

Submitted to- Submitted By-

Ms. Divyansha Jayaditya Rai

Faculty-in-charge 17FLICDDN02059

Ba.LLb(H)[3rd Year]
 Introduction

When we read an Act of Parliament the first and fundamental point of note is that it is not like reading
a book or a newspaper. Legislative text must be read according to the principles and rules as decided
upon by the judges and the statute itself. A special skill is required to understand the meaning. This
project will deal briefly with the subject, but it is hoped it will provide a better understanding of how a
Judge approaches the problems.

DAVID HUME once asked,’ referring to Pope’s Essay on Man, whether there is any essential
difference between one form of government and another; and whether every form is not to be
regarded as good or bad, according to whether it is well or ill-administered. Similar questions are
likely to occur to anyone who begins to examine the theory and practice governing the interpretation
of statutes. Does the interpretation of statutes really depend on the rules which are:-

Supposed to regulate it? Does not a judge, according to his outlook and capacity, simply use these so-
called rules to justify a decision which he has already reached on other grounds? And should the Law
Commissions, before embarking on an inquiry into the interpretation of

Statutes, have asked themselves whether their journey was really necessary? To these questions
Hume’s reply to Pope suggests one answer. He would be sorry, he said, “to think that human affairs
admit of no greater stability than what they receive from the humours and characters of particular
men”. But as applied to the interpretation of statutes today, this answer is unsatisfying. It is true that a
judge may express or reveal certain distaste for the policy of a statute and some reluctance to accept
that it is intended to override not only his personal predilections (which of course he would not
dispute) but also a long-established principle of the common law. That this reluctance can still be of
the greatest practical importance may be seen in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Allen v.
Thorn Electrical Industries1.

Nevertheless I do not maintain that we could justify an enquiry into the interpretation of statutes
solely on the ground that the judiciary approach statutes with some regard to what they conceive to be
the generally accepted values of the society in which they live, or because they read statutes to some
extent in the context of those values. On the other hand I am far from suggesting that the present
system of interpretation gives all the assistance which it might to the judge in determining in the first
place whether the words of a statute really are ambiguous.

1 1967 2 AllER 1137

If I might put in a few words the underlying contention of the Working Paper’, I should be tempted to
say that just as there are shades of meaning, so there are shades of ambiguity; that the tendency of our
tradition in statutory interpretation has been to make too many sharp distinctions, giving a misleading
appearance of simplicity to the judicial function; and that more can be done to help the judge in what
will in the marginal case always remain a task of very great difficulty. A better answer to the
questions which initially faced the Law Commissions with regard to the interpretation of statutes must
begin by admitting that, whatever rules are devised for interpreting statutes, that task has many of the
qualities of an art rather than of a science; and that an inspired interpretation of statutes cannot be
achieved by the mechanical application of certain rules any more than a performance on the piano
worthy of a Richter will automatically follow a diligent attention to the exercises of Czerny.

But if we forswear any intention to devise a comprehensive code of new rules for the interpretation of
statutes, we may nevertheless justify a more modest enquiry and indeed explain its purpose by another
musical analogy. Even a great pianist may be hampered by a bad instrument. The purpose of the Law
Commissions has been to discover how far the present body of law and practice which is supposed to
guide and assist the judge in his task of interpretation in fact fulfils that function; to determine how
much of the vast mass of learning which surrounds the interpretation of statutes is meaningful in the
light of that function; and to make proposals which will not indeed ensure that statutes are better
interpreted but at least put at the disposal of the judge an instrument sensitive and flexible enough to
respond to the various and intricate demands of modern legislation.

Much more significant is the link which Lord Simonds’ statement provides between the concept of a
so-called plain meaning, free from ambiguity, and the concept of the mischief of a statute emphasised
by Heydon’s Case2. Here again I would say in parenthesis that we need not spend many words on the
golden rule, for on closer examination when a court decides that particular words of a statute read in
the context of ordinary usage, are absurd, it implies, although often tacitly, that the construction is
absurd because it is irreconcilable with the court’s conception of the general policy of the statute; in
other words, the golden rule turns out to be a disguised version of the mischief rule of uncertain and
imprecise application.

As regards the mischief rule proper, you will have observed that Lord Simonds concedes that the
mischief is part of the context and that he says that other sections of the statute, the preamble, the
existing state of the law and other statutes in pari materia may be used to throw light on that mischief.
But you will have also noted that he refers to “other legitimate” but unspecified means to ascertain the
mischief. This seems to us the central problem connected with the rule in Heydon’s Case, which in
many respects has much to recommend it. The attempt which has been made in a number of

2 (1584) 76 ER 637
Commonwealth countries to give the rule in Heydon’s Case statutory effect and to make it the central
principle of statutory interpretation has produced disappointing results because little guidance has
been given as to how the mischief is to be ascertained.

