AUGUST 19, 2019 ENTRIES

1. VETERANS PARTY LIST (2000)First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party
list. Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast
for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit - each
qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

EN BANC
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT
MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER,
INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List
Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136786 October 6, 2000
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS'
ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW,
UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL
COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at
least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion
to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of
Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat,
obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary democracies - into our
presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel
questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on
time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution 1 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;2 and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3 of the
Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of
representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on
Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the
House of Representatives as regular members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.5
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list representatives, Congress
enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible." (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-
list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and
regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of
one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to
Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as
follows:6
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage
Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes

1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos

Melvyn D. Eballe

2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor

3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel

4. VETERANS
FEDERATION 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil

5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young

6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga

7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde

8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas

9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo

12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined
that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388
votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.
Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.7
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and
Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by
the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that
sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list organizations
in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang
Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It
also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent
district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable
the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system
should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system."
(Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative." It thus disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No.
7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for
intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names submitted by their
respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941."
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25,
1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of "Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-
List Representatives Through the Party-List System." Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for
every two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex "A." It apparently relied on this method when it
proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for
inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three "elements," the "Group of
38" private respondents.10
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least
two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and
(2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment
or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list
solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the
Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will
mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry
x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -
- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of
Representatives."
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three commissioners
concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the
proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941, the
Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more important considerations than
this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary
restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.13 In the suits, made respondents together with
the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives
from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself
as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January
1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No.
136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor
NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a
friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification of their
verbal arguments.14

The Issues

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can
be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Court’s Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but
disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent

Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15 of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."

Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats
allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
x .20 = No. of party-list representatives
.80
This formulation16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily
result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does
the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is
"No."

Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling

The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In
the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify
for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative requirement. If there
is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold
and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in
the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation
for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its
strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.
The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for
party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to
promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary
to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can
have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it
to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task
now, as should have been the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the
context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence
of the rule of law.

Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation

The Two Percent Threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned
from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña
when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to
qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the
votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been
given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."18
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the following shows:
"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which
would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think,
patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany." 19
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of which they left
to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
"MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who
has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-
and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three.
So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the
Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open
up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should
work hard, and should earn their seats within that system."20
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the
very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. 21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose
a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22 to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear,
the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention. 23

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of
representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double
or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of
the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. x x x."24
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified
party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these consolidated
cases.

Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the
two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining
how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no
dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as
"parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have
an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute
additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the
two percent vote requirement for the first seat.25 Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes
cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems
arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes
cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party
B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have
three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by
another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional
representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician
and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be
allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered
by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party
concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
No. of additional
to be allocated
No. of votes of seats of party
x =
party concerned concerned
Total no. of votes of
(Integer.decimal)
qualified parties
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the decimal portions of
the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method
would be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats
 1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7

2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5

3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4

4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4

FEDERATION

5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4

6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4

7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4

8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4

9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 4

10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3

12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3

13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3

Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than the limit will have
to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our
three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag
have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models,
however. As ably pointed out by private respondents,26 one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members.
More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast,
RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major
statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental
environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances
between the two party-list models.

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In
crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to,
we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed
"in proportion to their total number of votes."
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate "proportional representation" into a mathematical formula that will
not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this
Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed
one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for
the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified
party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the
votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.

The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio
between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of
the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because
the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in
such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27 that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole
membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to
x x x."

In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide
for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of
facts.

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive
twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The
formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
= first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid
votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then
the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first
party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional
seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case
wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of
seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.1âwphi1
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of
two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It
cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the
same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty
percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one
obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party
receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party

Total No. of votes

Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party

Total No. of
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:
No. of votes
Additional seats of ABA No. of additional
for concerned = x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of vites of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
.64 or 0 additional seat, since
for concerned = x1=
rounding off is not to be applied
party (ABA) 503,487
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats

1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2

2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1

3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1

4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1

FEDERATION

5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1

6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1

 PINAY

9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1

10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1

11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1

12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1

13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to
that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as
well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since,
in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum
number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation.
But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number of
incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the
legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that our formula merely
translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to
modify RA 7941 to make it "less strict," then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties,
organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the
two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the
Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review. 28
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that
our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.29
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,30 cannot simply disregard an act of
Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA
7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits. 31
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting
such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in
fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements
imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though
already popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to
take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and
the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our
sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the
State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of
popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be
more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in
time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the
remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

2. abakada party list (2005)

