What are the kinds of persons?

1.) NATURAL PERSONS - refers to a living human being, with certain rights and responsibilities under the
law.
2.) JURIDICAL PERSONS - is a non-human legal entity, in other words any organization that is not a single
natural person but is authorized by law with duties and rights and is recognized as a legal person and as
having a distinct identity. This includes any incorporated organizations including corporations, government
agencies, and NGOs. Also known as artificial person, juridical entity, juristic person, or legal person.

What is marriage according to the family code (EO 209 as amended)?

- Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man an d a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is a foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this code.

Distinguish between marriage and ordinary contract

a.) Marriage is a special contract; an ordinary contract is just a mere contract.

b.) Marriage is governed by law on marriage; an ordinary contract is governed by the law on contracts.
c.) Marriage is inviolable social institution; an ordinary contract is not.
d.) Marriage is not subject to stipulation EXCEPT only with regard to marriage settlement (economic
regime) which the parties may agree upon before the marriage; an ordinary contract is subject to
stipulation.
e.) Legal capacity is required in marriage; in ordinary contract, minors (below 18) may contract thru their
parents or guardians.
f.) In marriage, the contracting parties MUST ONLY BE TWO (2) and ONE IS A MALE AND THE
OTHER IS FEMALE; in ordinary contract, there CAN BE TWO OR MORE PARTIES AND THE
DIFFERENCE OF GENDER IS NOT MATERIAL;
g.) Marriage is terminated by death or declaration of nullity or annulment due to legal cause; ordinary
contract is terminated upon expiration of the term of the contract, upon fulfillment of the condition for
which it was entered to, rescission, by mutual agreement of the parties or through other causes.

Who may contract marriage?

Article 5.Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Discuss Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines.

Discuss Republic of the Philippines v. Cagandahan

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the
voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in
a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the
[OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering

the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth
of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
 dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:

xxx xxx xxx

 (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more
or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
 his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn
child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship
and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d)
civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as
may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s
petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered
the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff
Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years
and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female
to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
 The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was
posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex
organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted
to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the
reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing
proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces male
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to
be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby

ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon
payment of the prescribed fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF

CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate,
and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,

II.
 CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR
GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did
not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it
failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical
condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. [11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government
of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall,
if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such
name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated,
who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children;
(j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
 The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108
provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding
for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of
the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall
be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. [13] The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states
that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look
to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.[20]
 Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A
newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening
at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the
female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start
to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The
term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most

[23]
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. Since the rise
of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had
their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated,
whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the
category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly
female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the
birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has
ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
 Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It
is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere
with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals
with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals
with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
What are the essential requisites of a marriage?

- Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

What are the formal requisites of a marriage?

- Art. 3. The formal requisites of a marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license EXCEPT in the cases provided for in the chapter 2 of this title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

Is a marriage certificate an essential or formal requisite on the marriage?

- MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL OR FOMAL REQUISITE OF MARRIAGE

Article 2 did not include a marriage certificate as one of the requisites of marriage. The certificate is just an
evidence of the marriage and for that purpose is said to be the best evidence to prove the marriage.

DISCUSS de Loria v. Felix

Discuss Article 4 of the Family Code.

- Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio
except as stated in Art. 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Art. 45
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party of parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Distinguish between absent and defective requisites.

ABSENT REQUISITES

- If a requisite is absent whether it is essential or formal, the marriage is VOID FROM THE BEGINNING.
- A marriage without license (formal requisite) and a marriage without any ceremony (formal requisite) are
VOID.
- Marriage officiated by a solemnizing officer without authority (formal requisite) is also VOID, EXCEPT if
parties or either of them believed in GOOD FAITH at the time of the marriage that said officer has the
authority to do so the marriage is VALID.

DEFECTIVE REQUISITES

- When the essential requisite is defective, the marriage is VOIDABLE, meaning, it is VALID UNTIL
ANNULLED. Thus a marriage of a party between the ages of 18 to below 21 years WITHOUT PARENTAL
CONSENT IS VOIDABLE. So also when the consent of the contracting parties is vitiated by fraud, force or
intimidation.
- When a formal requisite is defective or suffers from any irregularity the marriage remains valid but the party or
parties responsible therefore incurs civil, criminal and administrative liability.

What is the effect of an irregularity in the formal requisites on the marriage?

- An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Discuss Article 5 of the Family Code.

- Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years and upwards not under any impediments of the
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Discuss Article 6 of the Family Code

- Art. 6. No prescribed from or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting
parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage
certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party,
which shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.

What is the rationale for a marriage ceremony?

- The ceremony required in Art. 6 is necessary to prevent the recognition of common-law marriages in the
Philippines and also of representative or proxy marriages.

What is a proxy marriage?

- is one where a partner who is absent in the wedding ceremonies is represented by an authorized
representative.
- PROXY MARRIAGE VOID – The personal appearance of the parties being mandatorily required, a
marriage by proxy is VOID.
Exception: If solemnized abroad and valid there as such, it is also valid in the Philippines.