The mischief rule of statutory interpretation is the oldest of the rules. The mischief rule was
established in Heydon’s Case. In Re Sussex Peerage3, it was held that the mischief rule should only
be applied where there is ambiguity in the statute. Under the mischief rule the court’s role is to
suppress the mischief the Act is aimed at and advance the remedy.

3 (1844) 11 Cl&Fin 85
 Mischief Rule

This is a very important rule as far as the Interpretation of Statute is concerned. It is often referred to
as the “rule in Heydon’s Case”. This very important case reported by Lord Coke and decided by the
Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the following rules:

That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered –

1) What was the common law before the passing of the Act?

2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the “disease of the
Commonwealth”.

4) The true reasons for the remedy.

And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. Before proceeding any further, a word of warning is appropriate.
Uses the exact words – “disease of the Commonwealth” – used by Lord Coke in his report and it is
important to bear in mind that words had different meanings. It is necessary to discover their meaning
at the time of writing. From the 14th century to the end of the 17th, the meaning of disease was lack
of ease, disquiet or distress and Commonwealth, of course, meant the Country.

According to an early case, The Longford(1889) 14 P.D. 34 an Act must be construed as if one were
interpreting it on the day it was passed. Thus, we ask ourselves what the word meant on the day it was
uttered if by analogy we argue that the same can be said of a judgment. The importance of the
mischief rule in criminal law can best be shown by considering examples. An Act of Parliament will
state the purpose for which it was enacted. If we take the case of Parkin v. Norman4, (reserved
judgment), it can be seen that the court decided that the Public Order Act 1936 was never designed
to deal with homosexual behavior in public toilets.

4 [1982] 2 All E.R. 583

The purposes of the Act and the mischief rule are, therefore, closely connected, and it is very genuine
to look at the long title. Another example of the application of the mischief rule is found in Ohison v.
Hylton5. The facts, briefly, were a carpenter was on his way home from work. He boarded a train
which was crowded. Another passenger objected and subsequently both finished up on the platform.
The defendant, the carpenter, took one of his tools of his trade, a hammer, from his briefcase and
struck the other man with it. He was charged under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Lord
Widgery, CJ, said, inter alia:

“This is a case in which the mischief at which the statute is aimed appears to me to be very clear.
Immediately prior to the passing of the 1953 Act the criminal law was adequate to deal with the actual
use of weapons in the course of a criminal assault. Where it was lacking, however, was that the mere
carrying of offensive weapons was not an offence. The long title of the Act reads as follows:

‘An Act to prohibit the carrying of offensive weapons in public places without lawful authority or
reasonable excuse’. Parliament is there recognizing the need for preventive justice where, by
preventing the carriage of offensive weapons in a public place, it reduced the opportunity for the use
of such weapons. If, however, the prosecutor is right, the scope goes far beyond the mischief aimed at,
and in every case where an assault is committed with a weapon and in a public place an offence under
the 1953 Act can be charged in addition to the charge of assault. Whilst on the subject of offensive
weapons, mention must be made of the Divisional Court’s decision in Gibson v. Wales6, which
decided that a “flick knife” is an offensive weapon per se.’”

Literature Survey: A lot of work has been done on this particular topic which belongs to
Interpretation of Statute because of the peculiar nature of its operation as it is considered to discover
Parliament’s intention and to give the judge more discretion than any other rule as it allows him to
effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. But at the same time It can be argued that this undermines
Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes law-making decisions away from the
legislature. There’s Judicial Overreach, So this controversy has been considered in favour by many
authors in their books of which some are like “Interpretation of Statutes” by Kafaltiya, B.M. Gandhi,
Maxwell and “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by G.P. Singh and many more in this regard and
therefore Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for the mischief rule,
the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine cases. Purposive interpretation is exercised
when the courts utilize extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation, including
early drafts, hansards, committee reports, white papers, etc. The purposive interpretation involves a
rejection of the exclusionary rule.

5 [1975] 2 All E.R. 490

6 (1983) 147 J. P. 143
 Case Laws

Smith v. Hughes7

The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon Street,
London and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959, between 8.50
p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the purposes of prostitution,
from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being some 8–10 feet above street
level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was

(i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object and by
hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and

(ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the premises
with such words as ‘Would you like to come up here a little while?’ at the same time as she indicated
the correct door of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a Street’ within the
meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no offence had been
committed. “The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a
street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a
common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution’.