EN BANC
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 168207
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY
A.S. MADRIGAL, AND SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, CESAR V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR.,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 168461
ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. represented by its President, ROSARIO ANTONIO; PETRON DEALERS’
ASSOCIATION represented by its President, RUTH E. BARBIBI; ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX DEALERS’ OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by its President, MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO ANTONIO doing business under the name and style of "ANB
NORTH SHELL SERVICE STATION"; LOURDES MARTINEZ doing business under the name and style of "SHELL GATE – N.
DOMINGO"; BETHZAIDA TAN doing business under the name and style of "ADVANCE SHELL STATION"; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA
doing business under the name and style of "NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE STATION"; EFREN SOTTO doing business under the
name and style of "RED FIELD SHELL SERVICE STATION"; DONICA CORPORATION represented by its President, DESI TOMACRUZ;
RUTH E. MARBIBI doing business under the name and style of "R&R PETRON STATION"; PETER M. UNGSON doing business
under the name and style of "CLASSIC STAR GASOLINE SERVICE STATION"; MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE doing business under the
name and style of "NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE STATION"; JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS doing business under the name and style of
"STARCARGA ENTERPRISES"; ADORACION MAÑEBO doing business under the name and style of "CMA MOTORISTS CENTER";
SUSAN M. ENTRATA doing business under the name and style of "LEONA’S GASOLINE STATION and SERVICE CENTER";
CARMELITA BALDONADO doing business under the name and style of "FIRST CHOICE SERVICE CENTER"; MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA
doing business under the name and style of "LORPED SERVICE CENTER"; RHEAMAR A. RAMOS doing business under the name
and style of "RJRAM PTT GAS STATION"; MA. ISABEL VIOLAGO doing business under the name and style of "VIOLAGO-PTT
SERVICE CENTER"; MOTORISTS’ HEART CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F.
FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS’ HARVARD CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA;
MOTORISTS’ HERITAGE CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE
STANDARD OIL CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO MANUEL
doing business under the name and style of "ROMMAN GASOLINE STATION"; ANTHONY ALBERT CRUZ III doing business under
the name and style of "TRUE SERVICE STATION", Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance and GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 168463
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO G. PLAZA, DARLENE
ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, OSCAR G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C. AGARAO, JR. JUAN EDGARDO M. ANGARA, JUSTIN MARC SB.
CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q. AGBAYANI and TEODORO A. CASIÑO, Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 168730
BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary; HON. MARGARITO TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance; HON. JOSE MARIO BUNAG, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and HON.
ALEXANDER AREVALO, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by everyone, and the more man enjoys
the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself honored in contributing to those expenses.
-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)
French statesman and economist
Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased emoluments for health
workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits … these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No.
9337)1 was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot
probe. The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional
infirmities in its passage.
Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify
their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.
House Bill No. 35552 was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House Committee on Ways and Means approved
the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The
President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the House of Representatives
approved the bill on second and third reading.
House Bill No. 37053 on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill
No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its "mother bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and
Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 19504 on March 7, 2005, "in substitution of
Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705." Senator Ralph G. Recto
sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M.
Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan. The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on second
and third reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a committee
conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate
Bill No. 1950, "after having met and discussed in full free and conference," recommended the approval of its report, which the
Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the President, who
signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.5 When said date came, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the temporary restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you a little background. You know
when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon. But before that, there was
a lot of complaints aired on television and on radio. Some people in a gas station were complaining that the gas prices went up
by 10%. Some people were complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people riding in domestic air
carrier were complaining that the prices that they’ll have to pay would have to go up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per
your presentation and per our own understanding of the law, that’s not true. It’s not true that the e-vat law necessarily
increased prices by 10% uniformly isn’t it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?
ATTY. BANIQUED : It’s not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted the Petroleum companies some
subsidy . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : That’s correct . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the elimination of the Excise Tax and the
import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by 10% to cover the E-Vat tax. If you
consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax would probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into
exact figures I am just trying to deliver a point that different industries, different products, different services are hit differently.
So it’s not correct to say that all prices must go up by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : You’re right, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at present imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When
this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also removed as a mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to
increase the fares by 10% at best 7%, correct?
ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.
J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day, were being increased arbitrarily
by 10%. And that’s one reason among many others this Court had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation.
That’s why we added as an issue in this case, even if it’s tangentially taken up by the pleadings of the parties, the confusion in
the implementation of the E-vat. Our people were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of an across the board increase of
10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3%
only, in some cases it should be 6% depending on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each product, of
each service, of each company, isn’t it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So that’s one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the clarification of all these and we wish the
government will take time to clarify all these by means of a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this
Court. . . .6
The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
G.R. No. 168056
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005.
They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a
10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the
rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
G.R. No. 168207
On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise assailing the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337.
Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that it
amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12%
contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is ambiguous
because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate
is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in the
VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the
previous year, should only be based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral Conference
Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment rule" upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.
 G.R. No. 168461
Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al.,
assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337:
1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods shall be amortized over
a 60-month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (₱1, 000,000.00);
2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the
output tax; and
3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services,
which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of
properties) of the NIRC.
Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory.
Petitioners’ argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the
amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may
not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that like any other
property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by limiting the same, the
government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added.
Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law under Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2)
invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial
differences to meet a valid classification.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the
Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences
thereof for it wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make.
G.R. No. 168463
Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed this petition for certiorari on
June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the following grounds:
1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section
28(2) of the Constitution;
2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on provisions present in Senate Bill
No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and
3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121, 125, 7 148, 151, 236, 237 and
288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
G.R. No. 168730
On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 20, 2005, alleging
unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered
establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should
be solely allocated for public purposes and expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing these establishments to
pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution.
RESPONDENTS’ COMMENT
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents. Preliminarily, respondents contend that R.A.
No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity.
Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA
630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the bicameral proceedings,
exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With
regard to the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, respondents contend that the law is complete and
leaves no discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise.
Respondents also refute petitioners’ argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input
tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding ₱1,000,000.00, and the 5% final
withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional
principle on progressive taxation, among others.
Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the government’s fiscal reform agenda. A reform in the value-
added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic
environment necessary for economic growth.
ISSUES
The Court defined the issues, as follows:
 PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following
provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
RULING OF THE COURT
As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-added tax (VAT), as the confusion
and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its nature.
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or properties and
services.8 Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the
buyer,9 with the seller acting merely as a tax collector.10 The burden of VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and
ultimately, the end-consumers.
In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it engages in, without
transferring the burden to someone else.11 Examples are individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence
taxes.12
In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in a different mode. Prior to 1978,
the system was a single-stage tax computed under the "cost deduction method" and was payable only by the original sellers.
The single-stage system was subsequently modified, and a mixture of the "cost deduction method" and "tax credit method"
was used to determine the value-added tax payable.13 Under the "tax credit method," an entity can credit against or subtract
from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports. 14
It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the VAT system was rationalized by
imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using the "tax credit method." 15
E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,16 R.A. No. 8241 or the Improved VAT Law,17 R.A. No.
8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,18 and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as
the VAT Reform Act.
The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
I.
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
A. The Bicameral Conference Committee
Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of taxes in addition to the value-
added tax.
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any legislative body for, as
unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business
of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order."19 Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the
Constitution provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to this inherent constitutional
power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for
the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as follows:
Sec. 88. Conference Committee. – In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendment to any bill or
joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere to and support the House Bill. If
the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to
the House for the latter’s appropriate action.
Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. – . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes
in or amendments to the subject measure.
...
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report prior to the voting thereon. The
House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final
reading.
Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint
resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days
after their composition. The President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the
approval of the Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in, or
amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the members of each House panel, voting separately.
A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled version thereof with the
explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to the report.
...
The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed by any constitutional
provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the
other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement
its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies
with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not
whether provisions of the rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether
the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.
In the recent case of Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary,20 the Court En Banc, unanimously reiterated and emphasized its
adherence to the "enrolled bill doctrine," thus, declining therein petitioners’ plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy
of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congress’s creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of
said committees’ proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and the disappearance or
deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that
such irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of
cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this
case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the
2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance
the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in
its favor.The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At
any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently,
"mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure."21 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege irregularities committed by the
conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to
the Fariñas case,22 the present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference committee on
matters regarding Congress’ compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic and inherent power
of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best
judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole
concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said members
violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only
the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of
government.
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,23 the Court already
made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be
sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house." 24 To date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that
Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient
legislative action.
Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the bicameral conference
committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court observes that there was a necessity for a conference
committee because a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on
the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said disagreements were as follows:
House Bill No. 3555 House Bill No.3705 Senate Bill No. 1950
With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
Provides for 12% VAT on every sale Provides for 12% VAT in general on sales Provides for a single rate of 10% VAT
of goods or properties (amending of goods or properties and reduced rates on sale of goods or properties
Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT on for sale of certain locally manufactured (amending Sec. 106 of NIRC), 10%
importation of goods (amending goods and petroleum products and raw VAT on sale of services including sale
Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12% VAT on materials to be used in the manufacture of electricity by generation
sale of services and use or lease of thereof (amending Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% companies, transmission and
properties (amending Sec. 108 of VAT on importation of goods and distribution companies, and use or
NIRC) reduced rates for certain imported lease of properties (amending Sec.
products including petroleum products 108 of NIRC)
(amending Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12%
VAT on sale of services and use or lease
of properties and a reduced rate for
certain services including power
generation (amending Sec. 108 of NIRC)
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision
No similar provision Provides that the VAT imposed on power Provides that the VAT imposed on
generation and on the sale of petroleum sales of electricity by generation
products shall be absorbed by generation companies and services of
companies or sellers, respectively, and transmission companies and
shall not be passed on to consumers distribution companies, as well as
those of franchise grantees of electric
utilities shall not apply to residential
end-users. VAT shall be absorbed by
generation, transmission, and
distribution companies.
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input tax credit for No similar provision Provides that the input tax credit for
capital goods on which a VAT has capital goods on which a VAT has
been paid shall be equally been paid shall be equally distributed
distributed over 5 years or the over 5 years or the depreciable life of
depreciable life of such capital such capital goods; the input tax
goods; the input tax credit for goods credit for goods and services other
and services other than capital than capital goods shall not exceed
goods shall not exceed 5% of the 90% of the output VAT.
total amount of such goods and
services; and for persons engaged in
retail trading of goods, the
allowable input tax credit shall not
exceed 11% of the total amount of
goods purchased.
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and excise taxes
No similar provision No similar provision Provided for amendments to several
NIRC provisions regarding corporate
 income, percentage, franchise and
excise taxes
The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard to (1) what rate of VAT is to
be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should not
be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and
distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers, as
proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited; (4) and whether the NIRC provisions on
corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise and excise taxes should be amended.
There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and Senate bills, the Bicameral
Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences
and/or disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing provisions by making the following
changes:
1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the Conference Committee Report
that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the
Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the
present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added tax collection as a percentage of
gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of
the previous year exceeds 1½%, when the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of
VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006.
2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution
companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and
distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral
Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report any no pass-on provision.
3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the Bicameral Conference Committee
decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the
output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner of
computing the same by providing thus:
(A) Creditable Input Tax. – . . .
...
Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for which deduction
for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59)
succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds one million
Pesos (₱1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital good is less than five (5) years, as
used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such shorter period: . . .
(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. – If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax, the excess shall be
paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding
quarter or quarters: PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be
credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any input tax
attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal
revenue taxes, . . .
4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax, franchise, percentage and excise
taxes, the conference committee decided to include such amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill
No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.
Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee
is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term "settle"
is synonymous to "reconcile" and "harmonize."25 To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in
the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions.
In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant
only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the
subject embraced by the original provisions.
The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted by the Senate is retained until
such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a compromise
to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is
still totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers.
The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee
held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no pass-
on provision in this wise:
. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking that no sector should be a
beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be discriminated on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And
let’s keep it plain and simple. Let’s not confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision. Two-thirds of the world have a VAT
system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the thinking of the
Senate is basically simple, let’s keep the VAT simple.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision "never really enjoyed the support of either
House."27
With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral Conference Committee came to a
compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the
Bicameral Conference Committee was totally within the intent of both houses to put a cap on input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of Representatives, one of the
major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy and administration by creating vital restrictions on the
claiming of input VAT tax credits . . ." and "[b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit, we are capping a major
leakage that has placed our collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage."28
As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in Senate Bill No. 1950, since said
provisions were among those referred to it, the conference committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the
version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of the
provisions referred
to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado29 and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,30 the Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said
conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in
the Tolentino case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in
the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no
reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so
long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but
needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this
case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the "No-Amendment Rule"
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Petitioners’ argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or delete provisions in the
House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule"
(Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each
of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modification of the
compromise bill. . . .
Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of
Congress, not to the conference committee report.32 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of
Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for
its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one
house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its
constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to
mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes and
percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following provisions, to wit:
Section 27 Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation
28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119 Tax on franchises
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue
Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the House. They aver that
House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No.
3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC
which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the House bills are not intended to be amended by the
House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such
amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The argument does not hold water.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending
provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate
came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also
amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with
the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the
constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from
the House?
The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a
result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be
to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
…
…Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect
to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
...
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase
of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting
within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House
revenue bill.
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been touched in the House bills
are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House Bill No. 3555, stated:
One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of solving the country’s serious
financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be
significantly increased. This may be easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities are still optimistic the government will be
operating on a balanced budget by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that will result to significant expenditure savings
have been identified by the administration. It is supported with a credible package of revenue measures that include
measures to improve tax administration and control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax
(VAT). (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that:
In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all acknowledged that on top of our agenda
must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system.
In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a balanced budget by the year
2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might seem poignant in the beginning, but in the long run prove
effective and beneficial to the overall status of our economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates,
evaluating the relevance given our present conditions.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues
for the government
to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues
from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the
measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide
for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors
instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the
provisions on income tax on corporation were included is worth quoting:
All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise ₱64.3 billion in additional revenues annually even
while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum products.
However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only ₱48.7 billion amount is from the VAT on twelve goods and
services. The rest of the tab – ₱10.5 billion- will be picked by corporations.
What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the consumer. Why should the latter bear
all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the burden of the consumer?
The corporate world’s equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to 35 percent, but up to 2008 only.
This will raise ₱10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to
30 percent.
Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency provision that will be in effect
for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their sacrifice brief. We would like
to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.
The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business will be there to share the burden.35
As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on provisions in the tax on
income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the government.
Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to the reforms to the VAT system,
as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which were
subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be burdened more as they
would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these sections to soften the impact of VAT.
Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:
However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a
VAT on this product.
For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT.
And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy the VAT chain, we will however
bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.
...
What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what was taken from the right. Rather,
these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT, so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices they
will have to pay as a result of VAT.36
The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are necessary for the
implementation of the changes in the VAT system.
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills, which is
