Partosa-Jo v.

CA
G.R. No. 82606
December 18, 1992

Facts:
Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima
Partosa is his legal wife. Jose Jo
admitted that he had cohabited with
three other women and fathered 15
children. The two agreed that Prima
would temporarily leave their conjugal
home in Dumaguete City to stay with
her parents during the initial period of
her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and
support her. They never agreed to
separate permanently. In 1942, Prima
went back to Dumaguete, but she was
not accepted by her husband.

In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial

separation of conjugal property as well
as for support. The trial court judge
rendered the decision granting Prima a
monthly support of Php500, Php40,000
for the construction of a house where
she may live separately, Php19,200 by
way of support in-arrears, and
Php3,000 for attorneyʼs fees. However,
the complaint for judicial separation of
conjugal property was dismissed for
lack of a cause for action and on the
ground that separation by agreement
was not covered by Article 178 of the
Civil Code.

Jose contended that the decision of the

trial court could no longer be reviewed
by the Court of Appeals because it has
long since become final and executory.
Prima, on the other hand, argued that a
disposition of that case was made in the
penultimate paragraph of the decision.
It reads:

“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all

properties in question are considered
properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in
this case, subject to separation of
property under Article 178, third
paragraph of the Civil Code, which is
subject of separate proceedings as
enunciated herein.”

Prima believed this to be the dispositive

portion of the case.

Issues:
1. Can the appellate court still rule on
the dispositive portion of the trial
courtʼs decision?
2. Is Prima Partosa-Jo entitled to a
judicial separation of conjugal property?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the
drafting of the decision was not exactly
careful. Although the petitionerʼs
counsel should have taken immediate
steps in rectifying the ruling, a mere
technical defect is not insuperable. It
has been ruled that where there is an
ambiguity caused by an omission or
mistake in the dispositive portion of the
decision, the Court may clarify such an
ambiguity by an amendment even after
the judgment has become final.

2. Yes. The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo,

invoked Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code,
which reads

Article 178. The separation in fact

between husband and wife without
judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership except that
****
(3) If the husband has abandoned the
wife without just cause for at least one
year, she may petition the court for a
receivership, or administration by her of
the conjugal partnership property or
separation of property.

Article 178 of the Civil Code had been

superseded by Article 128 of the Family
Code at the time of the decision by the
Supreme Court. As was ruled in Ramirez
v. CA, “an appellate court, in reviewing a
judgment on appeal, will dispose of a
question according to the law prevailing
at the time of such disposition, and not
according to the law prevailing at the
time of rendition of the appealed
judgment.”

Article 128 of the Family Code reads:

If a spouse without just cause abandons

the other or fails to comply with his or
her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the
court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority
to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership property, subject
to such precautionary conditions as the
court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned
in the preceding paragraph refer to
marital, parental or property relations.

As early as 1942, Jose had already

rejected his wife and refused to give
financial support to her. This falls
squarely under Article 135 of the Family
Code, which provides that if at the time
of the petition, the spouses had been
separated for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable, it
should be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property.
Petitioner Prima Partosa-Joʼs petition
for judicial separation of property is
granted.