Ramirez vs.

CA (248 SCRA 590)

FACTS: Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case in the QC RTC for damages. During a
confrontation in the respondent Ester Garcia’s office, Ramirez was vexed, insulated, and
humiliated by Garcia. Garcia was in a hostile and furious mood and the petitioner
considered it an affront to her dignity.

Ramirez’ evidence was a transcript of the confrontation. The source of the transcript was
Ramirez’ recording of the event. Garcia proceeded to file a criminal case in Pasig RTC
citing that the act of secretly taping the conversation was a violation of RA 4200, “An Act
to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communications and Other Purposes.

Ramirez filed Motion to Quash Information which was granted by the trial court. Trial court
agreed with Ramirez that (1) the facts did not constitute an offense under RA 4200, and
that (2) the violation penalized by RA 4200 refers to taping of a communication by a
person who is not part of the conversation. CA declared RTC order null and void and
corrected RTC judge’s decision by way of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ramirez is in violation of RA 4200

HELD: Yes. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Thus, a person part of the
conversation secretly records said conversation violates RA 4200. A perusal of Senate
Congressional Records shows that our lawmakers contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons.

Request for CA Justices Veloso, Gacutan, and Salazar-Fernando for

Computation/Adjustment of Longevity Pay (A.M. Nos. 12-8-07-CA; 12-9-5-SC; 13-
02-07-SC)

FACTS: Justices Veloso, Gacutan, and Salazar-Fernando are all Justices of the Court of
Appeals. They are requesting for their longevity pay to be adjusted to include services
rendered outside the Court of Appeals: Justice Veloso as NLRC Commissioner; Justice
Gacutan also as NLRC Commissioner; and Justice Salazar-Fernando as Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita Pampanga, and COMELEC Commissioner. Justice
Gacutan is also requesting for her retirement pay to be recomputed to account for any
deficiency that would result in the approval of her petition regarding application of the
longevity pay.

Section 42 of BP 129 defines longevity pay as such: “Longevity pay – a monthly longevity
pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges
of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
service rendered in the judiciary; provided that in no case shall the total salary of each
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the
Justice or Judge next in rank.”

ISSUE: Whether or not aforementioned Justices are entitled to the longevity pay as stated
in Section 42 of BP 129

HELD: No. Section 42 of BP 129 clearly states that the longevity pay “shall be paid to
Justices and Judges of the courts” for “services rendered in the judiciary.” Since the
statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, the plain meaning rule must be applied.

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. NLRC and Imelda Salazar
G.R. No. 82511

FACTS: Imelda Salazar was employed as general systems analyst in GMCR. She had a
close personal relationship with another of GMCR’s employees, manager for technical
operations’ support Delfin Saldivar.

Sometime in 1984 GMCR discovered, through a report by the company’s internal auditor,
Mr. Agustin Maramara, that several company equipment and spare parts worth thousands
of dollars under Saldivar was missing and unaccounted for. They launched an
investigation and found out that Saldivar had entered into a partnership with Richard
Yambao, the owner and manager of Elecon. Elecon was a supplier which was often
recommended by Saldivar to GMCR. Salazar acted as a witness to the articles of
partnership that Saldivar and Yambao entered into as Concave Commercia and Industrial
Company. Mr. Maramara also reported that a missing air-conditioning unit was found in
the apartment that Saldivar and Salazar shared. The report also alleged that Salazar had
full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the air-conditioning unit but failed to report
it to GMCR.

Given the events that transpired concerning Saldivar and Salazar’s alleged participation
in those events, Salazar was put under one month preventive suspension on October
1984. She was given 30 days to explain her side. Three days after she was issued a
notice for her preventive suspension, Salazar instead filed a complaint against GMCR for
illegal suspension and, thereafter, illegal dismissal after GMCR considered her dismissed
“in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove” their findings.

On July 1985, GMCR was ordered to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent position
and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received if not for her
dismissal, as well as 50,000 for moral damages.

On the appeal dated December 1987, NLRC affirmed the decision, limiting the
backwages to a period of 2 years and deleting the award for moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar is entitled to backwages and can be reinstated

HELD: Yes. Art 279 of the Labor Code provides that regular employees are entitled to
Security of Tenure: “…employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause…” and “An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement…and to his full backwages.”

There is no conflict of interest because Salazar’s job as general systems analyst merely
involved development of systems and analysis of designs. Her personal relationship with
Saldivar also does not automatically constitute to her knowledge of and involvement in
the latter’s transactions. The court considered her dismissal unjust, which in turn made
her entitled to reinstatement and to her full backwages.

Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, DOJ

G.R. No. 109445

FACTS: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
convicted of frustrate murder and of two ocunts of frustrated murder for the killing of
Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter’s wife Florida and his son Tirso. Basbacio
and the Boyons were in dispute over a parcel of land. Basbacio and Balderrama were
sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained.

Two years later, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting Basbacio. The
prosecution failed to prove that there was conspiracy between Basbacio and Balderrama.
Basbacio, having been imprisoned for two years, filed a claim under RA 7309 with the
Board of Claims of the Department of Justice. Sec 3(a) of RA 7309 provides for the
payment of compensation to “any person who was unjustly accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of acquittal.”
The Board disapproved the claim on ground that although Basbacio was acquitted, he
cannot be considered as a person who was unjustly accused.