to supplement our country’s fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those
amendments.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 I.
Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions
of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and
6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to
raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to
tax.
The assailed provisions read as follows:
SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. –
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods. –
(A) In General. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a value-added tax equivalent to
ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus
customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods
from customs custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or volume of the
goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that the President,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to
twelve percent (12%) after any of the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties –
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of
the following conditions has been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%). (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the government.
They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers
to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise
imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is
contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of
Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively
nullified the President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like
the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance.
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by
the law to bring about either or both the conditions precedent.
On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the imposition of the 12% rate would
be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without
representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a favorable recommendation and he may not
even give his recommendation. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to
how he will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can
easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.37 A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated."38 This doctrine is
based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.39
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "the Legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." The powers which Congress is
prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which
can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law – complete as to the time when it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable – and to determine the expediency of its enactment.40 Thus, the rule is that
in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear
that the power involved is purely legislative in nature – that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is
the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its
delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or
exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.42 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected.43 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.44
In People vs. Vera,45 the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the concept and extent of delegation of
power in this wise:
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
...
‘The true distinction’, says Judge Ranney, ‘is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’
...
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is
true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the
people of a particular community. In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature
may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which
may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of
the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the
apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity
arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in
his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States
in the following language — speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: The principle which
permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require
the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy,
which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to
do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under
other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the
legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require
to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative
will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may
be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the
happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the
specified contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).46
In Edu vs. Ericta,47 the Court reiterated:
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or
not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can
go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is
thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis supplied).48
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the
happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must
prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.49 While the power to tax cannot be delegated to
executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them,
including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.50
The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a
legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations
is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to
perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate
information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is proper. 51 The
Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself
every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared
to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself
properly to investigate.52
In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as
follows:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of
value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-
operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used
in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.53 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. 54
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions
specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the
word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate
when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the
legislature itself.
The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law effectively nullified the
President’s power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of petitioners
Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase "upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive the submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any
recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego
of the latter.
When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as head of the Department
of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a
political position and holds office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the
President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is "subject to the direction of the
President."55
In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to
the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.56 The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by
which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data
and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such
instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the
President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether by
December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective
January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This
is constitutionally permissible.57 Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job
must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way
in which the legislative process can go forward.58
As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax
is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax
but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task
of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.59
The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The
Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not
fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-
lived.
B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Additional Tax Burden
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the
people. Petitioners also argue that the 12% increase, dependent on any of the 2 conditions set forth in the contested
provisions, is ambiguous because it does not state if the VAT rate would be returned to the original 10% if the rates are no
longer satisfied. Petitioners also argue that such rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT
rate from year to year.
Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions set forth therein are satisfied,
the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of the law are clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10%
rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to 12%, the VAT collection goes below the
24/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year does
not exceed 1½%.
Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations be introduced where
none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress may tread upon.60
Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case the Court finds none, petitioners’
argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for petitioners’ fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself
does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present.
The rule is that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 61
Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an incentive to the President to raise the VAT
collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should be based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only condition. There is another condition, i.e., the
national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:
1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%
The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If VAT/GDP is less than 2.8%, it means that
government has weak or no capability of implementing the VAT or that VAT is not effective in the function of the tax collection.
Therefore, there is no value to increase it to 12% because such action will also be ineffectual.
2. Nat’l Gov’t Deficit/GDP >1.5%
The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the fiscal condition of government has reached a
relatively sound position or is towards the direction of a balanced budget position. Therefore, there is no need to increase the
VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a relatively healthy position. Otherwise stated, if the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is indeed
a need to increase the VAT rate.62
That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT collection does not render it
unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for which the law was passed, which in this case, is mainly to raise revenue.
In fact, fiscal adequacy dictated the need for a raise in revenue.
The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by Adam Smith in his Canons of
Taxation (1776), as:
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over
and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.63
It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and their variations.64
The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial woe. During the Bicameral Conference
Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary Purisima bluntly depicted the country’s gloomy state of economic affairs, thus:
First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in a position where 90 percent of our
revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso of revenue that we currently raise, 90 goes to debt service. That’s interest
plus amortization of our debt. So clearly, this is not a sustainable situation. That’s the first fact.
The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer countries that borrow money from that
international financial markets. Our debt to GDP is approximately equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a
sustainable situation.
The third thing that I’d like to point out is the environment that we are presently operating in is not as benign as what it used to
be the past five years.
What do I mean by that?
In the past five years, we’ve been lucky because we were operating in a period of basically global growth and low interest rates.
The past few months, we have seen an inching up, in fact, a rapid increase in the interest rates in the leading economies of the
world. And, therefore, our ability to borrow at reasonable prices is going to be challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is
our ability to access the financial markets.
When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad as it is now, at least based on the
forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were assuming that raising 80 billion would put us in a position where we can
then convince them to improve our ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have changed on us because the interest
rates have gone up. In fact, just within this room, we tried to access the market for a billion dollars because for this year alone,
the Philippines will have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount, we have borrowed 1.5 billion. We issued last January a 25-
year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We were trying to access last week and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have
not accessed and we might pull back because the conditions are not very good.
So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end our deficit reduction. Because
it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more
deficit you have because interest and debt service eats and eats more of your revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral.
And the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.65
The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable catastrophe. Whether the law is
indeed sufficient to answer the state’s economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. In the Fariñas case, the Court refused to
consider the various arguments raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
pronouncing that:
. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to
achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance.66
In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the executive policy, given that it is not
for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."67
II.
Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2),
110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and
confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty of property without due
process of law, as embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law.
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules
but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent
such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.68
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. It states, in part: "[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the
previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: …"
Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax due from or paid by a VAT-registered
person on the importation of goods or local purchase of good and services, including lease or use of property, in the course of
trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable
goods or properties or services by any person registered or required to register under the law.
Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. In effect, a
portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be credited against the output tax.
Petitioners’ argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and therefore, the input tax
in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of
such input tax is still creditable.
More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a business’s books of accounts and remains creditable in the
succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which provides that "if the input tax exceeds the output tax,
the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters." In addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered
person to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input
taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may be used in payment of his other internal
revenue taxes.
The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners exaggeratedly contend. Their
analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be
unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized input
tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later on
be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B).
Therefore, petitioners’ argument must be rejected.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the 70% limitation on the input tax.
According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a
portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle that tax collection and revenue should be for public purposes and
expenditures
As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when he buys goods. Output tax
meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In computing the VAT payable, three possible scenarios may arise:
First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the input taxes that he paid and
passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess, which has to be paid to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);69 and
Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should
the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the taxpayer’s option.70
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person can credit his input tax only up to
the extent of 70% of the output tax. In layman’s term, the value-added taxes that a person/taxpayer paid and passed on to him
by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to him on a taxable transaction. There is no
retention of any tax collection because the person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller
will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for the payment of the tax is the seller.71 What only
needs to be done is for the person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against his output
taxes.
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that
may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A VAT-registered
person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in
statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it may not
take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.72
Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of distribution are not recoverable from the taxes
payable, although it becomes part of the cost, which is deductible from the gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No.
273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it was then that the crediting of the input tax paid on purchase or importation
of goods and services by VAT-registered persons against the output tax was introduced.73 This was adopted by the Expanded
VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),74 and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8424).75 The right to credit input tax as against the output
tax is clearly a privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section
110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 110. Tax Credits. –
(A) Creditable Input Tax. – …
Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for which
deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine
(59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds One
million pesos (₱1,000,000.00): Provided, however, That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods is less than five (5) years,
as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such a shorter period: Provided, finally, That in the
case of purchase of services, lease or use of properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or license upon
payment of the compensation, rental, royalty or fee.
The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the creditable input tax on purchase or importation
of capital goods with acquisition cost of ₱1 Million pesos, exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread out only poses a delay
in the crediting of the input tax. Petitioners’ argument is without basis because the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of his
privilege to credit the input tax.
It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable input tax in this case amounts to a 4-year
interest-free loan to the government.76 In the same breath, Congress also justified its move by saying that the provision was
designed to raise an annual revenue of 22.6 billion.77 The legislature also dispelled the fear that the provision will fend off
foreign investments, saying that foreign investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing the case of China, where
despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not deterred.78 Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-
month amortization, this involves executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.
With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the government for taxable transactions,
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 114 of the NIRC, reads:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. – The Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of
goods and services which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold
a final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof: Provided, That the payment for lease or
use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of
payment. For purposes of this Section, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the withholding
agent.
The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the month the
withholding was made.
Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a more simplified VAT withholding system.
The government in this case is constituted as a withholding agent with respect to their payments for goods and services.
Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added taxes to be withheld -- 3% on gross
payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross payments for services supplied by contractors other than by public works
contractors; 8.5% on gross payments for services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on payment for the lease or use
of properties or property rights to nonresident owners. Under the present Section 114(C), these different rates, except for the
10% on lease or property rights payment to nonresidents, were deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is applied.
The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final, as opposed to creditable, means full.
Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): "final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%)."
In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997), the concept of final withholding
tax on income was explained, to wit:
SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source
(A) Final Withholding Tax. – Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax withheld by the withholding
agent is constituted as full and final payment of the income tax due from the payee on the said income. The liability for
payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure to withhold the tax or in case
of underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the payor/withholding agent. …
(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. – Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes withheld on certain income payments are
intended to equal or at least approximate the tax due of the payee on said income. … Taxes withheld on income payments
covered by the expanded withholding tax (referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these regulations) and compensation income (referred
to in Sec. 2.78 also of these regulations) are creditable in nature.
As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the government are subject to a 5% rate, which
constitutes as full payment of the tax payable on the transaction. This represents the net VAT payable of the seller. The other
5% effectively accounts for the standard input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu of the actual input VAT directly or attributable
to the taxable transaction.79
The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress intended to treat differently taxable
transactions with the government.80 This is supported by the fact that under the old provision, the 5% tax withheld by the
government remains creditable against the tax liability of the seller or contractor, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. – The Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each
purchase of goods from sellers and services rendered by contractors which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in
Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of three percent (3%) of the gross
payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross receipts for services rendered by contractors on every sale or
installment payment which shall be creditable against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor: Provided,
however, That in the case of government public works contractors, the withholding rate shall be eight and one-half percent
(8.5%): Provided, further, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be
subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For this purpose, the payor or person in control of the
payment shall be considered as the withholding agent.
The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the month the
withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits Congress’s intention to treat
transactions with the government differently. Since it has not been shown that the class subject to the 5% final withholding tax
has been unreasonably narrowed, there is no reason to invalidate the provision. Petitioners, as petroleum dealers, are not the
only ones subjected to the 5% final withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal with the government.
Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe. Revenue Regulations No. 14-2005 or the
Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations 2005 issued by the BIR, provides that should the actual input tax exceed 5% of gross
payments, the excess may form part of the cost. Equally, should the actual input tax be less than 5%, the difference is treated as
income.81
Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the government gets to tax a profit or value-
added even if there is no profit or value-added.
Petitioners’ stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will not engage in a legal joust where
premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be, as
Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,82 "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
What’s more, petitioners’ contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or value-added. It need not take an astute
businessman to know that it is a matter of exception that a business will sell goods or services without profit or value-added. It
cannot be overstressed that a business is created precisely for profit.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."83
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary
will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness. 84
Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of input tax, or invests in capital
equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid
classification.
The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in the subject of taxation, the kind
of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection.
Petitioners’ alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear different consequences. While the implementation of the law
may yield varying end results depending on one’s profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what the
legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction.
This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.85
Petitioners brought to the Court’s attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens. S.R. Osmeña III and Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. – Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No. 4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to
amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to 90%. This, according to petitioners, supports their stance that the 70%
limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations. Until Congress
amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays.
B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate.
Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all
people at all times.86
In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Sections 4, 5
and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on
sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale of services and use or lease of properties. These same sections also
provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction.
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70% limitation on the creditable
input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government.
It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation,
and only demands uniformity within the particular class.87
R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) does not apply
to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding ₱1,500,000.00.88Also, basic marine and
agricultural food products in their original state are still not subject to the tax,89 thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level
will remain accessible. As was stated in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:90
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with an
aggregate gross annual sales exceeding ₱200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application.
Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities,
spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.
It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and unduly favors those with high
profit margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law, under Section
116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual sales
and/or receipts not exceeding ₱1.5 Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses that qualify for VAT
coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing.
Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the tax on those previously
exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products91 and natural gas92 were reduced. Percentage tax on domestic carriers was
removed.93 Power producers are now exempt from paying franchise tax.94
Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to distribute the burden of taxation.
Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a previous
32%.95 Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still subject to 15% final withholding tax but the tax
credit allowed on the corporation’s domicile was increased to 20%.96 The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore.97 Even the sale by an artist of his works or services performed for the
production of such works was not spared.
All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would otherwise rest largely on the
consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that R.A. No. 9337 is equitable.
C. Progressivity of Taxation
Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive. It is the smaller business
with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences.
Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayer’s ability to pay. This principle was also lifted from Adam
Smith’s Canons of Taxation, and it states:
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to
their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.
Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected. 98
The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has no
relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed
is the same regardless of income. In
other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in the income earned by
a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the
income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats
away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is
that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The Court stated in the Tolentino case, thus:
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply
provides is that Congress shall ‘evolve a progressive system of taxation.’ The constitutional provision has been interpreted to
mean simply that ‘direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized.’ (E.
FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to
prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes,
would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, §17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI,
§28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by
imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects
of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3, amending §102 (b) of the NIRC), while
granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, §4 amending §103 of the NIRC)99
CONCLUSION
It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a first-aid measure to
resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does
not have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as
unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to
afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance, those involving political
questions. . . .
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political or social ills;
We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate
compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous
regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-
doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.100
The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino101 holds true then, as it still holds true now. All things considered, there is no raison
d'être for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463,
and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337, the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.

3. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST 2008

EN BANC
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352(Attrition
Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by
the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to
the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. 5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director
General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the
BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative
from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set
criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing
rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as
to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed
from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards.
It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval
of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being premature as there
is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this
Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the resolution of the constitutional
issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation
and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies
the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its
provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates,
separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of
power on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of
the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the
law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate
any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury
to themselves. On this account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature
of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the
legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead
modest lives.

Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public
for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency,
patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they
are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in
favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their
revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or
denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a
declared public policy.
Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and
mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of
public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of
deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the customs as well as other
parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling.
Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:

The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting
fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.

In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in
the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to
ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product
of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:

SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. – The officials, examiners, and
employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of
malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held
liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation,
negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences
in relation to the object to be accomplished.19 When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be
treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union,20 this Court declared:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be
based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.21 (emphasis supplied)

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:

Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. – The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to
the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. – The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management and
control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
 (6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the
BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard
test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.26 It
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the
above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:

SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. – A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to the
Revenue Targets Fund
30% or below – 15%
More than 30% – 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue
collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given
fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to
Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated
among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.30 Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. – The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil
service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the
following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, as has
no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period
under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
 nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility
covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought
about by natural calamities or force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board,
termination shall be considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such
decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of
an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant
laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of
security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by
law and only after due process is accorded the employee.31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.32 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of Representatives.
The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators representing
the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then
on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with
the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks
and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has
delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative agencies.
Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions within
the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
 Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its
primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily
available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to
conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision.
"Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation
involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch
performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority,
and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions
when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right"
to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a
proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and
the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or
to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass
new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as
it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and
practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards,
leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative
aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in
or agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the
reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One
safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without
some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus
whether legislative intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They
urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that
legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from
accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations
allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to
review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding
expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of
authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion
of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto
"is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its
policy as declared by statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of legislative veto
provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant
to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a resolution
vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the
 decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. The
immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien’s appeal, holding that it had no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that the House was
without constitutional authority to order the alien’s deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional
doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held
that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to the procedures set
out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the
President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions
invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto
provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress and thus met the
bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised. 35 (emphasis
supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the nature and
powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked not only to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated
by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the
Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two
basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or
judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.42

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall
in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right"
or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash
(other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. 43It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative
competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary
managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms
and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned
administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute50and
are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion
to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their
effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)

Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in Congress which consists of two
chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional
committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the
Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take
effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of Congress. 54Second, it
must be presented to and approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57,
the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:

A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some measures that
must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without amendments,
sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they
may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety,
scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the
passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least three
days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain them if they
are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. If
there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference committee 58 representing
both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives will
then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
 The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of
the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers…59
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication.60

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards
established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon
effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute.
Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes
effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the
executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch,
particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a
law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn
any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be similar
provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them
wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us. 64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other
provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:

SEC. 13. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of
this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect.

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid,
the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.
To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that
the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other.
Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent,
conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and
would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision from the
other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid
section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the
legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system
of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general
circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and
effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA
9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
4. BANAT (2009) We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The
allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this
Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for
certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed
before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition
of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation
and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails
NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations
and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced
that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning
party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in
both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes
cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution,
docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement
the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in
BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed
thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A
Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety
below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List,
as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three
thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the
National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. 1,337,032

canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not 102,430
yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del
Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462)votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving
more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have
been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand
four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260

4 GABRIELA 610,451

5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036

7 AKBAYAN 470,872

8 ALAGAD 423,076

9 BUTIL 405,052

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

14 ABONO 337,046
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for
the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list
system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, A TEACHER

Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms,
Inc.

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

8 Alagad ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

13 Abono ABONO
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared
the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula
as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462
votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed
party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected
maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in
Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and
that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
Party-List Projected total number of votes
 1 BUHAY 1,178,747

2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674

8 ALAGAD 423,190

9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have
obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula
as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en bancsitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as
entitled to additional seats, to wit:
Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1)
guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list,
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution shall be proclaimed.
 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the
first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they
received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-
list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule.
In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC
RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat
[sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in
allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and
Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or
coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt
the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot
and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a
motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list
organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC, the following party-list
organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3

1.2 Bayan Muna 2

1.3 CIBAC 2

1.4 Gabriela 2

1.5 APEC 2

1.6 A Teacher 1

1.7 Akbayan 1

1.8 Alagad 1

1.9 Butil 1

1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11 Anak Pawis 1

1.12 ARC 1
 1.13 Abono 1

1.14 AGAP 1

1.15 AMIN 1
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition
for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-
Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First Party"
violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and
another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required
under RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the
same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations,
the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant
Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct
interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation. 17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following
issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If
not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as
clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional
representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of
the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative
districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats
available to legislative districts Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a
legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220
x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution
left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on
the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list
votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional
seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent
in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be
proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes
they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately
preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats
shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats
under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and
apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by
each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with a median
percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under
BANAT’s second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and
the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do
not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by
dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified
party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of
seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-
list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are
allocated until all the seats are filled up.26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the
elections.27
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

 42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-
list.28
Votes Garnered over Total
Rank Party Votes Garnered Guaranteed Seat
Votes for Party-List, in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
"entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold
in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party
list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume
that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."30
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure
shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated,
at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to
the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The
whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Votes
Garnered Additional (B) plus
Guaranteed Applying
over Seats (C), in
Votes Seat the three
Rank Party Total Votes (Second whole
Garnered (First Round) seat cap
for Party Round) integers
(B) (E)
List, in % (C) (D)
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
 32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36
winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column
(D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number
of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we
going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the
Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass
on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties,
are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention
of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common
ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now
being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such
parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all
the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership
of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties
and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that
we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system;
and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena
for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941
reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a
problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or
sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and
this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban
poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives
found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated
20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-
list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties
from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list
seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC
No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall
be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating
in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

5. BANAT (2009) RESOLUTION

EN BANC
G.R. No. 179271 July 8, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179295
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, filed a motion for leave to intervene in G.R. Nos.
179271 and 179295. The House of Representatives filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated the issues for
clarification as follows:
A. There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220. Accordingly, the alloted seats for party-list representation
should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives seeks clarification on which of the party-list
 representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the Court declared as winners 55 party-list
representatives.
B. The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named
party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such number of representatives that would complete the 250
member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32,
will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the total members would now rise to
270.
C. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups which
did not attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought
whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary thereto,
the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify
as a party-list representative.
D. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in
Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not mandatory," has been
abandoned.1
On the other hand, Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion
for leave for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that:
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution of seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of
the equal protection clause, parties with more significant constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties
who did not even meet the 2% threshold.2
Following the Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted to this Court on 27 April
2009 National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 09-001. NBC Resolution No. 09-001 updated the data used by this
Court in its Decision of 21 April 2009. The total votes for party-list is now 15,723,764 following the cancellation of the
registration of party-list group Filipinos for Peace, Justice and Progress Movement (FPJPM). Moreover, the total number of
legislative districts is now 219 following the annulment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, the percentage and ranking of the actual winning party-list groups are different from Table 3 of the
Decision in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Number of Members of the House of Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250. However, the 1987
Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives provided a law is
enacted for the purpose. This is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The Legislature has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. Legislation that
makes piecemeal increases of the number of district representatives is no less valid than legislation that makes a general
increase.
In 1987, there were only 200 legislative districts. Twenty legislative districts were added by piecemeal legislation after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution:
Republic Act Year Signed Legislative District
into Law

1 7160 1992 Biliran

2 7675 1994 Mandaluyong City

3 7854 1994 Makati (2nd District)

4 7878 1995 Apayao

5 7896 and 7897 1995 Guimaras

6 7926 1995 Muntinlupa City

 7 8470 1998 Compostela Valley

8 8487 1998 Taguig City (2nd District)

9 8526 1998 Valenzuela City (2nd District)

10 9229 2003 Parañaque (2nd District)

11 9230 2003 San Jose del Monte City

12 8508 and 9232 1998 and 2003 Antipolo (1st District)

13 9232 2003 Antipolo (2nd District)

14 9269 2004 Zamboanga City (2nd District)

15 9355 2006 Dinagat Island

16 9357 2006 Sultan Kudarat (2nd District)

17 9360 2006 Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd District)

18 9364 2006 Marikina City (2nd District)

19 9371 2007 Cagayan de Oro (2nd District)

20 9387 2007 Navotas City

Thus, for purposes of the 2007 elections, there were only 219 district representatives. Navotas City became a separate district
on 24 June 2007, more than a month after the 14 May 2007 elections.
The Number of Party-List Seats
in the 2007 Elections
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part:
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. x x x
The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically applies
whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining the number of
seats available to party-list representatives is
Number of seats available
to legislative districts Number of seats available to
x .20 =
party-list representatives
.80
As we stated in our Decision of 21 April 2009, "[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus, for every four district
representatives, the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for
legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat.
We use the table below to illustrate the relationship between the number of legislative districts and the number of party-list
seats for every election year after 1987.
Election Number of Legislative Number of Total Number of Members of the
Year Districts Party-List Seats House of Representatives

1992 200 50 250

1995 206 51 257

New Districts:
Biliran
Mandaluyong City
Makati (2nd District)
Apayao
Guimaras
 Muntinlupa City

1998 209 52 261

New Districts:
Compostela Valley
Taguig City (2nd District)
Valenzuela City (2nd
District)

2001 209 52 261

2004 214 53 267

New Districts:
Parañaque City (2nd
District)
San Jose del Monte City
Antipolo (1st District)
Antipolo (2nd District)
Zamboanga City (2nd
District)

2007 219 54 273

New Districts:
Dinagat Island
Sultan Kudarat (2nd
District)
Zamboanga Sibugay (2nd
District)
Marikina City (2nd District)
Cagayan de Oro (2nd
District)