Who may solemnize a marriage?

a.) Any incumbent member of the judiciary may solemnize marriage. All incumbent judges of lower courts
and justices of the appellate courts are included. So also are justices of the Sandiganbayan. However,
officers exercising only quasi-judicial functions are not included. The members of the judiciary can
exercise their functions only within their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b.) Mayors
 c.) Religious Solemnizers. - Before a religious solemnizer can solemnize marriage, there are requisites to
comply with-
1.) They must be duly authorized by their respective churches or sects;
2.) They must be duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar General
3.) They must act within the limits of their written authority from their churches or sects
4.) At least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect.
d.) Ship Captains; Airplane Pilots
e.) Military Commanders
f.) Consuls.—Consul-General- only between Filipinos abroad who need not be permanent residents therein.

Discuss Article 8 of the Family Code.

- Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Art. 29 of this code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.

This article speaks of the venue of the marriage celebration and is supplemental to the provisions of Article 3(3)
of the Family Code. The venue—an incident in marriage is fixed by law and is NOT SUBJECT TO
STIPULATION.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9005 June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,

vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.

Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.

Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.

It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as
wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In
the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill.
Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched
Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent
had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their
union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession
of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme
Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2 Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in
January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.

On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to
an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana
de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan
Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the
court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.

Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which
they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the events which took place in
January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.

According to the Court of Appeals:

There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista,
solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de
la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the
 reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City
then, had no reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive
evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-
Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la
Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that
her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his
observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about
her condition that he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme
unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees
and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is the
admitted fact that it was not registered.

The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.

There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no
question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr.
Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."

The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:

(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as
required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and

(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.

The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The Court of
Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage
contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the
only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of
marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record of
Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the
only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)

However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or
contract" constitute a cause for nullity?

Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which
provides:

Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is

required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age,
that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in
an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and
said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . .
(Emphasis ours).

In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity
of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the
declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually
occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute
simply for the purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited
making it an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe
it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.

Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually

provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or
recording of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a
marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials
issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and
registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)

Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that
a license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the
ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of
the marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority
to secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such
statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where
such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is
the purpose of these statutes to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit
intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties
who live together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage.
. . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours.
(See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)

And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several
formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such
marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation
to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the
wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had
been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20
and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious consequences
to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.

The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does
not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not
present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the
requisites. (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55
Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to
make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a
marriage license. The firstpractically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without
the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of
such affidavit.

In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have lived
publicly in a state of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.

The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs who
are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews,
children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)

Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,

vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office
and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit
on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family
Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado,
Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed
by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that
they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983;
that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost
seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has
resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling
under Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized
the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction.
As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was
made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who
are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED

for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. 99-1211 January 28, 2000

(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 98-471-MTJ)

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant,

vs.
Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse
of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge
Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not
retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar
alleging —

a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got
married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his
residence of J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; . . .

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our
principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; . . .

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without

any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote
the City Civil Registrar to inquire my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City
that my marriage was not registered; . . .

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar; I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to
inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies
of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
 h. That not copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest
such as:

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before
the office of the Local Civil Registrar.

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be
solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal
Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing circumstances:

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to
report to his station in Sta. Margita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior
appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the
residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of
their marriage right then and there, first, because complainants said she must
leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as
scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage
would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a
solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact
former Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang
Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as
sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant
would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would
lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would
complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date
and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;

1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a
valid marriage, which respondent found all in order. 1âwphi1.nêt

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,

respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under
present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good

faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may
be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was also
occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of respondent:
 3.1. After handling to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private
office where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register
the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the
papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in the
premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were
missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena . . . . Mr. Yman to shed
light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso put the
copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party.
Unfortunately, it was too late to contract complainant for a confirmation of Mr.
Yman's claim.

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of
the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the
established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant
that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her
without any reason . . . but that said husband admitted "he had another girl
by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" . . . it seems reasonably clear who of the
two marriage contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies
of the marriage certificate.

3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody of
the missing documents in some amicable way during the expected hearing of
the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said
respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for possible
registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found
that respondent Judge ". . . committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will
be dealt with more severely pointing out that:

As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the

authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his
jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family
Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or
at a place other than his sala, to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
 The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when failed
to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which
provides:

It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of
the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in
Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not
later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil register of the place
where the marriage was solemnized. . . . (emphasis ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge
committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of
marriage which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge
indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate,
he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of
such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling official
documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were
taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve
consideration for being devoid of proof.

After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the
OCA well-taken.

Jimenez v. Republic1 underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage
in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has
surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about a condition that would shake its foundation
and untimely lead to its destruction."

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others,
that —

Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; . . .
(Emphasis ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counsel-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
 them in a sworn statement to that effect. (Emphasis ours)

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in
accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting
parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place
other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more
by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas
worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question,
"[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that
it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married."

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it
and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.2 A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law;3 he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.4 Certainly,
judges, by the very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of
their duties.5

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoined by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent's cavalier proclivity on its
significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior
to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws — let alone that enacted in order to preserve so
sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage — and the stability of judicial doctrines laid
down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant
in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his
court.6 Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that —

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by is Bishop.
An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.7

Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
City of Calbayog.8

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra
care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is
likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly
documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
—

Art. 23. — It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either
of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those
mentioned in Article 8. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less
than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in
ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events.9 However, the records show that the loss was
occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judge's part. This Court reiterates that judges must
adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business.10 It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and
filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge
of his official functions.11

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA. 1âw phi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.