Lord Parker CJ said Case that she ‘being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose
of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959.’ It was found that the
defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in a street. The
defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a house adjoining the
street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by tapping and calling down to
them. At other part the defendants were in ground-floor windows, either closed or half open. The sole
question here is whether in those circumstances each defendant was soliciting in a street or public
place. The words of section 1(1) of the Act of 1959 are in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a
common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’

Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must be in
the street. Equally, it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to
whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by considering what is the

7 (1871) LR 6 QB 597
mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets,
to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is
standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half
open; in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For
my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.

Elliot v Grey8

The defendant’s car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He was
charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on the road.
The defendant argued he was not ‘using’ the car on the road as clearly it was not driveable. It was
held: The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used on the road as it
represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of an incident. The statute
was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the hazards created by others.

DPP v Bull9

A man was charged with an offense under s.1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which makes it an
offense for a ‘common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a public street or public place for the purposes
of prostitution’. The magistrates found him not guilty on the grounds that ‘common prostitute’ only
related to females and not males. The prosecution appealed by way of case stated.

The court held that the Act did only apply to females. The word prostitute was ambiguous and they
applied the mischief rule. The Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the work of
the Wolfenden Report into homosexuality and prostitution. The Report only referred to female
prostitution and did not mention male prostitutes. The QBD, therefore, held the mischief the Act was
aimed at was controlling the behavior of only female prostitutes.

RMDC v. UOI 10

In RMDC v Union of India the definition of ‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Prize competition
act 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive skill is involved.
Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt from the definition of
‘prize competition’ under s 2(d) of the Act. Hence, in the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court has
applied the Heydon’s Rule in order to suppress the mischief was intended to be remedied, as against

8 [1960] 1 QB 367
9 [1995] QB 88
10 AIR 1962 SC 594
the literal rule which could have covered prize competitions where no substantial degree of skill was
required for success.

Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar11

Within the context of law, the mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts to
determine the legislator’s intention. Originating from a 16th century case in the United Kingdom, its
main aim is to determine the “mischief and defect” that the statute in question has set out to remedy,
and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. When material words are capable of
bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words “of
all statutes in general” is the rule laid down in Heydons case also known as mischief rule. This rule is
also known as purposive construction. The rules lay down that the court should adopt the construction
which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

In the Indian context, the rule was best explained in the case of Bengal immunity co. v State of
Bihar. The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of manufacturing
and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its registered head office is at
Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district of 24 – Perganas in West
Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered
number is S.L. 683A. Its products have extensive sales throughout the Union of India and abroad. The
goods are dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by the appellant
company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any agent or manager in Bihar nor any
office, godown or laboratory in that State. On the 24th October, 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of
Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which concluded as follows: -

“Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales Tax Act.
Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar Treasury at an early date
under intimation to this Department”.

The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant
company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its petition is
leviable by the State of Bihar. This was done by construing article 286 whose interpretation came into
question and the meaning granted to it in the case of The State of Bombay v. The United Motors

11
Appeal (civil) 159 of 1953
(India) Ltd12 was overruled. It raises a question of construction of article 286 of the Constitution. It
was decided that Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take
place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void.

The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express terms
subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared wholly ultra
vires and void. Until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain
from imposing sales tax on out-of-state dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place
in the course of inter-State trade or commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct
result of such sales or purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the
appellant in this Court and in the court below. Bhagwati, J. had agreed to the above interpretation.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Mischief Rule

Advantages:

1) The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to
the Golden or Literal rules.

2) It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.

3) Closes loopholes

4) Allows the law to develop and adapt to changing needs.

Disadvantages:

1) It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common law was
the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.

2) It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.

3) Creates a crime after the event, thus infringing the rule of law.

4) Gives judges a law making role infringing the separation of powers and Judges can bring their
own views, sense of morality and prejudices to a case

12
1953 AIR 252, 1953 SCR 1069
 Conclusion

As it can be seen from the case, mischief rule can be applied differently by different judges. It is
mainly about the discretion and understanding of the person applying it. Though, it as a far more
satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to the Golden or Literal rules. It usually avoids unjust
or absurd results in sentencing but it also seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th
century, when common law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not
established. It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic. In
the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were therefore well
qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy.

This is not often the case in modern legal systems. The rule can make the law uncertain, susceptible to
the slippery slope. Therefore Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for the
mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine cases. The purposive
approach is an approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation under which common law courts
interpret an enactment (that is, a statute, a part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of the
purpose for which it was enacted.
 BIBILOGRAPHY

 https://indiankanoon.org
 https://www.lawctopus.com
 https://en.wikipedia.org
 www.lawteacher.net