2010 220 55 275

New District:
Navotas City
(assuming no additional
districts are created)
We see that, as early as the election year of 1995, the total number of members of the House of Representatives is already
beyond the initial maximum of 250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats. However, the
increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed as the available seats for party-list
representatives have never been filled up before. As of the oral arguments in G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, there were 220
legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently
reduced to 219 with our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan.3 Thus, in the
2007 elections, the number of party-list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number
of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the
availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the three-seat
cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for
the first round of seat allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Court upholds this 2%
threshold for the guaranteed seats as a valid exercise of legislative power.1avvphi1
In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the
Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in
Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
 additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent
party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will
mathematically be impossible to fill up.
However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the
number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats
received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-
list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes cast.
All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Similarly, a presidential candidate may win the elections even if he receives only one thousand votes as long as all his
opponents receive less than one thousand votes. A winning presidential candidate only needs to receive more votes than his
opponents. The same policy applies in every election to public office, from the presidential to the barangay level. Except for the
guaranteed party-list seat, there is no minimum vote requirement before a candidate in any election, for any elective office, can
be proclaimed the winner. Of course, the winning candidate must receive at least one vote, assuming he has no opponents or
all his opponents do not receive a single vote.
In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the
disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same
manner, no one belabors the disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial
elections. However, for those interested in comparing the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the votes
received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a party-list seat, is
significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district representatives. 4
The Actual Number of Party-List Representatives
in the 2007 Elections
The data used in Table 3 of our Decision promulgated on 21 April 2009 was based on the submissions of the parties. We used
the figures from Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 6:00 p.m. of 31 August 2007. The NBC issued NBC Report No. 33 on 11
June 2008, updating the 31 August 2007 report. The parties did not furnish this Court with a copy of NBC Report No. 33. In any
case, we stated in the dispositive portion of our Decision that "[t]he allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System
shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this decision." Party-List Canvass Report No. 32 is not part of the
procedure.1avvphi1
The computation of the COMELEC in NBC No. 09-001 applying the procedure laid down in our Decision requires correction for
purposes of accuracy. Instead of multiplying the percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for party-list by 36, the
COMELEC multiplied the percentage by 37. Thirty-six is the proper multiplier as it is the difference between 54, the number of
available party-list seats, and 18, the number of guaranteed seats. Only the figures in column (C) are affected. The allocation of
seats to the winning party-list organizations, however, remains the same as in NBC No. 09-001. Our modification of the
COMELEC’s computation in NBC No. 09-001 is shown below:
Votes Garnered Additional
Guaranteed
over Seats (B) plus (C), in whole Applying the three
Votes Seat
Rank Party Total Votes for (Second integers seat cap
Garnered (First Round)
Party List, in % Round) (D) (E)
(B)
(A) (C)

1 BUHAY 1,169,338 7.44% 1 2.68 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,189 6.23% 1 2.24 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,735 4.81% 1 1.73 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,266 3.95% 1 1.42 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,733 3.94% 1 1.42 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,853 3.12% 1 1.12 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,448 2.97% 1 1.07 2 N.A.

85 ALAGAD 423,165 2.69% 1 1 2 N.A.

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,987 2.61% 1 1 2 N.A.

10 BUTIL 409,168 2.60% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,956 2.45% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,349 2.38% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,323 2.36% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 AMIN 347,527 2.21% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 ABONO 340,002 2.16% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 YACAP 331,623 2.11% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AGAP 328,814 2.09% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 AN WARAY 321,516 2.04% 1 1 2 N.A.

19 UNI-MAD 251,804 1.60% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 ABS 235,152 1.50% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ALIF 229,267 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 229,036 1.46% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,700 1.45% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 219,363 1.40% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 SENIOR 213,095 1.36% 0 1 1 N.A.

CITIZENS

26 AT 200,030 1.27% 0 1 1 N.A.

27 VFP 196,358 1.25% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 ANAD 188,573 1.20% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 BANAT 177,068 1.13% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 ANG 170,594 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.

KASANGGA

31 BANTAY 169,869 1.08% 0 1 1 N.A.

32 ABAKADA 166,897 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 1-UTAK 165,012 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 TUCP 162,678 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 COCOFED 156,007 0.99% 0 0 0 N.A.

Total 18 54
Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) and Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) both have
pending cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC correctly deferred the proclamation of both BATAS and ALIF as the outcome
of their cases may affect the final composition of party-list representatives. The computation and allocation of seats may still be
modified in the event that the COMELEC decides against BATAS and/or ALIF.
To address Roa-Borje’s motion for partial reconsideration-in-intervention and for purposes of computing the results in future
party-list elections, we reiterate that in the second step of the second round of seat allocation, the preference in the
distribution of seats should be in accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank, without limiting the distribution
to parties receiving two-percent of the votes.6 To limit the distribution of seats to the two-percenters would mathematically
prevent the filling up of all the available party-list seats.
In the table above, CIBAC cannot claim a third seat from the seat allocated to TUCP, the last ranked party allocated with a seat.
CIBAC's 2.81% (from the percentage of 4.81% less the 2% for its guaranteed seat) has a lower fractional seat value after the
allocation of its second seat compared to TUCP's 1.03%. CIBAC's fractional seat after receiving two seats is only 0.03 compared
to TUCP's 0.38 fractional seat. Multiplying CIBAC's 2.81% by 37, the additional seats for distribution in the second round, gives
1.03 seat, leaving 0.03 fractional seat. Multiplying TUCP's 1.03% by 37 gives a fractional seat of 0.38, higher than CIBAC's
fractional seat of 0.03. The fractional seats become material only in the second step of the second round of seat allocation to
determine the ranking of parties. Thus, for purposes of the second step in the second round of seat allocation,7 TUCP has a
higher rank than CIBAC.
Roa-Borje’s position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. However,
the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. Section 5(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
and organizations. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI
requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to proportional representation. However, this principle of
proportional representation applies only to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the
party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be "those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the
allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the
allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified
by Section 11(b)8 of the same law which mandates a three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization
from dominating the party-list system. Section 11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent
cut-off for those entitled to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the
Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number
of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one
seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two
percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the
party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional
because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The
additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step
procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not
require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the
wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list
representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these four
parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that could not
be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009 in the present case is clarified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
6. ARARO PARTY LIST (2013)The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of
BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows: Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list
candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast
for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently
disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not
be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid. The refined formula
shall apply prospectively to succeeding party-list elections from the date of finality of this case.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO PARTY-LIST,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is beyond human expectations that we charge voters with knowledge as to which among the many party-list groups listed in
the ballot they are presented with during election day is disqualified. To do so will amount to their disenfranchisement and the
failure to comply with the proportionality for party-list representatives required by the Constitution and by law.
We are asked to decide the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by a party-list group that ran for the 2010 national elections.
The petitioner questions the validity of the formula used by the Commission on Elections in determining and proclaiming the
winning party-list groups.1
We rule that the Petition is moot and academic. However, we provide guidance for the bench and the bar with respect to the
formula used in determining the winning party-list groups. We refine the divisor in the formula use din getting the percentage
of votes garnered by a party-list.
The facts as established on record are as follows:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly accredited party-list under Republic Act No.
7941.2Itgarnered a total of one hundred forty-seven thousand two hundred four (147,204) votes in the May 10, 2010 elections
and ranked fiftieth (50th).3 The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed
twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional
seats.4 The result was based on the Commission on Elections’ count of one hundred twenty-one (121) Certificates of Canvass or
a total of twenty-nine million seven hundred fifty thousand and forty-one (29,750,041) votes for the Party-List System.5
The winning party-list groups were the following:6
NUMBER OF
PARTY
SEATS

1 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 2

2 AKBAYAN! CITIZEN’S ACTION PARTY 2

3 GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY 2

4 COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY 2

5 ABONO 2

6 BAYAN MUNA 2

7 AN WARAY 2

8 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE SECTOR OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. 1

9 ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS PARTY 1

10 ANAKPAWIS 1

11 KABATAAN PARTYLIST 1

12 ABANTE MINDANAO, INC. 1

13 ACT TEACHERS 1

14 YOU AGAINST CORRUPTION AND POVERTY 1

15 KASANGGA SA KAUNLARAN, INC. 1

16 BAGONG HENERASYON 1

17 ANG GALING PINOY 1

18 AGBIAG! TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. 1

19 PUWERSA NG BAYANing ATLETA 1

20 ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS 1

21 TRADE UNION CONGRESS PARTY 1

22 ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC. 1

23 DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT WORKERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC. 1

24 KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA 1

25 KALINGA-ADVOCACY FOR SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT AND NATION BUILDING THROUGH EASING 1

POVERTY, INC.

26 ALAGAD PARTY-LIST 1

27 UNA ANG PAMILYA FORMERLY ALLIANCE OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES 1

28 ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS 1

TOTAL SEATS 35
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution of
the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups listed above.7
Without waiting for the resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the petitioner filed the present Petition
for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.8 The petitioner asks that this
Court:
1. modify the Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC9 by making the
divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast minus the votes for the
disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list groups are
disqualified;
2. enjoin the public respondent Commission on Elections from proclaiming the remaining winning party-list
candidates until it modifies the interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC to the formula proposed by
the petitioner; and
3. issue a Temporary Restraining Order against the public respondent until it modifies the present formula for
computing the number of seats for the winning party-list candidates to the formula proposed by the petitioner.10This
Court did not issue any Temporary Restraining Order.11By Resolution, the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
the winning party-list groups with the following computation:12
WHEREAS, as of May 17, 2010, the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than thirty million two
hundred sixty[-]four thousand five hundred seventy[-]nine (30,264,579)given the following statistical data:
REGISTERED
DESCRIPTION
VOTERS

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 29,750,041

Less: Votes garnered by the eight (8) disqualified parties 308,335

Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated after deducting votes of the eight (8) disqualified parties 29,441,706
 Add: Party-list votes still uncanvassed Lanao del Sur 515,488

Local Absentee Voting 19,071

Overseas Absentee Voting 9,299

Due to lowering of threshold 92,740

Precincts reporting Final Testing and Sealing results 186,275

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 30,264,579

WHEREAS, since there are twohundred twenty-nine (229) legislative districts, the total number of party-list seats available for
the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections is fifty-seven (57) based on the following formula: number of
legislative districts/0.80 x 0.20;
WHEREAS, the provision of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 provides, in part, that:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two [sic] (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization or coalitions shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
WHEREAS, applying the formula in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
Commission on Elections, and [sic] Bayan Muna, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc., and Abono [v.]Commission on Elections, the ranking of the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from highest to lowest based on the number of votes garnered as of May 17, 2010, and the seats that may be
obtained by each party to complete the allocation of the available 57 party-list seats, are shown below:13
VOTES
(B) plus
GARNERED OVER GUARANTEED ADDITIONAL
(C), in
VOTES TOTAL VOTES SEAT First SEATS Second
RANK PARTY whole
GARNERED FOR PARTY LIST, Round Round
integers
in % (B) (C)
(D)
(A)

1 AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY 1,522,986 5.0322% 1 2.26 3

2 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF 1,292,182 4.2696% 1 1.92 2

SENIOR CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.