Suffice it to say, Basbacio’s acquittal was based on a technicality. The murder was a
result of a dispute between him and the Boyons and this was basis for the Board finding
him “probably guilty.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Basbacio’s imprisonment could be considered unjust

HELD: No. Not all persons acquitted can claim to be completely innocent of the crime for
which he was accused of. The language of the law is clear: “any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of acquittal”.

Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned."
Unjust imprisonment is preceded by unjust conviction and unjust accusation. Basbacio
cannot claim that he was unjustly accused, nor was he unjustly convicted. The fact that
his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous
conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he
may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt.

The Board went on to say that they found Basbacio “probably guilty.” An accusation which
is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation.

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. vs. NLRC and De Los Santos
G.R. No. 109835

FACTS: NLRC dismissed JMM Promotions and Management, Inc.’s appeal on the
ground of failure to post the required appeal bond in accordance with Article 223 of the
Labor Code and Rule VI Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which
provides:

Article 223. In a case of a judgment involving monetary award, an appeal of

the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the commission
in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from.
 Section 6. Bond – In case the decision of a labor arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the commission or Supreme Court in an amount equivalent
to the monetary award.

JMM insists that the appeal bond is not necessary for they have already paid a license
fee of P30,000.00, a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P50,000.00 as
required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules. They also paid P200,000.00
in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, as escrow.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is required to post an appeal bond in accordance with
Article 223 of the Labor Code and Rule VI Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC

HELD: Yes. The rules are clear: in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part thereof be given effect. In addition to the amount paid by the petitioner, an appeal in
an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a
decision provided. In Statutory Construction, construction that would render a provision
inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole. We find that Section 6 of New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC complements Sections 4 and 17 of Rule II Book II of the POEA
Rules.

Duncano vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 191894

FACTS: Petitioner Danilo Duncano was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue with Salary Grade 26. On March 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Office of the Ombudsman filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8,
in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713.

The OSP claimed that Duncano willfully, unlawfully, and criminally failed to disclose in his
SALN his financial and business interests and connections to companies which his family
owned, as well as the 1993 Nissan Patrol registered in the name of his son.

Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss which the Sandiganbayan Second Division denied for
being devoid of merit. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was also ordered. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Reconsideration which was also denied.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over this matter, while the
latter claims otherwise. Both cite Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 as legal basis for their claims.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: No. Each had their own interpretation of Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249.
Sandiganbayan insists that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that
respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government
occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary
Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g).

Looking at the statute as a whole, however, casts a different interpretation. those that fall
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section
4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section 4 (A)
covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second
part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or
higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a)
to (g). Thus, the court sustained petitioner’s contention.

De Guia vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 104712

FACTS: On November 18, 1991, Congress passed RA 7166, "An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations therefor, and for other purposes." On November 20, 1991, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in question.

On February 20, 1992, Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia, an incumbent member of the

Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque, filed with COMELEC a Motion for
Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated
therein, which are all single-district municipalities would be elected by district in the May
11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 stating that its purpose in recommending to
Congress the apportionment of Sangguniang Panglungsod and Bayan seats to reduce
the number of candidates to be voted for.

Petitioner De Guia received the copy of the Resolution to mean that the election of
elective members of Sangguniang Bayan, by district of the 13 Municipalities in Metro
Manila shall apply in the May 11, 1992 election. Not satisfied, De Guia filed the instant
petition for reversal of the position of the respondent. Petitioner insisted that the
Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque should fall under category (d) in which they will still be
elected at large until the 1995 elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and others
would be elected by district in the May 1992 regular elections

HELD: Yes. As stated in Paragraph (c) Section 3: “Cities with 2 or more legislative districts
(Manila, Cebu, Davao) shall continue to be elected by district, as well as the 13
Municipalities of Metro Manila which have already been apportioned into 2 districts.”

Paragraph (d) Section 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan for Municipalities
outside Metro Manila, which will remain to be elected at large in the May 1992 election.
Paragraph (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the
interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of the statute in singling out the single
district provinces as useless or meaningless. The key to understanding what the
legislature intended in the language of a statute is its purpose or reason which induced it
to enact the statute.

Statutes should be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A Construction should

be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
its purpose for which it is enacted.

Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals and Guerra

G.R. No. 78687

FACTS: The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from
her parents, the Enciso spouses. The petitioners mortgaged the property twice, the
latest done on December 1975 in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet,
Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00. Petitioners failed to pay and so the
property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the public auction on
February 1981. A “Sheriff’s Final Deed” was issued on July 1983.
RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners
opposed. Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The Court of
appeals made a similar decision.

On November 1983 and on August 1984, petitioners wished to repurchase the property
and maintained that they had the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, as amended, which states that,

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date
of the conveyance.

Private respondent William Guerra argued that the petitioners were disqualified from
being legal heirs of the subject property since petitioners acquired the said property not
through inheritance, but by sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act

HELD: Yes. Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of
the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase.
This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs,"
makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos - where the law
does not distinguish, nor the interpreter must distinguish.

Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners,
being legal heirs, had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year
period had not yet proscribed. The Court held that when the petitioners expressed their
desire to repurchase the property in 1984, it was evident that the 5-year period had not
yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981 and the issuance of the Final deed
in 1983.