3 BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG 1,249,555 4.1288% 1 1.85 2

4 AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S ACTION 1,058,691 3.4981% 1 1.57 2

PARTY

5 GABRIELAWOMEN’S PARTY 1,001,421 3.3089% 1 1.48 2

6 COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK 943,529 3.1176% 1 1.40 2

PARTY

7 1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR 768,829 2.5404% 1 1.14 2

RURAL ENERGY

8 ABONO 766,615 2.5330% 1 1.13 2

9 BAYAN MUNA 746,019 2.4650% 1 1.10 2

10 AN WARAY 711,631 2.3514% 1 1.05 2

11 CITIZEN'S BATTLE AGAINST 647,483 2.1394% 1 0.96 1

CORRUPTION

12 ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER 614,725 2.0312% 1 0.91 1

 EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ACTION COOPERATION AND
HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

13 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ALLIANCE 515,501 1.7033% 0 1 1

SECTOR OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

14 BUTIL FARMERS PARTY 506,703 1.6742% 0 1 1

15 ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY 469,093 1.5500% 0 1 1

CONCERNS PARTY

16 ANAKPAWIS 445,628 1.4724% 0 1 1

17 KABATAAN PARTYLIST 417,923 1.3809% 0 1 1

18 LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, 417,600 1.3798% 0 1 1

INC.

19 ABANTE MINDANAO, INC. 376,011 1.2424% 0 1 1

20 ACT TEACHERS 369,564 1.2211% 0 1 1

21 ANG ASOSASYON SANG 357,009 1.1796% 0 1 1

MANGUNGUMA NGA BISAYA-
OWA MANGUNGUMA, INC.

22 YOU AGAINST CORRUPTION AND 335,635 1.1090% 0 1 1

POVERTY

23 ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE 313,359 1.0354% 0 1 1

ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

24 KASANGGA SA KAUNLARAN, INC. 296,368 0.9793% 0 1 1

25 BAGONG HENERASYON 292,875 0.9677% 0 1 1

26 ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND 292,057 0.9650% 0 1 1

DEMOCRACY

27 ANG GALING PINOY 269,009 0.8889% 0 1 1

28 AGBIAG! TIMBUYOG ILOCANO, 262,298 0.8667% 0 1 1

INC.

29 PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA 258,498 0.8541% 0 1 1

30 ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE 257,301 0.8502% 0 1 1

PROFESSIONALS

31 TRADE UNION CONGRESS PARTY 244,623 0.8083% 0 1 1

32 ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG 241,898 0.7993% 0 1 1

HALIGI NG AGHAM AT
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA
MAMAMAYAN, INC.

33 DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT 238,675 0.7886% 0 1 1

WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.

34 KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG 234,717 0.7756% 0 1 1

 NA WALANG SALA

35 KALINGA-ADVOCACY FOR SOCIAL 229,198 0.7573% 0 1 1

EMPOWERMENT AND NATION
BUILDING THROUGH EASING
POVERTY, INC.

36 ALAGAD PARTY-LIST 227,116 0.7504% 0 1 1

37 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON 220,002 0.7269% 0 1 1

38 UNA ANG PAMILYA FORMERLY 217,032 0.7171% 0 1 1

ALLIANCE OF NEO-
CONSERVATIVES

39 ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER 214,760 0.7096% 0 1 1

EDUCATORS

40 AANGAT TAYO 176,074 0.5818% 0 1 1

41 ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG 173,711 0.5740% 0 1 1

KOOPERATIBA

42 ANG LABAN NG INDIGONG 170,304 0.5627% 0 1 1

FILIPINO

43 ASSOCIATION OF LABORERS AND 167,654 0.5540% 0 1 1

EMPLOYEES

44 KASOSYO PRODUCER-CONSUMER 166,432 0.5499% 0 1 1

EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC.

45 ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY 163,164 0.5391% 0 1 1

DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION,
INC.

46 AKSYON MAGSASAKA PARTIDO 161,674 0.5342% 0 1 1

TINIG NG MASA

47 KATIPUNAN NG MGA ANAK NG 160,745 0.5311% 0 0 0

BAYAN ALL FILIPINO DEMOCRATIC
MOVEMENT

48 ANAK MINDANAO 157,733 0.5212% 0 0 0

49 VETERANS FREEDOM PARTY 154,183 0.5095% 0 0 0

50 ALLIANCE FOR RURAL 147,204 0.4864% 0 0 0

RECONSTRUCTION, INC.

51 ATONG PAGLAOM 145,435 0.4805% 0 0 0

52 PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR 143,151 0.4730% 0 0 0

COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH
ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE

53 ABANTE TRIBUNG MAKABANSA 142,013 0.4692% 0 0 0

54 ANGAT ATING KABUHAYAN 141,780 0.4685% 0 0 0

PILIPINAS, INC.
55 PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA 140,000 0.4626% 0 0 0

56 ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA 137,842 0.4555% 0 0 0

MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG-
BUKID AT MANGINGISDA

57 ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR 136,710 0.4517% 0 0 0

58 KAUNLARAN NG AGRIKULTURA 130,270 0.4304% 0 0 0

ASENSADONG PROBINSYA ANGAT
NG BAYAN

59 BARANGAY NATIN 126,462 0.4179% 0 0 0

60 1-AKO BABAENG ASTIG AASENSO 120,734 0.3989% 0 0 0

61 1GUARDIANS NATIONALIST OF 120,727 0.3989% 0 0 0

THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

62 BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN 117,299 0.3876% 0 0 0

63 BAGONG BAYAN NAGTATAGUYOD 115,428 0.3814% 0 0 0

SA DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOHIYA
AT LAYUNIN

64 AHON PINOY 115,197 0.3806% 0 0 0

65 ACTION FOR DYNAMIC 115,058 0.3802% 0 0 0

DEVELOPMENT, INC.

66 KATRIBU INDIGINOUS PEOPLES 114,891 0.3796% 0 0 0

SECTORAL PARTY

67 ANG LADLAD LBGT PARTY 113,187 0.3740% 0 0 0

68 CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK 110,759 0.3660% 0 0 0

SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATIONS, INC.

69 KABALIKAT NG MGA 109,739 0.3626% 0 0 0

MAMAMAYAN

70 ONE ADVOCACY FOR HEALTH, 109,682 0.3624% 0 0 0

PROGRESS AND OPPORTUNITY

71 BINHI; PARTIDO NG MGA 108,005 0.3569% 0 0 0

MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA
MAGSASAKA

72 1-AANI 107,970 0.3568% 0 0 0

73 AKAP BATA, INC. 107,154 0.3541% 0 0 0

74 ANG ASOSASYON NG MGA 107,135 0.3540% 0 0 0

TRABAHADOR AT PAHINANTE

75 AGILA NG MGA KATUTUBONG 105,009 0.3470% 0 0 0

PILIPINO, INC.
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that
were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were
disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation. The figure presented by petitioner resulted
from the following computations:14
37,377,371 (Number of voters who actually voted LESS votes
for disqualified party lists)

less 30,264,579 (Number of votes for party-list candidates LESS

number of votes for disqualified party-list candidates)

7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes

according to petitioner ARARO)
First, the total number of votes for disqualified party-lists is deducted from the total number of voters that actually voted. The
total number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is three hundred eight thousand three hundred thirty-five
(308,335). 15 The total number of voters that actually voted is thirty-seven million six hundred eighty-five thousand seven
hundred six (37,685,706).16 After subtracting the amounts, the result is thirty-seven million three hundred seventy-seven
thousand three hundred seventy-one (37,377,371)votes.
Second, the number of votes for disqualified party-list groups is again deducted from the number of votes for party-list
candidates which the petitioner pegged at thirty million five hundred seventy-two thousand nine hundred fourteen votes
(30,572,914).17 The difference then is thirty million two hundred sixty-four thousand five hundred seventy-nine (30,264,579)
votes.
Lastly, to get the total number of votes disregarded by the Commission on Elections’ interpretation, 30,264,579 is subtracted
from 37,377,371.The computation then results to seven million one hundred twelve thousand seven hundred ninety-two
(7,112,792) votes disregarded using the Commission on Elections’ interpretation.
On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers is the
following:
Number of seats available to
Number of seats
legislative districts
x .20 = available to party-list
representatives
.08
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:
229
x .20 = 57
.80
The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats,
where:
Number of votes of party-list
Proportion or
= Percentage of votes
Total number of votes for
garnered by party-list
party-list candidates
The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal to 2% or 0.02 to entitle a party-list
candidate to one (1) seat in the first round. There will be a second round if the total number of guaranteed seats awarded in
the first round is less than the total number of party-list seats available. Thus:
Proportion or
Total number of Number of seats
Percentage of Additional seats
party-list seats - allocated in first x =
votes garnered by awarded
available round
party-list
If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is computed by getting the sum of the
seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats awarded in the second round), the next in the party-list ranking will be
given one (1) seat each until all seats are fully distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning
groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded.
The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELECis flawed
because it is not in accordance with the law.19 The petitioner distinguishes the phrases, valid votes cast for party-list
candidates on the one hand as against votes cast for the party-list system on the other.
The petitioner puts in issue the interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No.7941 or "An Act Providing for the
Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The sections provide
the guidelines in allocating seats to party-list representatives:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-
list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.(Emphasis provided)
The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-list Law does not
distinguish between valid and invalid votes, to wit:
Therefore, votes for specific party lists are not the same as votes for the party-list system. Hence, people whose votes were
spoiled for instance (like checking or failure to properly shade the ovals in the ballots, or voted for two party lists when the
requirement is only one, or had erasures on their ballots for instance), or did not vote for any party-list at all are still voters for
the party-list system. The votes for the party-list system [include] all those people who voted whether their votes were counted
or not as long as the mechanism for the selection of party-list is in place.20 (Emphasis provided)
In its November 12, 2010 Comment,21 the Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position
that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on Elections argues that this will
contradict Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts that:
Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list
candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list system."24
The issues in this case are as follows:
I. Whether the case is already moot and academic
II. Whether petitioners have legal standing
III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula
used in BANAT v. COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
The third issue requires our determination of the computation of the correct divisor to be used. The options are:
A. All votes cast for the party-list system less the votes cast for subsequently disqualified party-list groups and votes
declared spoiled
B. The total votes cast
C. The total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups listed in the
ballot even if subsequently declared disqualified. The divisor should not include votes that are declared spoiled or
invalid.
We decide as follows:
I
This case is moot and academic. Mendoza v. Villas26 defines a moot and academic case:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground
of mootness.27
Several supervening events have already rendered this case moot and academic. First, the Commission on Elections En
Banc already proclaimed other winning party-list groups.28 Second, the term of office of the winning party-list groups in the
May 2010 national elections ended on June 30, 2013. Finally, the conduct of the May 13, 2013 elections resulted in a new set of
party-list groups.
We held that the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding Petition moot and academic. 29This
leaves any ruling on the issues raised by the petitioner with no practical or useful value.30
However, the following exceptions to the rule of declining jurisdiction over moot and academic cases are allowed: (1) there was
a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public
interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
(4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.31 On the importance of the assailed formula, this Court will discuss
the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review32 and for the guidance of the bench,
bar, and public.33
II
The petitioner is not the real party in interest
"A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit."34 The party’s interest must be direct, substantial, and material.35 In this case, the petitioner attacks the
validity of the formula used and upheld in BANAT. It also proposes its own interpretation of the formula to determine the
proportional representation of party-list candidates in the House of Representatives. However despite any new computation,
ARARO’s proposed divisor of total votes cast for the party-list system whether valid or invalid still fails to secure one seat for
ARARO. Reviewing the figures presented by the petitioner:36
With Divisor of total valid votes cast for With Divisor of votes cast for the party-list
party-list system minus votes cast for system as proposed by ARARO
disqualified party-lists or invalid votes (37,377,371)
(30,264,579)

Votes garnered 147,204 147,204

Votes garnered over 0.4864 0.3939

total votes cast for party-lists (%)

Guaranteed Seat 0 0
This table clearly shows that the petitioner does not suffer a direct, substantial or material injury from the application of the
formula interpreted and used in BANAT in proclaiming the winning party-lists in the assailed National Board of Canvassers
Resolution. The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law
for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the
argument in this Court.
III
However, we review the interpretation of the formula used for the determination of wining party-list candidates with respect
to the divisor used for the guidance of bench and bar and for future elections.
The textual references for determining the formula to be used are found in the Constitution and the statute interpreting the
relevant provisions.
Article VI, Section 5,paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1987 Constitution provide the following:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941,thus, provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-
list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
 shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.(Emphasis provided)
In Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,37 we reversed the Commission on Elections’ ruling that the respondent
parties, coalitions, and organizations were each entitled to a party-list seat despite their failure to reach the 2% threshold in the
1998 party-list election. Veterans also stated that the 20% requirement in the Constitution is merely a ceiling.
Veterans laid down the "four inviolable parameters" in determining the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election based on
a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941:
First, the twenty percent allocation-the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold-only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit-each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation-the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."38 (Emphasis provided)
In Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. COMELEC,39 the petitioning party-list groups sought the
immediate proclamation by the Commission on Elections of their respective second nominee, claiming that they were entitled
to one (1) additional seat each in the House of Representatives. We held that the correct formula to be used is the one used in
Veterans and reiterated it in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.40 This Court in CIBAC v.
COMELEC41 differentiates the formula used in Ang Bagong Bayani but upholds the validity of the Veterans formula.
In BANAT v. COMELEC,42 we declared the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as void. We said in
that case that:
x x x The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives." (Republic Act No. 7941, Section 2)
xxxx
x x x There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next
in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of
seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled.43
The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC44 does not in any way modify the formula set in Veterans. It only corrects the
definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed that party-list groups maybe national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. We abandoned the requirement introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list groups should prove that
they represent a "marginalized" or "under-represented" sector.
Proportional representation is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941.45 BANAT overturned Veterans’ interpretation of
the phrase in proportion to their total number of votes. We clarified that the interpretation that only those that obtained at
least 2% of the votes may get additional seats will not result in proportional representation because it will make it impossible
for the party-list seats to be filled completely. As demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share may never be filled if the 2% threshold
is maintained.
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of representation of party-list groups as intended by the law. This
is part of the index of proportionality of the representation of a party-list to the House of Representatives.46It measures the
relation between the share of the total seats and the share of the total votes of the party-list.47 In Veterans, where the 20%
requirement in the Constitution was treated only as a ceiling, the mandate for proportional representation was not achieved,
and thus, was held void by this Court.
The petitioner now argues that the votes of all the registered voters who actually voted in the May 2010 elections should be
included in the computation of the divisor whether valid or invalid.48 According to the petitioner, votes cast for the party-list
candidates is not the same as the votes cast under or for the party-list system. Specifically, it said that: The party list system is
not just for the specific party lists as provided in the ballot, but pertains to the system of selection of the party list to be part of
the House of Representatives.49 The petitioner claims that there should be no distinction in law between valid and invalid votes.
Invalid votes include those votes that were made for disqualified party-list groups, votes that were spoiled due to improper
shading, erasures in the ballots, and even those that did not vote for any party-list candidate at all.50 All of the votes should be
included in the divisor to determine the 2% threshold.
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable
to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot
but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who
voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale,
party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not
be included in the divisor.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the argument of the petitioner, Section 11(b) of
Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the
percentage of representation:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. (Emphasisprovided)
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the denominator, may be votes that
were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following: improper shading or having no shade at all;51existence of stray or
ambiguous marks;52 tears in the ballot; and/or ballots rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the
paper-based53automated election system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to
the voter’s action.
Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for party-list groups contained in the ballot even if
subsequently they are disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts. Thus, the content of the divisor in the
formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list component of the House of Representatives should be amended
accordingly.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the total votes cast for the party-list system.
This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as not to disenfranchise a substantial portion of the electorate, total votes
cast for the party-list system should mean all the votes validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on
the ballot when making his or her choices.
To the voter, the listing of candidates in the official ballot represents the extent of his or her choices for an electoral exercise.
He or she is entitled to the expectation that these names have properly been vetted by the Commission on Elections. Therefore,
he or she is also by right entitled to the expectation that his or her choice based on the listed names in the ballot will be
counted.
In Reyes v.COMELEC54 as cited in Loreto v. Brion,55 this Court said "that the votes cast for the disqualified candidate are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified."56 Therefore, the votes cast for disqualified candidates are
presumed to be made with a sincere belief that the voters’ choices were qualified candidates and that they were without any
intention to misapply their franchise.57 Their votes may not be treated as stray, void or meaningless58for purposes of the
divisor in the party-list elections. Assuming arguendo that petitions for certiorari do not stay the execution of the judgment or
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,59 the finality of the disqualification of a candidate should not be a means for
the disenfranchisement of the votes cast for the party-list system.
Section 10 of the Party-list Law should thus be read in conjunction with the intention of the law as seen in Section 2, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis provided)
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7941, which governs party-list elections, states that votes cast for a party-list "not entitled to be
voted for shall not be counted." It does not specify any reckoning period of the finding of disqualification or cancellation of
registration for the validity or the invalidity of votes unlike that in Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by
Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646.60 Taking Sections 2 and 10 together, this Court must consider the intention of the law and the
nature of Philippine style party-list elections. Party-list groups provide for a different and special representation in Congress. To
disregard votes of party-list groups disqualified after the conduct of the elections means the disenfranchisement of thousands,
if not hundreds of thousands of votes, of the Filipino people. Definitely, it is not the voter’s fault that the party-list group in the
ballot it votes for will be subsequently disqualified. The voter should not be penalized.
The counting of votes for party-list groups in the ballot but subsequently declared as disqualified is, thus, corollary to the
"fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern
them."61 It is also part of the right of suffrage, and the law’s intention to ensure a more representative Congress should be
given priority.
Therefore, the divisor should now include all votes cast for party-list groups that are subsequently disqualified for so long as
they were presented as a choice to the electorate.
If his or her vote is not counted as part of the divisor, then this would amount to a disenfranchisement of a basic constitutional
right to be able to choose representatives of the House of Representatives in two ways. First, his or her vote will be nullified.
Second, he or she will be deprived of choosing another party-list group to represent his or her interest should the party listed in
the ballot be declared disqualified.
However, there are instances when the Commission on Elections include the name of the party-list group in the ballot but such
group is disqualified with finality prior to the elections. In applying and interpreting the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646,we said in Cayat v. Commission on Elections62 that votes cast in favor of a candidate "disqualified with finality" should
be considered stray and not be counted. To be consistent, the party-list group in the ballot that has been disqualified with
finality and whose final disqualification was made known to the electorate by the Commission on Elections should also not be
included in the divisor. This is to accord weight to the disqualification as well as accord respect to the inherent right of suffrage
of the voters.
Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group would now henceforth be:
Number of votes of party-list
Proportion or Percentage of
=
votes garnered by party-list
Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of
the pendency of their motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or
disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose disqualification attained finality prior to the
elections should be excluded if the electorate is notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections.
The divisor also shall not include invalid votes.
WHEREFORE from the above discussion:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified party-list groups is denied for
being moot and academic;
2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v.
COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered
by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups whose
names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification
attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections
to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are
declared spoiled or invalid.
The refined formula shall apply prospectively to succeeding party-list elections from the date of finality of this case.
SO ORDERED.

7. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST 2013 Not every misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations would merit the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation
must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record is no longer
required pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum

EN BANC
G.R. No. 206952 October 22, 2013
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by (Abang Lingkod Party-List
ABANG LINGKOD) assailing the Resolution1 dated May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections COMELEC) En Bane in
SPP No. 12-238 PLM}, which, alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group.
The Facts
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and was registered
under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of
votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. On
August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,2 which, inter alia required previously registered party-list groups that
have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their
continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.4
Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary evidentiary hearing of previously
registered party-list groups. The COMELEC scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 -for the summary
hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its continuing qualification under the party-
list system.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the COMELEC
pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration
as a party list group. The COMELEC En Bane pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the
cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted
after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are
themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition5 for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by
fifty-one (51) other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list
system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from this Court.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections,6 laid down new parameters to be observed by
the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list
system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in
party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate
in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority
of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to
their respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including that of ABANG
LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by
the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution,7 which, inter alia affirmed the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary
evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the COMELEC held that:
The Commission maintains its position in the previous en bane ruling cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD. To
reiterate, it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. It is but reasonable to require from groups and organizations consistent
participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent, and not just seasonal and sporadic programs which are unrelated
to its sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical Mission on 11 November 2010, Disaster
Management Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1 December 2011.
And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to have been edited to show in the banners that ABANG
LINGKOD participated in the activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed on some banners to feign
participation in the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition.
Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground
that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD s registration.8
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC s Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on
May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the
instant petition9 with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its
motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the
COMELEC.
In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the
cancellation of its registration sans a summary evidentiary hearing for that purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should have
allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It claims that there
was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it complied with the six-point parameters
m screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum.
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. It asserts that
ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its registration since it was given
every reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled
ABANG LINGKOD’s registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may not be passed upon by this Court as the same is
supported by substantial evidence.
The Issues
In sum, the issues presented for the Court s resolution are the following: first whether ABANG LINGKOD was denied due
process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its registration under the patiy-list system sans any summary
evidentiary hearing; and second whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Due Process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.10
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded
ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified
through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its
Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A.
No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG
LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD’s Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish
its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary
evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD s qualification under the party-list system pursuant to
Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD’s claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a
summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new
parameters for screening party-list groups. The dispositive portion of Atong Paglaum reads:
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but
without mandatory injunction to include the names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under
the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41
petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list
system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The
Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were remanded to the COMELEC so that it
may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted by the former, whether they are qualified to participate in the party-list
system pursuant to the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Court did not require the COMELEC to conduct a
hearing de novo in reassessing the qualifications of said party-list groups. Nevertheless, the Court gave the COMELEC the option
to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing should it deem appropriate to do so.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 12
Second Issue: Cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD’s Registration
However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the new parameters in screening party-
list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared untruthful statement
in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally
altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence
showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present evidence showing
that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance.13 As a requirement
imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual
activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-
list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals. (Emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof of their track record as a
group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia track
record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented, thus:
xxx
In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political pat1y, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Secdon 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate
that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. (Emphasis ours)
Track record is not the same as the submission or presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC," which are but mere pieces
of documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said documentary evidence
presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seek to achieve.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track record has certain consequences in a
group's bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the
party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified
petitions their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant
information as may be required by the COMELEC."
In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under the party-
list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list
system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors
stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-list elections are still required to present
a track record, viz:
x x x In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
xxxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies'' include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce
evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually
belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
Dissenting, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or organizations intending to register
under the party-list system are still required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong
Paglaum that the track record that would have to be presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization.
He opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or
regional parties or organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization.
To submit to the dissent's insistence on varying track records, which are required of those intending to register under the party-
list system, depending on the nature of their group, would result into an absurd and unjust situation. Under the varying track
record requirement, sectoral organizations must present evidence showing their track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented, i.e. actual activities conducted by them to further uplift the cause of the sector/s they represent. On the
other hand, national and regional parties or organizations need only prove that they exist as bona fide organizations which, as
the dissent suggests, may be done through the submission of their constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC.
However, submission of a group's constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information required by the COMELEC, as explained earlier, is not synonymous with the track record requirement. In
such case, only sectoral organizations would be required to present a track record (actual activities conducted by them to
further the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented); while national and regional organizations need not present their
track record as they are only required to submit documentary evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations.
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or organizations as regards
their bid for registration under the party-list system. The varying track record requirement suggested by the dissent would
unnecessarily put a premium on groups intending to register as national and regional parties or organizations as against those
intending to register as sectoral organizations The imposition of an additional burden on sectoral organizations, i.e. submission
of their track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters the marginalized and underrepresented sectors from
organizing themselves under the party-list system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in ng Bagong Bayani in tong Paglaum does not mean that groups
intending to register under the party-list system are still required to submit a track record. The track record of groups intending
to register under the party-list system was required under the first guideline of Ang Bagong Bayani for a very specific purpose to
show that the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that would be allowed to participate in the party-list
elections are truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors It was necessary-then to require groups
seeking registration under the party-list system since representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, as understood
in the context of Ang Bagong Bayani is easy to claim and feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system to submit evidence showing
their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum not all groups are required to represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any incentive in merely feigning representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the marginalized and underrepresented, they
are likewise not required to show a track record since there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional party or organization. Thus, the Court, in
Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of registration under the party-list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of
sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-list system
still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into its qualification as a party-list group
since it seriously puts in question the existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a group per se and the genuineness of its representation
of the farmers and fisherfolk.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD s registration solely on the ground of the lack of its track
record -that it falsely represented, by submitting digitally altered photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. The existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group per se
and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were never raised in the proceedings before the
COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice in the Court, in this certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy of
ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the
cancellation of its registration, when the issue is limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in fact it participated in the May 2010
party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient number of votes in the May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in
the House of Representatives. These are circumstances, which clearly indicate that ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate
party-list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May 13, 2013 elections, was able
to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722 131 votes that were cast for the party-list,14thus entitling it to a seat in the
House of Representatives. This is indicative of the fact that a considerable portion of the electorate considers ABANG LINGKOD
as truly representative of peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and medical missions, which are activities
it conducted. Suffice it to state, however, that said activities do not specifically or directly pertain to the interest or advocacy
espoused by ABANG LINGKOD. As such, the misrepresentation committed by ABANG LINGKOD with regard to said activities
would not necessarily militate against its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG LINGKOD in connection with its bid for
continued registration under the party-list system. That ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track record, submitted photographs
that were edited to make it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the sectors it represents is a
factual finding by the COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is supported by substantial evidence, will not disturb. The
Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD s resort to chicanery and its shabby treatment of the requirements for registration
under the party-list system.
Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as to its track record
cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration -it is no longer material to its qualification under the party-list
system. In this case, ABANG LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be considered material to its
qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in part, reads:
Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other document pertinent to the registration
and/or accreditation under the party-list system, as a ground for the refusal or cancellation of registration under Section 6(6) of
R.A. No. 7941, is akin to material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy filed by an individual candidate under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Both provisions disallow prospective candidates from participating in an election for declaring
false statements in their eligibility requirements. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Elucidating on what constitutes material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the Court, in Lluz v. Commission on Elections,15 explained that:
From these two cases several conclusions follow. First a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it
refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate s eligibility. x x x Third a misrepresentation of a non-
material fact, or a non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate s certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or canceled by the
COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by the candidate. 16 (Emphasis ours)
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,17 the Court further clarified that a false representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Thus:
The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention must necessarily pertain to a material
fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies
a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate s qualification for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a
requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the
candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he is running.
Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.18 (Citation omitted and
emphasis ours)
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, in order to
be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of
the party, organization or coalition under the party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a
group, there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group
disqualified from participating in the party-list elections.
The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its continuing qualification under R.A. No.
7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already discussed, is no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum Simply put, they do not affect the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and, hence,
could not be used as a ground to cancel its registration under the party-list system. Further, the Court notes that the COMELEC,
in its Resolution dated November 7 2012, asserted that ABANG LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would show the track
record of its five nominees, composed of a non-government organization worker, an employee and three farmers, in uplifting
the cause of the sector that the group represents.1âwphi1 The COMELEC opined that the failure of ABANG LINGKOD to present
a track record of its nominees justified the cancellation of its registration as a party-list group.
The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as opined by the COMELEC, indeed do
not have track records showing their participation in activities aimed at improving the conditions of the sector that the group
represents, the same would not affect the registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out that [t]he nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
'marginalized and underrepresented,' or that represent those who lack 'well-defined political constituencies,' either must
belong to their respective sectors or must have a track record o advocacy for their respective sectors. Stated otherwise, the
nominee of a party-list groups may either be: first one who actually belongs to the sector which the party-list group represents,
in which case the track record requirement does not apply; or second one who does not actually belong to the sector which the
party-list group represents but has a track record showing the nominee's active participation in activities aimed at uplifting the
cause of the sector which the group represents."
In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus, are not required to
present a track record showing their active participation in activities aimed to promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD
represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not actually belong to the sector it
represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is
clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in tong Paglaum which states that "national, regional and sectoral
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation.
Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party-list group should not automatically result in the
disqualification of the group.1avvphi1 Otherwise it would accord the nominees the same significance, which the law holds for
the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to consider.
The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any
way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect. The party-list group must be treated as separate and
distinct from its nominees such that qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of
the former.
In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion derived from a
simplistic reading of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in tong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would merit the denial or cancellation
of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In
this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record
notwithstanding that a group s track record is no longer required pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum
Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding that it was able to obtain sufficient
number of votes for a legislative seat, would serve no purpose other than to subvert the will of the electorate who voted to give
ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to represent them in the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 10, 2013
issued by the Commission on Elections in SPP Case No. 12-238 (PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD
s registration and disallowed it to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one of the winning party-list groups during
the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered
during the said elections.
SO ORDERED.

8. ATONG PAGLAUM PARTY LIST (2013)

EN BANC
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L.
Agustin, the party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D.
Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG
NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General,
Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204321
ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul
Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358
ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B.
Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO
BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as
Commissioners thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q.
Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204408
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein
by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE
CHAIR AND MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as
COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204484
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and
organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27
November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC

Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

Resolution dated 23 November 20128

1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not

(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and

(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
 Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.

3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its

(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to

(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show

Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a

(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7 204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the

12-165 Party (AI) party represents a
(PLM) marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the

Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations of sectors; - The sectors of homeowners’
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
 Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations

Resolution dated 7 November 201215

9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track

Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

10 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an

(KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove

Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the

(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
 underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB
was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record
as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and
PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine
whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang
Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-
list elections:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1 203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and

(PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
 the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration

(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration

(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party’s track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration

(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng - Failure to show that
Masa (AKMA-PTM) majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration

(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration

(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
 Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration

(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration

(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
 - The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and

(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
 not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration

(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system; and
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration

(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and

(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
 underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party’s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona fide
members.

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
 Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party’s nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.

Resolution dated 3 December 201246

37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation

(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party’s nominees do not
 belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration

204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-
CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD,
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI,
BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued
Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo
Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)

204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

(PLM)

203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(PLM) (APEC)

203960 12-260 1st

(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)

203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(PLM) (ANAD)

204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(PLM) (COCOFED)

204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(PLM) (ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

(PLM)

204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(PLM) (UNIMAD)

204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

(PLM)

204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)

204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

(PLM) LINGKOD)

204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

(PLM)

204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

(PLM)

204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and

(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

(PLM)

204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

(PLM)

204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

(PLM)

204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)

204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

(PLM)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor

(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

(PLM)

204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

(PLM)

204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

(PLM)

204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(PLM) (1AAAP)

204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

(PLM)

204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)

204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

12-165
(PLM)

204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-
list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Court’s Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in
this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or
her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read
in light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute
the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely
cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly
would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors
cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar
groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this
Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these
nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which
went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because
when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who
comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called
"hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person
to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect,
giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system.
Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party
or a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially,
under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of
his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish
to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been
registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national
party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to
be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the
votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in
favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we
have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the
parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet
the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one
gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets
2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of
these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that
has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor
groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are
not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they should band
together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure that those
who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly.
These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able
to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if
we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in
each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we refer to
sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors because
the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and
we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number
of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are
we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party
list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the
Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass
on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties,
are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention
of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin
ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to
register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer?
Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation. My
question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along a specific
sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of
such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral
organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other
words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as
long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice
Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two
staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in
Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in
delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent
enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that
pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in the lion's den,
so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this
concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically
lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards
a compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was
further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which
would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and
in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the
Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and
brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of
seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt whatsoever
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district
elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in
legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for
both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-
sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and
regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at
the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was
never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is
composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1)
leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress
after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list
representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open
after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the
Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
 (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a
political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to
an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from
the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system
is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them
from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A
political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement
in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition
"marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties
in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or regional
parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice
and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of
Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become
members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941
do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing
provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party
either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is
sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the
youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins
of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where
those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their
own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that
do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list
system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of
Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list
system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong
Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang
Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political
parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating
in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus,
major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the
1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized
and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage
them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards
the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political
party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government,
officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941,
which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections)
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification
only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term.1âwphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case
of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track
record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid
down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially
excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong
Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through their
sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against
the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity
in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following
prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats,
reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the
Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either
must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria:
(1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors,
and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees
of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic
or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-
write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but
without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission
on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions,
which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to
the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on
Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.